

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE 1970

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Editor of the Arab World Section: GEORGE K. NASRALLAH

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INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1970

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PREFACE

This is the fourth annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine*, published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University. The purpose of the series is to record the attitudes and policies of the international community—including Israel and the Arab World—towards the Palestine question. The collection is divided into three sections: International (which includes Israel), United Nations and Arab World.

The contents of the International and Arab World sections have been selected from among policy statements issued by governments and significant political organizations, speeches and statements made by political leaders and government officials, parliamentary debates, official diplomatic messages, joint communiqués, and resolutions of conferences and congresses. In order better to represent important currents of opinion on Palestine, the volume also contains, particularly in the case of the Great Powers, Israel and the Arab World, statements by leading groups and other representatives of considerable bodies of opinion. Similarly, in the case of countries where press media are used to voice official policy—and here the Soviet Union and China are prime examples—some editorial articles and commentaries have been included.

The collection is by necessity selective and for no country has exhaustive coverage of all relevant statements been attempted. The incidence of documents in the International section is naturally higher for the Great Powers and for countries politically or geographically close to the Middle East. In this sense, representation in this collection is a rough index of the interest displayed by different areas of the world in the events of this region. Special attention was paid this year, however, to broadening the coverage by surveying more comprehensively the policies of smaller powers as well as of international and regional organizations.

The United Nations section follows as closely as possible the divisions of the international organization. Speeches by Heads of State and Delegations have been omitted due to lack of space. Instead, however, major parts of the *Report of the Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories* and the *Report of the Special Working Group Established by the Commission on Human Rights* have been included.

The Arab World section, selected, as in the past, from the comprehensive documentary collection published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies, *Arab Political Documents on Palestine*, contains documents relating to events such as the Jordan Civil War, the conflict in Lebanon and the death of President Nasser as well as major policy statements and other documents issued by Arab governments and political parties, and the Palestinian resistance organizations.

The documents are arranged chronologically within each section, and there is a name and subject index at the end of the volume. In the case of documents of which only the part or parts of the text related to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict have been reproduced, this is indicated either in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the addition of the word *Excerpt/s* after the title of the document. In some Arab World documents material that, though relating to the Palestine question, is inconsequential or repetitive has been omitted; these deletions too have been indicated as described above.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts which appear in their original, untranslated version. In documents translated from Arabic, names already familiar to the reader appear as they are generally printed in the English language press; others are transliterated according to a system which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

The Institute for Palestine Studies expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute further expresses its gratitude to Dr. George J. Tomeh, former Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic at the United Nations and presently General Consultant at the Institute for Palestine Studies, for his valuable assistance in the compilation of the United Nations section, as well as in the organization of that section.

Thanks are also extended to the Library of the American University of Beirut and to its staff and to the United Nations Information Center in Beirut and especially to its librarian, Margaret Husn, for her kind assistance.

The English language editor of the book was Dr. Jill Khadduri. Arabic to English translations were done by Meric Dobson. The typing of the manuscript was done by Rosanna Prince and Ghorra Frangieh and the major part of the proof-reading by Rosanna Prince. Technical advice on lay-out and proof-reading was provided by Suha Tuqan. The index was prepared by Eileen Olmsted.

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<i>AAUG Newsletter</i>	Washington, D.C.	Irregular
<i>ABC</i>	Madrid	Daily
<i>Action</i>	New York	Weekly
<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	Weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	Daily
<i>al-Ahwar</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>al-Alam</i>	Rabat	Daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	Daily
<i>al-Anba</i> ²	Rabat	Daily
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i>	Damascus	Monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	Bi-weekly
<i>Arab World</i>	New York	Bi-monthly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	Weekly
<i>BBC Summary of World Broadcasts</i>	London	Daily
<i>The Bulletin</i>	Bonn	Weekly
<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i>	Ottawa	Irregular
<i>Canada Reference Papers</i>	Ottawa	Irregular
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D.C.	Daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i>	Columbus, Ohio	Weekly
<i>Current Notes on International Affairs</i>	Canberra	Monthly
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D.C.	Weekly
<i>Disisleri Bakanligi Belleteni</i>	Ankara	Monthly
<i>Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy</i>	Stockholm	Annual
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	Daily
<i>External Affairs</i>	Ottawa	Monthly
<i>Fateh</i>	Amman, Damascus	Daily
<i>Filastin</i>	Beirut	Monthly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Washington, D.C.	Quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i>	Berlin	Three times a month
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	Monthly

<i>Free Palestine</i>	Washington, D.C.	Monthly
<i>al-Hadaf</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>Hansard's Parliamentary Debates</i>	London	Daily
<i>al-Haqiqah</i>	Bengazi	Daily
<i>al-Hayat</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>al-Hurriya</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>I.F. Stone's Bi-Weekly</i>	Washington, D.C.	Bi-weekly
<i>Ila al-Amam</i>	Beirut	Weekly
<i>Information Bulletin (MAKI)</i>	Tel-Aviv	Monthly
<i>International Affairs</i>	Moscow	Monthly
<i>International Committee of the Red Cross Annual Report</i>	Geneva	Annual
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	Daily
<i>Israel Digest</i>	Jerusalem	Bi-weekly
<i>Israel Government Yearbook</i>	Jerusalem	Annual
<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	Daily
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	Weekly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	Weekly
<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>	Paris	Monthly
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bristol	Weekly
<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel-Aviv	Quarterly
<i>Mizan Supplement A</i>	London	Bi-monthly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	Daily
<i>Moscow News</i>	Moscow	Weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Nashrat Jami'at al-Duwal al-Arabiya</i>	Cairo	Irregular
<i>National News Agency Bulletin</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Near East Report</i>	Washington, D.C.	Bi-weekly (weekly after November 1970)
<i>New Middle East</i>	London	Monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	Weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	Daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i>	Wellington	Monthly
<i>Newsweek (international edition)</i>	New York	Weekly
<i>al-Nida</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Notes et études documentaires</i>	Paris	Irregular

<i>Official Gazette: Yalkut Ha-Pirsumin</i>	Jerusalem	Irregular
<i>Pakistan Documents Series</i>	Washington, D.C.	Monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	Weekly
<i>Politique étrangère de la France</i>	Paris	Twice a year
<i>Problèmes politiques et sociaux</i>	Paris	Weekly
<i>al-Quds</i>	Jerusalem	Daily
<i>al-Raya</i>	Beirut	Daily
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	Bi-weekly
<i>al-Riyadh</i>	Riyad	Daily
<i>Sawt Filastin</i>	Damascus	Monthly
<i>al-Sha'b</i>	Algiers	Daily
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	Daily
<i>Soviet News</i>	London	Weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	Weekly
<i>La Stampa</i>	Turin	Daily
<i>Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs</i>	London	Bi-weekly
<i>Survival</i>	London	Monthly
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	Daily
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Damascus	Daily
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Tripoli	Daily
<i>al-Thawra al-Filastiniya</i>	Amman	Monthly
<i>Time</i>	New York	Weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	Daily
<i>U.N. Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	Monthly
<i>World Marxist Review Information Bulletin</i>	Ontario	Monthly
<i>Yugoslav Survey</i>	Belgrade	Quarterly

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International

Radio Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on Israeli-French Relations¹

January 3, 1970

Q. Mr. Eban, the world's press has been enthralled this week by the saga of the five gunboats. What is your view on Israel's stand on this affair?

A. Now, it is quite clear to me that at no stage whatever was there any violation of French law. That, I think, is the essential fact. For that reason, as we said in our statements yesterday, there is no justification for any criticisms by the French Government or for any measures such as those taken through the request for Aluf Limon to leave France. We are not in any position of moral or political or juridical defence; in fact, if we examine the root of the question, what is open to legitimate criticism is the embargo policy itself.

Q. Mr. Eban, there has been a degree of normalisation in the relations between Israel and France in the months that preceded this affair. Do you think this might now lead to some degree of deterioration?

A. I can't possibly deny that there has been an interruption of a process which even before that was not sufficiently rapid or intense for our own satisfaction, but we had begun the dialogue on certain matters—first of all, chronologically, Israel's place within the European complex; second, the need to modify the embargo policy, the problem of items outside the special case of the Mirage aircraft, and then the Mirage aircraft themselves. As I just said, we had not reached satisfactory conclusions, but there was a discussion. If there is an interruption in the dialogue and in the practical results that we hoped for from the dialogue, I hope that it will be brief. Our main concern now is not the five vessels, but the continuing

¹ Excerpted from Eban's interview, "This Week" program on Israeli Radio in English; reprinted by permission from BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3271/A/2.

attempt to get Franco-Israel relations back to the atmosphere and content which used to characterise them and which ought to characterise them now.

Statement by Deputy Leader of U.K. Labour Party Brown to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.A.R. National Assembly (Excerpts)²

Cairo, January 4, 1970

The four powers, and I mean all the four powers, are searching for a settlement of the whole problem. None are suggesting that separate or piecemeal settlements are possible.

The details of the proposals are inseparable parts of a whole, and contingent on each other. In short, both parties have to accept all the proposals before any of them becomes a commitment. This is the answer to all those who say they cannot afford to consider this or that concession.

[In my Middle East travels] I have found many people, more perhaps than you realize, looking to your country for a lead. May I suggest, in all sincerity, that your responsibility in the search for a settlement is that much greater?

[As to Britain's position], I have never said we are on the side of the Arabs. Nor would you want me to make such a patronizing statement. I am on the side of Britain, and where British and Arab interests coincide we work together.

We still have interests in the Middle East—very large interests. We intend to cultivate

² *The Times*, January 5, 1970, p. 5.

them—who does not? But I believe very sincerely that they are no longer interests which conflict in any way whatever with the economic interests or the political and social aspirations of the people of the area. On the contrary, I am certain that they harmonize.

Within the next two years British policy towards the Middle East will take a further step forward, indeed reach its culmination, in the withdrawal of our forces from the Gulf.

3

Commentary on U.S. Proposals for a Middle East Settlement in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda (Excerpt)¹

Moscow, January 14, 1970

In the American proposals for a settlement between the U.A.R. and Israel and one between Jordan and Israel, the U.N. Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, is "corrected" time and again. As is known, the most important provision of this resolution is the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied at the time of the 1967 conflict. The American proposals are clearly at variance with this demand. Instead, they all but proclaim the aggressor's "right" to decide the fate of the lands he has seized. In particular, this is what the U.S.A. proposes be done on the question of the future of the Gaza Strip. This area, according to the 1949 truce agreement, came under the administrative control of the U.A.R. Under the American proposals, its "fate" is to be

decided during negotiations with the participation of Israel, which has no right whatever to do this.

The U.S. proposals have proved bankrupt with respect to the main question of a settlement—ensuring the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation troops from the Arab lands. Disclosing the real meaning and purpose of these proposals by quoting American official circles (what better sources could there be!), The Washington Post wrote: "These circles declare that the Americans have no intention at all of seeking the withdrawal of Israeli troops to any new borders whatsoever unless Arab-Israeli negotiations are held." The formula of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries in conditions of the continued occupation of Arab lands is essentially tantamount to an attempt to place the aggressor and the states who were the victims of aggression on the same plane. This approach is rejected by the Arabs, and rightly so. Hence, the idea of "direct negotiations" that Israel is insisting upon is unrealistic, and the representatives of the U.S.A. know this very well. By insisting on something that is clearly unrealistic, Washington evidently wants to distract attention from the necessity of taking effective steps capable of extricating the Near East from more than two years of serious crisis.

Furthermore, Washington's face cannot be saved by the proposal to hold Arab-Israeli negotiations on the basis of the so-called "Rhodes formula." As is known, an Egyptian-Israeli truce agreement was signed on the island of Rhodes in 1949. Agreement was reached on its text through the mediation of U.N. representatives, who were in constant contact with the Arab and Israeli delegations. But the meaning that is in fact being read into this formula now is evident from the statement of the Israeli representatives, who allege that "direct" negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries were held on the island of Rhodes. And now, after this "Israeli interpretation," the U.S.A. is again dragging out the so-called "Rhodes formula" as one of the main questions.

The American press writes that the U.S.

¹English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 2 (February 11, 1970), pp. 15-16. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

proposals contain certain points about the Palestinian refugees. But here too the United States is playing a propaganda game. If it really were in favor of the resolution of this acute question in the Near East, it would have to do very little—first of all, it would have to make Israel fulfill the existing United Nations resolutions on the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees or the payment of material compensation for the property of the Palestinian Arabs who were driven from their homes but are unwilling to return.

Judging from the detailed exposition of the American plan in the pages of the New York press, the plan's center of gravity has obviously shifted from an attempt to work out a formula agreed upon among the four powers for implementing the U.N. Security Council's resolution so as to facilitate the Jarring mission to the purely formal resumption of that mission. The Jarring mission, which the Swedish diplomat has been carrying out for two years now at the request of the U.N. Secretary General, has definite positive significance. When he was making contacts, Jarring was able to ascertain the positions of the parties. But this stage lies behind. Further efforts are called for. If an agreed-upon position could be worked out for implementing the well-known Security Council resolution, it would then become possible to focus attention on the achievement by the parties to the conflict of an understanding on the basis of this agreed-upon position.

As is evident, the aim of the American proposals comes down to something else—the U.S.A. would like to reach an understanding mainly on those questions that are advantageous to Israel. Are not certain circles in the U.S.A. seeking thereby to torpedo the possibility of reaching agreement not on neutral formulations but on the essence of the concrete principles of implementing the Security Council's resolution on the liquidation of the Near East crisis?

An analysis of the American proposals leads to the conclusion that they are one-sided and distinctly pro-Israeli in nature. Moreover, in some provisions the U.S.A.

has even altered its position, again in a pro-Israeli direction as compared with the position previously taken. Despite this, a show of "dissatisfaction" was staged in Tel Aviv. The performers in this show evidently wanted to play an accompaniment to the U.S.A. in the latter's attempts to present its proposals as "pro-Arab."

The situation that is shaping up in the Near East dictates the taking of urgent measures. Every day Israel makes aggressive sallies against the U.A.R., Jordan, Syria or Lebanon. The extensive maneuvers that Tel Aviv conducted recently in the Sinai Peninsula indicate the existence of plans for the resumption of Israel military operations against the Arab states on a broad scale. In such conditions, it is necessary to mobilize all efforts to extricate the Near East from this dangerous state of affairs, which threatens a new explosion. It is necessary to establish a just and lasting peace in this area.

The attempts of Western propagandists to pretend that the position of the Arabs obstructs a political settlement are in vain. Cairo has repeatedly declared its readiness to implement the U.N. Security Council resolution. The analogous position of some of the other Arab states is well known. The policy of the Israeli ruling circles is the factor that is blocking a settlement. In its intransigence, which in a historical sense is fraught with the gravest consequences for the Israeli people, Tel Aviv is making wide use of the support of the U.S.A.

For several months the Soviet Union has been taking part in the meetings of the four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council on the Near East, as well as in bilateral contacts. Obviously, the continued efforts of the four great powers must have as their goal finding the best way for the practical implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967. This is the main thing.

4

Statement to the Knesset on French Middle East Policy by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel (Excerpts)¹

Jerusalem, January 14, 1970

The government of France is following in the Near East a policy characterized by a total lack of moral conscience, of respect for international law or of concern for peace.

Not only Israel, but French opinion and international opinion ask where France is going, if she persists in this policy.

The fact that France is aiding the Soviet Union to arm the Arabs could upset the balance of power in the Near East. Her position is totally different from that of Great Britain, which continues to respect its commitments to Israel and which has refused to sell Israel only one type of weapon: the Chieftain tank. This French attitude reinforces our right to a positive United States response to our requests for arms inasmuch as Washington knows how important it is to preserve the balance of power in the Near East.

The French embargo on arms to Israel was not a consequence of the Six Day War. It was in fact decreed on June 2, 1967, that is, before the outbreak of war.

History will show that the Six Day War itself was one of the results of this embargo and of the policy which the French government began to pursue in the month of May 1967, while our country was threatened from all sides by the Arab states who were openly proclaiming their will to destroy it.

Mr. Maurice Schumann assured our ambassador, Mr. Walter Eytan, in the course

of their interview last November that, if Israel cancelled its contract for the fifty Mirages and took back the money paid down, he could guarantee Israel that these airplanes would not be sold to the Arab states.

Last December the French Ambassador to Israel, Mr. Francis Huré, stated to a high official of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he doubted that arms would be sold to Libya.

Barely eight days ago, the counsellor of the French Embassy in Israel, Mr. Roux, declared that the news in the press about an eventual agreement with Libya was exaggerated. This accord, he said, would not be reached as quickly nor would it be as significant as the newspapers were saying. Moreover, the French press itself was talking in terms of a sale of only 15 or so Mirages. All these contradictory statements indicate that the French government itself is ashamed of its immoral policy which is in direct opposition to French public opinion.

While not one international body has decided to apply any sanctions whatsoever to Israel, France has decided to take them unilaterally. She has also practiced sanctions against the Israeli purchasing mission in France, though the five gunboats left Cherbourg legally and this purchasing mission had ordered in France large quantities of non-military material—which could have been procured elsewhere—solely because of our friendship with France. There is neither justice nor objectivity in the French attitude. It is dictated by financial and oil interests, by the competition among the great powers and, it is said, by the wish to avoid Soviet penetration into Libya. At no time could either a will to preserve peace or the influence of the principles of international morality be discerned in this policy.

¹ Translated from the French text in *Le Monde*, January 16, 1970, p. 3.

5

Reply to a Question on French Policy Towards Israel by Official Spokesman Hamon of the Government of France¹

Paris, January 14, 1970

[In answer to a question as to whether recognition of Israel's right to security implied recognition of Israel's borders]:

Elle implique la reconnaissance de frontières, le droit de vivre en paix à l'intérieur de frontières reconnues.

En toutes circonstances, et c'est peut-être un lien qu'on peut établir entre les deux politiques, l'influence de la France entendra toujours s'exercer dans le sens de la mesure et de la modération sans lesquelles il n'est pas de paix possible.

6

Remarks on French Middle East Policy by Foreign Minister Schumann of France²

Brussels, January 15, 1970

Cette politique se ramène à quatre points:

En premier lieu, le 3 juin 1967, c'est-à-dire avant la guerre de six jours, nous avons proposé et appliqué pour notre propre compte un embargo général. La date de cette proposition et de cette décision est révélatrice: la France a voulu—par un geste et par un acte qu'elle espérait exemplaires—arrêter la fatale escalade. Pourquoi? Tout simplement parce que nous n'avons pas d'autre but ni d'autre intérêt que la paix.

En deuxième lieu, bien que notre exemple n'ait été suivi par personne, nous avons, après la guerre de six jours, maintenu l'embargo à l'égard de tous les pays qui avaient été

belligérants. Israël, du fait qu'il était notre principal client, a—cela est vrai—subi au premier chef les conséquences de cette mesure, exactement comme il a été le premier bénéficiaire des assouplissements qui sont intervenus par la suite. Mais il est contraire à la vérité de dire que l'embargo ait jamais été unilatéral, puisqu'il est toujours appliqué à tous les belligérants de 1967.

En troisième lieu, il est vrai que l'embargo ne s'applique pas aux pays qui, sans avoir été belligérants, sont engagés dans la querelle. Par exemple, il s'applique à l'Égypte, mais pas à la Libye, à la Syrie mais pas au Maghreb. Pourquoi? Pour deux motifs: d'abord, si, par exemple, nous l'étendions aux pays de l'Afrique du Nord, nous commettrions envers la France, et pas seulement envers elle, la grave faute de compromettre notre présence et notre influence qui ont pour principal mérite celui d'être souhaitées. Ensuite le vide créé par notre absence serait bientôt comblé par une ou plusieurs autres présences qui sont beaucoup moins souhaitées et que nous aurions rendues inévitables.

Enfin, en quatrième et dernier lieu, si l'embargo ne s'applique pas aux pays non belligérants, cela ne signifie nullement que nous soyons prêts à leur livrer n'importe quelles armes, n'importe quand et dans n'importe quelles conditions. Bien au contraire, nous avons toujours pris soin de prévoir des clauses et des dates de livraison qui laissent toutes leurs chances de succès aux efforts entrepris, sur l'initiative de la France, par les autres membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité, pour préparer un règlement de paix acceptable par toutes les parties en cause. Dès lors, je crois que certains donneurs de leçons pourraient s'adresser à ceux qui ne s'embarrassent pas des mêmes précautions. Ce n'est pas la France qui pratique, soit au bénéfice d'un camp, soit au bénéfice de tous, la vente inconditionnelle des armements après avoir refusé l'embargo général au Proche-Orient comme au Biafra.

¹ *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation Française, 1970), p. 196.

² Excerpted from an address made before the Tribune des Amitiés françaises. *Le Monde*, January 17, 1970, p. 3.

Commentary on the Palestine Resistance Movement in the China Weekly Peking Review¹

Peking, January 16, 1970

The Palestinian people's armed struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackey, the Israeli aggressor, is forging ahead victoriously. The Palestinian people's armed forces have fought many hard battles and won enormous victories in the past year. They are hitting the Israeli aggressor and its U.S. masters with heavier blows and giving powerful encouragement to the Arab people's struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors.

In the past year the Palestinian people's guerrilla forces were active over a much wider area. The flames of armed struggle in Israeli-occupied territory raged from Syria's Golan Heights in the north to the port of Eilat on the Aqaba Gulf in the south, and from the Beisan Valley on the west bank of the Jordan River and the mountainous parts of Nablus in the west to Jerusalem and other cities. Even the territory under Israeli rule and Tel Aviv, the nerve centre of the Israeli regime, were subjected to guerrilla attacks.

Three times in one year the U.S. Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company, which battens on the blood and sweat of the Arab people, had its pipelines blown up by the guerrillas, resulting in heavy losses for U.S. monopoly capital.

Material published by the Palestinian people's armed forces reveals that, from January to November 1969, the guerrillas launched well over 2,000 attacks on the enemy, more than twice the number launched in 1968. The guerrillas set off 35 attacks in the first ten days of January last year, while more than 180 were launched by them in one week last December. The Palestinian guerrillas today operate throughout the length and breadth of Palestine. As an Al Fatah communiqué said: "There is no place in Israeli-occupied territory beyond the reach of the Palestinian guerrillas." The

Israeli "Minister of Defence" groaned: "The Israeli forces have not seen a calm there [Israeli-occupied land] since the June war [in 1967]."

The Palestinian armed forces who are "learning warfare through warfare" show great combat flexibility in battles with the Israeli aggressors. They use close fighting and night fighting tactics to launch fierce surprise attacks on enemy military headquarters, barracks and outposts. They cut enemy railways and highways, ambush his patrols and patrol cars, blow up his military installations and wipe out large numbers of effectives. According to incomplete statistics, the Palestinian guerrillas last year destroyed over 170 Israeli artillery positions. In February 1969 alone, the "Al Assifa" commandos under Al Fatah completely wiped out 11 Israeli patrols. All this fully shows the power of guerrilla warfare waged by the people.

War has taught and tempered the people. By actually taking part in armed struggle, the Palestinian people have come to a deeper understanding of Chairman Mao's great truth that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The broad masses of Palestinian workers, peasants and youth and students and those of other Arab countries, running the blockade and overcoming numerous difficulties, travel long distances to get to the Palestinian guerrilla training camps and actively join the guerrilla forces. Thus, the Palestinian people's revolutionary armed forces are growing in strength from day to day.

Commanders and fighters in many Palestinian guerrilla bases and training camps are often organized to study Chairman Mao's works to acquire wisdom and strength for revolutionary struggle. The fighters' political consciousness has thus been steadily raised and they know what they are fighting for. Whenever a battle mission comes up, everyone eagerly volunteers to fight and is not afraid of sacrifice in carrying out the mission.

"The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them." The Pales-

¹*Peking Review*, No. 3 (January 16, 1970), pp. 25-27.

tinian guerrillas have struck deep roots among the Palestinian people who are suffering national oppression. They often go among the masses to do political propaganda work, help the peasants in production and organize the masses for military training. Although the Israeli aggressors have tightened their fascist suppression and tried by every means to sever the ties between the people and the guerrillas, the people in Israeli-occupied land defy brute force and risk their lives to help the guerrillas in every possible way, thereby enabling the guerrillas to seize every opportunity in battle to wipe out the enemy and expand their own forces.

In the course of armed struggle, the Palestinian people have become increasingly aware that only by strengthening their unity can they persevere in struggle and win complete victory. Back in 1968, Al Fatah began to co-operate with other commando units in joint actions against the enemy. Early last April, the guerrilla units of Al Fatah and other nationalist organizations formally set up the Palestine Armed Struggle Command. Under this unified command, several Palestinian guerrilla detachments in early August launched an attack on enemy forces stationed along the green belt area in the northern Jordan valley. They destroyed three important Israeli strongholds, completely wiped out the enemy defenders and won a splendid victory.

Pummelled by the Palestinian guerrillas and the people of other Arab countries, Israel is facing ever graver political, economic and financial difficulties. According to material divulged by Western countries, Israel's military expenditures since launching its war of aggression against the Arab countries in 1967 have reached over 2,300 million U.S. dollars, more than double its total 1967-68 budget. Israel's 1969 defence budget was 630 million U.S. dollars, a more than 50 per cent increase over that of the previous year. Enormous financial deficits and serious economic troubles have not only added to the suffering of the Israeli people, but have also made the going for the Israeli ruling circles tougher and tougher. Israeli "Prime

Minister" Meir has admitted that Israel now has to tighten its belt. In its 1969 end-of-the-year report, AP also wailed that the Israeli ruling clique was more pessimistic.

The development and victories of the Palestinian people's armed struggle have struck fear into the hearts of U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism which, in their efforts to seize oil resources and important strategic points and redivide spheres of influence, have been collaborating and fiercely contending with each other at the same time in the Middle East. They have put forward "drafts" one moment and tried to sell "plans" at another; they held "four-power meetings" for a so-called "political solution" of the Middle East question, plotting to use counter-revolutionary dual tactics to induce the Arab countries to capitulate and liquidate the Palestinian people's armed forces. But the Arab people will never be caught in the U.S. imperialist and social-imperialist trap. Exposure and counter-blows by the Palestinian people's armed forces and the entire Arab people have made U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism suffer one ignominious defeat after another in their "political solution" fraud.

To put down the Palestinian guerrillas' activities, U.S. imperialism has been speeding up its arms supply to the Israeli aggressor troops, while at the same time it looks for agents in the Arab countries in an attempt to destroy the Palestinian guerrillas by the hands of reactionary Arab forces. Instigated by U.S. imperialism, the reactionary forces in certain Arab countries in April, May and October last year tried to throttle the Palestinian commando units. But the Palestinian guerrillas, closely united with the broad masses of the Arab people, rose in struggle and thwarted this vicious U.S. imperialist scheme. Unreconciled to seeing its dirty work defeated, U.S. imperialism recently advanced a so-called "proposal" for Israel and Jordan to "prohibit any acts of violence from its territory against the other." This is a new plot by U.S. imperialism in trying to incite the reactionary Arab forces to quell the Palestinian guerrillas.

Social-imperialism has always worked hand in glove with U.S. imperialism against the Palestinian people. It has viciously slandered and abused the Palestinian people's armed struggle as "terrorist operations," thus revealing its fear and hatred of the Palestinian people's armed struggle. In so doing it has only greatly discredited itself. Recently social-imperialism changed its tactics and hypocritically pretended to "support" the Palestinian people's armed struggle. It is clear to everyone that the purpose of this is to get control of the Palestinian armed forces and use them as chips in its dirty deals with U.S. imperialism in the Middle East, so as to realize its criminal plot of stamping out the Palestinian armed struggle and divide up the Middle East with U.S. imperialism.

But the heroic Palestinian people and other Arab people are daily awakening. They neither believe the "fine words" of U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism nor fear threats and suppression by the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. Holding their guns tightly, they have proudly marched into the great 1970s with big strides. We Chinese people resolutely support the just struggle of the Palestinian people and are convinced that the Palestinian armed forces will certainly strengthen their unity, persevere in their armed struggle, strike harder at the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and, together with all the Arab people, carry the national-liberation struggle through to the end.

8

Interview Statements on American Proposals for a Middle East Settlement by Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin¹

Washington, January 16, 1970

Lipski: Mr. Ambassador, what is the nature of Israel's concern at the latest American proposals for a Middle East settlement? Just what is it which worries Israel most about them?

Rabin: Well, I think when one talks about the latest movement of the United States this means the two American proposals which were submitted: the first one on October 28 about the proposed solution to the Egyptian-Israeli conflict within the Two-Power talks, and the second one, the proposed settlement between Jordan and Israel within the Four Power talks. And in the middle, of course, the public statement which was made by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers.

I think that the change expressed by the proposals and by the speech is twofold. First it shows a tendency towards some disengagement from Israel. This policy was once called more "evenhandedness"; now Mr. Rogers calls it the "balanced" policy of the United States. But the whole tone, the whole atmosphere of the last moves, have tried to imply a bit more disengagement from Israel.

The second part of the change is a substantial one. In the beginning of the Two Power and Four Power talks the concept was that the principle according to which the Arab-Israeli conflict should be solved was laid down in the Security Council resolution. It was the job of the parties with the assistance of the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, to promote agreement between the parties to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and to solve all the issues mentioned in the resolution along the lines laid down by the resolution.

The resolution left enough room for each side to bring into the negotiations all its own problems and to work out a solution between themselves. Since the Two and Four Power talks started, for all practical purposes the efforts to reach an agreement were shifted from the parties to the conflict to the big Powers. They have tried to reach agreement about a common interpretation of the resolution.

Gradually the United States has become more and more involved in getting down to the specifics of what the solution should be instead of leaving the parties to achieve this by themselves. Instead, we began to learn of more and more specific proposals

¹ Excerpted from Rabin's interview in *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, XIX, 3 (January 16, 1970), pp. 14-15.

that were introduced gradually into the American position.

Finally, we reached the stage where in the proposals for the Egyptian-Israeli settlement, for example, they have begun to mark clearly where the secure boundaries of Israel should be. Therefore practically very little has been left to the parties to negotiate.

More than that. One could possibly look on these developments as a matter of technicalities. But if the understanding about peace was something which could not be brought from the outside, here we see an entirely different approach—a departure from the prior concept to a new concept: that the Powers themselves have to work out the blueprint for the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This is the essence of the change. Now these proposals have become a blueprint which has left very little for the parties about which they could meaningfully negotiate. And, if you remember, the aim of Nasser and the Russians is to evade the need to enter meaningful negotiations. These latest proposals, therefore, have given them great hope and encouragement to go on believing that in the long run they can eliminate the need to negotiate peace.

Q: Some Americans say that Israel's concern is exaggerated because all that the United States has done is make suggestions which do not preclude the possibility, once negotiations start, of discussing everything. Do you see any point to that argument?

Rabin: Not at all. It is a way of avoiding the real question. Since the aim of the Powers is to agree on a blueprint, and since the Russians will never agree to any proposals which are not acceptable to the Egyptians, there can be agreement only when the proposals are acceptable to the Arabs.

And this process has not been finished. The Americans have moved into the area of fine details. But the Russians have not accepted any of the proposals. They are trying to continue the erosion of the American position by forcing them to go into more details and

to add more concessions until the proposals satisfy their Arab clients.

Then, of course, the whole world will stand behind the proposals, and all that Israel will be able to do will be either to accept them, which will be almost suicide because it will not bring peace, or reject them. This has undermined our bargaining capability, if not eliminated it. The crux of the matter, then, is that by submitting blueprints for a settlement, and making them public, we believe the United States has practically eliminated our bargaining position once negotiations start. And this is a total deviation from the prior concept of the role of the big Powers.

The basic question remains who should work out the peace—the parties or the Powers? This is not a matter of technicalities. We don't believe peace can be imposed. We have accepted that the international community has the right to lay down the principles of a peace settlement but not the details.

Q: Has the new development of American policy been a gradual shift or the result of a new way of looking at the problem?

Rabin: You have to take into consideration the basic American attitude that they cannot sit around and just do nothing. No-one here in Washington can understand that this is also a possibility. And they behave very eagerly.

The Russians, in my opinion, are much more clever. They just wait for another American proposal, and yet another. They play on the American attitude that they must show a certain amount of activity and there's been a gradual deterioration of the American position as a result. Not surprisingly to us, when the Americans move towards the Russians, the Russians move back, thus maintaining the same gap between their position and the Americans and retaining their assumption that, as long as the gap remains the same, the Americans will continue to come closer.

9

Radio and Television Interview Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on Recent Developments in the Middle East Conflict¹

January 18, 1970

Mr. Scali: Secretary Rogers, Israeli forces seem to be striking deeper and deeper in recent days into Egypt. Within the past few days, for example, Israeli commandos are reported to have cut power and telephone lines only 36 miles from Cairo itself. Are you disturbed or alarmed at these new tactics?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we are disturbed about the general situation in the Middle East. We had hoped at the beginning of this administration that we could play a more successful role in bringing about a permanent peace in the area. So these things are disturbing. Of course, they have been going on now for some time, in fact, to some extent ever since the war in 1967. We have counseled with both sides urging them not to engage in these attacks and counter-attacks. We are not strictly satisfied with the results so far. We would hope some efforts can be successful in the future to bring about a permanent peace.

Scali: Former Vice President Humphrey, in talking about the proposals that you have put forward for peace, claims that you are sacrificing Israel for the sake of agreement with Russia. What do you have to say to that?

Rogers: Well, there is nothing to that. I read what he said, and I noticed he only made one comment about it; and I think he at that time may not have read the proposal that we made, because our proposal had nothing like that in it at all.

We continue our fundamental support for Israel. There is no question about that. Israel knows it. What we are trying to do

is to see if it is possible to bring the parties together in a negotiating stance. Since the war in 1967 the parties have not negotiated at all; and we are doing what we can—and we think we have an obligation, a responsibility, to do all we can—to bring about a permanent peace; and the only way that is going to come about is if the parties negotiate.

Scali: Mr. Secretary, another question on the Middle East. The French Government apparently has gone ahead and negotiated for the sale of some 50 Mirage jets to the new revolutionary Government of Libya. Two points here: Are you concerned at all that this may upset the power balance in the Middle East, and do you think the French Government adequately informed the American Embassy in advance when questioned about this deal?

Rogers: On the first part of the question, I don't want to answer that at the moment—that there is no concern.

On the second part of the question, we have been in consultation with the French Government about phases of it. They have told us that they will give us further information in the future, so we are not totally familiar with what the agreement is going to consist of, and until we know I wouldn't want to make any further comment.

10

Press Conference Statements by Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo of Spain at the Close of His Official Visit to the U.A.R. (Excerpts)²

Cairo, January 21, 1970

Spain, which already defined her position on June 5, 1967, desires only a just peace in this conflict. And, of course, she would

¹ Excerpted from Roger's interview as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1598 (February 9, 1970), pp. 150, 154.

² Translated from the Spanish text in *Diario de la Noche* (Madrid), January 22, 1970, p. 8.

mediate only if she had relations with both parties and at the request of her friends.

[Referring to the Mediterranean area]:... we are particularly concerned with the problem of the security of this area because Spain is a coastal state and must have a voice in the matter.

[On the maintenance of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean]: As far as what concerns us—[the naval base at] Rota—there has been no change in our point of view, although it is possible that there has been a change in that of the North Americans.

II

Speech on the Middle East by National Chairman Eaks of the U.K. Young Liberals Organization (Excerpt)¹

London, January 23, 1970

World opinion must be mobilised to isolate the militant Zionists responsible for the present situation in the Middle East. Racial persecution and expansionism are terms instantly associated with Nazi Germany—yet today Israel is seen pursuing the same course. In 1939 we mobilised to stop Hitler. In 1970 we must stop Israel's blatant attempts to escalate the war.

There is no place for a State based on racial or religious discrimination. Zionist apartheid is no more acceptable to Liberals than South African apartheid.

Liberals in accepting the right of self-determination by all people must condemn

the aggression of Zionist Israel, and the attempts by external forces to impose a settlement on the peoples of the area.

Palestine is for the Palestinians—regardless of their race or creed. Palestinian liberation movements and Al Fatah must continue to assert their rights. In Israel all people must work to remove Zionists from power, and work with all peoples of the Middle East to create a non-sectarian state of Palestine.

12

Message from U.S. President Nixon to American Jewish Leadership Conference on the Middle East²

Washington, January 25, 1970

I am aware of your deep concern that Israel may become increasingly isolated. This is not true as far as the United States is concerned.

The United States stands by its friends. Israel is one of its friends.

The United States is deeply engaged in trying to help the people of the Middle East find peace. In this effort, we are consulting fully with all those most concerned.

The United States believes that peace can be based only on agreement between the parties and that agreement can be achieved only through negotiations between them. We do not see any substitute for such negotiations if peace and security arrangements acceptable to the parties are to be worked out.

The United States does not intend to negotiate the terms of peace. It will not impose the terms of peace. We believe a durable peace agreement is one that is not one-sided and is one that all sides have a vested interest in maintaining. The United Nations resolution of November 1967 described the principles of such a peace.

¹ From a News Release issued by the Young Liberal Headquarters on January 23, 1970.

² *Near East Report*, XIV, 3 (February 4, 1970), p. 54.

We are convinced that the prospects for peace are enhanced as the governments in the area are confident that their borders and their people are secure.

The United States is prepared to supply military equipment necessary to support the efforts of friendly governments, like Israel's, to defend the safety of their people. We would prefer restraint in the shipment of arms to this area. But we are maintaining a careful watch on the relative strength of the forces there, and we will not hesitate to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.

The United States has as its objective helping the people of the Middle East build a peaceful and productive future. I believe that all Americans can unite for that goal.

13

U.S. Magazine Interview Statements by Secretary-General Eliav of the Israeli Labor Party on Israeli Policy Towards the Palestinians¹

January 26, 1970

[On the Palestinians]: The first thing we have to do is to recognize that the Palestinian Arabs exist as an infant nation. It is there. We have to recognize them. The sooner we do it, the better it will be for us, for them, for eventual peace.

[On annexing Arab territory]: We have annexed Jerusalem. That is a fact that cannot be undone. But we should not annex any more territories.

[On claims by some Israelis to all of Palestine]: True, our forefathers lived here and in Jordan. But so did the Arabs. The solution has to be that two states can live equally together. There is ample place for a Jewish state as big as Holland, with 10 million people, and an Arab state as big as Belgium

with 9 million. I think we should recognize a legitimate Arab national movement.

[On the refugee problem]: [Israel] should start tackling the Arab-refugee problem, with those refugees already in our hands. We already are a little late.

14

Memorandum Submitted to Amnesty International by the Government of Israel in Response to Amnesty Requests for an Investigation of Alleged Israeli Ill-treatment of Arab Prisoners²

January 26, 1970

The case histories now submitted by Amnesty International concern, for the most part, events said to have taken place during the Six Day War and the period immediately following it, during which the military government was being organized.

Amnesty International will, no doubt, appreciate the difficulties inherent in any investigation held at this stage with the object of examining and verifying events after such a lapse of time and which are said to have taken place before the organization of the military Government was completed.

Nevertheless, the Government of Israel is prepared, in accordance with its general policy, to investigate the 'case histories' thus submitted by Amnesty International. Such an investigation can, of course, be conducted only if proper complaints are lodged, and the possibility is created to take evidence, to cross examine, etc.

To this end, and motivated by the sincere desire to ascertain whatever truth there may be in the complaints mentioned above, the Government of Israel has decided to grant the complainants, now at present in enemy states, the requisite permits to enter Israel-held territories so that they may be able to lodge their complaints in accordance

¹ *Time* (European edition), XCV, 4 (January 26, 1970), pp. 26-27; reprinted by permission from *Time*, The Weekly Newsmagazine; Copyright Time Inc.

² *The Times* (London), April 3, 1970, p. 8. (Published after the release of the Amnesty International report at the beginning of April).

with existing legal procedures. Should they so desire, they will further be permitted to appoint local lawyers of their choice to assist them.

15

Radio Interview on U.S. Middle East Policy by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel¹

January 26, 1970

Interviewer: Reacting to President Nixon's message to the conference of US Jewish leaders, the Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, told me the following in an interview:

Eban: In her statement, the Premier expressed satisfaction about three basic principles contained in President Nixon's message. First, the firm emphasis on friendship for Israel and concern for its security; second, the clear intention to ensure that Israel gets the military equipment necessary for its defence; and third, the underlining of the fact that peace can only be achieved by agreement and negotiations. We should remember that all these principles were discussed in detail by President Nixon and the Premier last September. However, in view of certain developments between October and December last year, it is clear that their re-statement at this time has an important political significance.

Q. Mr. Eban, to what extent does President Nixon's message contradict the proposals of the Secretary of State, William Rogers, for a settlement between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan?

Eban: There is no mention of these proposals in the President's message. I want to stress that I have never viewed US-Israel relations in an apocalyptic manner. I have always stressed that there are common

objectives and interests based on mutual friendship between the two peoples. However, within the framework of these relations, we are forced from time to time to clarify differences of opinion which arise as a result of differences in our outlooks on world and Middle East problems. We should not assume that this dialogue has ended or that everything has been settled. It is very important that the US President has placed our relations with the USA in a positive and fundamental framework.

Q. Will Mr. Rogers's proposals be cancelled as a result of this message?

Eban: I did not see in President Nixon's message any reference to these proposals.

Q. Mr. Eban, what are the motives for the publication of Mr. Nixon's message?

Eban: We can only guess. My guess is as follows. The US Government made a number of moves in October, November and December. The Israeli reaction was strong and unequivocal in rejecting these proposals. We were not alone in expressing this attitude. Our justifications for rejecting the proposals found a strong echo in public opinion. I had the opportunity just a week ago to express to my Cabinet colleagues my view that there is wide understanding of our concern. The Soviets and the Arabs have not modified their position. The four Powers have not progressed towards any fruitful result. I have said a number of times that, after an unsuccessful experience, States with an (? imperial) tradition normally reconsider their actions and ask themselves the old question: What is the advantage? If there is only tension with Israel, with no progress towards peace and instead an intensification of the war, then there is an inclination to try a new course.

This message, therefore, should be explained as a reflection of a number of phenomena and not only Israeli reaction. For example, the USA is very sensitive about maintaining the balance of power. There is no doubt that recent actions by the Soviet Union, and not only by the Soviet Union, were

¹ "This Day" Program on Israel Home Service in Hebrew. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3290/A/4 and A/5; reprinted by permission.

bound to increase concern lest the balance of power may be upset. Since moves in the past two months have not achieved any desirable result, it is very possible—and I want to be careful—that there is a process of reconsideration. Anyway, the President found it necessary to give emphasis to the three principles he expressed in his talks with the Israeli Premier last September. With regard to the effect of this statement on diplomatic moves, it is still early. We shall continue to maintain contacts, receive impressions and react.

Q. In other words, you do not want to forecast at this stage what the future of US-Soviet contacts on the Middle East will be.

Eban: We maintain close contacts with the USA. Only last Friday I had a talk with the US Ambassador, Barbour, on this subject. To the best of my understanding, the USA believes that the Soviet Union has not made any serious attempt to modify its position or to bring its Arab friends closer to a reasonable understanding for peace. The initiative is, therefore, in the hands of the Soviet Union.

16

Commentary Recapitulating Soviet Proposals for a Middle East Settlement in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda (Excerpt)¹

Moscow, January 27, 1970

The rising combat potential of the Arab armed forces, and especially the armed forces of the United Arab Republic, is tilting the scales in favour of a political settlement; Tel Aviv's illusions and calculations that for Israel the Arab world will always remain, military speaking, an "open zone," are collapsing like a house of cards.

Conducive to a political settlement is the constructive attitude of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon and a number of other Arab states which have accepted all the provisions of the United Nations Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and have declared their willingness to carry them out. Nor will anyone be fooled by speculation on the part of western propaganda about the Syrian and Iraqi attitudes. Although they have emphasised that they do not believe Israel will willingly give up the territories she has seized, nevertheless, in general, many statesmen in those countries have not ruled out diplomatic means of seeking a settlement.

Finally, there are the actual Soviet proposals on the implementation of all the provisions of the U.N. Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States press has quite a lot to say about the points, principles, plans and programmes of the United States for a Middle East settlement. As a rule, all those plans and programmes are presented as the only possible proposals, even though they are understandably rejected by the Arab countries as being pro-Israeli and lop-sided.

In its proposals, the Soviet Union proceeds on the basis of the premise that Israel, on the one hand, and the UAR and the other Arab countries which will take part in the settlement, on the other, must demonstrate their readiness to abide conscientiously by all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. The sides must proclaim the acquisition of territories by war to be inadmissible and must recognise the necessity for establishing a just and firm peace in the Middle East, in conditions in which every state in that region will be able to enjoy security.

It is perfectly clear that without the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied by them since 1967, there can be no question of justice, lasting peace or security for the peoples of the Middle East. It is the Soviet Union's firm conviction that it is necessary to rule out the possibility of territorial concessions to the aggressor—a

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5528 (February 3, 1970), pp. 53-54.

kind of "reward" for attacking neighbours. By clearly defining the line of June 5, 1967, as the border for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, the Soviet proposals stand opposed to the American proposals which, as is generally known, try to provide grounds for certain changes in the map of the Middle East and even to include Israel, the aggressor state, among the countries that will decide the fate of occupied territories such as, for example, the Gaza region or Sharm el-Sheikh, Egyptian territory near the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea. Those United States proposals are absolutely unacceptable. Furthermore, they have nothing in common with the interests of a just and lasting peace in the area.

How, in conditions in which tension is being built up and in which the mistrust existing in the relations between the parties concerned is being aggravated, will it be possible to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories they have occupied? How is the problem of ending the war in the Middle East to be tackled?

As the key to finding a way out of this difficult situation, the Soviet proposals recommend that the withdrawal of the Israeli troops should be tied up with the ending of the state of war between Israel and the Arabs. The withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces could be started on the day on which there was deposited at the United Nations the final document agreed by the sides through contacts maintained with the help of Dr. Jarring, the Swedish diplomat who, at the request of the U.N. secretary-general, is having meetings with representatives of Arab countries and Israel. On the day that document is deposited the state of war will be actually ended, that is to say, both sides will refrain from hostilities. As soon as the Israeli troops have withdrawn behind the lines they occupied prior to June 5, 1967, the total cessation of the war should be officially proclaimed.

Many people still remember very clearly statements made by Israeli leaders—particularly those statements made during and immediately after the "six-day war"—to

the effect that they were not motivated in any way by a desire for territorial gains and that they only wanted, so they alleged, to end the long war with the Arabs. But why is it, then, that now Tel Aviv does not want to accept proposals which actually ensure a just peace for all the states, including Israel?

Furthermore, the proposals put forward by the USSR ensure the territorial integrity of the Middle East states after the juridical ending of the war as well. When the Israeli troops withdraw to the June 1967 line, then the "recognised frontiers" of the states in the area can be guaranteed, either by the U.N. Security Council or by its four permanent members—the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France.

In addition, it is proposed that demilitarised zones should be established on both sides of the frontier with the consent of the countries concerned. The regime for those zones will include restrictions of a purely military nature and will not give advantages to any of the parties concerned. It is also envisaged that with the consent of the United Arab Republic and on a decision of the Security Council, United Nations troops will be stationed in the Gaza district where they were until May 1967, and also in the Sharm el-Sheikh district.

It stands to reason that in the event of Israel violating her commitments on the withdrawal of troops, the Arab countries will have the right to abstain from carrying out their corresponding commitments.

Israeli and western propagandists frequently misrepresent the Soviet position, attempting to present it as one which does not ensure general security in the Middle East area. As can be seen, there are no grounds for such talk.

Obviously the problem of the Palestinian refugees must be solved in order to ensure a lasting and stable settlement in the Middle East. That is why the Soviet proposals provide that Israel should pledge herself to carry out the U.N. decisions with regard to the Palestinian refugees who were driven from their native land. These decisions envisage, in particular, the return of those Pales-

tinians who want to return and the payment of compensation for their property to those who want to remain in Arab countries.

The Soviet proposals also provide for freedom of navigation for all states through the Tiran Straits, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

The unquestionable advantage of the Soviet proposals is their universal and all-embracing nature. On the one hand, they provide for the settlement of problems that exist between Israel and all the Arab countries and contain principles for a general settlement. On the other hand, they consider a political settlement in all its aspects, without any exception, and embrace the entire range of problems.

As far as the United States is concerned, when putting forward its plan, which has already been reflected in detail in the American press, it uses the following tactics: let everything acceptable to Israel be agreed upon in the shape of a complete formulation, while the unacceptable points will be simply referred for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations which, it is planned, will take place while Israel still occupies Arab territories. In other words, the United States would like to create a situation of victors and vanquished, to which the Arabs object for quite understandable reasons.

As a result of that approach, many "blank spots" remain in the American position—for instance, the absence of a major thesis on the interdependence between the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the ending of the state of war; in general, nothing is said about when the evacuation of the Israeli army of occupation is to start and when it will end.

The events in the Middle East are a serious threat to peace. Incidentally, the danger is not confined within the boundaries of that area. For instance, one can agree with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers when he stresses the explosive nature of the development of the Middle Eastern crisis as regards international security.

For a number of months the Soviet Union has been doing everything in its power to

facilitate the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is necessary to erect a barrier preventing that area from heading towards a new explosion, the consequences of which are hard to predict in advance. There is every opportunity to erect this barrier. The only obstacle is the expansionist, adventurist position of the present Israeli leadership, which enjoys extensive and open support from Washington. Historically speaking, however, that policy has no prospects.

17

Speech by F.R.G. Chancellor Brandt at a Dinner in Honor of Visiting Prime Minister Talhouni of Jordan¹

Bonn, January 17, 1970

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, and Gentlemen:

With great pleasure, I welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister, and those who accompany you, to Germany. We are satisfied that the good relationships between our countries, which found special expression through the visits of His Majesty the King in the years 1964 and 1967, is underlined by your presence.

I know that you did not come to the Federal Republic of Germany without anxiety. Due to the crisis in the Middle East your country today has to live under difficult circumstances. The German government and the German people are following the developments with great concern.

Our sympathies are directed to those who, without personal guilt, have had to suffer and cannot find rest. More than that, we would like to bring to bear our influence, restricted as it is, so that a peaceful and just solution to the crisis may be found soon in the interests of the peoples concerned.

In this part of the world, we endeavour

¹ Translated from the German text in *Bulletin des Presse und informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* (F.R.G.), January 29, 1970, p. 133.

to contribute to the repudiation of the use and threat of force in order to reach political aims. And we would be very happy if this principle could also find practical acknowledgement in your part of the world which is so close to Europe.

In spite of the known difficulties, the development of your country will be continued energetically under the leadership of you, Mr. Prime Minister, and your sovereign. We consider ourselves fortunate to have been able to be of some help in the past. Your visit will offer the opportunity to discuss greater cooperation between our countries. I assure you that in the future we will also be eager to contribute to a better future for the Jordanian people.

At the same time, we regard you, Mr. Prime Minister, as an important representative of the Arab World. Because of that I would very much like to say that the German government has on various occasions given expression to your wish to maintain good relations with all Arab countries. Our policies are aimed so as to cooperate with all nations who want to cooperate with us. I am sure that your visit and our talks will be meaningful for the general development in which we are both interested.

The German government pursues, without wishful thinking—but with perseverance, a policy to ease the tension and to bring peace. We believe that it should be possible to solve the problems of this world on the basis of making a compromise between the various interests of the peoples and states [involved]. We are very grateful to His Majesty the King and you, Mr. Prime Minister, that you have always been appreciative of our attitude. We and the German nation wish with all our hearts that your country may have peace, prosperity and success.

I beg you, Gentlemen, to drink a toast with me to the health of His Majesty King Hussein, Your Excellency the Prime Minister, and to a happy and peaceful future for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

18

Television Interview on French Middle East Policy by Premier Chaban-Delmas of France¹

Paris, January 27, 1970

Q. Monsieur le Premier Ministre, si je vous avais interviewé il y a quelques jours, je vous aurais sans doute posé d'autres questions qu'aujourd'hui, mais aujourd'hui l'actualité commande et je ne peux pas ne pas vous parler des fameux "Mirages" et la question que je vous pose, parce que je crois que beaucoup de gens se la posent, est celle-ci: est-ce qu'en livrant 100 Mirages à la Libye, la France n'est pas sortie de sa neutralité dans le conflit du Moyen-Orient et sortie au détriment d'Israël?

R. Mais pas du tout. En effet, ces Mirages dont vous parlez, cette centaine de Mirages n'est pas destinée à nourrir le conflit. Ce sont des appareils qui sont désirés par le Gouvernement libyen pour doter la Libye d'un système de défense garantissant sa sécurité. A cet égard, je voudrais vous rappeler que la Libye est un pays du point de vue de son territoire, une fois et demie la France, à population faible, moins de deux millions d'habitants, et que ce pays comprend des richesses fabuleuses en pétrole à telle enseigne qu'il est en train de devenir sinon le premier du moins l'un des tout premiers producteurs au monde et qu'une telle situation, une telle richesse peut dans l'avenir exciter bien des convoitises. L'histoire a enseigné à tous les peuples, à commencer par la France, ce que sont les convoitises extérieures. Et le Gouvernement libyen a pensé qu'il lui était nécessaire de s'assurer les moyens d'une défense, et comme cette défense il ne peut pas à l'évidence la fonder sur de gros bataillons, il lui est apparu qu'il fallait la fonder sur une force aérienne décisive entre les mains de pilotes libyens.

Q. Oui, c'est là la question M. le Premier Ministre. Où sont les pilotes libyens? Il paraît qu'il y en a deux pour l'instant?

R. Non, il y en a beaucoup plus que deux, mais il n'y en a pas un grand nombre. Je vous avoue que je ne connais pas le nombre exact, mais le nombre n'est pas très important. Mais le contrat qui porte sur la vente des appareils porte également sur la formation des pilotes.

Q. *On peut se poser la question, M. le Premier Ministre, pourquoi cette politique française à l'égard de la Libye? Après tout il y a deux ans, personne ne parlait de la Libye.*

R. Je dois vous dire d'abord qu'il y a deux ans on ne parlait peut-être pas de la Libye mais le régime précédent avait déjà noué des conversations.

Q. *Avec la France?*

R. Avec la France. Pourquoi la Libye? Parce que les Libyens se sont adressés à nous récemment; le nouveau Gouvernement, précisément pour assurer sa sécurité, son indépendance a préféré s'adresser à la France plutôt que d'accepter les offres qui lui étaient faites par les Etats-Unis, par la Grande-Bretagne et par l'Union Soviétique. Et si le Gouvernement libyen a préféré s'adresser à la France, c'est en raison du fait d'abord que la France est riveraine de la Méditerranée, et ensuite en raison de la politique française de décolonisation qui donne à ce Gouvernement toute assurance de ne pas se trouver un jour en face d'un impérialisme quelconque; et pour la France, à l'évidence, il s'agit là d'un atout politique très important puisque la Libye je vous le rappelle fait suite à l'Afrique du Nord, Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, et que de cette manière pour l'ensemble de la Méditerranée occidentale nous disposerons de vis-à-vis avec lesquels nous sommes en termes politiques positifs, ce qui de surcroît nous donne toute sécurité en ce qui concerne l'Afrique profonde, l'Afrique Noire.

Il y a là un élément de politique méditerranéenne et africaine dont vous mesurez l'importance. J'ajoute que nous attendons des développements économiques importants à telle enseigne qu'une mission économique et culturelle est en voie de formation à Paris et que les têtes de chapitres déjà fixées concer-

nent l'agriculture, les cadres techniciens, leur formation, le génie civil, c'est-à-dire les travaux publics, et maritime, c'est-à-dire les bateaux et la pétrochimie.

Q. *Tout cela est très bien, mais on peut se poser une question. Ces Mirages, dites-vous, sont destinés à défendre la Libye contre les convoitises que pourrait lui attirer son pétrole. Mais si ces Mirages changent d'affectation et si on les retrouve soudain sur le front israélien, quelle garantie en avez-vous?*

R. A n'en pas douter nous sommes en droit de compter qu'il n'en sera rien. Je n'insiste pas sur le fait que la distance entre la Libye et le front actuel rend pratiquement inopérant l'usage de tels appareils.

Q. *En partant de Libye?*

R. En partant de Libye. Je vous suis bien. Nous n'avons aucune espèce de raison de mettre en doute ce qui nous a été dit.

Q. *Les gouvernements changent, M. le Premier Ministre, surtout dans cette partie du monde.*

R. Eh bien! la réponse est simple: la position de la France consiste à ne pas nourrir en armes le conflit. C'est la raison pour laquelle la France ne livre ni à Israël, ni aux pays voisins. Et s'il apparaissait que ces appareils dont nous parlons changeaient de destination et nous le saurions vite, alors les suivants seraient sous le coup de l'embargo et permettez-moi de vous rappeler que l'on s'excite beaucoup sur ces Mirages pour la Libye mais il s'agit d'appareils qui ne sont pas encore en fabrication, à piloter par des pilotes qui ne sont pas encore formés, que les premières livraisons n'interviendront pas avant quinze ou seize mois, qu'elles seront échelonnées dans le temps et qu'elles ne deviendront importantes qu'en 1972-73 pour s'achever en 74, que d'ici là on peut penser que la guerre sera finie et qu'à l'heure actuelle, je le répète, il n'y a pas de raison valable de penser qu'un jour quelconque ces appareils pourront être utilisés contre Israël.

Q. *Est-ce que cela veut dire, M. le Premier Ministre, qu'Israël peut être rassuré quant à la*

politique de la France par rapport à son droit d'existence?

R. Mais la politique de la France à l'égard d'Israël n'a pas varié. La France a affirmé, et cela n'est pas d'hier, qu'elle donnait sa garantie précisément au droit d'Israël d'exister, c'est-à-dire à son indépendance, à sa sécurité, à l'exercice de la plénitude de ses droits souverains. Rien de tout cela n'est changé. Rien.

Q. Je vous pose une autre question, M. le Premier Ministre. Si tout ce que vous venez de me dire avait été dit plus tôt, est-ce que les choses ne seraient pas plus claires?

R. Oui, c'est vrai. Et je dois vous dire qu'une quinzaine est passée qui m'a paru longue pendant laquelle, pour une raison que je vais d'ailleurs vous dire, le Gouvernement n'a pas pu faire de communication officielle et a dû se borner soit à laisser dire bien des choses et bien des chiffres, soit quelquefois à démentir tel ou tel qui était vraiment par trop fantaisiste. Et la raison pour laquelle le Gouvernement n'a pas pu parler plus tôt est la suivante: nous sommes dans le domaine diplomatique, un domaine toujours complexe et dans lequel les nouvelles, les faits, le contenu d'un contrat par exemple n'appartiennent pas à un seul Gouvernement.

Q. A l'une des parties?

R. A une seule des parties mais aux deux et ni l'une ni l'autre des parties ne peut parler sans être en accord avec l'autre. Et la voie diplomatique, M. Desgraupes, je ne vous l'apprends pas, est lente et c'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons dû attendre jusqu'à la semaine dernière pour faire une déclaration officielle qui a d'ailleurs été faite de la manière la plus nette devant la Commission compétente de l'Assemblée Nationale, par le Ministre compétent, le Ministre de la Défense, ce qui fait qu'à partir de cette déclaration de nos compatriotes savent parfaitement et peuvent être sûrs que tout autre chiffre, toute autre énonciation en dehors et au-delà de cette déclaration sont

faux. C'est là quelque chose d'une importance extrême. Pour ma part, je pense profondément qu'il ne saurait y avoir de Gouvernement, de confiance dans un Gouvernement de la part d'un peuple s'il n'y a pas usage de la vérité. C'est une affaire fondamentale, c'est un pilier nécessaire de toute démocratie véritable et disons-le de toute société humaine digne de ce nom. C'est la raison pour laquelle je vous l'avoue je ne suis pas fâché, bien au contraire, que vous m'ayiez posé ces questions.

19

Statement to the British Parliament by U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Under-Secretary Luard on Arms Supply to the Middle East¹

London, January 27, 1970

My hon. Friend the Member for Ilkeston [Mr. Raymond Fletcher] has raised a problem of vital importance, a matter which concerns many people in this country and elsewhere. The conflict in the Middle East in itself is a problem of great magnitude which so far has defied all attempts at solution, and which periodically erupts in the violent engagements recorded almost daily in our newspapers.

The question raised is: How far is this situation exacerbated by the supply of arms to the area from outside sources; and what are the principles on which the Government base their policy on these matters?

Before I comment on some of the specific questions raised by my hon. Friend and also by the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed [Viscount Lambton], I will try to explain in general terms our policy in relation to arms supply in this area and the principles on which it is based.

First, I would recall the fact that at the time of the June war of 1967, from which

¹ *Hansard*, Vol. 794, No. 47 (January 28, 1970), cols. 1418-1422.

all the present troubles stem, and immediately after that war, the British Government several times called for a general embargo on the supply of arms to all countries in the area, and, indeed, we ourselves for a time unilaterally applied an embargo of this kind. But, as my hon. Friend pointed out, a unilateral embargo of this sort cannot of itself be of great value unless the example is followed by other countries.

We would have been willing to take part in an agreement either to stop altogether the supply of arms to the area, or at least to limit the supply of arms in specified ways. Unfortunately, all these efforts, which we have repeated a number of times, have not been taken up by some of the other Governments principally concerned. As a result we have remained ready to consider specific requests for arms from Governments in the area so long as these meet the principles which we have laid down for supplying such arms. I will now try to describe those principles.

We have many times made clear that one overriding consideration in meeting these requests is the effect of any particular transaction on the chances of securing a peaceful settlement in the area. This means considering above all the balance of arms in the area at the time in question, and not merely the numerical balance of arms; we must also be concerned about the overall balance of strength, of military effectiveness in the area. This means that it is not simply a question of counting the tanks or the aircraft, as my hon. Friend pointed out. Certainly we do not wish to leave any country in the Middle East at such a disadvantage that some aggressor might be tempted to take advantage of it.

These are the main principles which, in the light of the general political situation in the area, we have to apply, and have applied, in considering requests for arms from Governments in the region. We have received a considerable number of requests from Governments on both sides in the conflict. In the light of the principles that I have referred to, on a number of occasions we

have had to turn down requests from one or other Government of the region.

As my hon. Friend said, these are not easy principles to apply in practice, and a number of difficulties arise over them. Military strength cannot always be calculated easily in exact terms. Certainly it cannot be measured according to the exact number of arms alone, without having regard to the capacity to use those arms. The exact quantities which exist at any one time are not always precisely known, though we have fairly reliable estimates. Finally, it is necessary to consider not only the balance at any one time, but what it may be at some time in the future as a result of new supplies which may be made at some point to one side or the other.

My hon. Friend has drawn attention to another difficulty, which I intended to mention in any event. There may be new supplies of arms by some other Government to one or other of the countries in the area which may have an effect on the balance of arms in the conflict which we are considering. That is one difficulty, and, clearly, we have to take account of any new supplies of this kind which may be made to one side or the other. I think that my hon. Friend omitted to take account of the fact that there have also been supplies of arms on the opposite side of this conflict of a higher grade of weapon than perhaps is available on the other side. We have to take account of both new developments of this kind in considering our policy.

Another change which may come about and which again may affect the consideration of the military balance is a change in attitude or alignment of Governments on one side or the other, due perhaps to a change in Government. This again may alter the previously existing balance of power. All alterations of this kind are, clearly, relevant in considering the kind of balance that I have been describing, and they are all significant factors to be taken into account in reaching any decision on matters of this kind.

My hon. Friend called specifically for a

drastic review of our policy on these matters as a result of the kind of factor which he described. I must tell him that we keep matters of this kind under constant review, and we have no set policy which we follow blindly regardless of changes which occur in the balance of the area. I can assure him that we are reviewing, and have consistently reviewed, our policy in the light of the factors to which he drew attention and those which I described.

I will deal with some of his specific questions in a moment, but he made another point about a review of our policy. He said, as did the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, that in any such review we must take account not merely of the balance between the main parties to the conflict, but of the global strategic balance between East and West. I hope I do not need to reassure them that Governments in the West, naturally, are concerned about the global strategic balance, and changes which may have occurred in it through the increase in Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean certainly have not gone unnoticed by Western Governments.

However, the global balance is a matter which must be separated from the balance between the Arab States and Israel. Our prime consideration in considering a request for arms either from an Arab Government in the area or from Israel must be the effect on the balance between those sets of countries. Although the other consideration may not be altogether ignored, it will, clearly, not be the main factor in our minds in considering requests of this kind.

These are the general principles which govern our decisions.

I now turn to the particular question of Libya, which was raised by my hon. Friend and was also mentioned by the noble Lord. As the House knows, we are at present engaged in discussions with the Libyan Government about the whole of our future relationship. These discussions will certainly cover, among other things, the possibility of the future supply of arms from this country to Libya, if only because there was already a

question of the supply of arms from this country to Libya before the change in Government took place.

I can assure my hon. Friend that in conducting these discussions, which are beginning to take place now, we are conscious of the very factors which he raised and, above all, of the possibility that any weapons which we supplied to the Libyan Government might finally be used against Israel. We have indeed already asked for certain clarification from the Libyan Government on this very point. We have noted some of the public statements by Libyan leaders relative to this consideration, and certain reports which have appeared that it is possible that Libyan forces might be sent to the front to join those of other Arab countries. We also agree that supplies of arms by third countries to a country such as Libya—for example, the aircraft which France is now to send—are a relevant consideration in this respect in so far as they may alter the balance.

I should like to refer to one or two of the points that were mentioned in this connection. Obviously, one of the crucial points is whether these aircraft are likely to be used in the conflict between Israel and her neighbours. Concerning these aircraft, it is apparently a firm condition of the contract that the planes should not be sent to the front to take part in the fighting against Israel. I believe that the aircraft will not be supplied immediately all in one batch to Libya; so it will be possible to get some idea whether this condition is being abided by before the contract is completed. This is one point to be considered.

Another point—and here I must take up a point made by the noble Lord and also by my hon. Friend—is the suggestion that these aircraft in themselves, if they were to be used in the conflict against Israel, would be bound to overturn the balance and tip it against Israel. I suggest that a consideration of the situation in the area, especially in the air, as it has been revealed in the last two or three months, scarcely suggests that there is at present any danger of the balance being tipped very rapidly against Israel.

I think that we must all have observed that Israel seems to enjoy a total superiority in the air in the area. This may not be unrelated to the fact that there have been recent supplies of aircraft to Israel. I entirely accept that were these French aircraft to be used in the conflict against Israel this would be a new factor in the situation which would affect the balance, but we should not necessarily conclude that it would immediately tip the balance to the disadvantage of Israel.

20

Statement by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on Israeli Bombing Raids on the U.A.R. (Excerpts)¹

Tel-Aviv, January 28, 1970

[Israeli raids on the U.A.R. have a triple purpose]:

[First], to oblige the Egyptians to fully respect the cease-fire. Our raids reduce the pressure which is exerted on our soldiers at the front. While waiting for peace, we are ready to accept a total cease-fire and it is not absolutely excluded that the Egyptians will end by accepting it.

[Second], to prevent the Egyptians from preparing another war and to convince them that it would end very badly for them.

[Third], to weaken the Egyptian regime by showing the Egyptian masses that their leaders are deceiving them as to the real situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

[In answer to the questions: *What can be the ultimate stage in this escalation? Won't it reach civilian targets?*]:

There are no longer military objectives situated within Egyptian territory which are forbidden to us....

We have decided not to attack civilian

targets, but if the Egyptians do so, that would change things.

21

Newspaper Interview Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on American Proposals for a Middle East Settlement²

January 29, 1970

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Mideast—your December speech has been quite controversial. How do you feel with the Israeli complaints that in asking for the Israeli Government to withdraw its troops from occupied territory, you are asking them to give up something—in a sense to give up their joker or their ace card for negotiating period—that you were asking them in advance of negotiations?

A. I think that what you just said emphasizes the misunderstanding that results from some of our proposals. Our proposals are perfectly clear. I think what must be lacking is that people have not read them. We have never suggested any withdrawal until there was a final, binding, written agreement that satisfied all aspects of the Security Council resolution.

In other words, we have never suggested that a withdrawal occur before there was a contractual agreement entered into by the parties, signed by the parties in each other's presence, an agreement that would provide full assurances to Israel that the Arabs would admit that Israel had a right to exist in peace.

Now, that is what has been lacking in the past. The Arabs have never been willing to do that; and if that could be done, we

¹Translated from the French text in *Le Monde*, January 30, 1970, p. 4.

²Excerpted from Rogers' interview with Hearst newspapers as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1601, (March 2, 1970), pp. 218, 222.

think it would be a tremendous boon to the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the Middle East, do you feel the proposals you have offered are now completely dead, or do you think there is still some life in them? Is there anything you can do at this point to help that situation?

A. I think what we have done at this point has been useful and about all we can do at the moment.

In this field it is inevitable that proposals are misunderstood, proposals are labeled—for example, our proposals have been labeled as a shift of position, and the President's statement the other night, it was said to be pro-Israel. Other things we do are labeled pro-Arab.

What I am saying is that the ideas we advanced, I think, are sound. I think they provide a framework for negotiations.

If they do negotiate, then there is some possibility that an agreement can be worked out. In the absence of negotiations, then I don't think there is any possibility of agreement. So I think we have to wait and let people talk about the proposals, think them through, try to have a better understanding of what our proposals mean, and it is possible that something will develop.

Q. If I could ask you what you mean—I think this may be a popular conception or misconception—has there been a change in our basic longstanding policy toward Israel?

A. There is no change in our fundamental policy in support of the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

As I have said, this does not mean we are unfriendly to the Arabs.

Q. Are the internal prospects of Israel, say, and, say, the U.A.R. and the other countries, such that they could accept these proposals, do you think?

A. I think they could accept these proposals; yes.

22

News Conference Statement by U.S. President Nixon on Arms Supply to the Middle East¹

Washington, January 30, 1970

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, you recently said, "We will not hesitate to supply arms to friendly states as the need arises."² Has the sale of 100 jets to Libya by the French caused an imbalance in the Mideast arms situation, enough so that the United States should now expedite the sale of additional jets to Israel?

The President: Well, Mr. Jarriel [Thomas Jarriel, ABC News], the problem of the sale of arms to Libya has been one that does concern us. As you know, that involves our relations also with the French Government. One encouraging thing that has happened since we came into office is some improvement in our relations with the French.

One of the reasons that those relations have improved—and that improvement began when I visited President de Gaulle last February—is that we have had better consultation and discussion with regard to our differences, and those differences exist primarily in two areas: our policies toward the Mideast and our policies toward NATO.

President Pompidou will be here next month, and I will be discussing a number of problems with him. I would not want to speculate now as to what I will be discussing with him, except to say that all of those differences, naturally, will be on the table.

As far as our own policy toward the Mideast is concerned—a question which was the latter part, incidentally, of Miss Thomas' [Helen Thomas, United Press International] question—as far as our own policy toward the Mideast is concerned, let me put one

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1599 (February 16, 1970), pp. 173-174.

² For the full text of the Nixon statement to the National Emergency Conference on the Middle East, a group of American Jewish leaders, see Document Number 12, p. 13 above.

thing in context: I have noticed recent stories indicating that the United States is one day pro-Arab and the next day is pro-Israel. We are neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. We are pro-peace. We are for security for all the nations in that area. As we look at this situation we will consider the Israeli arms request based on the threats to them from states in the area and we will honor those requests to the extent that we see—we determine that they need additional arms in order to meet that threat. That decision will be made within the next 30 days.

23

Note on the Middle East Situation from U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin to U.S. President Nixon¹

Moscow, January 31, 1970

Dear Mr. President,

According to information now available, the Israeli leaders, ignoring the decisions of the Security Council, have in fact resumed anew military actions against the Arab states, including bombings of population centres of the UAR in the immediate vicinity of Cairo, not only military installations of the UAR and Jordan are being attacked but also civil population, destruction is being brought to towns, villages, industrial and other installations. The aims of these adventurist actions are clear—to force the neighbouring Arab countries into accepting the demands which are put forward by Israel. All this takes place at a time when the UAR and other Arab countries, honouring decisions of the Security Council, are not so far striking back at Israel.

In this instance as in determining their positions in Middle Eastern affairs in general the Israeli leaders are evidently proceeding from the assumption that the USA will go on supporting Israel and that under these cir-

cumstances the four great powers will fail to come to a common view on the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council.

There is danger that in the immediate future the military actions may become widescale while the decisions of the Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly will be losing weight in the eyes of world public.

We are now studying the question to what extent the Israeli counting on political and other support from outside has ground and has been co-ordinated with the diplomatic actions by certain powers. We consider it our duty, however, to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the highly risky consequences the course chosen by the Israeli leaders may have both from the point of view of the situation in the Middle East and international relations as a whole.

We proceed from the conviction that stable peace can and should be established in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has persistently strived for this and has influenced its friends accordingly. If on the other hand the US government supported its pronouncements in favour of peace in the Middle East by practical steps, and in the first place vis-à-vis the Israeli leaders then there would not have been such a situation in which for two years and a half the occupier continues to hold the occupied lands, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are forced to abandon their homes and people continue to perish.

Adherence by Israel to its present course may only widen and deepen the conflict, perpetuate tension in one of the most important areas of the world since it is impossible to force the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the aggression, to the seizure of their territory.

It is in the interests of universal peace and international security to warn the government of Israel against adventurism, to undertake urgent and firm actions, which will help in stopping the growth of military tension and will make Israel listen to the voice of reason. We believe that this would also correspond to the national interests of the United States.

¹ Unofficial English text in *Arab Report and Record*, March 1-15, 1970, p. 167.

We would like to tell you in all frankness that if Israel continues its adventurism, to bomb the territory of the UAR and other Arab states the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal with the help of which due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be made.

The situation in the Middle East urgently dictates the necessity of immediate cessation by Israel of its dangerous armed attacks and sorties against the UAR and other Arab states.

The four powers are capable and must compel Israel to abandon its policy of military provocations and to see to it that a lasting peace be established in the Middle East.

We believe that now it is necessary also to effectively use the mechanism of the bilateral talks of the 4-powers in order:

(1) to ensure speediest withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories,

(2) to ensure establishment of peace in the Middle East.

Withdrawal of forces is the key question for establishing peace. If it is solved then there would hardly be any particular difficulties on the way to agreement on other questions.

We would like you, Mr. President, to appraise the situation from the viewpoint of special responsibility for the maintenance of peace which lies on our countries. As for the Soviet government, there is no lack of goodwill on our part as well as resolution to act in the interests of peace in the Middle East.

Appropriate communications have been sent by us to Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.

24

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Traore of Mali to Algeria (Excerpts)¹

Ouargla, January 31, 1970

In response to an invitation from President Houari Boumedienne, President Moussa Traore, Head of State of Mali, paid a friendly visit to Ouargla in the Oasis Department on January 30 and 31, 1970.

The two Heads of State will do all in their power to secure the unconditional evacuation of all occupied Arab territories. On this occasion they affirm their absolute solidarity with the people of Palestine in the legitimate struggle they are engaged in to recover their sacred national rights.

They consider that the Palestinian people's struggle for liberation is an unavoidable course if a just and lasting peace is to be established in the Middle East.

25

Message to the International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East Crisis from British Philosopher Bertrand Russell²

January 31, 1970

The latest phase of the undeclared war in the Middle East is based upon a profound miscalculation. The bombing raids deep into Egyptian territory will not persuade the civilian population to surrender, but will stiffen their resolve to resist. This is the lesson of all aerial bombardment. The Vietnamese who have endured years of

¹ Translated from the Arabic text published in *al-Sha'b* (Algiers), February 2, 1970.

² *The Times* (London), February 14, 1970, p. 3 (advertisement).

American heavy bombing have responded not by capitulation but by shooting down more enemy aircraft. In 1940 my own fellow-countrymen resisted Hitler's bombing raids with an unprecedented unity and determination. For this reason, the present Israeli attacks will fail in their essential purpose, but at the same time they must be condemned vigorously throughout the world.

The development of the crisis in the Middle East is both dangerous and instructive. For over 20 years Israel has expanded by force of arms. After every stage in this expansion Israel has appealed to "reason" and has suggested "negotiations". This is the traditional role of the imperial power, because it wishes to consolidate with the least difficulty what it has taken already by violence. Every new conquest becomes the new basis of the proposed negotiation from strength, which ignores the injustice of the previous aggression. The aggression committed by Israel must be condemned, not only because no state has the right to annexe foreign territory, but because every expansion is also an experiment to discover how much more aggression the world will tolerate.

The refugees who surround Palestine in their hundreds of thousands were described recently by the Washington journalist I.F. Stone as "the moral millstone around the neck of world Jewry". Many of the refugees are now well into the third decade of their precarious existence in temporary settlements. The tragedy of the people of Palestine is that their country was "given" by a foreign Power to another people for the creation of a new State. The result was that many hundreds of thousands of innocent people were made permanently homeless. With every new conflict their numbers have increased. How much longer is the world willing to endure this spectacle of wanton cruelty? It is abundantly clear that the refugees have every right to the homeland from which they were driven, and the denial of this right is at the heart of the continuing conflict. No people anywhere in the world would accept being expelled en masse from their own country; how can anyone require

the people of Palestine to accept a punishment which nobody else would tolerate? A permanent just settlement of the refugees in their homelands is an essential ingredient of any genuine settlement in the Middle East.

We are frequently told that we must sympathize with Israel because of the suffering of the Jews in Europe at the hands of the Nazis. I see in this suggestion no reason to perpetuate any suffering. What Israel is doing today cannot be condoned, and to invoke the horrors of the past to justify those of the present is gross hypocrisy. Not only does Israel condemn a vast number of refugees to misery; not only are many Arabs under occupation condemned to military rule; but also Israel condemns the Arab nations, only recently emerging from colonial status, to continuing impoverishment as military demands take precedence over national development.

All who want to see an end to bloodshed in the Middle East must ensure that any settlement does not contain the seeds of future conflict. Justice requires that the first step towards a settlement must be an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in June, 1967. A new world campaign is needed to help bring justice to the long-suffering people of the Middle East.

26

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit to Cuba of a Delegation Representing the Ba'th Party of Syria (Excerpt)¹

Havana, February 2, 1970

In response to an invitation from the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba, a delegation representing the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, headed by Comrade Dr. Yusuf Zu'ayin, member of the National and Regional Commands of the Party,

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ba'th* (Damascus), February 2, 1970.

visited Cuba from January 19-26, 1970.

The international situation was carefully discussed, and in particular the situation through which the Third World is now passing, the situation in the Middle East and the struggle of peoples against colonialism for national liberation.

The two parties condemn Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. They also condemn the interference of imperialism, headed by the United States of America, and its conspiracy with reactionary forces in the area in an attempt to overthrow the progressive and revolutionary regimes. The two parties regard this aggression and its consequences as part of the imperialist schemes which have also made Israel a base which is employed for the penetration of colonialist monopolies into Asia and Africa.

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Cuban Communist Party support the heroic struggle in which the Palestinian people are engaged to recover their rights, and regard this struggle as part of the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

27

Letter of Support from Premier Chou En-lai of China to U.A.R. President Nasser¹

Peking, February 2, 1970

To: His Excellency President Gamal Abdel Nasser

The United Arab Republic
Cairo

With the support of U.S. imperialism, the Israeli Zionists have recently launched a series of fresh military attacks on the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries. On January 22, Israeli troops made an intrusion into the Shadwan Island of the

U.A.R.; on January 25, U.S. President Nixon openly declared that the United States would supply more arms to Israel to fight the Arabs. In so doing, they can only accelerate the national awakening of the great Arab people and strengthen the determination of the 100 million Arab people to fight to the end with common hatred against the enemy.

The Chinese people are greatly concerned for the struggle of the people of the U.A.R., Palestine and other Arab countries and are indignant at the U.S. and Israeli clamours for aggression and their war provocations. The struggle against aggression you are now waging is an important part of the struggle of the people of the whole world against imperialism and for national liberation. Your struggle is just. Although this struggle is very arduous, I believe that through protracted struggle, the Arab people will certainly overcome all kinds of difficulties, defeat the U.S. and Israeli aggressors and win final victory.

The Chinese people and Government firmly support your struggle. Your Excellency Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate to you that in the common struggle against imperialism, the Chinese people will for ever remain the most reliable friend of the people of the U.A.R., Palestine and other Arab countries.

CHOU EN-LAI

Premier of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China

28

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Tanzania (Excerpts)²

Dar-es-Salaam and Belgrade, February 2, 1970

The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and his wife, Jovanka, paid an official visit to the

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 6 (February 6, 1970), p. 6.

² English text in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 477 (February 20, 1970), p. 11.

United Republic of Tanzania from January 26 to February 2, 1970, at the invitation of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mwalimwe Julius K. Nyerere.

The two statesmen expressed their concern at the aggravating situation in the Middle East. They urged the observance and implementation of the provisions of the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967, considering that Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory and respect for the rights of the Arab peoples constituted the only way of restoring peace to that part of the world. They hold that the United Nations, the great powers and the entire international community should take effective measures to solve this problem which is increasingly threatening to incite further large-scale conflicts.

29

Note on the Middle East Situation from U.S. President Nixon to U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin¹

Washington, February 4, 1970

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Your message of January 31 has been studied carefully. For its part, the United States intends to continue its efforts to promote a stable peace between the parties in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 and to encourage the scrupulous adherence by all concerned, not just one side to the cease-fire resolutions of the United Nations. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, this is the steadfast policy of the United States.

We do not accept the views expressed by the Soviet government in explanation of the

current situation in the Middle East. We have been using our influence with both sides urging strict observance of the cease-fire. Thus any implication that the United States has been a party to or has encouraged violations of the cease-fire is without foundation.

Moreover, your attempt to place responsibility on one side is not supported by the facts, there have been repeated violations of the UN cease-fire resolutions by both sides—full compliance with these resolutions on all fronts, including the prevention of Fedayeen attacks against Israel, would help establish a more favourable atmosphere for progress toward a settlement.

As I have pointed out, the United States, just shortly before the receipt of your letter discussed this matter with Israel and the UAR and urged both sides to adhere strictly to the UN cease-fire resolutions. We intend to continue these discussions in order to reach early restoration of the cease-fire between Israel and the UAR. It will be recalled that in early 1969 the UAR announced and initiated a policy of non-observance of the cease-fire. An early indication by the UAR that it will abide by the UN cease-fire resolutions if Israel will do the same would contribute to a reduction of tension and violence and facilitate a political solution. We are prepared to continue our efforts in that direction. We are not aware of any recent Soviet efforts to this end.

We have noted the reference in your message to the effect that "the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal . . ." The United States has always opposed steps which could have the effect of drawing the major powers more deeply into the Middle East conflict. This could only complicate matters further.

For this reason, the United States: (1) supports the prompt restoration of the cease-fire and (2) favours an understanding on limitations of arms shipments into the area. The question of arms limitations was raised directly with Mr. Gromyko in July of last year, our willingness to discuss this important subject was reaffirmed in my speech before

¹ Unofficial text in *Arab Report and Record*, March 1-15, 1970, pp. 167-168.

the General Assembly this last fall and subsequently was again taken up with Mr. Gromyko by Secretary Rogers, and our strong preference for limitations was reiterated as recently as January 25. Our proposals for discussion of this matter were rejected by the Soviet Union.

While preferring restraint, as I indicated on 25 January the United States is watching carefully the relative balance in the Middle East and we will not hesitate to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.

On the broader question of a peace settlement, the United States remains committed to help achieve a peace agreement between the parties as called for by the UN resolution of November 1967. We have noted your point to the effect that if the question of withdrawal were resolved, there would be no serious obstacles to agreement on other questions.

As you know, there can be no withdrawal unless there is full agreement between the parties on all of the elements of a peace settlement.

In this connection, the proposals of 28 October and 18 December, 1969, meet the legitimate concerns of both sides on all key questions, including withdrawal. We believe these proposals constitute reasonable guidelines which would provide Ambassador Jarring the means to start the indispensable process of negotiations between the parties under his auspices. It is a matter of regret that Soviet unresponsiveness to these proposals is holding up this process; a more constructive Soviet reply is required if progress toward a settlement is to be made.

We note your desire to work with us in bringing peace to this area. We do not believe peace can come if either side seeks unilateral advantage. We are willing to continue our efforts to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East in a spirit of good will.

We are providing copies of this communication to Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou.

30

Declaration of the International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East Crisis¹

Cairo, February 5, 1970

On an invitation from the National Assembly of the U.A.R., Parliamentarians from 55 countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and the two Americas, representing a broad spectrum of political views and trends, met in Cairo from 2 to 5 February 1970 in an international conference to consider the Middle East Crisis.

The fact that such a large number of parliamentarians from different parts of the world have responded to the invitation, underlines the importance of this Conference and the concern of the whole world at the danger resulting from the deteriorating situation in the Middle East.

The Conference held free and frank discussion on the various study reports submitted to it by different delegates in accordance with the wishes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser who urged in his inaugural address for such a discussion. There was a consensus on the following:

The situation in the Middle East is grave and deteriorating day by day; on account of Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories which she seized by force in the June 1967 war and the escalation of her military action against Arab countries specially the increasing bombardment of their areas. Apart from the loss to human life and property in the area directly involved, serious damage has been caused to the commerce and economy of a large number of countries other than those of the Middle East.

Both before and after the June 1967 war, the Israeli government has systematically flouted various U.N. resolutions notably that of the Security Council which was unanimously adopted on November 22,

¹ *International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East Crisis: Documents* (Cairo: U.A.R. National Assembly, 1970), pp. 97-98.

1967, and Resolution 194/3 of 1948 on the Palestinian refugees which was reiterated time and again, and the resolution demanding of Israel to rescind all measures taken to change the status of Jerusalem. This defiance by Israel should be severely condemned.

The Parliamentarians endorsed the demand for the full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland. Participants declared their full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism, against discrimination based on race, language, religion, and for the recovery of their inalienable rights.

The Parliamentarians meeting in Cairo appeal to all Parliaments to exert their influence on their governments and the public opinion in their respective countries for the establishment of peace in the Middle East, particularly for bringing about the immediate cessation of bombing of the Arab countries, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, and the implementation of all United Nations resolutions, particularly the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, through all suitable measures, including steps to be taken through the machinery of the United Nations, for the realisation of this aim.

The Parliamentarians meeting in Cairo affirm that genuine and true peace cannot be realised except on the basis of the peoples' rights to live in their countries under democracy, equity and security.

31

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Zambia (Excerpt)¹

Lusaka and Belgrade, February 8, 1970

At the invitation of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, accompanied by Madame Broz and associates paid an official visit to the Republic of Zambia from February 2 to 9, 1970.

The two presidents reaffirmed their belief in the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence. However, they expressed concern as regards the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and noted that Israel refuses to comply with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 and to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. Likewise, in the view of the two presidents, the rejection of all other peaceful initiatives and proposals for the settlement of the crisis on the part of Israel constitutes a major obstruction to the achievement of a political solution of the Near Eastern problem. Such an attitude of Israel has contributed largely to the further deterioration of the situation in this area thus threatening world peace and security. The two presidents therefore agreed that it is indispensable to cease all hostilities in this area and that urgent and resolute measures be taken by the international community in general and by the big powers in particular in order to devise a peaceful and equitable solution of the crisis and thus ensure lasting peace and guarantee the security of all countries in this region.

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 477 (February 20, 1970), pp. 12-13.

32

U.K. Prime Minister Wilson's Answer to Parliamentary Question on Exchange of Notes with the Soviet Union on the Middle East Conflict¹

London, February 10, 1970

Q9. *Mr. Arthur Lewis* asked the Prime Minister what proposals he received on Monday, 2nd February from the Russian Government concerning the Middle East situation; what was the nature of his reply; and whether he will make a statement.

The Prime Minister: The Soviet Ambassador gave me a message from Mr. Kosygin, which drew attention to the dangers of the present situation in the Middle East and urged the need for progress towards a peaceful solution.

In my reply to Mr. Kosygin, delivered on 6th February, I emphasised our deep concern about the deterioration of the Middle East situation; the need to re-establish an effective ceasefire; our support for the Security Council Resolution of November, 1967, and especially the twin principles of withdrawal and commitment to peace which it contains; and our willingness to work for a general agreement on an arms limitation even in advance of a political settlement for which we shall continue to strive.

33

Statement by U.S. Acting Secretary of State Richardson Following the Israeli Bombing of Abu Zaabal, U.A.R.²

Washington, February 12, 1970

The United States continues to be deeply concerned over the continuation and level of violence taking place between Israel and certain Arab states. We have seen reports

¹ *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 795, "Written Answers to Questions" (February 10, 1970), col. 324.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1601 (March 2, 1970), p. 226.

of an Israeli air attack on the steel factory at Abu Zabal. We deplore this attack which apparently has resulted in considerable loss of life and injuries.

Neither can we disregard the tragic loss of life and injury to civilians resulting from renewed attacks by terrorists against civilian passengers traveling on international air transport far from the area of conflict.

The United States has repeatedly counseled restraint on both sides in order to discourage the continuing cycle of attack and counterattack by both regular and irregular forces involved. We appeal to both sides to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and urge that they take every possible step to assure that all concerned cooperate fully in restoration of the cease-fire. We urge others to join us in this appeal, and we have today taken the initiative to this end in the four-power talks at the United Nations.

34

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Ethiopia (Excerpts)³

Addis Ababa and Belgrade, February 12, 1970

At the invitation of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, emperor of Ethiopia, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and his wife made an official visit to Ethiopia from February 9th to the 12th, 1970.

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Both parties felt that the situation in the Middle East had become so serious as to threaten the international peace and security. They expressed the hope that the UN would make special efforts for the Security Council's resolution of 1967 to be put into effect in all

³ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 477 (February 20, 1970), pp. 13, 14.

its aspects, and they stressed the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all occupied territories.

35

U.S.S.R. Press Statement on Soviet Premier Kosygin's Messages on the Middle East Addressed to the U.K., France and the U.S.¹

Moscow, February 13, 1970

The attention of official circles and of public opinion throughout the world has been drawn to the worsening of the situation in the Middle East, brought about by new aggression on the part of the Israeli militarists which has found expression, in particular, in provocative air raids, shelling and attacks on populated localities in the United Arab Republic and other Arab states. All this is being done with a view to compelling the Arab states to accept the demands put forward by Israel. In this endeavour the Israeli leaders are relying on the assistance and support of the imperialist forces.

It is absolutely obvious that the interests of world peace and international security demand that the Israeli government should be warned against adventurism and that urgent and firm steps should be taken to help to put an end to the growing war tension and prompt Israel to heed the voice of reason.

As has been learned in press circles, Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, addressed personal messages the other day to President Nixon of the United States, Prime Minister Wilson of Britain and President Pompidou of France, drawing their attention to the very risky consequences of the line chosen by the Israeli government.

The messages point out that Israel's continuation of her present course is extending

and deepening the conflict in one of the most important regions of the world. It is impossible to force the Arab states into reconciling themselves with aggression and with the seizure of their territories. The situation calls for the immediate cessation by Israel of dangerous armed attacks and sorties against the United Arab Republic and other Arab states, and for observance of the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.

It is imperatively necessary to make Israel give up her policy of armed provocations and to promote the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. With this aim in view, it is necessary, in particular, to make effective use of the opportunities available for consultations between powers, including the quadripartite consultations between the USSR, the United States, Britain and France, which are in progress within the framework of the Security Council. Alexei Kosygin's messages have emphasised that it is necessary to secure the withdrawal of Israeli troops, at the earliest possible date, from all the occupied Arab territories and the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union, as is well known, stands for an interconnected fulfilment by the sides concerned of all the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, aimed at achieving a political settlement in the Middle East. As should be clear to every unbiased person, the most important question concerning this settlement has been and continues to be the problem of withdrawing Israeli troops from all the Arab territories which they are occupying. Without the withdrawal of those troops, it is impossible to achieve either an end to the state of war or the establishment of a lasting peace in that area.

The Soviet Union is fully resolved to help to foil imperialist ventures in the Middle East, and there should be no doubt about that. The Soviet government's initiative has met with a profound response in the Arab countries, which have seen in this initiative a major step in the struggle against

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5530 (February 17, 1970), p. 73.

the adventurist policy of the Israeli ruling circles. "The Soviet warning," the Cairo newspaper *Al-Akhbar* said, "is of a very important and serious nature." The Soviet Union's just stand is meeting with the understanding and support of wide circles of the public throughout the world, which is interested in preventing a further worsening of the Middle East situation. This just stand is being welcomed as a manifestation of the good will of the USSR and of its determination to act in the interests of peace in that area. What, however, has been the response of western official circles to this initiative?

It has been learned that the United States, Britain and France have sent replies to the Soviet appeal. The U.S. government openly takes the Israeli ruling circles under its protection, is trying to equate the aggressor and the victim of aggression, comes out vigorously against the just struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of their territories which have been occupied by the invaders, and threatens to increase its arms shipments. This can scarcely be described otherwise than as encouragement for the aggressor.

Even judging by the pronouncements of American newspapers, President Nixon's reply cannot be described as constructive.

Prime Minister Wilson's reply agrees in the main with that of President Nixon. That is also said by the British press. All this confirms the fact that the British government is following in the wake of American policy in the Middle East—a policy of supporting the aggressor and further aggravating the conflict.

Continuing the policy of delaying a political settlement in the Middle East and encouraging the Israeli ruling circles, the imperialist forces seem to believe that time is working for the aggressors and those who are supporting them. That is a grave delusion.

A conference of the leaders of the five Arab states that are in the front line against Israeli aggression has just ended in Cairo. In their concluding statement those who took part in the conference emphasised that the Arab peoples were not alone in their struggle and

that they were being supported by all the progressive, freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples. The participants in the conference expressed determination to strive for the liberation of the Israeli-occupied Arab territories and a firm belief in the triumph of the cause of justice and peace.

The policy of hatred and aggression in relation to the Arab peoples will bring nothing good to their adversaries. In the last analysis this policy is doomed to bankruptcy, with all the resultant consequences for the Israeli ruling circles and their protectors who are continuing to foment tension in the Middle East.

36

U.S. Newspaper Interview Statements by President Pompidou of France on French Middle East Policy¹

Paris, February 14, 1970

Q. Would you tell me what your Middle East policy is? Moreover, was the sale of planes to Libya simply to insure France's position in the Mediterranean and access to oil?

A. Anyone can see that France is seeking ways to reconcile the assertion that Israel has an absolute right to exist, to function freely and to live in peace within safe, recognized borders, with our refusal to recognize Israel's right of military conquest.

Everyone should understand that France has not forgotten the Nazi martyrdom of European Jews, including French Jews, whose courage during the ordeal earned the admiration of all our people. However, France also intends to maintain and develop its ancient ties with most of the Moslem world and more particularly with the Arab countries.

In the Middle East crisis, France wants and seeks only peace—a peace which I believe is indispensable to everyone and first

¹ Excerpted from Pompidou's interview with the *New York Times*, February 15, 1970, p. 22.

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of all to Israel. This is why we have placed the embargo on the shipment of arms to all the countries in the field of battle. The fact that at first this affected Israel in particular is correct. But since then all these countries have received increasingly powerful arms, sometimes from one nation, sometimes another, but never from France.

On the other hand, why should we refuse to fulfill the requests of countries that are not in the field of battle? To let others take our place? What would the cause of peace gain by that? It goes without saying that if the situation of such and such a country changed and that such a state decided to enter into the battlefield, then our attitude toward armaments would change as well.

As far as the Libyan affair is concerned, we do not consider Libya directly involved in the conflict between Israel and a certain number of countries, including Egypt. Naturally, Libya is Egypt's neighbor and an Arab nation. The Libyan leaders have made declarations of solidarity with the other Arab countries. All this is true. To maintain that there is no relationship would be contrary to the truth.

But France treated this affair separately for two reasons: First, our ties with the countries of North Africa and the Maghreb, of which Libya is not an integral part but to which it is far from foreign. Because of French interests in the Maghreb, our economic, cultural and intellectual position in that region, we cannot dissociate ourselves from Libya.

As long as she was tied to the Anglo-Saxon countries under the regime of King Idris, we never tried to make our presence particularly felt in Libya. But the day she offered and requested more cooperation, our entire North African policy obliged us to reply favorably.

The second reason is that if we weren't there, others would move in. Consequently, we consider that it is France's duty to herself, and also to all the western Mediterranean, to look after those interests common to European and Mediterranean countries.

We are not going to seek Libyan oil; we

buy oil from Libya, of course, but we are not seeking to expand our position as regards oil especially in Libya. I repeat, it is a country located at our very door and at the door of the Maghreb; it is a country whose oil resources are important for Europe as a whole, not only for France. It is a country whose strategic position is important.

We therefore think that it was not only our interest and our right but also our duty to fulfill the request of the Libyan Government.

Q. When you speak of other influences, do you mean primarily Soviet influence?

A. It could be Soviet influence if you wish, but I am not trying to offset any particular influence. I simply say that, placed as we are in Western Europe and in the western Mediterranean, our interest and our duty are to maintain a presence in these areas rather than to let others move in without our participation.

Q. According to published reports, you have asked for a guarantee that the planes in question will not be used in the war in Palestine. Has the Libyan Government promised anything in this respect?

A. We have promises concerning the transfer and assignment of the planes.

Q. Then I ask you this: There was a federation between Egypt and Syria, which did not last very long; if there were a new federation between Egypt and Libya, would there be a way of blocking delivery of the planes?

A. First of all, I believe that Libya is Libyan, I believe that its current relations with the United Arab Republic, the Sudan, etc., are very good, but I believe deeply that it is Libyan and that as the new regime gets its bearings, it will discover that Libyan interests are not identical to those of its neighbors. Thus, it will be looking more for ways to preserve its autonomy. I am not alone in this opinion.

In the second place, your hypothesis is possible, of course, but the time it will take to deliver the planes, to train the pilots, and,

consequently, to create a Libyan air force, will give us time to see whether Libya will evolve the way I believe or otherwise. Thus, we retain the right to freedom of judgement.

Q. May I ask you, Mr. President, whether there are any other plans for arms sales—to Iraq, for example—as has been mentioned in the press? There were reports on this which disappeared and then reappeared.

A. We are not selling planes to Iraq.

Q. And how about Israel? Is there any chance in the future of reconsidering the current total embargo? I am thinking, for example, of spare parts.

A. I have nothing to add to all that I have said about this previously. I stand by all the statements I have made since taking office on this matter; they are in line with my present thinking. But the way in which the principles expressed in these statements are applied will, of course, be contingent upon circumstances and climate.

Q. Some flexibility would therefore be possible, depending on the climate?

A. I have no further comment.

Q. Do you believe that the four powers can impose peace in the Middle East?

A. It is conceivable that the four powers might agree on a plan and to decide to impose it. This would be possible physically, but psychologically it would be a bad formula. A peace imposed outright would have built-in weaknesses since neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would give it their wholehearted consent.

I do think that if they want to, the four powers can agree on a plan for a settlement. It should be possible, thanks particularly to the Jarring mission, that the peace achieved be accepted and not imposed. But this is becoming increasingly difficult because of the current escalation, which creates a climate less and less conducive to peace.

Q. Mr. President, do you detect in the most recent Soviet note any new possibilities or do you feel the door is even more tightly closed?

A. I think the latest Soviet note is moderate in the sense that it does not close the door but that it should be taken seriously.

37

U.S.S.R. News Agency TASS Statement Pledging Soviet Support to the Arabs Following the Israeli Bombing of Abu Zaabal, U.A.R.¹

Moscow, February 16, 1970

Soviet and world public opinion has already been informed of the fresh criminal act perpetrated by the Israeli military—the raid on February 12th by Israeli aircraft on the Egyptian metallurgical combine near Cairo. As a result of the rocket, napalm and time-bomb assault on the combine, about eighty workers and employees were killed and as many seriously injured.

In an effort to balk a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East, the Israeli leaders are, apparently, prepared to go to any length, commit any atrocities, in defiance of the elementary principles of humaneness and international law. The Israeli military and those who place the arms into their hands are apparently confident that they can, by blackmail and threats, and the notorious escalation of aggression, compel the Arab countries, above all Israel's neighbours, to waive their legitimate interests and accept the imperialist demands.

It would seem that the aggressors, in the past and present, have one feature in common: a very short memory. Temporary success befogs their minds, but in the long run there comes the day of reckoning. This occasion is no exception. The farther the

¹ English text in *Moscow News*, No. 8, February 21, 1970, p. 3.

Israeli aggressors proceed along the criminal path the harder will be the verdict of the nations which today are rightly condemning Israel—which by the nature of its foreign policy is an imperialist state—as being a tool of neo-colonialism.

The Soviet people resolutely denounce Israel's savage, aggressive acts and voice their solidarity with the Arab peoples fighting for their legitimate rights. The policy of the Soviet Union is directed to restoring peace in the Middle East area and rooting out traces of national strife and wars. The Soviet Union will not slacken its efforts in achieving these goals.

But so long as the aggressor tramples underfoot the principles and aims of the UN Charter, and the decisions taken by this international organization to eliminate the aftermath of Israeli aggression and restore peace in the Middle East, the Soviet Union will give Arab countries the necessary support so that they can enhance their ability to protect their security and their legitimate interests.

The criminal policy of aggression and encroachment on the national liberty of the peoples and their statehood and security cannot but meet with mounting resistance. That is also wholly in keeping with the interests of consolidating the pillars of international peace.

38

Statement to Arab Envoys in Berlin by G.D.R. Foreign Minister Winzer Expressing East German Support for the Arab Cause¹

Berlin, February 16, 1970

Gentlemen Ambassadors, Mr. Chargé d'affaires,

At first I should like to thank you for handing me the Communiqué of the Summit

Conference of the Arab States directly confronted with Israel.

I judge the handing over of the Communiqué as a manifestation of confidence in the position of the Government of the German Democratic Republic towards the just cause of the Arabs and as a token of appreciation for this our attitude. I can assure you that the Council of Ministers will be informed immediately.

Our meeting is taking place at a time when imperialist powers and their tool, Israel, are aggravating the situation in the Middle East in a way endangering peace. You, the representatives of your states in the GDR, can witness every day with what attention and concern the official organs of the GDR, but also all its citizens, watch the course of events in the Arab region and how resolutely they condemn Israel's aggressive acts. The news of the brutal Israeli terrorist raid on the metal works at Abu Zaabal was received by our people with deep indignation and disgust.

The citizens of the GDR, a great number of whom experienced for themselves the horror of imperialist wars, can fully realize the sufferings of the Arab people affected by the attacks of the cruel Israeli soldiery. They are filled with the thought of active solidarity with the Arab peoples' struggle to defend their national achievements against the onslaughts of imperialism, neo-colonialism and Zionism.

In the Statement on the Situation in the Middle East of 27 November 1969 the GDR, together with other socialist states, pointed to the extremely dangerous character of the "aggressive policies of the bellicose circles of imperialism." The further stepping-up of Israel's aggressive acts in the last few weeks and days—and this has been expressed in brutal frankness by the Israeli extremists themselves—is aimed at overthrowing the progressive Arab Governments. This was the intention underlying the criminal bombing of the metal works at Abu Zaabal, which was a deliberate act of psychological warfare.

Resorting to such war crimes, Israel is executing the political, economic and strate-

¹ *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (G.D.R.), X, 7 (March 5, 1970), pp. 45-46.

gic interests of imperialism which the latter sees more and more endangered by the further advance and recent successes of the national liberation forces in the Middle East and in Northern Africa. The USA, and hand in glove with them the West German Government, are intensifying their assistance in many fields for the Israeli aggressor to escalate its annexationist policy.

Verbal protestations to the contrary and similarly verbal assurances of peaceful intentions on the part of the USA cannot deceive anybody and are sheer hypocrisy.

The laws of historical development, the international relationship of forces which is continuously developing in favour of the forces of socialism, social progress and peace, and the vigilance and coherence of the anti-imperialist forces in the world, however, make us firmly convinced that the aggressive schemes of imperialism and its stooges will fail also in the Middle East.

In view of the situation in the Middle East aggravated by Israel's aggressive acts, I should like to stress once more that six Communist Parties and Governments of socialist countries in their Statement of 27 November 1969 expressed their firm determination "...to do everything in their power to check the plans of the aggressors."

Rest assured that the GDR will continue to support in solidarity the Arab peoples' just struggle to overcome the consequences of the imperialist Israeli aggression. It will continue to give its unswerving backing to the struggle of the Arabs for the political solution of the Middle East conflict. In this connexion the GDR considers that the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces of occupation from the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of 22 November 1967 is a *sine qua non* condition. The GDR will continue to support the Arab people of Palestine waging a valiant anti-imperialist national liberation struggle for recovering their legitimate rights.

I should like to ask you to convey to the Governments of your states the assurance of close solidarity of the GDR Government

and people with the national liberation struggle of the Arab peoples.

I wish the Arab peoples success in warding off the provocative attacks of their enemies and in building up a life in peace and prosperity. However hard the struggle may be, your just cause will triumph through.

39

Commentary in the U.S.S.R. Daily Izvestia on Soviet Premier Kosygin's Messages on the Middle East Addressed to the U.K., France and the U.S. (Condensed)¹

Moscow, February 17, 1970

The danger menacing the whole world from the direction of the Near East has been created in the main, not only by the ill-considered policies of the Israeli ruling circles, but also by the policy being pursued in this area of the globe by imperialist powers, principally the U.S.A. This is the policy of encouraging the Israeli aggressors, which can be wholly comprehended within the framework of U.S. President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" and that aims at consolidating U.S. supremacy with the hands of America's allies and puppets.

In these conditions, the Soviet Union's new initiative for a Near East settlement cannot help but attract the close attention of all foreign circles that are disturbed at the way the course of events in the Near East has been developing and that are ready to adopt measures needed for a peaceful solution of the conflict. A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, has addressed personal messages to R. Nixon, the Pre-

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 7 (March 17, 1970), pp. 10-11. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

sident of the United States, to H. Wilson, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and to G. Pompidou, the President of France, calling attention to the extreme riskiness of the course chosen by the Israeli leadership. . .

U.S. President R. Nixon's and British Prime Minister H. Wilson's replies to the Soviet messages can only arouse the wariness of those who expect a positive initiative from the great powers in the solution of the Near East crisis. The American answer was based essentially on the "balanced" policy of the U.S.A. in the Near East, which U.S. Secretary of State Rogers was trying to justify as far back as the beginning of last December. This policy, when stripped of its verbal trappings, signifies that the aggressor is on a par with his victims, which in fact signifies the encouragement and support of the Israeli aggressor's pretensions. How, for example, can one verbally advocate the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, whose first requirement is that Israeli troops be withdrawn from the occupied territories, while at the same time supplying offensive weapons to the aggressor, who has openly declared his intention to annex the territories he has seized? Isn't the U.S.A. aligning itself with the Israeli aggressors even in the eyes of those who have until recently doubted that America was directly egging on the aggressors in the Near East?

Britain's reply only confirms the extent to which British policy follows in the wake of the American imperialists. It also shows up the hypocrisy of the British ruling circles, who have declared their intention of terminating Britain's "military presence" in regions "east of Suez." Following the example of its senior partner, Britain is determined to pursue identical policies with the hands of others, insofar as possible. But nothing will change as a result of this and Britain too will bear, as she already bears, responsibility for the present tension in the Near East.

The responses to the message from the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers indicate that the imperialists are sinking ever more deeply into political and moral

isolation. World public opinion, alarmed by the exacerbation of the Near East situation, is bringing and will bring increasing pressure to bear on the ruling circles of the powers that are encouraging the Israeli military, directly or indirectly, to compel these powers to take steps toward a political settlement in the Near East on the basis of the Security Council's resolution of Nov. 22, 1967. And the longer the implementation of this resolution is delayed, the greater the responsibility for the dangerous state of affairs in the Near East region that will rest upon the Israeli ruling circles and upon those at their side—the ruling circles of the powers that have given *de facto* support to aggression. Neither large nor small aggressors can evade this responsibility.

It's time to think twice, gentlemen aggressors!

40

Statements on American Middle East Policy in U.S. President Nixon's Report to Congress on Foreign Policy¹

Washington, February 18, 1970

...a peace which speaks not only about the integrity of nations, but also for the integrity of individuals.

Letter to the President of American Near East Refugee Aid, October 21, 1969.

...the peace that is not simply one of words but one which both parties will have a vested interest in maintaining.

Welcoming remark to Prime Minister of Israel, September 25, 1969.

These statements reflect some of my thoughts on the nature of the peace which must come to the Middle East. At the same time, this is an area with great resources and prospects for economic progress. It is the first region of developing nations that

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's Report to Congress as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1602 (March 9, 1970), pp. 303-305.

is near to meeting its capital needs from its own resources.

Yet this area presents one of the sternest tests of our quest for peace through partnership and accommodation of interests. It combines intense local conflict with great power involvement. This combination is all the more dangerous because the outside powers' interests are greater than their control.

Beyond the area of conflict and beyond this era of conflict, the United States is challenged to find new relationships in helping all the people of the area marshal their resources to share in progress.

The most important of the area's conflicts, between Arabs and Israel, is still far from settlement. It has serious elements of intractability, but its importance requires all concerned to devote their energies to helping to resolve it or make it less dangerous.

Local passions in the Middle East run so deep that the parties in conflict are seldom amenable to outside advice or influence. Each side is convinced that vital interests are at stake which cannot be compromised:

— Israel, having lived so long before on a thin margin of security, sees territories occupied in 1967 as providing physical security more tangible than Arab commitments to live at peace—commitments whose nature would be tested only after Israel had relinquished the buffer of the territories.

— For the Arabs, a settlement negotiated directly with the Israelis would require recognition of Israel as a sovereign state even while Israeli troops still occupy territory taken in 1967 and while Arab refugees remain homeless.

— For both sides and for the international community, Jerusalem is a special problem involving not only the civil and political concerns of two states but the interests of three great world religions.

A powerful legacy of fear and mistrust must be overcome if the parties are to be willing to subject their interests and grievances to the procedure of compromise. Until then, no formula acceptable to both sides, and no neutral definition of "a fair and

reasonable settlement," can get very far. However, a settlement should still be sought.

This Administration continues to believe that the United Nations cease-fire resolutions define the minimal conditions that must prevail on the ground if a settlement is to be achieved. We have persistently urged the parties in the area as well as the other major powers to do all possible to restore observance of the cease-fire.

Once those minimal conditions exist, we believe a settlement can only be achieved through the give-and-take of negotiation by those involved, in an atmosphere of mutual willingness to compromise. That is why this Administration has pressed this view in a series of consultations with leaders from the Middle East both in Washington and in their capitals, in bilateral discussions with the outside powers most concerned, and in formal talks with the Soviet Union and in the Four Power forum at the United Nations. In the course of these discussions, we have advanced specific proposals—outlined by Secretary Rogers in his speech of December 9—for creating a framework for negotiation in accordance with the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967. These have been written with the legitimate concerns of all parties firmly in mind. They were made in an effort to try to help begin the process of negotiation under UN Ambassador Jarring's auspices. Observing that the United States maintained friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis, the Secretary of State said that to call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the UN resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs, while calling on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel.

But the United States cannot be expected to assume responsibility alone for developing the terms of peace or for guaranteeing them. Others—in the Middle East and among the great powers—must participate in the search for compromise. Each nation concerned must be prepared to subordinate its special interests to the general interest in peace. In the

Middle East, especially, everyone must participate in making the peace so all will have an interest in maintaining it.

We have not achieved as much as we had hoped twelve months ago through the discussions with the Soviet Union or the Four Power talks. We have gone as far as we believe useful in making new proposals until there is a response from other parties. But we shall continue to participate in the dialogue so long as we can make a contribution.

If the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be finally resolved, at least its scope must be contained and the direct engagement of the major powers limited. For this is a second dimension of the conflict in the Middle East—the rivalries and interests of the major powers themselves.

The interests of the great powers are involved in the contests between local forces, but we also have a common interest in avoiding a direct confrontation. One of the lessons of 1967 was that the local events and forces have a momentum of their own, and that conscious and serious effort is required for the major powers to resist being caught up in them.

In its communications to the Soviet Union and others, this Administration has made clear its opposition to steps which could have the effect of drawing the major powers more deeply into the Arab-Israeli conflict—steps that could only increase the dangers without advancing the prospects for peace.

The activity of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and the Mediterranean has increased in recent years. This has consequences that reach far beyond the Arab-Israeli question. The United States has long-standing obligations and relationships with a number of nations in the Middle East and its policy is to help them enhance their own integrity and freedom. This Administration has shown its readiness to work with the Soviet Union for peace and to work alongside the Soviet Union in cooperation with nations in the area in the pursuit of peace. But the United States would view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek predominance in the

Middle East as a matter of grave concern.

I believe that the time has passed in which powerful nations can or should dictate the future to less powerful nations. The policy of this Administration is to help strengthen the freedom of other nations to determine their own futures. Any effort by an outside power to exploit local conflict for its own advantage or to seek a special position of its own would be contrary to that goal.

For these reasons, this Administration has not only pressed efforts to restore observance of the cease-fire and to help begin the process of negotiating a genuine peace. It has also urged an agreement to limit the shipment of arms to the Middle East as a step which could help stabilize the situation in the absence of a settlement. In the meantime, however, I now reaffirm our stated intention to maintain careful watch on the balance of military forces and to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.

This Administration clearly recognizes that the problem of the Middle East, rooted in a long history of local developments, will be solved only when the parties to the conflict—by reason or resignation—come to accommodate each other's basic, long-run interests. They must recognize that to do less will increasingly endanger everyone's basic goals.

We shall continue to seek to work together with all the region's nations, respecting their legitimate national interests and expecting that they will have the same regard for ours. But the emphasis must be on the word "together." The day is past when the large powers can or should be expected either to determine their course or to solve their problems for them. As the Secretary of State said on December 9:

[Peace] is...a matter of the attitudes and intentions of the parties. Are they ready to coexist with one another? Can a live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust and hate? A peace agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.

The Middle East poses many challenges for the United States. First, of course, is the problem of resolving or containing major causes of conflict. No one should believe that a settlement even of the Arab-Israeli conflict would lead to the complete relaxation of tensions in the area. Other local rivalries and the turmoil accompanying social and economic change will continue to produce possibilities for conflict.

Yet, beyond that, a new problem faces us—the character of a constructive American relationship with an area with large capital resources of its own.

A number of nations in the area are well-launched toward economic modernization. Some of them have substantial revenues to finance this effort, and those that do not will increasingly rely on the efforts of nearby nations to help through regional funds. Large numbers of skilled technicians have been trained, and many of them have crossed borders to help neighbors.

This means that—while the United States will continue to help where it can—the need will decline for capital assistance and for the type of economic assistance which AID and its forerunners have provided. Of course, American technology, investment, education, managerial skills are still much in demand and can offer much in helping break bottle-necks that remain.

The challenge to the United States, therefore, is to find new tools—new programs, new legislation, new policies—that will permit our government and our citizens to relate productively to the first major area of the developing world to be close to meeting most of its capital needs from its own resources. We want to continue to work together. We must therefore—while persisting in the quest for peace—develop new relationships to meet the circumstances and demands of the 1970's.

Beyond the dangerous conflict of today, our vision of the Middle East is of a common effort by all those—the people of the area and friends outside—whose high purpose is to erase the scars of the past and to build

a future consistent with their great heritage and abundant resources.

41

Commentary on the Palestine Resistance Movement by a Correspondent of the New China News Agency¹

February 20, 1970

The heroic people of Palestine are carrying on a valiant armed struggle against Israel, the U.S. imperialist tool of aggression. Every victory they win is a powerful support and encouragement to the revolutionary struggle of the people of the world.

In a recent visit to the Palestinian guerrilla areas, this correspondent was particularly impressed by the heroic spirit of daring to struggle and to win victory displayed by the Palestinian people. And there our great leader Chairman Mao's great truth "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" radiates its brilliance far and wide.

Accompanied by two responsible members of the Palestinian guerrillas, we set out one morning for a visit to a guerrilla base. On the way, one of them, scanning the far-stretching mountain ranges of Jordan, said with emotion: "The road of armed struggle traversed by the Palestinian people is as rugged as the rolling mountains before us. But we are determined to march forward bravely along the road of armed struggle. We will move away all the mountains in our way with the fortitude of the proverbial Foolish Old Man who removed the mountains!" Holding a copy of the Arabic edition of the *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung*, the other responsible member said with firmness: "We are waging a protracted people's war according to Chairman Mao's teachings. We are convinced that final victory belongs to us. U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are hatching 'political

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 8 (February 20, 1970), pp. 23-25.

solution' schemes to induce us to lay down our arms, but they will never succeed. The only road for us is to fight until Israeli Zionism, the dagger U.S. imperialism has thrust into the heart of the Arab nation, is completely smashed!"

On our arrival at a base in the south, we were met by Ismail, a leading member of the guerrillas, who warmly inquired after Chairman Mao's health. He was happy beyond words when we told him that Chairman Mao is in excellent health. Heartily thanking the Chinese people for their firm support to the cause of the liberation of Palestine, he said: "With great Mao Tsetung Thought as our guide and enjoying the firm support of the 700 million Chinese people, we are sure to be victorious!"

One evening, we climbed to the top of a high mountain with some Palestinian friends to look at Palestine at night. Lying before us under a bright moon were the world's lowest depression—the Dead Sea and the valley of Wadi Araba. It was around the Dead Sea and through this basin that group after group of the valiant Palestinian guerrilla fighters advanced to the Israeli-occupied areas where they repeatedly hit out at the enemy. One guerrilla fighter told us: "The circumstances in which we fight are very trying, but the difficulties facing the enemy are greater and even insurmountable. That is why we are sure to win!" Pointing to a myriad of glittering lights on the distant hillside, he said: "That is Jerusalem! How lovely is our homeland! But today it is forcibly occupied by the Israeli aggressors!" He told us how he once penetrated into Jerusalem with his comrades-in-arms to attack the Israeli aggressors. He said: "Once in our homeland and hitting at the enemy on our own land, I felt myself full of strength. If we are to liberate our homeland we must fight. Let the 'four-power talks' and 'political solution' all go to hell!"

Along the Gulf of Aqaba, the Wadi Araba valley and the Dead Sea, the heroic Palestinian guerrillas have established combat bases in the endless chain of rugged mountains. There they thrust into the Israeli-

occupied areas to mount surprise attacks, penetrating deep into the enemy's positions with lightning speed and moving away with the same agility. The guerrilla fighters told us that savage as they are, the Israeli aggressors are cowards. Their aircraft dare not fly low over the base, and they scamper off as soon as our guns go into action. Thus, for all their wanton bombing, they have never really hit any target. The guerrilla fighters said with a smile: "Chairman Mao has taught us that 'all reactionaries are paper tigers.' The U.S. and Israeli planes are also paper tigers." The leader of a guerrilla detachment told us an interesting episode. Some of the bombs dropped by the Israeli aircraft here did not explode. The guerrillas collected these duds, dismantled them and used the explosives for making dynamite packs which they carried into the enemy-occupied areas and "returned with interest" to the Israeli aggressors. He added: "This is what we have learnt from the teachings of Chairman Mao, striking back at the enemy with the weapons captured from him."

"We want armed struggle, not 'political solution'!" This is the common pledge of the Palestinian people. At a rally attended by some 1,000 Palestinian militiamen and refugees in Madaba city, we noticed that whenever a speaker declared "to open a way to victory with guns," the gathering responded with warm applause. In a Fateh hospital, we met a guerrilla fighter who was wounded recently while resisting the suppression by the reactionary Lebanese troops. He said: "For the liberation of their homeland, the Palestinian people fear neither bloodshed nor sacrifice. So long as a single man remains, he will fight on!" He said that he will take up his gun and fight again after recovering from his wounds.

In the southern plains, we had a chat with Atanator, a militiaman in his late forties, in the fields. He had crossed the Jordan River many times together with the guerrillas to attack the enemy, and every time they successfully fulfilled their combat mission. He said that he burnt for revenge whenever he saw the Zionists. He has made the pledge:

"Fight on till I'm too old to move, and fight to the finish!" He said: "The imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries are plotting to force us to lay down our arms and capitulate. We will never tolerate this! I'll fight to my last breath with anyone who wants to take my gun away from me!"

A 75-year-old Palestinian from the west bank of the Jordan River was very excited when he saw us. His first words, which he repeated many times, were: "Chairman Mao is a great man! The Chinese people are good!" This old man has gone through much hardship in his days under the savage rule of the British colonialists and now he saw his beloved homeland ravaged by the Zionist brutes. How he longs for the liberation of his homeland! After recounting to us many moving battle stories, he said: "Old as I am, I'll devote my efforts to the cause of the liberation of Palestine."

Coming from the guerrilla bases and refugee camps, many youngsters, some only 13 or 14 years old, have already taken up arms to fight the Israeli aggressors. Some Palestinian children joined the youth training camps at the age of six or seven, learning how to fight the enemy and preparing themselves for the day when they take over the rifles of the older generation. We met a 10-year-old boy named Safah at the training camp who was learning the skill of climbing, jumping, crossing over obstacles, shooting and demolition work. He told us that his goal was to become a guerrilla fighter, to fight Israel and liberate the homeland, Palestine.

At the end of our visit, the guerrillas at the base asked us to convey their high respects to Chairman Mao and their heartfelt thanks to the Chinese Government and people. Palestine, they pointed out, is their homeland and they will never tolerate the Israeli aggressors trampling upon it. They expressed their determination to persist in the armed struggle against imperialism and Zionism till final victory.

"War has educated the people and it is the people who will win the war." The fighting Palestinian people, firmly grasping the gun,

are determined to wage a prolonged struggle. They will smash all the schemes of imperialism, revisionism and reaction, and defeat the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and liberate their homeland with their guns.

42

Commentary in the People's Daily of China on the Middle East Following the Israeli Bombing of Abu Zaabal, U.A.R.¹

Peking, February 20, 1970

Following its bombing of an iron and steel plant near Cairo, which resulted in more than 100 workers killed or wounded, Israel, the U.S. imperialist tool of aggression, has again flagrantly sent planes to bomb military installations in the vicinity of the U.A.R. capital. The Chinese people express their utmost indignation at the barbarous crimes of aggression committed by U.S. imperialism and the Israeli Zionists and their deepest sympathy with and most resolute support for the U.A.R. people and the people of other Arab countries who are waging a heroic struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors.

War provocations by Israeli Zionism against the Arab countries have recently become extremely frenzied and blatant. Throwing all scruples to the winds, the Israeli Zionists dispatched troops to invade U.A.R.'s Shadwan Island and frequently sent planes to carry out wanton bombing raids on the U.A.R. interior. They also sent their aircraft to harass and make provocations against Syria and their planes and tanks to intrude into Jordan. These aggressive activities which were firmly rebuffed by the Arab people and the Palestinian guerrillas have stirred up greater depths of indignation among the people of the Arab countries and kindled new flames of struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggression.

It is only too clear that it is entirely due to

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 9 (February 27, 1970), pp. 19-20.

the manipulation behind the scenes by U.S. imperialism that Israel has dared to commit such flagrant aggression against the Arab countries. Before the Israeli bombing raid on the outskirts of Cairo, Richard Nixon had openly declared that the United States would increase its military "aid" to Israel. The *New York Times* revealed that the United States decided to give Israel 105 more military aircraft and openly instigated Israel to step up its bombing of the U.A.R. and the bases of the Palestinian guerrillas. U.S. imperialism is the arch criminal who engineered the crime of bombing the Cairo iron and steel plant and other atrocities. Workers and other sections of the people in Arab countries will rise up and settle accounts with U.S. imperialism and its lackey Israel for their atrocities and demand that they pay up all these bloody debts!

Our great leader Chairman Mao teaches us: "All reactionary forces on the verge of extinction invariably conduct desperate struggles. They are bound to resort to military adventure and political deception in all their forms in order to save themselves from extinction."

While egging Israel on in its aggression and provocation, U.S. imperialism pulled a sanctimonious face, declaring that its "position" in the Middle East "is fair and balanced," that it is concerned with "peace" in the region, etc. All this is just so much poppycock. From the blood shed by their massacred brothers the Arab people see through the vicious nature of U.S. imperialism. As the Libyan newspaper *Al Raed* pointed out, all aggressions against Arab territory are engineered by U.S. imperialism and Zionism, and the Arab people should cherish no illusions about the United States which fosters Israel. The Arab people have come to realize more and more clearly that only by taking up arms to wage an unyielding struggle against the aggression of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys can they boot out the aggressors, recover the land occupied by the enemy and liberate their ravaged homeland.

The 700 million Chinese people firmly

stand on the side of the Arab people and resolutely support them in waging their sacred struggle against aggression through to the end. We are convinced that so long as the Arab people are united and persist in their struggle they will overcome all difficulties, smash all the plots and conspiracies of imperialism and win final victory in their struggle against aggression.

43

U.S.S.R. News Agency TASS Statement on the Occasion of the Visit of Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Chairman Arafat to the Soviet Union (Condensed)¹

Moscow, February 20, 1970

A delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) headed by Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the P.L.O. executive committee, was in the Soviet Union from Feb. 10 to Feb. 20 at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee....

Talks took place in Moscow between the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation on questions of interest to both organizations, including cooperation in the common struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israel's imperialist Zionist aggression and in defense of the lawful rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine.

The members of the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation told about their people's struggle and about the people's resistance in the territories occupied by the Israeli usurpers—resistance that grows more intense with each passing day.

The delegation expressed sincere thanks to the Soviet people for their steadfast and

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 8 (March 24, 1970), p. 18. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

firm support of the Arab people's just struggle.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee emphatically condemned the Israeli aggressors' provocations against the Arab peoples—provocations that are continuing with the support of U.S. imperialist circles—and the aggressors' crimes against the civilian population of the occupied Arab lands. It was emphasized that the Soviet people have sided resolutely with the Arab people against the Israeli aggressors and their imperialist supporters and in support of the Palestinian Arab people's national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle.

The talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere....

44

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Kenya (Excerpts)¹

Nairobi, February 20, 1970

The President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and his wife made an official visit to Kenya from February 12 to 20, 1970, at the invitation of President Jomo Kenyatta.

In regard to the Middle East crisis, it was stated that a stable and just settlement could only be reached through the application of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. The recent escalation of military activity was a serious menace to peace and order in that area. The present situation necessitated an honourable and lasting solution of the problem to be found immediately.

45

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Uganda (Excerpts)²

Entebbe, February 20, 1970

The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and his wife visited Uganda on Friday, February 20, 1970, at the invitation of the President of Uganda, Dr. A. Milton Obote.

The two presidents expressed concern about the situation in the Middle East and reaffirmed their conviction that a peaceful political formula could be found within the framework of the provisions of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

46

U.S. State Department Statement Deploing Sabotage of Civil Aircraft³

Washington, February 21, 1970

The facts surrounding the tragic destruction of the Swiss airliner and its passengers over Wurenlingen are still not known. We extend our deepest sympathy to the Government of Switzerland and to the families of the innocent victims.

We have noted the reported claim of responsibility for this disaster, as well as for the attack against an Austrian airliner over Frankfurt, Germany, by an organization calling itself the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine General Command.

Certainly the conscience of the civilized

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 478 (March 5, 1970), p. 16.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1603 (March 16, 1970), p. 344.

³ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 478 (March 5, 1970), p. 15.

world will be shocked by these claims and outraged should they prove true.

These events point up the urgent need for intensifying efforts to curb terrorist attacks against innocent civilian air travel.

47

Communiqué Issued by the Federal Council of Switzerland on Security Measures To Be Taken in the Aftermath of the Swissair Airliner Disaster¹

Berne, February 23, 1970

Dans sa séance extraordinaire d'aujourd'hui, le Conseil fédéral s'est occupé à nouveau de la tragique catastrophe aérienne de Würenlingen. Il réitère l'expression de sa profonde sympathie aux familles des victimes. Le Gouvernement se fera représenter aux cérémonies funéraires par les conseillers fédéraux Bonvin et Brugger.

Le Conseil fédéral a pris connaissance des derniers résultats de l'enquête et constaté qu'on ne peut pas encore en tirer de conclusions certaines sur les causes de la catastrophe. Toutefois, l'examen des débris a confirmé nettement les déclarations des pilotes, à savoir qu'une explosion est à l'origine de la catastrophe.

Eu égard aux indications dont il dispose en ce moment, le Conseil fédéral a pris les décisions suivantes:

1. *Mesures de sécurité*

a) Les organes de la police frontière et des aéronefs poursuivront l'application des mesures de contrôle renforcé sur les aéroports.

b) La Swissair est autorisée, lorsque la sécurité des vols l'exige à suspendre à bref délai certains vols ou l'acheminement du fret et des colis postaux, par dérogation aux articles 5 et 6 de la concession d'exploitation du 19 décembre 1966. Le Conseil fédéral reste compétent pour prendre des mesures plus étendues.

2. *Convocation d'une conférence de sécurité aérienne*

Le directeur de l'Office fédéral de l'air est chargé, au nom du Conseil fédéral, de proposer au président du Conseil de l'Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale, qui siège actuellement à Montréal, de convoquer immédiatement une conférence internationale de sécurité.

La Suisse est prête à inviter cette conférence à se réunir sur son territoire.

Le Département politique fédéral est chargé, en plus de cette conférence d'étudier d'autres mesures propres à améliorer la sécurité aérienne sur le plan international.

3. *Mesures de police des étrangers*

a) Pour prévenir la répétition d'actes de terrorisme sur territoire suisse, le Conseil fédéral s'est résolu à rétablir l'obligation de visa pour tous les pays arabes. Cette décision n'est pas dirigée contre les gouvernements de ces Etats ni contre leurs ressortissants. Elle vise à établir si parmi les voyageurs arabes ne se trouvent pas des membres des organisations palestiniennes pratiquant le terrorisme à l'étranger. En effet, les ressortissants palestiniens ne pouvant pas disposer de passeports nationaux, ils voyagent généralement sous le couvert de passeports délivrés par différentes puissances arabes. C'est ce qui explique la nécessité d'un contrôle minutieux.

b) Le Département politique fédéral et le Département fédéral de justice et police sont chargés d'élaborer des directives rendant plus sévère la pratique suivie en matière de délivrance des visas, afin d'éviter dans toute la mesure du possible l'entrée en Suisse d'éléments indésirables.

c) La Police fédérale des étrangers est chargée, de concert avec les autorités cantonales de police, de renforcer également les mesures de contrôle à l'intérieur du pays.

d) Les agents des douanes et de la police frontière sont invités à renforcer le contrôle des bagages à la frontière.

4. Le Conseil fédéral a chargé ses ambassades dans les pays intéressés de porter ces mesures

¹ Text provided on request by the Embassy of Switzerland, Beirut.

à la connaissance des gouvernements auprès desquels elles sont accréditées. Il attend qu'ils désapprouvent formellement les actes terroristes commis à l'étranger et qu'ils fassent tout ce qui dépend d'eux pour empêcher de semblables actes.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Sudan (Excerpt)¹

Khartoum, February 23, 1970

The two heads of state [Tito and Numeiry] expressed concern at the further aggravation of the Middle East crisis. Israel's annexationist policy coupled with the United States' support for that country, which refuses to withdraw her troops from occupied Arab territories, is hampering efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the problem. The two presidents extend their unreserved support to the Arab peoples in their endeavours to reassert their inalienable and legitimate rights over the territories which have been taken from them by force, including the rights to freedom and self-determination of the Palestinian people whose liberation movement is becoming an increasingly significant military, moral and political factor in the prevailing constellation of forces in the Middle East.

The two presidents condemn the escalation of Israeli aggression against the Arab people and particularly the bombing and killing of the civilian population and air raids on non-military targets.

The two presidents pointed out that it was impermissible to usurp foreign territory by war and demanded that Israeli troops be immediately withdrawn from all the Arab territories which they occupied after June 5,

1967. This demand is in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, the UN Charter and other resolutions whose basic provisions grant peoples under foreign domination the right to fight with all available means for their national liberation.

49

Press Conference by President Pompidou of France at the U.S. National Press Club (Excerpt)²

Washington, February 24, 1970

Q. A votre avis, quelles mesures concrètes devraient être prises afin d'apaiser la tension toujours croissante de la crise du Moyen-Orient?

R. Ah!... Si j'avais un lapin dans mon chapeau, je le sortirais tout de suite. Malheureusement, je crois que personne n'a la solution. Mais tout le monde se rend bien compte qu'il est indispensable d'arriver dans les délais les plus brefs à rétablir la paix. La paix, cela veut dire que chacun des États du Moyen-Orient pourra vivre en bonne harmonie avec ses voisins à l'intérieur de frontières sûres, reconnues par tous et avec tous les droits d'un Etat souverain et indépendant. C'est vrai, avant tout, pour l'Etat d'Israël. Nous n'en sommes pas là et, chaque jour, la situation s'aggrave et l'escalade continue. Nous pensons, quant à nous, que le meilleur moyen à l'heure actuelle, le seul de commencer à progresser vers la paix, c'est dans la Conférence des Quatre, c'est de mettre sur le papier les points sur lesquels les Quatre sont parvenus à un accord ou croient être parvenus à un accord—on ne le saura que quand cela sera rédigé. Sur ces bases, M. Jarring pourrait reprendre sa mission.

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), No. 478 (March 5, 1970), p. 17.

² *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1970, (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), pp. 58-60.

Ce n'est pas que je pense que les problèmes pour cela seront résolus, je pense simplement qu'il faut engager l'escalade de la paix plutôt que de continuer l'escalade de la guerre.

Q. Vous avez récemment proposé au Premier Ministre soviétique, M. Kossyguine, que les Quatre Grands demandent conjointement un retour au cessez-le-feu des Nations Unies au Moyen-Orient et que les troupes des Nations Unies surveillent à nouveau cette région. Quelle réponse avez-vous reçue?

R. Vous faites allusion à la réponse que le Gouvernement français a faite à la note que M. Kossyguine avait adressée aux trois autres gouvernements. Quant à la réponse soviétique, nous la connaissons par ce qui s'est passé au cours de la dernière réunion des quatre puissances; il est évident qu'on n'est pas encore mûr pour une résolution sur cet appel au cessez-le-feu dans les conditions où la France le conçoit, mais il ne suffit pas d'espérer pour entreprendre ni de réussir pour persévérer.

Q. Au cours d'une récente interview, vous avez dit que l'Europe était vulnérable sur son flanc méditerranéen et que la France se devait de prévenir l'établissement d'une puissance extérieure dans cette région. Ceci est la politique française. Ne serait-il pas logique d'en revenir à une coopération militaire avec l'OTAN en Méditerranée? Est-ce que l'installation des Egyptiens en Libye, qui viennent en aide au nouveau régime, ne peut pas favoriser la pénétration vers l'Ouest d'équipes d'assistance soviétique?

R. Les deux questions peuvent être liées naturellement mais elles peuvent être aussi considérées séparément. Il suffit de regarder une carte et de voir où sont l'Europe et la Méditerranée pour se rendre compte qu'il y a un moyen d'attaquer l'Europe par le Sud, par la Méditerranée. Par conséquent, il est normal que le problème de la défense de l'Europe se pose dans cette région comme ailleurs. En second lieu, il suffit de regarder une carte pour voir que la France est directement intéressée à tout ce qui se passe en Méditerranée. Les Etats-Unis ont une pré-

sence importante en Méditerranée. Ils considèrent que la Méditerranée fait partie de leurs intérêts, des zones où ils doivent être présents; bien d'autres pays sont dans le même cas. Pour la France, ce n'est pas un problème de politique, c'est un problème de géographie. Nous y sommes et nous sommes obligés de nous en préoccuper. Nous sommes d'autant plus obligés de nous en préoccuper que nous avons des rapports extrêmement étroits avec la plupart de ces pays méditerranéens. C'est vrai du Maroc, c'est vrai de l'Algérie, c'est vrai de la Tunisie. Cela devient chaque jour plus vrai de l'Espagne. Cela doit devenir chaque jour plus vrai de l'Italie et d'autres encore sans exception. C'est une des raisons pour lesquelles dans l'affaire libyenne le Gouvernement français a réagi comme il a réagi. Parce qu'il s'est trouvé qu'un vide s'est créé tout à coup en Libye, un vide que nous n'avons rien fait pour provoquer, chacun peut en rendre témoignage, mais qui existait et que la politique et la France sont comme la nature, elles ont horreur du vide. Il y avait un vide à remplir et nous avons pensé que c'était notre intérêt, et j'ajoute l'intérêt de bien d'autres de le remplir. Alors, vous me parlez de l'OTAN. C'est une tout autre question, en réalité. Je répondrai que la collaboration avec nos alliés pour nous est aussi naturelle et aussi importante que le fait que nous ne voulions pas être dans une organisation intégrée et que nous voulions garder ce que le Général de Gaulle a appelé notre indépendance, c'est-à-dire notre liberté de décision. Nous sommes des alliés de libre choix et non pas des alliés d'obligation.

Quant à la présence en Libye de conseillers égyptiens, elle est bien possible et je ne m'en étonnerai point. Qu'elle ouvre des voies, je n'en sais rien, le moins qu'on puisse dire, en tous cas, c'est que la présence éventuelle de conseillers français n'est pas pour rendre nécessaire l'introduction des autres quels qu'ils soient.

Q. Du fait de l'intérêt que soulève cette question pour les Etats-Unis, pouvez-vous dire en termes simples, peut-être même peu diplomatiques, si la politique française soutient les Etats arabes contre

Israël parce que c'est pour elle un but essentiel ou bien a-t-elle d'autres objectifs?

R. La capitale de la France n'est pas le Caire. Je dois dire que ce n'est pas non plus Tel-Aviv. Nous cherchons dans cette affaire la paix dans notre intérêt, dans l'intérêt de la situation en Méditerranée et dans l'intérêt général et je vous dis que rien ne serait plus grave que de transformer le conflit entre l'Etat d'Israël et le monde arabe en un conflit entre l'Est et l'Ouest. La position de la France est, en grande partie, dictée par le souci de faire qu'il y ait dans l'Ouest un pays qui, sans être d'un clan contre l'autre, ne soit pas non plus de l'autre contre l'un. Nous ne sommes pas contre Israël. D'abord, nous avons avec Israël et nous avons eu des relations extrêmement étroites. Quand je vois que l'on écrit dans les journaux que la maîtrise de l'air risque d'aller aux Arabes à cause de la France, je suis obligé de constater que, dans le ciel du Moyen-Orient, ne volent que des Mirages israéliens. Mais, outre ces liens du passé nous avons la conviction que l'Etat d'Israël, puisqu'il existe, doit survivre et doit pouvoir vivre en paix et en toute tranquillité, et que cette paix et cette tranquillité ne peuvent venir que de l'accord avec ses voisins. Il faut que l'Etat d'Israël ne soit pas une sorte de tête de pont dans le monde arabe, mais qu'il se fonde dans un ensemble du Moyen-Orient où, Juifs, Musulmans et Chrétiens acceptent de vivre ensemble, de se connaître, de coopérer, de se comprendre. C'est une nécessité vitale pour cette région du monde, vitale pour la paix et vitale peut-être encore plus pour Israël qui est dans une position dangereuse par définition, comme on le voit bien sur la carte et qui ne trouvera son avenir et sa sécurité que dans l'entente avec ses voisins. Vous me direz, peut-être, "poussez-les à la négociation directe, à la conversation directe"—voyez, je vais au-devant de vos questions et je vous réponds: si ces conversations directes étaient possibles, si les bases d'une paix par des conversations directes existaient, nous y pousserions de toute notre force. Mais nous croyons à l'heure actuelle que le climat n'y est pas. Le fanatisme qui monte des deux

côtés ne les rend pas possible. Nous pensons, par conséquent, que le rôle des Nations Unies et, en particulier, le rôle des quatre membres du Conseil permanent de Sécurité, c'est de définir, de proposer des conditions générales permettant d'aboutir à un accord, accord qui, au bout du compte, évidemment, devra être signé par les intéressés, c'est-à-dire devra devenir un jour ou l'autre un accord direct.

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Address by President Pompidou of France to the U.S. Congress (Excerpt)¹

Washington, February 25, 1970

How could I not also mention the conflict in the Middle East? Judging its existence threatened, the State of Israel has started a preventive action which has brought it undeniable success on the battlefield. France has indicated her position in terms which have often been criticized or misunderstood. Faithful to the United Nations resolution for which our two countries voted, I reaffirm here the right of the State of Israel not only to existence but also to security and the free exercise of all the rights of an independent and sovereign state. But who cannot see the precarious and in the long run the barren nature of military success? Who does not understand that there is no assured future for Israel outside a lasting entente with the world which surrounds it—entente which implies renunciation of military conquest and the solution of the Palestinian problems. Such a result, in a situation where emotions and fanatical passions are increasing daily, should, to be quickly reached, proceed from United Nations action and in particular from the agreement of the four permanent members of the Security Council to define

¹ *Congressional Record*, February 25, 1970, p. 4714.

and propose the general conditions for a settlement and to provide the guarantees for it.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to the U.A.R. (Excerpt)¹

Aswan and Belgrade, February 25, 1970

At the invitation of the President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, made an official visit to the United Arab Republic from February 23rd to the 25th, 1970.

During the visit, throughout which the Arab people expressed their deep feeling of friendship, and which was marked by the warm welcome given to the Yugoslav president, the two heads of state, President Josip Broz Tito and President Gamal Abdel Nasser held talks in Aswan in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding.

The two Presidents talked over the present international situation and the problem of the Middle East arising from Israeli aggression against the Arab states. In this connection, they discussed the unyieldingly aggressive stand taken by Israel, its continued occupation of the territories of Arab countries, its constant violation of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, its provocation to the Security Council by refusing to adhere to the Council's resolution, particularly that of November 22, 1967, and its latest act of aggression in bombing factory buildings and sowing death among the civilian population. The two leaders agreed that Israel's continued aggression not only undermines possibilities for peace and security in the Middle East, but actually threatens international peace. For this reason

all peace-loving nations should take a firm stand against Israeli aggression.

President Tito and President Nasser felt that Israel would not be able to take such an aggressive stand if it did not receive encouragement and assistance from various outside quarters, particularly from the United States of America, which enables it to realize its expansionist and, for the time being, also colonial aims.

President Nasser and President Tito thought that the struggle of the Palestine people to regain their usurped rights is a legitimate and justified struggle that should be supported and aided by all peace-loving countries. The two Presidents reaffirmed their belief that the Palestine nation should be enabled to gain their inalienable rights to self-determination and to decide on their own future.

Hence the two Presidents were in complete accord that a just and durable peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, and without a full reestablishment of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Arab peoples of Palestine.

The two parties agreed on the significance of the role of the United Nations in achieving international peace and security. They expressed the opinion that the member countries of the world organization must use their influence in order to have the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its bodies observed and enforced.

The two Presidents reaffirmed their dedication to the policy of non-alignment which they regard to be of essential significance. They express the belief that the non-aligned countries can objectively help in the solving of international problems by peaceful methods, lay down foundations for international peace and security, and strengthen democratic principles in international relations.

President Tito and President Nasser agreed that it was the duty of the non-aligned countries as members of the United Nations to take up a firm stand against any member country of the United Nations which by refusing to respect the resolutions of this

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 478 (March 5, 1970), p. 18.

organization or by preventing their application, fails to fulfil its obligations to the United Nations Charter. This, the two Presidents felt, was of the utmost importance if this organization was to continue enjoying the confidence of its members and to realize its goals.

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French Newspaper Interview with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on U.A.R. President Nasser's Interview with Le Monde¹

Brussels, late February 1970

Q: President Nasser's latest declarations are represented as a significant turning point in Egypt's attitude. For the first time, the Egyptian head of state seems to have admitted the possibility of following a peace settlement with "economic and diplomatic relations" with Israel. Do you think there's been a genuine change in Cairo?

Eban: Everyone knows that I would not be the last to be interested in a genuine change in Cairo; but the wished-for change won't be brought about by pretending it exists when it doesn't.

I have studied President Nasser's statements to *Le Monde* very closely. The words you quote aren't in them. On the contrary, the question put to him was, "Might you one day go so far as to establish economic and diplomatic relations?" Nasser refused to answer the question directly and took refuge behind an ambivalent formula, saying notably that if Israel was ready to evacuate all the territories, to accept almost total militarization of Sinai, to resign herself to a renewal of the blockade of the Straits of Tiran after three years, to see the Holy

Places—Christian, Jewish and Muslim—restored to Amman, to accept the return of Syrian troops to the Golan Heights, to accord hundreds of thousands of Arabs the opportunity of inundating Israel and eradicating her national character—if all that happens, "there won't be any more problems between the Arab states and Israel." Nasser is right: in those circumstances "there won't be any more problems," because Israel will have effectively ceased to exist as a sovereign Jewish state. Those who know the Nasserist lexicon will have no trouble identifying in Nasser's proposals the policies backed by Arafat, that is the step by step liquidation of the Israeli reality. It is in this sense that, tomorrow or the day after, Nasser will explain his statements to the Arab people, and he must be taken at his word. I don't blame him at all: he is once more showing the unvarying consistency of his ideas. I am amazed at the excessive naïveté of those who refuse to recognize the obvious meaning of these words.

What shocks me in the statement quoted is the total lack of sincerity in regard to known and proven facts; Nasser says he never threatened Israel with destruction and that he never intended to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. However, I myself heard the declarations which at the time resounded throughout the world extolling the destruction of Israel (*izalat Israel*) and announcing the closing of the gulf with the aim of forcing Israel into confrontation.

Millions of people of all nations remember these declarations made in the month of May 1967, as well as the reactions they provoked. I find this deception disconcerting in the extreme. No one is obliged to accept Israel's views; all we ask is that no one make fun of us, for our existence and our most vital interests are at stake.

Q: President Nasser's latest interview is remarkable too for what it doesn't say. Not once does he make any mention of a Palestinian "people" or "nation." Do you think that this attitude will make a peace settlement easier? Does the Israeli government from its side rule out the idea that

¹ Translated from the French text in *Le Monde*, February 25, 1970, pp. 1 and 4. For Nasser's interview, see *Le Monde*, February 19, 1970, pp. 1, 2.

the Palestinian organizations could find a place and play a role in any eventual negotiations?

Eban: The opinion of the Palestinian population is not represented by "organizations" based outside the territory where these populations live. Those who wish that Israel cease to be Israel cannot play a positive role in the resolution of the conflict. For Nasser is right, at least, in emphasizing the responsibility of the sovereign Arab states. It is those governments who started the war who must also negotiate the peace. However, we have told the Palestinian leaders that if they want to serve as a means of communication between Israel and the Arab world, we would be willing to encourage them along the way to dialogue.

Q: *Isn't the policy of in-depth bombing, even if it entails military advantages for Israel, arousing unfavorable reactions in the diplomatic arena?*

Eban: I find everywhere a recognition of the fact that if Egypt renounces the terms of the cease-fire and takes upon itself the right to wage a war of attrition against us, Israel has the right to meet this challenge. Both the military and the diplomatic consequences of our aerial response could be eliminated once and for all by the simple acceptance of the cease-fire. I have the impression that world public opinion backs us in this position. By repudiating the cease-fire, Nasser has guaranteed the legitimacy of our response. After Mrs. Meir's declarations, it is incumbent upon Nasser to make the choice between combat and the cessation of hostilities in conformity with the resolution accepted by him and by us on June 10, 1967.

Q: *Israel proposes a return to the cease-fire as soon as Egypt ends the war of harassment. Don't you think that your government could itself take the initiative with a view to commencing de-escalation along the Suez Canal?*

Eban: Our initiative has been taken. The declarations of my government in favor of the cease-fire are known. If Nasser takes the opportunity we have offered him, de-escalation will be complete.

Q: *On the Israeli side, it is affirmed that the bombings of Egyptian territory are in no way designed to "bring about the fall of Nasser." Do you believe, however, that the personality of the Egyptian president plays a decisive role and that his eventual departure will lead to a softening of the Egyptian attitude?*

Eban: The decisive role of the Egyptian president's personality is known. It was he who started the war, and it is he who now refuses to negotiate peace. It is difficult for me to conceive of the possibility that Nasser would want to make peace, but I am willing to be convinced by evidence to the contrary. However, that still doesn't exist. The refusal to re-establish the cease-fire is a bad omen. After all, the cease-fire is pre-requisite to any sincere attempt to promote peace. Nasser does not accept that. However, it goes without saying that refusal of the cease-fire signifies refusal of peace.

Israel has neither the right nor the responsibility to select Egyptian leaders. For my part, I am convinced that the Nasser era has been a disaster for Egypt and the Near East. Nasser's anti-Israel and anti-Western obsessions, as well as his desire for hegemony and his aspirations for dominance in the Arab world, have brought this region a period of uninterrupted tensions, rivalries, wars, and global complications, with the suppression of the surging social development which could have predominated in the history of the Near East. What could have been worse than that? Nasser exerts against Israel the maximum of hate and violence of which his country is capable. No one can outdo him in this domain.

On June 9, 1967, Nasser had the courage to proffer his own resignation. This was the logical outcome of the initiatives which he had so disastrously taken in May 1967. But it has become obvious that any other consideration is with him subordinated to the passion to hold on to his position. Having said that, I repeat that we are ready to negotiate with any Egyptian regime, present or future.

Q: *President Nasser blames your government*

for not having replied to Ambassador Jarring's inquiries requesting a definition of "secure and recognized borders" as they are conceived of in Jerusalem. Do you think that it would be absolutely impossible to treat the problem of a territorial settlement before Israel and the Arab states meet around a single negotiating table?

Eban: Nasser, Hussein and the others are perfectly aware of our territorial conceptions. I say "conceptions" in general, for Israel cannot unilaterally "define" secure and recognized borders. It is negotiation alone which can determine them. Our refusal to bind ourselves definitely and with precision to an exact line reflects our moderation. Those who want to oblige us to "draw lines" wish simply to see Israel accused of unilateral annexation—and that for purposes of propaganda.

As for the border with Egypt, we have emphasized the question of Sharm el-Sheikh. We don't dare run the risk of a third war to defend a legitimate and innocent interest which should have always been recognized without objection.

The statement Nasser made to *Le Monde* will strengthen our already passionate conviction that without continued Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, the blockade, and so war, would become inevitable. Nasser refuses any solution which would insure our shipping and related interests. He announces a war after a period of three years. In effect, nothing prevents him from expelling international forces before the time he proposes.

Q. Taking into account, in particular, the demographic disproportion between the Arab countries and yours, do you think that time "works" for or against Israel?

Eban: I am aware of the problem of the demographic imbalance between Israel and the Arab states. This is not a new phenomenon. To me time doesn't work at all. All depends on the work men do with time. But I don't accept the fatality Nasser expressed concerning the influence of time in favor of his policies. First of all, we have

amassed instructive experience in the past. In June 1957 Mr. [John] Foster Dulles told me in Washington: "You can hold on well today. But if you haven't gotten a settlement ten years from now, your situation will be disastrous and you will be crushed by the Arab preponderance." However, in June 1967 the situation wasn't altogether disastrous for Israel.

In my opinion, the same logic will apply in the decade 1970-1980. Demographic weight is not a decisive factor in the age of technology and will not lead to a genuine change in the balance of power. For that there would have to be a complete social revolution in Egypt, a revolution in the field of education. But if this revolution did take place, it would favor a much more moderate attitude in the international and regional spheres.

Above all, I gather that Nasser hasn't the courage to face the truth. He wants, for example, to believe that Israeli pilots are imported from outside and not trained in Israel. He has never wanted to recognize the autonomous sources of Israel's vitality. He who won't recognize his adversary will never be able to defeat him.

To state that time "works" against Israel has no meaning for a people for whom exile and the regaining of independence happened over the period of a thousand years.

To Nasser's proposals we oppose the fundamental principles of our policy: cease-fire, negotiation, final and agreed-upon determination of borders, international dialogue on the refugee problem, establishment of a lasting peace with a view to the formation of a community of sovereign states in the Near East inspired by the principles of community adopted in Western Europe.

Statement on the Middle East to the West German Bundestag by F.R.G. Foreign Minister Scheel¹

Bonn, late February 1970

During the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister, we were able to talk about this crisis centre. We had the opportunity of discussing in detail the threatening situation in the Middle East, as also during the visit of the Jordanian Prime Minister a few weeks ago. In order to relate government policy to this centre of crisis, the government has aimed at renouncing equivocality of any kind and at bringing its view to bear equally on all the governments of this area.

As desirable as a balance in relations to the Arab states and Israel may be, this balance is not the decisive thing about our relations in this area. Our greatest interest is in preserving the peace, which is threatened in a most dangerous way in the Middle East. Our policy towards this area will be determined mainly by the wish to contribute to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the conflict. We have no direct possibility of doing this, because we are not one of the world powers that are directly involved in this problem. In addition, we have no diplomatic relations with a number of countries in this area. Our influence is naturally limited by this. But we shall do everything we can in order to serve a peace settlement in this area.

¹ English text in *The Bulletin* (F.R.G.), XVIII, 8 (March 10, 1970), p. 57.

Television Interview Statements by G.D.R. Deputy Foreign Minister Kiese-wetter on Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's Talks in the F.R.G.²

Berlin, February 26, 1970

Q. At his first official visit to Bonn, Israel's Foreign Minister Eban discussed the further consolidation of the special imperialist alliance between Bonn and Tel Aviv founded by Adenauer and continued by Erhard and Kiesinger with leading members of the Federal Government. What do you think of the Israeli Foreign Minister's visit to West Germany, Mr. Minister?

A. The negotiations between West Germany and Israel carried on behind closed doors concerned the further extensive economic, political and also military assistance to be rendered Israel by the West German Federal Government with a view to enabling the former country to continue its aggressive and expansionist policy.

Considerable funds have for years been flowing from Bonn into the Israeli military budget and the West German monopolies consider Israeli armament industry a profitable capital investment. Though the West German statesmen have always tried to make the world believe that the Federal Republic was not supplying Israel with arms, the facts give the lie to them. Israel still receives diverse military assistance; also armament experts are sent there.

Regarding economic matters, the West German Government gave Israel the greatest measure of support when an EEC preference treaty for Israel was discussed. The Israeli Foreign Minister's praise for his West German partners reveals that agreements were reached on new West German credits for Israel.

Mr. Eban announced that he had found that the political views held by Israel did not differ much from those of the Federal Republic. This is also rather revealing with regard to the Bonn-Tel Aviv axis.

² English text in *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (G.D.R.), X, 8 (March 16, 1970), p. 57.

There is no condemning the barbarian raids of the UAR by Israeli bomber pilots on the part of West German statesmen. The West German Federal Government sympathizes with the terrorist policy pursued by Israel towards peaceful Arabs, welcoming the stepped up course of Israeli aggression in the Middle East. The West German Government does not demand that the Israeli occupation forces withdraw without delay from the occupied Arab territories.

Eban's remark that there had been no mention of neutrality in his talks shows that what Messrs. Brandt and Scheel have always tried to hide is true: The SPD/FDP Government in Bonn is pursuing a definitely anti-Arab policy as did its predecessors. There is no such thing as the frequently professed "neutrality" towards the Arab states. Bonn is backing the cause of the Israeli aggressor and not of the invaded Arab states.

The West German Government put its press and information services at the disposal of the visitor from Israel to slander President Nasser, the Soviet Union and the GDR.

The GDR will continue its consistently anti-imperialist foreign policy, it will continue to condemn the imperialist policy pursued by Israel in defiance of international law, a course which is menacing peace, and strongly support the Arab peoples in their just struggle against Israeli aggression and for independence and social progress.

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U.K. Television Interview Statements by Prime Minister Meir of Israel on the Swissair Airliner Disaster and on Arms Supply to the Middle East¹

London, February 26, 1970

Llew Gardner: Minister, may we start with the latest events following the hi-jacking and shooting of your planes—we now have a Swissair plane

exploding in mid-air with 47 people killed. What do you want the governments of the world to do to stop this kind of thing?

Golda Meir: Well, I think that one must find out what it is that can be done at the source. These people are not just individuals, mad men or bitter men as you have around the world somewhere. These are organizations dedicated to kill and to bring down planes for Israelis. But wherever Israelis are, therefore, their planes must come down. They started with El Al and now they've gone on. These people are organised, they have a base, the bases in the Arab countries. The Arab countries openly support them with money, with arms, with possibilities of training—that's where they start out from—that's where they come back to. The Arab countries and their governments don't deny that these organisations have their sympathy and aid and understanding. They come back after hi-jacking the plane or after trying to destroy a plane, come back to the Arab countries as heroes. These Arab countries have airlines, some of them at any rate. They have airports. Now it seems to us that it is only natural for airlines, governments that have airlines, to say to Arab countries, if you want to participate in the community of air travel you play the game decently. I think now everybody feels that piracy of this kind and murderous acts of this kind—it cannot be limited only to Israel. I don't think it should have been allowed to go on even if it was only the El Al planes, but now I think it's quite evident. Of course, there's maybe another way out, but I can't imagine that a civilised world in the 20th century would adopt that.

Gardner: What other way out?

Meir: That is to say in so many words to the terrorists—well if that's what you want, well we'll help in a certain way. We won't fly to Israel, we won't fly any mail to Israel, we'll help you boycott Israel.

Gardner: If the world governments do nothing, what will you do?

Meir: We'll have to protect ourselves.

¹ Excerpted from an interview broadcast on the Thames TV program "This Week"; transcript provided on request by Thames TV; reprinted by permission.

Gardner: How?

Meir: We'll see, the best way we can. Not and—not attacking innocent victims, innocent passengers, that we don't do.

Gardner: Could we presume that there might be something like the Beirut raid again, might there, might Damascus airport go up?

Meir: I don't know. I'll tell you honestly that if I did know what we were going to do I don't think I would tell you.

Gardner: Prime Minister, after gunmen shot up your plane in Zurich you launched a massive retaliation raid on Beirut airport and yet the incidents have gone on. Doesn't this show that a policy of retaliation against governments for the action of guerillas just doesn't work?

Meir: What did we do against the Beirut airport? Did—was any person hurt? Our boys that went to Beirut, they didn't see to it that all the people that were wandering around at the airport should be, should get out of the way?

Gardner: But it didn't stop it, did it, Prime Minister, you were saying in fact that you'll have to do something, maybe somebody will have to get hurt?

Meir: No I don't want—we never go out to hurt anybody, anybody that is innocent. Sometimes innocent people are hurt, but that is not our intention....

Gardner: Yes but....

Meir: And it's not because we do not do everything possible not to hurt people.

Gardner: There are people presumably in the Arab countries who you would say are not innocent, who might get hurt.

Meir: I think our passengers on the Swiss plane, ours and other nationals, were innocent people.

Gardner: Both sides in the Middle East talk about an imbalance of power, the Arabs say that they need new weaponry to keep up

with you, you say that you need new weaponry to keep up with the Arabs. If you get the 50 Phantoms from the Americans, will this in fact correct the imbalance of power in your favour?

Meir: It will correct some of the imbalance. President Nasser said only several days ago he has—it isn't a question that he doesn't have enough planes, he said, we have planes but I don't have enough pilots. Supposing he gets more planes, will he have more pilots of his own? He said that in an interview—I don't remember exactly where to—that it isn't a question of a lack of planes, he doesn't have enough pilots. Israel has a lack of planes, he says, has two pilots for each plane, and they're good pilots—that's the truth, thank God for that. But, we've never asked nor can we afford to have plane for plane and tank for tank; that's all nonsense. But there is—you reach a certain point where the imbalance really becomes dangerous.

Gardner: Is it dangerous at the moment?

Meir: Is is extremely essential, very vital for us that this imbalance is corrected. You see, after the war what happened in Egypt? The Soviet Union not only replaced everything that Egypt had lost in the war but something much more than they originally had. Therefore the Israel ah... Egypt now has more planes and more tanks and more guns than it had before the war of '67 and does not have, Egypt does not have, too much difficulty in getting more, because Russia is prepared to send practically everything that Nasser asks for and there is also imbalance in conditions under which the Arabs get arms and under which conditions we get arms.

Gardner: You pay for them?

Meir: Yes.

Gardner: Are you confident that you're going to get these Phantoms?

Meir: I'd like to say yes. I hope, I mean, we haven't yet had an answer from the United

States Government, but I'd like to say that I'm confident that we'll get them. I think it is wiser to wait and see.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia to Libya (Excerpts)¹

Tripoli, February 27, 1970

At the invitation of the President of the Revolutionary Council and the Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic, Colonel Moamer Kadhafi, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, accompanied by his wife and aides, made an official visit to the Libyan Arab Republic from February 25th to the 27th, 1970.

During his visit, President Tito and his wife and aides were warmly greeted by the Libyan people.

In the course of their talks, the two Presidents made an exhaustive exchange of views on the good relations that exist between the two nations and governments and on current international questions, and particularly on the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and the situation in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Africa, as well as on the further activity of the non-aligned countries.

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The two sides devoted special attention to the situation in the Middle East and condemned the occupation of Arab countries by Israel, as well as its stepped-up aggressive actions against the Arab states. The two sides confirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), No. 478 (March 5, 1970), pp. 18-19.

The two delegations gave support to the Palestinian resistance movement and affirmed that this movement was an important element in the solution of the Middle East question. The two sides said that peace in this region could not be attained unless it was made possible for the Palestinian people to establish their legitimate rights to live in peace and security.

They also denounced the imperialist forces that were supplying Israel with material resources and weapons and in this way enabled it to continue its aggression and expansionist policy in this region.

In respect to the presence of foreign navies in the Mediterranean Sea, the two sides stated the need for this sea to become a zone of peace and security, and not a zone of contention and direct confrontation between the two super-powers.

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57

British Parliamentary Discussion on U.K. Middle East Policy¹

London, March 2, 1970

20. *Mr. Cronin* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on recent events in the Middle East.

22. *Mr. Lane* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a further statement on the situation in the Middle East involving British policy and interests.

23. *Mr. Walters* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the situation in the Middle East so far as British policy or interests are concerned.

40. *Mr. Dodds-Parker* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

¹ *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 797, March 2, 1970, cols. 24-27.

Affairs whether he has any further statement to make on the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. M. Stewart: The situation in the Middle East is naturally causing us concern. We have been discussing, with others who are concerned, the possibility of arms limitation and measures to reduce the present level of hostilities. We are continuing to play an active part in the four power talks, whose agreed purpose is to provide fresh guidance for Dr. Jarring, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

Mr. Cronin: Will my right hon. Friend convey to the Arab Governments the increasing detestation felt in this country for the activities of Arab guerrillas? Would he also make clear to them what harm it is doing to the Arab cause in this country?

Mr. Stewart: We have repeatedly made clear our detestation of acts of violence, by whomsoever committed. What is needed now is a period of quiet in the Middle East, and the determination of all parties to reach agreement based on the Security Council resolution.

Mr. Lane: In the continuing four-Power discussions will the Government urge that any Arab-Israeli agreement, once reached, should be safeguarded and policed by a permanent United Nations presence in the Middle East, both diplomatic and military?

Mr. Stewart: I do not think that I would want to commit myself to that now. We would have to see what the nature of the agreement was. I certainly would not rule out that a United Nations presence at certain points would have to be part of a lasting agreement. I do not think we ought to try to predict what it will be.

Mr. Walters: Bearing in mind that the Rogers plan was perhaps the most hopeful step since November, 1967, towards achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is the Foreign Secretary aware that a British initiative, either independently or in association with France, has been widely expected? Why has it not taken place?

Mr. Stewart: The hon. Member referred to the ideas put forward by the United States Secretary of State. It is universally accepted that these have gone further towards agreement than the United States has previously felt able to go. For that reason we have asked Arab countries to consider these ideas most carefully and to see how far they can go in agreement on that basis. That is the right thing to do at this stage.

Mr. Dodds-Parker: May I press the Foreign Secretary a little further on that? Will he have an investigation made, without commitment, into the possibilities of a European guarantee in the event of the nuclear Powers being deadlocked on this issue?

Mr. Stewart: We have considered this before, but I do not think we ought to assume at this stage that the four-Power talks will end in deadlock.

Mr. Moonman: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the situation is sufficiently serious to warrant a Minister taking responsibility to stimulate some of the discussions, particularly in view of a recent statement that the Russians intend to escalate the whole question of arms into the area?

Mr. Stewart: I would discount what my hon. Friend has said at the end of his supplementary question. It has been our concern, and I think everyone's concern, to avoid escalation.

Mr. Lambton: Would the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is still the Government's intention to allow arms sales to Libya?

Mr. Stewart: That is another question.

24. *Mr. Walters* asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the British Government's policy regarding the Lebanon, in view of recent developments in the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. M. Stewart: As I emphasised during the Foreign Affairs debate on 30th October last, we have had long and friendly relations

with the Lebanon. We hope to retain these close relations.

Mr. Walters: Bearing in mind these traditions and the friendly relations between Britain and the Lebanon, and the consistent efforts of the Lebanese Government to maintain a peaceful attitude in the Middle East, would the Foreign Secretary affirm Britain's determination to see the territorial integrity of the Lebanon maintained, particularly in view of the many and recent Israeli threats?

Mr. Stewart: We certainly see no reason why the territorial integrity of the Lebanon should be endangered.

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Israeli Newspaper Interview Statements by Newly Elected Chancellor Kreisky of Austria¹

March 3, 1970

I shall do everything to promote the existing good relations between Austria and Israel, but all the same it has been decided that Austria's neutralist policy will be strengthened. On the other hand, we shall also seek to strengthen our relations with the Arab countries.

[On his forthcoming government's Middle East policy, he said]: Obviously I am in favor of improving relations with Israel, but I believe that Austria should also do something to develop relations with the Arabs. As a neutral country Austria must pursue a balanced policy towards the countries involved in the Middle East conflict.

[When asked if he was in agreement with the attitude of the previous Chancellor,

Dr. Josef Klaus, who, in an interview with *Hatzofeh* a week ago, said that Austria should have a special relationship with the State of Israel because Austria had been the cradle of the Zionist movement, he said]: Klaus's party made many mistakes as regards Israel, and most probably the party intended the Chancellor's statement as a move towards remedying the situation. I am in favor of neutrality. Clearly if any country sustains an injury—including Israel—we shall stand by that country.

[Asked when he intended to visit Israel he replied]: I really do intend to visit Israel, and I hope to be able to do so, but of course this will depend on the burden of work and on the area being quiet.

59

Press Conference Statements by President Pompidou of France at the End of His Visit to the U.S.²

New York, March 3, 1970

Q. Puis-je demander au président s'il a eu le sentiment que Monsieur Nixon avait manifesté quelque sympathie ou quelque compréhension de la position française en ce qui concerne la vente des avions à réaction à la Libye?

R. Je vais beaucoup vous décevoir, mais nous n'avons pratiquement pas parlé de la vente des avions français à la Libye.

Q. Monsieur le président, vous avez évoqué la politique à court terme, à moyen terme et long terme. Je voudrais vous demander si vous pensez qu'à moyen terme ou à long terme le Président Nixon signera l'acte de vente d'avions "Phantom" à Israël?

R. Je vous conseille de vous adresser au

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text in *Hatzofeh*, March 3, 1970.

² Excerpted from Pompidou's press conference as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1970, (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), pp. 87-88, 88-89.

Président Nixon. Je vous signale qu'il habite à la Maison Blanche à Washington.

Q. Monsieur le Président, pouvons-nous vous poser une question très simple: croyez-vous qu'Israël doive exister?

R. A partir du moment où un Etat existe et où, de toute évidence, sa population a un instinct national ardent, eh bien cet Etat a le droit d'exister. Il a ce droit absolument et il faut que les autres le lui reconnaissent. Il faut aussi qu'il reconnaisse, lui, le droit des autres à exister et à avoir des rapports normaux avec lui.

Q. Dans vos conversations avec le Président Nixon, avez-vous essayé d'arriver à un accord avec les Etats-Unis sur une solution du problème au Moyen-Orient, que ce soit au moyen de la concertation des Quatre Grands ou d'une autre manière?

R. Nous avons naturellement parlé de ce problème, nous avons naturellement parlé de la concertation à Quatre. J'ai dit au Président Nixon comment nous voyons, nous Français, la possibilité de développement de cette concertation. Le Président Nixon m'a exposé son point de vue. Nos deux points de vue ne sont pas tout à fait les mêmes, mais je crois que l'un comme l'autre, nous désirons le même résultat, c'est-à-dire la paix le plus tôt possible. Ceci étant dit, et pour la suite de cette discussion, je me permets de vous dire que le problème du Moyen-Orient n'est pas l'unique problème pour les Américains ni l'unique problème pour les Français et que nous avons parlé de bien d'autres choses.

Q. Vous avez été cité comme ayant déclaré aux dirigeants de la communauté juive de Chicago que si quelques-uns des "Mirages" dont la vente à la Libye est prévue, aboutissaient dans les mains de l'Egypte, vous réexamineriez votre attitude en ce qui concerne vos relations futures avec les Arabes dans le Moyen-Orient. Ceci est-il conforme à ce que vous leur avez dit?

R. Bien que j'aie beaucoup parlé de ces questions, j'ai toujours dit la même chose et, par conséquent, je vous renvoie, Monsieur,

à mon interview au *New York Times* où j'ai répondu exactement à cette question.

Q. Monsieur le Président, les dirigeants des communautés juives ont dit ici, hier, qu'Israël avait acheté et payé des avions français qui n'avaient pas été livrés. S'il en est ainsi, ces avions seront-ils livrés à Israël?

R. Si vous les rencontrez, dites-leur que je suis prêt à les rembourser demain.

Q. Ceci veut-il dire, Monsieur le Président, qu'Israël n'aura pas ces avions à réaction?

R. Dans la situation actuelle et tant qu'il y aura l'embargo, c'est-à-dire la guerre, non.

Q. Et les avions à la Libye, qu'advient-il s'ils sont utilisés contre Israël pour des actes d'agression de la part des nations arabes?

R. J'ai déjà répondu, Monsieur, sur ce point. De toute manière, l'émotion à propos des avions libyens, je vais vous dire comment je l'interprète: il y a une parole d'Edgar Poe qui dit: "Peut-être le mystère est-il trop clair". Eh bien, je dirai, je ne sais pas si le traducteur pourra faire valoir mon jeu de mots, peut-être les "Phantom" sont-ils trop clairs?

Q. Quel dessein inspirait la vente d'avions français à la Libye?

R. Nous n'avons pas cherché à vendre des avions. Nous avons cherché à être présents en Libye, parce qu'il y avait un vide, et que nous préférons que ce soit nous qui le remplissions.

Q. Pourriez-vous nous parler de l'entretien prévu pour hier matin entre vous-même et les dirigeants juifs, un entretien qui n'a pas eu lieu. Pourriez-vous nous dire pourquoi?

R. Il y a à cela deux raisons: la première, c'est que pour des raisons de sécurité, on a estimé devoir réduire au maximum mes déplacements dans New York et qu'ainsi, on souhaitait que je ne passe pas par le Waldorf, que j'aille directement aux Nations-Unies. Mais il y a une seconde raison que j'ai dite

aussi. C'est que ces entretiens me paraissent à certains moments inutiles et même dommageables. J'ai eu les mêmes avec les dirigeants des communautés de Chicago. Ces entretiens ont été extrêmement francs, extrêmement courtois, extrêmement compréhensifs. Et je crois pouvoir dire que nous n'avons pas été, bien sûr, du même avis sur certaines questions, mais qu'à tout le moins chacun a apprécié la sincérité de l'autre et ses bonnes intentions. Et puis cela n'a rien changé à rien. Alors je pense que ce n'est pas la peine de rencontrer les dirigeants d'une communauté qui sont des hommes modérés et qui comprennent, qui cherchent à comprendre la pensée d'autrui dès lors que certains membres de cette communauté, de toute évidence, ont une autre attitude. Et j'ajouterai encore deux mots: le premier c'est qu'il n'y a dans ma pensée rien de désobligeant vis-à-vis de la personnalité des représentants de ces communautés et, en second lieu, ainsi que je l'ai déjà dit, on aura beau faire et on aura beau dire: je ne suis pas un antisémite.

Q. Comment pouvez-vous apprécier, aujourd'hui, les réactions de la communauté française aux controverses qui ont pu marquer votre voyage ici et là, notamment en ce qui concerne les relations de cette communauté avec Israël en particulier, et la communauté juive en général?

R. Ecoutez, je connais énormément de dirigeants de la communauté juive française, je peux vous assurer deux choses: c'est que forcément leur cœur bat pour Israël il ne peut pas en être autrement, mais que c'est un cœur français.

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Letter from a U.S. State Department Official to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Fulbright (Excerpts)¹

Washington, March 12, 1970

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with your letter of December 11, 1969, the Department of State has carefully reviewed Senate Joint Resolution 166 and is pleased to comment upon it.

Section 1 of Senate Joint Resolution 166 would repeal the Formosa Resolution (69 Stat. 7), the Resolution on the Middle East (71 Stat. 5), the Cuba Resolution (65 Stat. 697), and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (78 Stat. 384).

Much of the Middle East Resolution of March 9, 1957, is no longer relevant. That portion of Section 2 of the Resolution giving Congressional approval for the President to undertake military assistance programs has now been overtaken by the Foreign Assistance Act. Similarly, Section 3 of the Resolution, authorizing the President to expend funds during fiscal year 1957 is no longer relevant. Section 4, authorizing the President to furnish assistance to the United Nations Emergency Force, has no current applicability since UNEF no longer exists.

The Resolution's statement, in Section 2, that "the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism" plays a role in United States bilateral agreements with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Article 1 of those agreements, which is common to all three of them, says that "in cases of aggression against [Iran/Pakistan/Turkey], the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1606 (April 6, 1970), pp. 468, 470.

United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of [Iran/Pakistan/Turkey] at its request." Repeal of the Resolution would in no way affect the continuing validity of these bilateral agreements. On the other hand, if the Resolution is not repealed, the Administration would not construe it as a source of authority for any decisions which might involve the United States in a conflict in that area.

Perhaps the most important statement of the Middle East Resolution is the sentence in Section 2 which states that "... the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." The policy expressed by this statement has continued, throughout the years, to be the cornerstone of United States policy in the Middle East. It remains the policy of this Administration. Repeal of the Middle East Resolution would not affect our continued commitment to the preservation of independence and integrity of the nations in that area.

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Commentary on the Middle East Policies of Israel and the U.S. in the China Weekly Peking Review¹

Peking, March 13, 1970

U.S. imperialism and its tool of aggression Israel are working overtime on a new plot of aggression in the Middle East in a vain effort to blackmail the Arab countries into submission by war measures—"military escalation."

For some time now, U.S. imperialism has

been stepping up its collusion and contention with social-imperialism in the Middle East. Screaming for war over and over again and feverishly carrying out war provocations, Israeli Zionism, egged on and supported by U.S. imperialism, has wilfully threatened the Arab countries with armed force and committed a series of new crimes of aggression. Not only has Israel greatly increased its war provocations since mid-January, it has also steadily expanded the scale of aggression. Israeli planes bombed the vicinity of Cairo's international airport on January 18, again raided U.A.R. army camps near Cairo on January 28, and bombed a steel plant in the suburbs of Cairo on February 12, killing and wounding more than 100 U.A.R. workers. This was followed by a series of wanton bombing raids on the U.A.R. hinterland. During this period, Israel heli-lifted 600 paratroopers in its invasion of U.A.R.'s territory Shadwan Island and sent an armoured force of 800 men to intrude into the Ghor Safi area in Jordan and attack the Palestinian guerrilla bases there. Israeli military planes also intruded into Syria's air space to harass and wreak havoc on Damascus and other cities.

In the wake of these aggressive activities by Israeli Zionism, Israeli "defence minister" Moshe Dayan repeatedly shouted that Israel's policy towards the U.A.R. was "to strike as hard as we can" and that the air raids on the U.A.R. would "have no other restrictions and we shall go as deep as we like." Israeli "premier" Golda Meir also clamoured in a "policy speech" that Israel would continue raids deep into U.A.R. territory. It is worth noting that along with their war cries, Israeli Zionist chieftains have been stepping up their new manoeuvres for aggression, scheming to launch offensives against the Arab countries on a larger scale. The Syrian Arab News Agency reported from Amman in late February that Israeli aggressor troops had begun concentrating tanks and heavy artillery along the eastern front and built new military highways, and that about 75 per cent of the reserves had been called up.

¹ *Peking Review*, No. 11 (March 13, 1970), pp. 14-15.

U.S. imperialist backing is responsible for Israeli Zionism's sabre-rattling. Numerous facts have shown that the planned and phased Israeli armed aggressions against the Arab countries were hatched a long time ago by the United States and Israel. Following the Israeli bombing of the Cairo suburbs, U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon came into the open, and, in a letter to the Zionist Congress on January 25, he openly declared that the United States was prepared to give further support to Israel by supplying it with necessary military equipment. In a series of public statements and talks by State Department and other government officials, they howled for continued supplies of modern weapons to Israel. Sixty-three U.S. Senators openly declared in a statement on February 4: "We adhere to the principle that the deterrent strength of Israel must not be impaired." The *New York Times* later disclosed that the U.S. Government had decided to supply Israel with 105 more military planes, including 25 "Phantoms" and 80 "Sky-hawks."

Moreover, about the time the United States and Israel worked out the series of military attacks against the Arab countries, U.S. imperialism rushed large quantities of arms and ammunition to Israel. A.D.N. reported from Brussels on January 14 that for several months the Israeli freighter *Tamar* in the Belgian port of Zeebrugge "has been regularly loaded with weapons from American stocks in West Germany." This news agency also revealed that "guns, small jeeps, small tanks and other war materials arrive by West German railway wagons to be loaded on ships flying the Israeli flag." Two weeks later, the Associated Press said in a report from Haifa that this Israeli freighter *Tamar* which "carried surplus U.S. arms for Israel arrived quietly at this port city."

There are extremely vicious motives behind U.S. imperialism's extensive arming of Israel and instigating it to carry out new war provocations against the Arab countries. Israeli "defence minister" Dayan, faithful lackey of U.S. imperialism, admitted in a statement that Israel's frantic invasion of

U.A.R. territory and air space was aimed at forcing the U.A.R. "to respect the ceasefire (resolution) integrally," to prevent the U.A.R. from preparing against war and "to weaken the Egyptian regime." The U.S.-Israeli aggressors have tried in vain to use armed force to quench the flames of the Arab people's struggle against aggression, compel the Arab countries to accept the formula for a so-called "peaceful solution" of the Middle East question and wilfully occupy and trample upon their territory and sovereignty. This proves once again that U.S. imperialism is the ringleader in supporting Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and the ferocious enemy of the Arab people.

While inciting Israeli Zionism to carry out new aggression against the Arab countries, ferocious U.S. imperialism continues with its vicious counter-revolutionary dual tactics by peddling the fraud of a so-called "peaceful solution" of the Middle East question, which has long been repudiated by the Arab people. Recently, U.S. imperialism submitted a "proposal" on the "reimplementation of the 'ceasefire resolution' of the United Nations Security Council." On February 12, the day of the Israeli bombing of the U.A.R. steel plant near Cairo, the U.S. State Department issued a statement urging "both sides to adhere scrupulously to the ceasefire resolution of the United Nations Security Council" and urging that "they take every possible step to assure that all concerned co-operate fully in the restoration of the ceasefire." This "peaceful solution" trickery is being used by U.S. imperialism to cover up the expansion of its aggression. This is why Arab public opinion vehemently condemned U.S. imperialism's new scheme for a "ceasefire restoration" immediately after it appeared. The U.A.R. press hit the nail on the head when it pointed out that the present imperialist effort to reaffirm this "ceasefire resolution" was aimed at stamping out the flames of the Arab people's struggle against Israeli aggression and imposing the Israeli occupation on the Arab countries as a fait accompli.

Confronted with the armed provocations

and war threats of U.S. imperialism and its lackey Israel, the Arab people, united as one against the common enemy, are determined to carry their struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors through to the end. The broad masses of the Arab people angrily denounced U.S. imperialism for its new crime in supporting Israel's armed aggression. Hundreds of thousands of people in Cairo held a mammoth demonstration on February 13, carrying streamer banners reading "Down with the enemy—the United States!" and "We will liberate our land!" This fully demonstrated the determination of the U.A.R. and other Arab people to fight the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. At present, the people of the Arab countries are being mobilized on an extensive scale, determined to give their lives to resist the U.S.-Israeli aggressors.

The great leader of the Chinese people Chairman Mao teaches: "People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed." No matter how mad U.S. imperialism and its lackey Israel may become, using armed threats or "peace talks" fraud, as long as the one hundred million Arab people strengthen their unity and persevere in fighting, they will certainly be able to completely defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackey Israel. Final victory will certainly go to the heroic Arab people!

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of King Hussein of Jordan to Pakistan (Excerpts)¹

Islamabad, March 18, 1970

At the invitation of the President of Pakistan, Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, His Majesty King Hussein of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, paid a State visit to Pakistan from March 15 to 18, 1970.

His Majesty King Hussein and President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan held talks on a wide range of subjects. They reviewed the international situation in general and the situation in the Middle East in particular. They also exchanged views on relations between Pakistan and Jordan.

The King appraised the President of the developments that occurred in the region after their meeting in Rabat in September last on the occasion of the Islamic summit. He reaffirmed the resolve of his people to continue their struggle for the liberation of their territory and for a life of freedom, dignity and honor.

The President expressed his deep concern over the fast deteriorating situation in the Middle East which posed a grave danger to peace and stability in the area. He expressed deep sympathy with the people of Jordan in their suffering and admiration for their courage and fortitude.

Recalling Pakistan's consistent support to the Arabs in their just demand for the restoration of their lost territories, he expressed his firm belief that, in the interest of peace and stability in the region, the independence and territorial integrity of the Arab States in the area should be fully respected and safeguarded. The President reiterated once again the need for an urgent settlement of the Middle East crisis with due regard to the rights of the Arabs.

The King and the President shared the deepest anguish of the entire Muslim world over the continued occupation of the Holy City of Jerusalem. They considered that the sacrilege of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in last August was the direct consequence of the Israeli occupation of the Holy City and constituted not only an affront to the Muslim world but also an attack on the cherished values and sentiments of all mankind. They emphasized the need for continued and concerted efforts on the part of all Muslim States for the safeguarding of Muslim holy

¹ *Pakistan Documents Series*, VII, 3 (April 1970).

places and the restoration on the holy city to Jordan.

The two leaders reaffirmed their faith in the UN Charter and stressed the need for strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in preserving world peace and the settlement of international disputes. They declared that acquisition of territory by the use of force was a grave violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter.

They expressed their disappointment that the Security Council Resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, remained unimplemented as a result of Israel's intransigence, even two years after its adoption. They reaffirmed that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories including the Holy City of Jerusalem, in compliance with the Security Council resolutions, constituted an essential pre-requisite for a just and lasting peace in the area. They called upon the world community in general and the Big Four Powers in particular to ensure full and prompt compliance by Israel of all the UN resolutions.

has persevered in armed struggle, united with other anti-imperialist armed organizations of Palestine and dealt repeated blows at the enemy, thereby playing an active role in promoting the liberation cause of Palestine. Your struggles have won praise and admiration from the Chinese Government and people.

Recently Nixon clamoured time and again that the United States would continue to occupy the Middle East, continue to arm Israel and continue to commit aggression against the Arab countries in the 1970s. Only a few days ago, U.S. imperialism instigated Israel to drive all the 300,000 Palestinian people out of the Gaza Strip in a vain effort to perpetuate Israel's occupation of this Arab land. This is a new step taken by U.S. imperialism in attempting to strangle the revolutionary struggle of the Palestinian people, and a new crime committed by U.S. imperialism. The Palestinian people and the people of the Arab countries will never tolerate it.

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Speech by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China at an Official Banquet Honoring a Palestinian Delegation Led by Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Chairman Arafat (Excerpts)¹

Peking, March 21, 1970

Your struggle has set a heroic example for the people of all Arab countries and opened a new chapter in the annals of the struggle of the Middle East people against imperialism. The Palestine National Liberation Movement led by Chairman Yasser Arafat

Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people, pointed out: "The imperialist wolves must remember that gone forever are the days when they could rule the fate of mankind at will and could do whatever they liked with the Asian and African countries." Protracted struggles have made the Palestinian people and the people of all Arab countries understand ever better that perseverance in people's armed struggle is the correct road for the Arab people to defeat the aggressors and win national liberation and that only through armed struggle is it possible for them to defeat the U.S. imperialist and Israeli aggressors, recover their lost territory and achieve genuine independence and liberation. No matter what tactics the U.S. imperialists may employ, they will not be able to prevent the people of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people from winning final victory in the struggle against imperialism.

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 13 (March 27, 1970), p. 4.

The Chinese Government and people have consistently opposed any imperialist aggression against the Middle East countries, opposed the control of the destiny of the Arab people by the imperialist-manipulated United Nations, and firmly supported the Palestinian people and the people of all Arab countries in their just struggle. The Chinese people will always remain the most reliable friends of the Palestinian people and the people of all Arab countries. We firmly believe that so long as you are united as one, heighten your vigilance and persist in armed struggle, you will certainly overcome difficulties and win final victory.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. President Nixon on Arms Supply to the Middle East¹

Washington, March 21, 1970

President Nixon: On Monday the Secretary of State, as you have already been informed, will make a statement on the administration's Mideast policy, with particular reference to two requests by the Israeli Government, one for economic assistance and the other for military assistance.

The Secretary of State will have a press conference at that time in which he will answer any of the questions you may have on the specifics of that decision.

I would like to, at this point, indicate the basic factor that led to that decision and also the factors that will guide us as we make decisions in this area in the future.

As far as the military portion of the decision is concerned, I would describe it as essentially an interim decision. Our goal in the Mideast—or goals, I should say—in broad terms, are four: first, to have a cease-fire; second, to reduce the flow of arms into the area; third, to achieve a political settle-

ment; and fourth, to accomplish to the greatest extent possible a balance between the forces in that area which will contribute to peace from a military standpoint, and not to disturb that balance.

The decision that the Secretary will announce on Monday is one based on our present appraisal of the balance of power in the Mideast.

In recent days there have been disturbing reports that the Soviet Union, by deliveries of new missiles, SA-3's, to the U.A.R. and through the insertion of military personnel, may be taking actions which could change that balance. It is too early to say whether that is the case. We are watching the situation closely.

If the U.S.S.R., by its military assistance programs to Israel's neighbors, does essentially change the balance, then the United States would take action to deal with that situation.

The Secretary of State will cover this matter in greater detail in his statement.

It is our hope that in our negotiations with the Soviet Union, bilaterally and in the four-power talks, we can convince all the major powers to stop escalating the arms race in the Mideast, to work together for a cease-fire, and to achieve, of course, a political settlement.

Apart from the recent reports, there have been some developments in the Mideast in our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union that have been, I would say, modestly encouraging, and we trust that that trend, rather than this latest trend, will be the one that will prevail.

But the Secretary of State's statement on both the economic and military assistance program, as I have indicated, is based on the decision which was made on our analysis of the present balance in the Mideast, which we believe should be maintained in the interest of peace and of a settlement.

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Q. Mr. President, you expressed the hope that all major powers would stop the escalation of the arms race in the Middle East. Do you have any

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1606 (April 6, 1970), pp. 437, 438.

indication that France would be cooperative in their sale of planes to that area?

Nixon: First, as has been indicated, there is a long leadtime on the delivery of French planes to Libya. Secondly, while, of course, I would not presume to speak for the Government of France—that question should be directed to them—the Government of France is not taking a position that its delivery of planes to Libya is for the purpose of transshipment basically to the U.A.R. France is a participant in the four-power talks.

I discussed this matter in considerable detail with President Pompidou when he was here. I will not reveal what those discussions were, as I do not reveal the discussions, as he does not either, between chiefs of state. But I do believe that France recognizes, as we recognize, that any shipment of arms to the Middle East which imperils the balance of power increases the danger of war. I think that France, in its shipments over the next few years, will be guided by that principle, as we are guided by that principle in making our determinations of what arms we should ship.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on Arms Supply to the Middle East and American Settlement Efforts (Excerpts)¹

Washington, March 23, 1970

Secretary Rogers: Ladies and gentlemen: My statement will deal with the Israeli requests both for military and economic assistance from the United States. The decisions I am announcing today are based on our present appraisal of the balance of power in the Middle East.

Last year, the Government of Israel asked the United States to sell it 25 additional Phantoms and 100 more Skyhawks. The Israeli request has been carefully and sympathetically considered in the light of the military situation in the area and of our policy of doing everything possible to achieve peace in the Middle East in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

In our judgment, Israel's air capacity is sufficient to meet its needs for the time being. Consequently, the President has decided to hold in abeyance for now a decision with respect to Israel's request for additional aircraft. In doing so, he has instructed that close watch be kept on the military balance in the area. The United States will be in a position to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it. To this end the United States will remain in close consultation with those concerned.

In this connection, we have evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been taking recent steps to strengthen the air defense of the U.A.R. by introduction of SA-3 missiles and additional Soviet personnel. As the President indicated on Saturday, the situation bears and will receive close and careful scrutiny by us as well as continuous review and evaluation.

On the economic side, the United States will respond affirmatively to certain of Israel's short-term financial requests while studying further its longer range needs. There will be an expanded P.L. 480 program for purchase of surplus food, principally wheat and feedgrains, under favorable credit arrangements. We will also extend credits to help cover the balance due on past military contracts.

These decisions are taken with the strong conviction that ultimate security for all concerned lies in peace. They are taken in the belief that the current trend of events must be reversed if the situation is to be stabilized and if progress toward peace is to begin. Restraint will be required on the part of other major suppliers to the Middle East. No nation can pursue a policy of

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1607 (April 13, 1970), pp. 477-484.

seeking unilateral advantage in the area if peace is to be achieved.

In making this interim decision on aircraft, we have no intention of jeopardizing the security of Israel. If steps are taken which might upset the current balance or if in our judgment political developments warrant, the President will not hesitate to reconsider this matter.

We believe that our restraint will afford fresh opportunities for all concerned—in and outside the area—to diminish hostilities and enhance the prospects for peace. To this end, the United States will make renewed efforts in diplomatic channels to:

(1) encourage both sides to adhere fully to the U.N. cease-fire resolutions;

(2) call upon the parties to the conflict to reappraise positions which have become road-blocks to peace;

(3) urge all concerned to support proposals which would help Ambassador Jarring launch a process of negotiation among the parties under his auspices; and

(4) engage the other major suppliers to the Middle East in early arms limitation talks.

These will be serious initiatives. We urge all concerned to respond to them with the sense of urgency which the present situation demands of all responsible governments.

I'll take any questions, ladies and gentlemen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was the Soviet Union, as the other principal supplier of arms, informed of this decision which you have now made; and do you have some hope that even if you can't get an agreement on arms limitation, you may get responsive actions, on a theory of mutual example?

A. Mr. Hightower [John M. Hightower, Associated Press], the Soviet Union was not advised of this decision. However, I do plan to talk to Ambassador Dobrynin about the decision in the near future. I do plan to discuss with him the proposals that I have outlined at the end of my statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the Israelis been told of this decision, and if so, what was the reaction?

A. Yes, they have. Our Ambassador in Israel, Ambassador Barbour, notified Prime Minister Meir. I had a discussion with Ambassador Rabin this morning. I think it would be probably better to permit them to give their reaction to this decision.

I might say that they were disappointed, but we will continue to have discussions consistent with the policy that I have enunciated here this morning, and I would hope that they will understand what we think is the wise decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you answer the Israeli argument that a decision to delay on the planes really jeopardizes their security because of the long leadtime needed to get these planes later on?

A. Well, we want to make it clear—and I have tried to make it clear in this statement—we do not think that this decision jeopardizes their security. We have made a very careful analysis of the balance of arms in the Middle East. We have used the same techniques that we use in appraising our own military position—the same experts and the same techniques. Now, we are quite satisfied that Israel has the superiority in armaments at the present time, which will continue.

As far as the leadtime is concerned, as I have said in the statement, if the situation should change—if the military situation or the political situation should change—and the President has to modify or amend his decision, he can do that promptly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions: How much money is involved in economic credits being extended, and where does it come from? And secondly, the President said on Saturday he was "modestly encouraged," to use his words, by the bilateral discussions going on with the Russians. Can you elaborate on that?

A. Well, as to your first question, we're going to have additional discussions with Israel about the credits. P.L. 480 can be food and can be provided under present legislation, and we think that credits can be provided under present legislation.

Insofar as the—what was the second question you asked?

Q. About being "modestly encouraged."

A. I think the President was referring to discussions that we had in the bilateral context previously. If you will read the answer to that question, he said that in early discussions we had with the Soviet Union, there were developments that were reasonably promising; and he said he hoped that any subsequent discussions we might have would proceed along those lines.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of what you said about the introduction of Soviet missiles and men into Egypt, what do you believe is the purpose for this movement of new Soviet arms into the area? And have you any reason to believe, on the diplomatic side, that the Russian attitude toward settlement in the Middle East has in any way changed?

A. Well, the SA-3 missiles, as you know, are defensive weapons, and all we can do is assume that they are there for defensive purposes.

As far as the personnel are concerned, I think a fair assumption might be that they are there to assist the Egyptians in deploying those defensive weapons.

We'll have to wait and see what happens in Egypt. We'll have to wait and see what the contention appears to be. As the President said, if we think that the activity of the Soviet Union in Egypt does affect the military balance, then he will have to reconsider his decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from Israel indicate that henceforth Israel will seek to keep arms agreements with the U.S. secret. If the United States at some future date decides to sell Phantoms to Israel, can we have your assurance that that decision will be announced publicly?

A. Well, I don't think that the United States has made any agreement about secrecy. I'm not sure where that story came from; but as you know, in our system of government, secrecy is not a very productive policy to follow!

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your efforts through diplomatic channels to induce both the Arabs and Israelis to reappraise positions which have stood in the way of peace, would you say that further decisions by the President on both military and economic requests would be directly dependent on an Israeli reappraisal of its position toward peace?

A. No. We don't want to make the reappraisal that the President is talking about conditional on anything. We want to consider all of the factors that might enter into that decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, on this expanded 480 for Israel, do you plan to sell them wheat and feedgrains and buy from them with this home currency of theirs the necessary prefabricated housing for the United States—for the Philippines and Japan and the United States?

A. No. We haven't worked out the details of that P.L. 480 program yet.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you please clarify an earlier answer? How much money in figures was involved in the economic aid to Israel, and where is the money coming from?

A. Well, it's coming from military assistance programs in the legislation that is now on the books. We haven't decided exactly the amounts. We're going to have some discussions with the Israelis about that in the days ahead.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I clarify one point on that? In the story which broke on the Hill just before this news conference, Senator Scott, I believe it was, used the figure of about \$100 million. Since that figure is in the public domain, can you say whether it's wrong or approximately correct?

A. No. I think it's approximately correct.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in assessing the balance of power in the Middle East, did you include in the equation the Mirage jet airplanes that the French are selling to Libya?

A. Yes.

Q. What effect do they have on the balance of power there?

A. They don't have any effect at the moment. As you know, the delivery date is far in the future. There again, the President pointed out that he had considerable discussion with President Pompidou on this subject. And if it appeared at some subsequent date that those planes were in fact being used or sent to Egypt, that would be a factor of major importance. But in any event, it doesn't change the military balance at the present time at all, because the planes won't be delivered for some time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you replied to Mr. Adlai Stevenson's inquiry about American jets to Libya?

A. No, I haven't, but I will be glad to.

Q. Will you give us the substance?

A. Well, there was a contract between Libya and the United States for eight planes. It was made well over a year ago, before a change of government. The matter is now under consideration. In any event, I think they are F-5's, and we haven't decided—no decision has been made on it. The only other planes that were sent to Libya were some time back, by the previous administration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your fourth point on the Middle East earlier, you talked about arms limitation talks, and you were going to urge all concerned to respond. Do you plan to convene a formal conference, or call for a formal conference, or how do you—

A. No, we wouldn't convene a formal conference. We plan to discuss this matter particularly with the Soviet Union in the near future to see if there is any possibility of having a limitation agreement on arms shipments to the Middle East.

If all parties keep sending in more military equipment, then obviously the confrontation

that could possibly arise becomes more dangerous. We would hope that discussions with the Soviet Union might be productive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have discussed this question with the Soviet Union all of last year, the question of an arms limitation agreement.

A. That's right.

Q. And to get back to an earlier question, do you have anything to indicate that the Soviet Union at this time is any more responsive on this issue?

A. No, not at the moment, but there is always hope. There has not been peace, as you know, in the Middle East for 20 years. And all we can do is to work at it diligently, hopefully, in getting some break.

Q. The President in his "state of the world" message said, with a slight tone of pique or annoyance, that we were through making proposals in the Middle East unless we got some indication that there was a responsiveness on the other side. Are you suggesting, in your statement this morning, that either there is some sign of responsiveness or that we were a little too quick and that we would like to make some more proposals?

A. No. I didn't notice any sort of pique in his statement.

Q. He did say that we were—

A. He was talking about the proposals we made in connection with the four-power talks and the bilateral talks. He was not talking about arms limitation to the Middle East; and if we could work out something along those lines, it would be very helpful. He was talking about the proposals we have made in the four-power context.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you to clarify for me where your major effort is going to be made with regard to easing tensions in the Middle East: Is it going to be in your talks with Dobrynin and

an American approach on a bilateral basis, through the four-power talks, or both?

A. Well, both. And, also, there is a possibility that we would be able to initiate bilateral discussions again. We are going to engage in a very vigorous and active diplomatic campaign to see if there is any prospect of bringing about a peaceful settlement in the area. We are going to do it in every way that we think might be productive.

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Communiqué Issued by the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers¹

Jedda, Saudi Arabia, March 25, 1970

In accordance with the decision taken by the Islamic summit conference held in Rabat on the 25th of September, 1969, the Muslim Foreign Ministers' conference was held in Jeddah from 15th to 17th of Muharram 1390 A.H. i.e. from 23rd to 25th of March 1970.

The conference was attended by Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, the Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAR and the Republic of Yemen. The conference was also attended by the representatives of the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Cameroun as observers.

In his inaugural speech at the conference, His Majesty King Faisal had explained to the delegates the main objectives of the conference and expressed the hope that the conference would come out with positive results. The delegates attending the conference thanked the Government of His Majesty King Faisal for the warm welfare

accorded to them and for the special and adequate arrangements made for the conference.

The agenda of the conference, as decided at the Rabat Islamic Summit conference, included the following two points:

1. To discuss the results achieved so far of the collective efforts and unified action taken by the participating countries at the international level in conformity with the Rabat summit conference decisions; and

2. To discuss the question of the establishment of a permanent secretariat for strengthening contact among the participating countries and coordinating their joint efforts.

During the conference the delegates apprised the conference of the efforts of their respective countries for the implementation of the Rabat Islamic Summit conference declaration. The conference reviewed the situation arising out of the sacrilege of Al-Aqsa mosque and the increasing tension in the Middle East as a result of continued Israeli atrocities in the Holy City of Jerusalem.

The conference discussed the deterioration of the Middle East situation since the Israeli aggression on the Arab countries in June, 1967. It also discussed continued Israeli aggressions against Arab States resulting in the destruction of Arab cities and towns as well as killing of innocent civilians, including women and children.

The conference also noted that the United Nations has on many occasions condemned Israeli aggressions and atrocities. The conference condemned Israel for her continued refusal to implement the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council in the Middle East. The conference also condemned Israel for her refusal to vacate the occupied Arab territories and to annul all measures which she has already taken and plans to annex the Holy City of Jerusalem and to alter its status.

The conference reiterated the Rabat Islamic summit conference determination to reject any solution of the Palestine issue which deprives the Holy City of Jerusalem of the status it enjoyed before June, 1967.

¹ English text in *Pakistan Documents Series*, VII, 4 (April 1970).

The Conference reaffirmed the right of the people of Palestine to make struggle for the liberation of their home-land and for the restoration of their rights.

The conference called upon the member-countries to extend political, material and moral support to the people of Palestine in their struggle and to provide facilities for the establishment of Palestine Liberation Movement offices in Muslim countries.

The conference decided that August 21st, the day of the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque, would be observed as the day of solidarity with the Palestine people's struggle.

The conference denounced the Zionist movement as aggressive and expansionist movement constituting a permanent threat to the world peace.

The conference also decided that the participating countries should make collective efforts to persuade the United Nations for taking positive steps for the implementation of its resolution on Jerusalem and the Middle East crisis.

The conference called upon every member-country of the United Nations, particularly France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to intensify their individual as well as collective efforts for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied since the war of June, 1967.

The conference also called upon all the participating countries to take every possible step to strengthen capabilities of the Arab Governments and the Arab people struggling for the restoration of their usurped rights and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from their territories.

The conference felt the need for countering the Israeli propaganda which is persistently misguiding the world public opinion. It also felt the need for apprising world public opinion of the Israeli expansionist designs and urged every participating country to take immediate suitable measures in this regard.

The conference urged all the Muslim countries to work in complete solidarity between them in the face of Israeli occupation of Palestine and the territories of the neighboring countries.

The conference also called upon the participating countries to make every necessary effort for the promotion of economic, financial and cultural co-operation among the Muslim countries as the only positive means to counter Israeli attempts to infiltrate into these countries.

The conference renewed the call for closer contacts and consultations among the participating countries for strengthening economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual co-operation among themselves on the basis of the teachings of Islam and to the benefit of the Muslims all over the world.

The conference decided to meet once a year for reviewing the progress achieved in the implementation of its decisions and for discussing matters of common interest as well as for deciding about the venue and the date for Muslim Heads of State meetings.

The conference also decided to establish a Secretariat which will work as a liaison between the participating States and will follow the implementation of the decisions taken by the conference particularly regarding the problem of Palestine. The Secretariat will also make preparation for the holding of future conferences.

The city of Jeddah will be the provisional seat of the Secretariat till the liberation of Palestine. Its first Secretary will be a Malaysian for a two-year term. The expenditure of the Secretariat will be borne by the member-countries.

The conference also decided that the next meeting of the Muslim Foreign Ministers will be held in Pakistan during this year. The date of the meeting will be decided later.

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Interview by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on Arms Supply to the Middle East and on Israeli Policy Towards the Palestinians¹

Tel-Aviv, March 27, 1970

Q. Do you view President Nixon's refusal to undertake at this stage the future supply of further Phantom jets to Israel as an indication of a dangerous trend in American policy?

A. An outright refusal would be very dangerous. But there has not been a refusal—there has been a strong reaffirmation of the intention to keep Israel's air strength intact and replenished, as circumstances warrant, together with a judgement—with which I do not agree—that there is no need for a specific public commitment at this stage.

We think it would have been much wiser to be clear-cut and explicit, in order to obtain a clear deterrent effect. But President Nixon's decision to confirm the principle and keep its application in abeyance does not fall outside the traditional American policy towards Israel.

It exactly follows the pattern set by President Johnson in his discussions with the late Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Levi Eshkol, in January, 1968, when he refrained from public commitment until later in the year.

I think it would have been wiser to follow a different course in 1970, because Egypt's strength is greater than it was then—at least in the quantity of hardware. Moreover, in 1968 there was a relatively effective ceasefire, whereas now it is repudiated in theory and broken in practice.

To sum up: President Nixon's answer would be a very grave matter indeed, if it were his last word. It will be less grave, if—as I hope and believe—it represents an intermediate appraisal.

Q. Many hundreds of Russian anti-aircraft defence experts, as well as SA-3 missiles and other anti-aircraft equipment recently reached Egypt.

Should this information be taken seriously, and how do these developments affect the balance of power in the Middle East?

A. The reports ought to be taken seriously, even before they are confirmed. Powers greater than Israel have taken a serious account of a situation in which Soviet personnel are massively engaged. Our own military experience has so far been that, apart from the naval zone of Port Said, there is no Soviet presence in Egypt, except for advisers and technicians who do not become operationally engaged in the exchange of fire.

The conflict across the ceasefire lines is still between Israeli and Egyptian forces. But what we call balance of forces is not exclusively a matter of armaments. The stationing of Soviet personnel in large numbers in a certain area would obviously affect the nature of our military action in the area concerned.

Q. Israel's Air Force has strikingly demonstrated its absolute superiority over that of Egypt—even over the Cairo area itself. Why, in these circumstances, is there an urgency in an American response to Israel's request for further aircraft?

A. The urgency is for response, not for aircraft. The request put forward by the Prime Minister in September last year related to equipment which, if sold, would reach Israel in 1971-72. The supply of Phantoms and Skyhawks for 1970 is going smoothly.

Nevertheless, it is, in my view, urgent even ahead of 1971 and 1972, that both Israel and her adversaries should have concrete knowledge that our strength will not be eroded in the coming year or two, through lack of replenishment.

We live within a strategy of deterrence in which a consciousness of power has just such a sharp effect on reality as the application of it.

To be specific in this case: if Egypt has the belief or illusion that our air strength will not be replenished after the end of this year, then this knowledge will have an effect on its policies today. The effect will be the

¹ *Jewish Chronicle*, March 27, 1970, p. 7.

strengthening of those forces in Egypt which advocate intransigence and put their faith in a new war within the next few years.

On the other hand, if they know that Israel is not only strong today but will be so tomorrow, too, political attitudes based on war will be weakened.

On the Soviet side, the feeling that the Israel-Egyptian military relationship will not change substantially in 1971 and 1972 could lead to salutary despair in Moscow about the possibility of driving us out of the administered territories, and thus produce a more moderate Soviet policy.

Thus, from every point of view, the conviction that Israel will be maintained in its strength is a barrier against war and could become a bridge to peace.

Q. But would not the supply of further modern aircraft to Israel be used by the Soviet Union as a justification for more supplies of modern equipment to President Nasser—including that of the dangerous MIG-23?

The MIG-23 is a very elusive concept—I have not met anyone yet who has seen it. And in the arms race the Soviet Union does not react, but initiates. It gives to Egypt whatever it needs or requires, within the limits of a conventional strategy.

Israel's Phantoms and Skyhawks are responses to the rearming of Egypt by the Soviet Union, not a cause of it. I think that the result would be the opposite of what the question implies.

If the Soviet Union feels that Israel's air strength is likely to become obsolescent or depleted it is likely to see a chance of a Soviet-Egyptian victory by aggression or intimidation and, therefore, to arm Egypt with greater conviction than before.

Q. Did your answer to a query in the Knesset, indicating your opposition to the very idea of a separate Palestinian entity, reflect the unanimous view of the whole National Unity Cabinet?

A. Yes, it represents the view of both those who are against a territorial compromise—and I believe they are a minority—and those, like myself and all members of my party in

the Cabinet, who believe that in a permanent peace there would have to be a renunciation on certain territories. It would not be right to say that I denied the existence of a Palestinian nation.

However I do firmly believe that, in discussing the Arab-Israel relationship, we should have a clear notion who the actors in the drama are. In the area of the original Palestinian Mandate there are two nations, not one. There is an Israeli and an Arab nation: the latter exercised for nearly twenty years its political self-determination by its own choice in the Kingdom of Jordan.

The citizens of the Kingdom of Jordan were, and are, Palestinian Arabs, to about the same extent as the citizens of Israel are Jews. It would be a semantic deceit to claim that there are two nations for each of which a State must be established. It is preposterous to say that one nation has to have two States.

So much for the historical aspect. As to the juridical aspect: the international community is reflected in the United Nations structure, under which the Israel-Arab area is totally defined by means of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. No government in the world recognises another structure.

For Israel to take the lead in disrupting the recognised international structure in the Middle East would be more than exotic. If the terrorist organisations want to take us back 22 years, their motivation is obvious: they want to present an image of a Middle East without Israel. Why any Israeli should wish to follow this lead is beyond my understanding.

Finally, there is the political aspect. In theory it is possible to talk about a Palestine as about something additional and adjacent to Israel. But we do not live in a world of theory, but of political realities. The reality is that "Palestine" is today symbolised and expressed by groups and organizations which regard "Palestine" as a substitute for Israel, not a neighbour to it.

Some of them conceive of a Palestine which embraces and, therefore, eliminates the whole of Israel; others of one which embraces and

annexes at least part of Israel. Arafat, Habash and the others are quite clear about this, as Shukairy had been before the Six-Day War. In the reality of 1970 it is very hard to affirm "Palestine" without negating Israel.

Q. According to the spokesman of El Fatah in Cairo, Mr Mussa Alami is promoting here the idea of a Palestinian State friendly with Israel, and one of the Great Powers is also seeking support for the idea of such a State, to remain under some sort of Israeli control for five years. Has Israel been approached with such a plan?

A. Mr Alami has not approached us with any plan and we do not know what his thinking is. As to the Great Powers, all of them make proposals based on the United Nations structure, namely a settlement between Israel and its four contiguous neighbours, not five. The Security Council resolution, whatever its faults, also embodies correct political and juridical definitions.

It is astonishing to find that a concept, which has no juridical or political legitimacy and which no government in the world asks us to endorse, should be sponsored and adopted by Israelis, at their own expense. Even masochism can be taken too far... Once peace is established, our eastern neighbour can determine its own structure and seek its historical and cultural definition.

Q. Does this not imply a refusal on Israel's part to recognise the right of a million Arabs, now living under her rule, to be an active partner—and not merely a passive object—in a future peace settlement?

No, I would welcome any initiative on their part to hold a dialogue with us, both on our concrete relationship and on the future of Israel-Arab relations. But the solution of the problem of Israel, Jordan and the West Bank Arabs must be seen as part of an integral settlement.

The River Jordan is not a boundary dividing different nations in culture, sentiment, language or even category of citizenship. I met many responsible Arab leaders of Judea and Samaria—not one of them has

said that he thinks he has a separate destiny from that of the Arabs east of the Jordan.

Their passivity does not arise through our enforcement, but from their own predicament and decision. But it is quite false to say that there is any Arab group anywhere with whom Israel would refuse to talk. If, however, I would meet with a Lebanese Maronite leader, this would not commit me to the idea of dividing Lebanon into two States.

Q. A number of Israeli Ministers, usually referred to as "hawks" or "annexationists," went on record as advocating the granting of Israeli citizenship and equality of rights to those Arabs in the territories who so desire. What is the prospect offered to them by those Ministers who refuse both annexation and the creation of a Palestinian entity in the absence of tangible hope for a peace settlement?

A. There is no great concession in offering to the Palestinians the status of a minority—all of them would put this last on their list of desirable results. No principle of self-determination can be exercised to one hundred per cent. Up to 1967 there was an Arab minority in Israel, and following any peace agreement this minority would become larger.

But those who, like Mrs. Meir, Mr. Dayan, Mr. Allon and myself, do not envisage a peace settlement in which Israel would gain a million and more Arab citizens, have something very simple in mind: we mean that, once our peace boundary is established, Arabs to the east of it would be citizens of an Arab State whose future they would be fully able to determine. And those within our own boundaries would be Arab citizens of Israel, as those of Nazareth and Acre have been for many years.

Q. André Fontaine, of Le Monde, takes exception to a statement you made in a French radio interview, drawing an analogy between "anti-Zionist Jews" and "anti-French Frenchmen." Did you really imply that a Jew, anywhere in the world, has an obligation of loyalty to Israel or Zionism, which is like that of a citizen in his own State?

A. This is not correct at all. In my view, the solidarity of the Jewish communities with each other and of all of them with Israel is not something to be excused, explained or apologised for. It is something to be asserted and proclaimed, as one of the eternal, inexorable realities of history.

There may be exceptional cases of Jews in whose hearts Israel arouses no special vibration—as there might be Frenchmen, citizens of other countries, who say that the spirit and destiny of France mean nothing to them.

How strange that nobody questions the fact that Arab communities in many countries have a special tendency to support the Arab case.... The tormented discussion going on in the French press on this matter seems to me artificial and surprising—did not France join in 1947 in exhorting us to establish a “Jewish State”?

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Israeli Radio Interview with Deputy Premier Allon of Israel on the U.S. Decision To Defer Supplies of Aircraft¹

March 28, 1970

Q. My first question is whether, apart from the military implications, the American decision suggested a change in her Middle East policy.

Allon. I don't think it's a basic change. It is a source of disappointment because we expected America to give us a firm promise to supply a certain number of aircraft on a certain date, but when one reads carefully the statement issued by Secretary Rogers we can find an explicit undertaking to see to it that the balance of forces would be maintained in future.

I think that this statement inflicted a political harm more than a military one because it may encourage the Russians to think that they still have a chance to deter America from living up to her undertaking

vis-à-vis Israel and it may also encourage Arab expectations from America, what they may call appeasement. But militarily speaking, I think, room is still open for further negotiations in order to persuade the American Administration that the balance of forces has been really upset and it needs an immediate restoration.

Q. This upsetting of the balance of power, balance of forces in the Middle East, might this be manifesting itself in the arrival in Egypt of more SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles?

Allon. Of course. The SAM-3 is a much more efficient weapon than the SA-2 and the Egyptians, with their Soviet advisers, know very well that in order to hit the Israelis they must control the air. In order to control the air, they have to clear it of Israeli aircraft. They hope to do it by the new anti-aircraft missile and, only under this protection, may their planes be in a better position to fly over our advanced lines of defence and to enjoy their superiority in artillery.

Therefore, I think, it's an Israeli defensive necessity, an indispensable necessity, to go ahead not only with smashing the existing anti-aircraft system and other military installations, but also to prevent them from rehabilitating the old ones.

Q. Quite frankly, Mr. Allon, is that what the Israeli Air Force has been doing these last few days?

Allon. Only this.

Q. There has been an allegation that the United States may be interested in persuading the Soviet Union to join in a mutual arms embargo on weapons to the Middle East and that the decision to postpone the sale of Phantoms was one counter in this play. Do you think the Russians might buy it and that there could be an arms embargo on the sale of weapons to the Middle East?

Allon. Well, I don't want to guess what were the motives of America's Administration. I can only say that, if America really expected some response from the Russians, then they were mistaken, because the introduction of the SA-3 with the arrival of 1,500

¹ English text in *New Middle East*, No. 20 (May 1970), p. 45.

more experts is a clear demonstration that the Russians do not pay attention to any American proposals on this and the only way is to counter-balance this new development.

69

Resolutions Adopted at the Ninth Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel (Maki)¹

March 28, 1970

1. The C.P.I. Central Committee warns of the danger of a new Middle East military flare-up, and appeals to all international and regional factors to be concerned with the prevention of war and the promotion of peace. To achieve this aim, it is necessary to guarantee first of all a scrupulous, reciprocal observation of the cease-fire. The rejection of this proposal by the Egyptian government, backed by the Soviet government, should not discourage the Israeli government from adhering to this initiative and repeating it, with a willingness to interrupt unilaterally the bombings deep inside Egypt for a fixed, reasonable period. Refuting the argument that observing the cease-fire would perpetuate the cease-fire lines, the C.P.I. Central Committee reiterates its demand that the Israeli government renew the initiative for Rhodes-type peace talks, with the participation and mediation of the U.N.O. emissary, in order to outline secure, recognised borders to be agreed upon between the parties, and in order to reach an agreed interpretation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The State of Israel must declare that it will be prepared, as soon as a peace agreement is achieved, to withdraw from the cease-fire lines to the above mentioned agreed borders.

2. The C.P.I. Central Committee reaffirms

the attitude of the C.P.I. Bureau and its Knesset faction rejecting the Rogers plan, because it lacks two vital elements: It does not provide for negotiations between the parties on all controversial issues, which are substituted by an arbitrary settlement by a big power from outside; it does not specify agreed, signed peace treaties between the parties at the end of the negotiations.

The Central Committee warns against Israel relying on one world power, including the United States, and demands to pursue an independent Israeli foreign policy purporting to acquire friends among the countries of the world in all regions, whatever their regime.

3. The Central Committee expresses its concern following the increased Soviet participation in the Egyptian military campaign (the supply of SA.3 missiles and Soviet crews) and calls for a big-power agreement on the cessation of arms supplies to the Middle East.

4. The Central Committee reaffirms the communiqué of the Bureau on the anti-Israeli campaign in the Soviet Union and reiterates the sharp criticism of this campaign that is detrimental to the cause of peace in the Middle East, the policy of peaceful coexistence and the principle of peoples' brotherhood, that must be adhered to by a socialist state.

5. The Central Committee condemns the criminal acts of the Arab terrorist organisations that have reached their peak of shamelessness in the assaults on Israeli and international civil aviation, especially in the blowing up of the Swissair passenger plane. These means employed indiscriminately by the terrorists, combined with the political aim of annihilating the State of Israel and the Israeli people's right to national self-determination, deprive the armed Palestinian organisations of the right to call themselves a national liberation movement. The C.P.I. Central Committee urges all left, democratic organisations in the world to condemn the prohibitive objectives and means of these organisations.

¹ English text in *Information Bulletin* (Maki), No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 4-7.

6. The C.P.I. Central Committee warns against the government decision to erect a Jewish quarter in Hebron. This decision involves the danger that the mistrust and hostility between the people will be deepened, and the chances of a concord and peace with the Palestinian Arab people will be removed even further. The Central Committee demands that the government reconsider this decision with the intention of reversing it. On the other hand, the Central Committee reiterates its demand that the government enable the Palestinian Arab people in the Israel-held territories to establish a democratic national representative body with whom it should start negotiations on all issues pending a solution, on the basis of the principles of self-determination and peaceful coexistence.

7. The Central Committee views with deep concern the increasing influence of the right-wing forces of the Gahal type, and annexationist groups, on the government's policy. This influence is reflected in the "Alignment" and the coalition under the Premiership of Golda Meir, giving in to the extremist chauvinistic attitudes in the field of foreign policy and in the economic-social field, as well as to the pressure of clericalism (in the issue of "who is a Jew?", etc.).

8. The Central Committee expresses its objection to the steps taken by the government against the interests of the working class and the wide popular sections: The "package deal" that keeps the wages lagging behind the increase in output and the rise in prices; imposing the principal burden of taxation and loans on the popular masses; the rescission of the law limiting the permissible rates of interest, thereby delivering the workers' settlements, the manufacturers and settlers to the mercy of usurers; the constant threat to curb the freedom to strike, etc. The Central Committee urges all the employees to fight against the class assault on the rights and living standard of the working people.

9. The C.P.I. Central Committee expresses its opinion that for the benefit of the advance-

ment of peace on the part of Israel, for the benefit of a more just partition of the national income and of the expenditure for national security, for the benefit of democracy and the living standard of the working class and the popular sections—it is necessary to disband the national unity government, without delay, and to establish a government capable of pursuing a consistent policy and initiative for peace, progress and social justice.

10. The C.P.I. Central Committee protests the decision of the Histadruth Executive Committee to cancel the observance of the May Day 1970 as a workers' holiday, and calls the working class to celebrate May Day this year as a full holiday. The effort to help the border settlements is supported by all sections of the Israeli public, but this effort need not be made on May Day.

11. According to the decision of the 5th Plenary Session of the C.P.I. Central Committee, the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birthday will be marked by publishing a collection of articles dedicated to his personality, teachings and work, and by mass meetings and theoretical study groups in his memory.

12. The Central Committee calls the Israeli public to mark on May 9, 1970 the 25th anniversary of the historical victory over Hitlerite Germany.

13. The Central Committee expresses concern about the expansion of the war in South East Asia and joins all forces of peace in the world in the demand to put an end to the bloodshed, to respect the independence and sovereignty of all peoples of that region, to prevent foreign intervention of any kind, and to honour the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962.

14. The Central Committee reaffirms the composition of the organisational Committee that is to prepare the discussion on the issue of the Party organisation for the second session of the 16th Congress, its date to be fixed at the next plenary session.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. to Iran (Excerpt)¹

Teheran, March 31, 1970

[At the invitation of the Shah-in-Shah of Iran, Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, paid an official visit to Iran from March 28 to 31, 1970].

Being profoundly concerned about the persisting dangerous situation in the Middle East, the two Sides expressed their firm intention to work, jointly with other peace-loving states, for the implementation of all the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22nd, 1967. They reaffirmed that Israel should relinquish the territories it occupied, which is the basic condition for the settlement of this crisis, and denounced the bombings of territories and peaceful civilians in Arab countries. The two Sides stressed that a lasting settlement in the Middle East is possible through respect for the lawful rights of the Arab peoples, including the population of Palestine. They stand for the observance of the relevant UN resolutions.

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Report by President Tito of Yugoslavia to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly (Excerpts)²

Belgrade, March 31, 1970

Comrades Deputies,

Permit me to inform you about my recent visit to the friendly countries of East and North Africa. The visits took place in res-

ponse to invitations which the heads of eight countries had sent me.

We visited Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, the United Arab Republic and Libya, and talked with the heads of these countries; Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, Haile Selassie, Jaafar Numeiry, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Moamer Kadhafi. These talks were extremely fruitful.

During my talks with President Nasser and with the leaders of the new revolutionary governments of Sudan and Libya, the greatest attention was devoted to the crisis in the Middle East. This was understandable, because these countries are particularly concerned over that untenable situation, especially since it is deteriorating from day to day. It is with the deepest anxiety that we all follow developments in that area, which is also geographically extremely near to us indeed.

No one in the world can be indifferent to what is happening over there. The exacerbation of the crisis in the Middle East affects the interests of the peoples of all the Mediterranean countries. The behaviour of Israel, which is advancing its annexationist aspirations with increasing openness and completely ignoring the resolution of the Security Council and other endeavours aimed at a political solution, is a challenge to the peaceable public of the world. In the escalation of its aggressive actions, Israel does not shirk even from bombing the innocent population and civilian targets. For instance, a construction materials factory near Cairo was also bombed although it has nothing to do with war production. Napalm bombs killed eighty people and wounded many. But, in spite of these brutal Israeli undertakings, unfortunately there is still not enough concern in the world as to where the policy pursued by Israel with the aid of some big powers is leading.

The situation in the Middle East has

¹ English text in *Moscow News*, No. 14 (April 4, 1970), p. 3.

² English text in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 480 (April 5, 1970), pp. 15, 18-19.

deteriorated to a critical point. Matters are developing so badly that they may slip out of control any moment and result in unforeseeable consequences. It is more than clear to everyone today that Israel would not be able to act as it does but for support, aid and encouragement from outside. And in the background of all this is the obvious intention to halt the progressive and independent development of the Arab countries so as to preserve or restore old positions also in this area.

During the talks we had with all the heads of the African countries, we noted that they share our anxiety over the deteriorating crisis in the Middle East, because they realize that the policy of force and escalation of aggression on the continent on which they themselves live jeopardize peace and their own security and independence. Besides this, they directly feel the consequences of the blockade of the Suez Canal, which is causing serious difficulties and inflicting damage to their own economies, just as it does to us, to all for whom this is the shortest route to the Far East.

This situation requires urgent vigorous steps so as to find an outlet from the present blind alley and to open the way to a peaceable and just solution. Understandably, the condition must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Without this there can be no solution of the crisis in the Middle East, nor can the foundations be laid for a lasting peace and for security of all the countries in that area.

During my talks with President Nasser and his aides we were convinced once again that they have not abandoned the search for a peaceable solution in keeping with the Security Council resolution, in which regard they look to greater support from all peaceminded forces. But, they are also preparing for another kind of solution, if necessary, which is quite understandable. Because no one can deny any people the right to fight with any means to recover territory taken by force from it.

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U.S. Magazine Interview Statement by Member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council Benvenisti on Peace Opportunities Missed by Israel¹

April 1970

Elkins: What opportunities has the Israeli Government missed?

Benvenisti: I think our greatest mistake was to insist on total peace. All or nothing. As a result, some very important decisions that could have been taken three or four months after the war were turned down by the government. For example, in August 1967, there was a draft protocol of 29 clauses that could have led to close economic ties with Jordan, including a free port on the Mediterranean for Jordan. The project was actually initialed by the government, but we backed away because its opponents argued these were trump cards to be kept for the peace table. It was the same with the refugees and Jerusalem. Now the refugees are dominated by the fedayeen. In Jerusalem we could have proposed a single municipal area, including Ramallah and Bethlehem, with two distinct sovereignties. Each group would have had specific responsibilities on the municipal council—Jews, Moslems and Christians. And during an interim period we could have had home rule for Arabs on the west bank, turning over responsibility to them for all civilian affairs. Let's not forget that we do have open bridges across the Jordan, and that works. We could do more.

¹ Excerpted from "Israel: Criticism from Within," interview with Israeli intellectuals, *Newsweek* (International Edition), LXXV, 16 (April 20, 1970), p. 56.

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Article on "The Future of Israel" by World Jewish Congress President Goldmann (Excerpt)¹

April 1970

I belong, as my record proves, among the very first proponents of the idea of partition of Palestine. I was always a political Zionist, in the sense that I believed that Jews must have a state of their own to secure their identity and civilization. More and more, however, I am coming to the conclusion that Israel cannot be one of the more than a hundred so-called sovereign national states as they exist today and that, instead of relying primarily and exclusively on its military and political strength, it should be not merely accepted but guaranteed, *de jure* and *de facto*, by all the peoples of the world, including the Arabs, and put under the permanent protection of the whole of mankind. This neutralization would certainly be an exception to the normal forms of modern states but, as I indicated before, the Jewish people and the Jewish history are unique. Their singular character and ceaseless suffering—particularly during the Nazi catastrophe—allow the Jewish state to demand from the world the right to establish its own national center in its old homeland and to guarantee its existence. How this guarantee should be practically formulated and implemented will have to be thought out and elaborated. There may be a slight precedent for it in the neutrality of Switzerland, which was guaranteed by the major powers more than 150 years ago, with lasting results. If Switzerland, because of its history and tradition, was and is entitled to claim and obtain the respect for its specific neutral character, the Jewish people and Israel certainly have an even greater moral claim to it.

This neutralization of Israel would naturally have important consequences for the character and the activities of the state. It

would have to keep itself outside the sphere of power politics. Switzerland, for example, is not a member of the United Nations, because it is more than difficult to be in the United Nations and remain really neutral, abstaining from decisions which indicate a political position in favor of one or another of the groups and blocs in the world. Neutralization may even mean that a permanent symbolic international force may have to be stationed in the state of Israel, so that any attack on it would imply an attack on all the states guaranteeing Israel's existence and neutrality and participation in this international force. (To avoid misunderstandings, I would add that this does not signify the demilitarization of Israel and the abolition of its army, as long as there are no proof and experience to show the effectiveness of the international guarantee.) But by the nature of things, especially if this guarantee were tied up with a control of arms deliveries to the countries of the Middle East—a plan much discussed these days—the importance of the army and armaments would be reduced the more the guarantee and the neutralization become a reality, and this would allow Israel, as I said, to concentrate fully on its economic, cultural and spiritual efforts.

I can well imagine that such a neutralization could be the basis for an Arab-Israeli settlement and peace. Psychological and emotional motives are primarily at the root of the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict, as of most conflicts. All the factual problems—refugees, borders, etc.—could be solved without too great difficulties if there were goodwill and eagerness to reach an understanding. Seen from this aspect, the greatest hindrance in Arab-Israeli relations is the humiliation which the Arab world has suffered time and again by its military defeats. Whoever knows the Arabs, their history and character, agrees that pride is one of their most excessive virtues. But an appeal to the generosity of the Arabs, to be guarantors with the rest of the world for a Jewish state in a tiny part of the tremendous territories at their disposal—however unrealistic it may sound at the moment—may be more

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, XLVIII, 3 (April 1970), pp. 452-456.

effective in the long run for an Arab-Israeli coexistence than one Israeli victory after another.

Neutralization would also do away with one of the major and understandable fears of the Arab world, namely the worry about possible Israeli territorial expansion on the one hand and, on the other, the obstacle which Israel, by its geopolitical position, represents to the ideal of a united policy for the Arab world. A guaranteed neutrality of Israel, including the guarantee of its boundaries after the settlement of the present conflict, would do away with the Arab fear of Israeli aggression and expansion. A neutralized Israel, outside the sphere of power politics, would not be a handicap for the policies of a united Arab world, which sooner or later will have to emerge in this period tending toward the creation of larger units comprising many sovereign states. I mention, in this regard, a conversation between Nasser and Dag Hammarskjöld, who tried several times in talks with him to find a basis for an Arab-Israeli agreement, and on which Hammarskjöld reported to me. Nasser, Hammarskjöld told me, had indicated that maybe the Arabs would acquiesce in the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state in part of it, but they could never accept that Israel, by its location, partitions the whole Arab world—between Morocco and Iraq—and makes a united Arab policy very difficult. A neutralized Jewish state would do away with this fear.

The solution I suggest would depend on two preconditions. The first and obvious one is that the present crisis and war between Israel and the Arabs find an end by some kind of agreement between the parties, the exact nature of which this essay would not attempt too outline. Although nothing can be done concretely toward the implementation of my concept until this is achieved, if the concept should be accepted, it would naturally influence the character of the settlement of the present conflict.

The second precondition would be a basic settlement of the greatest human and emotional obstacle to Arab-Israeli under-

standing, namely the Arab refugee problem. Its main solution would have to consist in financing the settlement of the major part of the refugees in Cis- and Transjordan, which experts believe to be technically feasible; in Israel's acceptance, even as a matter of principle, of a limited number of Arab refugees; and possibly in yielding the Gaza Strip to Israel, on condition that it integrate the 200,000 Arabs living there as equal citizens.

There was a time when I advocated, privately and publicly, as a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the establishment of a confederation of states of the Middle East in which Israel should be a member. In such a confederation the Arabs would naturally be the majority and Israel would have to adapt its world policies to their desires. When I negotiated the idea of partition in 1945 with Dean Acheson, the then Undersecretary of State, and got his agreement, followed later by the consent of President Truman to this idea, I submitted to him a memorandum on behalf of the Zionist Executive, formulating our proposal as twofold: a Jewish state in part of Palestine and this state as part of a confederation of Middle Eastern states. In view of the experience of the last 20 years, I am no longer convinced of the practicability of this solution. First of all, because of Arab individualism and the tremendous cleavage between the feudalistic Arab forces of yesterday and the revolutionary forces of today, it will take a very long time for the Arab world to unite and form such a confederation. Secondly, and even more decisively, if this day should come, Israel as the only Jewish state in such a confederation would be overwhelmed by the enormous numerical superiority of the Arabs, even if a few non-Arab states were to participate.

In the last two years, another solution suggested by certain Arabs as well as by some Israelis has been gaining the sympathy of Left-leaning pro-Arab groups in the free world. It proposes the recognition of the Palestinian people in Cis-jordan which (in the suggestion of El Fatah) would form

one democratic Palestinian state together with Israel or (the solution favored by the Israeli proponents) would be recognized as a state of its own, linked in a federation with Israel. I do not regard this as practical, either from a Jewish or an Arab point of view.

From the Jewish aspect, such a unitarian Palestinian state would do away with the Jewish character of Israel. Had the purpose of Zionism been merely to save homeless and persecuted Jews, this concept might have been of value. But the Zionist ideal was to create a state which, beyond offering refuge to a number of suffering Jews, would be determined by its Jewish majority and would enable the Jewish people to maintain its traditions, develop its genius and contribute to world civilization. This aim could not be achieved by a binational Arab-Jewish Palestinian state, particularly in view of the higher birthrate of the Arab population, which would in a short while become the majority and do away with the Jewish character of this state—even if, as is the case in Lebanon, the equal position of both parts of the population, irrespective of their number, were to be guaranteed constitutionally. In addition, the Arab citizens of such a unitarian Palestinian state would, quite naturally, tend to side with the neighboring Arab states and would, consciously or unconsciously, constitute a “fifth column” within the state.

From an Arab point of view, genuine patriots will not agree to a Palestinian state which would imply their separation from the main body of the Arab world and would make them dependent on the superior strength and know-how of the Jewish citizens, with their greater technical and scientific knowledge and larger financial and economic means.

As for a federation between an Arab and a Jewish state, from an Arab point of view, the Israeli part would be economically and technologically so much superior that the Arab component would be practically a satellite of the Jewish one, which the Arab world would of course never accept.

For all these reasons, the idea seems to me—despite a certain attractiveness—unrealistic and unfeasible. I suggest, instead, the neutralization of the Jewish state of Israel.

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Report on Possible Ways to Peace in the Middle East Prepared by a Working Party of the Society of Friends (Quakers) (Excerpts)¹

April 1970

II: PEACE COULD YET BE MADE

Peace must come again some day in the Middle East. Short of an improbable agreement between the antagonists, it can come in the discernible future only if the United Nations and the major powers can, first of all, bring about a reduction in the level of violence in the area and, secondly, define and support, more decisively than they have yet done, a comprehensive political settlement. It is urgent for the welfare of the Middle East and of the world that the leaders of all nations with important interests and involvements there move energetically in behalf of such a settlement.

The prospects for peace steadily fade away, and time appears to be running out. Each side is the victim of what it is convinced is the

¹ Working Party, initiated by the American Friends service Committee and the Canadian Friends Service Committee and acting in association with the Friends Service Council (London), the Friends World Committee for Consultation and the Friends Peace and International Relations Committee (London), *Search for Peace in the Middle East* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: American Friends Service Committee, 1970), Parts II, IV, V, and VI, pp. 23-25 and pp. 51-72. (Part I, “Background” and Part III, “Viewpoints on the Conflict” were omitted here for reasons of space).

aggression of the other side. Everyone feels deeply aggrieved at an enemy from whom he cannot escape, whom he suspects and fears, and with whom he sees virtually no hope for peace. All are caught in a web of self-justification, bitterness, and hatred. Each side feels that force is the only language the other side will understand. And each side is wrong; force, we are convinced, is precisely the language neither side understands.

Although most Palestinian Arab refugees have found jobs and at least temporary homes in Jordan and in the neighboring Arab states, about a half million Palestinian Arab refugees remain, after twenty years, in "temporary" refugee camps, many of them having been made refugees twice during that period. Further violence makes still more refugees and pushes still further ahead the uncertain date for solving their problems. Since the June War of 1967, attitudes have hardened and voices of moderation, which are not absent on either side, have tended to fall silent, largely self-suppressed for the time being by the bitter emotions which physical violence has created.

The arms race among the Middle Eastern powers is on in earnest again. Nations which need all the resources they can acquire to further the economic and social advancement of their peoples are caught up in a frenzied competition to acquire the hardware of war and to divert large numbers of their men to use it.

Moreover, the *Fedayeen* resistance forces, made up of Palestinian Arabs, have reached new levels of public esteem and support and have gained a hold on the emotions of the young people, and of most of their elders, unequalled by any other political or ideological group. Both Israeli and Arab governments are increasingly wedded to a no-compromise line and to strident propaganda attacks on the other side.

Provocations for a new full-scale conflict are evident to everyone. The Arabs and the Israelis continue on a collision course ever deeper into a fourth-round war. This needs to be remembered even though it is now argued by some military observers that

Israel has such overwhelming superiority in the air that the Arabs would not dare cause a war now. There are heightened risks this time that nuclear weapons could be introduced into the conflict and that a major show-down between the Soviet Union and the United States in the area could develop. Peace in the area, and conceivably the peace of much of the rest of the world, is being put at the mercy of the unpredictable and uncontrollable forces that inevitably operate in times of continuous irregular warfare. Wars are rarely made on purely rational grounds. Wars break out when the rational case for attack, however flimsy, gets the support of overwhelming irrational pressures.

It is clear that the issues are profound and complex, that the passions on both sides are inflamed, and that the case each side presents to the world and against its enemy allows almost no room for compromise. Yet, however fractional the hope for peace may be, it must be pursued in the United Nations, in the talks among the major powers, and in continuing discussions with the leaders of the peoples concerned in the region, including representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, with all dispatch, energy, and imagination. A military solution will be no solution. There is no tolerable alternative to a political settlement.

These are the convictions of the Quakers who join in issuing this appeal to our own leaders and our fellow citizens and put forward these expressions of concern and good will to both Arabs and Israelis. We know that any suggestions on the making of peace in the Middle East will be considered by some on all sides as meddling. All analyses of so difficult a problem are subject to errors of fact and of judgment; yet we feel, despite the obvious presumption, that we must attempt an appraisal of the issues and prospects in the hope of advancing in some measure the search for greater understanding and eventual peace.

As we see the Middle East conflict, our conclusions are:

1) *The situation is not yet hopeless. It is exceedingly dangerous and steadily worsening. Time is working against everyone.*

2) *The contending sides are unable to solve their conflict directly and alone. They are incapable of reaching, on their own, any meaningful kind of truce.*

3) *Outside initiatives—vigorous and sustained—are essential if any settlement is to be reached. To succeed, those initiatives must have broad governmental and popular support, particularly in the United States.*

4) *No conceivable settlement could possibly satisfy the desires and demands of both sides, and it is almost inevitable that any workable solution will contain elements seriously objectionable to both.*

5) *There has in the past few years emerged an important new factor—the Palestinian Arabs, self-consciously seeking a role in their own salvation. They must be heard.*

6) *The United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on 22 November, 1967, remains the most practical and acceptable basis for achieving a peaceful settlement and should be faithfully and promptly implemented.*

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IV: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE BASES

OF A PRACTICAL PEACE SETTLEMENT

It is hard enough to determine the historical facts about the Arab-Israeli conflict and to make certain that they are recorded accurately. It is extremely difficult to hear with precision the viewpoints of the various interested parties and to interpret them fairly. To move beyond these hazardous exercises and to attempt to put forward specific proposals is patently presumptuous. However, people of many diverse viewpoints have suggested that Quakers should as a

part of this statement try to develop some proposals on how a peace might be achieved. It has been said with good-humored bluntness: "Everybody knows the Quakers are in favor of peace, but so is everyone else. What are the practical steps to be taken toward peace? The Quakers should try to come forward with some specific suggestions, even at the risk of being ridiculed."

We believe that everyone is in favor of peace in the Middle East—in the abstract. As in all conflicts, it is natural to want a peace that gives one's own side what it wants, or peace which represents total surrender by the enemy. The trouble is that peace as a concrete reality is almost always based upon accommodation, bargaining, compromise—even after an overwhelming victory by one side. So must it be if peace is to come to the Middle East.

Are there any grounds for hoping that the bases for an accommodation in the Middle East can be found? We believe there are, despite abundant reasons for discouragement and even despair. We know full well that whatever approaches are suggested will be subject to rejection and abuse by both sides—and may prove, objectively, to be ill-advised. Nonetheless, with all the risks involved, we are prepared to state our conviction that the following guidelines offer the most promising approaches to a settlement of the Middle East troubles that seem likely to be available.

1. *The first step must be an effort at psychological and emotional disengagement.*

Insofar as anti-Semitism still exists anywhere in the world, or may develop in the future, it is a problem with which responsible leaders everywhere must deal and against which world opinion must be mobilized. This, like all other forms of racism, must be combatted vigorously if there is to be a decent life in this interrelated age for any of us. But anti-Jewish prejudices, discrimination and persecution are not a problem which

the Arab countries must be expected to solve for the rest of the world by repeatedly trading away Arab territory. To place that burden upon the Arabs is to transfer from the West to the Middle East the most loathsome aspects of the anti-Jewish madness and to make peace for the area, in any true sense, impossible.

Convictions about an inevitable continuing Jewish expansionist drive alongside continuing Arab technical and military weakness long ago became a dominant factor in the Arab view of the world. It is, understandably, a fixation, a cause of fear, and a basis for hostile Arab judgments on all other current political phenomena involving Israel. The sometimes explicit, sometimes merely hinted references of Israeli leaders to a continuing in-gathering of Jews from all over the world give to the Arabs a sense of fear, hopelessness, and resentment that overclouds all attempts at rational discussion of a Middle East settlement. These attitudes will continue so long as that in-gathering can be interpreted as tied to an expansion of the Jewish-held territories in the Middle East at the expense of the Arabs.

Prior to the June War, and since, some Israelis have said that, by the intense application of labor and capital, Israel could absorb all the Jews of the world, if that should become necessary, within the truce lines recognized prior to June 5, 1967. All Israeli leaders insist that it was not any Jewish territorial ambition that produced the June War or that would stand in the way of peace now. However, having acquired new territories as the result of that war, many Israelis do not want to give them back and some indicate that they want even more. Only a forthright declaration by the Israeli government repudiating the accusation that its plans for Jewish immigration are tied to any further demands for territorial expansion can begin to allay the most persistent Arab fears.

The Arab paranoia over the prospects of unlimited Israeli territorial expansionism is matched by a Jewish paranoia toward the prospects of unceasing Arab determination to destroy Israel and to slaughter all Jews.

The daily commando attacks on Israeli communities, military outposts, or individual soldiers and civilians, of course, feed that fear. So do Arab propaganda broadcasts, declarations and calls for a Holy War which seem to support the Israeli charge that the Arabs will not accept the existence of Israel in any form. The Israeli government and people continue to brush aside the commando attacks as having no more military significance than traffic accidents, regrettable though bearable, but they serve to unify a loose coalition government that would otherwise fly apart and bind an otherwise critical and peace-hungry people to the hard-line policies of the government. Even those Israelis who denounce their government, sometimes in the most devastating terms, nonetheless also denounce the commando violence and say that if that violence brings on another war, they, while still critical of what they regard as their own government's stubbornness and stupidity, will join the fight, as Israeli patriots, to defend their nation against destruction. The further the Arabs go in trying to solve the conflict with the Israelis through violence, the more violence the Israelis will use against the Arabs. The more threats against the existence of Israel are uttered by Arab spokesmen, the more the Israelis become convinced that no peace with the Arabs is possible.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the emotionally overcharged atmosphere in the Middle East must be cleared, that the mutual fears and hatreds must somehow be abated, that the beginnings of mutual credibility must be established—if the first steps toward a settlement are ever to be taken. This means, we believe, that there is urgent need for certain unequivocal declarations of intent. First, the Israeli government must give forthright assurances on eventual withdrawal from occupied territories as part of an overall peace settlement and should attempt to refute accusations of further expansionist aims. Second, the Arab governments must declare their acceptance of the fact of Israel's existence as a sovereign state and must make clear their willingness to live in a condition of non-belligerency with Israel. Third, the Big Four should declare their readiness to underwrite a peace

settlement agreed upon by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt and negotiated in consultation with the Palestinian Arabs.

2. The second step must be an effort at military disengagement

Absolutely nothing can be accomplished toward a peaceful settlement if the acts of violence on both sides continue to escalate. Therefore, a most urgent issue in the area and before the United Nations and the Big Four is finding the means to reduce and, it is hoped, to halt the violence. To this end we suggest:

a) that an attempt should be made to secure special agreement for the establishment of a substantial United Nations emergency peace-keeping force to hold suitable demilitarized buffer zones, on both sides of agreed demarcation lines, for a limited period and subject to removal only by explicit vote of the UN Security Council;

b) that despite the inadequacies of similar UN efforts in the Middle East in the past, a special United Nations Commission to supervise effective cease-fire arrangements be set up to function on both sides of all cease-fire lines for the purpose of compiling an accurate and immediate record of all acts of violence, whether labeled as terrorism or counter-terrorism reprisals, these reports to be transmitted regularly and promptly to the United Nations and to the news media of the world;

c) that a conference be convened by the United Nations of the arms-supplying nations involved in or likely to become involved in the Middle East arms traffic, to explore ways of reducing the flow of arms into the Middle East and to undertake suitable UN action declaring the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the world community must for some years maintain an effective international police force for the Middle East. Despite obvious difficulties and substantial costs, it is incumbent on the world community to employ every available means to halt

the violence that is causing such widespread misery for the people of the Middle East and to help these people rebuild their hopes for a decent future.

3. The third step must be an effort to structure a political settlement

Even after psychological and military disengagement, when tempers have cooled, the shooting has stopped, and long-dead hopes of peace are reviving, it is unlikely that one grand, comprehensive peace plan can be drawn up and accepted at a given moment by all the parties to the conflict. Certainly, this is quite impossible in the form of "direct negotiations" for which the Israelis have so persistently pressed. An enormous amount of indirect bargaining, involving the great powers, the United Nations Special Representative and perhaps others, will have to take place before anything approaching direct and general Arab-Israeli negotiations can occur. Sooner or later, something like the Rhodes-style indirect consultations and negotiations will have to be initiated as first steps toward peaceful agreement. However, eventually, under United Nations auspices, representatives of the Arabs, specifically including the Palestinians, and of the Israelis must accept concrete agreements, and those agreements must be encased in official, public, written documents.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the Israelis should cease their opposition to the Big Four talks and publicly lay aside their insistence on immediate bi-lateral "direct negotiations" with the Arabs. Otherwise the conclusion is inescapable that the Israeli government accepts as unavoidable the indefinite prolongation of a no-peace/no-war situation. It is further recommended that the Big Four invite the contending parties to enter into sustained talks with suitable intermediaries, under United Nations auspices, for the purpose of reaching mutual agreement on the implementation of the plan for peace embodied in the United Nations Resolution of November 22, 1967, with such elaborations and refinements as may be necessary to produce a workable settlement acceptable to and publicly signed by both sides.

In the creation of a political settlement, we believe that the fundamental guidelines may be summarized as follows:

a) The right of existence for all states in the Middle East must be accepted by all other states in the area.

b) All claims and acts of belligerency of one Middle Eastern state against another must be ended.

c) Israeli claims to the acquisition of territory by conquest in the June War of 1967 must be abandoned and Israel must make firm commitments for withdrawal from territories occupied after June 5, 1967, it being understood that other provisions of UN Resolution will be faithfully implemented.

d) The right of self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs must be recognized by all parties to the conflict and appropriate United Nations arrangements should be set up to determine the will of the Palestinians. Pending such a determination, a temporary United Nations Trusteeship or some comparable type of international administration should replace the Israeli military occupation for Gaza and the West Bank.

e) During the necessary interval before the establishment of peace in the area, some form of temporary international authority must be established in the demilitarized Sinai and in the Golan Heights.

f) Jerusalem is unique, and a solution to the problem of Jerusalem will have to be unique. The story of the last two decades is a denial as much of the uniqueness of Jerusalem as of its holiness.

Three religious intensities meet in Jerusalem. No non-Jew can enter into the feelings and emotions of Jews at the Wall of the Temple. No non-Muslim can realize the Muslim regard for the Dome of the Rock. For Christians, certain special sites in Jerusalem arouse deep emotion.

The world should establish inviolable rights of access for Jews in perpetuity to the Wall, for Muslims to the Dome. Both must assure freedom of access for Christians to their holy sites.

It is difficult to set down in cold print even an outline of the requirements or possibilities of this task. Inevitably, an attempt to do so will prove the most unsatisfactory part of our analysis of the desperate problems of the Middle East.

In time it should be possible to create some sort of federal condominium to govern an undivided and demilitarized Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the most satisfactory arrangement would seem to be separate Jewish and Arab boroughs, with certain shared municipal services, under some coordinating United Nations agency. That the city should be undivided and demilitarized is obvious common sense. That it should be united under exclusive Israeli control seems unlikely ever to be acceptable to most Muslims and Christians. Jerusalem must not again become a divided zone of conflict as it was for twenty years. It cannot peacefully become the sole possession of one religion or one national state.

g) The shipping of all nations must be guaranteed the right of free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

h) The Palestine Arabs who became refugees after the passage of the 1947 U.N. partition resolution have the right, in accordance with repeated U.N. declarations, to one of two forms of compensation. Within some agreed annual maximum, Israel should agree to receive within its 1967 borders a number of returning refugees, who are willing to live at peace with their Jewish neighbors and who will receive compensatory provision for their re-establishment.

For most refugees, this course will be neither feasible or desired. These should receive compensation for the loss of their property, including appropriate payment for the years of non-use of lands, houses and other properties left in Israeli hands. They should receive generous assistance in re-establishing themselves.

Israel should contribute its part to the costs of compensation, but it is right and proper for other nations, especially of the Western world, and of whatever ideology,

to share in the payment of those charges. Whatever that figure, it will be less than the cost, over the next decades, of a Middle East in ferment, and is in any event required by the most elementary humanitarian considerations.

While many Jews migrated voluntarily to Israel, considerable numbers were evicted from their permanent homes in parts of the Arab world in conditions of total destitution, and such cases should be included in the compensatory processes on terms comparable with the treatment planned for Arab refugees.

4. The fourth step must be peace development

If psychological and military disengagements can be achieved, and if a practical political settlement can be eventually arranged, the Middle East will still be a long way from true peace. It is not realistic to assume, after all the bitter conflict of these many years, that "normal" political and economic ties will be quickly established between Israel and the Arab states and that mutual trust and friendly personal relations will rapidly develop between Jews and Arabs. Many small and large acts of good will, many shared experiences of constructive achievement must take place and many new social institutions for both Jews and Arabs must be developed in order to create the climate of understanding in which real peace can grow. Many acts of support will be required on the part of the international community for such enterprises of reconciliation to succeed.

In the long run, Jews and Arabs must themselves take the primary responsibility to push forward with the tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation. What outside groups, governments and international agencies do or fail to do may only aid or hamper the accomplishment of those tasks. Here, we believe, are some pertinent suggestions:

a) *A greater role should be envisioned for international economic aid*, and it should be calculated more in human terms and less in international political terms. Though

there is still a role for bi-lateral aid schemes, so selfishly have the great powers sought to tie aid programs to their own economic, political and military purposes, that bi-lateral aid from these sources is seriously compromised. No single proud Middle Eastern state wishes to see its future in terms of an association with outside political influences, nor should any be required to do so. More and more contributions of manpower and money should be channeled through the United Nations or through an institution to be created, perhaps a Middle East Institute for Research, Planning and Development, able to lift its sights from local problems to regional and worldwide considerations, avoiding the compromised and competitive domination of the great powers.

It is the suggestion of the authors of this paper that nations of the middle rank, politically uncompromised in the Middle East, concerned for peace and justice and willing to invest generously in orderly advancement of the area, should take the lead in organizing cooperating institutions and activities wherever possible among all nations of the region. They should find ways to maximize local leadership and resources, providing politics-free advice and counsel and a balance within the inevitably confused Middle East political structure. Financial support for such initiatives should, of course, also be drawn from the great powers if given without strings.

b) *A Middle East Bank for Development should be created*, perhaps in association with the World Bank, to provide needed funds and to help facilitate the wisest use of resources over the region. It should be clearly understood in advance, however, that any effort to "buy" peace, to put an economic value upon the hopes and dreams and loyalties of human beings, will inevitably fail.

c) *A Middle East Human Resources Institute should be established in Jerusalem* to carry out regional demographic studies and to plan for the day—perhaps far distant—when the technical competence of any one part of the region may be usefully employed elsewhere; to encourage educational programs which

could assist the development of most-needed skills; and to advise and counsel on the development of pertinent, action-oriented, interdisciplinary educational programs and intercultural research. Within its scope might be a Center of Semitic Studies, whose aim would be, in local institutions and overseas studies programs, to provide channels through which Jews and Arabs may acquaint each other with their respective backgrounds and traditions. For some time perhaps, such efforts will be most fruitful at universities in neutral areas abroad. In all of this activity, efforts for rational and maximal use of human resources within the several social traditions must be made. Flexibility and openness in defining emerging political, social and economic relationships for the future must be sought.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that here, in the field of social development, lies the greatest of the discernible human challenges in the Middle East. Progress in this field may go further to re-create the world role of the two great Semitic peoples than any other effort that might be undertaken.

V : BUT IS ANY KIND OF PEACE POSSIBLE ?

There is no question that one of the main barriers to the constructing of a Middle East solution is the widely shared belief on all sides that under existing circumstances no peace is possible now or in the predictable future. This pessimistic view is reinforced by the cynical judgment on each side that the enemy has no interest in peace.

The Israelis say that the Arabs are not interested in peace because: (a) the existing Arab governments would be overthrown if peace were made; (b) the governments of Jordan and the UAR would lose their subsidies from the oil-rich Arab states once the conflict ends; (c) Arab societies would have to undergo a social revolution if peace should come; (d) the Arab states would lose whatever sense of Arab solidarity they now possess once the Israeli challenge were removed;

(e) Soviet financial aid to the Arab world would be greatly reduced once peace came. Moreover, the *Fedayeen* will find glory and financial support only so long as a state of war or near-war can be maintained. In short, say the Israelis, the Arabs are not interested in peace, they have not abandoned their long-proclaimed dream of driving Israel into the sea, and they are interested only in playing games through the United Nations and the Big Four discussions in order to prevent peace. Israelis also express frequently the conviction that the Soviet Union does not want peace in the Middle East, preferring perpetual turmoil out of which it may reap political rewards among the increasingly "radicalized" Arab masses and their leaders.

The Arabs say that the Israelis are not interested in peace because: (a) they need a state of war or threat of war to keep the money flowing in from American Jews and other Jews around the world; (b) they need a continuing crisis to maintain domestic morale and acceptance of an uninspired, faltering coalition government; (c) they need a war economy to maintain a high level of economic activity and prevent the return of unemployment and the economic stagnation which obtained before the June War; (d) they need the myth of the beleaguered Jewish homeland to attract new immigrants and to prevent the return of the trend toward outward migration of European Jews which was evident before the June War. And, the Arabs point out, the Israelis have shown their contempt for peace-making efforts by their rejection of the UN Resolution of November 22, 1967, and numerous other UN resolutions, before and since; by their cynical establishment of Jewish communities in the occupied Arab territories; and by their hostility to the Big Four discussions on the Middle East. Moreover, say the Arabs, the Israeli obsessive demand for a comprehensive peace through immediate and direct negotiations with Arab leaders, given the present psychological and political situation in the Arab countries (of which the Israelis are fully aware), is such an unrealistic proposal

that the Israelis can make it only on the basis of a shameless hypocrisy, knowing that this maneuver is the surest guarantee that no progress toward peace will be made.

The arguments on both sides are overpowering. Examining them soberly, how can anyone imagine for a moment that anything can be in store for the Middle East except more bloodshed and more bitterness and almost certainly at least one more major, all-out Arab-Israeli war? Yet there are other factors which must be examined too:

1) The ordinary people on both sides are sick of war and the threats of war and want to be allowed to live in peace.

2) Among both Arabs and Israelis, particularly among some groups of intellectuals and students, there are sharp critics of the existing governments and of the current collision-course policies. The Israelis are a highly individualistic people and very much divided about their government and its policies. Arab dissenters are far less visible and less vocal, yet within the Arab states are many people weary of the life this conflict forces upon them and critical of the failures of their leaders. On each side the people will march once more when the bugle sounds, but they will do so with little enthusiasm and with little faith that their government knows what it is doing and can bring peace at the end of the battle.

3) Familiarity with war has not brought a diminished fear of war in the Middle East. On the contrary, there are deep apprehensions that if all-out war comes again it will be far more ghastly than anything previously experienced, that the principal cities on both sides will be bombed, that civilian casualties will be heavy, and that much of the positive achievements of these hard-working peoples, bought with great effort over the past twenty-five years, will, on both sides, lie in ruins. Fear has never been a guarantee against going to war, but, despite all the warlike rhetoric on both sides, fear of the consequences is now exercising a restraining influence—for a time.

4) Apart from these human considerations, the governments of the Arab states and of Israel have good reason to question the possibility that any national benefit can come from another war. On the Arab side there is widespread expectation that another war would mean another Arab defeat. On the Israeli side there is a widespread conviction that Israel cannot afford another "victory".

5) Still another reason for hope lies in the shared judgment of the Soviet Union and the United States that their own self-interest and the desired future of their relations with each other demand a calming down of the Middle East. Specially, the Soviet Union must give high priority to its conflict with China and the attendant dangers. The United States remains mired in a costly and unpopular war in Southeast Asia. Neither of the super-powers wants to be dragged into an unpredictable war in the Middle East. Neither can view with equanimity the possibilities that the smaller states whom they serve as patrons will come to dictate the course of the larger states' policies.

Beyond all these political considerations, which can be interpreted variously and debated endlessly, we feel, as Quakers, that we must assert the human claims of Jews and Arabs alike, and of all of us, for a life freed from the threat of wholesale destruction and the constant risk of violent death. The peoples of the Middle East are tired of this conflict. They want to get on with the tasks of building a decent existence for themselves and for their children. They do not see a way out and their passions are easily inflamed by new calls to arms. Yet, at the same time, they could be moved by a vision of peace with justice if enough voices are raised for such a vision—before everything blows up again.

VI: A QUAKER EXPRESSION OF CONCERN AND AN AFFIRMATION OF HOPE

Any analysis of the Middle East situation is bound to be incomplete, and will, in varying measure, displease everyone, including its authors. Any proposed solution is certain

to be flawed by seeming, on particular points, to favor one side over another. Any particular set of suggestions, including specifically these, will invite criticism for being too general or too detailed—or both. We have no pride in our authorship; we have no special interest or privileged position to defend.

Some, including other Quakers, will find what we have written “too political.” We will only point out that what we are faced with in the Middle East is a thoroughly political situation and that attempts at economic amelioration or at cultural cooperation will come to nothing until some significant progress is made on the basic political problem. We persist in believing that, despite all the proofs of hopelessness, progress toward a political settlement can be made.

We appeal, therefore, first, to the United Nations and to the representatives of the Big Four to continue, with renewed energy and imagination, their search for a military disengagement and a political settlement. Outside involvement has helped to produce and perpetuate the conflict; outside assistance must be used to effect a solution.

We appeal to the Israelis to reassess their present policy of seeking security primarily through the annexation of Arab territory to provide “secure and strategic boundaries.” We hold the conviction, shared by numerous Israeli citizens and other concerned residents of the area, that Israel cannot hope to survive indefinitely as an armed camp surrounded by vastly more numerous hostile Arabs. Despite official Israeli intentions to run an enlightened and humane occupation, the longer Arabs and their lands are held under Israeli control the deeper will grow the bitterness and hatred. In such a climate the cry for a war of revenge to destroy Israel will inevitably gain in popular support. In time the Arabs will have the technical and military skills to go with their superior numbers and to match the Israelis. The tacit assumption of Israeli leaders that time is on their side, that if they can only be allowed to wait it out they will be able to create so many “new facts” that

eventually a more accommodating Arab leadership will come to the fore with which a reasonable peace can be made—this assumption, we earnestly believe, is false. If it is maintained as a basis for Israeli policy, we can see only disaster for Israel—and for the rest of the Middle East. Israel’s ultimate peace and security are dependent upon having peaceful relations with its Arab neighbors. We, therefore, appeal most urgently to Israel to realize the fruitlessness of rigid policies, to recognize the obligation, as military victor in past combats, to make the first moves toward peace. Let us be plain:

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that without certain definite first moves by Israel, which only the militarily dominant power can make, progress toward a settlement of the Middle East situation cannot be made. Those first moves should involve firm public commitments to withdraw from Arab territories and to aid in the search for positive solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem. Such moves will be proof of strength, as well as statesmanship, not “confession of weakness.”

We appeal to the Arab states to reassess their present policies which are also caught up in a no-peace-and-not-quite-all-out-war pattern, to bring the commando groups under control, to reaffirm categorically their acceptance of the state of Israel as a sovereign and internationally recognized reality in the Middle East, and to renounce all claims of belligerency against it. Such an intention has already been publicly proclaimed by Jordan and the United Arab Republic in their notification of the acceptance of the UN Resolution of November 22, 1967 and has been frequently re-stated by their officials. The Israeli government does not believe these are valid assurances and may never believe them until a peace agreement is actually signed, implemented and lived with. We urge the Arab leaders to summon the courage to tell their peoples as an expression of responsible patriotism that, however unfair they may consider the manner of its creation, Israel is a reality which must be accepted and lived with in their own long-term interest. We urge the Arab governments

to turn with new energy to the tasks of social and economic development and the broadening of regional cooperation.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the Arab states should make an unequivocal public commitment now, through the United Nations, to accept an Israeli state within mutually agreed and final borders as part of a total peace settlement, and to undertake negotiations for the establishment of those boundaries and whatever demilitarized buffer zones may contribute to the greater sense of peace and security for both.

We appeal to the Palestinian Arabs to accept the fact that the state of Israel has come into being on a portion of their original Palestine homeland and to recognize that attempts to destroy that state can only bring more suffering and more injustice for more people than will be the case if Israel is accepted. At the same time we urge the Palestinians to seek to concert their voices and to become an active and constructive force in the making of peace. We do not presume to judge whether their best interests will be served by the establishment of a new independent Arab Palestine, or by the creation of a semi-autonomous Palestine federated with Jordan, or by reabsorption into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Nor do we pre-judge the future relations of the Palestinians with Israel. We feel that the Palestinians have a right to self-determination and should claim that right. The introduction of such a new factor could help to break the present stalemate.

We appeal to Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Syria and Israel to allow and encourage the Palestinian Arabs to seek to determine, freely and democratically, their own fate. To take such a far-seeing approach will be to allow some measure of mutual disengagement. Such an approach can succeed, however, only if all four states faithfully refrain from the temptation to use the Palestinians for their own national ends.

We appeal to the leaders of the American Jewish community, whose hard work and generous financial support have been so important to the building and sustaining of

Israel, to reassess the character of their support and the nature of their role in American politics. Our impression, confirmed by many comments from Israelis inside Israel, is that there is a tendency for the leaders of the American Jewish establishment to identify themselves with the more hard-line elements inside the Israeli cabinet, "to out-hawk the hawks," and to ignore or discount the dissident elements, in and out of the Israeli government, that are searching for more creative ways to solve the Middle East problems.

As free American citizens, members of the American Jewish community have every right to utilize all the instruments of a free society to register their convictions and desires, and to try to influence legislative and executive action. However, the nature of some of these pressures and their extensiveness have sometimes served to inhibit calm public discussion of the issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, on occasion, to induce public officials to endorse policies concerning Israel in which they do not believe and which they in fact regard as likely to be counter-productive for Israel as well as for the cause of peace. This is not a new phenomenon in American politics, but it is nonetheless disturbing. No one who is truly concerned about the long-term fate of Israel and the long-term threats to inter-faith harmony and brotherhood can be indifferent to these dangers.

We appeal to the Congress, the White House and the State Department to carry forward a continuing, searching examination of all the interests and issues at stake in the Middle East and to support a truly even-handed policy which will both protect the existence and peaceful development of Israel and bring justice and the hope of orderly progress to the Palestinians and other Arabs—within the frame of a comprehensive and agreed-upon peace.

We appeal to the world community—to governments, international agencies and voluntary organizations—to persist in all reasonable efforts to promote peace in the Middle East and to resist the counsels of

despair, to continue and enlarge the flow of financial support for developing the social and economic life of the Middle East peoples and for satisfying the material needs and hopes of the refugees, Arab and Jewish; and to continue to work at the many large and small tasks which must be performed in behalf of the long-term spiritual and cultural reconciliation of the Jewish and Arab peoples.

Any formal settling of the current Arab-Israeli conflict can represent only the beginnings of peace. The building of truly cooperative relationships will require many years in time and many changes in attitude. Such constructive changes will not come automatically. For the time to be well spent there is urgent need for a sustaining long-term vision of what a new order of things for the Middle East might be. Fortunately, even in the midst of the armed conflict there are many individuals and groups struggling with at least partial formulations of what a New Middle East might be. Those dreams, incidentally, are not confined to the so-called moderates or "doves," but are found in unmistakably idealistic forms among both the Palestine resistance fighters and the Greater Israel faction among the Jews. Despite their harsh, irreconcilable conflict of the moment, there are indications that some such vision as this for the long future might eventually win broad acceptance on both sides:

1) Some kind of confederation relationship of the Arab states of Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria with Israel—with ease of trade and travel and an elimination of armed borders among them.

2) A general scaling down of arms throughout the area and the withdrawal of Big Power military power from the entire region.

3) Large-scale, long-term technological and economic development of all units within the federation but with each national group protected in the maintenance of its cultural and political autonomy.

Such a dream may at the moment seem absurd. However, there are thoughtful

Jews and Arabs who are thinking in precisely these terms. It is conceivable that the future may belong to such ideas of Middle East cooperation and harmony rather than to the prophecies of unending war.

As this statement goes to press a remarkable article, "The Future of Israel," has just been published in the April, 1970 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It was written by Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress and former President of the World Zionist Organization. Rejecting an indefinite continuation of the present armed struggle state of affairs as ultimately disastrous for Israel, for international Jewry and for the whole world, Dr. Goldmann calls for the permanent neutralization of Israel as a special kind of state. He suggests that a permanently neutralized Israel living within agreed boundaries could be accepted by her Arab neighbors, and that such an Israel could eventually make the spiritual and cultural contribution to the Jewish people and to the world that the founders of the Zionist dream hoped for. He sees little hope for Israel as just another national state, trying to defend itself indefinitely through its own military strength behind cease-fire lines and surrounded by hostile neighbors. He believes that a neutral Israel could attain both peace and security and a chance to develop the special genius of its people.

FINAL THOUGHTS

As we review what we have written, we are struck by a major deficiency which we do not know how to correct: we have been incapable of communicating the depth of human anguish experienced on both sides, incapable of showing how those feelings color, shape, and dominate the words and deeds of able, intelligent, responsible people on both sides.

Non-Jews probably cannot understand the desperate, "here-we-stand" stubbornness of many Israelis. The trauma of the years of the Hitlerite holocaust has seared the souls of all Jews of middle age and older. It is

mainly the people of this older generation who govern Israel today. They identify the strength of Israel with their personal safety and with the survival of the Jewish people. Any proposed change in policy which can be interpreted as weakening the defensive capacity of Israel is resisted by many Israelis as an invitation to suicide.

Non-Israeli Jews share these emotions. As one American Jew said to us:

You have to remember that every thoughtful middle-aged Jew in the West carries deep within his gut two basic emotions—fear and guilt. Fear that what happened to six million Jews in the Nazi era could happen again—and to me next time. And guilt that, somehow, we who were spared didn't do enough to save those who were destroyed. Zealous support for Israel, whatever else it means, is a way of fighting off the fear and the guilt.

The passionate devotion of Jews, Israeli and non-Israeli, to the cause of a permanent, strong, prosperous Jewish state in the Holy Land is one of the central facts of Middle Eastern and world politics.

We also have not been able to depict with sufficient vividness the extremes of bitterness, frustration and rage felt by the Palestinian Arabs.

Anyone who visits the Palestinians in their refugee camps, talks with the young commandos in their camouflage uniforms, listens to responsible officials of UN or other international voluntary agencies or Arab governmental organizations is bound to be struck by the complex and tragic nature of the problems which beset the Palestinian refugees. He quickly discovers that no government needs to "whip up" bitterness and hatred among the refugees toward Israel. He can easily enough determine that the refugees themselves have again and again resisted efforts which some governments have made to resettle them. Most of all, he discovers that the overwhelming passion of the Arab refugees is "to go home." The attachment of Palestinian Arabs to the rocky soil of this Holy Land is quite as passionate as that of the Jewish newcomers.

Moreover, the outsider needs no extensive research to discover that the Palestinians are deeply distrustful of all suggestions that the Jews are willing to limit the size of their state, to refrain from further conquest of Arab lands, and to live at peace with their Arab neighbors.

At bottom, each side is filled with what seems to be absolute distrust of the other. The Israelis fear that the Arabs do not accept their existence, will not make peace with Israel, and could not be trusted to keep the peace if one were signed. The Arabs fear that the Israelis will not return any of the Arab lands now occupied and will, in time, demand more. At the heart of the peace-making problem is the challenge to find ways to put down those two great fears. We believe those ways can be found.

Our last word, then, is about people. Our basic concern is not with politics, power, or sovereignty, for these are only instruments in the search for the good life. The real tragedy of the Middle East today is that people are not enjoying the good life. For many, bodily conditions are harsh and their physical situation impoverished and unfree. Large numbers of the younger generation are wasting their precious youth in learning to kill, and in this way their bodies and minds are denied the chance to do the constructive work their communities so urgently need. For most men and women of the area, fear, hatred, and anxiety about what the future holds for themselves and their children fill their minds, to the exclusion of those things which bring joy and purpose and enlargement of life. But beyond the mind is the soul or spirit of a man, and of the larger community of which he is a part. At a time when the deepest values in persons and in nations are being challenged in both constructive and destructive ways throughout mankind, the world community simply cannot afford to lose the constructive genius of the Semites in internecine conflict. Here are brilliant and energetic peoples, whose present and potential value to all men is immense.

The real issue, significant for everyone,

is whether the sterile negatives of today's life in the Middle East, by which all men are imperilled, can be converted to a pattern of human cooperation not yet known or seen among men. Of all places on the face of the earth, Jerusalem should be the city where peace is made manifest in real terms—else why struggle for holy places in ways which negate their message and dissipate their holiness? Today we are all mockers of our faiths, we who call ourselves Christians no less than others, for we have done great evil. Indeed, the wider world has done so poorly with this business of national sovereignty and international relations that it is in desperate need of those, individually and nationally, who will set up totally new standards of relationships across physical frontiers and the frontiers of the mind and spirit. Today we see the nations of the Middle East sinking into the crude and outmoded patterns of violence and war so familiar elsewhere. Instead, what mankind needs is the example of a new adventure in cooperation unlike anything that has gone before.

Is what we call for sentimental nonsense, unrelated to the cold facts of *realpolitik*? Yes, if *realpolitik* is real and is the best that man can achieve! No, if men can believe that there are no hopeless situations, but only hopeless men. In these dark days we find hopeful men on both sides of the tragedy who are deeply concerned for the human condition and for the spirit of men. May their voices be more widely heard. And may common sense and human justice prevail.

75

Amnesty International Report on the Treatment of Certain Prisoners Under Interrogation in Israel¹

London, April 1, 1970

PREAMBLE

It is with the deepest regret that Amnesty International presents the following report containing *prima facie* evidence of the serious maltreatment of Arab prisoners under interrogation in Israel.

Amnesty's regret is the greater in that it acknowledges the generally liberal nature of the regime within Israel. Nevertheless, it cannot ignore, even within such a regime, the apparent existence of practices which are abhorrent to the conscience of mankind. That similar practices may occur in the adjoining countries is also a matter of deep regret and has already been the subject of Amnesty investigation and representation. (An outline of conditions in these countries and an account of some of the actions taken by Amnesty are given in Appendix III.)

THE SITUATION

1. Ever since the war in June 1967, Israel has occupied that part of Jordan which lies to the West of the River Jordan and contains some 600,000–700,000 Arab inhabitants as well as the Gaza Strip (before the war under Egyptian administration) which contains some 300,000–400,000 Arab inhabitants.

2. As is well known, the Occupied Territories are under Israeli military administration and the military authorities, under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, have extensive powers of detention and imprisonment. According to the information available to Amnesty up to January 1970, some 80 Arabs are arrested each week under this legislation.

¹ Amnesty International, *Report on the Treatment of Certain Prisoners Under Interrogation in Israel* (London: April 1970).

AMNESTY'S CONCERN

3. Amnesty does not contest the need for strict security measures and detention in political and military situations which are characterised—as they are in these Territories today—by guerilla warfare. Amnesty is, however, concerned that the treatment of such prisoners and detainees should be in conformity with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (approved by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1957) and with the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, especially Article 5 which reads:

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

4. During the last two years, Amnesty's representatives have made a number of visits to the Middle East. (An account of these visits will be found in Appendix III). In the course of these journeys, a number of those previously imprisoned or detained in Israel and the Occupied Territories approached the representatives with serious allegations of the maltreatment of Arab prisoners by Israeli personnel.

5. If these allegations are true, then extremely brutal torture is used on a not inconsiderable number of those detained. They would also seem to imply that such ill-treatment is continuing up to the present time.

6. Most of the recent allegations of torture refer to the period during which the prisoner is held for investigation and interrogation—a period which may last for several months—and before he is brought to court or committed to administrative detention. Allegations were also made that during this period, the prisoner is denied access both to his lawyer and to the Red Cross representatives.

AMNESTY'S ACTION

7. In an area of conflict such as the Middle East at the present time, it is inevitable that there should, from both sides, be allegations of the ill-treatment of prisoners.

8. Nevertheless, the allegations made to Amnesty's representatives during their investigations cannot be brushed aside. The forms of the alleged tortures were clearly described. The prisons, centres of interrogation, the periods within which torture was alleged to have taken place and the descriptions, names—or pseudonyms—of the alleged torturers were also given. The material in Amnesty's possession includes not only the foregoing, but also photographs and medical reports relating to complainants now in Jordan. Amnesty has, moreover, received from sources inside Israel and the Occupied Territories as well as from outside the names of men and women still (up to January 1970) in Israeli prisons who are alleged either themselves to have been tortured or to have been witness to the effects of torture on their fellow prisoners. (Appendix I gives four typical case histories. These are selected from the larger number of similar cases compiled by Amnesty investigators as a result of their inquiries in both Israel and the Arab countries.)

9. At the present point in time, Amnesty restricts itself to claiming that the serious nature of these allegations warrants immediate inquiry so that their truth can be tested and the practice of torture, if it exists, can be brought immediately to an end.

10. In Amnesty's view such an investigation as is needed can be carried out with the necessary speed and vigour only by a Commission of Inquiry whose impartiality is beyond question and which is fully empowered to call for documents and to subpoena witnesses.

11. For twelve months now, Amnesty has pressed this point of view on the Israeli government and has gone to considerable lengths in delaying its own action in order to give the government time to consider its proposals. (See Appendix II.) The Israeli government has, however, up to the present, not acceded to this proposal. Amnesty has, with the greatest reluctance, come to the conclusion that no useful purpose would be

served by further delay and has, therefore, taken the decision to publish.

AMNESTY'S APPEAL TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

12. The International Executive Committee of Amnesty International, having considered the *prima facie* evidence of the maltreatment of some of those held in Israeli detention centres and having reviewed the inconclusive nature of its negotiations with the Israeli government decides that:

(a) it must again request the Israeli government to agree to the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the allegations and so clear its good name. If such a Commission were international in composition, its judgement would go very far indeed to dispel the present widespread anxieties.

(b) on the Israeli government's announcing its decision to set up such a Commission, Amnesty International will give all the assistance it can to ensure that the fullest evidence is produced before it.

APPENDIX I

Summaries of Four Case Histories

Mr. A. - from Gaza

Town or place of residence: *Jerash Camp - Jordan*
 Age: *30*
 Date of arrest: *6 June 1967*
 Place (s) of detention: *ATLIT*
 Charges and/or trial: *Nil*
 Period of interrogation and/or detention: *2 months - released August 1967*

Nature of allegations: After being taken prisoner on the second day of the June war, complainant was kept in solitary confinement for a week. At the end of this period he was beaten up by a group of soldiers, and on the following day taken to a cell where he was strapped to a table and flogged.

During this time he was told to confess that he was a guerilla and asked for information concerning guerillas generally. He was returned to his cell with four broken teeth. On the following day the procedure was repeated; but in addition he was stood up against a wall, when his chest was slashed with a knife which inflicted seven parallel wounds and at the same time had one arm badly cut. His back and hands were burnt with lighted cigarettes. (Photographs of injuries and medical reports available.)

Mr. B. - from Nablus - taxi-driver

Town or place of residence: *Amman - Jordan*
 Age: *40*
 Date of arrest: *19 September 1967*
 Place (s) of detention: *NABLUS, RAMLE, SARAFAND and BEIT LID*
 Charges and/or trial: *Nil*

Nature of allegations: Arrested at 23.00 in his house and taken immediately to Nablus police station, whereupon he was beaten up by six officers and subjected to electric shocks to various parts of his body until he lost consciousness at about 4.00. On coming round he was given a glass of urine to drink; when he refused to do so was again beaten unconscious. Complainant was transferred to Sarafand where he was subjected to intensive interrogation concerning guerrillas which, on occasions, entailed the following treatment:

(i) being handcuffed with hands behind his back and having his feet shackled, then suspended naked by the wrists from a window bar. In this position he was whipped all over his body, a small rubber stick being used exclusively on the genitals.

(ii) being placed in the centre of a small room into which opened two doors opposite to each other. One arm would be tied to one open door and the other to the opposite door. Four soldiers would then rapidly shut and open the doors many times in succession.

Mr. C. - from El Bireh, Ramallah - motor mechanic

Town or place of residence: *Amman - Jordan*
 Age: *26*
 Date of arrest: *12 July 1968*
 Place (s) of detention: *RAMALLAH - SARAFAND*
 Period of interrogation and/
 or detention: *7 months - released*
13.2.69
 Charges and/or trial: *Nil*

Nature of allegations: Arrested in his house at 3.00 in the morning and taken to Ramallah H.Q. where he was beaten into unconsciousness. This interrogation continued for 3 weeks. He was later transferred to Sarafand where interrogation entailed the following treatment:

(i) being handcuffed, hands behind back and feet shackled and being suspended by the wrists from a window bar. In this position he was whipped and one of the interrogators would stand on his feet shackles greatly increasing the strain.

(ii) attaching alligator clips to his ears and genitals and passing an electric current through them.

(iii) inserting a biro type refill into the penis until it bled.

(iv) running water on the weals produced by whipping and then puffing sulphur on them.

(v) crushing finger tips between the door hinges and frame.

(vi) having a water hose inserted into his mouth and the tap turned on. An interrogator would then stand on his stomach, forcing the water out of his mouth.

Miss D. - from Nablus - student

Town or place of residence: *Amman - Jordan*
 Age: *18*
 Date of arrest: *14 March 1969*
 Place(s) of detention: *NABLUS*
 Period of interrogation and/
 or detention: *43 days - released*
26 April 1969
 Charges and/or trial: *Nil*

Nature of allegations: Arrested with her mother and sister and segregated. Interrogated at Nablus Police Station. Asked whether she knew a certain girl, on her replying "no" she was grabbed by the hair by the chief interrogator and thrown to the floor where she was beaten with a metal rod and also kicked and punched. Subsequently she was beaten in front of her mother, who was accused of hiding a member of the guerrillas in her house. When her mother pleaded with the interrogator to stop beating her daughter, she was struck on the forehead with the rod which cut it open.

APPENDIX II

Chronology of Amnesty's Action in Relation to Israel

(including its negotiations with the Israeli Government)

In *December 1968* an official Amnesty International observer attended a Human Rights Conference in Lebanon. Consequent upon allegations there, of ill-treatment of Arabs imprisoned and under interrogation by the Israeli authorities, he proceeded to Jordan where he interviewed Arabs previously imprisoned in Israel.

In *February 1969* the Secretary General of Amnesty International, returning from a visit to Africa, met the observer in Israel. Together they were invited to visit a few civilian prisons, and found conditions in them generally to be satisfactory. The Secretary General subsequently wrote to the Commissioner of Prisons, stating that he had been favourably impressed by what he had seen. This in no way affected the allegations of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners under interrogation in detention centres or police stations.

In *April 1969* a report was compiled by the Amnesty International Secretariat, including detailed cases of alleged torture and ill-treatment of Arab prisoners. The report was sent to the Israeli Government, with a strong recommendation for a formal inquiry (with international participation) to be instituted into the allegations.

The Israeli government in its reply of *August 10, 1969* stated:

The meticulous examination carried out of the material available has led the Israeli authorities to the conclusion that there is no substance in the allegations mentioned in the Reports and its Appendices.

The International Executive Committee at its meeting in Geneva in September 1969 considered carefully the full documentation submitted by the Israeli Government but found it insufficient and decided to continue to press for a Commission of Inquiry.

In *September 1969*, as a result of an invitation to Amnesty International to give evidence before the Expert Group of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, (which, in fact, was not taken up) the Secretary General of Amnesty International wrote to the Consul General of the Embassy of Israel pointing out that "as an organisation with consultative status with the United Nations, it will be difficult for us to decline to give evidence before a United Nations body if we have information which is relevant to the subject of their inquiry. We were naturally disappointed in the apparently negative response of the Israeli Government to the recommendations in the report. As you know, we have not sought to give publicity to our report as we hoped that the Israeli Government would itself wish to examine the information..."

In *October 1969*, whilst in New York, the Secretary General of Amnesty International, after lengthy discussions initiated by the Israeli representatives, wrote to the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations setting out a proposal, to the effect that Amnesty International should send a further, but more formal, mission to Israel, which would include a distinguished Israeli jurist. The mission should, with the cooperation of the Israeli government, carry out an inquiry and report.

In *November 1969* a letter was received from the Israeli Embassy in London, stating that there was no confirmation that the proposed

Amnesty International inquiry would be permitted by the Israeli Government. At the end of the month, the Executive Committee of Amnesty International decided to send further representatives to the Middle East, to obtain further evidence and information to bring the original report up to date.

In *January 1970* three Amnesty International representatives—the original representative of 1968/69, accompanied by a member of the Executive Committee and an international jurist—left for the Middle East. On their return, a summary of their report together with a further six cases of alleged ill-treatment were sent to the Israeli Government.

In a memorandum received on *27 January 1970* the Government of Israel informed the Secretary General of Amnesty International that it had "decided to grant the complainants now present in enemy states the requisite permits to enter Israel-held territories so that they may be able to lodge their complaints in accordance with existing legal procedures. Should the complainants so desire they will furthermore be permitted to appoint local lawyers of their choice to assist them in their complaints or evidence. "The Government of Israel would of course assure safety of the complainants during the entire period of their presence in Israel-controlled territory and guarantee their right to leave."

Requests for elucidation of the meaning of the phrase "existing legal procedures" evoked the following response on *10 February, 1970*:

The method of dealing with complaints is determined in each individual case in accordance with the circumstances and within the provisions of the law.

On *March 20th, 1970*, Amnesty received a letter from the Israeli Ambassador in London in which he referred to Amnesty's proposal for a Commission of Inquiry:

...it seems to me your proposal falls within the normal procedures established by the laws of Israel and, therefore, could certainly be

considered as one of the possibilities. However, it would be premature for the Israel authorities, at this stage and before official and proper complaints have been properly prepared and submitted, to determine the most appropriate, efficient and judicial way of dealing with them.

Comment

The International Executive Committee of Amnesty, having considered the letters of November 1969, January, February and March 1970 referred to above, notes that the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry is within the statutory powers of the Israeli Government and regrets that, despite Amnesty's urgent representations, the Government has so far failed to take this step.

The Executive is of the opinion that it has submitted sufficient evidence (which can be checked from sources within as well as outside Israel) to warrant the immediate setting up of the Commission it requests and is firmly of the opinion that the decision to establish such a Commission should not be made dependent upon the willingness of individual witnesses to return to Israel.

APPENDIX III

An Outline of Conditions in the Countries Adjoining Israel and an Account of Some of Amnesty's Actions in Relation to Those Countries

Amnesty International hoped to be able to organise a mission to the Middle East in 1968/69 which would visit both the Arab states and Israel in order to discuss prisoners and their treatment and the initial response to approaches was encouraging. The mission's terms of reference would include not only Arabs in Israel and Jews in Arab countries but all political or religious prisoners in this area. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to carry out an overall investigation as we had envisaged.

Briefly, the situation in the Arab states with regard to Jews is as follows:

Iraq

The Jewish community in Iraq has been subject to harsh discriminatory legislation

and restrictions since the June war. Several have been imprisoned and a number executed as alleged spies. Whenever there was forewarning of such executions, Amnesty made immediate representations to the Iraqi government.

Amnesty's effort to send an official representative into Iraq in order to raise the question of political prisoners, including the Jewish ones, failed because of the Iraqi Government's refusal to admit an official representative of Amnesty.

Syria

The picture given is again one of severe discrimination, but imprisonment does not appear to be a feature. In 1969 when a plane travelling from England to Tel Aviv was hi-jacked to Damascus, we took up the case of the two Israelis who were subsequently detained in Syria. The better-known of the two prisoners was put on the "Postcards for Prisoners Campaign" and a mass international letter-writing campaign was launched. The prisoners were subsequently released.

In the years before the June War, Amnesty undertook negotiations with the Syrian Government for a small number of Israeli prisoners suspected of espionage.

U.A.R.

During the June War, virtually the entire male adult Jewish population was arrested. Amnesty, in cooperation with other agencies, entered into negotiations leading to the release of a number of these prisoners. Regrettably, 81 are still in prison.

Libya

After the initial retaliation against Libyan Jews immediately following the June War, little more has been heard of the Jewish community. Recent reports, however, suggest that the position of the Jewish community may have worsened after the recent coup. At present Amnesty International has not enough information to assess the extent of the problem.

Amnesty has also been concerned with non-Jewish prisoners in all of these countries and has been in correspondence with Govern-

ments on their behalf during a period of political instability throughout the area.

In particular, there have come many allegations of torture of Iranian subjects in Iraq. These statements have been collected in Iran and are at present being sent to Amnesty International Secretariat for translation and evaluation.

76

Statement Issued by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on the Amnesty International Report on the Treatment of Arab Prisoners in Israel¹

April 2, 1970

The report is based on uninvestigated allegations by people who claim to have been mistreated while in detention or in prison under Israel authority. The facts are that the Israel Government offered, through Amnesty, to provide facilities for the investigation of such complaints. In a memorandum to Amnesty on 26 January 1970, the Israel Government stressed that an investigation could be conducted, provided, of course, that proper complaints were lodged and that there was an opportunity to take evidence, to conduct cross-examination and otherwise observe legal procedures.

These allegations were originally part of an Amnesty report on prisoners in Israel submitted to the Israel Government in May 1969. That report contained four sections. The Israel authorities furnished Amnesty with the detailed results of an investigation on the one section which contained names and particulars of complainants who were in Israel-held territory. The investigation clearly established the unfounded and unsubstantiated nature of the allegations. The other three sections related to unspecific and undocumented charges by anonymous complainants.

Now, instead of pursuing the offer of

the Israel Government to permit an investigation in accordance with judicial process and legal procedures, Amnesty has seen fit to publish a report critical of Israel. By this, Amnesty has permitted itself to be the vehicle for spreading unfounded and unchecked allegations, having their origin in a campaign of atrocity propaganda carried on by the Arab States and their supporters against Israel.

Amnesty's conduct in the matter is aggravated by the fact that the contents of the report were not submitted to the Israel Government for scrutiny and comment nor was the Government informed of Amnesty's intentions to publish the report.

The Israel Government regards this as an extraordinary way for Amnesty to behave towards the Government which has gone out of its way to cooperate with it. In the light of this experience, it is difficult to see how the Israel Government can place its trust in the good-will and sense of fairness of this organization and continue cooperating with it.

77

Official Statement by the Government of Israel Rejecting World Jewish Congress President Goldmann's Offer To Meet U.A.R. President Nasser²

Tel-Aviv, April 4, 1970

The Government has rejected Dr. Goldmann's offer to go to Egypt to meet Nasser. The Government has discussed the suggestion, which Dr. Nahum Goldmann states that he has received from various sources, that he should go to Egypt for a meeting with President Nasser. According to Dr. Goldmann, President Nasser stipulated that such a meeting should take place with the knowledge and approval of the Israeli Government and that notice of the meeting should be published. The Government decid-

¹ *Israel Digest*, XIII, 9 (May 1, 1970), p. 2.

² *Africa Diary*, X, 20 (May 14-20, 1970), p. 4960.

ed that it would welcome any manifestation of willingness on the part of the President of Egypt for a meeting to investigate problems crucial to Israel and Egypt, where each side was free to appoint its own representatives. Therefore, to Dr. Goldmann's request that the Government should approve his meeting with the President of Egypt, the Government has decided to reply in the negative.

78

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Foreign Minister Caglayanil of Turkey to Poland (Excerpts)¹

April 4, 1970

On the invitation of Mr. Stefan Jedrychowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland and Madam Jedrychowska, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and Madam Çağlayangil made an official visit to Poland March 30 to April 4, 1970.

The Ministers also turned their attention to various international conflicts.

They expressed keen concern with the dangerous situation in the Middle East. Reaffirming their opposition to the use of *faits accomplis* as a means of securing territorial gains and other political advantages, they reiterated the necessity for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, as called for in the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

79

Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Foreign Minister Kipriano of Cyprus to Yugoslavia (Excerpt)²

early April

Both sides consider that the situation in the Middle East has become so serious as to have become a menace to international peace and security. They pointed out that a lasting and just solution of the Middle East dispute could only be reached through the implementation of the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967, in all its aspects. They stressed the need for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from occupied territory.

80

Resolution on the Middle East Adopted by the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council³

Moscow, April 6, 1970

Of late there has been a further worsening of the Middle East situation, following the stepping-up of military acts of aggression on the part of Israel against the Arab countries and the continuous support being given by the United States.

The WPC Presidential Committee is bent on alerting public opinion about the dangerous turn of events in the Middle East which is threatening the peace of the world and international security, and which could lead to a new conflagration of unforeseeable dimensions.

Without US backing, it is clear that Israel

² *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 480 (April 5, 1970), p. 20.

³ World Peace Council Information Center, *Presidential Committee Meeting, Lenin Centenary: Documents* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1970), pp. 18-19.

¹ Translated from the French text in *Disisleri Bakanligi Belleteni* (Turkey), 67 (April 1970), pp. 90, 91.

would be unable to continue to pursue this aggressive policy. The United States, by making a considerable increase in their military, financial and political aid to Israel, are out to fulfill the imperialist plan aimed at overthrowing progressive regimes, in order to impose their domination and to increase their hold over the economic wealth of this region—of the oil in particular.

The recent plots against the Lebanon, Sudan and Cyprus, which have taken place while American intervention is spreading in Indochina, have brought out the close relationship existing between the various outcomes of the same global imperialist plan. The close links which Israel has with the ruling circles of the GFR and the Southern African racist regime illustrate this and are a danger for the peoples of Africa and of the whole world.

Encouraged by the United States, Israel is intensifying its criminal bombing raids against the populations and civilian objectives in the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon. It has unleashed a wave of repression, terror, torture, murders, destruction of dwellings, in the occupied territories. These actions are arousing the indignation of peoples throughout the world, and the United Nations have condemned many times these violations both of international law and the Rights of Man.

Scorning this condemnation, Israel has established a plan of forced displacement of people, a plan which is already beginning to be implemented, involving 300,000 Palestinian Arabs from the Gaza Strip, with a view to a final annexation of this zone. This is a new proof of the annexationist and racist character of Israel policy and of the greatly deceptive character of their leaders' peace talk.

Israel's obstinate refusal to accept the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and of the Security Council, her declared refusal to return to the boundaries of before June 5, 1967, confirmed by official statements made by her leaders and ministers, and evidenced by the speeded-up installation of para-military and other

settlements in the Arab occupied territories, compel the Arab countries and peoples to increase their armed forces and means of defence in order to counter air raids and to liberate their occupied territories. The Arab countries are finding sympathetic understanding among all their friends, and principally in the Soviet Union which gives them growing and disinterested support.

Israel's continuous refusal to accept the United Nations and Security Council resolutions—before and after June 5th—relating to Palestine, makes it a sacred duty for the Arab Palestinians to fight for the recovery of their legitimate national rights. Palestinian resistance, which is an integral part of the world national liberation movement against imperialism, colonialism and zionism, is receiving support from all forces of independence and peace.

The Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council calls upon all forces for peace and freedom in the world to act together to prevent a new full-scale war in the Middle East and to bring about a just and durable peace, by:

- putting an end to air raids and other Israeli acts of war against the people and civilian objectives;

- a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories;

- implementing all the United Nations and Security Council resolutions, especially the November 22, 1967 resolution;

- recognizing the legitimate national rights of the Arab Palestinian people and allowing Palestinian Arab refugees to return to their homes, in conformity with the repeated decisions of the United Nations.

The forces of peace can and must be brought together and organised around these objectives, in joint activity. Ever-increasing sections of the peoples in Europe, the United States and even in Israel, are becoming more and more aware of the grave dangers to peace and security inherent in the expansionist and racist policy of Israel.

The WPC Presidential Committee urges all the forces working for peace to express

their solidarity with the Arab peoples and to act vigorously for justice and peace in the Middle East. Let the first week in June, the International Week of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Arab Peoples for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression, be a period of intensified activities towards these ends.

The seriousness of the situation in the Middle East demands of all men who cherish peace the world over that they act promptly and vigorously.

81

Interview with Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army Bar-Lev on the Military Strategy of Israel¹

April 6, 1970

Q. Will SA-3 missiles mean more Israeli raids over Egypt?

A. Egypt today cannot indulge in large-scale offensive operations. She cannot even shell our lines for long because she knows that she will feel freer to do whatever she wants. So one should not fall for the illusion that the SA-3s are defensive. They are being installed to give Egypt an offensive capability. The most severe aspect of the problem is the Sovietization of Egypt. Soviet troops will be operating in Egypt not only as advisers and technicians but as ordinary troops operating weapon systems. This, to my mind, is the most serious problem for the U.S. particularly.

Q. Israel has been careful not to hit Port Said or Alexandria, where Russians and Russian ships are concentrated. Will you be just as careful about Russians at the missile sites?

A. We did not go to Alexandria before there were SA-3s—I am not sure we won't go one day—because we simply have not

found it necessary to bomb these places. They are civilian targets. But along the Suez Canal, I don't care who is manning the weapons. We must be in a position where air superiority along the canal is ours.

Q. What about Israel's deep bombing raids into Egypt?

A. The purpose of these deep aerial attacks on military targets is to interfere with the Egyptian armed forces' preparations for war, not to allow them to remain at peace so that they can prepare for a war. Nasser said half a year ago that he has half a million soldiers and was going up to a million. Our deep penetrations definitely disturb these preparations. Large amounts of equipment have been destroyed. The Egyptians have been forced to move back anti-aircraft and artillery to protect themselves not only on the canal but also west of Cairo.

Q. Can Israel tolerate Nasser's war of attrition?

A. Nasser is a wizard at inventing phrases. I think the war of attrition is his fourth, fifth or sixth slogan. When he came up with it, people really were occupied with what was going to happen and how we were going to cope with this type of war. Now we can say without boasting that we have presented an answer. I am quite sure that Egypt suffers from this more than Israel. In Israel from time to time you hear the question "What is to be?" I think the Egyptians should ask themselves not only "What is to be?" but "What the hell is going on?"

Q. How well do Egyptians use Russian equipment?

A. They manage to operate ordinary equipment. As far as airplanes go, they put up a poor show. I think the MIG-21, MIG-17 and the Sukhoi are very good planes—no worse than Western planes. But you have got to have men operating them who really know the ropes.

Q. What about Egyptian bombing of Israeli positions?

A. The planes use a Russian bombing

¹ Time (European edition), XCV, 14 (April 6, 1970), p. 39; reprinted by permission from Time, the Weekly News-magazine; Copyright Time Inc.

technique. They come in very low against positions on the canal, and before they reach the target they pull up to 1,500 or 2,000 ft. They dive, get rid of all their armament and then they turn west. This is the best way not to get hurt. It isn't the best way to hit the target.

Q. How do you judge Arab armies since 1967?

A. We do not think the soldiers are any better today. The question of quality and skill is a problem for the Egyptians. Their combat plans are made by Russians. Their planes attack according to a Russian plan. But the implementation is done by Egyptians and this makes a difference. The Russian plans are made for people who continue on their mission despite opposition fire. But the moment we discover Egyptian raiders and start firing, the attack is broken, finished. The carrying out of a plan is as important as the plan itself.

Q. How do you assess the Arab guerrillas?

A. I do not call them guerrillas; my definition of a guerrilla does not apply to someone who kills or hurts civilian populations. Secondly, we do not have a situation similar to Algeria or Viet Nam where one side consists of local people and the other of foreigners. We know the terrain as well as they do. We feel at home here more than they. Therefore, there is no reason why they should have the advantage that terrorists usually have. We have not managed to dismantle their organizations, but we have managed to keep them at a low level of activity.

Q. What is the basic aim of your army?

A. To maintain the cease-fire on the lines.

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Declaration on Middle East Policy by Foreign Minister Schumann of France Before the French Senate¹

Paris, April 7, 1970

En goûtant l'éloquence normalienne du Président André Monteil, j'ai pensé à cette réflexion de Vauvenargues: "il est plus aisé de dire des choses nouvelles que de concilier celles qui ont été dites" et je me demandais si, pour une fois, Vauvenargues ne pourrait pas être pris en défaut. Pas plus que M. Monteil, je n'essaierai de dire des choses nouvelles par rapport à celles que votre Commission des Affaires étrangères a entendues. Mais je me demande si, depuis le 27 janvier, il n'est pas devenu plus aisé de concilier celles qui ont été dites à la lumière des événements.

C'est à la Commission des Affaires étrangères du Sénat, je viens de le rappeler, que j'ai réservé mes premières explications après la révélation du contrat de ventes d'armement dont il vient d'être fait état. C'est au Sénat que—grâce aux questions déposées par MM. Monteil, Caillaud et Giraud—j'ai dès le début de cette session le privilège de compléter ces explications par des éclaircissements publics et—je l'espère—convaincants.

Mais à vrai dire, l'inquiétude—légitime dans son principe—est-elle toujours aussi vive? La critique—nécessaire aux yeux d'un homme attaché comme je le suis moi-même à la vigilance du contrôle parlementaire—est-elle aussi sévère le 7 avril que le 27 Janvier? Qui pourrait prétendre aujourd'hui, après la conférence de Presse du président Nixon, en date du 21 mars après les déclarations de M. Rogers en date du surlendemain—que le fameux, le litigieux contrat

¹ *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1970, (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), pp. 125-130. Mr. Schumann made a very similar declaration on the Middle East in his address to the National Assembly on April 28, 1970; (for the text, see *Politique étrangère*, 1st Semester 1970, pp. 139 ff; for the entire debate, see *Journal officiel de la République française*, National Assembly, Session of April 28, 1970, pp. 1345 ff.).

ait eu une incidence quelconque sur l'équilibre des forces au Moyen-Orient? Qui pourrait le soutenir après avoir pris connaissance des motifs invoqués par Washington pour justifier une décision concernant d'autres avions?

J'ai parlé, il y a quelques jours à propos des entretiens quadri-partites sur le Proche-Orient, d'une lueur d'espoir. J'ai évoqué la première et timide récompense de la ténacité que la France a déployée—après avoir été l'initiatrice de la consultation des Quatre—pour la préserver envers et contre tout. J'y reviendrai en conclusion de ma réponse. Mais, dès maintenant, je veux dire que le "dégel" aurait été plus difficile ou plus tardif si le Gouvernement américain n'avait pas témoigné de sa volonté d'empêcher une escalade nouvelle par le choix que je viens d'évoquer. Au même moment, l'U.R.S.S.—en annonçant la livraison de SAM III—a marqué, après des déclarations parfois inexactement interprétées de M. Kossyguine, qu'elle se contenterait de fournir du matériel défensif. Ainsi, un certain rapprochement russo-américain sur la question de la livraison des armes a secondé notre obstination. Chacun vous dira que cette prudence et, plus encore peut-être, les conseils de prudence dont elle fut assortie ou précédée doivent beaucoup à la concertation des Quatre et à l'action de la diplomatie française qui est, nous pouvons le dire, le ressort de cette concertation.

Je songe notamment, en apportant cette précision liminaire au dernier paragraphe de la question orale de M. Caillaud.

Et les autres paragraphes me dira-t-il? Et les contrats d'armements auxquels ils se réfèrent, comme l'essentiel de la question de MM. Monteil et Giraud? Je réponds d'emblée au risque de surprendre: Il n'y a pas de politique française des contrats d'armement; il y a une politique méditerranéenne de la France qui comporte, parmi beaucoup d'autres aspects, des contrats d'armements comme celle de tous les autres pays industriels. Cette politique, nous y reviendrons, n'a qu'un objet: éviter—selon l'expression d'un journal britannique qui

nous a, lui, fort bien compris et définis—que la Méditerranée occidentale dont nous sommes riverains d'abord, et, si possible, ensuite, l'ensemble du bassin méditerranéen ne devienne, ne redevienne, ou ne demeure un théâtre de la guerre froide, un enjeu supplémentaire de la rivalité des puissances.

Notre politique de contrats d'armements est-elle vraiment au service de l'ensemble d'une politique méditerranéenne ainsi définie? Il vous appartient d'en juger à la lumière des quatre faits que j'ai le devoir de rétablir une fois encore.

Premier fait.—C'est le 3 juin 1967, donc avant la guerre des Six Jours, que nous avons proposé et appliqué pour notre propre compte un embargo général. La date de cet avertissement, de cette décision, de cette proposition est révélatrice. Le Gouvernement d'alors (dont je suis solidaire puisque j'en étais membre) a voulu, par un geste et par un acte que nous espérons exemplaires, arrêter la fatale escalade. Comment et pourquoi aurions-nous agi ainsi si nous avions eu un autre but et un autre intérêt que la paix?

Deuxième fait.—Notre exemple n'a pas été suivi par les fournisseurs traditionnels d'armes qui occupaient dans cette région et notamment dans les pays arabes une place de beaucoup supérieure à la nôtre. Après plusieurs mois, en octobre 1967, nous avons limité l'embargo aux pays du champ de bataille mitoyens d'Israël. Pourquoi fut-il alors communément admis qu'aucun autre critère ne pouvait être choisi? Certes, Israël, du fait qu'il était notre principal client, a subi au premier chef les conséquences de la mesure adoptée, de même qu'il a été le premier bénéficiaire des assouplissements, car il y a eu aussitôt, et jusqu'à un certain raid sur Beyrouth dont aucun Français n'a tenté la justification, des dérogations qui ont permis à Israël d'acquérir des matériels à caractère défensif, par exemple des patrouilleurs ou des radars de surveillance. Il est donc contraire à la vérité, et, par conséquent, il n'est pas convenable de dire que l'embargo ait jamais été unilatéral, puisqu'il s'applique à tous les pays du champ de bataille. Est-ce

un vain mot? Fouillons le ciel qui domine les pays du champ de bataille. Où trouverons-nous des appareils de fabrication française et à qui appartiennent-ils? J'ai pu déployer devant votre Commission des Affaires étrangères un journal fort bien informé sur lequel s'étalait un grand titre: "Qui arme Qui?". J'ai des raisons de savoir que tous les chiffres cités sont rigoureusement exacts. Mais la réponse à la question posée figure dans le corps de l'article. Pas une seule des armes égyptiennes, pas une seule des armes syriennes, ne vient de France. Quant à l'Irak, il faut croire que nous avons observé à son égard une attitude réservée, selon l'expression de M. Michel Debré, bien qu'il ne soit pas au sens propre un pays du champ de bataille, puisque nous ne lui avons fourni—selon l'Aurore (car c'est d'elle qu'il s'agit et ses sources sont bonnes)—que 72 automitrailleuses légères (à comparer aux 500 chars soviétiques, aux 60 avions britanniques, aux 20 millions de dollars d'armes vendues par les Etats-Unis depuis 1962 qui figurent dans la colonne voisine).

Troisième fait.—Il est vrai que l'embargo ne s'applique pas aux pays qui, sans appartenir au champ de bataille, sont engagés dans la querelle. Par exemple, il s'applique à l'Egypte, mais non pas à la Libye; à la Syrie, mais non pas à la Tunisie. Pourquoi? Pour deux motifs qui s'imposeraient à n'importe quel Gouvernement français.

D'abord si, par exemple, nous l'étendions aux pays d'Afrique du Nord, nous commettrions, envers la France et pas seulement envers elle, la grave faute de compromettre notre présence et notre influence qui ont, entre autres mérites, celui d'être souhaitées. Ensuite, le vide créé par notre absence serait bientôt comblé par d'autres présences qui sont beaucoup moins souhaitées, mais que nous aurions rendues inéluctables. Ces deux arguments—et pour cause—n'ont jamais été réfutés même s'ils sont souvent esquivés. Or ils s'appliquent l'un et l'autre au cas de la Libye avec une rigueur parfaite. Notre politique méditerranéenne? Chacun comprend qu'elle doit échapper à la nostalgie passive et rancunière d'un célèbre héros

de Montherlant. Chacun comprend qu'elle ne peut pas laisser le champ libre à d'autres dans ces pays qui nous ont tant donné et auxquels nous avons tant apporté et sacrifié. Chacun trouve la justification de tout un passé dans le fait que, par exemple, le nombre des jeunes Algériens qui apprennent le français est cinq fois supérieur au même nombre il y a moins de dix ans. Bien! Mais y a-t-il une politique méditerranéenne de la France sans une politique libyenne? Comme le prouve toute l'histoire de la dernière guerre où nous avons vu le destin des armes changer d'abord en Cyrénaïque et en Tripolitaine, il n'y a pas de politique nord-africaine sans une politique libyenne. La Libye est le pays charnière entre le Maghreb et le Machrek. Elle fait partie de l'Afrique du Nord. Si nous voulons établir dans l'ensemble de cette région qui (personne ne le conteste) intéresse notre sécurité propre et celle de peuples amis "une zone d'intérêts communs pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité de chacun", tout nous interdit de laisser la Libye en dehors: la géographie et l'histoire, la plus ancienne comme la plus récente.

Pourtant, ce n'est pas nous qui nous sommes tournés vers la Libye. C'est la Libye qui s'est tournée vers nous. D'autres, plusieurs autres, beaucoup d'autres avaient fait—et pour certains d'entre eux—font encore des offres. Nous, nous n'avons fait aucune offre. On est venu à nous. On nous a dit: "La Libye, en choisissant la France, fait une expérience qu'elle voudrait exemplaire; notre souhait est, non de changer de bloc, mais de prendre nos distances à l'égard des blocs".

Fallait-il refuser? Refuser même de tenter la chance? Fallait-il—sans examen, sans période probatoire—contraindre délibérément les auteurs de cette initiative à faire de leur pays, d'un morceau de l'Afrique du Nord, le champ clos d'une rivalité entre les F5, les Mig, les Chieftain ou les Centurion? Si nous les avions condamnés à l'inféodation, qui, dans le Maghreb, qui, au Moyen-Orient, en aurait profité? A ce refus pur et simple, je le dis tranquillement, pas un Gouvernement français n'aurait songé à notre place.

Est-ce à dire que l'opération soit sans aléas, sans risques? Non certes. MM. Monteil, Caillavet et Giraud ont raison de nous les indiquer. Ils auraient tort de croire que nous n'y avons pas songé.

Car un quatrième et dernier fait suffirait, s'ils le croyaient, à dissiper leur erreur.

Je l'ai dit pour la première fois le 7 janvier: si l'embargo ne s'applique pas aux pays non belligérants, cela ne signifie nullement que nous soyons prêts à livrer n'importe quelle arme, n'importe quand, à n'importe qui et dans n'importe quelles conditions.

Les questions de MM. Caillavet et Giraud sont, sur ce point, précises. J'y réponds par des précisions renouvelées. Des clauses de non-réexportation et de non-utilisation sur des aéroports étrangers ont été stipulées par les contrats. L'échelonnement très strict des livraisons à partir de 1971 jusqu'à 1974 permettra, en cours d'exécution de l'accord, de vérifier la bonne observation de ces dispositions. Quant aux hypothèses, relevées par M. Giraud, d'une fusion de la R.A.U. avec la Libye et le Soudan ou de la subordination des forces armées libyennes à un commandement étranger, elles feraient jouer, bien loin de les tourner par un biais, les clauses du contrat de vente que j'ai rappelées.

Faut-il ajouter (cette fois surtout à l'intention de M. Caillavet) que les fournitures d'armes ne sont que l'un des éléments de la coopération projetée, si elles en sont la condition préalable dans la mesure même où elles marquent une volonté de non-inféodation? Une mission économique et culturelle s'est déjà rendue en Libye. J'ouvre une brève parenthèse pour dire qu'il n'a jamais été question d'une initiative française pouvant affecter de façon directe ou indirecte les intérêts de tel ou tel de nos partenaires étrangers dans le domaine pétrolier. L'essentiel est que, s'il y a des incertitudes (et il y en a là comme ailleurs), nous nous sommes ménagés le temps nécessaire pour en tenir compte. Ce n'est pas la France qui—après avoir refusé l'embargo général—pratique, soit au bénéfice d'un camp, soit au bénéfice de tous, la vente inconditionnelle des armements.

M. Monteil redoute—et il a raison—la relance de la course aux armements. Mais est-ce à nous que ce discours s'adresse? A nous qui—pour “ne pas nourrir en armes le conflit”, selon l'expression de M. le Premier ministre—nous gardons d'imiter les puissances par lesquelles de nombreuses fournitures d'armes sont faites aux pays directement engagés dans le conflit? On nous suggère ou, plutôt, on nous suggérerait à mi-voix une politique de rechange: la levée indiscriminée des mesures d'embargo, car—sous peine d'être qualifiée (et cette fois justement) d'unilatérale—il faudrait que la levée de l'embargo s'appliquât, comme l'embargo lui-même, à tous les pays directement engagés dans le conflit.

Oserait-on dire, oserait-on même penser aujourd'hui, après l'analyse par laquelle les Etats-Unis ont eux-même justifié leur propre décision, que nous aiderions ainsi à établir or à rétablir un équilibre des forces en présence? Bien au contraire, M. Monteil. C'est alors, mais alors seulement, que nous donnerions à la fois l'exemple et le signal d'une course aux armements accélérée et redoublée. Nous ne le ferons pas. Encore une fois, quel est le Gouvernement français qui le ferait à notre place?

Mais cette méthode—M. Caillavet a parfaitement raison de le souligner—ne conduira pas par elle seule à un règlement satisfaisant et équitable du conflit. C'est ici que M. Caillavet évoque—et il a encore raison—la concertation des Quatre proposée par la France et—je peux le dire—renouée par la France. Où en est-elle? Où en sommes-nous?

La concertation des Quatre est fondée sur la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du 22 novembre 1967. Pourquoi—malgré tant d'événements qui se sont produits sur le terrain—conserve-t-elle sa valeur? Pourquoi recueille-t-elle toujours l'adhésion des grandes puissances et celle de plusieurs parmi les principaux pays du Moyen-Orient? Parce qu'elle est fondée sur le principe d'un équilibre entre le retrait et la paix qui sont les deux éléments indissociables de tout règlement; c'est aussi parce qu'elle propose

une solution des problèmes qui ont été à l'origine du conflit: sécurité, réfugiés, liberté de navigation.

La France n'a jamais cessé de proclamer le droit d'Israël à l'existence, à la reconnaissance, à la sécurité. Cela est particulièrement vrai de ce Gouvernement qui, le 20 septembre dernier à New York, a fait consacrer par les quatre ministres des Affaires étrangères le droit imprescriptible de tous les Etats du Proche et du Moyen-Orient à vivre en sécurité derrière des frontières reconnues et qui, à Bruxelles par ma voix comme surtout à Paris par celle du Président de la République, avait parlé le langage de l'ouverture et du bon vouloir avant une certaine nuit de décembre.

Alors, où est la difficulté? Où réside sa cause profonde? M. Monteil a fourni la réponse le jour où, non sans courage, il a formulé une certaine mise en garde contre ce qu'il a appelé la tentation annexionniste, contre ce que j'appellerai l'incapacité d'Israël à se définir véritablement à l'égard de son problème fondamental: à savoir le sort des territoires occupés et d'un million d'Arabes.

...Israël n'a jamais fait connaître jusqu'ici l'étendue de ses revendications territoriales. Comment, dans ces conditions, peut-il espérer convaincre ceux avec lesquels il prétend vouloir traiter directement et sans préalables qu'il ne veut pas se servir du gage de l'occupation pour imposer un agrandissement de son territoire? Comment peut-il s'assurer de la sorte une sécurité qui, au temps des avions supersoniques et des missiles, ne se mesure pas en termes de marges kilométriques mais en termes de confiance, c'est-à-dire de paix aussi bien dans les esprits que dans les faits?

J'y insiste: la France demande, en contrepartie d'une évacuation des territoires occupés, qui constituerait le gage d'une indiscutable volonté de demeurer dans les limites territoriales acceptées par l'immense majorité des Etats, qu'Israël soit reconnu par ses voisins et que ces derniers s'engagent clairement et définitivement à vivre en paix avec lui dans la limite de ses frontières. Nous savons bien qu'une évacuation qui ne

serait pas assortie d'engagements de paix véritables serait un leurre.

C'est pourquoi, nous proposons l'établissement entre Israël et ses voisins de zones démilitarisées où seraient installées durablement des forces des Nations Unies qui ne pourraient plus être retirées sans décision du Conseil de Sécurité, et, de toute façon, pas avant un délai raisonnable. Nous ne voulons pas que l'on en revienne au système précaire de 1957; c'est un système entièrement différent, solide et durable que nous préconisons. Certes, cette idée qui nous paraît fondamentale, ne recueille pas d'emblée l'accord des différentes parties intéressées. Celles-ci répugnent en effet à admettre sur leur territoire des limitations de souveraineté, qui seraient pourtant de caractère exclusivement militaire. Mais ne sait-on pas que, où qu'aient été les lignes d'armistice, où que soient les lignes de cessez-le-feu, les combats n'ont pas cessé tant que les forces adverses ont été en contact? On le voit aujourd'hui sur le Canal, sur le Jourdain, à la frontière libanaise, comme on l'a vu hier en Galilée, en Cisjordanie ou, comme jadis, à Gaza. A-t-on oublié que si à Gaza et sur la frontière israélo-égyptienne, les incidents ont pratiquement cessé depuis dix ans, c'est parce qu'il y avait des forces des Nations Unies?

Il y a, nous dit-on aujourd'hui, un problème plus important que tous les autres, le problème palestinien. On nous dit qu'il est nouveau et qu'il faut imaginer, pour le résoudre, des solutions nouvelles.

Voici notre réponse: la carte politique de cette région du monde a été approuvée par la Communauté internationale: Les Etats-Unis, la France, la Russie, les Nations Unies ont reconnu l'existence d'Israël et de la Jordanie. Ce n'est donc pas à la Communauté internationale d'y apporter des modifications.

Seule la paix permettra un jour aux habitants de la région, et en particulier aux Palestiniens rétablis dans leur dignité, d'organiser leur destin authentique dans le respect des droits internationaux existants.

En demandant l'évacuation des territoires

occupés, nous avons en vue la possibilité pour les réfugiés de 1967—ceux qu'on appelle les “personnes déplacées”—de revenir sur les territoires d'où l'avance israélienne les avait chassés; en proposant un juste règlement du problème des réfugiés de 1948, nous avons le souci de permettre à ces derniers d'exercer le libre choix que leur a reconnu la Résolution de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies de 1948 entre le rapatriement en Israël et la réinstallation dans des pays d'accueil: nous pensons d'ailleurs que l'exercice de ce choix nécessite des procédures pratiques, dans la mise en œuvre desquelles les Nations Unies et le Conseil de Sécurité devraient avoir un rôle déterminant en raison des responsabilités de leurs membres et des moyens dont ils disposent; nous pensons également que les programmes concrets de rapatriement et de réinstallation ne sauraient être établis avec chance de succès sans consultation des intéressés. Si le problème des réfugiés reçoit ainsi une solution équitable, n'aura-t-on pas accompli un pas décisif sur la voie de la solution du problème palestinien et n'aura-t-on pas franchi le pas le plus concret?

C'est pour faire passer ces principes dans les faits que la France a proposé voici un an que les quatre Membres Permanents du Conseil de Sécurité se concertent sur les moyens pratiques de mettre en application la Résolution du 22 novembre 1967. Ces travaux ont été discrets mais ils n'ont pas été vains. Un rapprochement sensible des positions des uns et des autres s'est produit. La France, en proposant des solutions équilibrées, n'y a pas été étrangère. Le Gouvernement soviétique a bien voulu nous dire que nos propositions pouvaient constituer une base d'accord, le Gouvernement américain nous a dit qu'elles lui semblaient sur le fond proches de celles qu'il envisageait lui-même. Le Gouvernement jordanien, le Gouvernement égyptien nous ont dit qu'elles correspondaient à la plupart de leurs revendications. Nous regrettons que le Gouvernement israélien les rejette en bloc sans vouloir les examiner; il sait pourtant que, sur le chapitre de la paix comme sur

celui de la sécurité, il ne pourra obtenir mieux que ce que nous proposons.

C'est en somme un appel à la réflexion que je lance du haut de la tribune du Sénat de la République. Vous le savez: il ne s'adresse pas à un seul pays, il ne s'applique pas à une seule région. Vous êtes, M. Giraud un disciple de Jaurès; vous épousez M. Caillaudet la pensée de Léon Bourgeois; vous avez été nourri M. Monteil, comme moi-même, par celle de Marc Sangnier.

Nous ne croyons enfreindre aucune de ces traditions. A vrai dire, nous croyons les servir toutes, quand, dans le Sud-Est Asiatique, nous tentons de substituer l'escalade de la négociation à l'escalade de la violence ou quand, au Moyen-Orient, nous proposons sans rechercher aucun avantage politique ou matériel, à tous, de répudier le ressentiment et l'illusion.

Optimisme, a-t-on dit? Peut-être. Mais, au sens où les maîtres dont je viens de citer les noms furent non sans défi ni mérite, des optimistes eux aussi, eux surtout, parce que chacun à leur manière, ils étaient des croyants.

Optimisme avez-vous dit? Sans doute! mais au sens où Vauvenargues, encore lui, a écrit que “la patience est l'art d'espérer”.

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Statement by U.S. State Department Spokesman McCloskey on the Bombing by Israel of a School at Bahr al-Bakr, U.A.R.¹

Washington, April 8, 1970

We have seen press reports of shocking loss of life to a number of children in Al Sharkiyah Province in the United Arab Republic as a result of an Israeli attack. If these reports are confirmed, this tragic incident would be another deplorable and saddening consequence of the continuing disregard of the U.N. Security Council

¹ *New York Times*, April 9, 1970, p. 14.

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cease-fire resolutions. Once again we appeal to all concerned to adhere scrupulously to the resolutions in order to preclude further tragic deaths and injury to innocent civilians.

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Message from the International Red Cross to the Powers Engaged in the Middle East Conflict¹

April 11, 1970

Despite the cease-fire, acts of war continue to occur in the Middle East. It is alarming to observe the escalation of hostilities in regions where military installations sometimes co-exist with civilian populations, thus involving ever greater suffering.

In view of the tragic development of this situation, the International Committee of the Red Cross urgently appeals to the governments and all the forces engaged in that part of the world to apply, in all circumstances, the universally recognized rules of humanity.

It emphasizes that when signing the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Powers solemnly undertook to observe a series of standards which demand, *inter alia*, that non-combatant populations shall be spared and that no attacks shall be directed against them, that military and civilian detainees shall be treated in a fitting and humane manner, and that no maltreatment and reprisals shall be directed against persons and property. Hospitals shall enjoy particular protection.

The International Committee of the Red Cross urges the parties concerned to give its delegates greater support and increased facilities for the discharge of their mission. It is imperative that, through its representatives in the area of conflict, the ICRC be permitted to carry out its plans to provide more effective protection for non-combatants.

The Committee, which has often confronted the responsible authorities with their

obligations, earnestly requests them to observe the essential rules of humanity and to abstain from all acts likely to make efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict more difficult.

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Statements on the Middle East in a Speech by Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Brezhnev²

Kharkov, April 13, 1970

The progressive regimes in the Arab East, against which the main blow was levelled, did not only survive, but have gained strength. The friendship binding the Arab nations with the Soviet Union and entire socialist community has grown even stronger. At the same time, the prestige of the USA and of Israel's other patrons has never been so low amidst Arab nations, and in the whole world, as it is now. This even the West has been forced to admit. The flames of the people's liberation struggle against the invaders are spreading over the occupied territories. The international isolation of Israel and the universal indignation at its adventurism and impudence are also mounting.

It would be a mistake, of course, to underestimate the danger of the tensions in the Middle East. Much combustible material has been piled up there through the fault of the imperialists. The Middle East has known no peace for decades. The imperialists considered the nations populating that region as small change in playing up their interests. They have not reconciled themselves even today to the emergence of the Arab countries onto the road of independent development and social progress.

¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report, 1970* (Geneva: 1971), p. 46.

² Excerpted from the English text of Brezhnev's speech in *Moscow News*, Special Supplement to No. 16 (1007) (April 18, 1970), pp. 6-7.

Had it been merely a question of assuring for each state in the Middle East the right to security, peace could have been restored in that region long ago. But today's leaders of Israel, with their inordinate ambitions and plans of expansion, need tensions, just as their transatlantic sponsors need it.

It is said that a clever man learns from mistakes made by others. Israel apparently is resolved to learn everything from its own blunders. By its aggressive policy the Israeli Government is jeopardizing the security of its own people, whose future lies in good-neighbourly relations and not in confrontation with the Arabs.

There is but one way to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East: the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from the territories he had occupied. Israel must be made to respect the decisions of such a high international organ as the UN Security Council. This can best be achieved the sooner the US leaders realize the hopelessness and the danger of their encouragement of the Israeli aggressors. No one should have the slightest doubt that the Arab nations shall never capitulate, or agree to the perpetuation of the occupation of their lands.

The Arab nations have staunch friends in the socialist countries which are prepared to render the necessary aid to frustrate the plans of the aggressors in the Middle East. With the other socialist countries, the USSR will do all it can to promote a settlement in the Middle East that would guarantee the restoration of justice and bring peace and security to all nations in that area.

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Statement to the British Parliament by U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Stewart on the British View of a Middle East Peace Settlement (Excerpt)¹

London, April 13, 1970

Perhaps it is easy for us in our fortunate, humane, law-abiding country to talk about the virtues of a cease-fire. We must look at why it is difficult for both the parties concerned to give wholehearted consent to this. Israel believes that, for her own security, she must prevent a build-up of military power among her Arab neighbours and that she must take such military steps as are necessary to that end.

I think that she may also believe, though here I would think that she was wrong, that if she proceeds with actions of this kind her Arab neighbours are more likely to meet her at the negotiating table. I doubt whether she is right in thinking that, but I think that this thought is in her mind.

For the Arab countries, the issue can be put even more simply. They believe that the continued Israel occupation of Arab territories is in defiance of a United Nations resolution, and is illegal, and that they are, therefore, entitled to resist it.

I am not defending either of these propositions. I think that for either side, whether they think these propositions are right or not, to try to prosecute them by the use of armed force which results in the killing of people who can in no way be regarded as responsible for the policy of their Governments, is a disaster.

The conclusion that we have to draw from this is the following. Her Majesty's Government believe that it would be right to have a cease-fire, but I have mentioned the reasons why both sides find a cease-fire unacceptable. We may agree or disagree

¹ *Hansard*, April 13, 1970, fifth series, vol. 799, cols. 1031-1034.

with their reasons, but this is what they feel, and what follows from that is this: even if we could achieve a cease-fire for the time being, it would not last until there was a political settlement. Until there is a major political settlement both sides will feel, whether we agree with them or not, that they have reasons for rejecting a cease-fire.

We must, therefore, turn our attention mainly to trying to get a major political settlement. Some people might say, "Why should we in Britain bother about this? Have not we enough anxieties and problems here at home and in other parts of the world?" I think that the answer to that is threefold. First, the prosperity of this country depends to a very large extent on a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, not on British hegemony in the Middle East, not on the victory of one side or the other in the Arab-Israel dispute, but on an agreed and peaceful settlement. That is one answer.

The second answer is our long and intimate past connection with this part of the world, the fact that in consequence the people of Israel and of many Arab countries look to us to play a part—and sometimes, I think, look to us a bit beyond reason. One of the things that have struck me in my present office is the number of countries who will, at the same moment, reject any idea of British hegemony and ask us to take a responsibility for problems all over the world. But none the less, in view of our intimate past connection, we cannot dodge our responsibility for seeking a political settlement. I have mentioned, therefore, our straightforward interests and our past connections.

Another reason why we cannot dodge this question is this. We are a permanent member of the Security Council, and if there is any basis on which a solution can be erected to this problem it is the resolution of the Security Council of which my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper and my right hon. and noble Friend, Lord Caradon, were the architects. We have a responsibility, therefore, in that respect, also.

If we are to seek a settlement, how is it to be found? The basis, as I have said, must

be the Security Council Resolution. Let us see what both sides have said about this. President Nasser, in a Press interview in February this year, said:

The Security Council Resolution adopted on the 22nd November, 1967, provides a solution to these two problems—

he was referring to the problems of withdrawal and of the refugees—

while offering Israel guarantees about her right to sovereign existence, to security and peace and of free passage of her ships through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

Similarly, Mr. Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1969, said:

In a communication to Ambassador Jarring on the 2nd April, 1969, Israel declared that she accepts the Security Council Resolution calling for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace to be reached by negotiation and agreement between the Governments concerned.

I hope that we shall be able, therefore, to stick to it, that the resolution is the foundation of our policy and that the parties concerned will abide by it.

But, having accepted the resolution, the problem is to spell it out, to turn the necessarily general phrases of the resolution into a precise list of actions to be carried out by both parties on particular dates, all of them dependent on each other, so that when they are all complete everything in the resolution will be fulfilled. That is the task that has faced us ever since the resolution has been passed, and that has eluded us ever since.

What does it mean in practice? Let us first take withdrawal. To this, all the four Powers are agreed, and both the parties in a general sense have agreed. But when one speaks of withdrawal one is obliged to speak, in almost the same sentence, of boundaries. I think that it is now agreed by the parties concerned, certainly by the four Powers, that it is legitimate to speak of small altera-

tions, in interests of security, to those boundaries which existed at the beginning of the 1967 war. The boundary between Israel and the United Arab Republic has been understood and recognised for some time and, I think, would not be in question. As to the boundary between Israel and the Lebanon, I doubt whether anyone would question that this should be the boundary between the Lebanon and the former mandated territory of Palestine.

The boundary between Israel and Jordan presents greater difficulties. For our part, we would take broadly the same view as is taken by the United States, that modifications would have to be made here, that they would be small in scale and that their motives would be security, or, on a very minor key, administrative convenience.

There remains, on the question of boundaries, the great question of Jerusalem, on which I think it would be idle for anyone to try to make a final pronouncement until we have got further in solving the other questions in dispute. I believe that if all the parties concerned could get nearer on all the other questions, and if they felt that the whole issue between peace and hostility lay on whether they could agree about Jerusalem, or not, if they once got to that point there might be more willingness on both sides to make concessions—if they felt that this and this only lay between peace and hostility. But I think that to try to begin with this question would frustrate the hope of agreement.

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Letter from Officers of the U.S. Branch of Amnesty International Explaining Their Disassociation from the Organization's Report on Israeli Treatment of Arab Prisoners¹

Washington, mid April 1970

Sir,

The British public, which has warmly supported Amnesty International, is entitled to a full explanation of why the United States branch of Amnesty has dissociated itself from last week's Amnesty International report alleging Israeli mistreatment of Arab prisoners.

The original Amnesty investigation of Arab charges produced a preliminary report a year ago. There were two groups of cases where Arabs asserted they had been tortured or mistreated. In one group, Amnesty named the Arabs. The second group were anonymous. When the Israelis replied in August, 1969, they claimed to have thoroughly investigated the first set of cases, and said in considerable detail why they considered the complaints unjustified. However, they outright refused to comment on the second group, asserting it was impossible to answer anonymous charges. The original Amnesty report, and the Israeli reply, have not been made public by Amnesty.

When this new report was issued April 1, 1970, four anonymous case histories were given as examples of Israeli mistreatment. Two were taken from among the anonymous group on which Israel had already refused to comment, and two had apparently been collected by Amnesty subsequently. None was among the cases where Israel had given a detailed reply to the charges.

The current report, by using only anonymous cases, raises the inference that Amnesty was satisfied with the Israeli reply to the other cases. If Amnesty was indeed satisfied, it ought to have said so. If not, it should have said why. Also, Israel's reasons for not answering the other charges, that

¹ *The Times* (London), April 17, 1970, p. 13.

they could not be looked into because they were anonymous, should have been stated.

At best, the Amnesty report reveals the zeal of the prosecutor, convinced of the defendant's guilt, who perhaps without conscious malice omits from his brief material which would help the defence. It would have been better if the report, in asking for an international investigatory commission, had said that Arab torture of Jews in such countries as Iraq also ought to be looked into. Amnesty's explanation, that the Iraqis had refused to admit an Amnesty representative, is weak, because all four cases used in this report to bolster the charges against Israel are of Jordanians, who could be interviewed outside Israel. Also, no government should be allowed to stymie an Amnesty inquiry just by refusing a visa.

No doubt the Israelis had procrastinated. But on January 27 they made the unprecedented offer, to the Arab complainants, of safe conduct and an opportunity to obtain legal counsel if they wished to come into Israel to file charges. Israel is virtually in a state of war, the Arabs concerned are at least the equivalent of enemy civilians and many of them had been suspected, rightly or wrongly, of terrorist activity. This was quite a concession by Israel, and 10 days before the report was issued Israel went even further by telling Amnesty that the proposed commission was within Israeli law but that more hard evidence had to be submitted before a determination could be made as to whether to accept it. We read all this as a definite offer to Amnesty, which ought to have been accepted, to have those Arabs file charges. Issuance of the report could not have been worse timed.

The United States section has been unhappy since long before the Israel affair with Amnesty's work for persons who are not prisoners of conscience. We consider that much of the organization's international reputation has been accumulated because we have traditionally confined our efforts to non-violent prisoners concerning whom we need offer no apologies. This report does not even suggest that any of the Arabs

involved were prisoners of conscience. No doubt even guerrillas have rights, but in attempting to assure them, Amnesty is neglecting its principal wards, the non-violent prisoners of conscience, and losing the confidence of the governments with which it must deal.

Finally, even if Amnesty can under its international statute investigate the torture of persons who are not prisoners of conscience, it must remember that those who ask for impartial commissions must display impartiality themselves. Amnesty has a duty to the parties and the world, and most of all to its own invaluable name for absolute fairness, to be impeccably evenhanded in its recommendations, and in its reports to set out all the relevant facts. This report, whether its final conclusions are right or wrong, does not meet Amnesty standards and the United States affiliate cannot subscribe to it.

Yours very truly,

MARK K. BENENSON, Chairman
NELSON BENGSTON, Treasurer
Amnesty International,
United States Affiliate

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Letter from Amnesty International Secretary-General Ennals Explaining His Position on the Controversy with the U.S. Branch Over the Organization's Report on Israeli Treatment of Arab Prisoners¹

London, April 20, 1970

Sir,

Amnesty International has an elected International Executive Committee which takes decisions between meetings of its representative International Council. If individuals or sections wish to question decisions of the executive, then it is customary to discuss in writing or by telephone the

¹ *The Times* (London), April 23, 1970, p. 13.

differences of view. It is therefore regrettable that Mr. Benenson and Mr. Bengston, in their letter of April 17 on the Amnesty report on Israel, should choose to disagree in public before discussing in private.

Mr. Benenson is not a member of the International Executive Committee which drafted the document published on April 1 and therefore is unaware of the confidential discussions which have taken place with the Israeli Government with regard to Amnesty's work for the Arabs in Israel and for the Jews imprisoned in Arab states.

He is also unaware of the various proposals which were put to the Israeli Government which included the simple appointment of an Israeli lawyer as Commissioner to investigate the evidence. Publication of the report was delayed to enable the Israeli Government to decide on this suggestion which had in fact emanated from Israel.

As for the report itself; Amnesty International has now made public some discussions which have taken place with the Israeli Government. We have illustrated the type of allegations which seem to us to be substantiated by evidence worthy of investigation in Israel. We have simply asked that the Israeli Government establish an enquiry into these allegations. We have not published details and I am sure that the Israeli Government and our critics would have been justifiably angry if at the same time as calling for a judicial enquiry we also published evidence which should properly be considered by such an enquiry.

The sickening part of this controversy is that it is not over procedure or protocol. We are arguing about whether human beings are being subjected to "torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The human element seems sometimes to have been overlooked.

Yours faithfully,

MARTIN ENNALS, Secretary
General, Amnesty International

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Statements on the Middle East in a Report by Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Brezhnev at a Joint Meeting of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet¹

Moscow, April 21, 1970

Where they feel it necessary the imperialists continue to shed the blood of freedom-loving peoples without the least compunction, flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of the young states, weaving webs of intrigue against progressive leaders, and organising conspiracies and coups in order to remove governments that do not suit them.

The number of examples of this policy is more than sufficient. . . .

This same line can be seen in the Middle East as well. The real goal of the Israeli aggressors and of the policy pursued by the US imperialist circles backing them is to abolish the progressive regimes in the UAR, Syria, and a number of other Arab countries and to ensure conditions for the unhindered exploitation of the oil and other wealth of the Arab East by foreign monopolies.

But powerful popular forces are now rising against the conspiracies of the imperialists. The Arab peoples are actively and staunchly defending their just cause. On their side are the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and the communist and democratic movements of the whole world. One can confidently say that the cause of the imperialists is doomed and that the cause of the freedom of peoples is unconquerable!

¹ Excerpted from the English text of Brezhnev's report as published in *Moscow News*, Supplement to Issue 17 (1008), (April 25, 1970), pp. 25-26.

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Press Statement on the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Nordic Countries (Excerpts)¹**Helsinki, April 22, 1970**

The customary spring meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers took place in Helsinki on 21st-22nd April 1970.

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The Ministers noted with concern that tension still prevailed in the Middle East. They were still convinced that the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967 ought to be taken as the basis for a solution of the crisis. They hoped that the current Great Power negotiations would make a contribution towards the achievement of a just and permanent peace in the area on the basis of that resolution.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit to Syria of a Delegation of the Workers' Party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Excerpts)²**Damascus, April 23, 1970**

In response to an invitation from the National Command of the Ba'th Party, a delegation representing the Korean Workers' Party, headed by Comrade Kim Tong-kyu, member of the Political Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee and Director of the Central Committee's International Affairs Department, paid an official visit to the Syrian Arab Region from 4 to 12 April 1970.

¹ English text in *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy*, New Series I: C: 20 (Stockholm: Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1971), pp. 70, 71. The Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), April 23, 1970.

The two delegations expressed their firm belief in the inevitability of the victory of the Palestinian Arab people in the sacred battle for the liberation of their territory and for return to their usurped homeland. The two delegations regard the armed struggle of the Palestinian Arab people against colonizing Zionist occupation as an important part of the struggle of the peoples of the world against world imperialism, and consider that to support this struggle with all material and moral resources is a duty imposed by the unity of the common struggle of the forces of world revolution.

The two sides condemned the acts of savagery perpetrated by the Zionist occupation authorities against Arab citizens in the occupied territory, with the support of world imperialism led by American imperialism. They also strongly condemned the crimes committed by the occupation authorities against civilian targets and against children, workers and defenseless citizens in the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries, regarding such criminal conduct as a flagrant defiance of all human values and principles.

In this connection the two sides energetically condemned American imperialism's constant scheming and plotting against the progressive Arab regimes, the armed Palestinian resistance movement and the Arab revolution in general. They observed that the escalation of these aggressive schemes has been accompanied by the constant stock-piling of arms and war material in that imperialist base, Israel, and that aggression has reached the stage of direct armed intervention in the form of United States citizens being sent as military volunteers to join the Israeli armed forces.

The two sides agreed that Israel constitutes a racist and aggressive entity and a tool of Zionism and world imperialism. In particular they drew attention to the importance of the aggressive and destructive role played by Israel as an imperialist base and a bridgehead for imperialist economic, cultural and military infiltration.

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Statement on His Visit to the Middle East in an Address by Foreign Minister Luns of The Netherlands to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (Excerpts)¹

Strasbourg, April 23, 1970

Mr. President, let us go on now to another subject. Your Assembly devoted a large part of yesterday's deliberations to the question of the Near East. As Foreign Minister of my country, I consider it useful to give you some information after a trip I made to the Near East three weeks ago. During the visit I recently made to Lebanon, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United Arab Republic, on the invitation of the respective governments, the talks I was able to have with the heads of state or government in these countries did not leave me any more optimistic as to the possibility of a peaceful solution of the conflict—at least in the near future. Though they expressed the sincere desire to see a peaceful settlement with Israel on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967—with, I might add, full acceptance of all the consequences that would entail for the Arab countries—the situation, military as well as political and psychological, has appreciably worsened during the course of the past year. Furthermore, the Arab states entertain doubts of Israel's willingness to withdraw from the occupied territories.

I have the impression, Mr. President, that without an Israeli declaration of principle on this subject, any attempt to bring about talks leading to a settlement is doomed to failure. For the Arab states, this is the most important point.

Another very important point is that of a solution to the refugee problem on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

Here again a recognition of principle of such a solution would seem to be a key to open the door to negotiations.

On this question, as on many others, I was able to ascertain great solidarity both within and among the countries I visited. The fact that a settlement has been delayed for nearly three years has markedly weakened the position of moderates and reinforced that of more radical groups.

Mr. President, by force of circumstances, the escalation of hostilities and the bitterness of the Arabs in the face of what they call Israel's inflexibility have furnished ground receptive to increasing extremism. Moreover, the immense refugee camps in the Arab countries still provide a very fertile soil for this extremism.

On the spot, one cannot avoid realizing that a country like Jordan now has more refugees than citizens, a situation which for that country not only is a heavy financial burden but also contributes to political instability.

In this context—this too I was able to ascertain—it is the United States which is blamed, accused of supplying arms to Israel and of a lack of support for the Arab position. Despite this, I was struck, Mr. President, by the great courtesy of the Arab leaders towards a European interlocutor, to whom time was spared to express his views in detail on the present position of Israel, that of the United States and other problems as well.

The position of the Palestinian organizations is now such that more and more their wishes will have to be considered in any eventual settlement.

As I have pointed out, the internal stability of Jordan, and that of Lebanon as well, would seem to me to be affected by controversies involving these organizations, certain other currents in the countries concerned, and the governments of the two states. This is yet another reason which leads moderate leaders to fear that the chances for peaceful settlement diminish as time goes by.

¹Excerpted and translated from the French text of Luns' Address provided on request by the Embassy of The Netherlands, Beirut.

Finally, I cannot escape the impression that to get out of the present impasse, the idea of a solution imposed by the Big Powers is gaining ground here and there.

During the official visit which Mr. [Habib] Bourguiba, Jr., the Tunisian Foreign Minister, just made to The Netherlands, he gave me the impression that he shared my pessimism as to the possibilities of an early peaceful solution to the conflict.

As agreed before my tour, I communicated my detailed impressions to the Israeli government as well as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by means of a personal letter. It's a matter of completely personal impressions which, as I told the leaders of the three countries, in no way bind the Arab governments; but of course, I did not fail to inform those three governments in detail of what I wrote Mr. Eban and Mr. Thant.

I shall conclude, Mr. President, in expressing the opinion that it is today more than ever necessary that the nations of the West continue actively to seek possibilities for agreement.

There will be in effect great danger of escalation if, again, the two parties confront each other militarily and once more seek a solution in that domain. I have only to mention in this regard the naval situation in the Mediterranean and the fact that Turkey is one of the NATO allies, circumstances which would directly affect a large number of European countries if escalation did occur. In fact, a new military confrontation could have three consequences: first, a victory for the Arab countries who would thus recover the territories now occupied by Israel; second, an overwhelming success in which case the danger of escalation is obvious to everyone, for Israel would be quickly at bay, her back to the sea; third, the "non-success" of confrontation for the Arab side, which would seriously aggravate the situation and once more put in motion the reactions we saw last year on the part of certain big powers and I am thinking, in particular, of Soviet Russia.

I regret, Mr. President, to have to reveal myself rather pessimistic on this very

important point, so touchy is the present international situation; but I felt I must inform this Assembly, which has shown so much interest in this problem, of my personal feelings and those of my government.

I thank you, Mr. President.

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Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco at a News Conference on His Return from a Middle East Trip¹

Washington, April 24, 1970

Before taking your questions, I want to give you a few preliminary observations regarding the Near East part of my trip.

First, I accomplished 80 percent of what I set out to do, which was to have a direct exchange at the top with the leaders of the key countries concerned, both friendly and critical—to listen to their views, to learn of their concerns, and to answer clearly and frankly their questions about American policy. I did this in the U.A.R., Israel, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia—four of the five countries in the Arab-Israel area which I had planned to visit.

I regret that the visit to Jordan had to be deferred. It is in the mutual interest of Jordan and the United States that there be no long-range adverse effects on our close and mutually beneficial relations. There has been no interruption of our continuing discussions with Jordan.

Second, I wish I could say that I return with the impression that an early peaceful settlement is near. The clouds of suspicion and distrust still hang heavily over the area, and there remain fundamental differences between the parties. In my judgment, progress toward peace is unlikely unless both sides

¹ Opening Statement of News Conference at Dulles Airport on Assistant Secretary Sisco's return from a 17-day trip which included attendance at a conference of U.S. chiefs of diplomatic missions held in Teheran, April 20-21, 1970, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1614 (June 1, 1970), p. 693.

demonstrate a willingness to move from their maximum positions. This is another way of saying that, in my view, progress toward peace will require both sides to move in the direction of the kind of negotiating framework which Secretary Rogers outlined last December 9. That framework is firmly rooted in the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and provides a fair and balanced middle ground for getting negotiations started under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

While neither side has agreed to the framework outlined by the Secretary and set forth in the October 28 and December 18 proposals, I stressed throughout my trip our continued firm adherence to them.

Third, our resolve must continue to be made clear in two ways: (1) that we will exhaust all avenues to help the parties achieve a peaceful solution; (2) that we will remain engaged and continue to make our presence manifest in order to discourage any who would seek unilateral advantage in the area.

Fourth, I return convinced that there is general recognition in the area that the United States has a decisive role to play in helping bring stability and a durable peace. The governments there with which we are in communication clearly want to continue talking to us. I believe our dialogue with those countries I visited, including the U.A.R., has been deepened. I have a better understanding of the views and positions of the governments and of the current trends in the area. I hope there is also a better understanding of our views and our position on their part.

Finally, I return reinforced in the belief that there can be no peace unless it takes account of the legitimate concerns of all in the area who are touched in their daily lives by the Palestine problem. As Secretary Rogers said on December 9, "There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration toward hope and justice." While the Palestinians themselves speak with many voices, the United States is keenly aware of their sense of frustration and is as dedicated

to the just solution of their problems foreseen in the November 1967 Security Council resolution as it is to all other parts of that resolution.

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Radio Interview with Prime Minister Meir of Israel on the Middle East Situation After the Visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco¹

April 25, 1970

Prime Minister Meir: As there were no special items to be discussed after Mr. Sisco's visit because there was no specific problem that was brought up, I can say only one thing. Now, of course, you are expecting me to go into a report of our talks. We were very happy to have him here, and various Ministers—the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, Deputy Prime Minister—and myself, we had talks with him. And I can only say one thing—of disappointment and sorrow that we all experienced by the fact that Mr. Sisco did not bring us some message that Mr. Nasir is prepared to make peace.

Q. Did Mr. Sisco bring anything with him, any new proposals, any new ideas?

A. No, none at all.

Q. How would you sum up Israel's relations with the United States in the wake of Mr. Sisco's visit?

A. I do not see that anything has changed with Mr. Sisco's visit. I think the relations are very good—two really friendly countries, we have very much in common. We both want peace in the area. We also, our countries, see no sense in the war going on. Neither one of us sees that any solution can come through war; it can bring you only

¹ Broadcast on Israeli Radio in English; reprinted by permission from BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3364/A/5 and A/6.

more deaths and more destruction. The only solution is peace. In this we are absolutely of the same mind. So there is friendly relations. There is a continuous dialogue between the two countries on various levels. This does not mean that there are no points on which we have differences of opinion, on methods, and so on. But on the whole, this is a great friend Israel has.

Q. Mrs. Meir, it has been suggested by various friends of Israel that Israel could help bring peace nearer if it announced publicly that it was prepared to withdraw from territories conquered in the six-day war. What do you think of it?

A. Israel has made its position very clear—immediately after the war and since. We say we want peace, but a real peace. Nothing that is something instead of peace, no makeshift—that we already have. If this was the first war that we had, we would probably be doing what we did after the war of liberation and after the Sinai campaign. Since we had this bitter experience, and we have not had any peace at all; not only did we have three wars but we never knew a day of peace between wars—there is always trouble on our borders despite the fact there were armistice agreements, despite of the fact that there were demilitarised zones. We had UN observers, we had the UN Emergency Force, we had everything. Every gimmick was tried on us and we saw where it led to. Therefore, this time we decided that we want peace, a real peace agreement with our neighbours.

A peace agreement with our neighbours does not mean to us that it is merely the signing of a piece of paper. It means that the entire relationship between us and our neighbours will have to go through a radical change, and if our neighbours will be prepared to sign a peace agreement with us, I am sure that that will mean that they have come to the conclusion that this change must take place. It means living in friendship and in co-operation with open borders so that Egyptians can visit Israel and Israelis can visit Egypt, so that there are diplomatic relations, and so there are trade relations and

cultural relations. There are many things that have to be done in this area that can be done only if all the countries in the area participate and co-operate. This is what we mean with peace.

The symbol of it is a signed peace agreement. To get this peace agreement and in order to have the contents of peace, we must have direct negotiations. Until they are prepared to meet us in negotiations, this means that they are not prepared to live with us in peace and friendship. And this is not a matter of technique; this is a matter of essence. Now we have said that. We have said that we want negotiations without any preconditions from either side. We said we want secure, agreed and recognised borders.

I am convinced that we have said everything in these few sentences. After all that, there's semantics. If it's only semantics, then we know that the Soviet Union and the Arab leaders want us to go, to withdraw without peace, just go back to the same borders that we were at. When we were at those borders, the war broke out. But the United States did not ask us to go back to the borders without peace. Now, when the time comes—we pray day and night that it comes soon—when our neighbours will sit with us and negotiate; they can put on the table any idea, any suggestions that they have. We will put our ideas on the table. We are convinced that after all will be said and done we will come to a peace agreement. I don't know what else can be expected of us. Nobody in his right senses can believe that there will be a peace agreement, agreed borders, and that the armies will remain wherever they are.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the UN spoke about deployment of the armies after there will be a peace agreement. And there is no magic word that if we use it, despite the connotation that our enemies give to this word, that there will be peace.

Q. You don't feel that as it has been suggested that Israel is being inflexible?

A. We have been inflexible when we want peace and we want direct negotiations,

when we want secure and agreed borders. Maybe all this is inflexibility. But to the best of my conviction we are saying the minimum for our defence after an experience of 22 years of belligerency and war.

Q. Mrs. Meir, what do you think are the prospects for such a peace?

A. I don't know, because it depends entirely on the other side. Don't forget that the other side has a big—the second biggest—Power in the world aiding it and certainly not pleading with Egypt for peace. There is no doubt in my mind, there is no doubt in the minds of any of the Arab leaders. And if, had there been a doubt, we have through tens of people that have visited both the Arab countries and Israel, conveyed this message. We are prepared at any time and any place and any level to meet with our Arab neighbours and to go into a discussion on peace and peace agreement. There hasn't been a person whom we knew, whether member of Government or a newspaperman—anybody—that we knew was visiting Israel and was visiting Egypt, or was not visiting Israel, was merely visiting Egypt, to act and to convey this message and to try to influence Nasir and Husayn and the others that we are prepared to meet them, and I've said this in public and I'll say it again: We are not intending to meet them as a nation victorious to a nation that has lost the war. We don't want to win wars, we don't want to appear in them, we don't want to fight wars. We want to meet as equals with all the honour that we have and expect them to have for us. We want—we want to meet them as equal representatives of countries who have no [sic] misery of war and now should try peace—the only thing that hasn't been tried in this area.

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Address by U.S. Under Secretary of State Richardson on Controlling Local Conflicts (Excerpt)¹

New York, April 29, 1970

... In some areas of the world the power of the United States is involved in the local balance; in some areas Soviet power is involved; in other regions we are both involved, directly or indirectly.

Certain regions where both of us are now deeply involved are so important to the central configuration of power that accommodations will require a careful process of negotiation on outstanding issues. Central Europe, for which the NATO ministerial meeting recently proposed mutual and balanced force reductions, is the outstanding example.

In other areas, however, where neither of us is now so heavily committed, progress can be made toward reducing the danger of expanded local conflict by deliberately limiting our involvement. This does not require that we agree on the origin and merits of the conflict in question nor that we forgo all interest in the area. What is required is that we do agree, either tacitly or explicitly, to refrain from any action, direct or indirect, which might disturb its internal equilibrium.

Since the world of the 1970's is not likely to be a placid one, this will not be an easy task. Experience has shown that the process of modernization is inevitably accompanied by convulsion and dislocation. Turmoil and turbulence are thus unfortunately likely to continue to accompany rapid social change in large parts of the world. Peaceful development—economic or political—is a process that has thus far eluded much of mankind.

The temptations, the impatience, and the anger which will be stirred by continuing eruptions and violence in developing areas

¹ Address made before the Second National Convocation on the Challenge of Building Peace, sponsored by the Fund for Peace, in New York, N.Y.; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1612 (May 18, 1970), pp. 628-629.

emphasize the need for major-power abstention. The development of spheres of restraint will require that both major powers recognize that their long-term interests are not furthered by attempts to gain short-term—and often fleeting—advantage.

Each side has its own views as to what constitute current examples of such attempts. I believe, for instance, that the Soviet Union should realize that any immediate gains it might make by attempting to take advantage of the troubled Middle East situation are far outweighed by the danger of stirring up a wider conflict. When in such an area one of us—in this case the U.S.S.R.—involves itself militarily, it is inevitable that the other will take notice and react.

We in the United States, meanwhile, must come to terms with the fact that violent upheaval, however repugnant to our preference for orderly and peaceful change, is going to continue to occur. We must realize that in most such situations U.S. power is neither a desirable nor an effective prescription.

In addition to realizing that we have neither a moral right nor a duty to intervene in every local quarrel, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. must also recognize that our power to deal with such disputes is sharply circumscribed by the new confidence and strength of many of the smaller nations. In many cases, to be sure, our participation—together with such leverage as we can usefully exercise—can help the parties find an acceptable formula for a settlement. This is what we are seeking to do in our discussions on the Middle East. But such efforts should not lead us to believe that an imposed solution, even where we can agree on its basic elements, is a lasting solution. Where persuasion fails, coercion is not an acceptable option.

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Statement Issued by the Government of Israel on U.S.S.R. Military Assistance to the U.A.R.¹

April 29, 1970

In the Soviet involvement in the Middle East there has been a grave development. In recent days it has become clear beyond any doubt to the Government of Israel that for the first time Soviet pilots are flying operational missions from military installations under their control in Egypt. The operational activity of the Soviet pilots has not extended so far to the cease-fire line, and they have not been involved in the air combats in this region.

In the month of March, the U.S.S.R. began to install in Egypt SA-3 missile batteries manned by Soviet personnel. At that time the Government of Israel brought to the attention of international political factors the gravity of the political and military significance of this dangerous development. Now, there is the further step of Soviet operational participation at the side of Egypt in the military campaign which Egypt is waging against Israel. This involvement has already enabled Egypt to increase its aggressive acts against Israel.

The Government of Israel has brought to international attention the dangerous implications of this development. The escalation of Soviet involvement in Egypt must cause concern not only to Israel but to all freedom-loving peoples.

This latest development is a continuation of the policies of the Soviet Union and of its consistent identification with Egyptian aggression before the Six Day War and since, in the following:

The delivery of vast quantities of Soviet arms to the Egyptian army in order to prepare it for renewed aggression;

The encouragement of Egypt to adhere to the noes of Khartoum;

Support given to Nasser's attempt to undermine the cease-fire line;

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, April 30, 1970, p. 3.

Identification with Nasser in his announced decision of May-June 1969 abrogating the cease-fire;

Support for the implementation of Nasser's declared war of attrition against Israel;

The encouragement of Egypt to reject the appeals by Israel and other political factors to reinstate the cease-fire as fixed by the Security Council in June 1967, without limitations of time or any other conditions;

A vicious anti-Israel propaganda campaign carried out in the Soviet Union in recent months;

The installation of SA-3 missiles manned by Soviet personnel and culminating with the activation of Soviet pilots in Egypt on operational missions.

Israel will continue to defend itself against all aggression which violates the cease-fire arrangements and which aims at renewal of war in the area. In all its struggles the people of Israel drew strength from its unity and from the justice of its cause. Israel will continue in its firm stand and in its quest for true and lasting peace.

97

Statement on the Situation in the Middle East by the Government of Sweden in the Foreign Affairs Debate in the Swedish Risksdag¹

Stockholm, April 29, 1970

The supply of arms to the Middle East is particularly disquieting. The greater the accumulation of arms, the greater the risk that the conflict will spread. In the international discussions on this and associated problems, a possible arms embargo is a constantly recurring theme. Naturally Sweden does not permit the sale of war materials to the countries involved in this

conflict, this being in line with our policy of not exporting war materials to disturbed areas.

The situation in the Middle East has deteriorated disturbingly during the last few months. Artillery and air bombardment as well as acts of sabotage and personal violence have increased both in number and in extent.

These hostilities have claimed more human lives than in earlier years. The propensity of the parties to have recourse to military escalation opens up unpredictable perspectives. The peaceful work of reconstruction in these countries is being harmed by the aggravation of the conflict. The rest of the world is being affected more and more by the increasing bitterness of the parties. In the wake of the conflict international civil aviation is being seriously threatened as a result of new and desperate fighting methods. Steps will have to be taken to safeguard communications.

The crisis in the Middle East is particularly dangerous as Great Power interests are involved on opposite sides. Local incidents all the time threaten to lead to conflicts at the Great-Power level. When the struggle between the parties upsets the balance of power in the area, there is a danger that the Great Powers will consider it necessary to intervene and provide military support.

It is gratifying that despite the dark background of increasing violence in the Middle East, the Great Powers are continuing their talks in order to find possible solutions. They seem to be in agreement that events must not be allowed to develop into a clash between them. Among the matters taken up at their talks are what methods can be applied so as to enable the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967 to be implemented.

Our Ambassador in Moscow, Mr Gunnar Jarring, is still at the disposal of the Secretary-General as his Special Representative. Now as in the past Sweden is ready to co-operate with the UN in the attempts to reach a peaceful settlement.

¹ Excerpted from the English text of the debate as published in *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy*, 1970, New Series I: C: 20 (Stockholm: Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1971), pp. 28-29.

98

Interview with Israeli Army Chief of Staff Bar-Lev on the Military Strategy of Israel¹

Tel-Aviv, late April 1970

Bar-Lev: People's memories are very short. One has to ask how we came to the point where our planes were attacking military targets deep in Egypt. Exactly a year ago, in March 1969, Nasser publicly declared that the cease-fire had been cancelled. He even said that whereas an Egyptian soldier had previously been court-martialled if he fired across the Suez Canal, henceforth he would be court-martialled if he did NOT.

Since last March the Egyptians simply scrapped the cease-fire. We did not put the air force into action immediately, however. We did so only in July. We also found that action only along the Suez Canal was not effective enough. The military build-up was still going on in Egypt. The people and even high military authorities there still behaved as if everything were normal and at peace. This is the justification for our deep raids against military targets.

Our own problem was not only to interfere with their preparation for war. It was mainly to show them that they lack the element of air cover, of air superiority, the prerequisite for any military offensive in this area. Exactly this has been achieved. Today it is clear to Egypt, to the Russians and, I think, to the world, that despite Nasser's claim of having half a million soldiers, 500 planes and so on, his air force cannot give him the necessary air support for bridging the Canal.

A year ago this was not at all clear. In Egypt, they felt they were preparing to do something. On the sixth of June last year, Hassanein Heikal wrote that the coming winter—of 1969—was going to be hot and decisive, that they would reach the solution, that a day like the fifth of June, 1967, would never occur again. This was the feeling during the months of March, April, May

and June in Egypt and, I believe, also outside.

I do not remember any military correspondent who visited me who did not ask "How are you going to manage the war that is imminent?" But by putting in the air force, we cancelled this danger. I do not know for how long. But for the time being, I don't think people in Egypt, or outside, believe that in the near future they're really going to cross the Canal or to try to achieve something by a massive use of force.

Now, of course, it isn't very popular. I can understand a commentator saying to us: "Well, if the fighting is going on on the Canal, stick to the Canal. Don't attack the camps and the military installations round the Delta."

But we did not breach the cease-fire. Our policy is peace. Our national aim is to achieve peace and, until then, to keep the present *status quo* along the lines. This is our policy. Their policy is not this.

Interviewer: What would have happened if you had not carried out these raids?

I think there would have been a much more serious situation along the Canal itself with many more casualties on both sides. But, of course, I'm concerned with our side. I do not believe that the Egyptians would have succeeded in crossing the Canal, but I'm sure they would have tried. This would have meant a lot of bloodshed. And, maybe in such a case we would not have just sat on this side of the Canal.

That is my assessment of what would have happened had we not put in the air force and started to attack targets in the depths of Egypt. Every student of logic knows that it is very difficult to prove something which did not happen. But I think this would have been the situation, because Egypt—the present regime in Egypt—is not going to accept the cease-fire or the *status quo*. Nasser said it; Nasser meant it; and Nasser is doing it.

And so we have to take all the necessary steps to play for time. Maybe in three years, maybe in five, maybe in two years, maybe in ten—I don't know—there maybe a different

¹ *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, XIX, 18 (May 1, 1970), p. 11.

mental attitude. But right now, for Nasser it is an obsession not to go to a conference and not actually to accept the State of Israel.

[*Asked about military policy on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts*]

Bar-Lev: Unlike Nasser, the Syrians have not said the cease-fire is dead. But from time to time they do nasty things. And for the time being we think we can keep them controlled by punishments, by blows; and it works. As long as they do not cancel the cease-fire we try to control the Syrians by the minimum necessary activities.

The problem with the Jordanians is just as much theirs as ours. The terrorist groups have snowballed and are a greater danger to the regime in Amman than to us. For us it is a nuisance. It costs a lot of effort, money and lives. But for them it is a real danger—yesterday they bombed the American cultural centre in Amman, and burned American cars. Mr. Sisco was, after all, a guest of the King.

Along the cease-fire line, the Government and authorities in Jordan are either not capable or not willing to control the situation. It is true that ordinary Jordanian forces, and even Iraqi forces, have not fired since December on our settlements. But every night you have a few *Katyushas* shelling the settlements—always by the terrorists. And the situation might deteriorate along the border, because there is a certain limit. The casualties are nil, or very low. But the question is how things develop.

99

Reply to a Press Conference Question on Soviet Pilots Flying for the U.A.R. by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin¹

Moscow, May 4, 1970

You see, we have an agreement with the government of the UAR under which we have military advisers attached to the UAR forces. This is done with the object of combating Israeli aggression. It is taking place only because of the great assistance from the USA, which is delivering the necessary weapons and supplying and supporting Israel in the aggression which it is conducting against the UAR. The functions of our military advisers are being co-ordinated with the government of the UAR.

100

Speech by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on the Military Situation in the Middle East and the Policies of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.²

Haifa, May 4, 1970

First of all, I suggest that we be very, very realistic in assessing our war situation. In plain words: not to hope that the Russians won't do what they intend to do, not to expect the Americans to do what they don't intend to do, and not to believe that the Arabs agree to anything that they do not agree to. But beyond them—and beyond Yasser Arafat and George Habash, the Fatah, Sa'eka [Saiqa], the Popular Front—let's not forget the Jewish People. Let's not forget the strength that the Jewish People has displayed throughout its history to overcome difficulties, and let's not underestimate Zahal. Let's bear in mind Zahal's power, which in

¹ Quoted on Moscow radio, May 4, 1970; English translation in *Mizan*, Supplement A, No. 3 (May/June 1970), p. 1.

² Speech to a gathering of Israeli students; English translation in *Jerusalem Post*, May 8, 1970, p. 5.

the two previous fighting generations—those of the War of Liberation and of the Sinai Campaign—derived first and foremost from valour and daring, which have not diminished and which have now been augmented by a technological level not to be ashamed of.

I want to define things as I see them on two topics: the state of the war and the prospects of peace. In discussing the war, I will deal first with the Russians. They have undertaken the task of militarily defending Egypt's vital centres against air attack. This has three implications. First, that Cairo, Alexandria, the Aswan region and the approaches to them today have Soviet air protection, by aircraft, and Soviet ground protection in the form of SAM-3 batteries and anti-aircraft guns. This protection is not absolute, but it is much better protection than existed before.

The second implication is one that Nasser hinted at in his May Day address at Abu-Zaabel,¹ announcing that his forces were going to renew the war initiative. Egyptian forces that were tied to defensive tasks are now freed to take the offensive against the Israeli forces.

The most important implication of all is that by the very act of undertaking a belligerent military task, the Russians have displayed, in a manner menacing to both Israel and the United States, the extent of their readiness to be involved in this war.

I shouldn't and I don't wish to engage in prophecy, but in what the Russians are doing today there is an element of throwing down the gauntlet, of saying: We Russians are not only defending Cairo, we are not only relieving Egyptian forces of the job of defence so that they may be free to attack the Israeli forces all along the Canal, but we are also involved in this Egyptian war against Israel. This threat, this throwing down of the gauntlet, is no less significant than the actual fighting, the personnel and the equipment themselves.

Of course the Soviets in relieving Egyptian forces of defence tasks and giving them military-political backing, have revived Egyptian spirits. The Egyptians have gone on an offensive which Nasser has called "taking the battle initiative back into our hands." In his programmatic May Day speech, Nasser mentioned that Israel's air sorties deep into Egypt last winter caused damage and ruin, and made it necessary for the Egyptian Army to split up its forces for defence tasks in various places throughout the country, thus wresting the military initiative from him. But now that the Soviets are doing this job, the Egyptian Army is again free to take offensive initiatives and try to undermine the Israeli hold on the ceasefire line along the length of the Canal and the Gulf of Suez.

And in fact, Israeli casualties on the Egyptian front alone almost doubled in April, going up to 89 from 47 in March. What is worse, the number of dead rose from nine in March to 27 in April. I hope that in the coming months—even if the Egyptian initiative continues—we will succeed in reducing these losses. This will require a considerable military effort, but I hope that we will be able to bring it off and achieve the desired results.

Concerning the Russians, I want to say with—if I may be permitted to use the term—satisfaction that although they have been operative in Egypt (since about the middle of April, according to Nasser), and although we have continued to fight with all our might on the ceasefire line, and prevented the installing of anti-aircraft missiles and guns in the Canal sector, we have not yet clashed with any Soviet pilots. I also hope that we have not hit any Soviet ground crews in our air attacks on the western side of the Canal.

One can't really speak of satisfaction when the Soviets are there—it would be better if there were no Russians there—but as they have been there for something like a month, it's a very good thing that so far this hasn't led to any encounter between us and them—as of this moment.

¹ For the text of Nasser's speech see Arab World Section, below, Document 382.

In this connection, the American position is equally important. Everybody knows that there are differences of opinion between us and the Americans on the question of formulating a peace plan or arrangement. But as yet there has been no concretization of these differences.

The Americans cannot say that there is an arrangement that is ready to be implemented, that Nasser is ready to implement it, or that the Four Powers are agreed on it, only we Israelis are being stubborn. But for all our difference on a political settlement, I have not yet heard an American demand that we withdraw, "fold," or stop fighting for the cease-fire line just because Soviet forces have come in and assumed the task of protecting vital centres in Egypt. I do not have the impression that in compliance with the American position we should withdraw or release our hold on the cease-fire line when the Egyptian side has shown no readiness to come to any peace arrangement, not even one proposed by the Americans. We are not feeling any American pressure to relax our struggle or to deprive ourselves of the ability to hold on to the cease-fire line by allowing an anti-aircraft network to be placed on the other side.

This is very important for us, but it doesn't mean that the Americans are assuming any responsibility for our grip on the cease-fire line, or that they are promising us any military help to maintain our hold.

As to the renewed Egyptian war initiative—I don't know whether Nasser really believes the announcements of his military spokesman, or whether he knows how immense is the gap between those announcements and the facts. If we review what actually happened in those 15 days since—according to Nasser, speaking on May 1—the Egyptians resumed their initiative, it will transpire that it is very doubtful whether he has much cause for boasting.

I've reviewed our losses in April. These included—if I remember correctly—two killed and five wounded in Egyptian air attacks and ambushes on our side of the Canal. But most of the casualties were from

artillery and mortar shelling. In those Egyptian air and commando sorties since mid-April, the Egyptians have lost six planes—including the two Ilyushin bombers that were downed with their crews at El Arish—and five boats that tried to cross the Canal, leaving behind 46 bodies on our side or floating in the Canal.

Let's take two examples of how things look in Egypt as compared to what actually happened. Of one, the Egyptian spokesman said it was "the biggest and deepest penetration across the Canal since 1967." He said the invading force consisted of an infantry battalion—with auxiliary forces, equipment and all—which "penetrated the enemy's fortifications and reserve emplacements all along the sector, causing the enemy heavy loss of weapons, and destroying considerable equipment and many bunkers. In addition, one enemy plane was downed and another hit, and a number of tanks and armoured vehicles were destroyed when they tried to counterattack." So much for the communiqué.

What actually happened is that an Egyptian force was sighted while trying to cross the Canal in rubber boats. We opened fire on them while they were still trying to cross the Canal—tank, mortar and small-arms fire, supported by aircraft. Four boats were hit and sunk and others capsized or were seen withdrawing. After our barrage, not a single Egyptian soldier was seen in or alongside any bunker. The Egyptians never got to attack the bunkers. We suffered no casualties. Such was "the biggest assault since the Six Day War." Such is Nasser's renewed Egyptian fighting initiative.

The second example is less important. On May 3, the Egyptian spokesman announced: "Egyptian Naval Commando forces rained a concentration of fire into enemy command posts in an Israeli camp in the e-Tur area, using heavy mortars and rockets. They scored direct hits on the installations, which could be seen burning in the distance." What *we* know is that a few Katyusha shells were fired from launchers placed on some boat that had been sunk

in the Six Day War, about 800 metres offshore. There was no damage, and our men even had to search high and low before they found the spot where a few shells had landed.

To sum up so far: we will not withdraw from the cease-fire line and we will not "fold" under military pressure. We will fight anybody who tries to evict us from there by force. We will not allow our hold on the cease-fire line to be loosened, even if it means fighting other forces besides the Egyptians.

I think we have to make it perfectly and candidly clear to ourselves on what terms—from the Arab standpoint—it is possible today to achieve an end to the hostilities, and whether we are ready to accept these terms. There is nothing abstract or obscure about them. To be sure, no Israeli or Zionist emissary has been to Cairo or spoken to Nasser, but he was very explicit about it. In his May Day speech Nasser announced that he was ready to halt the war on two main conditions. The first is total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied areas—from the Golan Heights, from Sharm e-Sheikh, from East Jerusalem—withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines.

The second condition is that Israel should take back the 1948 refugees on the basis of the so-called "free choice"—that is, every refugee will be given the option of returning to his home in what they call "Palestine" and we call the State of Israel.

But when we say we want peace, and the question arises what kind of peace we can achieve today, we have to decide whether or not we are ready to accept it. We have to answer ourselves: Are we ready to come down from the Golan and expose the settlements in the north to Syrian artillery fire? Leave Sharm e-Sheikh—and leave our navigation to the good-will of Egyptian coastal guns? Leave the Gaza Strip and leave George Habash there to direct the war against Nahal Oz and Yad Mordechai? Leave Kalkilya, Nablus, East Jerusalem—and leave the Jordanian forces to sit once more on the mountains, and the Fatah to

wage their terror war? If we're ready for that, then we can bring an end to the present war in no time at all. If we're not ready for that, then I don't know of any more liberal Arab proposal for bringing peace nearer.

What is Israel's peace stand? The Basic Guidelines of the Government, agreed to by all the parties in the National Unity Cabinet, state that Israel is ready to sit down to peace negotiations without any prior conditions. The Labour Party platform qualifies this somewhat by saying that Israeli forces will remain in Sharm e-Sheikh, which will remain connected territorially with the State of Israel; we will not leave the Golan Heights, etc. Nasser, on the other hand, declares: Not a single millimetre! We say: Although we know, Nasser, that your conception is diametrically opposite to ours, and despite the fact that you know that we have a different conception from yours about what the borders between us should be—let's sit down at the table without any prior conditions. We do not demand that you accept our conditions before we sit down, and please don't demand that we accept your conditions in advance. Let's sit down, on the assumption that in sitting at the peace-negotiations table together, mutual concessions will be made from the opposing conceptions.

Lately a certain doubt has been raised among some parts of the public as to the attitude of the young generation—not necessarily to war and peace, I am sure every one of you wants peace, and I hope you achieve it under better conditions than those offered by Nasser—but as to the readiness of the young twelfth-graders and Goldmannists [supporters of Nahum Goldmann's ideas on Israeli policy toward the Arabs—ed.] to serve in Zahal, to fight, and to do so with all your heart and soul.

Therefore, before coming here this evening I asked the General Staff for comparative figures on volunteering in the Regular Army since and before the Six Day War. And it transpires that if before June, 1967 ten per cent of those completing their compulsory

service as officers signed up for a period in the Regular Army, the figure today is 40 per cent. The number of national service men applying to go into the Paratroopers has doubled. Twice as many boys want to fly in some capacity—and the Air Force never lacked volunteers. Volunteering for the various Naval Commando units has risen by 280 per cent: they're running out of fins, so if any of you want to volunteer, this is your last chance.

These figures did not surprise me, but I was happy to read them nonetheless, very happy. I know that young people have questions and difficulties; and no wonder: we're on the threshold of the fourth year of the war. But beyond these current things there is something vital in this people of ours, this public of ours—something unique—which passes from generation to generation, something that isn't the exclusive property of any one generation. And these twelfth-graders—Victor Shemtov's son and all the other boys—I am not one bit worried about how they will greet the Egyptian Naval Commandos coming towards them when they are in the fortifications at the Suez Canal, not one bit worried.

Q. Why aren't we dropping leaflets on Egyptian cities?

Dayan: Our radio and television broadcast in Arabic. To fly over Egyptian cities to scatter leaflets is not a simple matter, and wasn't even before the arrival of the Soviet pilots and Sam-3 missiles. Furthermore, anybody who doesn't want to listen to our broadcasts will say that the leaflets are only enemy propaganda. Nevertheless, I calculate that in the end the Egyptian public will know the truth, as they knew it last year when Nasser announced that 60 per cent of the Israeli fortifications along the Suez Canal had been destroyed, and another 10 per cent and another 10 per cent.

Q. Why have we halted our bombings deep in Egypt?

Dayan: Now that the Russians are there, I would prefer to wait and see what we can

and ought to do. Under no circumstances should we withdraw from the cease-fire line or diminish our capacity to hold on to it. But we must be very wary about taking offensive action, lest this bring us into encounters with Soviet pilots. If there is no alternative, things will come to that anyway; but there is no need for us to invite it.

Q. Why are we allowing the Jordanians to repair the Ghor Canal for the third time?

Dayan: We've had a few dialogues, so to speak, with the Jordanians. From time to time we have had the impression that the Jordanian Army is trying its best to prevent the Fatah and the other terrorist organizations from striking at us. Just a few days ago the Jordanian Army clashed with terrorist forces in the Shuneh region. Sometimes we have reasons for granting requests of the Jordanian Government, mainly on such humanitarian matters as irrigation canals, and we thereby strengthen the hands of those who promise to fight to restrict the activities of the terrorist units, or whom we expect to do so. Our consideration in giving the Jordanian Army another chance to pacify the area is based on the assumption that if Jordanian farmers are able to work on their side, they will be less interested to see terrorist activity than if the area were to turn into a wilderness, and this will also make it easier for our farmers to work on our side.

Q. What is your view of making peace with a Palestinian State?

Dayan: My opinion about the establishment of a Palestinian State is negative, for two reasons. One concerns the Jewish standpoint, which I will clarify in my own name, and from the Arab standpoint, as it was explained to Dr. Nahum Goldmann when he met with a number of Palestinian leaders, with none of the limitations that apply to me. They explained the views of the Palestinian leadership to him, even though they themselves do not constitute the first rank of this leadership. On the question of peace, they expressed the following views—

and I have reason to assume that the information I have is quite accurate:

First, Israel must withdraw from all the area she occupied in the Six Day War to the pre-war lines;

Second, even if Israel withdraws, they—the Palestinians—cannot and are not ready to make peace with Israel separately from the other Arab states, because they are part of the Arab world.

The people Dr. Goldmann spoke to said to him: "You consider us a potential party to a separate peace with Israel. You're mistaken. We are not such a partner, neither from the point of view of a timetable, nor from the geographical point of view. We can't make peace with you until the Arab states do so, and we are not ready to make peace with you that is based on boundary lines that differ from those demanded by the Arab states—namely, absolute Israeli withdrawal from all the areas. In addition, we demand what the Arab states are demanding, including the return of the refugees on the principle of free choice for each and every one of them to return to his former place."

Then they added another minor detail: "We don't want a Palestinian State at all." Anwar Nusseibeh, who represents the Palestinians and met with Dr. Goldmann, and other leaders told him: "There is no point in an independent Palestinian State separate from the other Arab states. A state based on Jenin, Nablus and Hebron is no state, and if it comes into being it will be dependent on you Israelis." That is what the Palestinian leadership told Goldmann, and I myself have not met a Palestinian Arab who says that there are any chances for the survival of a Palestinian State separate from the other Arab states. What they say—in Arabic, in English, or even in Hebrew, but in any case in no uncertain terms—is: "First of all, go away from here to the other side of the armistice lines, go home. What we do afterwards with East Jerusalem and Nablus is none of your business. We'll return to Jordan or not, —whichever way it suits us best." And

those whom it suits add: "My opinion is that we should be linked to Jordan."

If we're prepared to accept conditions of this sort for an arrangement, then why only with the Palestinians? On the basis of total withdrawal and return of the refugees we can achieve an end to the war with somebody more authoritative than Anwar Nusseibeh, with Abdul Nasser.

As for me—as a Jew and an Israeli—I am not one bit enthusiastic about a plan to set up a Palestinian State that would include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Do we really need a corridor cutting across the Negev from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, bisecting the State of Israel as though she were surrounded by staunch friends whose mind it never entered to destroy her?

Q. Isn't there a danger that we may find ourselves back in the situation of 1967, with Nasser cocksure under Russian auspices?

Dayan: That, of course, depends on what the Russians will do. Assuming that the Soviet forces in Egypt will limit themselves to the tasks they are now fulfilling, then the Egyptian Army, relieved of the task of defending Cairo, Alexandria and Aswan, will consider itself free to take the offensive against the Israeli forces. At first the military commanders or the political security people may think that the Egyptian Army is capable of crossing the Canal and driving us away from there. But it will very quickly become clear to them that it is no simple matter at all, and that they have to pay a very high price for this effort. This is something they should know from their experience since April 18.

The difference between our situation in 1967, when we stood opposite the Gaza Strip, and today consists in the fact that we are deployed in fortifications all along the Canal, and that we have aircraft operating in the sector.

I do not underestimate the significance of Soviet forces in Egypt, and of the fact that they free the Egyptian Army for new initiatives. But in light of the tasks which the Soviets are fulfilling, and of the Egyptians'

present military situation, I don't think they can allow themselves to go for full-scale war. And if they do try, I assume that they are going to fail.

Q. Is it possible to compare Russian involvement in Egypt with U.S. involvement in Vietnam? What does Egypt expect of the U.S.? What can be done in the present situation?

Dayan: The relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt are very close, but I don't believe they are as close as those between the U.S. and South Vietnam. There the U.S. is actually conducting the war. I don't think that the Soviet involvement in Egypt is that deep, or that the responsibility that the Soviets have assumed in Egypt is that comprehensive.

Egypt wants two things, or at least one of them, from the U.S.: to order Israel to withdraw from the occupied areas; or, failing that, to halt all aid to Israel, to stop sending her planes, and to stop giving her loans and other economic assistance.

What's to be done in the present situation? Two things. First and foremost, that we should be ready to fight for the cease-fire lines even under the present circumstances. If we don't fight, nobody will help us. If we fight, it may be that somebody in the world—the U.S. or somebody else—will help. And I think we're ready for that, and able to do it. We'll fight even if there are Soviet pilots in Egypt. I'm happy that so far they are not intervening in the fight over the cease-fire line.

The second thing is more remote and more abstract. I will not express an opinion on the place of the U.S. in what is now happening in Cambodia and Vietnam. But I don't think I am free not to say the following:

With things in the world going the way they are, and with a power like the Soviet Union behaving in the Middle East—in Egypt—as she is, causing this war—if, under these circumstances, the U.S. in the international arena turns into what is called a "paper tiger," withdraws into her private affairs, and avoids taking any part whatever

in international struggles, leaving the field open to Soviet challenges, leaving the Soviet Union free to expand her influence and military intervention, then things are going to be very bad indeed for the free world. Because getting right down to it, it is the U.S. that is capable of standing up to the Soviet Union, not only the U.S., but she first.

But there are two possible courses for future world military-political developments. It may be that the U.S. will say that she is not getting involved anywhere or in anything beyond her own borders, that she will defend only herself and the moon. Or it may be that the U.S. will not conduct a non-involvement policy, that she will be a true tiger, with teeth that bite, in the face of Soviet pressure and expansionist tendencies.

What we can and are in duty bound to say is: "We are ready to observe a cease-fire, ready to negotiate peace, but we are not budging from the cease-fire lines under military pressure, no matter who the source of the pressure is. If anybody wants to throw us out of the cease-fire lines by force of arms—we will fight, and we will fight alone."

101

U.K. Television Interview with Prime Minister Meir of Israel on Israeli Military Strategy and U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East¹

Jerusalem, May 4, 1970

[Alan Hart has been this weekend in Jerusalem where he spoke for "Panorama" to the Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir.]

Alan Hart: Prime Minister, your government has made a lot of noise and a lot of fuss about Russian pilots flying combat missions inside

¹ "Panorama" broadcast on BBC Television; transcript provided by the British Broadcasting Corporation and printed here by permission.

Egyptian air space. Can I ask you first of all to disclose some evidence that will support your allegations?

Prime Minister Meir: I don't think I can tell you what our sources of information are. But all I can say is that we are convinced—beyond any doubt—that there are Russian pilots flying Egyptian planes. And I think that other governments beside the Israel government know it.

Hart: What are the chances—would you say?—of your 'planes and your pilots becoming involved with Russian pilots?

Meir: Well, that depends upon the Russian pilots.... upon the Russian government. We have no desire to become involved with Russian pilots. We have no desire to become involved with any pilots. We don't want to use our air force. This is not our ideal—to become involved with somebody.

Hart: What do you think is the immediate aim of this new Russian involvement? Could it be perhaps that they are trying to frighten you into stopping reprisal raids deep into Egypt?

Meir: What has happened since they... we have found that they are in the skies of Egypt, is that Egyptian activities on the Canal have become much more aggressive than they were for many months in the past. Actually—why did our 'planes cross the Canal all together? As our Ambassador in Washington said—put it very very well—to us our 'planes are flying artillery. There is no balance of power on the Canal with the Egyptian artillery on one side and ours on our side. It is clear out of balance and we haven't that man power, nor gun power there. And the only way that we could try and quieten down the Egyptian artillery is by our 'planes.

Hart: By striking deep into Egypt.

Meir: No. First by striking on the Canal.

Hart: But let's come back to the strikes that you used to carry out. I mean—they haven't been going on now for two or three weeks—deep into Egypt

(YES....) Now, clearly, you are not carrying these strikes out at the moment, because you are presumably frightened of becoming involved with the Russian pilots.

Meir: We were carrying out these strikes only for two reasons. We wanted to relieve the pressure on the Canal. We wanted to make it at least difficult for Nasser in his preparations for the next war. If you will remember, Nasser announced a programme. At one point he said now his army is reorganised. Now he is going to begin the war of attrition. And after the war of attrition will come the big battle that he is preparing now. Well—the war of attrition, everybody knows has been a failure. And he was preparing himself and his army for the next war. Well, we didn't think that it was our duty to sit by passively and left him prepare the next war with all the convenience that is necessary for him. And this is why we struck in the depth of Egypt—and for no other reason.

Hart: Before the new SAM-3 missiles were installed by the Russians, you were attacking radar stations and other missile sites to preempt any threat to you. Presumably for the same reasons you must now attack the SAM-3 missile sites.

Meir: Look—naturally I don't plan operations...military operations. There are some matters of policy that we have to decide; and there are tactical sides to the question. We do not want to—we certainly have no desire to do anything which is not absolutely essential for our self defence. But I must say that when we come to the conclusion or our military people come to the conclusion that something is essential for our self defence, we will have to do it.

Hart: Are you prepared—if the Russians take on your pilots—to shoot Russian 'planes and pilots out of the sky?

Meir: We are prepared by necessity to do everything that is absolutely necessary to defend our lives—the lives of our people—and the integrity of our country. We didn't go into Russia to fight Russian pilots.

Russian pilots are not naturally stationed in Egypt. This is not a war that has been fought between Russia and Israel; this is a war between Egypt and Israel. And anybody on Egyptian soil or Jordanian soil or Syrian soil, that fights us, naturally we will fight back. It is the attitude of the people that is being attacked, whose very life is in danger, whose sovereignty is in danger, whose physical—actually physical—existence of its people is endangered and has the choice of either committing suicide or defending itself. And we have chosen to defend ourselves. And that is that. We are not fighting a war with the Russians.

Hart: But you may soon . . . or you could be . . .

Meir: But they have come—if they will fight it is because of their choice, that they have decided far away from their borders to join a war that has nothing to do with them. But that is a moral principle which the Russians have to decide, or the world has to decide how valid they have a reason to come and fight. But as far as we are concerned, anybody that stands there against us and wishes to destroy us—no matter what his nationality is and no matter what his . . . what signs he wears . . . he is an enemy that is facing us in battle. And we won't run.

Hart: A lot of people, Prime Minister, would say to you that you brought this greater Russian involvement upon yourselves by your arrogant and bullying tactics. In other words, you have humiliated not only the Egyptians but the Russians in destroying so much of the equipment that the Russians had supplied to the Egyptians, and therefore you have left the Russians with no choice but to escalate in this fashion.

Meir: Oh—poor Russians! They have given the Egyptians all this hardware, knowing exactly what the Egyptians want to do with it. The Russians carry a major responsibility for the six day war, and we have humiliated the Egyptians and the Russians by doing something to which we plead guilty—which is to refuse to lose the war which would have meant death to this

people. But we fought back and won the war in order to remain alive.

Hart: Isn't your real problem the fact that the more you go on hitting the Egyptians and maybe the Russians too, the more the Russians must become involved; and surely that way madness lies, because that leads to the ultimate confrontation between East and West.

Meir: This may all be true; but I yet refuse to understand and incapable of understanding what is it that is exactly expected from Israel? Now, what is it exactly that Israel is supposed to do in order to avoid humiliating the Russians—humiliating the Egyptians and saving the big powers from an embarrassment? Is it supposed to conveniently just pass out of this world? If that is what is expected, then it is better for our friends, mainly for our friends—on our enemies it won't make much impression—but our friends must understand—at least understand, even if they do not agree (I hope they agree)—that the people of Israel have no intention whatsoever to accommodate anybody by giving up their life, or their right of sovereignty in the State of Israel. We have known a very very tragic history; but that was when Jews were incapable of defending themselves. We have no intention whatsoever that these two and a half million Jews who are in Israel in an independent state, with means of defence, that the same thing should happen to us what happened to a million Jews before us.

Hart: Do you have any doubts of the extent to which the Americans would be prepared to back you if you get involved in a confrontation with the Russians?

Meir: I don't think that any country would send an army into this area merely for our survival. The question of the Russians coming into this area as they are coming into this area—I think, presents a problem not only for Israel but those powers for whom this problem exists will have to decide on their own. What we are asking from friendly governments is to give us the means with which to . . . give us—I mean to sell us the

means with which to defend ourselves. Now this I say as an Israeli. As a citizen of the world I think the Russians coming in to the Middle East and practically wanting to take over, this has implications not only for Israel. This has implications I believe, for the international pattern. What kind of a world are we going to live in? And will the small peoples have the slightest chance to be free, and to live as they wish to live? This involves the entire basis maybe of human existence. But that is not only Israel's problem. Israel has quite enough with its own little problem of remaining alive.

102

Message on the Middle East from the Shah of Iran, President Sunay of Turkey and President Yahya Khan of Pakistan to U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin¹

Ankara, May 7, 1970

We, the heads of state and government of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, have met and discussed the question of the Middle East conflict, which was among other questions of mutual interest to us.

The continuing worsening of the situation in the Middle East is a cause of our serious concern and anxiety. We fear that the escalation in the Arab-Israeli conflict may soon reach such a stage that it will become irreversible. In Rabat, together with other heads of state and government, we appealed to all members of the international community, particularly to the great powers, to multiply unilateral and collective efforts so as to ensure undelayed withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the territories, occupied by them in June 1967. This would be fully in compliance with all provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967. The need of such actions is becoming ever more pressing now. We are

convinced that this will create in that area an appropriate atmosphere, favourable for a final peaceful settlement. Therefore, we earnestly request you, Your Excellency, to use, with this aim, the indisputably great influence of your country.

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Communiqué Issued at the Close of the Tripartite Summit Meeting Between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey (Excerpts)²

Izmir, May 8, 1970

HIM Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shahanshah Aryamehr; HE Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan; HE Mr. Cevdet Sunay, President of Turkey; HE Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran and HE Mr. Suleyman Demirel Prime Minister of Turkey, met in Izmir on May 6 and 7, 1970.

The Heads of State and Government stressed their concern about the state of affairs in the Middle East which continues to pose a serious threat to the stability of the region. They condemned the bombing of non-military targets and civilian population. They reiterated that unilateral measures designed to change the status of the holy city of Jerusalem cannot be accepted. They reaffirmed their opposition to the use of force as a means of securing territorial gain and political advantage.

They also called for an early solution of the Arab-Israel conflict including *inter alia* the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories in conformity with principles contained in the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967. In this respect, the Heads of State addressed a joint message to President Nixon and Prime Minister Kosygin.

¹ English text in *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 22 (1013) (May 30, 1970), pp. 6-7.

² English text in *Pakistan Documents Series*, VII, 6 (May 1970).

104

Response to a Radio Interview Question on U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East by Foreign Minister Schumann of France¹

May 8, 1970

Il n'y a pas une soviétisation mais une internationalisation du conflit, une escalade qui conduit à l'internationalisation. C'est justement parce que nous l'avons toujours redoutée que nous avons voulu, dès la première minute, opposer à l'internationalisation de la guerre l'internationalisation de la paix. Tel est le motif de l'offre française qui tendait à organiser une concertation des quatre puissances à New-York. Cette concertation s'est déroulée pendant un an. Elle avait marqué des progrès assez importants, je peux le dire, et si je constate qu'à l'heure actuelle elle est contrariée par l'évolution de la situation internationale,—car cette situation est indivisible,—je ne désespère pas de cette méthode pour la raison nécessaire et suffisante qu'aucune autre méthode de pacification n'a été jusqu'à présent proposée.

105

News Conference Statement on Arms Supply to Israel by U.S. President Nixon²

Washington, May 8, 1970

Q. Mr. President, have you made any judgment yet on the sale of jets to Israel? And how do you view the situation in the Middle East at the moment?

The President: The situation has become ominous due to the fact that reports have been received with regard to Soviet pilots being interjected into the U.A.R. Air Force, not in combat but in some other role. We are

¹ Broadcast over "Europe 1"; *Le Monde*, May 10-11, 1970, p. 5.

² Excerpted from Nixon's news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1613 (May 25, 1970), pp. 644-645.

watching these reports very closely. If those reports prove to be true and if that continues to escalate, this will dramatically shift the balance of power and it would make it necessary for the United States to reevaluate its decision with regard to the sale of jets to Israel.

We have made it very clear—and this is in the interest of peace in that area—that the balance of power must not be changed and we will keep that commitment.

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Radio Interview by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on the Middle East Military Situation, U.S.S.R. and U.S. Policy, and on Israeli Policy Towards the Palestinians (Excerpt)³

May 9, 1970

Q. The State has passed through three wars and, in fact, we are now engaged in a fourth. Would you describe our security situation as strong?

A. Yes, certainly. We have not experienced three wars. To be precise, the Arab States never agreed with us on general and final peace and there were outbreaks once in a while, in 1948, 1956 and 1967....

Q. Do you agree with the description that our security situation today is stronger?

A. I agree with this description if viewed not in terms of one day but in terms of the entire period. Our security and political situation in my opinion is improving....

Q. Mr. Dayan, if we review the past three years, would you say the Israeli Defence Forces have become stronger since the six-day war?

A. Certainly, this is the easiest thing to prove. I could prove this with numbers

³ "Interview of the Month" broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3376/A/5, A/6, A/7, A/8 and A/9; reprinted by permission.

if divulging numbers were allowed. Today we are stronger in weapons, equipment, fortifications, trained units, electronics and technology than we were 12 months ago. I believe that in another 12 months we shall be stronger than we are today.

Q. Nevertheless, we are paying a high price in blood day after day and hour after hour. Where does this lead us?

A. This will lead us to victory. . . .

Q. I would like to return to the subject of the Israeli-Egyptian border. The MiGs flown by the Russians and the SA-3 missiles are casting a heavy shadow on our region. Is this, in your opinion, a process which is getting deeper and more serious or should we expect the establishment of a static situation in this matter?

A. For myself, I do not prophesy more than is necessary. What we should tell ourselves is how to behave. I believe we should, at this time and in this situation, behave with maximum vigour on the question of defence, that is, not forego anything in our ability to defend the Suez Canal front, but act with maximum restraint in initiating actions not vital to the defence of the cease-fire line. This is because this time is very, very critical for us in this situation, and we should not push things to a grave stage.

Q. Do you say this in the light of the facts about Soviet pilots in Egypt?

A. Without "in the light", but certainly in connection with the Soviet pilots in Egypt.

Q. You said you would not want us to fight the Russians. The question, however, is: At what point shall we tell them this is the limit; this is a line you will not cross?

A. We shall strictly maintain our ability to stand fast on the cease-fire line. We shall not permit the installation of anti-aircraft systems, anti-aircraft guns, SA-3 missiles, and so forth, because this will lead to a situation in which we shall not be able to hold the Canal line with soldiers, strongholds and so forth. Therefore, if the Russians decide to intervene—something which they

have not done yet and they have already been in the air space on the western side of the cease-fire line for one month—if they attack us there, we shall defend ourselves and our pilots will fire back.

Q. What does it mean to intervene, Moshe Dayan? To intervene means to shoot at our pilots near the Canal, but is it not intervention to shoot at our pilots 30 km. from the Canal?

A. Yes, yes. When I say we should preserve our ability to hold the Canal line, this means not permitting the installation of anti-aircraft systems west of the Canal. Aircraft are not boats and do not sail in the water. They have a minimum operational air space in order to support the ground forces defending the cease-fire line. Therefore, if foreign aircraft appear in this minimum air space and attack us, our aircraft will have to hit them.

Q. A number of people say that, in our bombings in the heartland of Egypt, we humiliated the Egyptians and the Russians to the extent that they were forced to increase Soviet involvement there. Do you accept this evaluation?

A. I do not accept the terminology, but I accept the context. It is necessary to make it more true and simple. The question was whether to fail or to triumph in the war which the Egyptians launched in March last year [1968]. That is to say, the question was whether to allow them to achieve the third stage—liberation, to cross the canal and to throw us out of Sinai—or, after they abrogated the cease-fire and launched raids and artillery attacks, to hit back. We hit back with selectivity and caution. It took us a long time to decide to use aircraft. Anyway, when we found that there was no alternative, we hit back. It would not have made any difference if, instead of going deep inside, we went south or north. If this war was to end the way it ended—in their failure—they would have been in the same situation that they found themselves in during November this year [1969] when they were forced to ask themselves what they should do to continue the war. The only

thing they could do was to receive Soviet reinforcements because there were no additional resources in Egypt itself....

Q. But now we have suspended these attacks.

A. If you mean now, as you speak to me, this is one thing. If you speak about future policy, certainly you do not expect me to tell you our real operative plans. It is true, however, that we occasionally need to evaluate the situation, measures and fronts to choose objectives. Our operations have been very selective in the past, and they should be selective today and take into consideration the Soviet forces there....

Q. To what extent are the memories of Munich and the affair of Czechoslovakia two years ago likely to change the attitude of the world toward us?

A. I do not know. I think we should decide for ourselves that we should first of all fight by ourselves.... If we fight, I hope part of the world will come in one way or the other to help us. But if we throw up our hands, no one will come to our aid.

Q. I know you do not like to make analogies with the situation in Vietnam. Nevertheless, try to compare the situation in the Middle East with Vietnam.

A. I want to tell you something which I want us to understand. This is how I see it at least. There are two super-Powers in the world, the Soviet Union and the USA. The Soviet Union is very ambitious now and is pursuing a policy of expansion in the Middle East. We, of course, are fighting and shall fight to defend ourselves. I do not, however, want the next period, from an international point of view, to be such that, in international matters, the USA will be what they themselves call a paper tiger without teeth. That is to say, I do not want the world and the Middle East—and us in it—to remain open to Soviet ambitions while the Americans are busy with the Moon and the USA and do not actively intervene to restrain or to balance this situation in the world, even in areas where the Russians are trying to expand against

the will of the peoples, such as Israel in this region.

Q. Do you believe we are politically isolated?

A. I believe we do not have enough friends. The number of votes supporting us at the Security Council, even when they all know we are completely right, are few....

Q. We should not ignore the fact that our friends in the USA and in other Western countries occasionally abandon traditional pro-Israeli positions. Where does this put us?

A. This places us in the situation you mentioned. In my opinion we should not exaggerate the importance of the matter, despite my desire to win the sympathy of the world. I want them to love us, I want us to be popular, and I want them to support us, but if for this reason for example, we have to allow Fatah to fire Katyushas from Lebanon at Qiryat Shemona without retaliating, then I am ready to forego the sympathy of the Netherlands Foreign Minister and preserve the life of the school caretaker in Qiryat Shemona....

Q. We are seeking security on the Suez Canal. What are we seeking in Hebron? Security or more than that?

A. In Hebron, we are seeking the homeland....

Q. At times it looks as if we do one thing and then the opposite. On the other hand, we are conducting a war of David and Goliath on the borders, and on the other, we are an occupation force, and these things are being carried out by the same army. How can this be reconciled?

A. We are not an occupation force. First of all, we are ready to make peace tomorrow with Jordan, Egypt and the others. Second, in the period in which there is no peace, I doubt if our behaviour in the areas can be called the behaviour of an occupation force. However, I am prepared to accept this: From the point of view of the Arabs, the residents of the Gaza Strip, Nablus, Janin and Hebron, we are an occupation force, and they do not want us there. Here there is a

clash between what we want to see as the State of Israel and the will of the Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There is no escape; there is a clash here. This clash existed between our will and the will of the Arabs of Nazareth and Haifa. Finally, we came to a country in which Arabs are living. Not only were we absent from it 2,000 years, but Arabs lived in it for 1,200 years. The question before us now, at this period, is not to get rid of the Arabs, but how to live with them. I do not think the critical question for Israel is how to get rid of the Arabs. I fully believe it is possible to live with all these Arabs without any of them having to leave the area and to determine the required borders and the appropriate Government for the State of Israel.

Q. How do you see the terrorist organisations today compared with three years ago?

A. I think, contrary to what was before the six-day war, that this is a national terrorist movement composed mostly of Palestinians with different principles. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that it has elements of a movement, like the [word indistinct] mercenaries. It consists of political elements with which we cannot agree. They want to liquidate the State of Israel. This movement is using military means and a military organisation whose achievements are very few....

Q. Have you ever thought about establishing a Palestinian State, say in Judaea and Samaria?

A. I have not thought that we can or should establish any kind of State for the Arabs. I think there is a question from the Arab point of view as to whether they consider themselves linked only with Jordan or are ready to consider closer relations with Israel within the framework of peace. This is not realistic now....

Q. While speaking about the past, we should see today clearly. In your opinion, is the effort demanded of the people too much? Is it not difficult to withstand the losses?

A. The effort is difficult and it is difficult to withstand the losses. What is the other

alternative before this nation...? If I have to choose between the losses we had this week in the Golan Heights on Mount Hermon—three precious young men were killed there—or to have the Syrian guns there again to open fire on the whole of the Hula valley, I prefer this price until we reach peace, provided we keep the Golan Heights....

Q. In your political and military evaluations, you sound realistic and pessimistic at times. Nevertheless, you seem to think there is a ray of optimism and hope on the horizon and maybe more.

A. I think we are making achievements and daily progress. Take for example the relations between us and the Arabs. I never believed in 1948 that 250,000 Arabs could live among us for 20 years as they did without continuous bloodshed because these Arabs did not ask to be citizens of Israel... I think, as a Government, we should pursue a policy of development but allow the Arabs to manage their personal and communal affairs, and to a great extent their national lives, in an independent manner.... If the Jew and Arab cannot live together, no peace agreement can last long. We should establish a common life between Arabs and Jews. In the present situation, this is probably the only thing we can do. We shall fight the Egyptians, but with the Arabs with whom we can live, we should live as man with man as if there is peace already. This is probably a very realistic step towards peace itself....

Q. This is the hope concerning what is done here in the State. What about across the borders?

A. We shall fight for the cease-fire lines, and we shall succeed. We know how to fight. When I said in my speech to the commanders that we are not Czechoslovakia or Biafra, I assume they understood my intention—that we are not Czechoslovakia in that we will not allow invasion and conquest without war and we are not Biafra in that we shall not fight with clubs. We have a better and advanced technology. I simply believe they will not be able physically to

drive us away from the lines. We will fight until peace....

Q. What, in your opinion, should we expect this coming year?

A. This coming summer will be a critical summer on the Egyptian front. The Egyptians think they have been released from defensive tasks and will certainly try again to carry out raids in the air and on the ground, and they will be hit hard. They tried and have already felt the blows. So far, I do not know what the next move of the Russians in Egypt will be. I hope that what we are seeing now will be all: That they have taken upon themselves a limited task to defend vital centres in Egypt but not to intervene in the area of the fighting on the cease-fire line which the Egyptians, contrary to the Security Council resolution, are violating. I hope the Russians will not do that; will not join the Egyptians in this action which is contrary to the Security Council resolution by actively taking part in the fighting against us. Anyway, the Egyptian front will be the critical front. On the other fronts, we have problems with Fatah in Lebanon and Jordan and some problems with the regular forces, but we are not sitting idle. We are adding fortifications and taking other measures. In the end, I do not believe this summer will be more difficult for us than the previous summer.

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Israeli Independence Day Speech Delivered in Arabic by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel¹

May 10, 1970

A total of 22 years have passed since the independent sovereign State of Israel was established and during this time the battles of the six-day war, which President Jamal

Abd an-Nasir resorted to and welcomed, took place. Yet peace has not prevailed.

The absence of peace actually puts a heavy burden on all the people of the area. Every week brings more killings, raising the number of widows and orphans, and the number of those suffering the agony of being refugees and evacuees. The main victim of the absence of peace, however, was and will always be, the Palestinian Arabs. Despite successful efforts made to maintain the progress of the economic life and to create coexistence points, your civil and political identities are still unidentified. Both Israel and the Arab States are exercising their sovereignties and are working towards their own national goals. But in your case alone, a question mark still hangs over your future.

I believe two contrasting roads are open to you. The first one has now been delineated in the name of the official Arab leadership by President Jamal Abd an-Nasir's latest speech. He proposed to continue the war, to continue to reject negotiations, and to continue along the road which led to the 1967 war. He continues to subject large parts of the Arab world to Soviet colonialism, which has actually destroyed the independence and sovereignty of the biggest Arab State. Instead of the hundreds of Britons and French men who ruled the States in the area a generation ago, there are today thousands of Russians established in Egypt and turning the Arab world's independence into an illusion.

The road proposed by President Jamal Abd an-Nasir will mean continued and increasing suffering and agony for you and the ending of all chances for a stable peace. It will also mean a lack of response to your wish for civil independence. All this will happen without the least chance of Abd an-Nasir's dream coming true.

Israel will not return to the old lines. It will only move its forces to secure any permanent borders agreed on and defined within the framework of peace. I am fully convinced Israel will be ready to make important concessions for the sake of peace, but it insists on a new system of relations and on

¹ Broadcast on Israeli Radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3376/A/3 and A/4; reprinted by permission.

secure borders serving the interests and national dignity of all the States in the area.

Israel will not be weakened by the so-called war of attrition. The number of Jews returning to the homeland has increased. National production has also increased and exports are steadily growing. More and more countries want to strengthen their relations with Israel, particularly the developing countries.

I can also assure you that Israel is receiving important arms to increase its defence strength in addition to its already growing production power. Should three more years elapse similar to the past three years, we shall hear three or more other speeches from President Abd an-Nasir and a number of us will be killed, but Israel will, on the whole, be stronger than it is now, while you, the Palestinians, will become further away from the dignity of independence and peace.

There is another course before you. I suggest this in order that you may express your earnest opinion on it. It is that of raising your voice to support negotiations between the Arab States and Israel; negotiations that will bring peace nearer and will irrevocably eliminate the conflict which brought upon us all and upon you in particular unlimited suffering, disappointment, grief and hardship.

In the event of peace, the border between Israel and her eastern neighbour will be open to trade and visits. The original borders of the Holy Land will comprise two sovereign States but these will be unified. This is what I meant when I said on more than one occasion that social relations would be established between us similar to the present relations between a number of West European States which have voluntarily and after generations of conflict reached permanent coexistence and peace and regional co-operation, the scope of which is constantly expanding.

The question is whether the Arabs of the Holy Land are ready to exercise self-determination and to abandon the course of terrorism and hatred which has brought upon the Palestinian Arabs defeat in the area

and world shame; to abandon this course and substitute one of peace. Should this happen, peace, prosperity and national dignity for all peoples in the area will be possible in our coming year of independence; otherwise, Israel will continue to strengthen its structure within the blockade and because of it. The irony of history is that we see that, by their position, the Arab States and (?Fatah) are only strengthening the spirit of Israel, closing its ranks, securing further support for it and increasing its security without serving the glory and dignity of Palestinian Arabs.

The strengthening of Israel and its development as an independent Jewish State is guaranteed in all circumstances. Israel, however, as the Premier and other Ministers have said, does not desire, in the event of peace, to govern another 1,000,000 Arabs. The option is in your hands. In the event of peace, you and we alike would enjoy freedom, prosperity and dignity. I conclude my speech by expressing the hope that this day next year will be a day of peace celebrations.

108

Final Resolution of the Legal Commission of the World Conference of Christians for Palestine¹

Beirut, May 10, 1970

The Legal Commission of the World Conference of Christians, held in Beirut from 7 to 10 May 1970:

1. Ascertains once again the unqualified illegality of the creation of Israel, a *de facto* state founded on violence and on the violation of public international law and municipal law considered in all its aspects, thus consecrating a colonial fact on the level of the law of nations.

¹ World Conference of Christians for Palestine Document No. 47/E.

2. Ascertains further that the government of Israel resides upon a political ideology of a religious nature, which is racist, discriminatory and expansionist and that it submits the indigenous population to a systematic *apartheid* which is legally consecrated by its jurisdictions.

3. Affirms that the Christian conscience cannot allow this grave injustice and clear prejudice to law and morality and urges support for the legitimate struggle of resistance and revolution of the Palestinian people.

4. Notes from the documents, evidence and reports submitted to our conference that there is decisive evidence proving that Israeli authorities have perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity including *inter alia*: torture, deportation, expropriation of private property, collective penalties, destruction of villages, mass killings, pillage, in disrespect for private persons, property, honour, and religious convictions in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Regulations of The Hague relating to the protection of civilian populations.

5. Condemns with particular vigour the use of napalm and of other prohibited weapons.

6. Recalls that all these serious derogations have already been ascertained and condemned by all international instances which have had occasion to know about them, among which are the United Nations and the Human Rights Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross and several non-governmental organisations, as well as several international conferences.

7. In consideration of the situation referred to above and within the present historical and legal context, considers that these acts constitute a blatant aggression, a threat to world peace and a violation of our Christian conception of the Rule of Law.

8. Therefore expresses its wish, consistent with its concern for avoiding the aggravation

of the conflict and to help bring about its solution, that all the national committees created after this Conference will undertake a careful and thorough study as a prelude to effective implementation, of a Palestinian proposal for the creation of a democratic State of Palestine recognizing the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights according to the right of self-determination.

Warmly appreciates the examples of human brotherhood given by Lebanon to all men of good will and considers that any attack on Lebanese sovereignty, territorial integrity or on its Arab and human mission would be a loss for humanity.

109

Statement Issued by the World Conference of Christians for Palestine¹

Beirut, May 10, 1970

To the Christians of the whole world: The World Conference of Christians for Palestine, comprising 400 Anglicans, Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants coming from 37 countries, enriched by the living experience and the participation of Christian Arabs, addresses a fraternal message.

We stand in a solidarity with the Palestinian people in its struggle for the right to a free and independent life, and we condemn all explicit or hidden forms of anti-semitism, opposing with equal vigor the many manifestations of anti-Arab racism. We invite all Christians to combat such attitudes and political or religious justifications on which they are based, contrary to the spirit of the Gospel: where man is persecuted, Jesus Christ is dishonored.

Affirming that the Gospel reveals a Messiah whose kingdom is not of this world while it is being manifested in this world, we reject the manipulation of Biblical texts for the

¹ *Action* (New York) II, 5 (June 8, 1970), p. 4.

purposes of political powers. Being contrary to the spirit of Christianity, the Zionist political interpretation seems to us as unacceptable to Christians as it is for Jews faithful to the spiritual message of the Old Testament. It leads in effect to a scriptural legitimization of the grave injustices which the Palestinian people and other Arab people have undergone, in the face of which the human conscience must protest. Thus the Zionist state, like any political-religious system, whether based on a living faith or not, is opposed to the dignity and liberty of man.

Therefore we Christians gathered in Beirut appeal to all our brethren to join in the construction of a humane society, secular and democratic, in which all convictions may find a place.

We Christians gathered in Beirut recognize that many non-Arab countries and the Great Powers bear a very heavy responsibility for the injustice committed against the Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples. We contest radically the idea that the problems of the Middle East can be solved by the balance of powers alone, or by any other national or international policies which contradict the rights of the Palestinian people and especially its essential right to return to its country and its right to self-determination.

We declare that it falls first to the Palestinian people to bring political solutions which will permit the co-existence of men of different ethnic groups, religious convictions and ideologies in a free and democratic Palestine in the midst of the Arab world.

We consider that the evacuation of occupied territories is a first indispensable step toward that preparation of peace. It seems to us that another step toward peace will only be taken by the disappearance of Zionist structures.

Furthermore we oppose the massacres, torture, destruction of villages and houses, despoiling of land and all arbitrary measures against collectivities and individuals, and the violation of the rights of civilians in time of war, etc.

Protesting against all forms of exploitation

of man by man, we do not separate the struggle of the Palestinians from that of the poor and oppressed in the world who struggle for their liberation and their development. We call all our brethren to a change in mentality, and to take the side of all who struggle for the recognition of their human dignity. The establishment of new social and political structures, on the national as well as international level, requires the elimination of present systems of oppression and violence.

As Christians obeying the judgement of God and led by His merciful grace, we ourselves undertake, and invite you, Christians of the whole world, to acquire a better knowledge of Arab problems and to support the Palestinian people in its resistance and in its struggle, which constitutes one of the most significant expressions of the struggle for man and for liberty.

110

Television Interview Statements by U.S. Under Secretary of State Richardson on U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East and American Policy¹

May 10, 1970

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, shortly before the Cambodian war suddenly took—I mean our movement into Cambodia—took the attention from everything else, we learned that the Russians have put their own pilots into military operations in Egypt, which was quite a new departure in that part of the world. My question is in two parts. Has the Cambodian venture distracted our attention from it? Has it held up unduly and dangerously a decision on giving Israel permission to buy the planes they want, and (b) when will there be action on this matter?

¹ Excerpted from Richardson's interview on American Broadcasting Company radio and television program "Issues and Answers," *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1614 (June 1, 1970), pp. 685-686.

Mr. Richardson: No, it has not in any way prevented the intensive review and consideration of this entire problem within the Government. This is a matter of concern. Ambassador Beam met the other day with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union seeking clarification of Soviet intentions. He did say that he received no clear-cut answer. Meanwhile, intensive analysis of the whole situation by our intelligence community is underway, and we in the Department of State and others in the White House and in the Pentagon are reviewing all the possible courses of action open to us, including the question of some further steps in response to the pending Israeli request.

Mr. Scali: Well, hasn't this now tipped the scales in favor of a decision to sell to Israel the Phantom fighters and the fighter-bombers that they want?

Richardson: It certainly is a factor on that side of the scales. On the other hand, I think we also need to consider measures that could induce an element of restraint in the situation and which could hopefully lead to a normal and publicly acknowledged cease-fire.

Harsch: Was our hesitation about granting permission to buy those Phantoms before a deliberate act of restraint, and did the Russians, in your opinion, take advantage of that act of restraint?

Richardson: It was an act of restraint. I think it will be premature to say that they took advantage of it, since their actions beginning with the deployment of SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles in the U.A.R. can be seen in the context of the earlier Israeli deep-penetration raids into the U.A.R., and these subsequent moves involving aircraft may well be a part of decisions taken, going back to the period of late December and early January.

Scali: But it is a rather dangerous escalation of the Soviet military involvement, is it not, Mr. Secretary?

Richardson: It is a potentially dangerous

situation certainly insofar as there is the risk of actual contact, combat, between Israeli and Soviet planes and particularly insofar as there is a possibility of the use of Soviet planes over the canal area itself. So we do have important reason to try to assure that restraint on both sides is observed.

III

Resolutions of the Political Bureau of the United Labor Party of Israel (Mapam)¹

May 13, 1970

In view of increased Soviet involvement and the participation of Soviet pilots in military operations in Egypt that increases Egyptian aggressiveness and diminishes the chances of peace in the Near East, the Political Bureau of Mapam appeals to friendly factors and all peace loving people in the world to add their voices to the call for the immediate termination of Soviet involvement and the opening of negotiations between the parties directly concerned in order to establish peace in this region.

The political Bureau also calls upon the government of Israel to constantly take the initiative for peace and develop an information campaign in order to strengthen the belief that Israel desires peace while actively defending itself from violations of the cease fire.

The representatives of the party in the government and in the Knesset will continue to make the political suggestions of Mapam subjects for discussion. Some of these suggestions are as follows:

The Six Day War was a defensive war. The Israeli army didn't fight to make conquests but it won't withdraw from the cease fire lines until a stable peace is guaranteed by a treaty determining the secure and agreed upon borders between Israel and her neighbours.

¹ *Mapam Bulletin*, No. 18 (July 1970), p. 3.

When peace is concluded, the Israeli Army will withdraw to secure, recognised and agreed upon boundaries.

The government of Israel will repeat its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution "to promote agreement and the establishment of a just and enduring peace and reassert its willingness to hold discussions on all the principles included in it with a view to reaching agreements" (according to the announcements of Y. Takoa [Tekoah] and A. Eban in the U.N.).

The Israel government will repeat its willingness to conduct talks according to the "Rhodes formula", that is to say contact that begins with the representative of the United Nations serving as chairman and ends in direct negotiations between the parties.

112

News Conference Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the Military Situation in the Middle East¹

Washington, May 13, 1970

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you discuss the Middle East crisis in the light of the Israeli raid into Lebanon, the introduction of Russian pilots into Egypt, and the President's reevaluation of his decision on the sale of jets to Israel?

A. Yes. First, on the question of Lebanon, we are, of course, pleased that Israeli troops are withdrawing. We regret any military activity in the area. We do recognize, however, that when you consider what has happened, you have to consider the causes for it. And, clearly, there was a great deal of guerrilla activity directed against Israel.

We continue to caution all the bodies in the area against this process of attack and retaliation and counterretaliation. We would hope that it could lessen; we would hope that these activities would not continue.

¹ Excerpted from Rogers' news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1614 (June 1, 1970), p. 675.

Insofar as the presence of the Soviet pilots and advisers in the U.A.R. is concerned, I don't think we have anything to add to that at the moment. There has been no additional intelligence that's come to our attention since Mr. McCloskey made the statement on that some time ago.²

On the question of the policy of our Government vis-à-vis Israel and requests for further military equipment and so forth, that's still under consideration. As the President said, no decision has been made on it.

113

Statement Severing Diplomatic Relations with Israel Issued by the Royal Government in Exile of Cambodia³

Peking, May 14, 1970

It is common knowledge that the American imperialists are responsible for the aggression and war in the world against the peace- and freedom-loving people and that they support the regimes devoted to them in this criminal and barbarous undertaking.

In the Middle East, the fraternal Arab and Palestinian people have been victims of American imperialism, whereas the government of Israel is its instrument and bridgehead for invading and occupying the Arab territories in defiance of all principles of international law.

Considering that it is the duty of all peoples and governments aspiring to justice, peace and freedom to support the struggle of the Arab people, the Palestinian people in

² In reply to news correspondents' question, Department press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey had stated on April 29 that "we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of reports that Soviet pilots are flying combat aircraft..... there is no evidence that we have that they have been involved in combat with Israeli aircraft" and that "we do regard this as a serious development, and one that is potentially dangerous." [Footnote from *Department of State Bulletin*.]

³ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 21 (May 22, 1970), pp. 20-21.

particular, for regaining their national rights and opposing the Israeli aggressors in the pay of American imperialism, the Government of National Union Under the Leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea decides to sever from this day Cambodia's diplomatic, consular and other relations with the Israeli government.

On this occasion, it desires to emphasize the fraternal and militant solidarity which binds the Khmer people and the Arab people, particularly the Palestinian people, together against the common enemy, American imperialism.

114

Statement on the Middle East by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin in Response to a Message from the Shah of Iran, President Sunay of Turkey and President Yahya Khan of Pakistan¹

Moscow, May 20, 1970

I thank you for your message of May 7th, 1970, which you deemed necessary to address to the Soviet Government.

The Government of the USSR shares the concern and anxiety you express in connection with the present alarming situation in the Middle East. We agree with the demand you expressed on the need of the undelayed withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Arab territories they had occupied in June 1967, in complete compliance with all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967.

It has to be stated with regret that there are still serious obstacles on the road towards relaxation of tension and the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. It is well known that the Israeli Government frustrates all efforts at a political settlement of the Middle East crisis. Supported and

encouraged by certain circles in the West, the Israeli Government is trying to act "from positions of strength" undertaking barbarous raids on civilian targets in neighbouring Arab states. Contrary to the Security Council's decision of November 22nd, 1967, the Israeli Government still avoids making a clear-cut statement on the withdrawal of its troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, and also on its consent to comply with other provisions of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution.

The Soviet Union is consistently working for a speedy political settlement in the Middle East. We are rendering the Arab states, victims of Israeli aggression, extensive assistance to enable them successfully to defend their legitimate national rights. We intend to continue exerting efforts in this direction with the aim of a settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of compliance with all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967.

The Soviet Government hopes that Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, interested in the normalization of the situation in the Middle East, will continue their efforts toward the establishment, at long last, of a stable and just peace in that area.

115

U.S.S.R. News Agency TASS Commentary on Soviet Military Aid to the U.A.R. (Excerpts)²

Moscow, May 21, 1970

The consolidation of the United Arab Republic's defense is directed first of all at dampening the aggressor's eagerness to launch barbaric raids against civilian objectives in Arab countries and to commit evil acts against the peaceful Arab populations....

¹ English text in *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 22 (1013), (May 30, 1970), p. 7.

² *New York Times*, May 22, 1970, p. 9.

Tel Aviv and Western propaganda have started a loud campaign attacking the aid given by the Soviet Union to the United Arab Republic in the strengthening of its armed forces, struggling against Israeli aggression.

[Israel and her Western supporters are seeking] to attempt to allege that the strengthening by the Soviet Union of the United Arab Republic's defenses is a threat to Israel....

Meanwhile, the aims of the Middle East policy promoted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are well known. The consistent promotions of a line aimed at the speediest attainment of a political settlement in the Middle East, the rendering of all-around aid to victims of the Israeli aggression and the prevention of Israeli extremists from imposing from the positions of strength on Arab countries such a settlement of the Middle East crisis that would signify recognition of the aggressor's right to the seizure of Arab countries.

116

Statement by Deputy Premier Allon of Israel Threatening Reprisals Against Lebanon for a Commando Attack Near the Lebanese Border¹

Safad, May 22, 1970

The terrorists are boasting of their great victory. They succeeded in killing little ones, children on their way to school, their teachers and their driver. People throughout the world will now be able to grasp the moral values and the outlook of the terrorists. They are murderers, not freedom fighters. The Government of Lebanon, which has-tened to complain to the Security Council, bears the responsibility for this crime. Our national poet has already said that for the

blood of a little child the devil himself cannot devise vengeance.

Let the Government of Lebanon remember that the arm of the Israel Army is long and hard-hitting. Those who are responsible for this act will not be absolved of their guilt. Israel, its people, all the school-age population and all teachers are at one with the border settlements. The army will do what is necessary to ensure their life and safety.

117

Television Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Schumann of France on the Four Power Talks and the Military Situation in the Middle East²

Paris, May 22, 1970

Q. Moyen-Orient, Monsieur le Ministre, depuis hier, le président Nasser a admis officiellement qu'il avait des pilotes, des entraîneurs soviétiques sur des avions égyptiens, est-ce que cela modifie fondamentalement les données du problème, qu'est-ce que vous en pensez?

R. Ça n'était un secret pour personne. Il est bien évident que, là comme ailleurs, si les conditions de la négociation ne sont pas offertes et saisies, l'escalade, c'est-à-dire l'affrontement indirect et, dans ce cas peut-être à la limite, direct, un affrontement des grandes puissances, à travers un conflit local pourrait devenir inévitable. C'est la raison pour laquelle la France a proposé, vous le savez, il y a un an, la concertation des quatre.... Tel est l'objet de la concertation des quatre.

Q. Toujours la concertation...

R. Toujours la concertation, je vous remercie de cette interruption qui est à la fois, permettez-moi de le dire, un éloge, enfin je le prends comme tel et qui est surtout un

² Excerpted from Schumann's interview as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), pp. 168-169.

¹ *Israel Digest*, XIII, 11, (May 29, 1970), p. 1.

excellent résultat, c'est ce que j'essaie de vous dire et de vous expliquer.

Q. Et la concertation?

R. Alors justement, la concertation des quatre avait deux objets, nous verrons ensuite avec quels résultats... le premier objet, on ne le dira jamais assez, la reconnaissance du droit d'Israël à l'existence derrière des frontières sûres et garanties et le deuxième objet, c'est le retour d'Israël dans ses frontières d'avant-guerre, moyennant des garanties de paix. C'est la répudiation, appelons les choses par leur nom, de la tentative annexionniste.

Alors la concertation des quatre avait fait des progrès assez considérables, on peut dire que sur ces deux principes, il y avait un accord des quatre et il y a même un accord des deux grandes puissances, les Etats-Unis et l'U.R.S.S. Mais pour l'application et l'exécution de ces principes, il faut une atmosphère générale qui a été quelque peu compliquée et viciée par les récents développements de la situation, internationale ailleurs. Pourtant, je suis loin de désespérer, car j'ai le sentiment, pour ce qui est du Proche-Orient, que ni les Etats-Unis ni l'Union Soviétique ne sont résignés à l'escalade, en tout cas nous nous appliquerons à nourrir le dialogue.

118

**U.S. State Department Statement
Deploring Violence on the Israel-
Lebanon Border¹**

Washington, May 22, 1970

We are shocked by reports of the death of a number of children and adults in Israel as a result of an indiscriminate attack on a school-bus, for which a splinter group of

¹ Read to news correspondents by State Department press spokesman Carl Barch on May 22; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1615 (June 8, 1970), p. 713.

the *fedayeen* movement—and the splinter group is the General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—has claimed responsibility. We note the statement by Al Fatah, a major *fedayeen* organization, disassociating itself from this attack. Such acts of terror must be condemned by the world community, and we regret the Security Council did not address itself adequately to this aspect of the problem in its action 3 days ago.

We are also shocked by the reports of civilian deaths in Lebanon resulting from Israeli counteraction. This tragic cycle of violence demonstrates again the need for all concerned to take prompt and effective action to return the Lebanese-Israeli border to a state of tranquillity.

119

**Statement Issued by the Government of
Israel on Palestinian Commando
Attacks Near the Lebanese Border²**

May 23, 1970

The Government of Israel expresses its shock and horror at the murderous attack which was carried out from Lebanese territory this morning on a civilian bus which—daily and at a fixed hour—carried children and teachers to a school.

This murder of children, teachers and other innocent passengers was carried out in cold blood. The killers were fully aware of the target at which they directed their fatal shells. They have even expressed pride in the act, in their announcement broadcast this morning in Beirut.

Six children were killed in this attack, pupils of the first, second and third grades from Avivim settlement. Killed with them were four adults, including two teachers, and 21 other passengers of the bus were wounded, most of them children (another child and an adult died later).

² *Jerusalem Post*, May 24, 1970, p. 8.

The heart of every person in Israel is heavy with this tragedy, along with the stricken families. The people as a whole joins them in sorrow and mourning.

This outrage constitutes a new low in the series of murderous attacks which have emanated from Lebanese territory.

The Government of Lebanon bears full responsibility for this murder, as it does for the acts of sabotage, mining and murder which have previously been carried out from its territory. Under the auspices of the Egyptian Government—and with its approval—the Lebanese Government came to an agreement with the terrorists regarding the activities of the sabotage organizations from Lebanese territory. By means of this agreement, the Lebanese Government transformed that part of Lebanon which borders Israel into a permanent, active base of murderers.

Farmers, passersby, soldiers and civilians were turned into targets for homicide. The settlements of Kiryat Shmona, Sha'ar Yishuv, Dan, Dafna, Hagoshrim, Sa'ar, Kfar Giladi, Kfar Yuval, Beit Hillel, Manara, Margaliot, Avivim, Yiftah, Zeraim, Shtula, Hanita, Gesher Haziv and Metulla—all became targets for aggression from Lebanon.

It was not long ago that we buried the victims of Kiryat Shmona. Since January, more than 140 acts of aggression were carried out from Lebanon. Twenty of our citizens have fallen victim to this aggression, and 59 were wounded.

At the initiative of the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council was convened. Instead of condemning the murderers and the authorities which give them cover, it condemned us—for having exercised our right of self-defense.

The Arab states and the terrorist organizations thus interpreted this decision as the granting of immunity and encouragement to their activities. The act of murder carried out today proves that this was their interpretation of the Security Council resolution.

The opening of Lebanon's gates to the terrorists destroyed the quiet which had prevailed for 20 years on both sides of the

border, and which was to the advantage of both peoples. In those years, the citizens of both countries were able to till their fields side by side, on good terms.

The Government of Lebanon, instead of continuing and enhancing the quiet in the area and exercising its sovereignty and honouring its international obligations, lent its hand to the transformation of this area into a base of murderers.

Israel places full responsibility for the situation on the Government of Lebanon and will not cease to demand from Lebanon that it exercise its authority to halt the acts of aggression from its territory and fulfil its obligation in returning a state of quiet to the area.

So long as the Government of Lebanon relinquishes its responsibility for what is done from its territory, for the death which is spread from this territory on Israeli settlements and their inhabitants—the State of Israel will fulfill its obligation and will defend its cities, its villages, its roads and its citizens with all necessary means.

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Letter of Support from Premier Chou En-lai of China to Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Chairman Arafat¹

Peking, May 25, 1970

Yasser Arafat

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Spokesman for the Palestine National Liberation Movement

Your Excellency,

With the support of U.S. imperialism, Israel not long ago brazenly dispatched large numbers of troops to invade the southern part of Lebanon in a vain attempt to wipe out the Palestinian guerrillas. Together with the army men and people of Arab countries,

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 23 (June 5, 1970), p. 35.

the Palestinian guerrillas rose in resistance and repulsed the enemy's frenzied attacks, thus smashing the enemy's ignominious designs. Your victory has greatly heightened the morale of the revolutionary people and deflated the enemy's arrogance. We highly admire you for your revolutionary spirit of fearing no sacrifice and fighting valiantly and strongly condemn the U.S.-Israeli reactionaries for their new acts of aggression.

A new upsurge is now emerging in the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. imperialism. The revolutionary armed struggles waged by the Indo-Chinese people against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys are spreading rapidly and vigorously like a prairie fire, giving powerful support and encouragement to the Arab people and the people of the whole world in their struggles against imperialism. In the Middle East, tightening the noose round the neck of U.S. imperialism, you are dealing incessant blows at the U.S.-Israeli aggressors, and in so doing you on your part are giving powerful support and encouragement to the three Indo-Chinese peoples and the people of the whole world in their struggles against imperialism. The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao has recently issued the call: "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!" At present, the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world against U.S. imperialism are all developing vigorously, and within the United States a revolutionary mass movement is also being unfolded on an unprecedented scale. All this is fiercely pounding at the reactionary rule of U.S. imperialism. The day is not far off when U.S. imperialism and its running dogs will be buried.

Your Excellency, your struggle is just and has the support of the revolutionary people throughout the world. The Chinese Government and people consistently and unswervingly support your struggle. We will always stand together with you. We are firmly convinced that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples tempered through anti-

imperialist revolutionary struggles, persevering in unity and in protracted people's war, will surely overcome the difficulties on their road of advance, smash all plots and schemes of the enemy, defeat the aggressors and win complete victory.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Chou En-lai

Premier of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China

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Letter to U.S. Secretary of State Rogers from a Number of U.S. Senators Urging American Sales of Military Aircraft to Israel¹

Washington, May 26, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We feel compelled to express our sense of urgency respecting the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. The decision by the Soviet Union to undertake a direct military role in the Arab-Israel conflict by flying combat planes over Egypt represents, in our judgment, a significant change and a challenge to American strategic interests and a growing threat to world peace. Recent Soviet moves have encouraged Arab belligerence, and are creating a growing military imbalance in favor of the Arab states.

Your decision in March to hold in abeyance the sale of additional jet combat aircraft to Israel under the then prevailing conditions has failed to induce the Soviet Union to exercise reciprocal restraint with respect to the arming of the UAR and the other Arab states. In addition, the Soviet Union has taken the unprecedented step of overtly involving an increasing number of its own military personnel in a state far from its own borders.

We believe, Mr. Secretary, that the United

¹ *Congressional Record*, Senate, June 2, 1970, pp. 17808-17809.

States should now announce its intention to provide Israel with the aircraft so urgently needed for its defense. Such action will serve as a significant element of a credible response to the reckless Soviet escalation of the Middle East conflict. We feel that the strengthening of Israel's military posture at this time is the best guarantee against the outbreak of major hostilities.

We also suggest prompt consultations with our NATO allies because of the dangers posed to their own security and economies by the Soviet build-up in the Middle East. We urge the United States to redouble its efforts to reestablish the cease fire as a preliminary step to eventual peace negotiations.

We would be grateful for an early opportunity to meet with you at your convenience, so that we may have a full exchange of views on all aspects of the issue which we believe is warranted by the critical situation that has now developed.

Sincerely,

Kennedy, McGee, Ribicoff, Symington, Talmadge, Young of Ohio, Allen, Bayh, Bible, Burdick, Byrd of Virginia, Cannon, Church, Cranston, Dodd.

Eagleton, Gravel, Harris, Hart, Hartke, Holland, Hollings, Hughes, Inouye, Jackson, Magnuson, McGovern, McIntyre, Metcalf, Mondale.

Montoya, Moss, Muskie, Nelson, Pastore, Pell, Proxmire, Randolph, Spong, Tydings, Williams of New Jersey, Sparkman, Jordan of North Carolina, Yarborough, Stennis, Democrats.

Scott, Javits, Brooke, Dole, Gurney, Prouty, Schweiker, Packwood, Murphy, Goodell, Percy, Smith of Illinois, Boggs, Thurmond, Saxbe.

Tower, Goldwater, Mathias, Cooke, Bennett, Case, Hruska, Baker, Fannin, Stevens, Miller, Curtis, Fong, Republicans.

122

Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel on the Military Situation in the Middle East, U.S. and U.S.S.R. Policy, and on Israeli Settlement Terms (Condensed)¹

Jerusalem, May 26, 1970

Upon the opening of the Knesset session, I wish to review the security and political situation. In recent months, and especially in the past few weeks, there has been a serious deterioration in the security situation in our region, particularly on our southern front, the harmful effect of which is also felt on the other fronts.

The principal feature of the escalation and tension in the region is an advanced and dangerous stage in the Soviet involvement in Egypt at the service of Egyptian aggression and the violation of the ceasefire. This involvement, which has no precedent in the history of Soviet penetration into our region, is encouraging Egypt in her plan to renew the war of attrition as a stage in her road and in her ambition to vanquish Israel . . .

In many of his speeches, Nasser boasts that it is he who put an end to British power and the power subjugation of Egypt. But the very leader who promised his people complete independence and the end of subjugation by a foreign power, preferred to renew the dependence and subjugation of his country, only in order not to make peace with Israel and not even to observe the ceasefire . . .

From the words of Nasser himself, in his speech on May 1, 1970, it transpires that, only three days after Egypt responded to the Security Council's call for a cease-fire on June 9, 1967, the Soviets agreed to re-arm the Egyptian army, Nasser said: "On June 12—and now I can reveal it—I received a note from Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny, in which they promised to support the Arab nation and restore Egypt's armed forces,

¹ English translation in *New Middle East*, No. 22 (July 1970), pp. 46-49.

without any payment, to their pre-war level.

"Thus we were able to withstand and overcome our plight, and rehabilitate our armed forces anew."

Within the past three years the Soviet Union has supplied Egypt, Syria and Iraq with 2,000 tanks and 800 fighter aircraft, as well as other military equipment, to a total value of some 3.5 billion dollars, two-thirds to Egypt alone. These arms were supplied for practically no monetary recompense. As for Egypt, Nasser admitted it in his speech on May 1. Thousands of Soviet specialists engaged in training the Egyptian forces. In the course of events, it has transpired that Soviet advisers were guiding and instructing the Egyptian forces within the units and the bases even during actual battle.

It is hard to believe that in March 1969 Nasser would have dared to resume aggression on a large scale without the Soviet Union's authorisation. It is even harder to believe that in the months of May-June 1969 he would have announced the abrogation of the ceasefire without Soviet authorisation. Not only did the Soviet Union not employ its capacity to influence the Egyptian President to resume compliance with the ceasefire, she even encouraged him to step up his aggressive policy. A very conspicuous example of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to add its contribution to the resumption of peace may be seen in the fact that she rejected the US proposal, in mid-February 1970, for a joint appeal by the Four Powers to the parties in the region on the observance of the ceasefire.

The prevailing assumption has been that the Soviet Union does not want an all-out war in the region, in which her protégé, Egypt, will once more be defeated on the field of battle, and at the same time does not want a ceasefire as a state in the advance towards peace. The assumption was that the Soviet Union would prefer the continuation of an intermediate situation: frontier clashes, indecisive battles, continued tensions, which will allow her to exploit Egyptian

dependence to the full, in order to advance her penetration and her aims in the region. And by maintaining military and political pressure on Israel, the Soviet Union is striving to give Egypt what she asks without involving her in the danger of defeat and without an unnecessary peace.

Parallel to the encouragement of Nasser's warlike and aggressive policy, the Soviet Union has embarked upon an anti-Semitic propaganda campaign within her own borders and a venomous propaganda campaign against Israel through all communications media and on international forums....

In view of the failure of the war of attrition and in the light of Nasser's requests, the Soviets have decided to take a further step in increasing their involvement. At a time when in New York and Washington Soviet representatives were taking part in discussions with the representatives of the Western Powers on the renewal of the Jarring Mission and on a peace settlement, Soviet ships were sailing to Egypt, laden with cargoes of SA3 ground-to-air missiles, and thousands of Soviet experts were arriving in Egypt.

In December 1969 signs of entrenchments for use as bases for ground-to-air missiles could be discerned in the Canal Zone and other areas in Egypt.

According to our assessment, there are at this stage about 20 SA3 missile bases in the heart of Egypt.

In mid-April, Soviet involvement went one step further—the gravest step so far. It became clear that Soviet pilots, from bases at their disposal on Egyptian soil, had assumed the function of carrying out operational missions over wide areas in Egypt. With Soviet defensive coverage of the rear, the Egyptians renewed the artillery bombardments in the Canal Zone in April on a scale unparalleled since the aggression began in March 1969....

Thus the region has been flung into a new dimension of tension. The Soviet Union has added another very grave link to her chain of acts which are dragging the region into an escalation of warfare and killing,

and which foredoom to failure any progress towards peace....

As for Israel, the Government of Israel has already made it clear, within the framework of its basic policy to defend our existence and sovereignty under any conditions, that the Israel Defence Forces will continue to defend the ceasefire line on the southern as on other fronts, and will not permit it to be undermined or breached.

For this purpose, it is essential to prevent the deployment of the ground-to-air missile pads which the Egyptians are working to set up in the area close to the ceasefire line, for that is essential in order to defend our forces who are entrenched there to prevent the breaching of the front. No serious person will suspect Israel of wanting to provoke or being interested in provoking, Soviet pilots who have integrated with the Egyptian war machine, but no man in his senses will expect Israel to allow the Egyptian army to carry out its aggressive designs without the Israel Defence Forces using all its strength, with the utmost efficiency, to thwart these plans, even if factors outside the area are assisting in their execution.

As a result of these developments, our request for facilities to purchase the arms required for our defence has become more urgent and more vital. When we asked to be allowed to buy more aircraft from the United States, we based our request on the fact that enormous arms deliveries were flowing from the Soviet Union to Egypt free of charge....

I paid attention to what the President of the United States said at his press conference on May 8 about the ominous situation in the region, as reports had been received that Soviet pilots had been integrated into the air force of the UAR. He went on to say that the United States was following the situation, and if it became clear that the reports were true, and if the escalation continued, this would drastically shift the balance of power and make it necessary for the United States to re-evaluate its decision with regard to the supply of jets to Israel. President Nixon also said that the United States had already

made it perfectly clear that it is in the interests of peace in the Middle East, that no change be permitted in the balance of forces and the United States will abide by this obligation....

I need not say that I attach great importance to these statements, I must say with the utmost seriousness, that any delay in granting our request leaves unaltered the change for the worse which has taken place in the balance of power as a result of the new stage in Soviet involvement, with all the attendant dangers.

Since then there has been close and continuous contact between ourselves and the US authorities on this matter. Last week the Foreign Minister had talks with President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers. We have been told that the urgent and detailed survey mentioned by the President four weeks ago has not been completed: but the Foreign Minister has been told that the statements made by the US government on March 24 and May 8 about the balance of power remain fully valid.

In all our contacts, we have emphasised the importance of the time factor, for any delay in granting our request is liable to injure our interests and be interpreted by our enemies as encouragement of their aggression and by the Soviet Union as condonation of its intensified involvement. I find inconceivable that the United States will not carry out its declared undertaking.

In recent months, aggressive activity has increased on the other fronts as well. Nasser is trying to enhance the efficiency of the eastern front, and there is no doubt that Egypt's military policy has affected the situation on the other ceasefire fronts. This destructive effect is reflected not only in the operations of the terrorist organisations acting against Israel from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, but also in the military policy of the neighbouring governments and the disturbance of the internal balance in Jordan and Lebanon.

The terrorist organisation in Syria is, in fact, a section of the Syrian army, acting under government directives. In Jordan and

Lebanon the domination of the terrorist organisations has grown until it has become a threat to the existence and authority of the governments. In both countries, we have witnessed attempts by the Governments to reconcile two opposites: Their own governmental authority and the active existence of the terrorist organisations. Such attempts could meet with no more than a semblance of success. On a number of occasions the governments were about to confront the terrorist organisations, but recoiled from the attempt. . . .

In both countries the terrorists have been granted a recognised status which assures them freedom of action. The entire world knows of "The Cairo Agreement" between the terrorists and the Lebanese government, achieved through the mediation and under the auspices of the Egyptian government. Under this agreement, the terrorist organisations have been allowed to continue their activities openly in the regions allotted to them, in co-ordination with the Lebanese authorities and army, as well as in other regions along the border.

From the beginning of January until May 20 there were 1,100 enemy operations along the Jordanian front. On the Lebanese front, the Fatah and other organisations continued to entrench themselves along the entire length of the Israel-Lebanon frontier, which has recently become another focus of murderous activity.

In this region, there were 140 various incidents and incursions initiated by the terrorist organisations. . . . By accepting the Cairo agreement in November 1969, and allowing the establishment of terrorist bases in her territory, Lebanon has progressively been endangering her independence as Jordan had done before. Facing incessant provocations of the Arab terrorists from Lebanon, we retaliated a number of times against the Fatah bases. In view of the increasing cooperation between the Lebanese government and the terrorist organisations, the responsibility of the Lebanese government becomes increasingly evident. The Lebanese government cannot shrug off this

responsibility. We shall not cease to demand of that government that it use the power at its disposal to halt the acts of aggression from its territory and do its duty by restoring tranquility. . . .

The aspiration for peace is not only the central basis of our policy, but also the cornerstone of our creative way of life and effort in this country. Ever since the renewal of our independence, we have based all our settlement and other creative under-takings on the fundamental fact that we did not come to dispossess the Arab residents of the country, but to cooperate with them in peace and prosperity, to the benefit of all.

Let us remind ourselves and others: at the ceremony of the declaration of our statehood, while the murderous attack upon us was at its peak, we called upon the Arabs living in Israel "to keep the peace and to play their part in building the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its institutions, provisional and permanent."

We extended "the hand of peace and good-neighbourliness to all the States around us and to their peoples" and we called upon them "to cooperate in mutual helpfulness with the independent Jewish nation in its land in a concerted effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East"

The only way to permanent peace in our region and to the establishment of secure and recognised boundaries between us is through negotiations between ourselves, in the way all sovereign states behave to one another, in the same way as states do which recognise each other's right to existence and equality, in the way of free peoples, not protectorates enslaved to foreign powers or to the dark instincts of war, destruction and ruin.

To attain peace, I am ready to go at any hour to any place, to meet any authorised leader of any Arab state—to conduct negotiations with mutual respect, in equality and without preconditions, and with a clear recognition that the problems which are the subject of debate can be solved, for in the Middle East there is room for the fulfill-

ment of the national aspiration of all the Arab states and of Israel: that it is possible to hasten progress, development and cooperation amongst all nations, in place of barren bloodshed and wars without a solution.

The absence of peace in our region does not arise from lack of willingness on our part: it is the inevitable outcome of the refusal of the rulers of the Arab states to make peace with Israel. This refusal to conclude peace with us is still a result of their refusal to reconcile themselves to the very existence of our State within secure and recognised boundaries, and a fruit of the hope, which still flickers in their hearts, that they will achieve the destruction of the Jewish state.

This situation has persisted since 1948, since before the issue of the territories had arisen as a result of the Six Day War. Nor is the absence of peace the result of an alleged lack of "flexibility" on our part, nor of what is called the "rigidity" of our position.

Our position is: ceasefire, agreement and peace. The position of the Arab governments is: no ceasefire, no negotiation, no agreement and no peace. Which of these two positions is stubborn and inflexible? Ours or that of the Arab governments?

Some claim, among them the Arabs, that we have not accepted the United Nations Resolution of November 22 1967, whereas they have. In point of fact, the Arabs only accepted the UN Resolution according to their own distorted and mutilated interpretation. They interpreted it as meaning an immediate and total withdrawal of our forces, with no obligation to peace. They were prepared to agree to a total Israeli withdrawal, while the Resolution stipulates nothing of the kind.

The UN Resolution, according to its text and to statements made by its compilers, is not self-implementing. The operative clause in the Resolution calls for the appointment of an envoy, acting on behalf of the Secretary-General, whose task would be "to establish and maintain contact with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accord-

ance with the provisions and principles in this Resolution." Through her Ambassador at the United Nations, Israel announced on May 1, 1968 that "in declarations and statements made publicly and to Ambassador Jarring, the Israel Government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council's Resolution for the promotion of an agreement to establish a just and durable peace."

I am authorised to reaffirm that we are willing to seek an agreement with each Arab state, on all the matters included in that Resolution. More recently, we have accepted Ambassador Jarring's proposal to arrange meetings between Israel and each of her neighbours, under his auspices, and in fulfillment of his mandate under the guidelines of the Resolution to advance a peace agreement. No Arab state has yet accepted that proposal. . . .

Another argument is heard: That by the creation of facts on the ground we are laying down irrevocable conditions which render negotiations superfluous and make it more difficult to enter into negotiations. This allegation is also totally incorrect and without foundation. The refusal of the Arab states to enter into negotiations with us is an extension of the inconsistent policy which they have pursued for many years. It goes back to before the Six Day War, i.e. before there were any settlements in the territories.

As I have already stated, also after the Six Day War, we said—and we left no room for doubt—that we are prepared to enter into negotiations with our neighbours with no pre-conditions from either side. This willingness does not mean that we have no opinions, thoughts or demands, or that we shall not use our right to voice them in the discussions, as our Arab neighbours are also entitled to do. Nasser and Husain, for example, in their official replies to Dr Jarring stated that they see the partition borders of 1947 as constituting definitive frontiers.

It is superfluous to state our attitude to that answer, but we do not impose the condition that at the time of negotiations

with us they will be denied the right to make any proposal they think fit, just as they are not entitled to invalidate from the outset our right to express in the discussions thoughts or proposals which we decide upon. And there certainly is no moral or political basis for the demand that we must refrain from any constructive act in the territories, even though the Arab governments deny the demand for peace and prepare for war.

There is also another argument related to our demand for direct negotiations. This argument is also devoid of foundation in the annals of international relations and of the relations between us and our neighbours. For we did sit face-to-face with the representatives of the Arab states, at the time of the negotiations in Rhodes, and no-one is entitled to claim that Arab honour was thereby affronted. There is no precedent where a conflict between nations was brought to a solution without direct negotiations between them. On the plane of the conflict between the Arabs and Israel, the issue of direct negotiation touches upon the heart of the matter. For the objective is to achieve peace and coexistence, and how will our neighbours be able to live with us in peace if they refuse to speak with us at all.

From the beginning of the conversations with Jarring, we agreed that the face-to-face discussions should take place under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General's representative. During 1968 Dr. Jarring tried to convene the parties under his chairmanship in a neutral place. In March 1968, he proposed to us that we meet with Egypt and Jordan in Nicosia. We agreed, but the Arabs rejected the offer. During the same year, and again in September 1969, we expressed our agreement to the proposal that the meetings should take place in the manner of the Rhodes talks, which comprised both face-to-face talks and also indirect talks. A number of times in the past, there was an impression that the agreement of the Arabs and the Soviets to this proposal had been received, but in the end both of them went back on it. . . .

I am convinced that the view that the use of the word "withdrawal" will pave the road to peace is artificial and utopian.

True, those among us who believe for some reason that that is the magic word which is likely to bring us closer to peace—mean withdrawal, after peace is achieved, to secure and agreed boundaries laid down as a result of a peace agreement. On the other hand, when the Arab and Soviet leaders talk of "withdrawal", they demand complete and immediate retreat from all the territories, including Jerusalem, without the establishment of a true peace and without an agreement on new permanent borders, but with an addendum calling for Israel's agreement to take back all the refugees. Israel's policy is clear and we shall continue to clarify it at every suitable opportunity, as we have done from the United Nations rostrum and on other occasions. No one who is devoted to truth could misinterpret our policy that when we talk of secure and recognised boundaries we do not mean that the disposition of the Israel Defence Forces, after the establishment of peace, should be beyond the boundaries agreed upon in negotiations with our neighbours. No one could mistake our policy that Israel desires secure and recognised boundaries with her neighbours. . . .

Unless the fundamental Arab approach changes no formulae, sophistry, and definitions will avail. Those in the world who seek peace would do well if they heeded this basic fact and helped to bring about a change in the fundamental Arab approach, which constitutes the obstacle to peace. Any display of "understanding" and forgiveness, however unintentional, is bound to harden the Arabs in their recalcitrance and encourage them in denying Israel's right to exist. Moreover: displays of "understanding" and forgiveness are exploited by Arab leaders for ideological justification of the continuation of the war against Israel. . . .

The victories we have won have never intoxicated us or filled us with complacency to the extent of making us give up the desire and demand for peace—a peace that means

good neighbourly relations, cooperation and an end to slaughter. Peace and cooperation with the Arab nations has been, and is, one of the fundamentals of the Hebrew Renaissance Movement, and generations of the Zionist Movement were brought up on this desire. The desire for peace has guided the policy of all governments, in all their different compositions. No Israeli government, ever in power, however constituted, has ever been an obstacle to peace....

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Communiqué Issued by NATO Ministerial Council (Excerpt)¹

Rome, May 27, 1970

5) The ministers recalled their earlier declarations concerning the situation in the Mediterranean. They examined and approved a report on this subject prepared by the council in permanent session in accordance with the request which had been presented to it at the session of December 1969. Having considered the conclusions presented in this report, the ministers judged that they had cause to express once more the anxiety they feel at the situation in this region: they emphasised once again the importance of frequent and in-depth consultations among the allies on this question, as well as the necessity for maintaining constant vigilance. They charged the council in permanent session to continue to examine closely the development of the situation in the Mediterranean and to prepare them a detailed report on this subject.

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Statement Issued by U.S.S.R. News Agency TASS Commenting on Israeli Raids on Lebanon²

Moscow, May 30, 1970

For over two weeks the Israeli military has almost incessantly been staging armed provocations on the southern frontier of the Lebanon. Armoured troops and infantry are being used in these provocations. Supported by aircraft and artillery, they are invading the territory of the Lebanese Republic. Grossly violating the Lebanon's state sovereignty, Israeli troops are carrying out operations on Lebanese territory with the result that the number of casualties among the peaceful population of the southern regions of the Lebanon is growing, many houses are destroyed and other material damage done. Residents of these areas are forced to leave their native abodes. The present government of Israel with provocative cynicism have declared their "right" to such aggressive acts against the Arab countries in the spirit of colonialist traditions.

To justify all these armed provocations the Israeli rulers, as usual, refer to some "threat to Israel's security". In fact, the actions of the Israeli military are spearheaded against the territorial integrity of the Lebanon. Israel does not conceal the fact that it is trying to force the Lebanon to leave the all-Arab front and to isolate it from the rest of the Arab world. Hence, Israel's aggressive actions are spearheaded not only against the Lebanon, but against all Arab states, against all Arabs, against peace. It is no accident that these actions are righteously regarded throughout the world as premeditated acts, aimed at the further aggravation of the situation in the Middle East.

Ignoring the decision of the Security Council on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories, occupied in June

¹ Translated from the French text in *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester, p. 170.

² English text in *Moscow News*, No. 23 (1014), (June 6, 1970), p. 5.

1967, and relying on the support of foreign imperialist circles, Israel hopes not only to consolidate its positions in the occupied territories, but also to extend the occupation to the southern areas of the Lebanon.

These piratic actions of Israel once again convincingly show that Israeli ruling circles, intoxicated to blindness by chauvinism, strive for new territorial gains, not for peace in the Middle East, as they assert. They seek expansion at the expense of other countries and peoples.

The growing tension in the Middle East, as a result of the reckless actions of Israel, is being resolutely condemned in the Soviet Union. To establish peace in the Middle East, it is necessary to force Israel to respect the United Nations Charter, to end its armed provocations, withdraw its troops from all the occupied Arab lands, fulfil the Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967, and other decisions taken by the United Nations. It is high time for Israeli ruling circles to realize that continuation of the adventuristic line in politics is fraught with dangerous consequences, first of all for Israel itself.

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Statement by an Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denying U.S.S.R. Charges Concerning Israeli Raids on Lebanon¹

Jerusalem, May 31, 1970

This communiqué is typical of the line taken by the Soviet Union in its policies and propaganda. It completely ignores the activities of the terrorist organizations from Lebanese territory and expresses no regret for their deliberate murder of children and villagers. On the contrary, it blames Israeli aggression.

According to Soviet doctrine, an ally

who acts as an aggressor becomes a victim, and the one attacked, if he is an enemy, is treated as the aggressor.

The Soviets make themselves out to be Lebanon's protectors against a non-existent danger. Israel has no intention of attacking the territorial and political integrity of Lebanon. It has many times declared its wish to live in peace with Lebanon on the present borders. The Russians, who should support this line of conduct, prefer to add fuel to the flames in order to increase tension between the two countries.

126

French Radio and Television Interview Statements by the Shah of Iran on Iranian Policy Towards the Middle East Conflict²

late May 1970

Q. I think we can now discuss the Middle East conflict. Would Your Majesty state Iran's policy, as a Muslim country with historical ties with the Islamic world, towards Egypt, Syria and Jordan which are the main parties in the Arab Middle East conflict?

A. As you know, Iran is a Muslim country and as such we naturally have friendly feelings towards our Arab brothers. In addition, our policy and philosophy involve another principle, on the basis of which we believe that one cannot accept occupation of one country's territory by another country's forces in the world today. Accepting this in one case will lead to accepting it in other cases, as well. Thus, in addition to religious sentiments, we believe as our political doctrine that annexation of other territories by force must not be accepted. On the other

¹ Translated from the French text in *Le Monde*, June 2, 1970, p. 3.

² Excerpts broadcast on Teheran Home Service in Persian, May 27, 1970; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3391/D/1 and D/2; reprinted by permission.

hand, the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967 reflects all these principles. The resolution is not just a legal point, for it also contains several recommendations. We firmly support the resolution.

I should like to be open about our relations with Egypt—which, of course, are not very promising—and those with Syria—which in turn are not all that promising and friendly.

Our relations with Jordan, however, are of a different kind. We have always had fraternal relations with the Jordanian people and Government and I should like to emphasise this.

For the Egyptian people, we of course, have nothing but friendly feelings. The Egyptian people are now going through a difficult time. About the Egyptian Government, however, I think it is gradually changing its views about us. They know well that Iran's friendship is far more valuable to Egypt than the opposite.

The situation is different with regard to Syria. Certain statements are occasionally issued there that astonish us. In this manner the Syrians are trying to find themselves a place in Persian Gulf affairs. They even go so far as to speak about the Arab character of some of our provinces. How can one expect Iran to try to resume its ties with them while they persist in their attitude? Nevertheless, they still have a *chargé d'affaires* in Iran and our relations with them have not been completely broken off. It is necessary, of course, for them to open their eyes, concentrate on realities and avoid the illusion that they can interfere in the affairs of others with impunity. We—that is, the countries described as moderates or tranquil—shall not easily give in to other people's insults. I think that had we warned them from the outset that we would not tolerate their impertinent attitude, the situation would not have come to its present stage.

Q. Might I ask Your Majesty about Iran's relations with Israel, a country whose relations with Iran seem to be more normal than Iran's

relations with some of its fraternal countries?

A. These relations you describe as normal are not yet all that normal because we do not have an embassy in Israel or an ambassador there. We have given Israel only *de facto*, not *de jure*, recognition because we believe that Israel merely exists as a State. This is a fact everyone accepts. In its 22nd November 1967 resolution the UN (? recognised) Israel's right to exist—and in conditions of security. We subscribe to that as well. We recognise all these rights and openly believe in this attitude. Our advice to Israel is that it should accept the 22nd November 1967 Security Council resolution and particularly the principle of withdrawing from the occupied Arab territories, because this will be in Israel's interest. We, like some others, believe that time is not on Israel's side.

[Asked whether there have been any opportunities for him to give such advice to Israel and whether Iran could mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is also a matter of concern to Iran, the Shah said]: It is easy to exchange views between Governments. We could even discuss our views with communist China, with whom we have no relations at all. This would be very easy. It should be borne in mind, however, that in our official statements and through our diplomatic channels we have always pointed out that Israel should accept the Security Council resolution. Whether we are able to help restore peace in the Arab Middle East is a little difficult to comment on. The situation must first progress to a favourable stage. Moreover we must be requested to mediate in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Letters from Member of U.K. Parliament Rose to Northern Ireland Leader and M.P. Devlin Attacking Her Support for Palestinians¹

London, late May 1970

Dear Bernadette,

I have just been phoned by an angry student alleging that you are speaking at an anti-Israel meeting this weekend. I hope this is not true but if it is I can only say that it will be an example of unsurpassed irresponsibility.

As 200 members of the Parliamentary Labour Party are supporters of Labour Friends of Israel including such people as Kevin McNamara and Maurice Miller, and most of Ireland's sympathisers are also sympathetic toward Israel for exactly the same reasons, I just cannot understand it.

I for one would have to challenge you to a public debate on the subject. If necessary in your own constituency.

I address an Irish meeting on Sunday and could not remain silent. I shall also be in Ireland for ten days at Whit, and am bound to be questioned about this. I do not want to see a split on Ireland—as happened over Vietnam last week when several abstained because of failure to condemn Arab action in the Middle East.

But if you wish to enter the public arena on the side of racialism, feudal sheikhs and military dictators against a democratic socialist state with a history so much similar to the tragic history of Ireland, then you put yourself on the same level as the anti-semites in the Soviet Union and the National Front.

You would destroy your image and make it impossible for me and others to give you any support. I pray that you will not betray a people whose fate has been so much akin to your own.

PAUL

Dear Bernadette,

I am thoroughly disgusted that a personal letter to you intended to save you from making a complete idiot of yourself should have been used by your friends unscrupulously at Trafalgar Square. They lied in saying what they did and your own conduct shows that you cannot be trusted by those who only sought to be your friends.

I have received dozens of phone calls every day by students outraged at your support for those who wish to murder 2½ million people. If it gives you satisfaction to support the ex-Nazis in Cairo and the lies of Hitler then you may do so. But you cannot expect me to sit idly by any more than those who defended Bogside could do so.

The Dublin Post Office and the Warsaw Ghetto, the June war that saved Israel from destruction and your own struggle are identical. Your action can only give satisfaction to the racialists.

Both Arabs and Jews have their right to self determination but the slogan carried at your meeting was "Victory and no compromise". At the same time a group of genuine left wingers held a meeting for "Jewish-Arab co-existence". In the light of what you know about Ulster which slogan commends itself to you?

Last night at the University of Ireland Club I had the pleasure of supporting Austin Currie, who was active in the civil rights movement long before you came to sabotage it. How I regret that he was not selected for Mid-Ulster.

PAUL

¹ *Free Palestine* (London), III, 1 (June 1970), p. 3.

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Letter from Northern Ireland Leader and Member of U.K. Parliament Devlin Replying to Letters from M.P. Rose Attacking Her Support for Palestinians (Excerpt)¹

London, late May 1970

I have just received the second of your two letters regarding my decision to speak at a Palestinian rally in London. Let me say first that I regard your writing to me in the terms that you do as being totally reprehensible.

You suggest that you will be forced to withdraw your support for the people of Ireland if I do not support your position on the Middle East question. This suggests to me that there is but scant principle behind your support for Ireland. I suggest to you that it would have been preferable if you had sought to use rational arguments to convince me that you are right and I am wrong instead of making veiled accusations against me of racialism and of support for Nazis and the lies of Hitler—accusations which you know perfectly well you cannot substantiate.

I do feel that the original decision to set up the Jewish state was mistaken and bound to lead to trouble. I would remind you of the remarks of Sir Ronald Storrs, the first British military governor of Jerusalem, that the idea behind the Balfour Declaration was to set up a "Jewish Ulster" in the midst of the hostile Arab world.

Indeed the treatment of the Arab population by the Israeli government, concerned at the natural increase of the Arab population, is strikingly similar to that of the Catholic population of Northern Ireland by the Unionist government in that they seek to make life difficult for the Arab inhabitants so that they become "voluntary" refugees. My own aim for the area would be the establishment of a democratic secular state embracing the whole of Palestine without discrimination or privilege in relation to any group on the basis of race or religion,

guaranteeing in the words of the 1916 Proclamation "equal rights and equal opportunities for all its citizens."

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Statement on the Middle East in an Address by Secretary of State for External Affairs Sharp of Canada²

Bucharest, June 3, 1970

There are, of course, other international matters which are of great concern to both our countries, and on which it is important to maintain an exchange of views. No one here needs to be reminded that the world situation in which we find ourselves is, unfortunately, marked by bloodshed and by the threat of a wider conflagration. I need refer only to the situation in the Middle East. I visited this area last autumn and, following conversations with Israeli and Arab leaders, came away more convinced than ever that the only way to achieve a real solution to the problems in the Middle East would be for both sides to moderate considerably their maximum positions. There is no evidence that any such moderating process has since occurred; if anything, an even more dangerous level of tension has developed. Canada's concern that some means should be found to move toward an accepted peace settlement on the basis of the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 has been emphasized to the parties, most recently when the Foreign Minister of Israel visited Ottawa several weeks ago.

² Excerpted from Sharp's address to the Association of International Law and International Relations as published in *Statements and Speeches* (Canada) (Ottawa: Information Division, Department of External Affairs, 1970), No. No. 70/9, p. 5.

¹ *Free Palestine* (London), III, 1 (June 1970), p. 3.

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Speech by G.D.R. Secretary of State and Acting Foreign Minister Florin at a Dinner Honoring Arab Envoys to East Germany¹

Berlin, June 3, 1970

Our friendly meeting is held immediately before the third anniversary of the Israeli imperialist aggression of 5 June 1967. On this day I should like to reassure you of the firm determination of the German Democratic Republic to support the just cause of the Arab states and peoples to the best of its abilities.

In the course of the three years which have passed since Israel's perfidious imperialist aggression of 5 June 1967 against the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan, the Arab peoples have strengthened their defensive power, extended the national and social achievements made as a result of their decade-long liberation struggle and defended them against the continued attacks of imperialism. They have proved that the revolutionary power of the peoples is stronger than all efforts of imperialism to restore its old positions.

Imperialism and its satellites feel an impotent rage over the further changing of the relationship of forces in the world in favour of the forces of socialism, national liberation, peace and progress. The struggle of our peoples has helped to bring about this change. We are witnessing the grown adventurous aggressiveness of imperialism. The USA have escalated their aggression against the peoples of Indochina and the reactionary ruling circles of Israel aggravate the situation in the Middle East. Israel continues to an increased extent the annexation of the occupied Arab territories, plunders them and suppresses the Arab people living there. World public opinion is trampled under foot by leading Israeli politicians. They follow the clear—though unattainable—objective of forcing the Arab peoples to give up the

progressive road of development the latter have embarked on.

Israel can carry out this aggressive policy only because it gets direct and extensive political, military and economic help from its main allies, the USA and West Germany. In this regard, West German imperialism is pursuing its own aggressive objectives. Only recently the West German Foreign Minister described the Federal Republic as a "Mediterranean neighbour" in a manner which for one century has been so typical of the great-power chauvinism of German imperialism. Such statements remind us of the sinister policy of expansion and aggression pursued by German imperialism in the past, of the Agadir incident and the Morocco crisis, the imperialist policy of the Baghdad Railway, of two world wars started by the German imperialists, which events demanded heavy sacrifices also from the peoples of the Middle East and the Mediterranean area. These historical parallels show the close connection between the struggle against imperialism in Europe, the Middle East, in Asia and other parts of the world, on the one hand, and underline, on the other, the need for a further strengthening of the alliance between our peoples and all anti-imperialist forces of peace in the world.

We can therefore state with special satisfaction that a close relationship of confidence and solidarity has developed between the GDR and the Arab peoples, which reached a significant climax one year ago with the establishment of diplomatic relations with five Arab states. The recent establishment of diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria is another successful step on the road to the tightening of friendship and cooperation between our peoples and states.

Especially during the International Week of Solidarity with the Arab Peoples the close alliance of the citizens of the GDR with the Arab peoples' just struggle against aggression and war, for the defence and consolidation of their national and social achievements has again become clearly visible. The call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal

¹ English text in *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (G.D.R.), X, 18 (June 25, 1970), p. 143.

of the Israeli troops of occupation from the occupied Arab territories, for a settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the United Nations Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, for the respect of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to self-determination, has been raised most energetically throughout the GDR these days. At the same time the imperialist conspiracy between Washington, Bonn and Tel Aviv is denounced and condemned most strongly. The Arab peoples and the people of the GDR have common enemies and common friends.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. to France (Excerpts)¹

June 5, 1970

Sur l'invitation du gouvernement français, M. A. A. Gromyko, ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'U.R.S.S., a fait en France une visite officielle du 1^{er} au 5 juin 1970.

Au cours de son séjour à Paris, M. A. A. Gromyko a été reçu par M. Georges Pompidou, président de la République française, par M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Premier ministre. Il a eu un entretien avec le ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'U.R.S.S. a eu des entretiens avec M. Maurice Schumann, ministre français des Affaires étrangères.

Les entretiens, qui se sont déroulés dans une atmosphère amicale et de compréhension mutuelle, ont porté sur les questions relatives à la coopération franco-soviétique ainsi que sur les principaux problèmes internationaux.

Conscientes des dangers que comporte l'aggravation de la situation au Moyen-Orient, les deux parties ont confirmé qu'elles étaient pleinement d'accord sur la nécessité de parvenir au plus tôt à un règlement politique dans cette région sur la base de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité du 22 novembre 1967 dans toutes ses dispositions. Elles estiment qu'une paix juste et durable doit être fondée aussi bien sur l'évacuation par Israël de tous les territoires occupés, que sur l'engagement de tous les pays intéressés de reconnaître mutuellement la souveraineté, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de chacun d'eux.

Les deux parties ont reconnu que les Quatre ont un rôle essentiel à jouer dans l'élaboration d'un tel règlement et qu'ils doivent donc redoubler d'efforts pour aboutir d'urgence à un accord entre eux de nature à permettre à M. Jarring, représentant spécial du secrétaire général de l'O.N.U., de reprendre sa mission.

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Television Interview Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East and American Policy²

June 7, 1970

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Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, on another subject: You left a group of Senators with the impression the other day that the administration would soon decide to sell jets to Israel. Is that true?

Secretary Rogers: That's true.

Kalb: Could you put a time frame on that? Are we now talking about weeks?

¹ *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), pp. 176-177.

² Excerpted from Rogers' interview broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System radio and television program "Face the Nation"; transcript printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXII, 1618 (June 29, 1970), pp. 789-792.

Rogers: I wouldn't think it would take that long, Mr. Kalb. We are in the process of making a decision about whether we sell additional jets to Israel and in what form we do that, how we announce it—we would expect it would be fairly soon. I wouldn't want to put a time limit; I think it would be before a few weeks.

Kalb: And how dangerous do you regard—does the American Government regard the operational nature of Soviet military involvement now in Egypt?

Rogers: Well, we regard the Soviet presence in Egypt as a serious matter. It's a new element. It's a new element in the sense that they have introduced more pilots in Egypt than they had before. They have these air-to-surface missile sites, SA-3's, which are manned by the Russian personnel, and they are actually flying planes in some patterns that would suggest operational patterns. Now, those are very, very serious matters. And we consider them seriously. And we've advised the Soviet Union that we consider these to be matters of concern to our Government. We would hope that the Soviet Union responds favorably to discussions we've had and that they desist from these operational flights and that they do not inject any further Russian personnel into the area. We don't know what their response is going to be. They say that what they have done is defensive in nature, but it is a serious matter, one that we have under study now, and I hope that we will have a decision before long.

Mr. Herman: Do you consider the Tass dispatch today to be a partial answer, or a preliminary answer? Tass said, as I understood them, that they were referring not to Government pressure but to American press pressure on the Soviets to withdraw from Egypt, and they said this method has never worked and it's an unpleasant method and we reject it, and so forth and so on. Do you think that this is a harbinger of the likely Soviet Government answer?

Rogers: Well, I suppose it reflects their views at the moment. Anything in Tass naturally does. It doesn't—

Herman: Did you get any other feeling or any other reaction when you talked to Ambassador Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States] or any of the other officials?

Rogers: Well, I'm not sure. I think it's very difficult to tell whether the Russians are satisfied to leave the situation in its present unsatisfactory state and thereby gain influence in the Arab world or whether they would like to work out a peaceful settlement. Certainly, as far as we're concerned, we're going to do everything we can in the next few weeks to try to get negotiations started, because it's a sad situation. These are nations that would have a very bright future, all of them, if they could settle these problems. And they are not insoluble at all. But there is so much emotion and so much hatred in the area—it's very difficult to get people to talk about these problems sensibly. And of course the only nation that is gaining is the Soviet Union.

Mr. Bailey: Mr. Secretary, I get the impression from your remarks that the basic decision—that is, to sell the airplanes to the Israelis—has been made and that it's a question of timing in the means and method, and so on, that remains to be settled.

Rogers: Well, I wouldn't want to say that exactly. I would like to say, though, that what we want to do is to make it clear to Israel that our policy has not changed. It's in our best interest to be sure that Israel survives as a nation. That's been our policy, and that will continue to be our policy. So we have to take whatever action we think is necessary to give them the assurance that they need that their independence and sovereignty is going to continue. At the same time, we want to do it in a balanced and measured way so that we don't signal to the Arabs that we are so behind Israel that we'll support them in no matter what they do. The reason for that is that we want to keep the door open for negotiations and we think that it's just possible—just possible—that you could get negotiations started and it's just possible that this could result in a settlement some-

where along the line. This has been going on for 20 years, and we just hope that we can do everything as a nation to get the parties to settle this tragic conflict.

Kalb: *Aren't we in fact further from a negotiated end to this conflict, Mr. Secretary, now than we were when you came out with your own ideas on a solution last December?*

Rogers: Well, I wouldn't say that we're any further away. I'd say that we're about the same, but it's possible that both sides might come to the conclusion that *this* is a good time to settle. For one thing, I think Israel is concerned about what has happened. They are losing people. They realize that they are surrounded by hostile nations that have got a much greater population. It may well be that Israel—I mean Egypt—is concerned about the Soviet presence. They know about the doctrine of limited sovereignty, and the other Arab nations know about it; so it may well be that the frame of mind is such that they want to talk about a settlement.

Herman: *Do you plan some new initiative to take advantage of this concern on both sides?*

Rogers: Yes, as a matter of fact we do. We're going to do everything we can to get negotiations started, and we plan to take some initiatives in the next 2 or 3 weeks.

Herman: *We have about 30 seconds. In the time that is remaining, can you assess Cambodia on one hand, Russians in Egypt on the other hand, and tell us how our relations with the Soviet Union are at the moment—are we easing in tensions or are we getting tighter?*

Rogers: Well, I don't think that you can generalize. I think in the case of the SALT [strategic arms limitation] talks the relations are quite good, and I look on those rather optimistically. On the Middle East, I'm not so optimistic. On the whole, our relations with the Soviet Union are quite good. We have sensible discussions, and I would hope that they would continue.

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Letter to U.S. President Nixon from a Number of U.S. Congressmen Urging the Immediate Supply of Military Aircraft to Israel¹

Washington, June 10, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

It is clear to us that the moment has arrived for the United States to taken firm action to meet the present danger posed by the involvement of the Soviet Union military forces in the Middle East. In the face of this threat, we believe that it is urgent that our government provide Israel with additional supersonic jet planes to enable her to deter aggression against her.

It is public knowledge that the Soviet-Arab aircraft strength is now four times the strength of that of Israel and that the presence of Soviet fliers and technicians may adversely affect Israel's heretofore qualitative advantage.

The Congress is vitally concerned with the threat of Soviet presence in the Middle East, as evidenced by the number of signatories hereto, and by the letter sent to the Secretary of State which was signed by over seventy Senators, urging the immediate sale of these planes so vital to the preservation of the balance and peace in the Middle East.

Respectfully yours,

Abbit, Addabbo, Albert, Anderson (Calif.), Anderson (Ill.), Anderson (Tenn.), Annunzio, Ashley.

Baring, Barrett, Beall, Bell, Beville, Biaggi, Biester, Bingham, Blatnik, Boggs, Bolling, Brasco, Brinkley, Brock, Broomfield, Brown (Ohio), Broyhill (Va.), Buchanan, Burke (Fla.), Burton (Calif.), Bush, Button, Byrne.

Camp, Carey, Casey, Celler, Chappell, Clark, Clausen, Clawson, Cleveland, Co-helan, Conable, Conte, Conyers, Corbett, Corman, Coughlin, Cramer, Crane.

Daddario, Daniel, Daniels, Davis (Ga.), Delaney, Denney, Dent, Derwinski, Devine,

¹ *Congressional Record* (June 10, 1970), p. E5456. Names of signers as of June 24 as reported in *Near East Report*, XIV, 13 (June 24, 1970), p. 126.

Diggs, Dingell, Donohue, Dorn, Downing, Dulski, Duncan, Dwyer.

Eckhardt, Edwards (Calif.), Edwards (Ala.), Eilberg.

Fallon, Farbstein, Fascell, Feighan, Fish, Fisher, Flood, Flowers, Foley, Ford, Gerald R. (Mich.), Fraser, Friedel, Fulton (Pa.), Fulton (Tenn.), Fuqua.

Gallagher, Garmatz, Giaimo, Gibbons, Gilbert, Goldwater, Green (Oreg.), Green (Pa.), Grover, Gubser, Gude.

Hagan, Haley, Halpern, Hanley, Hansen (Idaho), Harrington, Harsha, Hastings, Hawkins, Hays, Heckler, Helstoski, Henderson, Hicks, Hogan, Holifield, Horton, Hosmer, Howard, Hull.

Karth, Kee, Keith, King, Koch, Kuykendall, Kyros.

Latta, Leggett, Lennon, Long (Md.), Long (La.), Lowenstein, Lujan.

McCarthy, McClory, McCloskey, McCormack, McCulloch, McFall, McKneally, Macdonald (Mass.), MacGregor, Madden, Mailliard, May, Michel, Mikva, Miller (Calif.), Minish, Monagan, Moorhead, Morgan, Morse, Morton, Moss, Murphy (N.Y.), Murphy (Ill.).

Nix, O'Hara, Ottinger.

Patten, Pelly, Pepper, Pettis, Philbin, Pike, Pirnie, Podell, Preyer, Price (Ill.), Pucinski.

Railsback, Randall, Rees, Reifel, Reuss, Rhodes, Riegle, Rodino, Rogers (Colo.), Rogers (Fla.), Rooney (Pa.), Rooney (N.Y.), Rosenthal, Roth, Roubenush, Roybal, Ryan.

St Germain, Sandman, Satterfield, Scheuer, Schneebeli, Shriver, Sikes, Sisk, Stanton, Steiger (Wis.), Stokes, Stratton, Stubblefield, Symington.

Taft, Taylor, Thompson (Ga.), Thomson (Wis.), Tunney.

Udall, Van Deerlin, Vanik, Vigorito.

Waggoner, Waldie, Watkins, Whalley, Williams, Wilson (Bob), Wilson (Charles), Winn, Wolff, Wright, Wyatt, Wydler, Yates, Zion.

In addition, there were 17 who did not sign the leadership letter but who joined in the earlier communication:

Boland, Brademas, Burke (Mass.), Bur-

ton(Utah), Clay, Griffiths, Hathaway, McDade, Meskill, Molloyhan, O'Neill (Mass.), Pollock, Reid (N.Y.), Thompson (N.J.), Weicker, Whitehurst, Yatron.

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U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda Commentary on U.S. Policy and the Situation in Jordan (Condensed)¹

Moscow, June 12, 1970

Blood has been shed in Jordan. Intense fighting has broken out between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian guerrillas; the fighting has claimed large numbers of victims....

What is behind the present events in Jordan?

I recall one of my meetings with a head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization: Yasir Arafat, the leader of Al Fatah, which is the largest and most influential of the groups that make up this organization. About a year ago, at one of the partisan bases inside Jordan, he discussed the outlook for relations with King Hussein and the country's leadership: "We know the dangerous consequences that could result from a clash between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinians. We understand full well that such clashes could put the American politicians who are supporting the Israeli elite in a position of holding unlosable cards. Why unlosable? Because if the anti-Palestinian side were to win in such a clash, one of the leading forces in the armed struggle against the Israeli occupiers would be weakened. Were we to come out on top in such a clash," continued Yasir Arafat, "there is every reason to believe that the U.S.A. and Israel would exploit such a change in the alignment of forces in Amman as a pretext for Israeli occupation of the Jordanian capital."

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 24 (July 14, 1970), p. 17. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

A representative of Al Fatah, commenting on the latest events in Jordan over Al Asifa radio, stated flatly and unequivocally that the present hostilities had, in the organization's opinion, been prepared by American agencies operating in Jordan.

There are serious grounds for such a conclusion. American politicians have lately been trying to aggravate still further the Near East tension. Their aim is to force the Arabs to agree to capitulation on terms dictated by Israel....

Informed Arab circles are saying that last month the U.S.A. experienced "increasing displeasure with Jordan," which has been pursuing a policy of consolidating its relations with the United Arab Republic and certain other progressive Arab regimes. Still another question arises in this connection: In Washington's view, might not the replacement of an intransigent monarch by a new pretender to the throne be the prize in the game it is playing?

It must be said that certain elements in the Palestinian movement that expound the principle, "the worse things are, the better," are helping — objectively speaking — the American politicians. These elements' irresponsible and adventurist escapades have harmed the difficult and involved struggle being waged by the Arab peoples to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression.

Newspapers in many countries have noted the calm, reasoned approach taken toward the events in Jordan by Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus and a number of other Arab capitals. The easing of the situation in Amman, which is imperative, was also greatly helped by Yasir Arafat's timely arrival in Jordan for the holding of talks. An agreement on cooperation and the normalization of the situation was concluded between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian guerrillas. The implementation of this agreement will undoubtedly help to thwart the imperialists' plans to divide the Arabs in the face of Israeli aggression and Tel Aviv's new provocations aimed at frustrating a political settlement of the Near East crisis.

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Pre-Election Interview Statements on U.K. Middle East Policy by Leaders of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Parties¹

June 12, 1970

Q. Is there any new initiative you think Britain could take to secure a Middle East settlement permitting Israel to live at peace within "secure and agreed borders"?

Wilson: It was we who sponsored Security Council Resolution 242 (67) which speaks of the right of every State in the Middle East "to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries." Above all, we want a peaceful and accepted settlement based on this Security Council Resolution and are doing all we can to achieve this in the Four Power talks in New York. While these talks are going on a new initiative would be out of place. But we are watching the situation the whole time and will not hesitate to take a new initiative if this seems more likely than our earlier one to produce a just settlement.

Heath: I certainly agree that we must try to reach a Middle East settlement securing to Israel, and indeed to every State in the area, the right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries. I saw on my visit to Israel last year how vital such a settlement is and the same point was impressed on me by Mrs Meir and her colleagues. In my judgement a settlement will not be reached until the two sides find some means, direct or indirect, of discussing together the issues which divide them. Britain has a part to play here and I believe that under a Conservative Government it could be a more imaginative and energetic part than of late. As I told German leaders in Bonn last month, I would like to see Europe speaking with a united voice on the problems of the Middle East. I believe

¹ Excerpted from interview in *Jewish Chronicle*, June 12, 1970, pp. 8-9. Three additional questions were unrelated to the Middle East.

that in this way the countries of Europe could exercise a powerful new influence for peace.

Thorpe: Any British Government has an historic, moral imperative to secure a settlement which will permit Israel to live at peace within agreed borders. The British resolution of November, 1967, accepted by the Security Council, and implicitly but not equivocally by the parties concerned, remains the basis of any such settlement. Any new and purely British initiative is not likely to be of much effect. However, Britain, acting *in concert* with her European allies in the EWU and within the United Nations should:

(i) Call on the super powers to agree to a ban on further arms sales, private or governmental, to both sides and at the same time to agree to reinforce the UN observer team;

(ii) Call on the Arab States to meet at once with representatives of Israel in a United Nations-sponsored "talk-about talks"—possibly in Cyprus;

(iii) Call on Israel to pledge the unrestricted return of those displaced by the 1967 hostilities, coupled with financial compensation for those who have lost their homes and livelihood since 1948.

Q. In the absence of a Middle East settlement, what do you think is the best course for the British Government to pursue to avoid another outbreak of war? Are you prepared to respond favourably to Israeli requests for arms, particularly Chieftain tanks? Would you sell Chieftains to Libya or any other Arab country opposed to Israel without granting Israel the opportunity of purchasing the same equipment?

Wilson: We are convinced that to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement offers the best prospect of preserving the Middle East from the disaster of another outbreak of war on a large scale. Our arms supply policy is well known; Ministers have frequently defined it in Parliament. We consider on their merits all applications by countries in the region for the supply of arms. And we take carefully into account

the balance of military forces in the region and the likely consequences of any decision on the prospects for the achievement of a peaceful and accepted settlement.

Heath: The supply of arms to the Middle East is one means of influencing the situation for good or ill. The British Government must judge every proposal for the supply of arms to the Middle East by the test of a reasonable balance. They should aim by their policy on the supply of arms to make a fresh outbreak of war less likely and improve prospects of a settlement. Only the Government of the day can have the confidential information on which their judgement on each particular proposal must be based.

Thorpe: In the absence of a settlement and a UN ban on further arms on either side, the British and French Governments, *acting together*, with the support of their allies, should withhold and ban arms sales, private or governmental, to *either side*. (This would include the Arab States.) Until an international arms embargo is achieved, there is a case for the sale of limited numbers of defensive weapons (anti-tank, air defence systems, etc.) to Israel.

Q. The British forces have pulled out of Libya. The last British troops in the Persian Gulf will also soon be withdrawn. Meanwhile the Russians are intensifying their military involvement in the area. Do you accept the thesis of Russian "creeping escalation" in the Middle East, and what action can Britain take to oppose it?

Wilson: We are seriously concerned by the increased Soviet military presence in the UAR. But this development is the product of a complex set of circumstances for which no State, in the region or elsewhere, has been uniquely responsible. And, of course, we are also concerned about any fresh involvement of outside powers in the dispute between Israel and the Arab States. We are doing all we can at present to achieve a settlement in the area which would secure the recognised boundaries of all the States against pressure from whatever quarter.

Heath: It is true that the Russians are intensifying their penetration of the Middle East using the supply of military equipment as one of their main weapons. The real solution to this Russian penetration is to secure a just and lasting settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Arab States. It is not for Britain alone to undertake the task of resisting Russian encroachments, but there are areas where, in collaboration with our friends, we can help to maintain peace and stability. Your suggestion that the British troops in the Gulf are soon to be withdrawn is not correct. Although the Labour Government intends to withdraw by the end of 1971, Conservative policy is to keep a British presence in the Gulf after that date if our friends in the area want it. We believe that this will help to maintain stability in the Gulf, which is in the interests of everyone in Britain and indeed in the Middle East.

Thorpe: The Soviet Union intends to match the US presence whether in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean, hence their increased military involvement. This policy would not be deflected by keeping a British presence East of Suez and there is no action which Britain acting alone could take.

Q. Britain has supported a Security Council resolution condemning Israel for her retaliation against Lebanon. In view of the fact that the Security Council has not censured repeated Arab violations of the cease-fire, do you think that Britain's support for anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations enhances Britain's position as a "neutral" in the Middle East conflict and strengthens the authority of the Security Council?

Wilson: The Security Council has condemned any and all violations of the ceasefire in several resolutions which it has adopted since June, 1967. Our own attitude is clear. We condemn all acts of violence, whoever may commit them. We especially condemn acts of violence which cause civilian casualties, such as the recent attack on a schoolchildren's bus in northern Israel. Our voting record in the Security Council has been consistent with this attitude.

Heath: The authority of the Security Council in the Middle East conflict has not been as great as it should be. Britain, as a permanent Member of the Council, must consider every proposal brought before the Council on the merits of the evidence. The Conservative Party has, of course, no responsibility for past actions of the Labour Government. We would be careful to ensure that the British attitude in any future debates of this kind in the Council could not be construed as partisan or unfair.

Thorpe: Britain believes that the policy of mutual retaliations has no end. She also believes that Israel has a strong moral defensive position, which is not enhanced by her policy of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." Rather does it tend to increase the prestige of Arab guerrilla forces, postpone any settlement and make the task of UN mediation more difficult.

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Pre-Election Statements on U.K. Middle East Policy by Representatives of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Parties¹

June 12, 1970

Questions:

1. *What priority should the next British Government give to the Middle East situation? What importance should be attached to British interests in that region? How relevant to world peace does your party consider a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict to be?*

2. *What should be the role of Britain in peace moves in the conflict—if any?*

3. *How much importance should the British Government attach to relations with Israel?*

¹ *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, XIX, 24 (June 12, 1970), pp. 12-13.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Conservative Party Shadow Foreign Secretary:

1. The Middle East situation is one of the most critical in the world today. British interests lie overwhelmingly in a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area. A solution to the conflict is very relevant to world peace, the present situation containing, as it does, the seeds of a possible confrontation between the US and Russia. Apart from the general British interest in peace and stability, our trade and commercial interests in the Middle East are considerable. The region constitutes the source of more than half the oil supplies of Britain (and Western Europe) and is an important market for exports.

2. Britain has a part to play, particularly as she is a member of the Security Council and one of the four Great Powers engaged in discussions on the matter in New York. Under a Conservative Government it should be possible for Britain to play a more imaginative and energetic part than of late.

3. The British Government should attach high importance to her relations with Israel as a friendly country, member of the UN, with whom we have many cultural and other links.

Lord Byers, Liberal Party Campaign Director:

1. The Arab-Israeli conflict can and will be a continuing danger to world peace. While, in the short term, there may be advantages in the Soviet Union keeping the pot boiling, in the long term a peaceful settlement including agreed but not imposed *de jure* recognition of Israel by Arab States, and re-opening of the Suez Canal to all shipping, and justice for displaced Arab populations, are world interests.

As a trading nation bearing more moral and historic responsibility for the present situation than any other European nation, the British Government has already taken the lead in promoting a settlement. The British resolution of November 1967—accepted by

the Security Council and, by implication, by both sides in the conflict—remains the only viable basis of such a settlement. Present British interests are moral, military and political rather than economic.

2. The next British Government, acting in concert with her allies in the WEU and through the UN, must:

i. bring pressure on the super powers to halt the flow of arms to both sides;

ii. persuade the Arab States to agree to a meeting around a conference table;

iii. persuade Israel to desist from military action which is retaliatory rather than purely defensive.

3. British relations with Israel are based on moral obligations, on history, on human rights and on democratic principles. But these are not exclusive to Israel. It is not in the latter's interest that the Arab world should become a "fishery" for Soviet communism.

The Liberal Party, still recognising that there are wrongs on both sides of the dispute, has insisted and will continue to insist that the threat to the existence of Israel is a menace to the most rudimentary conceptions of civilisation and cannot be accepted by any loyal member of the UN. Any British Government, as a member of the UN and as the initiating power of the Security Council resolution, is morally bound to ensure the existence and security of Israel's borders, her freedom of navigation, and recognition of her membership of the UN. By the same token, any British Government is also bound to insist on the immediate and unrestricted freedom of Arab refugees displaced by the 1967 war to return to their homes, with compensation for those who have lost their homes and means of livelihood.

Moreover, any British Government would expect Israel to make a pledge to make a contribution, along with other States and non-governmental agencies, in respect of Arab refugees displaced by the 1948 hostilities.

Harry Nicholas, Labour Party General Secretary:

1. The need for a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute has grown steadily greater and more urgent. A Labour Government must always give high priority to working for such a settlement, which offers the best prospect of protecting the region from the horrors of another war on a large scale, and under which all the peoples in the area will be able to live in and develop in peace.

The very large British interests both in Israel and in the Arab world are bound to be a major factor in any consideration of British policy towards the Middle East. But they will not be the only factor to be taken into account. The prime goal must be the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area.

The continuance of the dispute is certainly very relevant to world peace. This is especially so as we have seen a growing tendency for powers from outside the area to become involved in the region. Most recently we have seen the increased Soviet military commitment in the UAR, which is a serious cause for concern. This tendency is the result of a complicated chain of circumstances for which no one State bears the sole responsibility. But it is a tendency which obviously increases the dangers in the situation—and also, the need for a settlement.

2. Britain sponsored Security Council Resolution 242 (67) which set out the principles and provisions on which a peaceful and accepted settlement should be based. We should continue to do what we can to promote a settlement based on this resolution, which both sides have accepted. This is why the Government have recently taken part in the Four Power talks in New York. It is also why they have consistently supported the work of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Dr. Jarring, in his task of assisting efforts to achieve a settlement.

3. The links between the Labour movements in Britain and in Israel have always been very strong, and will continue to be so. No one who is of the political faith of the Labour Party can fail to be impressed by the

achievements of the Israeli people in building a genuine social democracy. The tremendous sympathy which exists for Israel extends throughout the entire British Labour movement, embracing Government, party and trade unions alike.

A British Labour Government will, therefore, always attach great importance to relations with Israel, which have been close, friendly and valuable throughout the period since the creation of the State of Israel. But the Government also attach great importance to their relations with the countries of the Arab world. The Government's policy is to work for a situation in which the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute will make it possible not only for Britain to have friendly relations with all the countries in the region, but also for those countries to enjoy good and mutually beneficial relations with one another.

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Resolutions on the Middle East Crisis Taken by the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel (Maki)¹

June 13, 1970

A

The C.P.I. Central Committee states with regret and with concern that the increased Soviet involvement in Egypt has aggravated the military tension on the Egyptian-Israeli front and has stressed the danger of a flare-up of war.

It is the unanimous desire of the people of Israel to prevent a Soviet-Israeli military confrontation. There is no contradiction between the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the national interests of the State of Israel that cannot be settled by way of mutual agreement. Restoration of the diplo-

¹ Excerpted from the English text of the resolutions of the Tenth Session in *Information Bulletin (Maki)*, No. 7 (July, 1970), pp. 3-6.

matic relations between the two states would, without any doubt, help the achievement of a reciprocal accord.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel appeals to the Communist and Workers' Parties, to the forces of peace in all countries, to exert their full influence to prevent Soviet military intervention in the Middle East conflict.

The Central Committee is convinced that in the future as well, everything will be done on the part of Israel to avoid a direct clash with the Soviet forces, and nothing will be done that might serve as a pretext for, or cause a Soviet-Israeli military confrontation.

Contrary to the views expressed by certain circles and personalities in Israel, the Central Committee of Maki is of the opinion that it is not in the interest of Israeli policy to invite American counter-intervention nor to rely on it or expect it.

The Central Committee of Maki declares that the people of Israel will independently fulfil its national duty and its international right to self-defence, and will defend the the cease-fire lines until peace comes, against every attack and every attacker.

The Central Committee of Maki sends greetings of encouragement to the soldiers and commanders of the Israel Defence Forces who are standing in the campaign for Israel's survival, security and independence. The Central Committee mourns the heroic defenders who fell in battle, the victims among the citizens—men, women and children—who were murdered in ambushes. The Central Committee expresses sympathy and consolation to the bereaved families, the Central Committee sends get-well wishes to the wounded and to the convalescing.

B

The Central Committee of Maki sees the correct way out of the Middle East crisis not in any new military confrontation, but in a political solution that will bring a just, lasting peace between the Arab states and Israel on the basis of an agreed interpretation of all provisions of the Security Council

resolution of November 22, 1967.

No settlement between the big powers and no political solution imposed or recommended by them can serve as a substitute for a peace agreement between the peoples themselves—and a correct Israeli policy must firmly insist on a conclusion of the conflict by the achievement of an agreed peace based on reciprocal recognition of the just rights of all peoples concerned. A peace agreement will also outline the mutually agreed upon borders of peace that will abrogate the present cease-fire lines. The "secure and recognised" borders of peace, as provided in the Security Council resolution, will be drawn by the way of an accord between the parties, and not by the way of a dictate imposed by one side on the other.

C

Regarding the No's of Khartoum and the trends of a globalisation of the conflict as the chief obstacles of the conflict, the Central Committee of Maki reiterates its view, that steps for the promotion of the cause of peace, if incessantly initiated, are likely to help the removal of the above obstacles, and it is universally agreed that they are likely to gain understanding, sympathy and support of international factors for Israel's campaigns.

The Central Committee of Maki reaffirms the motion tabled by its faction in the Israel parliament on May 18, 1970 calling for Israeli peace initiatives. (See Information Bulletin No. 6.)

The Central Committee of Maki notes with satisfaction, that the political statement of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on May 26, 1970 includes an express consent to the first three points of the above motion, and calls all forces of peace in Israel to rally and to persist in the struggle until the remaining points of the motion become part of Israel's official policy.

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Statement of Intention To Suspend Diplomatic Relations with Israel in a Speech by Governor-General Gopallawa of Ceylon Outlining Policies of the New Ceylonese Government¹

Colombo, June 14, 1970

Diplomatic and other relations with Israel will be suspended until such time as the Government of Israel either conforms to the resolutions of the UN Security Council of November 22, 1967 and subsequent dates and withdraws its armed forces from the territory of UAR, Syria and Jordan which they occupied by force after June 4, 1967 or arrives at any solution acceptable to the Arab States concerned.

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Speech by Italian Foreign Minister Moro at a Dinner Honoring Foreign Minister Eban of Israel During His Visit to Italy²

Rome, June 15, 1970

Mr. Minister:

In the talks which I have had the pleasure of having with you and in those which you will be having with other Italian officials, peace and the methods and procedures most suitable for seeking it, achieving it and guaranteeing it certainly constitute the basic theme. Italy, which is at the heart of the Mediterranean and which has interests, old and new, spiritual as well as material, in the Middle East, Italy, for whom the Suez Canal is not just a transportation route but a vital artery of communication, has an im-

mense interest in peace for her own sake and that of others. Italy seeks neither privileges, nor special position, nor selfish advantages; what she wants is to maintain the traditional bonds of friendship and the profitable cultural and commercial relations she has always had with the Mediterranean states, with all the nations of the Middle East.

She is therefore prepared—and we think we have even recently furnished proof of this—to be present, to put forward formulas, to exert influence in order that the states involved in the conflict, which unhappily has plagued the Middle East for more than twenty years and which, far from subsiding, is intensifying and threatens to spread, may work with good will to seek peaceful political formulas, gradually to reconcile with one another in the interest of that peace and cooperation which would be of benefit to all.

The existence of the state of Israel is close to Italy's heart. But the security of your country can be effectively and permanently obtained, outside dramatic moments of resort to force, only through peaceful political understandings with the other nations involved, to be sought patiently by the means that step by step become possible, to be sought above all within the framework and under the aegis of the United Nations which has already adopted resolutions which in our view contain all the elements of an amicable and peaceful settlement, if they are interpreted and implemented in good faith by all concerned with due consideration to the human interests of the people involved.

I am convinced that the government and people of Israel are motivated by peaceful intentions and ready to work to attain peace with security and self-respect, which naturally cannot be separated from the security and the self-respect of others, who are equally deserving of consideration. For the supreme good which is peace, one can pay a fair price.

¹Excerpted from Gopallawa's speech as published in *Asian Recorder*, XVI, 33 (August 13-19, 1970), p. 9694.

²Translated from the French text provided on request by the Embassy of Italy, Beirut.

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Interview Statement on the Middle East by President Ceausescu of Rumania Before His Visit to France¹

Bucharest, mid June 1970

We also consider that the prolongation of the conflict and the increase of military activity in the Near East represent a serious danger to peace. Rumania declares herself in favor of the solution to this conflict based on peaceful political means, through the application of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. We consider as absolutely necessary the retreat of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, and respect for the rights of existence and independent development of all States in the area. Likewise, we consider that, to guarantee a lasting peace, a solution must be found to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, in conformity with their national interests, and so that the legitimate desiderata of the Palestinian population, including, if they wish it, their formation into an independent national State, should be satisfied. We hope that, in the end, reason will triumph, and that peace will finally be re-established in this part of the world.

Rumania thinks that, in order to eliminate the sources of tension which exist in the world today, and to prevent the appearance of new ones, it is vital once and for all to abandon imperialist policies of domination over other nations, and attempts by certain States to impose their will on others by force. The healthy development of international life calls for rigorous respect for the inalienable right of every people to independence and sovereignty, and for its wish to determine its own destiny. A policy of cooperation and mutual aid among States needs to be established with a view to eliminating the wide economic differences which exist between nations in today's world

and the backwardness which still persists in vast areas of the earth, in order that a better world may be constructed where all nations can fully enjoy peace and the benefits of modern civilization.

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Joint Communiqué Issued by the Ba'th Party of Syria and the French Communist Party on the Occasion of the Visit to France of a Ba'th Party Delegation (Excerpts)²

Paris, June 17, 1970

A delegation representing the Ba'th Party, headed by Comrade Muslih Salim, member of the National Command, with ... Comrades Mahmud al-Himsi, Member of the National Command, ... and Mustafa Rustum, Member of the Regional Command, as its members ... visited France from June 7-13, 1970, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party.

The two delegations drew attention to the danger arising from the constantly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, of which the recent events in Jordan have provided new evidence. The United States, by the political and military support it provides to Israel and the reactionary forces in the Arab homeland, bears the principal responsibility for this situation.

The series of military bases established in this area and the presence of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, in whose maneuvers forces of the NATO Pact take part, constitute a means of exerting constant pressure and threats directed against the peoples and the peace of this part of the world.

¹ Excerpted from Ceausescu's interview and translated from the French text in *Le Monde*, June 16, 1970, p. 3.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), June 18, 1970.

In the Middle East, just as in Vietnam, Europe and everywhere in the world, it is plain that America is determined to play the role of policeman to maintain or recover the strategic and economic positions of the great imperialist powers.

The aggression of June 1967, whose principal object was to bring down the progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria and to destroy the Arab people's liberation movement, was frustrated thanks to the struggle of that people supported by the U.S.S.R., the socialist countries, the world Communist movement and the world liberation movement. This endurance gave an impetus to the anti-imperialist national liberation movement of the Palestinian Arab people as well as contributing to the collapse of the reactionary regimes in Sudan and Libya.

The two delegations emphasized the importance of the Palestinian Arab people's national liberation movement and their legitimate pursuit of resistance to aggression.

This movement, which is an indivisible part of the Arab liberation movement has become an element in the anti-imperialist movement and the national liberation movement throughout the world.

The delegation of the French Communist Party reaffirms its full solidarity with the Arab people's liberation movement, including the liberation movement of the Palestinian Arab people, and with all progressive and anti-imperialist forces struggling against occupation and against Israel's expansionist policy in this area.

The Ba'th Party expressed its appreciation for the French Communist Party's constant solidarity with the Arab People's national liberation movement.

The two delegations disclosed that the reactionary and chauvinistic character of Zionism, which is the basis of Israeli expansionist ideology, is used as an instrument by imperialism, in particular American imperialism, in its aggressive policy against the Arab people's resistance movement, and constitutes a grave threat to peace in the Middle East and the world.

To reach a solution of current problems in the Middle East, it is essential to put an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and to affirm the Palestinian Arab people's right to national existence.

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Letter Containing U.S. Proposals for a Restoration of the Cease-Fire and Resumption of Negotiations under Jar-ring's Auspices from Secretary of State Rogers to U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad¹

Washington, June 19, 1970

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

I have read carefully President Nasser's statement of May 1 and your subsequent remarks to Mr. Bergus [Donald C. Bergus, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General, U.S. Special Interests Section, Spanish Embassy, Cairo]. Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] has also reported fully on his conversations with President Nasser and you, and we have been giving serious thought to what can be done about the situation in the Near East. I agree that the situation is at a critical point and I think it is in our joint interest that the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and states of the area. We hope this will prove possible and are prepared to do our part. We look to others concerned, and in particular to your government, which has so important a role to play, to move with us to seize this opportunity. If it is lost, we shall all suffer the consequences and we would regret such an outcome very much indeed. In this spirit, I urge that your govern-

¹ Released by the Department of State on July 22, 1970; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1624 (August 10, 1970), pp. 178-179.

ment give the most careful consideration to the thoughts which I set forth below.

We are strongly interested in a lasting peace, and we would like to help the parties achieve it. We have made serious and practical proposals to that end, and we have counseled all parties on the need for compromise, and on the need to create an atmosphere in which peace is possible. By the latter we mean a reduction of tensions as well as clarifications of positions to give both Arabs and Israelis some confidence that the outcome will preserve their essential interests.

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security Council Resolution 242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently said that Israel would be prepared to make important concessions once talks got started. At the same time, Egyptian participation in such talks would go far towards overcoming Israeli doubts that your government does in fact seek to make peace with it. I understand the problems that direct negotiations pose for you, and we have made it clear from the beginning that we were not proposing such an arrangement be put into effect at the outset, although, depending on the progress of discussions, we believe the parties will find it necessary to meet together at some point if peace is to be established between them.

With the above thoughts in mind, the US puts forward the following proposal for consideration of the UAR.

(a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire for at least a limited period;

(b) that Israel and the UAR (as well as Israel and Jordan) subscribe to the following statement which would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary General U Thant:

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

(a) that having accepted and indicated

their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242;

(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective July 1 until at least October 1, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

We hope the UAR will find this proposal acceptable; we are also seeking Israeli acceptance. In the meantime, I am sure you will share my conviction that everything be done to hold these proposals in confidence so as not to prejudice the prospects for their acceptance.

I am sending a similar message to Foreign Minister Rifai [of Jordan].

I look forward to your early reply.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

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Speech by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China at a Banquet Honoring a Sudan Government Delegation Led by Treasury Minister Mahgoub (Excerpt)¹

Peking, June 21, 1970

In the Middle East, the Palestinian people and the people of other Arab countries, continuously using revolutionary armed force to oppose counter-revolutionary armed force, have dealt severe blows at U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in their various wild schemes to suppress the Palestinian guerrillas, and have won one victory after another. Recently, U.S. imperialism instigated pro-U.S. reactionary forces in Jordan to unleash rabid armed attacks on the Palestinian guerrillas and the Palestinian people residing in the vicinity of Amman, but they met with the resolute resistance of the Palestinian people and evoked universal condemnation by the people of the Arab countries and revolutionary people throughout the world. This plot of U.S. imperialism failed ignominiously. The Palestinian people and their armed forces who have gone through the severe test of war are growing stronger through fighting and their militant unity has become closer. We are also glad to see that only a few days ago U.S. imperialism was compelled to dismantle its Wheelus air base in Libya and that the last batch of U.S. imperialist aggressor troops was sent packing out of that country. This is another victory won by the people of Libya and the people of other Arab countries in their anti-imperialist struggle.

While trying hard to wipe out the Palestinian guerrillas, U.S. imperialism and its accomplice are energetically clamouring that now is a "good time" for peace talks and are stepping up their efforts to cook up peace talks schemes in a vain attempt to strangle the liberation cause of the Palestinian

people and the entire Arab people. We are deeply convinced that the Palestinian people, persevering in unity and protracted people's war, will certainly defeat the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and win complete victory.

The Chinese people and Government unswervingly stand on the side of the Palestinian people and the people of other Arab countries and firmly support their just struggle. Their struggle is support and encouragement to the Chinese people. With the solemn call of the Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs," the revolutionary friendship between the Chinese people and the Palestinian people, the people of other Arab countries, the Afro-Asian people and the people of the whole world will develop and grow stronger.

The people of our two countries, he said, have sympathized with and supported each other in their long struggles against imperialism and colonialism. We believe that through the present visit of the delegation and our joint efforts the friendly relations and cooperation between China and the Sudan will daily develop and grow stronger.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the American June 19 Proposals²

Washington, June 25, 1970

Secretary Rogers [opening statement] : Turning now to the Middle East, I would like to make a brief statement about the Middle East. Recent disquieting events in the Middle East led President Nixon, on April 29, to order a thorough review of all political and military aspects of this problem. That review has now been concluded.

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, No. 27 (July 3, 1970), pp. 67-68.

² Excerpted from Rogers' news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1620 (July 13, 1970), pp. 26-28, 29-30, 32-33.

As a consequence of the review, the United States has undertaken a political initiative, a major political initiative, the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring [Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Special Representative] in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Our objective in launching this initiative has been to encourage the parties to move toward a just and lasting peace which takes fully into account the legitimate aspirations and concerns of all governments and of all peoples in the area.

In the light of that objective, we believe that it would not be useful, particularly because of the sensitive nature of the discussions now underway, the diplomatic discussions now underway, to disclose at this time the details of the political initiative or to discuss publicly military assistance for Israel.

We firmly believe that this is the time for such an initiative, which we have launched directly with the parties and with other interested powers. We are now in the process of having further discussions, getting the responses of other governments to this initiative, and we very seriously and profoundly hope that this initiative, taken together in collaboration with others, will result in the beginning of discussions which might lead to a peaceful solution of this problem that has plagued the Middle East for 20 years. Thank you.

Mr. Hensley [Stewart Hensley, United Press International].

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the subject of military aid for Israel, which you say you don't care to discuss today, does your statement imply any diminution or any abandonment of the American policy of not permitting the balance of military power to be shifted against Israel in the Middle East?

A. Mr. Hensley, it does not. Our policy vis-à-vis Israel remains constant. It has not changed. We believe that the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Israel is very important for our national interest.

President Nixon has made clear what his policy is toward Israel, and that policy has not changed. On the other hand, we do think the time is propitious—in fact, the time demands that every effort be made by all concerned to enter into discussions to see if this problem can't be solved.

I think it is useful—I know it is useful to me—occasionally to go back and read the Security Council resolution of 1967, because it does lay down a framework for a solution to that problem, and it clearly contemplates that the parties will discuss the principles that are established or laid down in that resolution for the purpose of seeing if a settlement can be reached.

I think it is interesting to notice that the resolution refers to principles which are agreed to. Secondly, it refers to the fact that the Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, has the assignment of attempting to bring about an agreement based on those principles; and that is what has been lacking for the last 3 years—there has been no serious exchange of views among the parties attempting to put those principles into effect by way of a settlement. So our initiative is designed to see if that can be done.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this review that you have mentioned in your opening statement, also, I believe, was supposed to ascertain whether the military balance of power has changed in the Middle East as a result of SAM-3's and Soviet pilots flying in Egypt. Can you say whether that review has found a change in the military balance?

A. Well, that review has been completed. As I have indicated, I would prefer this morning not to get involved in a very detailed discussion of the arms problem in the Middle East. But I will say that, clearly, the review revealed that a new factor has entered into the equation in the Middle East. The fact that the Soviet Union has assisted, in fact, deployed SA-3's in Egypt, the fact that Soviet pilots are flying planes in Egypt, the fact that there are a large number of Soviet personnel in the U.A.R.—all, of course, present new factors.

We are not inclined to think that Israel,

at the moment, is unable to support itself militarily; but we do think that the presence of the Soviet personnel and military equipment is a new factor and it is a very serious factor.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what degree do the Soviets agree or disagree with this American initiative? And did you consult with them at length about it, and are they just simply standing silent during it?

A. Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], we did; and we have presented our initiative to many governments. We presented it directly to President Nasser because he directed an appeal to President Nixon in his May—or at least he directly referred to President Nixon in his May 1 speech. He made a proposal to the President which we thought called for a response, so we did respond directly to President Nasser.¹

At the same time, we presented our suggestions, which we referred to here as “an initiative,” to Jordan, to other Arab nations, to the Soviet Union, to France and the United Kingdom, other members who are actively engaged in the four-power discussions, and other European nations.

We have not had a response from the Soviet Union. They listened politely and thoughtfully to the presentation we made. We have not had a response from them yet.

As I say, at the moment, the discussions on this initiative are in a very sensitive stage; and we would hope that the Soviet Union and others have the same interest in peace that we have.

Mr. Scali [John Scali, ABC News].

Q. Mr. Secretary, various dispatches, from the Middle East capitals particularly, say that one of the key features of this new American approach is a call for some kind of cease-fire, temporary or otherwise—end of the shooting. Can you tell us whether this is accurate?

A. Well, yes; it does include, as I have indicated in my brief statement here, the idea that the parties should stop shooting.

Now, I don't want to go into it any further than that, except to say that it seems clear to us that if the parties are going to have discussions which might lead to peaceful solution, it's much easier and much more satisfactory to do it at a time when they are not engaged in hostilities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be useful, in your view, for Israel to make a commitment in principle to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territory?

A. Well, I don't want to pick out any particular phrases and comment on them, except to say that I was very encouraged when the Prime Minister of Israel referred recently in a statement, a speech, to the fact that Israel accepted the principles set forth in the Security Council resolution.

And if you read that resolution, you see that it does set forth principles that I think would be viable, looking toward a peaceful settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the Prime Minister's speech, what indications do you have that the parties concerned are any more receptive now to new peace initiatives than they have been in the past?

A. Well, I can refer to two or three public—three or four, as a matter of fact—public things which have given us some encouragement.

One, as I have said, is the appeal, the statement by President Nasser, directed to President Nixon.

Secondly, President Nasser, in a National Educational Television Program recently, indicated that under certain circumstances, they might be receptive to a cease-fire; and as I recall his statement, he said, somewhere in the neighborhood of 6 months or less.

Three, the Prime Minister of Israel, as I have said, indicated willingness to accept the Security Council resolution, which contains principles which I believe will lay the foundation for peaceful settlement.

Then the Foreign Minister of Israel indicated that if the negotiations once start, the Arabs would be surprised at the concessions that Israel might make.

¹ The letter to Nasser containing U.S. proposals was dated June 19 (see above), but was not made public until July 22.

Now, that indicated to me that there was considerable flexibility on the part of Israel and that if negotiations started, there would be a prospect that progress could be made.

And I think that, looking at it realistically, as long as the parties sort of negotiate in public, so that each time a proposal is made the other party is called upon publicly to accept it or reject it, it makes a very unsatisfactory way to negotiate.

If the parties could get together in a negotiating stance—and I am speaking now about in the same city or in adjacent buildings or on different floors of the same building or different rooms on the same floor—and have an active exchange of ideas, quietly and sensibly looking toward a prospect of peace, progress might be made.

Ambassador Jarring is the negotiator that has been selected by the United Nations for this purpose, and we think that negotiations of that kind have some prospect, hold out some promise.

In the absence of that, what happens is the parties really argue in public. There is no frank exchange of ideas looking toward a settlement. The parties just argue their cases in public, and that obviously doesn't lead to progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on March 23, when you said that the Israeli request for jets was going to be held in abeyance, you were asked that in the future if there were a decision in favor of giving, or selling, them more jets—whether it would be announced, and you answered it: "You know, in our existing government, secrecy is not a very productive policy to follow."

Now, when and if the United States decides to sell more Phantom jets to Israel, are you going to make a public announcement on it, or is this going to be kept secret?

A. Well, I haven't changed my views on secrecy at all since that statement.

This morning, I just want to emphasize that we think, for the moment, the emphasis should be on the diplomatic initiative that we have taken, and we think any announce-

ments or anything of that kind of a military nature would be counterproductive.

We have no hope that anything we do will ever be secret so that, clearly, any decisions that are carried out will become known. But we do think, at the moment, because of the sensitivity of our diplomatic discussions and because of their tremendous importance and the danger that exists in the area, that it's better at the moment not to discuss them.

Q. Mr. Rogers, Sir, how many nations around the world is the United States today selling arms to, and is there any chance of us having a revision of this role of arms merchant for the world?

A. The first part of the question was, how many nations—?

Q. —are we selling arms to now.

A. That we are selling arms to. I don't know offhand. Certainly, we are not the arms merchant for the world. There are a lot of other nations selling arms. In any event, I don't know the answer to your question.

Q. Is there any chance of having this role of selling arms to other nations revised?

A. Well, we would like to. We have indicated in every area that has been publicly discussed a willingness to engage in embargoes of arms shipments. We have tried to do it in the Middle East. We've asked the Soviet Union if they'd be willing to undertake a limitation on arms shipments, and we've done this in other parts of the world. But unfortunately, the sale of arms has been something that's plagued mankind, I guess, throughout its history.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your December 9 speech you outlined a set of negotiating principles for the Middle East, which I don't believe you've referred to today. Does the United States continue to believe that those guidelines will be the ones under which the Jarring negotiation should be conducted?

A. Well, not necessarily. We think they are very useful guidelines, but we don't insist that the parties accept them. We think they would be very useful for purposes of discussion. But we are perfectly prepared, and obviously we would have to be, to have the discussions conducted by Ambassador Jarring, and he can use any beginning point he would like to.

One of the most useful starting points of a negotiation would be the Security Council resolution itself. As I said, every once in a while, I go back and reread it, because it is a very good basis for negotiations.

And if the parties—they've all accepted this—well, at least the U.A.R., Jordan, and Israel have accepted the Security Council resolution; and if there was a willingness on the part of the parties to sit down and discuss how to carry out those principles—how to implement those principles, how to translate those principles into specifics—I believe that there is a possibility that it can be done.

But you have to start out with a willingness on the part of the parties to do that. And I don't believe—we have never believed that outside governments could do that.

There are a great many specifics, details, that have to be worked out before an agreement could be reached. And we think the exchange leading up to that agreement has to be among the parties.

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Interview Statement on the Middle East by President Yahya Khan of Pakistan During His Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹

late June 1970

Q. How do you assess the present situation in the Middle East?

A. I think the Middle East situation today is definitely one of the most explosive situa-

tions anywhere in the world for the simple reason that there is actual fighting going on. We believe that the forceful occupation of territories anywhere in the world is not on, and that it does not lead to any solution.

The Middle East situation particularly is very tragic because Israel has aggressively captured the territories of several Arab countries, in particular Jerusalem, which is of such vital importance not only to the Arabs, but to the whole Muslim world.

As a result, you know, Muslim countries have been getting together, at Rabat and then at Jidda, to raise their voice against this naked aggression. We should like to explain one thing, that this Muslim countries' getting together has nothing to do with religion. It is just a question of Muslim countries getting together to raise their voice and fight for the cause of peace and justice. We reckon that it is a most unjust situation that exists in the Middle East today.

There is no other solution, to my mind, except to observe the resolution passed by the Security Council on November 22, 1967, which has been unanimously approved by almost everyone in the world. If obedience to international agreements still has any value at all, that resolution of November 1967 is the only sensible and just solution.

The complete withdrawal of Israeli troops to their own territories is the basis of the solution.

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An Appeal by a Group of Black Americans for U.S. Support for Israel²

June 28, 1970

The crisis in the Middle East is a cause of great concern to all Americans—non-Jew as well as Jew, black as well as white. Our concern as black Americans is motivated not only by the threat to world peace which is pos-

¹ Excerpted from the English text of Yahya Khan's interview in *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1970), p. 66.

² *New York Times*, June 28, 1970, Section IV, p. 5 (Advertisement).

ed by the Arab-Israeli conflict. We are also moved by the ideals of democracy and social justice, ideals which we have struggled to achieve in this country and which we firmly believe the United States must uphold in the Middle East. In our opinion, the United States can best stand by these ideals by unequivocally guaranteeing Israel's security.

While we are aware that Israel, like any other nation, has its shortcomings, it is by far the most democratic country in the Middle East. What is remarkable is that the high degree of political freedom in Israel has not diminished despite the constant need to maintain military preparedness. In contrast, countries like Iraq, Syria, and Egypt are dictatorial one-party states where the press and the courts are rigorously controlled and non-Moslem minorities are severely persecuted. Moreover, Israel has made tremendous strides toward achieving an equalitarian economic order. Its sophisticated system of educational, health, and welfare services is more advanced even than in our own country and has enhanced the quality of life for Arab as well as Jewish Israelis. The incidence of poverty in the Arab countries, on the other hand, remains appalling. The income from oil has been used to sustain wealthy sheikdoms—and often terrorist organizations as well—but rarely to alleviate the suffering of the poor.

We are deeply concerned about the plight of impoverished Arabs, particularly those who have been made refugees as a result of the three Arab-Israeli wars. But we do not feel that the continuation of the conflict serves the real interests of these people. Prolonged hostilities and inflammatory calls for the destruction of Israel can only divert precious attention, energy, and resources away from an attack on the pressing social and economic problems of the Arab people.

Some Americans, including a small minority of blacks, have expressed the feeling that the Middle East crisis is fundamentally a racial conflict between nonwhite Arabs and white Israelis. We think that this point of view is not only uninformed but dangerously misleading. It ignores the fact that approximately half the Jewish Israeli population

consists of immigrants from Asia and Africa. And it also implies that there is an inherent solidarity of nonwhite people. This notion should have been laid to rest not only by the tragic Nigerian civil war, but also by the continuing brutal persecution of black Africans by the Sudanese government which, it must be emphasized, is militarily allied with and assisted by the Egyptian government. We should add in this regard that Israel, with its impressive program of foreign technical aid, has contributed far more than any of its Arab enemies to the development of black African nations.

We, therefore, support Israel's right to exist for the same reasons that we have struggled for freedom and equality in America. And it is again for these reasons that we believe that only peace and economic development can bring real justice to the Arab people. The present crisis in the Middle East endangers both Israel's existence and a better life for the Arabs. We believe that the United States has a vital role to play in ending this crisis. If it does not stand firm in the Middle East, the Soviet Union will be encouraged to increase its intervention, thereby escalating the conflict still further.

We urge the United States government to use its great influence to help bring the Israelis and the Arabs to the conference table where they can work out among themselves a just and negotiated settlement. *We also urge our government to take steps to help guarantee Israel's right to exist as a nation.* For the present this means providing Israel with the full number of jet aircraft it has requested.

Raymond Pace Alexander, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Margaret Belcher, President, National Association of Negro Business and Professional Clubs, Inc.

James Booker, Consultant to Kerner Commission.

William H. Bowe, International Secretary-Treasurer, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

Shirley Chisholm, U.S. Congresswoman, 12th District, New York.

LeRoy Clark, International Vice-President, United Furniture Workers of America.

William L. Clay, U.S. Congressman, 1st District, Missouri.

John Conyers, Jr., U.S. Congressman, 1st District, Michigan.

Earl Davis, Minority Affairs Director, Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO.

Georgia M. Davis, State Senator, Kentucky.

Walter G. Davis, Director, AFL-CIO, Department of Education.

C.L. Dellums, International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

Charles C. Diggs, U.S. Congressman, 13th District, Michigan.

William Gary, Administrative Assistant to the President, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.

Hugh M. Gloster, President, Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia.

Simeon Golar, Chairman, N.Y.C. Housing Authority.

Ernest Green, Director, Joint Apprenticeship Program, WDL/APREF.

Richard Hatcher, Mayor, Gary, Indiana.

Augustus F. Hawkins, U.S. Congressman, 21st District, California.

Dorothy Height, President, National Council of Negro Women.

Vivian Henderson, President, Clark College, Atlanta, Georgia.

Aaron E. Henry, President, Mississippi State Conference NAACP.

Norman Hill, Associate Director, A. Phillip Randolph Institute.

William R. Hudgins, President, Freedom National Bank of New York.

John H. Johnson, Publisher, *Ebony*, *Jet*, *Tan* and *Black World*.

Leroy R. Johnson, State Senator, Atlanta, Georgia.

Vernon E. Jordan, Executive Director, United Negro College Fund.

Thomas Kilgore, Jr., Senior Pastor, Second Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California.

Martin Luther King, Sr., Pastor, Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia.

John Lewis, Executive Director, Voter

Education Project.

Arthur C. Logan, President, United Neighborhood Houses.

Marion Logan, Secretary, Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

William Lucy, Executive Assistant to the President, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.

Louis Martin, Vice-President and Editor, Sengstacke Newspapers.

Frank C. Montero, Assistant to President, Tishman Realty and Construction Corp.

Ronnie M. Moore, Executive Director, Scholarship, Education and Defense Fund for Racial Equality, Inc.

John Morsell, Assistant Executive Director, NAACP.

John H. Murphy, President, Afro-American Newspapers.

Eleanor H. Norton, Chairman, N.Y.C. Commission on Human Rights.

Frederick O'Neal, Actor.

Peter Ottley, President, Local 144, Hotel, Hospital and Nursing Home Union, SEIU.

Basil A. Paterson, State Senator, New York.

Ernest M. Pharr, Editor, *The Atlanta Inquirer*.

Channing Emery Phillips, President, Housing Development Corporation.

Robert E. Powell, Vice-President, Laborers International Union of North America.

A. Phillip Randolph, Vice-President, AFL-CIO.

Jackie Robinson, Chairman of the Board, Freedom National Bank of New York.

Bayard Rustin, Executive Director, A. Phillip Randolph Institute.

Horace L. Sheffield, Executive Vice-President, Trade Union Leadership Council.

Arthur D. Shores, Member, Democratic National Committee, Alabama.

Asa T. Spaulding, Owner, Spaulding Consulting and Advisory Service.

Marcus Stewart, Sr., Editor, *The Indianapolis Recorder*.

Carl Stokes, Mayor, Cleveland, Ohio.

Louis Stokes, U.S. Congressman, 21st District, Ohio.

O.L. Tandy, Publisher, *Indiana Herald*.

Gardner Taylor, Past President, Progressive National Baptist Convention.

Jesse H. Walker, Executive Editor, *New York Amsterdam News*.

Wyatt Tee Walker, Pastor, Canaan Baptist Church of Christ, New York City.

William J. Walls, Bishop, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church.

Roosevelt Watts, Executive Vice-President, Transport Workers Union.

Robert Weaver, President, Bernard M. Baruch College, New York.

Roy Wilkins, Executive Director, NAACP.

Thomas G. Young, Vice-President, Local 32B, Service Employees International Union.

Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League.

(*Partial List—Organizations For Identification Only.*)

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Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel Reacting to the U.S. June 19 Proposals¹

Jerusalem, June 29, 1970

The government of the U.S. has recently brought to our attention a plan for a political initiative, the aim of which was defined publicly by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, as intended "to encourage the parties to progress towards a just and lasting peace." The plan, as transmitted to us, has of course been submitted for consideration by the Government, and we are in continuous dialogue with the U.S. Government on this important subject, which is so vitally important for our national and political existence.

In view of the fact that the U.S. Government did not publicize the main points and details of its plan, I do not propose at this stage to discuss the subject in the Knesset plenum, since it is not for us to publish a plan which has been presented to us as not for publication.

The details of the American initiative have also been submitted for information and discussion to the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, which is charged and authorized, *inter alia*, to discuss matters which are not appropriate for consideration in plenary session, especially at a stage where there are political or security reasons for refraining from public discussion in the plenary.

Members of the Knesset. It is only natural and understandable that the Knesset should expect to receive an authoritative report on the American initiative. Not only would an authoritative report provide accurate information on a subject on which there have been various statements and interpretations not always distinguished by accuracy, but authoritative information is also a major condition for a serious and useful debate. At the same time, I am sure that the Knesset will understand the reasons that prevent the government, as yet, doing it the service of providing authoritative information. The Knesset may rest assured that the Government of Israel will meticulously comply with the procedures and obligations of Israeli democracy and the matter will be submitted for debate in plenary session at a suitable time when conditions exist which make such a debate possible and necessary.

At this time I feel it appropriate to make a few remarks on political matters.

Israel's policy is founded on a constant striving for peace with each and every one of the neighbouring Arab states. Hence we follow and study closely every manifestation of readiness for peace by the factors directly involved in this terrible dispute. In accordance with the logic of this principle, we welcome any sincere political aid by political factors which try to influence the countries of the area to turn their faces toward peace, to stop shooting and start talking.

Peace is our most vital interest and our dearest aspiration. Peace means stopping the killing, agreement on secure and recognized boundaries, the diversion of costly resources to material and spiritual creativity, the hope of cooperation and the prospect

¹ English translation in *Jerusalem Post*, June 30, 1970, p. 2.

of fraternity between nations. Peace is the dream of parents and wives, educators and commanders. We are all confident of its power and rightness. Our hearts yearn for peace and are open to receive any hint that testifies to the possibility of peace. This sensitivity of ours to the possibility of peace is also the source of our intense alertness and our clear-minded examination of every indication, in case it should prove to be an illusion, lest we should mistake the disappointing reality for the desirable goal and, on the other hand, lest we should—heaven forbid—miss any opportunity of progress towards peace.

We are following with the closest attention everything that is happening in the Arab world and devoting unremitting study to the situation. It gives me profound regret to state that I cannot tell the Knesset today that there has been any sign of the longed-for change among the Arab leaders, or that any substantial possibility has been revealed that may enable us to start talking instead of continuing to defend ourselves against our attackers.

There has been no easing of the situation in the region since the May 26 debate in the Knesset plenum. On the contrary, there have been serious, brutal developments in the area of military security. Violation of the cease-fire by the Egyptian ruler continues on the southern front and has even spread to other fronts, in the east and north. There is no doubt that Soviet operational involvement has encouraged all warmongers in the Arab governments and states. The continuing Soviet operational integration breathed new life into the aggression in our region. The terrorist organizations are borne on the rising wave, to the extent of endangering the stability of neighbouring countries, while the rulers of these countries learn to accept the terrorists' principal demands—albeit by *force majeure*—and accord them recognized status and considerable freedom of action.

Every day we are witnesses to the duplicity of the Arab rulers, who put on the guise of peacemongers in front of the television cameras while they hasten to tell the truth when they speak to their peoples and when

they give orders to their armies. In my statement to the Knesset on May 26 I referred to Nasser's speech of the First of May. It was an aggressive speech, calling for war. Even then, Nasser already declared, *inter alia*, that "in the last 15 days there has been a change, as we see, and our forces are taking the initiative in bold military operations in the air and on land." In the same speech, in which Nasser announced that he would also shell Israeli civilian targets, he described how the Soviet Union had rehabilitated his army free of charge and how she was continuing to supply him with arms of all categories. Once again he justified his policy of non-compliance with the cease-fire and called for the intensification of the war against Israel. Can anyone find in this speech any expression of readiness for negotiations and peace, or renewed compliance with the cease-fire? Nasser had one object, and one alone, in this speech: To address a demand to President Nixon to withhold from Israel arms vital for her defence, to stop all aid from the U.S. to Israel. As Nasser put it in the plainest terms: "The U.S. must withhold from Israel all aid, political, military or economic." Careful heed should be paid to these words of Nasser, especially at this stage. And it is not superfluous to point out that this drastic approach to President Nixon came at a time when Egypt continues to receive from the Soviet Union a copious supply of modern arms, without any limitations and almost free of charge, and when Soviet missiles and pilots are at the service of Egyptian belligerency.

Recently, on June 14, in an interview over American educational television,¹ Nasser assumed an air of righteousness and explained his conditions for a settlement. But it should be noted that, when the interviewer pressed him with the question whether he would agree to recognize Israel even according to the June 4, 1967 borders—Nasser replied:

Well of course, there was confusion. We are always stressing about the rights of the peoples

¹ For the text of Nasser's interview, see Arab World Section, below, Document 411.

of Palestine. So now if the withdrawal and the rights of the people of Palestine are fulfilled it will make a difference to us.

This TV appearance by Nasser was interpreted by certain circles, for some reason, as a good omen. Nevertheless, the more we scrutinize the words of the Egyptian President, the more astonished we are at those who do not understand his real programme in all its gravity. How is it possible to ignore the fact that to any political settlement Nasser attaches two preconditions, which rule out any settlement. How can anyone fail to understand that the precondition of an Israeli undertaking of full withdrawal and "the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people in its homeland" show the direct opposite of readiness for peace?

To us it is perfectly clear that these conditions demanded by Nasser can only have one meaning: these are conditions for the liquidation of Israel as a Jewish State in sovereign control of its territory in order that a "democratic Palestine" as understood by Arafat should arise in its place.

We, who did not want the war that Nasser forced upon us, are prepared for, and call for, negotiations for peace without prior conditions, without ultimatums, while Nasser, who was defeated in the war he declared against us in order to liquidate Israel, gets up and presents us with ultimative terms for a cease-fire and a settlement whose significance is the achievement of the same aim: the liquidation of our State.

In the same interview, when Nasser was asked about the cease-fire, he replied that he was prepared to accept a cease-fire for six months at the most, on condition that this period be used to arrange for Israel's withdrawal to the borders of June 4, 1967.

Members of the Knesset. As is well known, the cease-fire, as decided on by the Security Council on June 6, 1967 and accepted by all parties, is not limited in time or by any conditions whatsoever. The Arab states were most interested in accepting this decision when their armies were routed, their territories defenceless, and their regimes in danger of collapse from within. But as

early as spring 1969, when Nasser felt that he had the strength to renew the aggression, he announced the annulment of the cease-fire and started a war of attrition against Israel. Now, in face of the Israeli demand for a cease-fire, and being in need of a period of quiet in order to deploy his forces for an offensive and set up new missile systems, he has decided to make all his aggressive preparations while opposing a cease-fire in the plain sense of the term and in the guise of agreement to a temporary and conditional cease-fire.

There is an essential difference, from the military, political, moral and juridical points of view, between the cease-fire as decided upon by the Security Council and the limited and conditional cease-fire which Nasser proposes and calls a "cease-fire."

While the general and unlimited cease-fire is meant to serve as a stage of transition from war to peace, the trick of proposing a conditional and limited cease-fire is meant to achieve the transitional period which he requires to prepare for the renewal of the war in a more intense form. From the military point of view, Nasser needs such an interval in order to strengthen his fortifications all along the line, to rehabilitate his bases and installations which have been damaged by the Israel Air Force and, above all, to facilitate the installation of Soviet missiles for the purpose of achieving an air umbrella, trying to prevent our Air Force silencing the Egypt artillery aimed at our positions, and enabling him to make an attempt to cross the Canal.

If Nasser's proposal for a cease-fire for a specified period is accepted, the renewal of the shooting at the end of the period will be legitimized in his eyes. The aggressor will be able to argue that he is exempted from his obligations and is entitled to renew the war.

Nasser's consistent objection to a cease-fire in the plain sense of the term shows that he is still guided by the decisions of the Khartoum Conference, which have nothing whatever in common with peace.

If there was any doubt in anyone's mind

concerning Nasser's real intentions, we have his latest speech in Benghazi on the 25th of this month, in which he declared his intentions with commendable frankness.

In order to prevent any peace agreement between Israel and any Arab state whatsoever, Nasser is fanning the flames of hostility and taking pains to give the conflict a pan-Arab character. Nasser told his listeners:

Your people in Egypt will under no circumstances agree to any bargaining about withdrawal. Syria comes before Egypt. The Golan comes before Sinai. We have declared this and we declare it once again—had we wished for a withdrawal from Sinai, we would have come to an agreement with the U.S. two years ago, but we rejected this, saying that withdrawal from Sinai was not the main operation, but Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Golan come before Sinai.

How can this statement possibly be interpreted as a sign of readiness for a peace settlement?

Perhaps we can learn something from these words about the reasons for the latest Syrian aggression in the Golan Heights and about the coordinated attempts by the Egyptian and Syrian Governments to create military pressure on Israel while trying to bring political pressure to bear upon us.

Nasser goes on to interpret his statement by saying:

We are preparing for the great campaign against Israel, who is supported by imperialist forces headed by the U.S. We say that whether matters are dealt with by political means or solved by military means, we shall not on any account agree to anything less than withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the liberation of all the Arab territories which have been stolen. Nor shall we for any consideration whatsoever agree to give up the rights of the Palestinian people in its country and homeland Palestine.

Nasser also explains why he needs a period of relaxation of tension. He boasts that the Israelis "know that the Egyptian army will complete its training for the purpose of crossing the Canal."

He goes on to say:

We are convinced that, in the very near future, we shall be able to set up a complete system of air-defence in the Canal Zone, and that in the very near future we shall be able to balance Israel's air superiority and to reach parity with her in the air. That is because we are training hundreds of pilots and receiving hundreds of aircraft.

In these words, Nasser also hints at the vast aid which he is receiving from the Soviet Union. Is it any wonder, therefore, that Israel is emphasising the absolutely vital nature of her demands that she be enabled to acquire the arms needed for her defence? Does anyone believe that Nasser will agree to make peace with a weak Israel which is threatened with annihilation? Can we disregard the fact that Soviet pilots are continuing their operational flights, in addition to training Egyptian troops on land and in the air?

So long as the circumstances have not altered, Israel will continue to employ the methods that are being used now. She will not cease to defend herself, and therefore she will not desist from her efforts to prevent the installation of missile systems in the Canal area. She will not be misled by any cunning device deed to facilitate the setting up of missile batteries.

Even this realistic description of Nasser's intentions cannot weaken us in our endeavours to achieve peace and our agreement to a mutual and total cease-fire as a stage towards peace.

It is not from weakness and discouragement that we desire to hasten peace. We have no psychological block against revealing this desire of ours, as has been done on various occasions through the Government of Israel's authorised spokesmen.

Our forces stand firm along the front lines. The Israel Air Force operates efficiently in the execution of its missions. Our soldiers have raided across the Canal line in order to remind the Egyptian ruler that we shall not let him dictate the pace and scope of the war of attrition. Our trust in our own

strength does not distort our reasoning, and if our enemies hope for feebleness and internal weakness in Israel, they will be surprised—in future as in the past—by the people of Israel's moral stamina in its trials.

Members of the Knesset. The Government of Israel has remained faithful to the principles of its policy as expressed in the Government's programme and its authorised statements, and I see no reason to change them.

This policy leaves ample room for progress towards peace and contains basic principles which will safeguard Israel's existence, security and independence. These principles of the Government of Israel include all the elements required for a peace of mutual respect with our neighbours. According to the principles of this policy, we shall continue to strive to speed up progress towards peace.

The only thing that still prevents the realization of peace is the absence of any readiness on the part of our neighbours to stop the war and make peace with the sovereign Jewish State.

We hold fast to our confident faith that so long as we continue to safeguard our existence, this readiness on the part of our neighbours will come about one day.

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Speech by U.S.S.R. President Podgorny at a Dinner in Honor of Visiting U.A.R. President Nasser (Condensed)¹

Moscow, June 30, 1970

Allow me on behalf of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government to greet you most cordially, our dear friend Gamal Abdel Nasser, and also the statesmen and

politicians of the United Arab Republic who have arrived with you.

In greeting you we greet the representatives of a country with which the Soviet Union is united by strong ties of friendship and co-operation, the representatives of a people waging a courageous struggle against imperialist aggression, for national independence and freedom.

The people of the United Arab Republic is now in one of the active sectors of the struggle against the forces of imperialism and reaction. The aggression carried out by imperialism in the Middle East is not an isolated phenomenon. It is just one link in the chain of imperialist efforts intended to cut short the advance of the people towards freedom, peace and progress.

It is with this aim in view that the imperialists have unleashed a bloody war against the peoples of Vietnam and other countries of Indo-China, and are meddling in the affairs of Latin American states, provoking conflicts in Africa and opposing the efforts on behalf of security on the continent of Europe. They are intensifying the activities of NATO and other aggressive blocs and rattling the sabre in many parts of the world, widely resorting to methods of political and economic pressure and having recourse to treacherous ideological diversions and other forms of subversive activity.

Yet all these actions on the part of imperialism are meeting with a decisive, ever-increasing rebuff from the socialist and other progressive states, from the peoples and from all the forces which champion free and independent development in conditions of peace and international security.

Together with its friends, the Soviet Union firmly and consistently comes out in favour of the Middle East conflict being settled on the basis of observance of the well-known resolution of the Security Council, with due account being taken of the legitimate rights and interests of all the peoples of that area. And although the Israeli extremists still occupy Arab territories, pursue a policy of expansion and military pressure and drag out a settlement, justice is not on their side

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5550 (July 7, 1970), p. 5.

and time is working against them.

We are convinced that a just political settlement will be achieved and that peace will triumph in that area. A guarantee of this is the strengthening economic and defence potential of the United Arab Republic and other Arab states and their further internal consolidation. A guarantee of this is the growing unity of the Arab countries and peoples, and the pooling of their efforts in the struggle against the imperialist aggressors. A guarantee of this is the aid and all-round support given to the Arab countries and peoples by the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and all the progressive forces of the world.

Imperialist circles and reaction are doing everything they can to lessen the effect of these factors.

They want the Arab peoples to lose faith in the possibility of a just settlement and want to sow suspicion between the Arabs and their friends; they want to foment discord among them. In the last analysis the imperialists want to impose on the Arab states, under the conditions of a *diktat*, a settlement such as would consolidate the aggressor's advantages.

This is the obvious reason for the diplomatic manoeuvres of Israel and her western patrons.

The strengthening friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the United Arab Republic, the friendship between the socialist and Arab countries is instilling fear in the hearts of the enemies of peace and social progress. They are making persistent efforts to destroy this friendship. Yet no one will succeed in weakening and, still less so, in obliterating something which has been developing and growing stronger throughout the many years of common struggle against the forces of reaction and imperialism.

It is with great interest and understanding that the peoples of the Soviet Union are following the progressive development of the United Arab Republic as it carries out social and economic reforms in the interests of the people. There is no doubt that the people of the United Arab Republic will solve the

problems confronting it, whatever sinister plots and provocations the imperialists and international Zionist circles may resort to. Of course, on this great and far from easy road, there are and, possibly, still will be obstacles.

But the obstacles can be overcome and the attacks of the imperialists and their stooges can be repulsed if the correct road of development is chosen, if vigilance is maintained with regard to one's enemies, if, in one's struggle and work, one relies on sincere and reliable friends, and if the government and the people are united. We ardently wish the people of the United Arab Republic and its leaders new and great successes on the road they have chosen.

The Soviet Union will continue to help the Arab countries in their struggle for the removal of the consequences of Israeli aggression and for the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

We shall continue to develop still further the broad, equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and the United Arab Republic in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres, and shall continue to broaden contacts between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Union.

There is every reason for expressing satisfaction over the friendly relations between our states and peoples. These relations are another convincing proof of the strength and the fruitful nature of co-operation between the countries of socialism and the forces of the national liberation movement.

We are confident that the visit of the President of the United Arab Republic to the Soviet Union and the negotiations on questions of interest to both sides will help to strengthen still further our friendship and co-operation and will assist the successful struggle of the Arab peoples for the removal of the consequences of Israeli aggression and for achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

This, in turn, will undoubtedly have a favourable effect on the general situation

in the world and will promote a real easing of tension and stronger international security.

[At the end of his speech President Podgorny proposed a toast] to the unbreakable, ever-growing friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, to further successes of the Arab peoples in their struggle for freedom, peace and independence, and to the health of that outstanding figure in the national liberation movement, that tried and tested leader of the United Arab Republic, our great friend President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and to the health of all our Arab friends.

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Interview Statements on Spain's Possible Role as a Mediator in the Middle East Conflict by Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo of Spain¹

Madrid, June 30, 1970

Spain has never had, nor does it have now, any anti-Jewish feelings and, with the fundamental aim of bringing about a peace that would respect the decision of the United Nations, Spain would be willing to serve as a bridge between both parties.

[The role of mediator] would be compatible with our loyalty to the Arab world, providing that some practical solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees could be worked out.

We did not deal with this subject, nor was this a propitious occasion. For that the condi-

tions of the conflict involving our friends, the Arab countries, would have to change. But the occasion for the recognition of the state of Israel might present itself at some future time.

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Address on American Middle East Policy by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco²

Los Angeles, June 30, 1970

I would like to share with you a few brief impressions of a recent trip that I took to the Middle East in April, in which I had an opportunity for detailed discussions with President Nasser of Egypt, Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel, President Helou and Prime Minister Karame of Lebanon, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, as some of you may know, I did not quite make Jordan, where I had hoped to have discussions with our very good and close friend King Hussein. It is important that Americans reflect very seriously on events in the Middle East because this is an area that holds greater potential for danger and risks for world peace than any other area in the world over the coming 5 or 10 years.

One of the principal impressions that I came away with after these discussions was that the clouds of suspicion are everywhere in the area. Emotions and distrust run deep. There is a feeling of fatalism that events are inexorably moving toward a cycle of increased violence and counterviolence which has seemed irreversible up to this point.

I was struck, too, that as a reflection of this deep suspicion, the positions of the parties, if anything, had hardened since the June war of 1967. The Israelis, I found, remained convinced that Egypt has no intention of

¹ Original interview in *A.B.C.* (Madrid), June 30, 1970; English excerpts in *The Times* (London), July 1, 1970, p. 6.

² Address made to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council; text in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1624 (August 10, 1970), pp. 175-178. The questions and answers which followed were not printed in the *Bulletin*.

making peace with Israel on a permanent basis. And equally I found the view in Cairo that the U.A.R. remains unconvinced that Israel had any intention of withdrawing from the territories occupied during the June war. Moreover, I found that neither side really was convinced that time may be against them.

If one looks at the political evolution in the area, the movement is toward greater radicalism in the Arab world and away from the voices of moderation. There is the emotional and charged atmosphere, reflected by violence and counterviolence and hardened positions of the parties, all manifesting themselves in the strong feeling that the respective courses that each is pursuing at the present time offer no real alternatives.

Now, superimposed on the fundamental Arab-Israeli dispute is also the prospect of serious differences between the two major powers, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union, who have important interests in the area. The Soviet Union in recent months has installed SAM-3 missiles in Egypt. For the first time, their own personnel are there in an operational capacity. For the first time Russian pilots are flying operational missions. We view these developments with very deep concern, and we feel that it is potentially dangerous for the Soviets to have involved themselves as directly as they have in recent months.

So you have in the area the complicating feature of two major powers with important political, economic, and strategic interests—a situation where there is every reason in the world for some stabilization to be found. If this stabilization is not achieved, there is increased risk that the cycle of violence and counterviolence can one day in the future result in another renewal of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis. This in turn could confront the United States and the Soviet Union with very difficult choices and decisions indeed.

I believe that every avenue of diplomacy must be exhausted not only to achieve a reasonable stabilization of the area but also to achieve a stable peace between the parties,

because in the absence of that and in light of a probable continuation of the impasse we are seeing today, the risks increase that a general renewal of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis could again come to pass, with all the consequences that this might entail for the major powers. I have chosen these words carefully because I believe it is important for the American people to realize that the Middle East is likely to be a serious trouble spot over the next decade and could confront us with decisions which could be both difficult and painful.

In recent weeks, the United States has reviewed all aspects of current developments in the Middle East. We looked at the violence, at the present positions of the parties, at the Soviet involvement which has injected a new qualitative factor in the situation, and the rise of the Palestinian movement with its increasing strength as a formidable political force in the area. We were also struck by the fact that if a solution is not found the options of the parties in the area, as well as the major powers who have direct interests in this area, will tend to be more restricted and more circumscribed as the weeks and the months pass. The Palestinian movement represents, at a minimum, a politicizing of the refugee problem which has existed in the area for over 20 years.

Our purpose in trying to pursue a political settlement in the area is a very simple one: We felt that for 20 years the Middle East was an area of instability that was kept together largely on the basis of armistice arrangements, arrangements that gave rise to two wars in the period of 20 years which followed the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. And in an interdependent world, in which each of us is living in the other's backyards, the world can little afford even small wars.

What have we done in recent weeks? We have launched a new political initiative whose simple purpose is to try to get the parties to stop the fighting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, the representative appointed by the U.N. Secretary General pursuant to the U.N.

Security Council Resolution of November 1967, to try to achieve agreement between the parties based on that resolution. You will recall that resolution laid down the basic elements of a political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. It called for a just and lasting peace between the parties based on withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in 1967, freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, recognition on the part of all states in the area that all have a right to exist and to live within secure and recognized borders free from the threat or use of force, and a just solution to the refugee problem.

For nearly 18 months the United States has been negotiating bilaterally with the Soviet Union and at the United Nations in the fourpower talks on the basis of the U.N. Security Council resolution. The purpose of these talks has not been to impose a solution on the parties: the purpose has not been to take the place of a fundamental agreement between the parties. Their purpose has been to serve as a catalyst to get the negotiating process started between the Arabs and the Israelis. During this protracted period we have not been able to achieve common ground between the United States and the Soviet Union or between the major powers in the four-power talks in New York. The reason we have not been able to achieve common ground is largely a reflection of the broad fundamental gap between the positions of the parties that I described a moment ago: where one side does not believe the other is willing to get out of occupied territories and the other side does not believe that its adversaries really genuinely want to make peace with it.

Moreover, I must say very candidly there is a very serious question in our minds as to whether Soviet objectives in the Middle East in fact are parallel with those of the United States. I am convinced that the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States over the Middle East any more than the United States wants a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Neither do I believe that the Soviet Union wants a renewal of

Arab-Israeli hostilities any more than we do, because it confronts both of us with very tough choices indeed. But the big question mark is: Do the Russians really want the kind of stable peace that the United States is talking about, or do they see sufficient advantage in the turmoil, which, if it can be controlled, works in support of the objectives of the Soviet Union in the area and to our corresponding disadvantage? This is really the big question mark. This is what the U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks have been all about.

The American initiative we have taken this week is new at least in one important sense. The United States decided to go directly to the parties concerned in the area. Without going into the details of this proposal, I can say it is being actively considered by each of the principal parties at the present time. None has given any final reaction through diplomatic channels, where we will await a very serious and considered reply. But we went to the parties directly concerned in this particular instance because we wanted to make crystal clear the importance the United States attaches to the prompt beginning of talks now between the parties, under the umbrella of the U.N., within the framework of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. The key elements relate to the question of withdrawal and the question of peace. No proposal that any country makes in this particular area can get around the two key elements; these are the decisive elements because the parties themselves attach fundamental importance to them.

Now, it is very difficult to predict whether this latest U.S. effort will succeed or fail. During the period in which we will pursue this political initiative, the United States does not intend to comment specifically regarding military assistance to Israel. We are going to focus, as we have been, on making a major effort to try to get this new political initiative started successfully.

Now, this does not mean that American policy has changed. I think the United States has made it clear, amply clear, that we support the security of Israel. We support the territorial integrity and political indepen-

dence of Israel as we do other states in the area. We feel that now is the time to place primary emphasis on the question of achieving a political solution. This does not change our attitude with respect to how we feel about the balance of power in the area. Our political initiative does not change any fundamental policy insofar as the United States is concerned.

Now, you undoubtedly have seen in the press this morning that President Nasser has gone to Moscow. You may have noted with interest also that yesterday the Prime Minister of Israel made a major speech before the Knesset, and she did not choose to reply directly or substantively to the new American proposal. It will be a while before we hear, because there is a general recognition in the area that the U.S. initiative is an important new opportunity. And as one looks over the history—and it is really a very sad and a very tragic and a very painful history, for all of the peoples on both sides—one is struck with the fact that it has been a history of lost opportunities.

Now, we, as professional diplomats, tend to be optimists. We tend to be optimists in the sense that we never really talk in terms of the last chance or the last opportunity. But I am convinced of one thing: If we are not able in the foreseeable future to get a genuine negotiating process started between the parties, the developments in the area are evolving in such a way that the options for the future, both for the parties in the area as well as for the major powers, will become even more severely restricted than they are today. There have been a number of lost opportunities since the end of the June 1967 war. I would hope that this has not become another one of those lost opportunities, because this is a conflict which no longer can be considered, if it ever was, as one limited exclusively to the region of the Middle East.

The Mediterranean is an important area in the world. It is significant in terms of the southern flank of NATO and very important oil interests. Western Europe relies on Middle Eastern oil for roughly 50 percent of its needs and Japan for 90 percent. Now,

you can imagine the kind of dagger that would be at the throat of Western Europe if this oil were to fall into the hands of those whose objectives are inimicable to Western interests. Our interests in this area are significant not only in terms of the area itself but in the broadest sense from a worldwide point of view.

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Television Interview Statements on American Middle East Policy by U.S. President Nixon¹

Los Angeles, July 1, 1970

Mr. Smith: I can see a clock on the wall which indicates we haven't got a lot of minutes left. I want to ask you about the Middle East.

Mr. George Ball wrote an article in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine section in which he suggested that the Russians were bold enough to move into the Middle East because we were bogged down in Indochina. Do you accept that concatenation of the two events?

The President: As a matter of fact, Mr. Smith, Mr. Ball should know something about that because he was there when we got bogged down in Indochina, as you recall, as Under Secretary of State. I did not hear his comments at that time indicating that that was the problem.

Now, the second point that I would make is that if the United States, after this long struggle in Viet-Nam, if we do what Mr. Ball and some others apparently want us to do—just get out, without regard to the consequences—I do not see the American people and the American Congress then saying that if we couldn't do what was necessary where the

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's interview broadcast by the National Broadcasting Company, Columbia Broadcasting System and American Broadcasting Company; transcript printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1622 (July 27, 1970), pp. 112-113.

lives of American men were involved in Viet-Nam, that we will do what is necessary because we are concerned about Israel or some other state in the Mideast.

You cannot separate what happens to America in Viet-Nam from the Mideast or from Europe or anyplace else. That is why European leaders—some of them don't say it publicly, but privately they all know how much rides on the United States coming out of Viet-Nam not with a victory over North Viet-Nam but with a just peace, because if the United States is humiliated or defeated in Viet-Nam, the effect on the United States is what I am concerned about, the people of the United States. And I think we'll see a rampant isolationism in this country in which we will not do what we should do in other parts of the world.

If I can turn to the Middle East briefly because I think we should spend a moment on it, if you other gentlemen would like. I think, and I say this respectfully, that some of the columnists and commentators—and I read them and listen to them both with respect—and some of us in political life have a tendency to look at the Middle East too much in terms of the Israeli-Arab struggle. We look at Israel, a strong free nation in the Middle East, and we look at its neighbors, its aggressive neighbors, the U.A.R. and Syria, and we see this struggle, and we say, "Are we going to give planes to Israel and are the Russians going to give them to the U.A.R.? And how are we going to have a settlement between Israel and the Arab states?"

If that is all there was to it, it would not be as difficult a problem as I am going to put it. I think the Middle East now is terribly dangerous. It is like the Balkans before World War I—where the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a confrontation that neither of them wants because of the differences there.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. President, I believe the Russians today at the U.N. are circulating some new ideas about approaching peace negotiations

in the Mideast. Is there anything you can tell us about this?

The President: I haven't had a chance to study them yet, but I will say this: that any propositions that the Russians or anybody else circulate that would offer a chance to cool it in the Middle East would be helpful, because when you look at the Middle East, it is not just a case of, as I say, Israel versus the Arab states, but the Soviet Union is now moving into the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Mideast is important. We all know that 80 percent of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Mideast. We know that the Mideast, this area, this is the gateway to Africa; it's the gateway to the Mediterranean, it's the hinge of NATO, and it is also the gateway through the Suez Canal down into the Indian Ocean.

Now, under these circumstances, when we then look at it in terms of Israelis versus Arabs, moderate Arabs versus radical Arabs, and whoever would think that there would be somebody more radical than the Syrians, within the radical Arab states, *fedayeen* that are more radical, the superradicals—when we think of all these factors, we can see what a very difficult situation it is.

Now, what should U.S. policy be? I will summarize it in a word. One, our interest is peace and the integrity of every country in the area.

Two, we recognize that Israel is not desirous of driving any of the other countries into the sea. The other countries do want to drive Israel into the sea.

Three, then, once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker than its neighbors, there will be a war. Therefore, it is in U.S. interests to maintain the balance of power, and we will maintain that balance of power. That is why as the Soviet Union moves in to support the U.A.R., it makes it necessary for the United States to evaluate what the Soviet Union does, and once that balance of power is upset, we will do what is necessary to maintain Israel's strength vis-à-vis its neighbors, not because we want Israel to be in a position to wage war—that is not it—but because that is what will deter its

neighbors from attacking it.

And then we get to the diplomacy. The diplomacy is terribly difficult, because Israel's neighbors, of course, have to recognize Israel's right to exist. Israel must withdraw to borders, borders that are defensible. And when we consider all those factors and then put into the equation the fact that the Russians seem to have an interest in moving into the Mediterranean, it shows you why this subject is so complex and so difficult.

But we are going to continue to work on it, and I can assure you the fact that we are in Viet-Nam does not mean that the United States is not going to give every bit of its diplomatic and other energies to this subject as well.

Mr. Chancellor: Very briefly, Mr. President, would you say that the situation in the Middle East is as dangerous to the United States as the situation in Viet-Nam?

The President: Yes. The situation in Viet-Nam, fortunately, has reached the point where we are embarked on a plan which will get the United States out and which will bring a just peace. It will succeed. That I know.

Second, the situation in the Mideast is more dangerous, more dangerous because it involves—and this is not the case in Viet-Nam—a collision of the superpowers.

Neither Communist China, in my view, nor the Soviet Union will have a confrontation with the United States about Viet-Nam, although many have feared that. But it has not happened, and it will not happen, in my opinion.

But in the Mideast, because of the things that I have mentioned earlier, this tremendous power complex, it is not only the cradle of civilization, but it also, as we have already indicated, this is the area that controls so much of the world's people and the world's resources.

The Mideast, being what it is, is a potentially dangerous spot, and that is why it is in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union to work together to bring this particular danger spot under control.

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Press Conference Statements on French Middle East Policy by President Pompidou of France¹

Paris, July 2, 1970

Kassary [Maariv, Tel-Aviv]: Lors de votre conférence de presse du 10 juillet, vous avez parlé de l'éventualité d'un retour à l'embargo sélectif en ce qui concerne Israël. Un an après, et en prenant en considération la présence soviétique au Moyen-Orient, qu'en est-il?

M. le Président: Monsieur, depuis un an, en effet, il ne se passe pas de jour ni de semaine où quelqu'un ne dise ou ne se demande si notre politique en matière d'embargo se modifie, va se modifier, s'est modifiée. Les questionneurs et les informateurs sont infatigables! Ils me font penser à ces gens qui appellent éternellement le même numéro de téléphone, et qui ne sont pas découragés parce que le disque leur répond: "Il n'y a pas d'abonné au numéro que vous avez demandé". Eh bien, Monsieur, il n'y a pas d'abonné au numéro que vous avez demandé!

Elie Maissi [Ha'aretz]: Je me permettrai, Monsieur le Président, de poser une question plus générale au sujet de la situation créée en Méditerranée. Il me semble bien tout de même que depuis un an la situation stratégique en Méditerranée a été assez fortement modifiée, d'abord par la présence de forces accrues soviétiques en Egypte, ensuite par le fait que la France a fait savoir qu'elle a une politique méditerranéenne qu'elle suit actuellement. Que pouvez-vous nous dire là-dessus, Monsieur le Président?

M. le Président: La politique méditerranéenne de la France ne consiste pas à menacer la paix en Méditerranée, je peux vous le garantir. Ce que nous appelons "politique méditerranéenne", cela consiste à entretenir

¹ Excerpted from Pompidou's press conference as published in *Actualités-Documents*, No. 64 (1970), supplement to *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, No. 33-34 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), pp. 20-21, 23.

les meilleures relations possibles, les plus étroites, avec tous nos voisins méditerranéens sans exception, et par priorité avec les plus proches soit par la géographie, soit par l'histoire, mais avec tous.

Quant à l'équilibre des forces dont vous parlez, et dont il est tant question, eh bien, à nos yeux, il n'y a qu'une manière de rétablir cet équilibre des forces, c'est de faire la paix. Une fois encore, nous ne cessons de le répéter, il faut faire la paix au Moyen-Orient.

Certains jours, on espère, et le lendemain on désespère, mais il faudra bien y arriver, faute de quoi, effectivement, l'équilibre des forces ne cessera de se dégrader, et en particulier quoi qu'on fasse, il ne cessera de se dégrader au détriment d'Israël. C'est pourquoi il est de l'intérêt d'Israël plus que de personne d'autre d'aboutir à un règlement de paix, d'accepter un règlement de paix et tous les efforts que nous faisons, sans grand succès jusqu'ici, en particulier au sein de la Conférence des Quatre, tendent à ce but: faire la paix.

Paul Balta [Paris-Presse]: Monsieur le Président quelles sont, à votre avis, les conditions indispensables pour parvenir à un tel règlement, et quelles sont les chances d'y aboutir?

M. le Président: Je le répète, mon opinion sur ce point est que les chances varient sans cesse. Peut-être, en ce moment, sont-elles un peu meilleures qu'il y a un mois ou deux. Quant aux modalités du règlement, je me garderai bien de les donner.

Il n'y a pas de plan de règlement français, il ne doit pas y avoir de plan de règlement américain, et il ne doit pas y avoir de plan de règlement soviétique. Il faut, puisqu'eux seuls peuvent le faire, que les Quatre présentent un plan de règlement commun, car seul, un plan de règlement commun pourra être accepté par les uns et par les autres, et tout plan présenté isolément par une nation est automatiquement suspect à l'une des parties en présence.

Mais sur les données générales, vous connaissez notre position, elle résulte de la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité. Il est évident que les modalités sont très impor-

tantes; sur ces modalités, nous avons notre opinion; nous la défendons au sein de la concertation à Quatre, bien entendu, mais nous préférons ne pas la rendre publique.

Je le répète, nous ne cherchons pas, dans cette affaire, un succès de prestige, nous cherchons purement et simplement à rétablir la paix; je le dis une fois de plus, mais c'est un mot qu'on ne répète jamais assez dans le monde actuel.

Dominique Pado [L'Aurore]: Je voudrais pour la dernière question, revenir sur l'affaire du Moyen-Orient, qui est sans nul doute la question actuellement la plus grave, et qui, pour des raisons diverses, peut nous toucher aussi directement.

Vous avez dit tout à l'heure que votre Gouvernement s'employait à maintenir, ou du moins à essayer d'obtenir la paix, mais la paix, vous l'avez dit vous-même, c'est quelque chose de dur à obtenir. Toutes les parties sont intéressées, toutes les parties sont responsables.

Le Président Nixon a déclaré cette nuit que le déséquilibre des forces au Moyen-Orient s'opérant au détriment d'Israël nous conduirait obligatoirement à une guerre.

M. Maurice Schumann, à différentes reprises, a déclaré que la position du Gouvernement français pouvait évoluer suivant les circonstances.

Est-ce que vous ne pensez pas, vous aussi, que le fait de voir l'équilibre se détériorer au détriment d'Israël, c'est-à-dire les menaces se préciser, est-ce que vous ne pensez pas que cela aussi pourrait être un événement grave pouvant conduire non pas à la paix, mais au contraire à une extension du conflit?

M. le Président: C'est possible, en effet, et c'est pourquoi il est probablement préférable, plutôt que d'être là à peser les armes de chaque camp et à mesurer l'équilibre, de faire pression pour aboutir à la paix, car si la politique qui affirme avoir pour objectif la paix consiste simplement à fournir un peu plus d'armes à l'un, puis un peu d'armes à l'autre, pour que les deux plateaux de la balance soient égaux, ou qu'il y ait déséquilibre, le risque est grave, et grave pour tout le monde.

Donc je pense que plus que jamais la paix, et la paix rapide, est nécessaire. Je pense plus que jamais que le temps travaille contre Israël, et que rien ne serait plus grave, non seulement pour Israël, mais pour le monde entier, que de transformer un conflit qui, à l'heure actuelle est certes déplorable, mais du moins est localisé, en un conflit généralisé entre deux très grandes puissances. Pour le coup, ce serait un désastre mondial. Mais cela ne dépend pas de nous malheureusement, que de ramener tout le monde à la conception dont je parle, c'est-à-dire à la nécessité d'une paix négociée rapide.

Mesdames et messieurs, je crois vraiment, et le fait que les dernières questions posées soient revenues sur des sujets déjà traités le prouve, m'être prêté à vos questions très librement et que tous les sujets possibles ont pu être abordés.

Je vous remercie infiniment de votre attention.

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Commentary on the U.S. June 19 Proposals in the U.S.S.R. Weekly New Times¹

Moscow, July 3, 1970

The continuing Israeli aggression is increasingly alarming world opinion. For the Middle East remains pregnant with the danger of a major international conflict. Hence the keen interest evinced everywhere in every move offering the slightest hope that a peaceful settlement of the crisis can be brought nearer.

The world press is now commenting on the announcement made on June 25 by Secretary of State William Rogers—that the U.S. was putting forward new proposals to deal with the situation. But what strikes one above all is that although the actual proposals have not been made public—

according to the Secretary of State they have been brought to the attention of the "parties and other interested powers" through diplomatic channels—the dominant note in the press comment, the American included, is one of scepticism and reserve. For everyone remembers the U.S. "peace proposals" advanced last December by Rogers by means of which Washington sought (true, in a veiled form) to find a way to meet Israel's expansionist claims at the expense of the vital interests of the Arab countries.

Since then the international situation has changed considerably. The U.S. Cambodian adventure, instead of bringing the end of the Vietnam war closer, as the White House and the Pentagon promised, has had the opposite effect: the war has spread to all of Indo-China and there is no end in sight. America's prestige has fallen even in the eyes of its allies. And this naturally cannot but influence U.S. diplomacy in other areas of the world.

The Washington-backed Israeli aggression threatens finally to undermine the positions of the U.S. in the Middle East. When they encouraged Israel to embark on this aggression, the U.S. rulers counted on using their Tel Aviv stooges to overthrow the progressive regimes in the Arab countries and thereby to strengthen their own strategic and economic positions in this quarter. But contrary to the expectations of the U.S. imperialists, the progressive Arab regimes have grown stronger. More, they have been reinforced by the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolutions in Sudan and Libya. Consequently, too, open support of Israel faces the U.S. policy-makers with the danger of losing their last foothold in the Middle East. Hence the manoeuvring typical of U.S. diplomacy to create a semblance of a move towards meeting the Arab countries halfway. In the light of the developments of the recent period, one can well understand those who see in the latest U.S. proposals just another diplomatic manoeuvre.

There is also another reason for taking a cautious approach to the U.S. proposals. It will be remembered that Washington made

¹Published in *Novaya Vremya*, the Russian edition of *New Times*, on July 3, 1970; this text from *New Times* (English edition), No. 27 (July 8, 1970), p. 7.

an analogous move last year at the time of the Arab summit in Rabat. The latest proposals seem to have been similarly timed; they came immediately after the Arab leaders' meeting in Tripoli. The impression is that Washington's "peace initiatives" are designed not so much to facilitate a genuine peaceful political settlement in the Middle East as to use them to disrupt the crystallizing unity of the Arab countries and drive wedges between them. How else could one explain the fact that, judging by the information that has found its way into the press, Rogers' proposals provide for leaving the Golan Heights in Israeli hands on the plea that Syria has not accepted the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967? As if Israel accepted this resolution with its provisions for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories they seized in June 1967. Clearly, this "concession" to the aggressor is intended to set the Arab countries one against another.

Some of the U.S. proposals may of course contain constructive elements and should therefore not be rejected a priori, before we are fully acquainted with them. However, Rogers' statement that "our policy vis-à-vis Israel remains constant" gives good cause to doubt the sincerity of this "political initiative the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting." The constancy of Washington's policy would suggest that as hitherto it is in agreement with the expansionist ambitions openly propounded by Israeli leaders. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, and General Moshe Dayan have all repeatedly confirmed in recent weeks that Israel intends to annex large areas of Arab territory, including the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the Arab part of Jerusalem, and Sharm el Sheikh on the Sinai Peninsula. Indicative too is their stand in regard to occupied West-bank Jordan. Eban, for instance, has declared that Israel's "security frontier" must run along the River Jordan.

If the U.S. continues to support this aggressive policy—and one gathers from Rogers' statement that it does—what is the

positive value for peace of the new U.S. initiative?

The bloodshed can be stopped and a just peace settlement achieved in the Middle East only if the stipulations of the Security Council's November resolution are strictly carried out. And these are the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and due regard for the rights and interests of all the countries and peoples in this area. The U.S. plan could be useful if this were its purpose. But if it is aimed only at pleasing the aggressor, it is bound to share the fate of the previous American proposals. It will be rejected by the Arab countries and rightly so.

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Comment on U.S. President Nixon's July 1 Statements on the Middle East in a Speech by Premier Chou En-lai of China¹

Peking, July 5, 1970

Moreover, Nixon has put forward a deceptive proposal for a "political solution" of the Middle East question. He even said in a threatening tone that the situation in the Middle East is like the Balkans before World War I and that it is more dangerous than Indo-China. In so doing, he obviously wants to intimidate certain countries into helping him create a Munich in the Middle East, in Indo-China and in other parts of the world, a worldwide Munich.

However, now is no longer the time of the Munich! It is definitely not U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in various countries, but the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples who decide the destiny of Palestine and the Arab world and the three Indo-Chinese

¹ Excerpted from the English text of Chou En-lai's speech at a banquet welcoming exiled Head of State of Cambodia Sihanouk in *Peking Review*, XIII, 28 (July 10, 1970), pp. 7-8.

peoples who decide the destiny of Indo-China. No military adventure or political deception can save them from their doom of complete defeat in these regions.

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Since World War II, U.S. imperialism, taking the place of the German, Japanese and Italian fascists and taking advantage of its position as a victor state, has made energetic efforts to expand its spheres of influence in a vain attempt to dominate the world. It has sent large numbers of troops to be stationed on the territory of many countries, carried out interference, control, subversion and sabotage everywhere, and incessantly launched wars of aggression against the people of various countries. U.S. imperialism helped the Chiang Kai-shek clique fight a civil war in China. It launched a war of aggression against Korea and at the same time forcibly occupied China's territory Taiwan. It has torn up the Geneva Agreements and carried out aggression against Viet Nam, against Laos and now further against Cambodia, expanding the war of aggression to the whole of Indo-China. It provoked border conflicts on the Asian sub-continent. It has been supporting Israeli Zionism in committing aggression against Palestine and Arab countries, resulting in the present grave situation in the Middle East. It also sent troops to the Lebanon in a vain attempt to suppress the Iraqi revolution.

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Exchange of Letters Between U.S. Congressman Hamilton and the State Department on President Nixon's July 1 Statements on the Middle East¹

July 7 and 24, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was highly disturbed by President Nixon's comment of July 1 that it is the intention of the Arab states to drive Israel into the sea.

This seems to me to be a most unfortunate statement. My understanding is that the U.A.R., Jordan, and Lebanon have each supported the United Nations' resolution of November 1967 as the basis of settlement. I know there are major differences to be resolved, but it does not advance a peaceful settlement for the President to misstate so grossly the Arab position.

Upon calling the Department of State to determine if this statement reflected the President's interpretation of Mideast events, I was told that it was an "oversimplified" discussion of the situation.

I regard the use of the term "oversimplified" as a wildly inaccurate euphemism that does not adequately portray the potentially damaging impact the President's comment may have on prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON
Member of Congress

Dear Congressman Hamilton:

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of July 7 in which you commented on the statement of the President in his July television interview that it is the intention of the Arab states to drive Israel into the sea.

When the President spoke about the Middle East situation in his July 1 television interview, he was emphasizing US policy with particular reference to the greater, more di-

¹ *Congressional Record*, July 27, 1970, p. E7057.

rect and increasingly provocative Soviet military involvement in the area, particularly in Egypt. The President's remarks were intended to bulwark the US political initiative outlined by Secretary Rogers on June 25.

When the President stated that it was the intention of the Arab states of drive Israel into the sea, he was not referring to the Arab moderate states but to certain Arab radical nations and movements whose actions and rhetoric have contributed to the belief that if Israel faltered its existence would be in jeopardy. That, of course, is why we believe it is so important to displace the hate and mistrust of the past 22 years with a just and lasting peace based on the principles contained in the UN Security Council Resolution of November 1967. If the very existence of Israel is not still an open question among some Arab states and movements, then it might be asked why they refuse to accept the provisions of the Security Council Resolution.

A look at the record supports this conclusion, particularly with regard to Syria. Syria has consistently refused to accept the Security Council Resolution which, among other equally important points, calls for: "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for an acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." Syria also refuses, as called for in the resolution, to accept the Secretary General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, who was mandated to "promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of the resolution." Syria has also been an active supporter of irregular Arab forces—certain radical elements of the fedayeen—whose avowed purpose is to alter fundamentally the nature of the state of Israel.

I am also enclosing for your information the relevant portion of the Assistant Secretary Sisco's interview July 12 on "Meet the Press" dealing with the question you have raised in your letter.

I hope the above explanation and the enclosed material will be helpful to you.

Sincerely,
DAVID M. ABSHIRE
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

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Statement by the Embassy of Israel in the U.S. on the Soviet Military Role in the U.A.R.¹

Washington, July 7, 1970

1. The Soviet operation of SA-III missiles against Israeli aircraft in the Suez Canal battle zone represents a further and unprecedented phase of direct Russian military escalation. The new SAM-III's are a part of the sophisticated ground-to-air missile system covering the Suez Canal sector which Russian military personnel have helped set up in recent days. Some details of the new system were revealed in a public announcement on July 6 by the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Lt. General Haim Bar-Lev. He said:

Joint efforts have been made in recent weeks by the Russians and the Egyptians to emplace ground-to-air missiles in the area of the Canal with the aim of depriving us of freedom of action in the air along the length of the Canal, and to enable the Egyptians to concentrate and escalate their war effort in this region. About a dozen SA-II missile batteries have been put into position, as well as at least another two SAM-III batteries, designed to cover the SAM-II's of longer range. We discovered the system fairly quickly and attacked it. In these attacks three of our planes were hit by SA-II missiles. I believe that five SAM-II batteries received direct hits by our planes and another two were partially damaged.

¹ *Policy Background: Russian Military Intervention—The Third Phase: Soviet-Manned SAM-III's Move into Suez Canal Battle Zone* (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Israel, July 7, 1970), pp. 1-4.

To the best of our knowledge, the SAM-III is manned by the Russians. The SAM-II is, we think, manned by Egyptians, but there are a number of Russian officers attached to each battery who serve as more than advisors. The Russian hand is clearly felt throughout the whole of this system, in design, operation and direction of the batteries.

The Chief of Staff went on to state that SAM-III's were among the hundreds of missiles that have been fired at Israeli aircraft since the ground-to-air system was put into operation on the night of June 29-30. Its range covers the central sector of the Suez Canal.

2. The emplacement of the missile system to cover the Canal battle zone represents the third phase in the progression of escalatory military steps undertaken directly by the Soviets since March. In that month Russia first introduced its SAM-III's into the Egyptian heartland and brought in thousands of military personnel to install and man them.

The second phase came in mid-April when Russian pilots, based on Egyptian airfields and flying Mig-21's, began carrying out combat missions over Egyptian airspace, with orders to intercept and engage Israeli planes, thus assuming responsibility for the air defense of the Egyptian interior. This, in turn, released Nasser's resources in order to resume his strategy of attrition after a period of deescalation that Israel's air responses had brought about. Freed from the need to disperse his forces inside Egypt, Nasser was able to move units from the rear into the Canal zone. These included SAM-II's which had been emplaced around military installations inside Egypt, as well as a substantial number of anti-aircraft units.

What has now occurred—the extension of the ground-to-air missile network from the Egyptian heartland to cover the Canal proper—is the latest manifestation of the Soviet decision to provide direct military support to the Egyptian armed forces. In so doing, the Soviet Union has registered two new facts: it has now, itself, entered the war of attrition against Israel as a direct belligerent; and it has escalated that war to a new and crucial height.

3. In the view of the Israeli analysts, this contingency was rendered inevitable as the Soviet build-up continued through March, April, May and June without vigorous censure from the West. Already in March the trend of direct Soviet military involvement began to emerge, and it was clear that in the absence of some appropriate response the Soviets would continue to escalate their presence. Israel, on its part, had made an urgent case for additional aircraft supplies. It had asked the U.S. for planes, knowing all too well that, without them, the already fragile arms balance would deteriorate to a perilous degree. It believed, too, that their supply at that time, in March, would have served to effectively demonstrate to Russia that its act had not gone unregistered. Instead, on March 23, more than a week after Russian SAM-III's and combat units had entered Egypt, Washington announced that the decision on Israel's aircraft request was being held "in abeyance." This, plus the assertion that the SA-III missiles had been installed in Egypt for "defensive" purposes only, opened the way for further Soviet escalation. Israel strongly contested the U.S. assessment. It argued that the installation of the missiles was an aggressive, not a defensive act; that they were there in support of Nasser's offensive attrition strategy and hence must be seen as fulfilling an offensive function. This was soon proven to be correct when Nasser resumed his attrition war during that same month. By labelling the missiles "defensive", a degree of license was accorded the very Russian military presence, and Moscow interpreted it in this light.

Israeli spokesmen expressed the view that the apparent tolerance towards the Soviet positioning of combat units and missiles in Egypt, coupled with the vacillation displayed towards Israel's legitimate aircraft needs, must inevitably invite further Soviet boldness. This fear was expressed in a "Policy Background" paper issued by this Embassy on March 26, after the public announcement that the decision on Israel's order for aircraft was being held in abeyance. The following observation was made:

Certainly, the U.S. decision is rendered particularly grave when measured against the Russian actions to increase the Arab military potential, backed by an increased Soviet military presence in Egypt. The absence of a positive U.S. response to Israel's request for aircraft at this time is liable to be interpreted by the Soviet Union as an assurance that its continued military and political support for the Egyptian attrition strategy may go forward and be further intensified without hindrance.

Regrettably, the forecast proved correct. A few weeks later, in mid-April, the Russians began flying their combat missions over Egyptian skies. Once again, this phase-two of the Russian involvement entered into effect with hardly a ripple of censure, thus emboldening the Soviets to proceed to the third phase, namely the installation of the SAM-II and SAM-III missiles covering the Canal area. One must but assume that the Soviets are now waiting to see what concrete response, if any, their latest action is going to evoke. It might be reasonably predicted that if the response is again to be passive they will push on to stage four, and the prospect of Soviet pilots entering the Canal zone proper and beyond is not to be discounted.

4. Much as it may ring obsolete in terminology and strategy, the fact is that Russia is playing power politics in the Middle East and it cannot be expected to deescalate unless given reasonable cause to do so. What it seeks is hegemony and out of this ambition stems the intrinsic alliance of interests between the Soviet leaders and Nasser. Through this alliance, President Nasser is provided by the Soviet Union with all the support, military and political, direct and indirect, to wield the power he seeks as the unchallenged regional ruler. He, in return, has provided the Soviets with the base they have long sought to penetrate the Middle East in depth and establish hegemony over it. The quest for dominion of the one is the instrument for the expansion of power and influence of the other.

Hence the Soviet refusal to cooperate with, promote, or even entertain any plan for a settlement that might lead to a true and last-

ing peace. What the Russians seek is to dictate the terms of a new Mideast order, one which in deference to the client states will deny Israel both peace and security.

This explains why Russia has entered Egypt, why it has now engaged directly in the battle against Israel, and why it will continue to escalate that battle unless given grounds to desist. The immediate arena is the war of attrition. The goal, however, is hegemony in the Middle East, to be achieved in either of two ways: The dictation of a Soviet-styled settlement by political measures, or the subjugation of Israel by military measures with the Soviet Union providing the assistance necessary to make Arab arms effective. In both cases, the Soviet predominance over the region will have been achieved.

This is the crux of the issue now being contested along the Suez Canal cease-fire line. Immediately at hand is the attempt to wrest control of the Canal region airspace from Israel's hands, the command of the air being the key element in Israel's ability to maintain the cease-fire line. The Soviets have come a long way in providing Egypt with assistance towards that end.

The battle is a crucial one because on its outcome depends the future national integrity of democratic Israel and also, in large measure, the future course of the Middle East as a whole. Israel's position has been clearly enunciated. It has made plain its resolve not to be intimidated or deterred, but will continue to defend itself along the cease-fire lines for the sake of its own security and eventual lasting peace.

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Radio Interview on American Middle East Policy with Ambassador of Israel to the U.S. Rabin¹**Washington, July 9, 1970**

Announcer: To hear an Israeli evaluation of the US position and Israel's expectations, we contacted our Ambassador in Washington, Yitshaq Rabin, this evening. Dan Halperin first asked what demands Israel was now making to the United States.

Rabin: I think that at the moment Israel's main demands are concentrated on a confirmation of—the acquisition of means, mainly weapons; easy terms for buying the weapons that will permit Israel to deal with the enormously increased Soviet intervention; and US warnings against additional Soviet ventures, especially a closer Soviet approach to the Canal.

Q: Do you think the Soviets will in fact try to draw nearer to the Canal?

Rabin: I am unable to say for certain that they will not. I think that at the moment the key is both in Israel's capacity to act on the one hand, and the Soviet evaluation of the genuineness of the US government declarations.

Q: Do you think Nixon's statement in the famous television interview proves that there has been a new US perceptiveness in the US attitude to Soviet intentions, or was it merely another press conference?

Rabin: I do not think—there is no increased perception here of the Soviet intentions. In my opinion, such perceptiveness already existed. The question facing the United States is: what shall we do? The United States is faced with a certain dilemma, at least from its point of view. The problem is do what we think, the problem is what the United States thinks. Its dilemma is: Can it on the one hand continue to curb the

Soviets without losing the shaky relations it still has with the Arab world? How, in fact, to eat the cake and have it too, more or less.

Q: In Moscow, as regards the talks between Abd an-Nasir and the Soviet rulers: Do you think the United States believes the Rogers proposals might be accepted by the Soviet Union and Egypt?

Rabin: I do not know what the US thinks. I believe they are waiting to hear. I doubt whether the Russians and the Egyptians are capable of accepting the proposals. They rejected them, or similar ones, in the past. I also doubt that they will openly reject them. I believe they will reject them in a not no and not yes manner—that they will try, basing themselves on the new facts created and perhaps to be created in the Middle East, to enter into a (?minute political analysis) in order to lessen US demands, and to bring them nearer to Russian or Egyptian or other proposals.

Q: The Russians presented to the big-four talks a memorandum containing their own peace proposals. Does this represent a change in their policy?

Rabin: First of all, there was no complete new Soviet proposal. I am really sorry that the greatest publicity given to the allegedly new Soviet proposals was in the Israeli press, at least so it appears from here. All the Soviets have presented is a change of formulation in two clauses which have no significance and have nothing to do with the essence of the Arab-Israeli problem and [word indistinct] the solution it needs.

Q: A last question. Can we expect, as far as you know from the information in your possession, any US response to the demands you mentioned which we have presented?

Rabin: I will not go into details. As you will recall, the US Government stated that it would not go into details of the military aid given to Israel and I think that, so long as this is the US request, I will honour it. I will only say that I am not pessimistic, but I am not sure we shall get everything we want. We shall get much less.

¹ Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3427/A/6 and A/7, reprinted by permission.

Q: Do you mean in the political field, or also in the military sphere?

Rabin: I do not want to go into details.

Announcer: Our correspondent spoke to Mr. Rabin before publication of the Soviet programme.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Central African Republic President Bokassa to the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)¹

Moscow, July 11, 1970

His Excellency, General Jean-Bedel Bokassa, President and head of the Government of the Central African Republic, was in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit from July 1st to 11th, 1970, at the invitation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Union and the Central African Republic condemn the imperialist policy in the Middle East and in Indochina, and state their solidarity with the peoples fighting for freedom, national independence and territorial integrity of their states.

Having exchanged views on the Middle East situation, the two Sides voiced anxiety over Israel's continued occupation of the territories of Arab countries.

The Soviet Union and the Central African Republic declare support for the Arab countries in their effort to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression and secure a fair and lasting peace in this region and in conformity with UN decisions and the Security Council resolution of November 22nd, 1967, and reaffirm that the evacuation of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab

territories represents an indispensable condition for a Middle East settlement.

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Television Interview with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco on U.S.S.R. and U.S. Policy in the Middle East¹

July 12, 1970

Mr. Newman: Our guest today on "Meet The Press" is the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco. Secretary Sisco is the United States negotiator in the current Middle East talks with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the President said that the situation in the Middle East is "terribly dangerous . . . and the United States and the Soviet Union could be drawn into a confrontation."

Now, many Americans fear that we may be on the verge of a shooting war with the Soviet Union. Is there danger of the U.S.-Soviet military confrontation over the Middle East?

Sisco: There is a danger, Mr. Spivak, that events can develop in such a way that they can lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the moment we are pursuing a very important political initiative in hope that we can get the parties to stop shooting and start talking. We think this is the best way at the moment to try to alleviate the difficult situation that confronts us.

Spivak: Mr. Secretary, there are some Americans who look upon the Middle East problem just as a dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis, and they can see no reason why the United States should get more deeply involved. Why should we get more deeply involved?

Sisco: Mr. Spivak, we have very important

¹ English text in *Moscow News*, Supplement to No. 29 (July 18, 1970), pp. 10, 11.

¹ Broadcast on National Broadcasting Company television and radio program "Meet the Press"; transcript provided by Merkle Press for NBC.

interests in the Middle East. The Mediterranean is important in terms of strategic interest to the United States. The Middle East is a gateway not only to the Persian Gulf, but to the Indian Ocean. It is important in terms of our policy in Africa. We have got important political interests there, we have got a number of friends, including Israel, as well as a number of friends among the Arab world, and we have got a number of very crucial economic interests in the area.

Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the United States has indicated on a number of occasions that it will provide Israel with additional aircraft if it is convinced that she needs them for her defense.

In view of what you have just said about our vital interests in the situation in the Middle East, can you tell us whether the United States is convinced today that Israel needs the additional aircraft for defense?

Sisco: We feel that the heavier Soviet involvement has injected a new qualitative factor into the situation. Both the President and the Secretary of State have made it very clear that we are going to do whatever is necessary to assure that the balance does not tip against Israel. Mr. Spivak, I cannot get into the specifics of the military aspects of this thing during the period in which we are pursuing this political initiative. I would only reaffirm quite categorically that the United States is resolved to do everything that is necessary to maintain the balance in the area.

Spivak: Can you tell us whether we now think the balance has tipped or whether we think it soon will tip?

Sisco: The balance has been affected by the more direct involvement of the Soviet Union, both in the hinterland of Egypt, as well as with the positioning of SAM-2's and SAM-3's in areas in close proximity to the Suez Canal. It has been affected, and this is what I meant when I said a qualitative factor has been injected in this situation simply because the Soviets now for the first time are operating in Egypt in an operational capacity.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Sisco, you have mentioned that the United States would do everything necessary to maintain the balance between Israel and the Arabs, and you spoke of the danger of a confrontation between the two great powers. Does this mean United States forces would become involved on the side of Israel if the Russians became involved in a full-scale war on the side of the Arabs?

Sisco: There are no plans, Mr. Smith, for involvement of American forces. My response to Mr. Spivak was within the context of the question, as to what military assistance the United States is or intends to provide Israel in the future.

At the moment, Mr. Smith, we are pursuing an important political initiative to try to get the shooting stopped and to get the parties to begin talking under Jarring's auspices. We think this is very important. We think if we can get the parties talking that there is some hope of developing some flexibility between the two sides which would offer an opportunity for progress.

Smith: Let me be a little bit more specific. The White House has spoken recently of expelling the Soviet advisors and the combat pilots who have become involved in the defense of Egypt.¹ Does it mean by this that U.S. forces would be necessary, or what can we realistically do to get the Soviets out of Egypt?

Sisco: As you know, Mr. Smith, the word "expel" was further elaborated on and explained subsequently. I would merely say

¹ The U.S. Administration gave two "private" background briefings on the subject of Soviet military involvement in the Middle East prior to President Nixon's television statements on July 1. One was a four-hour session at which newspaper and television executives were briefed, according to a White House announcement, by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's National Security Advisor (to whom the statement about "expelling" the Russians is generally attributed), John W. Vogt, Jr., Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The second was a briefer session for White House reporters.

Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler later denied any intention to use U.S. troops to push the Russians out of the Middle East, but did maintain that the American Administration would like to see Soviet personnel "removed" from the area. (See *New York Times*, July 3, 1970, pp. 1-2 and July 4, 1970, pp. 1, 5.)

to you that we are interested in reducing Soviet influence in the area. The best possible way to reduce the Soviet influence is to achieve a political settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides, and that means a settlement that will protect the security of Israel but also meets the principal concerns of the Arab states, and I would include here the Palestinians as well.

Smith: Do you sense in the growing Soviet role in Egypt's defense a basic change in Soviet strategy in the Middle East that is going from what has been essentially a defensive role in Egypt on to an offensive role?

Sisco: The question that is raised with respect to the Soviet role gets focused principally on the developments of the last month or six weeks. For example, we are particularly concerned over the creeping process we have seen in the last few weeks. It raises the question: Is this defensive or is it intended to afford the opportunity to Egypt to press its announced war of attrition against Israel and to challenge and to win the control of the air over the Suez Canal?

You must bear in mind, Mr. Smith, that it is only as recent as a speech at Bengasi that President Nasser made very, very clear that if Egypt should wrest air control over the Suez this would afford the opportunity to press the war of attrition further against Israel.

Mr. Rogers: Mr. Secretary, you have made clear that there is a Russian incursion into Egypt which poses a great threat. Could you be more specific and say precisely, for example, how many, what number of Russian technicians there are, how many shiploads, how many planeloads of supplies, how many generals?

Sisco: I would say—and this is a rough guess—that there are anywhere between eight to ten thousand Soviets in Egypt today. Our intelligence has noted in recent weeks a substantial increase, not only in the number of loadings, but also the number of ships that have arrived in Egypt, as well as a number of air transports.

I would go further, Mr. Rogers. We have noticed, for example, quite recently that there

has been a shipment of amphibious equipment.

Rogers: Landing craft to carry troops to make landings?

Sisco: That is correct.

Rogers: You say the balance of power has been affected, the military balance is affected. By this I take it you mean adversely in respect to the Israeli point of view?

Sisco: I would use merely General Bar-Lev's statement to explain that. What he said was this, that Israel continues to retain control of the air, but the control has been limited by virtue of what has been done in recent weeks.

You must bear in mind, Mr. Rogers, that, from the point of view of Israel, the defense of the cease fire lines depends primarily on its capacity to maintain control of the air over that particular area.

Rogers: In view of that, can I ask you point blank: Has a decision been made to supply planes to Israel?

Sisco: I cannot comment specifically on that, Mr. Rogers, during the course and during the period in which we are pursuing this political initiative, but I will repeat what I said to Mr. Spivak: The President has made it very clear that we intend to support the security of Israel, and I think that you can just take that at face value.

Mr. Valeriani: To follow up, Mr. Sisco, Newsweek Magazine will say in its new issue that President Nixon has ordered the Pentagon to rush a shipment of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel along with top secret electronic equipment that jams radar. Can you confirm or deny that report?

Sisco: I can neither confirm nor deny that report, Mr. Valeriani. I am not going to get into the details of what we may have been doing or are doing with respect to military assistance for Israel.

Valeriani: At the time that Secretary of State Rogers announced the new American peace initiative, he said the situation was so sensitive that he did

not want to talk about either military aid to Israel or the details of the proposal, and then ten days ago President Nixon talked about the Middle East in rather harsh words, calling Egypt and Syria aggressive and saying that some other countries wanted to drive Israel into the sea.

Isn't there an inconsistency in the approach here?

Sisco: There certainly isn't, Mr. Valeriani.

The Secretary of State, in announcing that initiative, declared a moratorium on one specific thing: namely, he wasn't going to get into the details of the military assistance aspect for Israel any more than I have gotten into the details here today. There was no moratorium with respect to what the Soviets are doing in the area. A check of that press conference will indicate that the Secretary of State underscored with great seriousness the feelings that we have with respect to this encroaching role of the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State himself has brought this to the attention of the Soviets on several occasions, and what the President had to say on July 1st was the result of a systematic, careful study of all of the information which the President ordered in late April.

We have had a number of National Security Council meetings on this. I personally have discussed this matter with the President on several occasions in the last four or six weeks, and as recently as the last 48 hours, so that the judgments that have been expressed by the President on July 1st were the result of a careful consideration and evaluation by this administration, and the Soviet factor, I might say, Mr. Valeriani, has been taken into account in our strategy throughout because we are up against both a political as well as a military strategy from the Soviet Union.

Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, if you were trying to get the Arabs into a very delicate negotiating process, how is it going to help by calling them aggressive and saying they want to drive Israel into the sea?

Sisco: Mr. Valeriani, what was being referred to there was simply this: Let's look at the record for just a moment. You have Syria that has never accepted the Security

Council resolution, has been unwilling to meet with Jarring and has never talked in terms of a political solution.

You have the Palestinians, a variety of groups with a variety of opinions, but none has come out explicitly for a political solution based on coexistence with Israel.

We have also, as the background, a recent speech by President Nasser which talked in terms of wresting control over the Suez Canal, which would afford an opportunity for pursuing the war of attrition further against Israel. You have the Egyptian spokesman in the last two weeks basically repeating this same line.

It is important, Mr. Valeriani, for all concerned to know that we are very anxious to achieve a political solution, that we are quite flexible politically. We have put forward some new propositions, but it is also equally important for all to know that we are keenly aware that the context [in] which we are pursuing this political initiative and that the political initiative offer a new opportunity in a very difficult situation.

Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you have been negotiating with the Soviet Union for a great many months, I understand. Can you give us any idea what some of the major stumbling blocks are?

Sisco: I certainly can, Mr. Spivak. First of all, the three key issues have been the question of negotiation; the question of peace between the parties; the question of withdrawal; and I would add a fourth: the question of the refugees. We feel that this time what we need is a peace agreement, not a de facto armistice arrangement which existed for 20 years and gave rise to several wars during the period. We agreed with the Soviets as late as last September that negotiations ought to be pursued on the basis of the so-called Rhodes model. In other words, this was a proposition that afforded both sides to engage in both indirect and direct discussions. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union backed off, so there is no meeting of the minds as yet as to how the negotiations, as a matter of form, should proceed.

Secondly, we have been absolutely insistent

that the future agreement must be a peace between the parties in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal commitments in relationship to each other. The Soviet proposals have fallen short in this regard.

Third, obviously, withdrawal is a key element. Withdrawal from the territories occupied during the June war is a key element of the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November, 1967.

Spivak: Withdrawal from all occupied territories?

Sisco: No, and this is what the argument is all about. The Security Council Resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied during 1967. I was engaged in the negotiations for months of that resolution. That resolution did not say "total withdrawal." That resolution did not say "withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines." That resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other words, the question of the final borders, Mr. Spivak, is a matter of negotiations between the parties.

Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you have been talking to the Soviets for some time. Have you come to agreement on anything significant?

Sisco: There are a number of points that we have agreed on. For example, I think at least formally speaking, there is a clear understanding that any agreement has to be based on the recognition of the right of all states in the area to exist. There is a large measure of agreement with respect to the right of all states to use the international waterways in the area. We are coming close to the point where, hopefully, there is more understanding that an agreement really has to be based on commitments to make peace with one another. But the fundamental differences, Mr. Spivak, are two: the question of withdrawal, as I have described it a moment ago; and secondly, how do you solve the question of refugees in a way in which it meets the concerns of both sides.

Smith: Let me follow up, Mr. Sisco, and put it just bluntly. Do you think the Soviets want a political settlement in the Middle East?

Sisco: Mr. Smith, we have been operating on the assumption that it is not in the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States to allow things to evolve in such a way in the area to where it increases the risk of confrontation. We have also been operating on the assumption that it is no more to the interest of the Soviet Union to allow things to come to the point where there is a general renewal of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis. Other things being equal, I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Union has been deriving unilateral advantage from the present turmoil in the area, but the Soviet Union, in assessing as to whether it wants a political solution or not, must weigh whatever unilateral advantage it has been deriving in recent months. It must weigh that against the risk of this thing getting out of control, as it did just before the June war, and confronting both the Soviet Union and the United States with some very difficult choices indeed.

Smith: Earlier you mentioned the Palestinian groups, the commando groups. They have gained a lot of strength in the last two years. Is it realistic to try to form any kind of a settlement in the Middle East without including the Palestinians in the negotiating process?

Sisco: I have just returned from a trip some six weeks ago, Mr. Smith, and I became even more convinced then than I had been before that it isn't going to be possible to achieve a peace in the Middle East unless the legitimate concerns, not only of the established governments—and here I mean primarily President Nasser and King Hussein—but the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians must also be met, because, as you say, today it has become a formidable political force in the area.

And I would add this. For its part, the United States is ready to talk to anyone—anyone that is interested in pursuing a political solution based on the Security Council Resolution, which is another way of saying,

a political solution and a peace based on a live and let live philosophy.

Rogers: Mr. Secretary, as you pointed out, the Russians have gained a lot of advantage over the years by exercising a policy of controlled turmoil in the Middle East, and now we see them making an entirely different approach to this whole situation.

Is it your view that they abandoned this old policy upon which so much of your assumptions are based, that they are now directly moving in without respect to Israel being a factor to play with, that they are supporting the Arabs and that they don't mind this possibility of a confrontation?

Sisco: The Soviets have very, very consistently supported the Arab position, and the new increment is the one that I indicated: namely, a much more direct Soviet involvement in Egypt.

The Soviets are pursuing a political strategy bulwarked by increasing military strength, Mr. Rogers, and for this reason it is important for American policy to approach this from both points of view, do everything that we can, exhaust every possible way to achieve a political solution but at the same time make our resolve clear, make it clear that we intend to remain engaged in this area.

I am not talking about the United States being truculent. Truculence breeds provocation. But weakness, Mr. Rogers, will only help to promote and to encourage brinksmanship in the area. We must remain engaged in this area in every respect.

Newman: Less than three minutes left, gentlemen.

Rogers: My point was, have they now abandoned this policy? If we would be firm if not truculent, would they again back down?

Sisco: Of course, this is an "iffy" question, Mr. Rogers. I would only repeat this: The Soviets are using both political means and military means, and in recent weeks it has been a step-up of military means in support of a political strategy.

Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, you mentioned that the Soviets have now sent amphibious equipment to Egypt. That doesn't sound like defensive equip-

ment. What is your reading of that? Does that indicate they are getting ready to cross the Canal?

Sisco: No, I don't say that, Mr. Valeriani, but I certainly will agree with the judgment that you just expressed, namely, it doesn't look like defensive equipment to me.

Valeriani: How serious would you regard the threat of another all-out war in the Middle East now?

Sisco: I think the situation is serious. I think, however, that neither side is ready to break out into something which is more general. However, I will say this, Mr. Valeriani: If the political initiative of the United States is rejected, I am afraid that this will be another lost opportunity, and there have been a good many lost opportunities over the months. If we lose this opportunity, I feel that the options that are open to the parties in the area, as well as to the major powers in the future, are slowly becoming more constrained, and what we can look to, unfortunately, is a continuation of the violence and the counterviolence, and, I am afraid, at an escalated level.

Valeriani: Do you have a deadline for replies to the initiative?

Sisco: No, we don't. Our hope is, as Secretary Rogers stated last night in London, our hope is that when President Nasser returns we will receive a reply shortly.

Newman: About thirty seconds left.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you have made it clear, as the President has, that we are going to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. Is it possible to maintain that balance of power merely by sending planes to Israel?

Mr. Sisco: I think, Mr. Spivak, we have made major efforts to try to get arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union going in the last 17 months. We have been turned down every time.

The way to maintain the balance of power is to pursue, I think, the kind of policy that we are pursuing. We want the friendship of all of the countries in the area. We are trying

to achieve a political solution that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Spivak: That is not responsive to my question.

Newman: I must interrupt at that point. I am sorry, our time is up.

Thank you, Secretary Sisco, for being with us today on "MEET THE PRESS".

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Television Interview Statements by U.S. Senator Symington, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East, on U.S. -U.S.S.R. Relations and Middle East Policy¹

St. Louis, Missouri, July 12, 1970

Mr. Herman: Senator Symington, do you feel that the United States is drifting towards a collision with the Soviet Union in the Middle East?

Senator Symington: I think it's much more possible today after what we found out about the use of Soviet pilots, and even more important in one way, the new SAM-3's, which we have not yet found in Indo China; I think a direct confrontation is much more possible today than it was, say, six weeks ago.

Herman: Senator, it's about a week and a half since President Nixon warned of this danger of collision with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. What do you think of the United States' moves to try to avoid such a confrontation?

Symington: Well, I think it's very important because, of course, an ultimate confrontation could result in a full nuclear exchange. And I would hope that the Soviet Union would also consider it important because regardless

of our efforts in other fields, economically for example, neither of these two great super powers want a nuclear confrontation because both of them know that it would result in the destruction of both countries.

Mr. Lisagor: Senator, a high Administration official who has to remain nameless said the other day that the United States must expell, and I use that word advisedly because it's the word he used, Russian presence from Egypt.² Is it realistic in your view to expell the Russians, to remove them in any way now, or aren't they frozen into Egypt for a long time?

Symington: Well, I would think so. They've been frozen in the Mediterranean for a long time, and if the Egyptians want them, I can't quite understand what that gentleman meant. Because that would mean that we would have to move militarily against the Soviet Union in the Middle East. That would be a long jump from the present position which is that even though we give planes and other armament to many countries that are against Israel and fighting against Israel, we won't sell them to Israel. So it seems to me that's a long jump forward, and I would doubt that the Administration backs up that particular individual, whoever he happens to be.

Mr. Kalb: Well, Senator, the Secretary General of the U.N. was recently in Moscow and he just on Friday was talking with President Nixon, and he believes this is not the time to reactivate a U.N. mediation role. He is quite gloomy about diplomacy. If that's the case, what can the United States do?

Symington: Well, I think we can keep trying to reactivate it. Certainly the Soviets are interested on some basis, in the success of the SALT talks, for example. And we now know that as these things go on, these minor brush fire wars around the world, that we are steadily getting closer, whether we like it or not, to a nuclear confrontation. And not only because of things like the Middle East that you just referred to, but

¹ Excerpted from Symington's interview broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System television and radio program "Face the Nation"; "Face the Nation" is the property of CBS News, and is a publication of Holt Information Systems, A Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

² See note 1, page 208, above.

also because other countries are steadily becoming nuclear powers.

Kalb: But in the Middle East what can you do? The United States has the Sixth Fleet there: Do you beef that up?

Symington: Well, I think it would be well to keep our naval power in the Mediterranean. We now know that we have a direct naval power confrontation there with the Soviet Union. And I for one am worried about operating a carrier task force, for example, in a closed sea like the Mediterranean, not only because of the new developments in sea-to-sea missilery and air-to-sea missilery as well exemplified by the sudden sharp extinction of the Israeli destroyer the *Eliyat* by a Soviet missile, but also because of the very much more to me dangerous potential of relatively short range ground-to-sea missilery that could be developed and put into many different countries by the Soviet Union if they thought our fleet was a menace.

Lisagor: Senator, we have two carriers, I believe, with the Sixth Fleet, in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in the Mediterranean. Would you remove them from the Mediterranean?

Symington: No, I couldn't remove them. I think that's a sign of weakness. But I think we have to recognize that the type and character of warfare that we would have there on a conventional basis from the standpoint of seapower, and also from what I hear, with respect to the Soviet planes in the Mediterranean, also from the standpoint of airpower, might not be too favorable. And, of course, we don't know how we would conduct the war. We haven't done too well in the five years of escalation in Indo China, and obviously we would have nor did we do anything about the sinking of the *Pueblo* with respect to North Korea. And I think one of the reasons was relative strength. So we would have a very difficult conventional problem in the Middle East.

That being true, that's what worries me about a direct confrontation there, and I think the Soviets probably have the same apprehension.

Lisagor: In answering Mr. Herman's first question you said that the danger of a confrontation was greater, I think, because of the use of Soviet pilots in Egypt today.

Symington: And SAM's.

Lisagor: What about the use of the Soviet pilots that we don't know about. To what extent are they engaged in combat with Israeli aircraft? Are they or are they not? We've heard that they're defensive.

Symington: Well, they're operating pretty deeply. And from what I understand the Israelis are anxious not to engage them. On the other hand, we know that modern ground-to-air missilery has now moved up much closer to the Canal, and presumably, inasmuch as it is probably, in all probability, run by Soviet technicians, presumably their airpower is going to move eastward closer to the Canal than it has been so far in the U.A.R.

Kalb: You've been talking in conventional terms. Is it possible that nations in the Middle East, and I'm thinking of Israel and perhaps Egypt, are now developing nuclear weapons?

Symington: I don't think there's any question about the fact that Israel is doing its best to develop nuclear weapons. As you know, they don't have to be launched; they can be dropped. We are experts, unfortunately, at that. And it would be a very, relatively simple matter for the Soviet Union to give nuclear weapons to any of the Arab countries.

But again I believe that the Soviet Union faces up to what would happen. They know what a full nuclear exchange, and that could certainly be the start of it, would do to the world. So I don't think we have to worry too much about that, unless—if the Israelis have it, I think they'll do anything before they become—well, wiped out, you might say, as Nasser said he wanted to do when he announced his plans in May of 1967, just before the June '67, war.

Kalb: Is it your thought or idea that the Israelis now have atomic weapons or are in the process of developing them?

Symington: Mr. Kalb, I think now we're getting pretty close to something I can't talk about.

Herman: Senator, there's one thing I have a little problem in figuring out what your intention or what your meaning is. So far what I have heard mostly from you is negative, things we should not do: We should not send more carriers; we should not do this, we should not do that. If you believe that the drift towards confrontation in the Middle East comes largely from the Soviet side, what should our answer be in your estimation?

Symington: I don't want to be a prophet as to what the President should do in the Middle East. I think it is clear, and I was glad to hear him say the other day that there is no military victory attainable in the Far East, which has cost us \$125 billion, and made most of the other countries of the world suspicious about our capacities. And what's infinitely more serious, has cost us some 50,000 lives of the best that we've got. Now, whatever he does in the Middle East, and I think his hand is being forced somewhat in the Middle East as a result of our stalemate, you might say, in the Far East—whatever he does he has to do now with the realization that it could be a direct confrontation with Soviet power. And I think that is why he quietly told the American people about it a few nights ago, that here it is, you might say. It is the first time, to the best of my knowledge, that this has been the fact—been a fact since World War II.

Herman: Well, the purport, then, of my second question, what do you think of the policy, are you confident, are you satisfied that he is doing what you would have him do?

Symington: Well, I don't know what he's doing. As you know, we didn't know anything about the Cambodian invasion until the troops were in Cambodia. And I don't know what his plans are for the Middle East. I do know this: based on my experience, that whatever they are, he has got an infinitely more serious problem in the Middle East and one that is much more important to the United States and to Europe.

Lisagor: Senator, if you—

Symington: If I may proceed, for just a minute, Mr. Lisagor?

This cuts at the heart of NATO. What will the Turks think and what will our other allies think and how will Iran feel about it, and what will Pakistan's reaction be? And yet on the other hand, when you're talking about the air force of North Vietnam you're talking about one thing, or the capacity of the Pathet Lao. But when you're talking about the capacity of the Soviet Air Force with their modern SAM's which we now know are in the U.A.R., you are talking about a different ball game entirely. And something has to be done, I would hope that it is done in the diplomatic field and that we can sit down and work this situation out, because American policy, Western Europe depends on Mid East oil, and so does Japan. And if this thing goes on the way it is going, and if Israel falls, then the Soviet Union will be the dominant factor in the Middle East.

Herman: Well, in diplomacy, what have we got to offer outside of the threat of confrontation? What do we have to negotiate with?

Symington: Well, that's a pretty good threat.

Herman: You think the threat is adequate?

Symington: I don't know. I don't know what the military planning is, and if I did know the plans, I couldn't talk about them on the air.

Lisagor: Senator, do you think—

Symington: I do think that the people in the Kremlin realize that they do not want to have a full confrontation with the United States. That is an asset for us. The fact that we feel that way in negotiation is an asset for them. And I was quite impressed with their latest suggestions with respect to Israel. We don't want to go into a nuclear war, neither of us, and why don't we sit down and talk this thing over.

Lisagor: Senator, you've been one of the most persistent critics of secrecy in dealing with other countries, and because of that I'd like to ask you

whether you believe we have a secret understanding for supplying jets to Israel and are we in the process of carrying out that understanding?

Symington: Well, I don't know whether we have any secret understanding. I would think if we have any understanding it would be an open understanding. Because there are only three countries in the world that make the type and character of plane that Israel needs to defend itself against the Arabs. One country is the Soviet Union that is furnishing them to their satellites. The other country is France, and they are furnishing them to the Arab satellites. So if we don't sell these planes to Israel, then we guarantee the destruction of those people. For that reason I think that we should sell them the planes, and I don't see why it should be secret. I should think it would be an open matter.

Kalb: Senator, do you feel, given the current mood in the United States caused by the war in Vietnam, a lot of people call it the pull-in mood, withdrawal, that the United States can take upon itself a major obligation to protect Israel?

Symington: Well, I think that the United States can do anything that it wants to do. This is a great country. But on the other hand, we are having very serious troubles. We are very much expanded from a military standpoint. Our economy is obviously in serious trouble, which as you know, for some time, I've felt because of the \$100 million a day we're putting out all over the world in our military ventures. And I think it's fair to say that there's a split in public opinion which is damaging the national policy in this country today. So, I would hope that all these things are recognized, but if we decide that we can do it and the people are behind it, this country can do anything.

Kalb: Should we do it?

Symington: Well, that depends upon the policy, the diplomatic policies that the President undertakes. I am one who believes more in diplomatic policies in a nuclear world and the space age than in military activities,

and that is one of the reasons I've been so interested in trying to point out how antique and obsolete so many of our policies are in the nuclear-space age with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

Kalb: Senator, from the point of view—from a moral point of view, from the point of view of national interest, and you've just talked about the importance of the Middle East, should the United States undertake a major obligation to protect Israel?

Symington: I think we have undertaken a major obligation in selling them the jets. How far we go with that is not a matter that a legislator could decide. I would hope that the President realizes that if the U.A.R. comes under the complete dominance—and Syria already is—of the Soviet Union, that the whole concept of NATO as I see it could well fall on its face, and it would tremendously influence our position in the Far East. I don't think it's right for me on this program to tell the President what he should do. But I have always felt, as I believe you know, that it is infinitely more important to the security and prosperity of the United States, the Middle East than the Far East, because the Middle East is tied in so tightly with Europe from an economic standpoint as well as from a physical position standpoint.

Lisagor: Your concern for NATO and the impact of the Middle East on it, Senator, raises the question of what went into your vote against—or for an amendment which would cut off aid to Greece, for example, which is one of the militant anti-Communist anchors, we are told, of NATO. How do you explain that?

Symington: Well, I think that these countries that are run by totalitarian governments are what we are against, whether it's a totalitarian government comparable to the Nazis, or one comparable to the Stalin government. I just am opposed to totalitarianism. And I think that vote in the Senate was a warning to Mr. Papadopoulos that he either cleans up his place to at least some extent, or he is liable to lose the support of the United States.

Herman: Senator, you talk about solving the problem of the Middle East or of avoiding the confrontation by diplomatic means: Is that something that can be accomplished as simply bilateral talks involving only the Middle East, or does that have to be part of a bigger solution, a bigger détente involving nuclear weapons in European bases, troops—American troops overseas and so forth?

Symington: I think that's an awfully good question, because I think the latter part of the question is terribly important. Years ago the Secretary of Defense testified, Secretary MacNamara, that we had 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe. And, everybody knows that we have got them in many other countries around the world. And what right have we got to have nuclear weapons in countries that are very close indeed to the Soviet Union—much closer, those countries, than Cuba is to us—and at the same time expect them to make some kind of an arrangement with us because now they are the other super power. And so what I would like to see at this time to keep the two scorpions in the bottle and not have twenty in the bottle, you might say, is for these two countries to sit down together, because together they can save the world, or together they could destroy the world.

Herman: Well, would this be part of the SALT talks?

Symington: Oh, yes, I would definitely hope so. My basic hope for the SALT talks, which I think could be the most important talks in the history of mankind is that we make a package deal in the SALT talks.

Herman: Do you include the Middle East?

Symington: Yes.

Herman: That would include the Middle East?

Symington: That would include everything, because you automatically, if you get into the SALT talks on the right basis, you automatically get into the Middle East. Because there's no other way that you could prevent, in my opinion, some day, nuclear weapons being used in the Middle East. I'm not say-

ing that would be tomorrow or next year, but it would come unless there's agreement not to do it.

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Speech to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel Describing the Israeli View of a Middle East Settlement (Excerpts)¹

Jerusalem, July 13, 1970

Why should not Egypt and Israel send authorized representatives to an agreed place to decide jointly, without prejudice to their existing attitudes and claims, the arrangements, framework and agenda, without prior conditions, for official negotiations?

Such contacts, which could be of the most informal nature, could lay the groundwork for effective and concrete negotiations, without which—as has been proven—no deadlock has been broken in any international dispute...

[Mr. Eban declared that President Nixon was expressing a fundamental truth when he said],

Israel is not desirous of driving any of the other countries into the sea. The other countries do want to drive Israel into the sea... Once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker than its neighbours, there will be a war.

The war of attrition waged against Israel by the Arab states with the help of the Soviet bloc has failed as a comprehensive strategy. Even under conditions of siege Israel has continued its growth and development in all fields, including the diplomatic and polit-

¹ English text in *Israel Digest*, XIII, 15 (July 24, 1970), pp. 1, 2.

ical. Since 1967, over a million visitors, in addition to 100,000 immigrants, have arrived.

Nasser will be celebrating, in a few days, the 18th anniversary of his regime, but although he claims to have cast off the rule of Western empires, he has in fact opened the gate to Soviet re-colonization of the Middle East and Africa. Ten years have passed since the U.N. General Assembly adopted, with Soviet and Egyptian support, a declaration in favor of decolonization, but in 1970 Nasser is introducing thousands of Soviet soldiers and weaponry into Africa, which believed it had liberated itself from the military presence of external powers. Instead of putting an end to the independence of Israel, he has jeopardized the independence of Egypt.

It is doubtful if the Six Day War would have erupted without the support and encouragement of the Soviet Union, and even today there would be a chance of a more moderate Arab attitude if not for its policy.

The Soviet military presence in Egypt overshadows the Arab-Israel conflict and should be opposed by all those who cherish peace. Egypt is becoming a country whose military and political moves are prescribed by the Soviet Union. The battle for the Canal line is a battle for the bare security of Israel, and therefore Israel follows the various stages of Soviet involvement of Egypt with the utmost seriousness and it is not alone in this attitude.

Israel is absolutely determined to hold on to the cease-fire lines of 1967 until secure and recognized borders are established. International practice and law support its right to remain on these lines until the establishment of frontiers of peace, and it has the power to implement this right. Israel will not on its part initiate a clash with foreign soldiers or pilots. At the same time it will not recoil, and does not recoil, from any action that is regarded as necessary to maintain its positions.

It is clear that Soviet motives are not confined to the Arab-Israel conflict, but that there are also efforts to undermine the international balance, to put to the test the responsibility of the U.S. as a stabilizing and balanc-

ing force in the system of world security, to circumvent the southern defense of Europe, and to establish a Soviet military foothold in Africa. The Soviet aspiration to achieve strategic superiority in the Mediterranean is central in all these efforts.

If Israel is asked to react to proposals submitted for its consideration it is even more entitled to have its own principles and initiatives seriously considered. Thus, Israel is ready to accept the cease-fire as decided by the Security Council in June 1967, to negotiate freely and directly with every Arab state, to have Ambassador Jarring invite the parties to conduct negotiations on the establishment of peace, and to hold such a peace conference according to the Rhodes procedures.

Israel has emphasized that the establishment of the peace frontiers is open for negotiations and agreement, and it is not a question that has already been decided. It has announced that any question, without exception, may be discussed at the negotiations.

It has clarified at the U.N. and in the Knesset, between May 1968 and May 1970, its attitude to the Security Council Resolutions of November 1967, and it has stated that when peace is established there is no intention that forces should be stationed beyond the boundaries agreed upon in negotiations with the neighboring states.

Israel has proposed an international conference to work out a five-year plan to solve the refugee problem. It has formulated principles expressing the universal spiritual responsibility in regard to the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam. It has proposed procedures of regional cooperation with its eastern neighbors, the majority of whose inhabitants, in any possible combination, will be Palestinian Arabs, and it has proposed a free movement of men and trade across open peace frontiers.

The principles enunciated by Israel have been regarded in all similar cases in world history as a basis for peace and co-existence. Still Israel has declared that if the Arabs have other principles and attitudes they should be submitted at the conference table in order to reach agreement.

Israel's policy will continue in two directions—to hold its ground and strengthen its security, while at the same time striving continuously for peace and cooperation between all the countries in the area.

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Statement by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on the Middle East Situation (Excerpt)¹

Moscow, July 15, 1970

Matters now stand like this: either the military danger in the Middle East will increase still more—and this might happen if the aggressor is not curbed—or measures must be taken to ensure a political settlement on the basis of observance of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, in its entirety.

Israel's aggression in the Middle East, supported by neo-colonialist circles, is not only directed against the Arab states. What happens in that area, at the junction of the Asian and the African continents, has a direct bearing on the destinies of the peoples of all the countries of Asia and Africa, on the fate on world peace, on the security of the nations. The anti-imperialist and peaceloving forces realise that passivity in face of the aggressor would free the hands of the imperialists for new aggressive actions against other peoples and against other independent states.

The Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet are convinced that in conditions in which the reckless actions of the Israeli leaders are creating a real threat to international peace and security, not a single parliament and not a single member of parliament can remain indifferent. All who treasure the ideals of peace, freedom and the independence of nations must take resolute action and must condemn and isolate the aggressor and his

patrons so as to make the imperialists abandon their adventurist course.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR entirely approves the policy of the Soviet government in giving all-round assistance to the Arab states in their courageous struggle against Israeli aggression, the policy aimed at achieving a just and peaceful political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR believes that every state in the Middle East has the right to independent national existence and to independence and security.

The Soviet Union has believed and continues to believe that only the peoples and the governments of the Middle East states should be the masters of the situation in the Middle East.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR expresses the hope that this statement will meet with a favourable response and with support from all the peace-loving forces and will help the states to take the necessary measures in keeping with the aims of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on U.S. and U.S.S.R. Middle East Policy²

Washington, July 15, 1970

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in London, I believe, that you hoped you would have a response from the Soviet Union on the Mideast diplomatic initiative. Has any progress been made on that front?

A. No. There hasn't, and the [Soviet] Ambassador indicated yesterday that he expected they would have a response sometime before long. He didn't say when.

² Excerpted from Rogers' news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1623 (August 3, 1970), pp. 129-130, 130-131, 132.

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5552 (July 21, 1970), p. 28.

And it's possible that the response will come from the Arabs rather than from the Soviet Union. But as you know, President Nasser has delayed his departure from Moscow two or three times, and we assume that they are having discussions on this subject.

Q. In your press conference on June 25 you said that any decision on sending more jets to Israel—the results would become known. Since then, the President has indicated rather strongly, on television, that there is a danger of the balance of power being upset by the missiles. Mr. Sisco said that our policy was to maintain this balance of power.

There were reports about secretly sending the jets to Israel. Could you tell us, in fact, where we stand on the jets to Israel at the moment?

A. We stand right where we did when I had my last press conference, as far as discussions of what we are going to do in terms of providing military equipment to Israel.

We still have some hope that the initiative that we have taken will produce results, and we are encouraged by the fact that the parties have taken so long to decide what their position is on it.

I also was, I think, encouraged by the speech that the Foreign Minister of Israel gave the other day.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that some of the tough talk that one heard from the White House officials a few weeks ago has helped or hurt the negotiations on the Middle East?

A. Well, I think that the statement by the President, in his television appearance, helped the situation. He made it clear that the United States is firm, that our policy toward Israel has not changed, and that he is very serious about it.

In terms of one of the background statements, I think that there was one word that a spokesman used that he said later on, it would have been better if he had used some other word—and I think probably what he was referring to was that if there was a political settlement in the Middle East, then it would

be our hope that the Soviet troops would be removed from the U.A.R.

In this case, I think there is a possibility.

Q. Senator Javits said this morning that the European countries are not interested in supporting the United States in Israel. Would you care to comment on that?

A. I haven't seen what he said. I'd like to see what he said. I think there's a good deal of support for Israel in European countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, right at the moment in the Middle East, do you see an immediate danger of the possibility of Israeli attacks on Soviet missile sites which could involve action with Soviet combat power in the Middle East?

A. I don't think I can answer that. Certainly we would hope not. I think everyone is quite aware of the risk that would be involved.

On the other hand, it's obviously a development. When I say it's a development, I mean the deployment of SAM-3's is a very serious development. I think all we can say is that as much as we can, diplomatically, we're pointing out the risks. And I think all parties are well aware of what the risks are.

Q. When you talk about having a political settlement in the Middle East and thereby hoping that the Soviet military presence would leave, is it your feeling that the Soviets are not trying to establish a permanent combat or military base there?

A. Oh, no, no. I think that their presence there is part of their foreign policy. They feel that it helps their position with—not only with Egypt but other Arab countries. And therefore I would not expect them to leave very readily.

On the other hand, it's conceivable that if you could work out a settlement under the

Security Council resolution that part of it would be the removal of foreign troops from Arab countries.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of U.A.R. President Nasser's Visit to the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)¹

Moscow, July 17, 1970

[Israeli policy] finds expression in the raids by Israel's armed forces on the territories of the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, in the measures taken for the unlawful annexation of temporarily occupied territories of Arab countries and in the terror and repression against the Arab population of those territories.

The two sides expressed their firm conviction that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be ensured through the adoption of urgent measures to stop armed attacks by Israel on the Arab countries, through the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the principle that territories are not to be acquired by war, and through complete implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and of the United Nations' decisions on questions concerning the Palestinian refugees.

Both sides reaffirm their support for the efforts made within the framework of the

United Nations to achieve a political settlement in the Middle East.

The two sides express solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine who are waging a courageous anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation and against Israeli aggression.

The President of the United Arab Republic spoke highly of the Soviet Union's steps in the sphere of foreign policy aimed at establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. He expressed gratitude to the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government and the peoples of the Soviet Union for political, economic and other support for the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries in the struggle against Israeli aggression.

The government of the USSR declared its readiness to continue supporting the just struggle of the Arab peoples for their national independence, sovereignty and freedom and to give them the necessary assistance in this.

The two sides discussed further steps which they believe must be taken to achieve a political settlement of the Middle East crisis and declared themselves in favour of further co-ordinating their efforts in this direction.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser expressed profound gratitude for the all-round assistance which the people and the government of the Soviet Union are giving to the people and the government of the United Arab Republic and for the resolute support which the Soviet Union is giving the Arab nation in its present complex and difficult struggle against aggression by Israel.

The two sides note with satisfaction the strengthening solidarity among the Arabs and the development and consolidation of co-operation among Arab states and peoples.

The leaders of the Soviet state expressed their support for the steps taken by the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries to strengthen unity of action and co-operation

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5552 (July 21, 1970), pp. 25, 30. The talks were attended on the Soviet side, in addition to Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin, by Ponomarev, Gromyko and Marshal Grechko, Skachkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers' State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; Vinogradov, Ambassador to the U.A.R., and Sytenko, head of the Middle East Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taking part on the U.A.R. side, in addition to President Nasser, were Ali Sabri, Muhmud Riyad, Muhammad Fawzi and the U.A.R. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Reported on Moscow Home Service; BBC Monitoring Service SU/3433/A4/1.

among Arab countries in the struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and its agents.

In coming out in favour of the speediest possible settlement of the Middle East conflict, the two sides believe that the sooner the peace-loving forces compel Israel to give up her policy "from positions of strength" in relation to the Arab peoples—a policy which has no prospects—the sooner will a just and lasting peace be ensured in that area, in accordance with the vital interests of all the peoples in the Middle East and the interests of world peace.

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F.R.G. Magazine Interview with Prime Minister Meir of Israel on the Military Situation in the Middle East and on the Israeli Attitude Towards Various Peace Proposals¹

Jerusalem, July 20, 1970

Spiegel: Mrs. Meir, do you expect a new war in the Near East?

Golda Meir: A new war? We have had war all the time—to my regret it is not yet finished. Peace prevails on no border. It is not so important to us whether our people are struck by a shell fired by the regular army or from a Katusha rocket of the Fateh guerrillas. There is much more of it on the Suez Canal.

Spiegel: The Russian anti-aircraft rockets are moving ever nearer the Canal. They threaten Israeli air superiority. Won't that force you to launch a counterattack when possible with ground troops? Are you considering a new preventive attack?

Meir: I don't believe that it would be a realistic consideration at this moment.

Spiegel: But this possibility is not ruled out forever?

Meir: We have never fought a preventive war.

Spiegel: And you do not have the intention of ever having one?

Meir: "Ever" is a big word.

Spiegel: But you also don't say "never."

Meir: As soon as we allow the Russians to blanket the other side of the canal with SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles and our airplanes can no longer fly over, we really become sitting targets for the Egyptian artillery and must suffer unbearable losses. Only to prevent this do we fly over. If we had anywhere near as much heavy artillery as the Egyptians, then we probably would not have put so much in our air force; but we do not have this artillery and we can not have it. We are only two and a half million people.

Spiegel: What you have just said can only mean that you must undertake something against the Russian concentration on the west bank of the Canal.

Meir: Exactly—to the extent to which the Russians establish themselves there.

Spiegel: Couldn't your determination to launch a counter-attack be underestimated?

Meir: No, I don't think so. The Russians know our point of view. They know us. And after all the Americans, the Russians, and actually everybody in the world should know that Israel cannot afford to lose a war not only because she dislikes losing a war (no one likes losing a war) but because a lost war for Israel does not only mean the loss of her sovereignty but also the annihilation of her people. That is why we cannot afford to lose a war.

Spiegel: If there is no other choice but to launch an attack against the SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles on the other side of the Canal, then this means that Israelis and Russians will clash head-on.

Meir: It may be. But it will not be us who brought about the clash. After all the Russians don't belong where they are now.

Spiegel: But doesn't all this mean that the Great War is dangerously close?

¹ Translated from the German text in *Der Spiegel*, No. 30 (July 20, 1970), pp. 76-79; reprinted by permission.

Meir: Perhaps.

Spiegel: *You believe that it is necessary to take this risk?*

Meir: We don't want a Great War. We don't even want war with Egypt. But we are certainly not prepared to put up with Egypt being allowed to break the armistice while we have to accept it.

Spiegel: *There is certainly a difference between not wanting a Great War and being prepared to risk it if necessary. The result may be the same, namely, war.*

Meir: The alternative would be to put our existence at stake and we are not especially prepared to do that.

Spiegel: *Has there already been combat between Israeli and Russian pilots?*

Meir: No. Not up to now.

Spiegel: *Have Russian soldiers already been killed in Egypt?*

Meir: We have no notion. If Russians have been killed then it was because they were where they weren't supposed to be.

Spiegel: *Suppose it came to a single combat between Israeli Fighters and MIG's which were clearly flown by Russians—would the Israelis shoot at such planes?*

Meir: We operate in the Canal Zone to defend ourselves. The Egyptians far outnumber us in soldiers and artillery. Only by making use of our air force can we silence their artillery. That is, as I have said, the only reason why we fly over the Canal. And if someone gets in our way during this self-defense, we cannot stop and think who the pilot may be.

Spiegel: *In any case, this confrontation with the Russians means that Israel's situation has become far more serious. Did you expect it to come to this confrontation?*

Meir: Well yes, we could infer this, in any event, from the conduct of the Russians. It began when they sent arms to Egypt. Then

came instructors, experts and finally military advisers. We couldn't prove that the Russians were actually pushing the button. But, at least, we knew that the military advisers were not far from the button. Then came the SAM-3 rockets with Russian operational staff; that is an open secret. Everyone knows that the Egyptians cannot operate SAM-3 because this instrument of war is much too complicated. Finally Russian pilots arrived and flew operational sorties.

Spiegel: *What do you think the Russians want to achieve with their engagement in the Near East? Do they want to destroy Israel?*

Meir: I am not sitting there when talks are held in the Kremlin. But I don't believe that the Russians want to destroy Israel. It would not pay them to do so. What would they gain from that? They want to make an old Russian dream come true, which was not first dreamt by the Bolsheviks, but which is an inheritance from the Czars: to be master of this part of the world and the Suez Canal also. And then also North Africa and Southern Europe. Then they would not only have a say in East Europe but everywhere in this part of the world. By the way, there is oil here and, as mentioned before, the Suez Canal. Then they would have a share and have a vote in Europe also. They want that. Now if in the realization of this dream, Israel would have to be annihilated in passing, then I believe they would not lose any sleep over it. But I don't maintain that they are aiming at annihilating Israel; this I don't believe.

Spiegel: *Whatever the Russians may have their eyes on in this part of the world, isn't it an awful thought for you, Mrs. Meir, that you are now involved in such a confrontation with the Eastern World Power?*

Meir: There's no doubt it's an awful thought. I mean we have not lost all sense of perspective. Certainly we are "big" and "strong" and all that. But Russia is also big and strong. And believe me, it is no fun to have to reckon with the possibility of a clash—I am not talking of a clash with the Red Army, but we would also not be happy

with a clash with Russian pilots and airplanes. And even if we consider our pilots outstanding, and because of that even believe that in nine out of ten air fights the Russian plane would be shot down and not ours, we would still not be pleased with such a victory. Naturally, it is a depressing idea that one of the two Super Powers is preparing itself to become militarily active against us.

Spiegel: But wasn't the Russian intervention triggered by the bombardment of the Egyptian hinterland by the Israeli air force?

Meir: I know that this has been asserted on various occasions and is still asserted, but as far as we know the agreement to send SAM-3 rockets with Russian operating staff to Egypt came about long before our bomb attacks on the Egyptian hinterland.

Spiegel: Would it have been possible in your opinion to prevent Russian intervention?

Meir: Well, I think if someone had spoken to the Russians a month or two ago, then at least they wouldn't have gone this far.

Spiegel: Who should have spoken to them?

Meir: Someone whose word means something to the Russians—the Western World.

Spiegel: Washington?

Meir: Washington, first of all. But Washington alone is not the Free World. There are other countries in the Free World who are at least as involved as the United States. And because the Russians, in my opinion, do not want a long war with the Western Powers—with the USA and with others, let us say NATO—that is why I believe they would not have dared to do what they are doing now if the members of NATO had said something suitable a month or two ago.

Spiegel: Does that mean that the Americans in particular do not do enough to help Israel with re-establishing military equilibrium in the Near East?

Meir: The Americans do not like to talk about weapons and the like in public, and neither do we. But I can say in all earnestness that we do not doubt American friendship for Israel. Because we are two sovereign states—not necessarily equal in size but still sovereign—there are indeed differences of opinion. When Israel thinks she needs more military equipment, the Americans do not always say, "If you want it, help yourself."

Spiegel: It was reported in *Newsweek* this week that the Americans will send two Phantom jet fighters per month in addition to the fifty other planes for which delivery has already been agreed.

Meir: First of all, I hope that *Newsweek* is right. The information doesn't come from us, and I do not know how reliable it is, but I cannot and will not speak about the number of airplanes.

Spiegel: Perhaps you would like to talk about howitzers which were shipped from Cleveland [Ohio] to Israel recently? They are supposed to be able to fire atomic shells also.

Meir: Will the atomic shells be delivered with them?

Spiegel: That is a good question. Do you think that there is any danger of an atomic clash between the Israelis and the Arabs?

Meir: I hope the Egyptians do not have the atom bomb. As far as Israel is concerned, this question is not of primary concern to us. Besides, I do not believe the Egyptians have the bomb.

Spiegel: President Nixon has just found very strong words to describe the dangers which threaten the peace of this part of the world. He compared the Near East with the Balkans before the First World War. If this is so, if the prospect of confrontation between the Great Powers in the Near East has become so threatening, can it make Israel safer?

Meir: Yes, because if I am not mistaken, the Russians do not want a confrontation with the United States. And when it is put clearly to the Russians that such a con-

frontation is almost unavoidable, they will think twice about any further steps. They did that in the Cuban crisis. I do not want to say we are dealing with an exactly similar situation. But there are similarities.

Spiegel: *Don't you feel that such a strained situation could lead to wrong inferences of great consequence. Could not the Americans, for example, underestimate the determination of the Israelis to attack the Russian missile sites on the west bank of the Suez Canal?*

Meir: Do you think that the Americans don't believe that we will do that? No, I do not believe the Americans have any doubt about it because there is nothing else we can do.

Spiegel: *After all the two World Powers are not only militarily engaged in this conflict. They have also drawn up peace plans. Do you see any useable suggestions in the American or Russian plans?*

Meir: The Russian paper is not a peace plan at all. They can, of course, stick any label on anything. They can hang a sign on which "lion" is written on a camel—because of that it will still not be a lion; it will remain a camel. And they can stick the label "peace plan" on a document in which there is no trace of peace. The Russian plan simply wants Israel to give up. The Russians do not want any peace in this part of the world. God forbid—if there were peace, then what would they be doing here? And besides, the Russians cannot do anything if Nasser does not cooperate.

Spiegel: *So you do not believe the Russians are capable of dictating peace terms to Nasser?*

Meir: No, I think that even for this he is not trustworthy enough for them. Maybe they fear that Nasser will turn away from them if they should try to dictate to him. I can scarcely believe that they can consider Nasser a Marxist or a Communist. But it is likely that the time will come when there is nothing else for Nasser to do. He has signed over the souls of his people and everything else to the Russians for the realization of

his great dream. His great dream is to destroy Israel.

Spiegel: *And how do you judge the American peace plan?*

Meir: This at least is a plan. Some things in this plan are good; others not so good. We have not yet publicized our verdict; we are still discussing it with the Americans.

Spiegel: *But you still want only direct peace negotiations with your Arab neighbors?*

Meir: Correct.

Spiegel: *Have you ever tried it?*

Meir: Oh yes, but you need two to negotiate. Starting a war one can do alone. But for peace negotiations both parties are required.

Spiegel: *The other day you said that you had tried it secretly several times, five times, ten times, twenty times. Could you mention at least one concrete example.*

Meir: No. I have not given up hope yet that the Arabs will one day be ready and if I talk about it now, it will not be secret negotiations any longer.

Spiegel: *That means that you are still trying.*

Meir: Naturally, we never give up.

Spiegel: *Would you also be prepared to enter into peace negotiations if these were arranged by the Big Powers?*

Meir: The nations who have to live here, who have fought here and who will have to live here in the future—they are directly concerned, they should come to terms among themselves. Actually, why do the World Powers think that it is they that have to come to terms?

Spiegel: *Because they are entangled in this conflict and they still do not want a Great War.*

Meir: No. because the Arabs refuse to negotiate with us. This is the only reason.

Spiegel: Therefore there will be no agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis. The Israelis refuse to withdraw their troops from the occupied territories before peace negotiations have begun and the Arabs refuse to begin peace negotiations before the Israelis have withdrawn their troops from the occupied territories.

Meir: I regret to say that the situation is not like that. Have you ever heard an Arab say that they would make peace with us after we had withdrawn from the armistice line? For them, peace is a swear word; it does not even come to their lips. The most they will speak of is peace in the Mediterranean area and peace in the Near East. What is that supposed to mean? They did not fight a war against the Near East but against Israel.

Spiegel: Forgive me, but have you ever heard Israelis say that they will withdraw from the occupied territories after peace negotiations have begun?

Meir: Are we speaking here of mere words, or of their meaning? If we are speaking of their meaning, then would you please take into consideration the following: our foreign minister has said that when once we have come to terms with the Arab States at the negotiating table on secure borders, then of course, no Israeli soldier will remain beyond the border agreed upon with the Arabs.

Spiegel: But what do you mean by secure borders for Israel? What does it mean?

Meir: Secure borders for Israel are secure borders for Israel. But we also speak of "recognized borders", secure and recognized, agreed upon by us and our neighbors.

Spiegel: How can the World Powers help so that an agreement concerning secure borders will be concluded?

Meir: By forcing the Arab States to sit together with the Israelis and to reach an agreement. For this reason, we did not draw a map, for we don't want to say to any of our neighbors, here is a map, sign on the dotted line! In general, after a war it is done this

way by the victor. The victorious conqueror presents a paper and the loser has to sign on the dotted line. We do not want to do it this way, although it was not we who started the war but the Arabs.

Spiegel: But there's one map you have drawn—of Jerusalem.

Meir: Jerusalem is not a question of cartography: we gave back to Jerusalem the status that it had before King Hussein's grandfather Abdallah annexed part of the town by force. Some countries in the world are trying to teach us a moral lesson, namely that one is not allowed to acquire land by force—if the case were not so serious one could actually laugh at it. How then did Abdallah acquire the old part of Jerusalem? With love? Maybe by force? Well, we came and removed the offensive barbed wire which cut right through the heart of the Holy City—Holy for Muslims, for Christians and for Jews. The Arab population remained. No one was thrown out because he was an Arab. And beyond that, we have offered all kinds of development aid in the Old City. And now the people are saying: What? A united Jerusalem?

Spiegel: So for you, it could never be part of an agreement that what you call the offensive barbed wire should be erected once again in Jerusalem?

Meir: Never. But if the Arabs want to mention Jerusalem in the course of negotiations, they may do so.

Spiegel: But since, as you yourself said, the Arabs do not want any direct negotiations, then why do you not agree on indirect negotiations or to such mediation attempts as Nahum Goldmann wanted to undertake?

Meir: I don't think much of that.

Spiegel: Why not?

Meir: Because we do not believe that two nations can make peace with the aid of a mediator who runs from one to the other. By the way, Dr. Goldmann is no mediator. He does not represent the standpoint of the Israeli government, he has the right to have

his own opinion and he has stated it. But I cannot imagine any government which would let an opponent to their politics mediate for them. So if Dr. Goldmann wants to visit Nasser privately, that is his business.

Spiegel: All right. You are convinced that the other side is not prepared to enter direct negotiations at the moment. And you don't think much of mediation. And in the peace plans of the Great Powers also, there is not much written with which you agree. There obviously will be no chance for a negotiated peace in the near future; how long can you go on like this?

Meir: Actually, why do you believe that a mediator can bring about peace? The question is whether Nasser wants to live in peace with Israel or not. He does not want it—either with or without a mediator.

Spiegel: We repeat the question: How long do you think the Israelis can hang on, without hope of a negotiated peace in the foreseeable future with a war that does not end?

Meir: As long as the Israeli people want to live.

Spiegel: But with this opinion, you are pushing the young people, especially students, into opposition. They are asking exactly the same question: How long can this go on and should not the government do more in order to come nearer to a peaceful solution?

Meir: Yes, and I admire the young people for that. It would be awful if the Israeli people should say, "We do not care, let the war go on." Of course we are worried. I am not young and I am no student, but do you think I like war? After all, who does like war? Perhaps Nasser does. Of course, questions are asked and of course there is a longing for peace. Naturally there is mourning for anyone who falls at the hands of the enemy.

Spiegel: But did you expect this—war weariness, especially among young people?

Meir: First of all, it is a gross exaggeration when you talk of "the young people."

Spiegel: We said: "among young people."

Meir: The question is among how many. I received a critical letter signed by 55 young people who are just finishing school and who now have to do their military service. Incidentally, there is not one among them who wants to refuse military service; but after that, thousands of students wrote to me saying, we are not of the same opinion as that of these 55 [letter writers]. By this I do not mean to say that there are only 55 who protest in the country. There are more. But because of this they are still by no means the younger generation.

Spiegel: What do you say to the doubting young people?

Meir: I try to present the situation to them as it is without any embellishment. And the situation is as serious for me as for any young person. But the moment we become weak, it is the end—not the end of the war but our end.

Spiegel: Can this nation summon up sufficient strength, economically, socially and morally? How long can Israel stand one generation after another going off to war?

Meir: As long as the Israelis want to live. If the Israelis one day were to be willing to be driven out of this land, then they would capitulate; then there would be "peace".

Spiegel: Then it is up to the Israelis how long this war will last?

Meir: No. It is up to the Arabs how long this war will last.

Spiegel: And it is up to the Israelis to see how long they can hold out?

Meir: My friends, all your questions are based on a supposition which does not exist. Suppose that today we reach the conclusion that we cannot cope with all this any longer, that we are exhausted, that we have had enough of the war, that we find ourselves in a bad way economically, and that we then give up because of that—then you are inferring that we could still live here. But this is where you are wrong. You simply will not comprehend that we will have only one refuge

the moment we capitulate: the sea, nothing else. Perhaps some could ask friendly states to accept them as refugees. Where would we go? Do you know a country?

Spiegel: You have no choice—is that what you mean?

Meir: If in the Second World War we had had a piece of land in which we could have taken refuge, then some of the six million Jews would still be alive. We will never voluntarily let this happen again. Never again. Never again.

Spiegel: We thank you for this interview, Mrs. Meir.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. President Nixon on U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East and American Arms Supply to Israel¹

Washington, July 20, 1970

Q. Can you at all, sir, clarify for us how your various approaches to the problem, both to the area itself and Soviet interests in the area, are proceeding?

The President: I would be glad to discuss it. I don't, however, count this as a clarification. I think my position is quite clear.

First, I have always said, as I said on July 1, that our interest is peace in the area and the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of every state in the area.

Second, I pointed out that to maintain peace in the area we felt that it was important to maintain a military balance of power so that no state in the area would be encouraged to launch an offensive against another state or be driven to launching a preemptive strike because of fear of an offensive or of a buildup.

Third, I have indicated that the Soviet movement not just of weapons but of men to Viet-Nam (sic) to man the weapons causes us concern because if that continues that could upset the balance of power. It has not yet been upset, as the Secretary of State has said, but we are watching it closely because if the balance of power is upset then that would have the effect of leading nations on both sides possibly to take action which would lead to another war.

I further pointed out that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned and the United States is concerned that we both wanted to avoid a confrontation, we want to avoid a confrontation everywhere in the world. We want to avoid it in Europe, we want to avoid it in Southeast Asia, and we want to avoid it in the Mideast. And that an arms escalation, and particularly the insertion of troops, men, into the Mideast increases the risks of a confrontation, a confrontation that neither side wants. That is why we are putting such emphasis on our peace initiative. That is why we have not announced any sale of planes or delivery of planes to Israel at this time—because we want to give that peace initiative every chance to succeed.

Now, one other point that I think is worth, shall we say—I will accept the word “clarifying” in this respect—I know that there was some concern expressed about the use of the word “expelled” in one of the backgrounders that was given. I read the backgrounder; and I support exactly what was said, because what we meant to say there was simply this: that in any peace settlement, once a peace settlement is made then there will be no need for the forces of other nations to be in these countries.

The use of the word “expelled” was not with the idea of using armed force for that purpose but to negotiate any peaceful settlement, the removal of these forces which if they remain there we believe might increase the chance of a confrontation.

I suppose that needs to be clarified again.

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1624 (August 10, 1970), p. 163.

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Speech by Senator McGovern to the U.S. Senate Describing Middle East Peace Terms the U.S. Should Support¹

Washington, July 20, 1970

Mr. President, the situation in the Middle East, where the Soviet presence has added to the existing tensions between Arabs and Israelis, is inherently unstable and explosive. Such a perilous state of affairs may persist for some time, threatening to turn into an all-out conflict at any moment.

The objectives of American policy in the Middle East must remain what they have always been. The United States seeks peace in the area not as a way of sanctifying the status quo, but as the only way that the countries of the Middle East can satisfactorily develop politically, economically, and socially. In addition, the United States seeks to maintain the traditionally good relations it has had over the past decades with all countries—Israel and the Arab nations alike.

The Nixon administration has now put forward suggestions for bringing Israel and the Arab nations to the negotiating table. I sincerely hope that these proposals will help move the countries of that area back from the brink of war toward more stable relations.

But the present proposals are limited largely to tactics for getting both sides to negotiate. They appear to be running into tough obstacles. I submit that if the United States made known the kind of equitable solutions of the major issues in the Middle East, it would be prepared to support, chances would be markedly improved for acceptance of our suggested steps for opening the talks.

The debate over American policy in the Middle East appears to have crystallized around the single question: Should we sell aircraft to Israel? This is, of course, the most immediate problem requiring an answer now. But its resolution will not, in itself, bring peace or nurture good relations with the Middle Eastern countries.

I have joined with three-quarters of the

Members of the Senate in urging the administration to sell Israel the planes needed to insure its defense in the face of the continued buildup of armed forces in the Arab nations and the appearance of Soviet military personnel in Egypt.

The delivery of planes to Israel may help lessen the likelihood of war resulting from a miscalculation of the relative strength of Arab and Israel forces. If the well-trained Israel Air Force is given sufficient airpower to make it clear that Israel could repel any attack that might be launched against it, the chances of such an attack should be lessened. This is the fundamental reason for which the United States should sell aircraft to Israel. Such aircraft should not be made available for forays over Arab territory for the purpose of sustaining the limited but real war which has persisted since the 6-day conflict in 1967.

The question has been asked whether the sale of aircraft to Israel would be consistent with the necessary and long-overdue withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia. It has been argued that if the United States sold aircraft to Israel to support a nation that was faced with a threat by Soviet forces in Egypt, it should be prepared to continue defending the South Vietnamese Government from its enemies.

The situations in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia are sharply different. In the Middle East, a democratic state is seeking to assure its security with its own fighting men. It asks only that it be permitted to purchase essential aircraft from the United States. In Vietnam, a government which does not even enjoy the support of its own people, is asking American troops to continue fighting in its defense and in addition to supply billions of dollars of assistance.

The sale of American planes to Israel may help convince the Arab leadership that there is no point in escalating a costly armaments race. They might better understand that the only path to a settlement of the outstanding problem in the Middle East is through peaceful means.

A balanced arms race does not, in itself, lead to lasting peace. As a result, the United

¹ *Congressional Record*, July 20, 1970, pp. 25008-25009.

States should not limit its policy to a simple decision to sell aircraft to Israel. Instead, it should move simultaneously to make clear its commitment to some traditional policies in the Middle East and its resolution to evolve new policies which could help bring peace there. These are some of the policies I would propose:

First. The United States is committed to aid in the preservation of the State of Israel. This has been American policy for more than two decades. At the same time, the United States is committed to the preservation of all Arab States in the area. One of the purposes of peace in the Middle East is to insure that no Arab country should be threatened with dismemberment and collapse because of the aggression of any other country or because of wholesale domestic subversion resulting from a continuing state of war and turbulence in the area.

Second. The state of war that exists between Israel and the Arab States must be brought to an end. Both sides have seen in the past 3 years that there is nothing to be gained, except the maintenance of a status quo of terrorism, by armed incursions across the battlelines which separate them. Thus, these incursions should be halted. The United States should express clearly its wish that the aircraft sold to Israel should not be used for such incursions to extend the area of combat. Such a declaration would signal to the Arab leaders the American intention to seek directly some restraint on the part of Israel. This would help restore credibility in American policy. Though it would cost them nothing in strategic terms, the Arabs should reciprocate by ending the formal state of war between the two sides, which might have an important psychological effect. At the very least, if Israel reduced or halted military action across the battlelines, the Arabs would be subjected to considerable pressure to do the same.

Third. Negotiations among the nations of the Middle East are the only method by which tensions may be reduced. These negotiations should begin at the earliest possible date. In view of the tinderbox situation,

both sides should be willing to negotiate in any way feasible—directly, through intermediaries, in the open or in secret. The unfortunate “Goldmann affair” in which Israel seemed to have missed the opportunity for informal direct contacts with the Arab leaders should not be repeated. If both the Arabs and Israelis make it clear that they are sincerely ready to talk about any problem, that would represent a powerful impetus toward negotiations. Should the Arab nations so desire, representatives of the Palestinian Arab organizations should be permitted to participate in the negotiations.

Fourth. Before the Arab governments can be expected to gain full credence in any negotiations, they should recognize the fundamental rule of international law which requires each country to accept the responsibility for acts of aggression committed from bases in its own territory. As long as the Arab governments admit, in effect, that they cannot control activities taking place on their own territories, they are not in a position to guarantee that they will keep any commitments they might make in negotiations with Israel.

Fifth. The policies of the nations of the Middle East have been plagued by the insistence of both sides on basing their position on some past wrongs done to them. Both sides can point to United Nations resolutions that they have been willing to accept but which have been rejected by the other side. This kind of debate is sterile and fruitless. It may represent one of the major obstacles to acceptance of the administration's present proposals. Instead, attention should be focused on the present and future, on achieving the reasonable goals of all the parties. By the same token, the United States itself should pursue such a forward-looking policy. This would not mean that there was no merit in many of the claims arising from the past, but that it is impossible to move forward by looking back. If all debate about Middle East policy continues to be cloaked in historical rhetoric, however justified, there can be little hope of a peaceful settlement.

Sixth. The need to look ahead is especially

apparent in solving the problem of the Arab refugees, the question to which the senior Senator from Oregon (Mr. Hatfield) addressed himself thoughtfully a few days ago. The present situation is quite clear. Israel was created as a Jewish state. As a result, it cannot accept a large, hostile population in its midst. If Israel were to admit all Arabs who wished to return to their homes and property on its territory, it would have to accept just such a disaffected group. At the same time, it is undeniable that thousands of Palestinians sincerely feel that they have been unjustly barred from their homes. Since repatriation is not possible, reparations are necessary. Some Palestinians might be able to enter Israel, to return to their former homelands, but most could find new homes in underpopulated Arab nations.

Israel has already said that it is willing to compensate the Palestinian Arabs. Since such compensation is an inevitable part of any possible settlement, Israel might now proceed a step further as a token of its willingness to negotiate an agreement with the Arab nations. It could allocate a specific sum of money for compensation and place it in an escrow account for the Palestinian Arabs. The amount to be placed in the account could cover not only the losses in real property but an adequate indemnity for the psychological loss suffered by Arab people who have no prospect of ever returning to their homes. Even if the total amount eventually to be placed in escrow account were beyond the present resources of the Israel Government, the total goal could be publicly designated and regular contributions could be made to the account. In the interest of creating the conditions of peace in the Middle East, other nations including the United States and European countries could contribute to this Palestinian refugee account.

The feeling of the Palestinians that they have unjustly lost their homes and property is perhaps the most important source of tension and conflict in the Middle East. A unilateral act of Israel recognizing this to be the case could be the greatest single step toward peace in the Middle East.

Seventh. Because Israel wants to maintain its integrity as an essentially Jewish state, it cannot, in the long run, continue to occupy vast territories in which a sizable Arab population lives. Hundreds of thousands of Arabs are now under Israel jurisdiction as a result of the June 1967 war. Thus, for this reason alone, Israel must be prepared to yield much of the territory gained in that war.

Naturally, the question of Israel withdrawal from occupied territories will be one of the key elements in any negotiations. Israel will almost certainly have to indicate its acceptance of this point in order for negotiations to have any real chance of success. The ultimate demarcation of boundaries will, of course, have to be settled between the parties directly affected. All of us understand the importance of guaranteeing the borders of Israel in any such negotiated settlement. Boundaries cannot be imposed by the United Nations or by other governments. As in any negotiations, both sides will have to recognize the need for concessions.

Eighth. Although the international community cannot impose its will in the setting of boundaries, it can help to guarantee the security of those boundaries. A new United Nations peace force could be stationed along the borders. Because the maintenance of security and peace there would be in the interest of all nations, this force could be financed through the United Nations. Because it was a truly international force, serving the needs of the world community, its withdrawal could be made contingent on decisions by the appropriate organs of the United Nations. It should be recalled that the sudden withdrawal of the U.N. forces in 1967 at the request of Egypt alone, led directly to the outbreak of those disastrous hostilities.

Finally, in the spirit of mutual concessions, to bring about a peaceful settlement, Israel, as well as the Arab States, should be willing to accept the presence of the U.N. forces of their territories. In the past, Israel has not welcomed U.N. troops.

These steps would, I believe, contribute to a substantial reduction of tensions in the

Middle East. They would remove many of the causes for the present arms race. They would enable the United States to begin the restoration of friendly relations with the Arab nations. They would help demonstrate that, while the United States is not a contestant in any popularity contest for the affection of the peoples of the Middle East, it can exercise its influence there in ways designed to meet the real and legitimate needs of all countries there. If American moves are sincerely directed to this end, American influence cannot help but increase.

These steps would reduce those very tensions which have created a situation ripe for Soviet intervention. If they are taken soon, they would reduce the opportunity for further Soviet penetration.

The chances for a mediatory role shared by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East are not very good, to say the least, because of the differing objectives of the two major powers.

The Soviet Union seeks to take advantage of political and military instability in the area; the United States seeks to lessen that instability and defuse a potential time bomb that could lead to a conflict beyond the confines of the Middle East.

The United States has traditionally sought to maintain friendly relations with all nations of the Middle East. It need not await the approval and cooperation of the Soviet Union to play the role of peacemaker. It can now extend the hand of conciliation to those elements in the Middle East that support the steps I have outlined, or similar steps. And it must move to a vigorous pursuit of its own national interests—a Middle East peace which can be sustained without direct American military intervention.

For if we do not now employ all of our best diplomatic efforts in support of a settlement based on these eight steps, we run the risk of eventual involvement in a new war, one which could be far more disastrous than even the Indochina conflict.

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Statement by the U.K. Foreign Office on the U.A.R. Acceptance of the U.S. June 19 Proposals¹

London, July 24 (?), 1970

The British Government are very glad to learn of the United Arab Republic acceptance of the American proposals. We welcomed the American initiative when it was launched.

We continue to hope that all concerned will do everything they can to work on the basis of the United States proposals to achieve a political settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 1967.

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News Conference Statement by U.S. President Nixon on the Status of the American June 19 Proposals²

Los Angeles, July 30, 1970

Q. Mr. President, could you give us an update on the very fast-moving developments in the Middle East; particularly, have we heard from Israel in response to your peace initiatives?

The President: We have not yet heard from Israel on our peace initiatives. As you know, we have heard from the Jordanians and the U.A.R., and the Israelis have been considering the matter in Cabinet sessions. We are hopeful that Israel will join the U.A.R. and Jordan on the peace initiative.

Some concern has been expressed by Israeli Government officials that if they agree to a cease-fire they run the risk of having a military buildup occur during the cease-fire.

¹ *The Times* (London), July 25, 1970, p. 12. For the text of Nasser's speech see Arab World Section, below, Document 422.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1625 (August 17, 1970), p. 185.

We and others have attempted to assure them that that would not be the case. If there is a cease-fire, a natural proposition connected with that, a condition with that, is that there will be a military standstill during that period.

As far as Israel's position is concerned, I indicated on July 1 in a television broadcast with network commentators from Los Angeles the position of this Government insofar as Israel's security is concerned and our commitment to maintaining the balance of power in the Mideast. Seventy-one Senators have endorsed that proposition in a letter to me which I received today.

In view of that position, which was stated then and which I will not go into now, I believe that Israel can agree to the cease-fire and can agree to negotiations without fear that by her negotiations her position may be compromised or jeopardized in that period.

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Statement by U.S. President Nixon on the Acceptance by Israel of the American June 19 Proposals¹

San Clemente, California, July 31, 1970

Ladies and gentlemen:

As you know, the Secretary of State and I have been meeting for the past 2 hours and a half on various foreign policy matters, but particularly concentrating on the problems of the Mideast. The Secretary has made a report to me on the latest developments, and I have a prepared statement which will be issued to all of you immediately after this statement.²

With regard to the developments in the Mideast, as you know, on June 25 the Secre-

tary announced that the United States was undertaking a major political initiative and our objective was to encourage the parties to the conflict to stop shooting and to start talking under the auspices of United Nations Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the pertinent resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

The Israeli Government is now in the process of drafting its detailed reply to the United States. However, I am pleased to say that we have been informed by the Government of Israel of the Cabinet vote to accept the United States proposal, and I am gratified that now all three governments to whom we addressed our initiative have responded positively and accepted the U.S. proposal.

We do not underestimate the difficulties which still lie ahead. The acceptance of the U.S. proposal by the governments principally concerned, important as it is, is only a first step. It will require moderation, flexibility, and a willingness by both sides to accept something less than their maximum positions if progress toward a just and lasting peace between the parties is to be made. But the cease-fire and the negotiations that now seem within reach are an essential beginning.

In this connection I want to reiterate one point, a point that I made last night in my press conference. It is an integral part of our cease-fire proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire period to improve its military position in the area of the cease-fire lines. All would have to refrain from emplacing new missiles or other installations and from undertaking a military buildup of any kind in such an area.

For our part, we have been engaged since early 1969 in cooperative efforts with the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France to help move the Middle East conflict toward a peaceful settlement. We expect these efforts to continue. We firmly believe, however, that the focus of future efforts must be on the parties directly concerned under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring's mission. We wish him and the parties well in their efforts, and we stand

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1626 (August 24, 1970), pp. 218-219.

² The prepared statement to which the President referred was an advance text of the statement printed here. [Footnote from *Department of State Bulletin*.]

ready to help whenever and wherever we can.

In that connection, in the same area we have made two appointments to ambassadorial positions today—two of our most distinguished and able Ambassadors—to Jordan, Mr. Dean Brown, and to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Nicholas Thacher.

I will say, finally, that I believe that all of those who have worked on this initiative within our own Government, and particularly those in the State Department, deserve a great deal of credit for the progress that has been made.

As we have indicated, we still have a long way to go before we achieve the results that we hope can be achieved. But in a situation where a year and a half ago there seemed to be no hope, there now appears some hope—some hope that a peaceful settlement can be arrived at.

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Commentary on the U.A.R. Acceptance of the U.S. June 19 Proposals Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda¹

Moscow, August 1, 1970

As is known, President Nasser has announced that the United Arab Republic is prepared to take practical steps for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis. This decision by Cairo is linked with proposals for resuming the mission of Gunnar Jarring, the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general.

In reply to questions from participants in the fourth session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, the UAR President said that the United States had evidently realised that it was useless to wait for the capitulation of the Arab countries.

What is more, the situation on the fronts of the Israeli-Arab war was now changing

and not in favour of Israel. As a result of the strengthened defence capacity of the UAR in the Suez Canal Zone, the Israeli Air Force had suffered considerable losses recently. Moreover, the United States feared a further weakening of its positions in the Arab countries because of its support for Israel.

It may be recalled that Cairo agreed to a temporary three-month cease-fire and the resumption of the mission of Dr. Jarring, who is vested with appropriate powers to help to bring about the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

The UAR continues to stand for the liberation of all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in June 1967 and for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

At the same time, the UAR President stressed in his latest statements that the United States had always encouraged Israel to carry on its aggression against the Arab peoples and had thus enabled Israel stubbornly to ignore the November resolution of the Security Council and to reject a political settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The people of the United Arab Republic support the peace initiative of President Nasser. It was approved at the fourth session of the general national congress of the Arab Socialist Union which ended recently. This initiative was welcomed by Jordan, the Lebanon and the Sudan, which supported the attitude of the United Arab Republic on a political settlement of the Middle East crisis.

Some other Arab countries, Kuwait, for example, also took a positive attitude to President Nasser's initiative. Prime Minister Rashid Karami of the Lebanon told correspondents of newspapers and news services that the Egyptian leader had shown the whole world that the Arabs were prepared to have a peaceful settlement. That is the essence of his initiative.

The Beirut newspaper *Al-Anwar* said in connection with President Nasser's statement:

As long as there is fighting on the banks of the

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5554 (August 4, 1970), p. 42.

Suez Canal, movement in the sphere of politics is quite natural and essential. In any case, it will do no harm.

Kuwait Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah said that Kuwait could not have any objections to the agreement of states bordering on Israel to proposals directly affecting them. The Minister added right away that agreement to the resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission would hardly interfere with the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs.

Answering questions from journalists, the Jordanian Prime Minister, Abdul Moneim al-Rifai, said that Jordan's reply to the proposals for the resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission was a favourable one and similar to that of the UAR.

In the light of such reactions from certain Arab countries to the UAR's initiative concerning a political settlement of the Middle East crisis, one cannot but be surprised by the position taken by the leadership of the Iraqi Baath Party. A few days ago the national leadership of this party issued a special statement.

Formally, it concerns the Middle East settlement but actually, as is seen from its contents, it is a reply to the position of the UAR government. They suddenly began in Baghdad to talk of "attempts finally to do away with the Palestinian problem" and so on and so forth. And this is said at a time when President Nasser stressed that the UAR's reply made special note of the need to restore the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

Now that many countries in the world have reacted positively to the UAR's initiative in seeking a formula for a political settlement on the basis of the Security Council's November resolution, the negative attitude of the leadership of the Iraqi Baath Party to President Nasser's initiative and to the position of the UAR government does not help the genuine struggle against the aggressor and those imperialist and Zionist forces supporting him.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Foreign Minister Buweisir of Libya to Turkey (Excerpt)¹

August 1, 1970

In response to an invitation extended by His Excellency Mr. Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, His Excellency Mr. Saleh M. Buweisir, Minister of Unity and Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic, paid an official visit to Turkey from 29 July to 1 August 1970.

During his visit, the Minister of Unity and Foreign Affairs of Libya visited the cities of Ankara and Istanbul.

His Excellency Mr. Saleh M. Buweisir was received by His Excellency Mr. Cevdet Sunay, President of the Republic of Turkey and by His Excellency Mr. Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister.

In an atmosphere of warm cordiality and understanding the two Ministers held wide-ranging talks during which they reviewed the state of bilateral relations and had a full exchange of views on international problems focussing particularly their attention on the dangerous situation in the Middle East.

During the talks, the two Ministers outlined the foreign policies of their respective countries and they stressed the value of traditional and historic friendship existing between the two countries which reflects the sincere desire of their peoples. They further expressed their respective Governments' determination to maintain and to continue to develop and intensify the existing cooperation between the two countries in the fields of commerce, economy, petroleum, tourism, culture, communications and in other fields.

In examining the international situation, the two Ministers reaffirmed their countries' genuine will to work unceasingly for the cause of a just peace in the region as well as in the world and of international stability.

¹ English text in *Disisleri Bakanligi Belleteni* (Turkey), No. 70 (July 1970), pp. 82-84.

The two Ministers reviewed at great length the situation in the Middle East which poses a serious threat to the peace and the stability in the area because of the continuation of the Israeli occupation.

The Minister of Unity and Foreign Affairs of Libya outlined his country's views in regard to the rights of the people of Palestine and the evacuation by Israel of occupied Arab territories.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey reaffirmed the friendship and deep sympathy of Turkey towards the Arab countries and called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories in conformity with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. He also welcomed the last American proposal which has created new hopes for the settlement of the conflict, and expressed the appreciation of his Government for the positive attitude adopted by the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Jordan.

The two Ministers reiterated their firm opposition to the use of force as a means of securing political advantages and territorial gains, and the use of such gains to impose unilateral solutions. They further agreed to spare no efforts for the realisation of a just and honourable peace safeguarding fully the legitimate rights of the Arabs.

The two Ministers noted that the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israeli forces creates a tense situation fraught with dangers for both regional and world peace.

The two Ministers expressed the concern of their Governments regarding the situation in the Holy City of Jerusalem. They voiced their opposition to the continuing occupation and to measures aiming at changing unilaterally the status of the City prevailing before June 5, 1967.

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Formal Acceptance of the U.S. June 19 Proposals Issued by the Government of Israel¹

August 4, 1970

Having considered President Nixon's message of July 24, 1970, basing itself on its contents and in strict adherence to its policy principles and authoritative statements, the Government of Israel has decided to reply affirmatively to the latest U.S. peace initiative, and to inform the U.S. that it may convey to Ambassador Jarring that:

(1) Israel is prepared in due time to designate a representative to discussions to be held under Ambassador Jarring's auspices with the U.A.R. (Jordan), according to such procedure and at such places and times as he may recommend, taking into account each side's attitudes as to method of procedure and previous experience of discussions between the parties.

(2) Israel's position in favour of a cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, in accordance with the Security Council's cease-fire resolution, remains unchanged. On the basis of clarifications given by the U.S. Government in this matter, Israel is prepared to reply affirmatively to the U.S. proposal for a cease-fire (for at least three months) on the Egyptian front.

(3) The discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices shall be held within the framework of the Security Council Resolution (242) on the basis of the expression of readiness by the parties to carry out the Security Council Resolution (242) in all its parts, in order to achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace agreement between the parties which will ensure:

(a) Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israel of all claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, August 5, 1970, p. 3.

boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Each of the parties will be responsible within its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military forces or paramilitary forces, including irregular forces, against the armed forces or against civilians living in the territory of the other party.

(b) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements.

(4) Israel will participate in these discussions without any prior conditions. Israel will not claim the prior acceptance by the other party of her positions, as Israel does not accept in advance the positions of the other parties as communicated publicly or otherwise. Each party will be free to present its proposals on the matters under discussion.

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Speech to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel Reporting on the Israeli Government Acceptance of the U.S. June 19 Proposals¹

Jerusalem, August 4, 1970

In my statement of 29 June, I informed the Knesset that the Government of the U.S. had brought to our attention a plan for a political initiative, aimed at "encouraging the parties to move towards a just and lasting peace." I added that the Knesset could rest assured that the Government of Israel would bring the subject for debate in plenary session at the appropriate time, as soon as circumstances permitted and necessitated such a debate.

The proposal of 19 June, to which we were required to reply, was to designate a representative to discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, on the basis of a report to be submitted by him to the U.N.

Secretary-General, the essence of which would be:

...Ambassador Jarring will inform the U.N. Secretary-General that, the parties having indicated their willingness to carry out Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under his auspices. The discussions will be held according to such procedures and at such places and times as the Secretary-General's envoy may recommend, taking into account the parties' preferences and the procedures under which such discussions were held in the past between the parties.

The purpose of these discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between the parties, based on:

(1) Mutual acknowledgement by the U.A.R. (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and...

(2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

In order to facilitate Jarring's task to promote agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe (for three months at least) the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

That is the text proposed by the Government of the U.S. for Ambassador Jarring's report.

Despite our negative attitude which was communicated to the Government of the U.S., we have—as I have stated in the Knesset—maintained close dialogue with it on this important subject. On behalf of the entire Government we sought elucidations from the Government of the U.S., receiving important clarifications on most essential subjects, both as regards the strengthening of Israel's defensive capacity and as regards acknowledgement of the justice of our attitude on fundamental political matters. These clarifications made it easier for the Government of Israel to reply affirmatively to the latest American initiative.

On 31 July 1970, the Government of Israel resolved:

1. Having considered the appeals of the President of the U.S.A., and while continuing its com-

¹ English translation: Golda Meir, *Address to the Knesset, 4 August 1970* (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs Information Division, n.d.).

mitment to its basic policy guidelines and authorised statements, the Government has resolved to reply affirmatively to the latest peace initiative of the Government of the U.S. and to designate, at the appropriate time, a representative for peace negotiations without prior conditions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242, and with the aim of reaching a binding contractual peace agreement between the parties.

2. Israel's position in respect of a cease-fire on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, on a basis of reciprocity, in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, remains in force. Taking into account the clarifications provided by the Government of the U.S. on the subject, Israel is prepared to reply affirmatively to the proposal of the U.S. concerning a cease-fire (for three months at least) on the Egyptian front.

In addition, the Government resolved that a ministerial committee would draft the precise language of the reply of the Government of Israel to the Government of the U.S. The committee has completed its work, and the text has been approved by the Cabinet plenum at its session today:

Having considered President Nixon's message of 24 July 1970, basing itself on its contents and in strict adherence to its policy principles and authoritative statements, the Government of Israel has decided to reply affirmatively to the latest U.S. peace initiative, and to inform the U.S. that it may convey to Ambassador Jarring that:

(1) Israel is prepared in due time to designate a representative to discussions to be held under Ambassador Jarring's auspices with the U.A.R. (Jordan), according to such procedure and at such places and times as he may recommend, taking into account each side's attitudes as to method of procedure and previous experience of discussions between the parties.

(2) Israel's position in favour of a cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, in accordance with the Security Council's cease-fire Resolution, remains unchanged. On the basis of clarifications given by the U.S. Government in this matter, Israel is prepared to reply affirmatively to the U.S. propos-

al for a cease-fire (for at least three months) on the Egyptian front.

(3) The discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices shall be held within the framework of the Security Council Resolution (242) on the basis of the expression of readiness by the parties to carry out the Security Council Resolution (242) in all its parts, in order to achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace agreement between the parties which will ensure:

(a) Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israel of all claims or states of belligerency and respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Each of the parties will be responsible within its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military forces or paramilitary forces, including irregular forces, against the armed forces of against civilians living in the territory of the other party.

(b) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements.

(4) Israel will participate in these discussions without any prior conditions. Israel will not claim the prior acceptance by the other party of her positions, as Israel does not accept in advance the positions of the other parties as communicated publicly or otherwise. Each party will be free to present its proposals on the matters under discussion.

Members of the Knesset: These resolutions of the Government of Israel are predicated on the principles of our policy over the years and conform to what has been the policy of the Government ever since the cease-fire: strengthening the security of the State and advancing the cause of peace between Israel and the neighbouring countries. These decisions are a direct outcome of the necessity to continue to consolidate our capacity to stand fast on the cease-fire lines and to continue to strive for negotiations with the Arab States—without prior conditions from any party whatsoever—for the conclusion of peace treaties.

We have always regarded these principles as mutually complementary. This policy

has found expression in the authoritative statements of the Government and in the activities of its representatives, who have been at pains, constantly, not to forgo any possibility or prospect for negotiation to advance the cause of peace between Israel and her neighbours.

In this resolution, moreover, we kept in mind our duty to ensure the continued strengthening of the Israel Defence Forces, as well as to continue to nurture the friendly relations between Israel and the U.S., its people and its Government.

The U.S. Government, in its appeal to the Governments of the region, stresses the urgent need to end the bloodshed and to begin a genuine negotiating process between the parties concerning an agreement for a just and lasting peace. Towards this end, it proposes the holding of talks between the parties under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

On 24 July 1970, the U.S. Government informed us that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had informed it of the unconditional consent of his Government to the proposal of the U.S. Government.

The manner in which the Egyptian President worded his agreement to the American proposal testifies that the hoped-for change in his attitude has not yet taken place, and that we have yet to see a burgeoning of that readiness for peace which alone can ensure sincere negotiation. One need only take note of the statements of the Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, Government officials and statesmen in the neighbouring countries to continue to feel grave doubt about the readiness to recognize Israel and to conclude an agreement for a just and lasting peace with her. Nevertheless, in spite of these doubts, the Government of Israel feels it must not forgo testing this prospect, slight though it may be.

Since the American initiative was presented to us, we have heard political declarations on the part of President Nixon, Secretary of State Rogers, Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State Sisco. In President Nixon's public declarations, expression was

given to the basic policy of the U.S. with regard to the Middle East, including the obligations undertaken by the U.S. for the granting of aid to Israel in all that concerns maintenance of her security and of the balance of forces in the region, particularly in the light of the growth of the Soviet involvement and the flow of Soviet arms to Egypt.

I have reason to believe that the President's positive attitude to the task of preserving the balance of our security is both practical and consistent.

In the course of the clarifications with the U.S. Government, we reiterated in an authoritative manner our position with regard to the major subjects to be discussed in the talks if in fact peace talks do get under way between Israel and the Arab States under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. Our attitudes were defined in accordance with the basic principles of Government policy, Chapter 5, Paragraphs 4 and 5, and in accordance with the decisions and statements of the Government as ratified by the Knesset.

Here I must emphasize again that we have reiterated Israel's views not as prior conditions to talks, nor as binding clauses for prior agreement on the part of our negotiating partners—but Israel's stand was and is readiness for peace talks without any preconditions from any side. I will mention here some of the positions we have seen fit to stress with regard to possible talks with the Arab States:

Israel has publicly declared that by virtue of her right to secure borders, defensible borders, she will not return to the frontiers of 4 June 1967, which lay the State open to the temptations of aggression and which, on various fronts, lend the aggressor decisive advantages. Our position was and remains that, in lieu of peace, we will continue to maintain the situation as determined at the time of the cease-fire. The cease-fire lines will be replaced only by secure and recognized boundaries determined in a contractual peace.

In accepting the American Government's peace initiative, Israel was not asked to, and did not, take upon herself any territorial

commitments. On the contrary, the Government of Israel won support for its position that not a single Israeli soldier will be withdrawn from the cease-fire lines until a binding contractual peace agreement is reached.

Israel's position on the implementation of the Security Council Resolution has been authoritatively stated, and there has been no change. The Foreign Minister defined it in the U.N. on 8 October 1968, and made it clear that the intention of the Resolution is to bring about agreement between the parties on all its constituent clauses. That is to say—implementation of the Security Council Resolution through negotiation, agreement and the signature and application of treaty engagements to be worked out between the parties. Moreover, in our reply of 22 April 1969, we made it clear to Ambassador Jarring that implementation would begin only after agreement had been reached on all the clauses.

The Government of Israel is convinced of the justice of its demand for direct negotiations with the Arab States, and I emphasized in my Knesset speech on 26 May that in the history of relations between States there is no precedent of a conflict being resolved without direct negotiations. The Armistice Agreements at Rhodes were signed as a result of a process which included direct negotiations.

In agreeing to talks under Jarring's auspices, we are not giving up this basic position. But still I must say openly and clearly, as I have already pointed out from this rostrum, that we are prepared to reach face-to-face negotiations with our neighbours even if this is preceded by a stage of indirect talks. We do not hold that such a prior stage is essential on the road to peace, because there is no reason not to start with face-to-face discussions without prior conditions. But if our consent to such a stage can promote the dialogue between the parties on peace, we will accept this too. That was and is the logic behind our agreeing to Rhodes-style talks.

For some time now, there have been moves afoot to change Ambassador Jarring's mandate and grant the Four Powers the status

of a body authorized to instruct the U.N. envoy. Israel opposes this trend and has officially stated that she is prepared to cooperate with the Ambassador in carrying out his mission in the framework of the authority vested in him by the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967.

In our talks with the political factors concerned, we have repeatedly made our position clear that Paragraph 11 of the U.N. Resolution—concerning granting the refugees the free choice between returning to Israel or receipt of compensation and rehabilitation in Arab countries—is irreconcilable with Israel's existence, security and character. We did not bring about this tragic problem, and we are not responsible for the postponement of its solution. We are prepared to cooperate towards a solution of the problem in the context of the peace and in the framework of a regional programme. I want to make it clear that we were not asked to, nor did we take upon ourselves, any commitments on this subject.

We subscribe to a cease-fire on all fronts on the basis of reciprocity. The agreement to a cease-fire on the Egyptian front, if only for three months at least, was passed unanimously by all the Ministers. I am sure that even those Ministers who opposed the American proposal, but agreed to the limited cease-fire, did so in the light of the clarifications we received on the subject from the Government of the United States.

According to the proposal of the Government of the U.S., accepted by the Government of Egypt, the cease-fire on the Egyptian front, to be effective, would have to include an understanding that (1) both sides would stop all incursions and all firing, on the ground and in the air, across the cease-fire lines, (2) the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. would refrain from changing the military status quo (by emplacing SAM's or other new installations in an agreed zone west of the Suez Canal cease-fire line), and (3) Israel would observe a similar standstill on new installations in a similar zone east of the Canal.

It has also been made clear to Israel, in

the most official manner, that the obligation to observe the cease-fire on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, is a continuing one, and the American proposal for a limited cease-fire is only a first step towards bringing about full and continuous acceptance by the parties of the Security Council Resolution on the cease-fire, even after the end of the three-month period.

Israel has made it clear that the cease-fire must apply to all forces operating from the territory of a country which accepted it. That is to say, all regular forces of that country, all foreign forces stationed on its territory and para-military forces operating from its territory, including the terrorists.

I do not intend to review now all the problems pertaining to the cease-fire. We would do better to discuss the subject at the appropriate time in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.

We have reason to assume that Israel will not find herself weaker if the Arabs decide to renew the war.

Members of the Knesset: Just as we do not underrate the importance of the common denominator which exists between the U.S. and ourselves in basic issues in the security and political spheres, we must not ignore differences of opinion that exist between us on a number of issues. Even these differences should not be permitted to overshadow the basic fact that we are discussing and arguing with a friendly Power, which has proved in the past, and is proving in the present, its sincere desire that the peace and security of Israel be safeguarded.

In the formulation of the U.S. position, there have been in the past—such as in a document submitted to us on 16 June—and there may appear in the future, definitions which are not acceptable to us and concerning which we have already explained our negative attitude. There is no change in our negation of these positions now, but these questions do not call for a decision at this stage.

This is also the reason why I raise the question concerning the timing of the withdrawal of Gahal from the Government.

We have never concealed the fact that, in the National Unity Government, positions diverged regarding the final borders of Israel to be included in the peace treaties.

The members of Gahal today submitted their letters of resignation from the Government. All members of the Cabinet received this with deep regret. I must say that great efforts have been made over the past few days by all members of the Cabinet to dissuade the members of Gahal from this step, and I should like to hope that the relations of collegueship and mutual trust that prevailed for over three years in sessions around a common table will continue in future as well, when the relations are those between Government and Opposition.

There were and are basic issues on which the Government was fully united, to wit: that there would be no withdrawal from the cease-fire lines until the advent of peace, and that Israel would not return to the 1967 borders. These positions have not changed, and they are still valid today. Unlike Gahal, however, all the other components of the Government visualized the agreed and secure borders of Israel within the framework of a peace treaty as not necessarily identical with the present cease-fire lines in all sectors.

We did not decide on the issue of the map of peace, since we saw no political benefit in a decision which would have led to disunity before there was any political need for a decision, and especially since there was a national necessity to close ranks for the performance of common tasks. According to my best judgement, the time has not arrived even now to submit this issue for a plebiscite.

On various occasions, I have indicated the possibility of a change in the Government's composition when the time will come to determine the borders. I do not think this is the moment necessitating the departure of Gahal, at a time when none of us is yet convinced that negotiations will commence, and no one is certain that such negotiations—our sincere desire in this regard notwithstanding—will actually lead to peace and will require a decision on territorial matters. My opinion is that, from a national point

of view, Gahal would have done better had it seen a possibility of remaining in the Government at least until such time as we shall be compelled to decide on the question of borders.

Members of the Knesset: The decision taken by the Government of Israel was not an easy one. Not because we hesitated to launch a move that may bring us nearer to peace, but because of the doubts we have concerning the readiness of the Arab leaders to embark sincerely on the road to peace.

Since the publication of the American peace initiative, and even after their announcement of its acceptance, we have heard and continue to hear authoritative pronouncements by the Heads of Arab States, including Egypt and Jordan, which clearly indicate that they aim at war and not peace, at the resumption of hostilities and not a cease-fire, at the continuation of the conflict and not its liquidation, at the deepening of tension and not its relaxation.

Even so, in the past as in the present, we have felt duty-bound carefully to examine every prospect, be it ever so slim, which could lead us to peace—to examine with the fullest readiness and maximum responsibility.

It is not out of weakness that we reached our decision. It is within our power—and we prove it every day—to maintain our control of the cease-fire lines on all fronts until peace comes. At the same time, we do not approach the negotiating table with the haughtiness of the victor. We have said repeatedly: we want peace among equals, peace that will ensure our existence and sovereignty, just as it will ensure the existence and sovereignty of every Arab State in the region. Now that we are called upon to translate this readiness from theory into practice, we do so in all sincerity, guided by the same cardinal motive of the desire for peace upon which our society is based. But we are not proceeding blindly. We are aware of the hostile tendencies still lurking in the hearts of the Arab leaders in our region. And we are aware of the involvement of a super-Power such as the Soviet Union, which is stirring up our region for the

promotion of its own selfish interests and not of those of any of the nations in the area. It behoves us to proceed sincerely, yet with open eyes, in full readiness to accept peace, but without disregarding the dangers. The Government of Israel is convinced that its decision assures the continued ability of Israel to defend itself against all aggression without forfeiting any opportunity to embark on the road to peace.

In the years since the Six-Day War, the wonderful staying power of the nation has been revealed. The secret of this staying power lies in the people's capacity to persevere in essentials without recoiling. Even now, following our latest decision, there is no reason to doubt this capacity of the people under the guidance of its Government.

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Statement on U.S.-Spain Agreement Submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Alexis Johnson (Excerpt)¹

Washington, August 6, 1970

During . . . 17 years of friendly cooperation under the 1953 agreement the United States Government has been permitted to establish and maintain in Spain three joint-use air bases and one joint-use naval base, including associated support facilities. Our total original investment in these facilities is approximately \$400 million. Our present force strength in Spain is approximately 10,000 military personnel. These bases have supported important missions of SAC, MAC, Air Defense, antisubmarine warfare units, 6th Fleet supply, and, most significantly, our Polaris submarine force. During this period we have made grant military assistance available to Spain. All of these activi-

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1627 (August 31, 1970), pp. 248-249.

ties and expenditures were specifically authorized and funded by the Congress after appropriate study, hearing, and debate.

The administration has most carefully considered the question of whether or not to seek to continue maintaining these facilities in Spain; and after thorough review by all authorities concerned, particularly the Department of Defense and the Department of State, the President decided that we should do so. The committee was informed of this decision and the general outlines we envisaged for the new agreement by Deputy Secretary Packard and myself at a hearing on April 22, 1970. These negotiations have now been concluded successfully.

The broad compass of U.S. operating facilities, which will continue to be made available to us by Spain under this new agreement, continues to be important in (a) maintaining our general deterrent posture in the Mediterranean area, (b) providing the infrastructure to support our forces deployed in Europe and the Mediterranean, and (c) contributing to our worldwide strategic and tactical mobility. The facilities in Spain contribute to our deterrent strength, particularly by providing maximum coverage for our Polaris-equipped submarines. Thus all of our facilities in Spain are defensive and deterrent in nature and will contribute to the maintenance of peace and avoidance of conflict.

Our overall Mediterranean security posture would be considerably degraded were these bases not available. Although it is possible to conceive of alternative locations for some of the functions presently performed in Spain, in some cases political considerations would make relocation difficult or impossible, and in any event any such relocation would be very expensive. Many of the relocations would not be adequate substitutes. Our Polaris Fleet ballistic missile alert coverage would be lessened. Our staging facilities to support our forces in the event of a crisis would also be reduced. These are just two examples.

Most importantly, however, some of the facilities are not replaceable elsewhere. The geographic location of Spain obviously can-

not be duplicated, especially the favorable terrain and weather conditions for aerial weapons training required to keep our European air defense forces in a high state of readiness, and the privilege of overflight is important. Since we have been deprived of our former bases in other areas, this factor of geography has taken on increased significance.

In short, we think that our strategic posture and tactical strength and logistic capabilities make it important that we continue to maintain military facilities in Spain.

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Commentary on the U.S. June 19 Proposals and the U.S.S.R. Attitude Towards Them Published in the China Weekly Peking Review¹

Peking, August 7, 1970

U.S. imperialism and its partner are making every effort to plot a "Munich" in the Middle East. The aim behind the plot of these "superpowers" is to realize their fond dream of dividing the spheres of influence in the Middle East between themselves at the expense of the interests of the Palestinian people. The scheme has aroused strong condemnation and resolute opposition by the 100 million Arab people.

After prolonged closed-door bargaining with its partner, U.S. imperialism dished up a so-called "political initiative" through U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on June 19 for the solution of the Middle East question. This was submitted to the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Israel and some Arab countries. According to a U.S.I.S. dispatch on July 22, U.S. imperialism's "political initiative" stipulates first of all that the Arab countries and Israel "subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire" for a "limited period" of three months. It also stipulates that the

¹ *Peking Review*, XIII, 32 (August 7, 1970), pp. 25-27.

Arab countries and Israel should agree to "hold discussions" and "reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them" under the auspices of the U.N. "special envoy" Jarring in accordance with the November 22, 1967 "resolution" of the U.N. Security Council. Besides, the "initiative" requires the Arab countries to acknowledge the "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" of Israel. At his press conference on June 25, Rogers trumpeted that his "political initiative" was "to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council." He even stated in a threatening tone that "the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Israel is very important for our national interest."

In his so-called "political initiative," Rogers deliberately obliterated the distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. This is in essence a plot to make the Arab people lay down their arms and give up their just cause of national liberation, and to force the Arab countries to resign themselves to national humiliation, abandon their struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and recognize the U.S. imperialist base of aggression in the Middle East. Therefore it is an out-and-out plot for a Middle East "Munich" at the expense of the interests of the Palestinian people and the Arab countries.

With a view to coercing social-imperialism to lend a hand in his machination, U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon bellowed out threats in his July 1 television speech: "The Middle East is now terribly dangerous. It is like the Balkans before World War I." He absurdly compared the situation in the Middle East today to that in the Balkans more than 50 years ago in a deliberate attempt to exaggerate the danger of a so-called "confrontation" between the "superpowers." Moreover, he made a ballyhoo about the so-called "balance of forces," or the hegemony of big powers, a hoax which has long since gone bankrupt, urging that the two "super-

powers" "maintain the balance of power" in the Middle East. He raved that "once the balance of power shifts" to the disadvantage of Israel, "there will be a war." On July 12, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco went a step further with the threat that "we are going to do whatever is necessary to assure that the balance does not tip against Israel" and that if the U.S. "political initiative" was rejected, U.S. imperialism would support Israel "at an escalated level" in its war of aggression against the Arab countries.

Since the "political initiative" was put forward by U.S. imperialism, certain people of another so-called "superpower" have made busy behind-the-scenes contacts with U.S. imperialism, cooking up schemes and engaging in other activities with ulterior motives. These types have helped U.S. imperialism in putting the pressure on the Arab countries. They have instructed their propaganda machines to grind out counter-revolutionary trash lauding the "general tenor" of the "political initiative" proposed by U.S. imperialism for being "closer to the legitimate aspirations of the Arab countries." Harping on the same tune of U.S. imperialism, they even said that that "time has come to . . . get down to serious efforts to bring about a political settlement." While making "serious efforts" to help U.S. imperialism peddle the fraudulent "political initiative," these fellows have bared their fangs and rained furious curses on the Palestinian guerrillas who take a firm stand against the plot of the "political initiative." They even viciously smeared in their newspapers the revolutionary struggle of the Palestinian guerrillas as "irresponsible adventurous freakishness." Afraid of U.S. imperialism and still more of revolution, they have been ganging up with U.S. imperialism in many foul and dirty schemes, betraying the interests of the Arab people and undermining the armed struggle of the Palestinian people. Today, the Palestinian and other Arab people are heightening their vigilance and watching what more dirty counter-revolutionary deals they are striking with the U.S. imperialists in their plot for a Middle East "Munich."

But times are not the times of "Munich" over 30 years ago. To this Middle East "Munich" plotted by U.S. imperialism and its partner, *Fateh*, organ of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, has given a powerful reply: "No." A struggle against compromise, capitulation and the plot for a Middle East "Munich" is developing vigorously. The angry denunciations by the awakened Arab people against Rogers' "political initiative" are resounding all over the Arab land. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization solemnly declared in a statement on July 25 that the Palestinian people will not be bound by a ceasefire and lay down their arms, but will continue the armed struggle till victory.¹ The statement indignantly denounced Rogers' "political initiative" for aiming at undermining the unity of the Arab people and suppressing and liquidating the Arab liberation movement in general, and the Palestinian resistance movement in particular. It categorically rejected Rogers' "political initiative" and declared: "Down with all liquidationist and capitulationist solutions!" In a July 26 statement, a spokesman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council said: "The Revolutionary Command Council reiterates its definite rejection of all projects that are aimed at liquidating the Palestine question and the Palestinian people's right to return to their land, particularly the recent U.S. proposals." On the same day, Hadeeth Mourad, Commander of the Syrian People's Army, pointed out: Rogers' "political initiative" is a link in the chain of conspiracies against the Palestinian cause. The Syrian people, he said, are ready to wage a decisive struggle against the U.S. and Israeli aggressors. In a statement to the press in Beirut on July 27, Syrian Minister of the Interior Mohamed Rabah al Taweel announced Syria's outright rejection of the American proposals. *El Moudjahid*, the Algerian paper, said in an editorial on the same day that Algeria holds that every point of the "Rogers' plan" runs counter to the

interests of the Arab nation and the masses of the Arab people in general and the Palestinian people in particular. In Amman, capital of Jordan, more than 10,000 people held a demonstration on the same day. They shouted in one voice against Rogers' "political initiative" as well as the 1967 "resolution" of the U.N. Security Council. Their placards bore inscriptions resolutely supporting the Palestinian people's armed struggle and calling for the smashing of all "political settlement" schemes which betray the interests of the Palestinian and Arab people. Palestinian commandos who took part in the demonstration declared on their banners: "The guns of our fighters will determine the fate of the Palestinian people."

The Palestinian and other Arab people are determined to persist in their armed struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. They do not fear the war intimidation by U.S. imperialism and its partner, still less do they give credence to their political deception. The great revolutionary struggles of the Palestinian and other Arab people against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors are surging forward wave upon wave. The plot of a Middle East "Munich" being hatched by one or two "superpowers" is bound to be crushed by the 100 million Arab people.

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Commentary on Attitudes to the Middle East Cease-Fire and the Resumption of the Jarring Talks Published in the U.S.S.R. Weekly New Times²

August 7, 1970

There are signs—at long last—of some progress towards a political settlement of the dangerous and protracted Middle East crisis. Restoration of peace in this part of the world is of course a long way off. But Amman, Khartoum, Beirut and certain other

¹ For the text of the P.L.O. statement, see Arab World section, below, Document 425.

² Published in *Novaya Vremya*, the Russian edition of *New Times*, on August 7, 1970; this text from *New Times* (English edition), No. 32 (August 12, 1970), pp. 4-5.

Arab capitals have reacted positively to the peace initiative of the United Arab Republic, which has accepted proposals for a three-month ceasefire and the resumption of the mission of Gunnar Jarring, the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General. The Swedish diplomat has already arrived in New York for the necessary instructions.

How did the new situation come about? Let us recapitulate. Politically, many observers say, this summer has been a hot one. For Israel, however, the beginning of July could be likened to bleak December (it is cold in winter in Sinai). At the end of June and the beginning of July the Israeli Air Force lost five Phantoms over the Suez Canal zone. It was a week, to quote General Haim Bar-Lev, Chief of the Israeli Army General Staff, when "Israeli Phantoms crashed one after another over the Egyptian front." Tel Aviv attributed the turn in the military situation in the Suez Canal zone to "Soviet intervention." This fantastic claim, however, failed to convince anyone. General Bar-Lev himself was forced to admit that the Israeli planes which came to grief over the Suez Canal zone were brought down by Egyptian rocket troops.

On July 23, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, addressing the fourth session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, announced that the U.A.R. accepted the proposals for the resumption of the Jarring mission advanced in June by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Among other things, they provided for a three-month ceasefire to ensure the success of the mission.

On July 31 Tel Aviv finally announced that it too found the U.S. proposals acceptable. Foreign news agency reports stressed, however, that Golda Meir's government had not yet decided on what terms it would accept them.

Rogers's proposals have been loudly acclaimed by the American press as a "new plan" for a Middle East settlement. It attributes the initiative to the United States, although there is really nothing new in these "new" proposals. As a matter of fact, resumption of the Jarring mission, for

instance, has been proposed time and again, but Washington's stand hitherto made it impossible. For the U.S. insisted that the Swedish envoy should play the role of a "mailbox," that is, that he should confine his activity to forwarding the proposals of the parties concerned to U Thant. It is now proposed to halt the fighting for three months to create better conditions for the talks Jarring is to hold in the Arab capitals and Tel Aviv. The basis of the settlement remains the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The Soviet Union has all along favoured the immediate elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression and the restoration of peace in the Middle East. The above-mentioned resolution has always been considered in Moscow a realistic basis for the political settlement of the Middle East crisis. What is more, the Soviet Union has repeatedly advanced concrete proposals for a just settlement. It fully approves the United Arab Republic's initiative, which creates conditions for resuming the Jarring mission and halting fighting for three months.

It is of course necessary that both Israel and the Arab countries should abide by the agreement on the temporary ceasefire. If the Jarring mission is to be successful, both sides must declare themselves ready to implement all the provisions of the 1967 Security Council resolution. To recognize it "in general," as the Israeli politicians from time to time claim they do, is to leave loopholes for emasculating it with the aid of legal chicanery and word juggling. Israel, for instance, should unequivocally recognize the need to withdraw its troops from all the Arab areas it occupied in June 1967. In that event, and given a just solution of the Palestinian refugee problem, the question of recognition of the Israeli frontiers as of June 5, 1967, will be settled and a just and stable peace in the Middle East eventually established.

Lastly, the next logical step would be to activate the quadrilateral consultations in New York with a view to working out agreed recommendations to Ambassador Jarring.

This would naturally speed the resumption of his mission.

How has the world reacted to the new element in the quest for a political settlement in the Middle East? On the whole, with unconcealed relief. True, in Tel Aviv and in Zionist circles in the United States one still hears talk about "suspicions" with regard to the peace prospects.

The disturbing and at times explosive situation in the Middle East is fraught with grave danger for world peace. Consequently, any sign of a possible settlement is encouraging, though it must be said that there is still quite a gap between the positions of the parties to the conflict. For one thing there is as yet no indication that Tel Aviv has any intention of renouncing its annexationist plans.

After President Nasser had announced his peace initiative, a stormy week began for the Israeli government. Endless meetings were held to work out a new stand. For Israel found itself in danger of being completely isolated politically, and that is something Golda Meir and her followers cannot afford. The extremist and chauvinist Gahal Party, which has six Ministers in the government and is headed by Menahem Begin, advanced a jesuitical plan: the government should give a favourable reply to President Nixon's special message to Israel but avoid any definite acceptance of the proposals. The Cabinet thought it better not to risk approving this plan. Thereupon the Gahal Ministers resigned. True, the conditions on which Israel is prepared to accept the ceasefire and the resumption of the talks under Jarring's auspices are still vague. Nevertheless, the Tel Aviv rulers have finally been forced to waive their demands for "direct" talks with the Arab countries. Experience has shown them to be totally unrealistic. The Arabs have made it perfectly clear that they will not engage in direct negotiations as long as Israel remains in occupation of the Arab territories inasmuch as this would mean capitulation.

Jordan, as a country directly involved, and Lebanon, Sudan, Kuwait, Tunisia and

certain other Arab countries have, as I have stated above, reacted favourably to Cairo's acceptance of the settlement proposals. Libya said it would define its stand somewhat later. The heads of state of Lebanon and Sudan and the Foreign Minister of Kuwait in their statements describe Cairo's move as wise and farsighted. Iraq, Algeria and Syria took a negative stand on the issue. There is no unanimity, as we see, among the Arab countries. According to the United Press International, however, it is felt in Damascus that if a political settlement is reached Syria will not interfere.

A sharply negative attitude to the settlement proposals and Cairo's peace initiative has been taken by the leaders of Palestinian organizations. Most of them claim, among other things, that the latest diplomatic actions allegedly ignore the interests and rights of the Palestinian refugees.

Such an appraisal is puzzling, to say the least. The refugees' lot is indeed terrible, but there is a clause in the 1967 Security Council resolution providing for a just solution of the refugee problem.

President Nasser took this fully into account when, announcing his country's peace initiative, he stressed the need to restore the lawful rights of the Palestinian Arabs. Does this not accord with the interests of the Arab population of Palestine? And does the prospect of liberating the Arab territories which were seized by the Israelis in June 1967 militate against their interests? This is precisely what the Palestinian Arabs themselves are striving for by waging patriotic guerilla warfare in these areas.

What will happen if the peace initiative of the U.A.R. and other Arab countries is torpedoed? Who will benefit by it? Surely, only those who want the Israeli aggression and occupation of Arab lands to continue. Imperialism and international Zionism with its military tool—Israel—will then have an excuse to complain that the Arab countries are opposed to a political settlement in the Middle East. And there can be no solution of the Middle East crisis other than political. Those who cherish the interests

of the Arabs, including the Arab population of Palestine, should not forget that.

And so the Israeli Phantoms which crashed in the Suez Canal zone in the hot days of July brought about a turn in the quest of a formula for the political settlement of the Middle East crisis. The capitulation of the Arabs, of which General Dayan dreamed in June 1967, has failed to materialize. But it has taken more than three years and the strengthening of the United Arab Republic's defence potential (the front on Egyptian territory is the main one) for Washington finally to realize that there is no hope for a military solution of Israeli-Arab problems.

As for the American newspapers' attempts to create the impression that the United States has well-nigh radically altered its Middle East policy, these claims are totally at variance with the facts. The interests of peace are served not by words, but by deeds.

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Statement Announcing the Middle East Cease-Fire Broadcast by Prime Minister Meir of Israel¹

August 7, 1970

Good evening. I have the pleasure of announcing to the Israeli public that a general cease-fire between Israel and Egypt will come into effect today. The cease-fire was achieved thanks to the initiative of the US Government and it will come into force at midnight. It will cover all the forces on both sides of the cease-fire line.

In my speech in the Knesset on Tuesday I announced the Government's decision to reply in the affirmative to the US Government's proposal on a cease-fire between us and Egypt. Our response to this proposal comes after reaching an understanding that the cease-fire will take place under condi-

tions that will preclude its being taken advantage of for wrong purposes. Israel was prepared strictly to observe the cease-fire arrangements determined at the end of the six-day war according to the Security Council resolution of June 1967. However, Egypt regrettably violated its obligations persistently and even declared publicly that it no longer recognised its obligation to maintain the cease-fire. Now the Egyptian Government has announced its readiness to accept the cease-fire according to clauses agreed on between the Governments concerned and the US Government. We accept this announcement willingly. Israel on its part announces its complete readiness to follow strictly all the clauses of the cease-fire arrangements on the basis of reciprocity.

Israeli citizens, at the end of the six-day war we responded to the UN resolution on the cease-fire in the hope that it would not be long before negotiations opened between Israel and its neighbours on a just and viable peace. This hope has not yet been achieved but the people and their Government have never ceased their readiness and efforts to achieve the hoped-for peace.

I hope the cease-fire that will begin today will be maintained continuously by the other side until a peace is concluded between the two States. Israel for its part wishes to see the cease-fire stage as a natural stage on the way to a contractual peace which will be implemented on defensible and permanent borders between us and Egypt.

If there is no peace Israel will obviously continue to maintain fully the situation as stipulated in the cease-fire, and it will not spare any effort necessary for the development of the State so that it will be able to face all the tests which confront it under all circumstances. We have reached this stage thanks to our strong military position and our political struggle. Difficult tests are in store for us and we need great internal unity based on our confidence in our course. With our utmost hope that the cease-fire—not only on this front—will be the beginning towards peace, we shall endure because our path to peace is still long and difficult.

¹ Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME 3452 A/6 and A/7; reprinted by permission.

On the threshold of the cease-fire between us and Egypt, the Israeli Government sends its greetings to all troops of the Israeli Defence Forces of land, sea and air. To our soldiers in captivity and to the settlements on the firing lines we extend greetings and profound thanks for the bravery and resourcefulness they are demonstrating daily. We extend our greetings and love to every one of them in the belief that, as in the past, they will continue in the future to fulfil successfully their duty of defending the security, independence and success of Israel.

Good night.

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Answer to a Question on the U.S. Attitude to Spain's Position on the Middle East Conflict by Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo¹

Washington, August 7, 1970

The United States does not take exception to our Middle East policy.... Once the cease-fire is re-established and the Arab countries themselves have recognized Israel, it will be time enough to reconsider our position.

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Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers Welcoming the Middle East Cease-fire²

Washington, August 7, 1970

We have just been informed by the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel of their acceptance of the United States proposal for a standstill cease-fire to come into

effect at 2200 Greenwich mean time today, Friday, August 7.

The President and I, of course, welcome this statesmanlike action taken by the leaders of the governments concerned. We hope this important decision will advance the prospects for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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Communiqué on the Israel-U.A.R. Cease-Fire Issued by the Foreign Ministry of France³

August 10, 1970

Le Gouvernement français accueille avec une grande satisfaction l'annonce du cessez-le-feu entre la République Arabe Unie et Israël.

L'arrêt des combats doit être marqué par un nouvel effort de tous pour la recherche d'une solution équitable et durable du conflit. La France, pour sa part, s'y emploiera.

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Commentary on the Middle East Cease-Fire Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Izvestia (Excerpts)⁴

Moscow, August 11, 1970

Diplomats' dialogues have silenced the artillery shelling. The guns on the Suez Canal are silent, jet aircraft are not sweeping over the canal, and bombs are not exploding on its banks. For the first time in 3 years peaceful fires have been lit in the Egyptian cities near the canal.

¹ Translated from the Spanish text of Lopez Bravo's press conference in *ABC* (Madrid), August 8, 1970.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1627 (August 31, 1970), p. 244.

³ *Politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, Second Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), p. 55.

⁴ *Izvestia*, August 11, 1970, p. 2 L; English translation by U.S. Foreign Broadcasts Information Service.

The official announcement in Cairo and Tel Aviv of a 90-day cease-fire between the UAR and Israel is unquestionably a hopeful step toward a settlement of the Middle East crisis which began over 3 years ago with Israeli aggression against the Arab states. It is important to draw attention to the fact that even in the tense situation which developed in the Middle East this summer, hopes that the Middle East crisis could not only be eased but also that it could be settled by political means were not abandoned.

In once again adopting a positive attitude toward the implementation of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, the UAR has demonstrated a constructive approach to the question of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

An analysis of the circumstances leading up to the cease-fire is of no small importance. They are characterized by a number of features: First, the growing resistance of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The second feature was the growing isolation of Israel, whose aggressive actions are now being decisively condemned even by those who only yesterday were "tolerant" toward Tel Aviv's adventurist policy. Another factor of no small importance is the increasingly sharp criticism levelled against Israel's patron, the United States, and the growth of anti-American feeling in the Arab world, which, as *Newsweek* admitted, puts U.S. interests in the Middle East at stake.

A great role in creating the prerequisites for a settlement of this crisis was played by the position of the Soviet Union, which back in 1967 submitted proposals aimed at achieving peace in this region.

The 3 month cease-fire and the resumption of the mission of the UN Secretary General's special representative Gunnar Jarring opens up many opportunities for a settlement of the Middle East crisis. Naturally, there are still many difficulties and obstacles on the difficult road toward the establishment of

lasting peace in the Middle East, but already steps have been taken which go a long way toward inducing a more optimistic outlook. In resolving this complex crisis there is a reliable basis—the well-known Security Council November resolution.

Together with all peace-loving forces, the Soviet people welcome the peaceful initiative of the UAR and other Arab countries, and express their support for the steps they have taken which are aimed at a political settlement of the Middle East conflict and at liquidating the consequences of Israeli aggression, primarily the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied during the "6-day war," and the satisfaction of the Palestinians' just right. The Soviet people hope for the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

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Declaration by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the Middle East Cease-Fire (Excerpts)¹

Hanoi, August 12, 1970

The U.S. scheme is extremely perfidious.... [It is] obviously intended to help the Israeli aggressors grab part of the Arab territory and strengthen their position for securing a position of strength in negotiation.

At the same time it is also intended to create conditions for Israel to increase its forces for an eventual renewed attack on the Arab countries in case a political solution beneficial to the U.S. and Israel fails to materialize. By proposing a cease-fire, the U.S. also attempts to divide and weaken the resistance of the people of the Arab countries and to stamp out the liberation movement of the Palestinian people.

Standing on the forefront of the struggle against U.S. imperialism, the Vietnamese

¹ Broadcast by Hanoi Radio on August 12, 1970 and issued as an article in the official daily *Nhan Dan*; this text from *Free Palestine* (Washington), II, 5 (September 1970), p. 6.

people have followed with deep concern the fight of the Arab people, their intimate comrades-in-arms and brothers.

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Speech to the Knesset by Gahal Party Leader Begin Announcing the Withdrawal of the Gahal Ministers from the Government of Israel¹

Jerusalem, August 13, 1970

Mr. President, in our view there could be no statement more dangerous than that made by the Prime Minister a week ago, because this statement contains a clear undertaking to re-partition Western Eretz Israel and to give Hussein most of the areas of Judaea and Samaria. It was this decision that led to our resignation. Who can imagine that I will join my former colleagues in a discussion of how the Land of Israel is going to be partitioned? And according to that decision it will be partitioned—that is understood. The question remains whether or not this or that hill will be included in the area of the sovereignty of the Jewish State.

There could be nothing more dangerous than that statement in our view. But as to my colleagues and the members of the cabinet—what has happened to us? What has happened to the Government of Israel and the State of Jews? How did we become playthings in the hands of foreigners? I recall that when the Big Four met for the first time the Government decided to issue a statement. I know what was in it by heart; I had the honor to participate in preparing the text. In particular I recall one sentence that was included in it, "Israel shall never be the object of Power politics, or intra-Power politics"—an important sentence which evoked understanding and

sympathy in all parts of the world. There is no small or medium-sized country that wants to be the object of Power politics or intra-Power politics.

Today we are entirely the object of Power politics or intra-Power politics. They do not even ask us or consult us. They give us a letter to sign. The government rejects it, and adds amendments and reservations, but it is not our document that forms the basis; rather, the document that was dictated at the start.

Deception on the part of Washington, deception on the part of "political circles" in Israel—those hidden political circles. And when *al-Ahram* has announced that Egypt has a clear undertaking from the United States government that Israel will withdraw to the June 4 lines, the "political circles" tell us that this is impossible, because this is not American policy, America's policy is expressed by Mr. Sisco, and he says that Israel will not be asked to withdraw to the June 4 lines.

Gentlemen, Members of the Knesset, see how it is possible to deceive the public, to try to deceive and mislead them. It would seem that what the political circles say is true. In spite of that, what they say is absolutely incompatible with the facts. Certainly America does not say to the June 4 lines in so many words; but our people must know the truth: America says that the June 4 lines are the basis, with trifling modifications of the June 4 lines. America said that to us in December 1969, and it said the same thing in June when it submitted the Rogers Plan to us: the June 4 lines are the basis.

.... Gentlemen, for three years and more we have been in the government and shared the immense burden—we bore that burden together. Now we have left the government—why have we left it? For profits? For revenues? For an easy life? We have left the government for things that are dear to the heart of every Jew, for sacred principles,

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text in *Divrei Ha-Knesset* ("Knesset Debates"), Seventh Knesset, First Session, No. 35, August 12, 1970, pp. 2862-2863, 2866.

for our right to the homeland, for our right to security, for life and survival....

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Radio Israel Announcement of Alleged U.A.R. Violations of the Standstill Provision of the Middle East Cease-Fire¹

August 13, 1970

Our correspondent learns that last Saturday, after the cease-fire had come into force, the Egyptians brought a number of SA-2 and SA-3 missile batteries forward to between 20 and 30 km. from the Suez Canal. The missiles have been installed in the sector between the Suez-Cairo road in the south and the Ismailia-Delta road in the north. Military commentators believe the move of missiles closer to the Canal may make operations in the area more difficult for the Air Force should hostilities be resumed. A US State Department spokesman yesterday confirmed that the United States and Israel were examining the contention that the Egyptians had brought the missiles to the Suez Canal bank four hours after the cease-fire had gone into effect. The spokesman said that this information had been conveyed to the United States by our Ambassador, Yitshaq Rabin. However, the US spokesman said that so far there was no proof that there had been a violation of the condition to stop military activity in the strip bordering on the Canal but that his government was examining the matter.

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Text of the Middle East Cease-Fire As Read to the Knesset by Defense Minister Dayan of Israel²

Jerusalem, August 13, 1970

Israel and the U.A.R. will observe cease-fire effective at 2200 G.M.T., Friday Aug. 7.

Both sides will stop all incursions and all firing, on the ground and in the air, across the cease-fire line.

Both sides will refrain from changing the military status quo within zones extending 50 kilometers to the east and the west of the cease-fire line. Neither side will introduce or construct any new military installations in these zones. Activities within the zones will be limited to the maintenance of existing installations at their present sites and positions and to the rotation and supply of forces presently within the zones.

For purposes of verifying observance of the cease-fire, each side will rely on its own national means, including reconnaissance aircraft, which will be free to operate without interference up to 10 kilometers from cease-fire line on its own side of that line.

Each side may avail itself as appropriate of all U.N. machinery in reporting alleged violations to each other of the cease-fire and of the military standstill.

Both sides will abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and will accept the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out their obligations under that convention.

¹ Broadcast on Israel home service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3456/A/12; reprinted by permission.

² English text in *New York Times*, August 14, 1970, p. 6.

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U.S. State Department on Alleged U.A.R. Violation of the Terms of the Middle East Cease-Fire¹

Washington, August 19, 1970

We have concluded that there was forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and within the zone west of the Suez Canal around the time the cease-fire went into effect. There is some evidence that this was continued beyond the cease-fire deadline, although our evidence of this is not conclusive.

With respect to additional information which the Israeli Government has brought to our attention concerning possible violations of the cease-fire, we are examining it and are in touch with the parties through diplomatic channels.

We do not now anticipate making further public statements on this matter.

Adherence to the cease-fire and standstill is of great importance to the success of current peace efforts. The main thing now is to concentrate all efforts on getting discussions going under Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices.

The United States believes that these talks should begin promptly.

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Radio Interview on Israel-U.S. Relations with Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Rabin²

August 22, 1970

Question: Mr. Rabin, what is the cause of the so-called crisis of confidence between Jerusalem

and Washington which you do not describe as a crisis?

Answer: As in the past, there are now matters on which Israel and the United States agree and there are other matters on which they differ. There is no identity of views between us and the United States on the final aim. When I say identity I mean on the nature of the peace as well as the peace borders. When there is no identity of views on the aim, and sometimes the ways to attain this aim, misunderstandings and conflicting views occur.

Q. Returning to the subject of the present stage, Israel said the maintenance of the cease-fire was more urgent than the appointment of a representative to the Jarring talks. Have you found in your recent contacts with the Americans understanding for this attitude?

Answer: In so far as I understand the American attitude, they see no direct connection between the cease-fire and steps towards a political settlement. Basically, the Americans do not distinguish between the political and the military parts of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They consider the political settlement as the central point of their efforts because in their opinion only a political settlement will bring about the end of the military conflict.

Q: If this is so, then why was the cease-fire needed at all. Is it possible to begin talks without a cease-fire?

Answer: There is no doubt that the Americans wanted to create an easier atmosphere or a more suitable climate to work for peace and to prevent bloodshed during the negotiations. Hence, the cease-fire was part of the American initiative. Right at the beginning of the American peace initiative the Americans told the two sides that non-acceptance of the cease-fire was not a condition for accepting the peace initiative [sentence as heard].

Q: And what about the violation of the agreement?

¹ Read to news correspondents by State Department Press Spokesman McCloskey; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1628 (September 7, 1970), p. 278.

² Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3465/A/3, A/4 and A/5; reprinted by permission.

Answer: The violation of the agreement is a serious problem. I feel that Israel has the full right to demand insistently from the United States, in its capacity as the mediator between us and the Egyptians and as the country responsible for the cease-fire, that Egypt should honour its commitments according to the word and spirit of the cease-fire agreement.

Q: Mr. Rabin, the Americans did not accept this Israeli attitude. With the cease-fire violation there are circles in Israel which visualise a picture of the Russian bringing his knife nearer to us while the American holds our hand from behind claiming he is covering us. In your opinion, is there justification for such a gloomy description?

Answer: I do not want to go into very [word indistinct] descriptions, but I have no doubt that agreement between Cairo and Moscow is much greater than that between Jerusalem and Washington. I think the simple fact that Russian soldiers today fight side by side with Egyptian soldiers against Israel while nothing similar exists from the US side is a clear indication of that. This is a reality which we can try to change, but that it is today an existing reality is almost indisputable.

Q: In view of this reality, is it right to say what you have stated before that the United States is nevertheless our friend? Is it not more appropriate to say that it is the least hostile to us?

Answer: Friendship is a relative matter. Among the other countries of the world it is the best friend. However this is a friendship with a limited liability.

Q: It is reported that the American Administration is angry about the publicity with which Israel acted. What is the effect of the pressure of public opinion, particularly Jewish public pressure, on a Republican Government compared with a Democratic Government?

Answer: I do not think that the Israeli Government must (?act) according to whether the American Administration is angry or not if Israel has already set certain

objectives, whether political, military or informational.

Q: Foreign sources report that the Americans intend to maintain the military balance in the region. In your opinion, can this be viewed as an American concession with regard to an attempt to get the missiles moved back?

Answer: I do not know whether the American Administration seriously intends to try to get the missiles moved back. Even if the Administration takes serious action, there is no guarantee that the United States is capable of getting the missiles moved back. This does not free the United States, as the initiator of the latest political move of which the cease-fire is part, from the responsibility for the Egyptian violation. The question is to what extent the United States will (?apply) the principle of balance of forces in the right manner, quantity and quality, and at the required time.

Q: Can you say more about what is being done at the present?

Answer: No.

Q: Mr. Rabin, it appears that the Americans are giving up Husayn and beginning to consider the Palestinians as a factor. In your opinion, can this serve as a guide for our thinking?

Answer: I do not want to go into the realm of our thinking. With regard to the United States, it recognises Husayn's regime and is aware of this regime's fragility. The United States is aware that a new political element which has a certain weight in the Arab world has come into being. This is the Palestinian element. We should not be surprised if the United States at a certain stage recognises the existence of the Palestinian element and takes it into account even in its contacts.

The United States is sitting at a negotiating table—if I may use that term—with a "Fatah" which is killing Americans—with the Viet Cong. If the Americans are prepared to accept that for themselves, we should not be surprised if they are prepared to accept a "Fatah" which is killing not Americans but Israelis.

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Speech to the U.S. Senate by Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Fulbright Describing Middle East Settlement Terms the U.S. Should Support¹

Washington, August 23, 1970

Mr. President, although dangers and uncertainties remain, the prospect for peace in the Middle East has improved. The more favorable outlook is the result of the responsible and politically courageous actions of the Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian Governments in responding affirmatively to Secretary Rogers' letter of June 19, calling on the parties to implement a cease-fire, to declare their willingness to carry out the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967, and to renew negotiations through Ambassador Jarring toward the implementation of that resolution. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have played constructive roles in bringing about the improved prospect for peace, the United States by initiating the cease-fire proposal and persuading Israel to accept it, the Soviet Union by its own favorable response and by the influence it apparently brought to bear on President Nasser. Also encouraging was a Soviet declaration, published in *Pravda* on July 21, repudiating the allegation that either the Soviet Union or the Arab States wished to "push Israel into the sea."

As Ambassador Jarring's mediation gets underway, the first important move will probably be up to Israel, which, as the military victor of the moment, can reasonably be expected to initiate the bargaining with a demonstration of flexibility, if not indeed of magnanimity. Should the Israeli Government agree in the early stage of discussions, and in fairly specific terms, to a peace settlement providing for Israeli withdrawal from

the occupied territories and for a just settlement of the refugee problem—both as called for in the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967—the prospect for peace would be better than at any time since the 1967 war. One hopes that, in considering the course which it will now follow, the Israeli Government will consider the problem in its full political and moral dimensions as well as in terms of immediate military advantage. This, I am aware, is a great deal to ask of any government—it is more than most governments, including our own, can usually bring themselves to do. There are, however, rewards in farsightedness and generosity—for those who can muster the will and the wisdom.

One of our own leading Jewish intellectuals, the journalist I. F. Stone, has placed the problem in its moral perspective. He writes:

For me, the Arab-Jewish struggle is a tragedy. The essence of tragedy is a struggle of right against right. Its catharsis is the cleansing pity of seeing how good men do evil despite themselves out of unavoidable circumstance and irresistible compulsion. When evil men do evil, their deeds belong to the realm of pathology. But when good men do evil, we confront the essence of human tragedy. In a tragic struggle, the victors become the guilty and must make amends to the defeated. For me the Arab problem is also the Number One Jewish problem. How we act toward the Arabs will determine what kind of people we become: either oppressors and racists in our turn like those from whom we have suffered, or a nobler race able to transcend the tribal xenophobias that afflict mankind.²

As a modest contribution in the effort to transcend the tribal xenophobias that afflict mankind, I propose today to review some of the myths and realities of the Middle East, as I perceive them, to define as best I can the perspectives of the local parties and their great power mentors, and finally

¹ "Old Myths and New Realities: II. The Middle East" was released on August 23, 1970 and delivered in the Senate on August 24; this text is from the *Congressional Record*, August 24, 1970, pp. 29796, 29803-29810. A long interjected debate with Senator Ribicoff has been omitted here; following the speech there was another exchange, largely with Senator Javits.

² I. F. Stone, "Holy War," in *The Israel-Arab Reader* (Walter Laqueur, ed., New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 324. This and subsequent footnotes are part of the text of the speech as published in *Congressional Record*.

to suggest some additional steps which might contribute to a durable peace.

I. THE MYTHS

The myths that shape events in the Middle East are the oldest myths of all.

Some derive from religion. The contested land is a "holy" land; more than a place for raising crops and building cities, it is "sacred soil" for three great religions. Jerusalem contains both the Wall of the Temple, which is sacred to Jews, and the Dome of the Rock, which is sacred to Muslims. Neither can hold exclusive title to the city without also owning the other faith's shrine. Now, as in the days of the Crusades, religion exacerbates the issue, because, now as then, the behavior of the belligerents is more affected by the zeal with which they hold their beliefs than by the humane ethics taught by their respective religions. Now, as in the past, it is hard to strike a bargain over sacred soil.

Then there are the myths of mutual victimization. Perhaps I should say the half-myths, because both Jews and Arabs have victimized each other, though surely not with the deliberate and malign intent that each attributes to the other.

The Jews are obsessed with the fear of a repetition of the Nazi holocaust, and the Arabs do nothing to allay this fear with extravagant talk about "holy wars" and about throwing the Jews into the sea. These threats have understandably alarmed the Israelis in much the same way that Khrushchev's talk of "burying" us agitated Americans a decade ago. As I shall point out in detail later on, President Nasser and King Hussein have both, in effect, repudiated such draconian threats, but the Israelis seem not to have noticed the disavowals.

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As survivors of genocide, they can hardly be expected to distinguish with perfect clarity between Nazi crimes and Arab rhetoric. All they know is that they came to Palestine in peace, settlers in an under-

populated land, but have been allowed no peace; they have fought three wars they never wished to fight and still their enemies remain implacable, refusing even to talk to them, contesting—until recently—their right to survive as a state. Nonetheless, the Arab-Nazi analogy is a faulty one; it clouds the distinction between the myth and reality of Arab intent—whatever these may be.

The Arabs, for their part, perceive Zionism as a new form of western imperialism. Having lived on the land of Palestine for thousands of years, they can have little sympathy for the historic sentiments of the Jewish diaspora. It is, I should think, impossible for them to put themselves in the place of the Jews, whose cultural attachment to their ancient homeland sustained them through centuries of dispersal and persecution. The Arabs are on a different wave length: while the Jews prayed for Palestine—"next year in Jerusalem," they said in their prayer—the Arabs inhabited the land. They could not see the Jews as the Jews saw themselves: as refugees from genocide seeking safe haven. What did this have to do with the Arabs? They had done the Jews no harm and could see no reason why they should compensate the Jews for the crimes of Europeans. In fact, to Arab eyes, the Jews were Europeans, armed with European skills and technology, coming on the heels of other Europeans to drive them from their homes and steal away their lands.

In its way Zionism has seemed to the Arabs even more threatening than the old European imperialism. The British and French after all were only establishing colonies and, bad as that was, colonies come and go. But the Jews were establishing a homeland, and homelands do not come and go. On the contrary, once established, they are likely to expand. The Jewish state actively encourages immigration from all over the world, creating for Arabs the specter of a Jewish drive for lebensraum, which could only mean the annexation of even more Arab lands. Some

elements within Israel and the world Zionist movement openly proclaim the need of a policy of expansion, which must give rise to a fear among Arabs not unlike that felt by the Jews when the Arabs talk of throwing them into the sea. To the Arabs, in short, Zionism is not a program of deliverance for a persecuted race but a foreign conquest bolstered by strong ties between the conquering people and the most powerful governments of the West.

As if the Arab-Israeli problem were not enough, the great powers have made their own special contribution to the mythology of the Middle East by infusing the crisis with the hocus pocus of geopolitics. The Middle East, in geopolitical terms, is something far more abstract than an oil-rich desert contested by feuding Semitic peoples. Beyond that, it is the "gateway to the East," the "hinge of NATO", and the crucial cockpit of the historic Russian drive toward warm water. By sending planes and missiles to Egypt the Russians are not merely bolstering a shaky client; to the X-ray eye of the geopolitician, they are embarked upon a drive to convert the Mediterranean into a Soviet lake. The concept is admittedly vague: would the Russians close the Mediterranean to foreign shipping? Prohibit fishing? Use it as a vacation resort? No one really knows what a Russian *mare nostrum* would be like, but the concept serves the purpose of its users: It scares people; it imputes the "vital interests" of the great powers to a regional conflict, converting it into a battleground of the cold war. In this frame of reference one even suspects the Russians of an insidious design in wishing to reopen the Suez Canal—something which used to be considered a good thing, before the geopoliticians came along.

The vital interests of the great powers are, in fact, involved in the Middle East—primarily because those powers have chosen to become involved. The ultimate danger is that the Arab-Israeli conflict could draw the superpowers and the world into a nuclear war—and that certainly is a matter of vital interest—but the danger is not inherent in

the local situation, nor is it predestined by fate. It has come about because the great powers have surrendered much of their own freedom of action to the bellicose whims of their respective clients. There is of course one way—in case anyone still cares—in which the great powers are obligated to intervene: as members of the United Nations Security Council charged by the Charter with the responsibility to "decide what measures shall be taken" in response to a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." Instead, the Soviet Union and the United States have played the role of cobelligerents to their respective clients, arming, and financing them, committing their own prestige to the issue and, in so doing, converting a local conflict into a potential world conflict. All that can be said in mitigation is that both great powers have shown a certain prudence by holding back at times on the arms supplied to the warring parties.

Finally there is the myth of militarism, and that affects all of the parties. Each clings to the notion that another round may settle things—although three wars have settled nothing—or that some new weapons system will stabilize the balance of power—as if either side would accept the other's notion of what it takes to establish a proper balance.

Since the June war of 1967 the Egyptians have acquired vast arsenals of Soviet weapons, including air support and advanced ground-to-air missiles, and they have launched a "war of attrition." What has it gotten them? The Israelis have been compelled to stop their deep penetration air raids but they still hold the Sinai; until the cease fire they were bombing Egyptian installations on the west bank of the Canal around the clock; and they have every prospect of acquiring additional Phantom and Skyhawk jets from the United States so as to re-establish their version of the balance of power. Nor has any of this new Egyptian hardware wrung any political concessions from the Israelis: Prime Minister Meir explicitly rejects the borders of 1967 and,

instead of offering concessions, Foreign Minister Eban contributes pithy ironies about recognizing the right of the United Arab Republic to exist.¹

The Israelis, for their part, have hardly profited from their military successes. They have gained territory and they have established their military superiority, but they have failed to gain what they most want: security. In 1967 they felt desperately insecure along the Gaza Strip frontier; today they feel desperately insecure along the Suez Canal, so much so that they and their friends abroad seem almost to have forgotten that it is not their own but Egyptian territory that they are defending so tenaciously. One begins to understand the spheres-of-influence psychology, which causes a nation to believe that it can have no security at all until it has robbed its neighbors of all semblance of security.

Surrounded by hostile neighbors, holding down occupied lands inhabited by a million Arabs, plagued by fedayeen attacks and oppressed by the costs of armaments, Israel is a desperately insecure nation. That is clear, but it is anything but clear that her present policy of relying on military superiority is ever going to alter the situation. If the Suez frontier does not provide security, what boundary would? And even if the United States provides all the Phantom jets the Israelis want and the electronic jamming gear which may neutralize the SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles, it is unlikely that Israel will gain more than a respite; the Russians will soon enough come up with something else.

After the First World War the French tried to gain security in somewhat the same way that Israel seeks it today. They, too, were confronted with a potentially powerful but momentarily weakened antagonist and they tried to perpetuate that situation by occupying the German

Rhineland, temporarily detaching the Saar, and compelling Germany to pay reparations. The effort to make France secure by keeping Germany weak was a failure. Now, 25 years after the Second World War, France has nothing to fear from Germany although Germany is strong and in possession of all of the western territories France once wished to detach. France is secure now not because Germany has lost the power to threaten her but because she has lost the wish to do so.

The analogy is imperfect and simplified but it holds: Israel will be secure when and if the Arabs lose the wish to threaten her. Eliminating that wish should be an object worth pursuing from Israel's point of view. As victors the Israelis are in a position to be magnanimous without being suspected of weakness—which is something nations worry about whenever they are thinking about behaving sensibly. But thus far they have shown little inclination to trade their conquests for peace. Instead, they cling to the advantages won by their military victory of 1967, which is a rapidly wasting asset. One insecure frontier has been traded for another and all that the future seems to hold is continuing conflict, as threatening to the outside world as it is to the Arabs and Israelis.

Because the conflict is a threat to the outside world, it cannot be left solely to the humors of the belligerents. I have never fully understood why some of our statesmen feel that it would be a heinous crime for external parties to impose a solution. Under the United Nations Charter the Security Council has full authority—possibly even the obligation—to impose a settlement upon warring parties who fail to make peace on their own. The very premise of the charter is that warring nations can no longer be permitted immunity from a world police power. As far as the United States is concerned, it is worth recalling now and then that the United Nations Charter is a valid and binding obligation upon us, ratified as a treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate. As to the Arabs and Israelis, they too are

¹ Interview on "The Advocates," a public television network presentation of KCET, Los Angeles, and WGBH, Boston, June 21, 1970. "The Middle East: Where Do We Go From Here? Part II: The Case for U.S. Support for Israel."

signatories of the charter and no one can say they have been denied a fair opportunity to settle their differences peacefully and on their own. They might now be reminded of their commitment under article 25 of the charter, which states that—

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

I think it would be a fine thing—a useful step forward for civilization—if, in the absence of a voluntary settlement by the parties, the United Nations were to impose a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It would be an equally fine thing if the United Nations could impose a settlement in Southeast Asia.

II. PERSPECTIVES

There are four major perspectives on the Middle East conflict and need of a fifth. The needed one, as I have suggested, is that of the world community through its duly constituted organ, the United Nations. The development of such a perspective and its translation into action will require changes and adjustments in the long frozen perspectives of Arabs and Israelis, Russians, and Americans. There are at present some hopeful signs of possible change, brought forth by Secretary Rogers' constructive initiative. In this slightly improved atmosphere it may be well to review the prevailing perspectives of those involved in the Middle East, with a view to detecting misconceptions, desirable directions of change, and opportunities for future agreement.

Starting with Israel, it is less than adequate to say that Israel is concerned with her survival. Surrounded and outnumbered by seemingly implacable foes, the Israelis are obsessed—as anyone else in their position would be—with the fear of being destroyed. This fear is based on salient facts but it is reinforced by fear itself, and by a 2,000 years' history which planted the fear of extermination deeply in Jewish minds. The result, I suspect, is a tendency on the

part of the Israelis to exaggerate their own vulnerability, to credit their adversaries with more relentless hostility than in fact they may harbor, and to dismiss tentative gestures of conciliation as hypocritical tricks.

It is noteworthy, in this connection, that, when President Nasser responded favorably to Secretary Rogers' peace proposal, the initial reaction of the Israelis and of some Americans was that Nasser was setting a trap in which Israel would be forced either to stop bombing the west bank of the Suez Canal or risk alienating the United States. Quite possibly that was President Nasser's motive—no outsider really knows—but how can there ever be progress toward peace if neither side is ever willing to take the other's word for anything, if each insists upon crediting the other with the most fraudulent and devious possible motives, and if each bases its policy on its own suspicions rather than the other's behavior? Would Israel, and Israel's friends in the United States, have liked it better if President Nasser had rejected the American proposal? Would they have thought better of him for it? Would they have commended him for candor and courage?

Chronic suspicion is ultimately unrewarding; it is the kind of outlook which causes myths to displace realities in the minds of statesmen who pride themselves on realism and hardheadedness. It has distorted American perceptions of China and the Soviet Union, and it has distorted the Israeli view of Arab intentions and capacities. When suspicion governs policy, it becomes impossible for adversaries to communicate or negotiate because neither side is receptive to even the bare possibility that the other may be telling the truth when he makes a conciliatory gesture, or that he may be amenable to compromise.

The Israeli conviction of Arab hostility is by no means invention, but there is a touch of paranoia about it—just as there is in our own attitude toward communism—and the worst of it is that the prophecy is self-fulfilling. It is a truism of modern psychology that we influence the behavior of others by our own expectations of how they are going to behave.

The critical question for Israel is whether it is willing to risk taking the Arabs at their word when they offer to live in peace—as they have done in effect by accepting the Security Council resolution of November 1967—and, in taking this risk, helping to influence Arab behavior in the direction of compromise and peace. This is not to say that Israel can or should gamble her survival on the hope of Arab good will; Israel has the unchallengeable right to survive as a state and, as I shall indicate later, I would be willing to support a significant new commitment by the United States to assure Israel's survival. Nonetheless, I think it is incumbent upon Israel at this juncture to credit President Nasser with good faith when he says that he is willing to live in peace. A change in Israeli expectations might well bring about a change in Egyptian behavior.

A promising opportunity to do that was lost last spring when the Israeli Government refused to authorize the president of the World Jewish Congress, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, to hold talks in Cairo with President Nasser. The "torpedoing" of the Goldmann mission was surprising as well as unfortunate because, as the *New York Times* pointed out at the time, a meeting between a veteran Zionist leader and the Egyptian President would have represented a "significant breakthrough toward the direct contacts on which the Israel Government has always insisted."¹

In Dr. Goldmann's view the Zionist movement has suffered since its inception from a failure to grasp Arab psychology. Instead of seeking to minimize the injustices done the Arabs by the establishment of the Jewish homeland in Palestine, Israel, writes Dr. Goldmann, "counted on military force or the intervention of foreign powers to attain its goals." As a result, he continues, Israel "has ceased to project the image of a small country threatened with destruction" and has become "an occupying power," which "exercises control over peoples who reject it and whom it has subjected." The result of Israeli policy since the Six Days' War of 1967, in Dr.

Goldmann's view, is a dangerous impasse which does not work to Israel's advantage, because time is not on Israel's side. Israel's present advantage, Dr. Goldmann points out, derives from the virtues, character and technological ability of its citizens, but the Arabs too have demonstrated energy and talent in the past and they greatly outnumber the Israelis. "No one," writes Dr. Goldmann, "can predict how long it will take them to catch up with Israel technologically, especially in the field of weaponry. But sooner or later the balance of power will shift in their favor." Maintenance of the status quo, Dr. Goldmann concludes, "will lead to new wars, new Arab defeats and growing hatred of the Israelis"—a situation which "could have disastrous consequences for the Jewish State in the long run."²

I recently had a conversation with a prominent Israeli journalist who had played a leading role in the struggle against British rule before 1948. Concerned that Israel has become a garrison state, he expressed fear for his country's survival as a democratic society. I said that I had the same fear for America, because we too have been chronically at war for over two decades. We agreed that both Israel and the United States would do well to recall Alexis de Tocqueville's warning of a century and a half ago:

All those who seek to destroy the freedom of the democratic nations must know that war is the surest and shortest means to accomplish this. That is the very first axiom of their science.³

This Israeli journalist concluded by expressing the hope that Americans of moderate persuasion would speak out on the Middle East. If they did, he thought, Israeli moderates too would be encouraged to speak in favor of a policy of conciliation.

Israeli policy since the 6-day war has been characterized by a lack of flexibility and foresight. The establishment of Israeli settle-

¹ "Sorry Wrong Number," editorial in *The New York Times*, April 10, 1970.

² Nahum Goldmann, "Israel and the Arabs—an 'Unrepresentative' View," *Le Monde*, Weekly Selection, May 27, 1970, p. 4.

³ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), vol. II, ch. 22, p. 625.

ments on the occupied west bank of the Jordan River and in the Sinai, as well as on the Golan Heights, can only be interpreted as steps toward foreclosing the return of these territories to their previous Arab owners. The insistence upon the non-negotiability of the status of Jerusalem and upon the retention of certain other occupied territories—notably the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh—lends unfortunate credence to President Nasser's pessimistic assertion, in accepting Secretary Rogers' peace proposal, that, "While we inform the United States that we have accepted its proposals, we also tell them that our real belief is that whatever is taken by force cannot be returned except by force."¹

Equally distressing—although not entirely unprovoked—is the Israeli view of the United Nations as what Mr. Eban calls a packed court whose recommendations may be ignored. The insistence upon the non-negotiability of Israel's annexation of Arab East Jerusalem is in open contempt of the United Nations General Assembly, which censured that unilateral act by a vote of 99 to 0.

I speak critically of Israeli policy in part because of my belief that Israel, as the momentary victor, has both an obligation and an interest in a policy of magnanimity. The obligation arises from general considerations of world peace and from the specific injustice which has been done to the Palestinian Arabs, who, as Arnold Toynbee has written, "have been made to pay for the genocide of Jews in Europe which was committed by Germans, not by Arabs."² Israel's self-interest in magnanimity is a matter of the only kind of security which really is security. In the words of a member of the law faculty of Hebrew University:

A border is secure when those living on the other side do not have sufficient motivation to infringe on it... We have to remind ourselves

that the roots of security are in the minds of men...³

The Arabs, too, must face up to certain realities: that Israel has come to stay; that it is demagogic nonsense to talk—as some of the Palestinian guerrillas still do—of driving the Jews into the sea; that in any case the Arab States can have no realistic hope of doing that because they themselves cannot defeat Israel, the Russians are not likely to do it for them, and the United States would almost certainly intervene to save Israel from destruction. Once these facts are recognized—as in large measure they have been recognized by the governments of Egypt and Jordan—the Arab countries will be able to free themselves from their morbid preoccupation with past defeats, from futile dreams of revenge, and from the oppressive burden of armaments which slows their development and makes them dependent upon foreign powers.

While Egypt and Jordan are still widely credited with the desire to destroy Israel, both in fact have repudiated any such ambition and have done so explicitly and repeatedly. They did it in the first instance by accepting the United Nations Resolution of November 22, 1967, which required them to give up positions to which they had held tenaciously for 20 years. By accepting that resolution, Egypt and Jordan committed themselves to terminate their belligerency against Israel; to acknowledge Israel's sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and to respect Israel's right to freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.

Having accepted these provisions of the resolution—which in fact meet all of Israel's stated and legitimate aspirations—the Egyptians and Jordanians now emphasize the other provisions of the resolution of 1967; the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories; a just settlement of the refugee

¹ Nasser Accepts U.S. Plan, but Asks Aid to Israel End," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1970, p. 1.

² "The Argument Between Arabs and Jews," in *The Israel-Arab Reader*, p. 262.

³ Quoted in *Search for Peace in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1970), p. 43.

problem; and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

The last is a general principle which goes beyond the special interest of the Arab States. Its vindication—even in one instance—would represent a long step forward toward the establishment of the rule of law in international relations. That would serve everybody's interests—everybody, that is, who wishes to survive the nuclear age and who still has some hope that the United Nations can be developed into an effective peacekeeping organization. It is natural enough for Israel to resist the honor of being the first modern military victor to be obliged to abide by the principles and specifications of the United Nations Charter, especially when the great powers who dominate the Security Council have set such a wretched example. Be that as it may, the principle involved is too important to be cast away because of the hypocrisy or self-interest of its proponents.

Returning to the Arab perspective, I think there has been insufficient recognition of the distance the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have come toward accommodating themselves to some form of coexistence with Israel. President Nasser and King Hussein have repudiated the contention that they will be satisfied with nothing less than "driving Israel into the sea" not only by subscribing to the Security Council's resolution of November 1967 but through repeated and explicit public statements. Speaking in Washington last year, for example, King Hussein reiterated his own and President Nasser's willingness to abide by each of the provisions of the 1967 resolution and then added:

In return for these considerations, our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war, and the implementation of all the other provisions of the Security Council resolution.¹

To take another example: in an American television interview on June 14, 1970, President Nasser stated unequivocally his

willingness to accept the boundaries of Israel as they existed before the 1967 war as final boundaries. Asked whether Egypt would promise that its territory would not be used for attacks on Israel once the Israelis withdrew from the occupied territories, President Nasser replied—several times—"Yes."²

Unless one is prepared to contend—and back the proposition—that President Nasser and King Hussein are simply not telling the truth, it seems to me irresponsible to continue accusing either Egypt or Jordan of a policy aimed at "driving Israel into the sea." Even the President of the World Jewish Congress has recognized the extent of the change in Egyptian and Jordanian policy. Dr. Goldmann states it is his impression that not only King Hussein but President Nasser would be happy to conclude an agreement, if not a formal peace, with Israel. President Nasser, he notes, uses expressions which would not have been possible a few years ago.³

Withdrawal from the occupied territories is one of two concerns which dominate the Arab perspective; the other is the question of the Palestinian refugees. Whatever the political considerations which have led Israel to evade responsibility and the Arab States to exploit their plight, the unhappy Palestinian refugees remain preoccupied with the indisputable facts that, after 20 years in exile, they are not permitted to return to their homes and they have been denied compensation for their lost properties. Although, according to United Nations estimates, some 60 percent of the refugees have found new homes and jobs, many thousands—made up mostly of the elderly, the very poor, the sick and the least educated—are still interned in miserable camps, living hopeless lives as wards of the United Nations. Since the 1967 war approximately half of the 2½ million Palestinian Arabs have been living under Israeli occupation. Despite annual United Nations resolutions recognizing their right to choose between returning to their homes and resettling

² "The Advocates," June 14, 1970.

³ Nahum Goldmann, "Israel and the Arabs—an 'Unrepresentative' View," *Le Monde*, weekly selection, May 27, 1970, p. 4.

¹ Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1969.

elsewhere with compensation for lost properties, the refugees remain neglected and embittered pawns in the continuing Middle East conflict, the original 750,000 refugees of 1948 having increased to over a million. In the words of the Friends' Working Party:

The Arabs of Palestine see themselves as a people in diaspora, just as the time when the Jews have won their struggle for a national home.¹

Since the June war of 1967 the Palestinians have emerged as active participants in the Middle East conflict. The largest of the guerrilla organizations, Al Fatah, demands the dissolution of the present state of Israel and the creation of a secular multireligious state. They reject partition but they also deny any wish to "throw the Jews into the sea." Other Palestinian Arabs, more moderate, more realistic and—prudently, under present circumstances—more silent, acknowledge that Israel is here to stay and say that they are prepared to make peace—provided that Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967.

The status of the Palestinians and the question of the occupied territories are the critical issues for peace in the Middle East. The two issues are closely related because many Palestinian Arabs are haunted by the fear that there are no bounds to Israel's territorial aspirations—a fear which feeds upon classic Zionist ideology as well as upon the declarations of military-minded Israelis who press the claim for "strategic" frontiers. A declaration by the Israeli Government of willingness to restore all of the occupied territories as part of a general peace settlement would go far to alleviate Arab fears of Zionist expansionism. Such a statement would meet the Egyptian-Jordanian condition for peace and would also improve the chances for a settlement in Palestine.

In the Arab perspective the central issues are the occupied territories and the Palestinians. In the Israeli perspective the issue is the survival and security of the Jewish state. The United Nations Resolution of 1967

recognizes the legitimacy of both parties' concerns. The question now is whether the two sides, and their great power mentors, are ready to proceed through the renewed mediation of Dr. Jarring toward the translation of general principles into specific agreements.

More perhaps than either would care to acknowledge, the two superpowers have played similar roles in the Middle East, both characterized by a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, they have played the traditional great power role, arming their respective clients, committing their own prestige, building spheres of influence, fretting over geopolitical abstractions—all serving to elevate a regional crisis into a global one. On the other hand, both the Soviet Union and the United States have shown an appreciation of the dangers in the Middle East, and that appreciation has caused them to restrain the two sides at critical moments and to encourage some form of accommodation. In recent weeks both great powers have shown a commendable sense of responsibility; as a result of their mediation, the prospects for a compromise settlement have improved. Particular credit is due Secretary Rogers for the cease-fire and the renewal of Dr. Jarring's mediation.

The conflict of course is far from over and the chances of a settlement arising out of the new Jarring mission have to be rated less than even. The great powers, accordingly, still must determine the kind of role they are to play in the Middle East, whether they are to revert to power politics or undertake to advance and enforce a compromise peace through the United Nations. Heretofore the superpowers have vacillated between the temptation to turn the Middle East into a cold war battleground and a caution induced by the well-founded fear of an uncontrollable conflict. The outcome in the Middle East will be determined as much by the great powers' conception of their own interests and of their own proper roles as by the attitudes of the Arabs and Israelis.

Like their tsarist predecessors, the Soviet

¹ *Search for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 36.

leaders are pursuing a foreign policy aimed at the acquisition of influence in the Near East and the Mediterranean. What, if anything, they hope to gain in concrete terms is unclear—probably even to themselves. The Russians do not appear much inclined to try to communize the region; they have amiably overlooked the imprisonment of local Communists and the suppression of Communist parties in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, eagerly providing armaments to all three countries, both before and since the June war of 1967.

The Russians appear to be interested in the Middle East for reasons of security and trade as well as influence. They would like to see American military power removed from the region, although it is hard to see how that would benefit Soviet security since American bases would remain in Greece and Turkey. That, however, is the sort of thing big countries worry about, and I for one am inclined to take it at face value. The Russians would of course benefit commercially from the reopening of the Suez Canal, as would other countries, but that could be accomplished through a compromise peace and hardly requires a Soviet drive for power in the Middle East.

Basically, I suspect, the Russians are motivated by the same vague geopolitical impulses that all great powers are susceptible to: They enjoy sailing their warships around the Mediterranean and would enjoy it even more if we felt constrained to keep our ships out; they would like in general to be "top dog" in the Middle East and would be delighted to see American influence reduced or eliminated. It appears to be in large part a matter of ego gratification, or of what the psychologists call "self-maximization," and it is by no means a unique Soviet susceptibility.

For the advancement of these noble purposes, Israel is indispensable to the Soviet Union. So, at least, says Edward Crankshaw, the well-known Kremlinologist. Israel, in his view, is the Soviet Union's admission ticket to the Middle East. If it did not exist, the Arab States would have little need of

Soviet military and political support, and the Russians would have nothing with which to charm the Arabs except their communism, which does not seem to charm them at all. Without Israel the dream of paramount Russian influence in the Middle East and of the Mediterranean as a "Soviet lake" would go aglimmering. If Israel did not exist, says Crankshaw, the Russians would have to invent it.

Israelis can be forgiven for an unwillingness to base their security on Soviet national egoism, but at least they—and their supporters in the United States—ought to take solace in the available evidence that the Russians have a stake in their survival. The Israel leaders are not known for simple-mindedness or a lack of diplomatic skill, and that causes one to suspect that they may be somewhat less terrified of the Russians than they care to let on. After 25 years of the cold war the word has pretty well gotten around that invoking the Communist menace is a fairly reliable way of keeping the Americans in line.

A recent statement by the American Jewish Committee, for example, referred to the dispatch of Soviet military personnel to Egypt as an action "obviously designed to test the intentions of the free world and particularly that [sic] of the United States." "The balance of power in the area has already been disturbed," the statement goes on, "and a serious challenge to the national will of the United States has been raised." And further:

The United States must make it unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union that it intends to defend its vital interests in the Middle East against encroachment by the Soviet Union.

The statement then calls for "affirmative action"—by which is apparently meant more Phantom jets and other military supplies for Israel—"to avoid the danger of a confrontation through Soviet misinterpretation of our past restraint as a sign of weakness."¹

¹ "American Jewish Committee, Statement on the Middle East," May 17, 1970.

The language of this statement has a familiar ring: it is of Vietnam vintage. Their vital interests are suddenly identified as our vital interests; their security becomes a matter of our "national will;" their regional conflict is identified with our global crusade against communism—all without benefit of factual analysis, much less a security treaty ratified by the Senate. It is the same old game of waving a red flag in front of the anti-Communist bull, and many Americans are still falling for it.

Fortunately, Secretary Rogers and other individuals in our Government have made a cooler assessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. They have recognized that, although the Soviet Union has made harsh verbal attacks on Israel, it has been consistent in its advocacy of a political settlement based on the Security Council resolution of November 1967. It also seems evident that the introduction of Soviet pilots and of SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles into Egypt was something less than a bid for Soviet domination of the Middle East. The Israelis, it may be recalled, had been flying deep penetration raids over Egypt and had even bombed the suburbs of Cairo. The Egyptians at that time seemed unable to counter Israel air power and there was even talk of this situation resulting in the fall of President Nasser. The steps taken by the Russians since then can—and I think should—be interpreted as fairly cautious measures designed to bolster a faltering client. They seem quite cautious when compared with the things we have done to shore up our faltering client states in Asia.

The weight of evidence indicates that the Russians do indeed want a compromise settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the New York Times' correspondent in Moscow, they would welcome the reopening of the Suez Canal, relief from the heavy costs of arming Egypt, and a reduction of great power tensions. A solution acceptable to the Arabs, moreover, would earn gratitude and influence for the Russians in the Arab world, would enhance Soviet prestige all over the world, and appease the

Jewish population of the Soviet Union.¹ And, most enticing of all, in the Soviet perspective, would be the ego-gratifying prospect of a region full of neutralist states more amenable to Soviet than to American "influence"—whatever that might mean in concrete terms.

When ideological and moral pronouncements are set aside—as every now and then honesty commends—the American perspective on the Middle East is in a number of important respects the mirror image of that of the Russians. We, too, attach great importance to our fleet plying Mediterranean waters; we too have an economic stake in the region—though not as great as that of some of our allies, who get most of their oil from the Middle East; we too derive ego-gratification from wielding "influence" in various parts of the world—although, like the Russians, we prefer to dress up our egoism in unctuous pieties; and, like our rival, we are a pushover for geopolitical grandiosities, the Middle East being, in President Nixon's phrase, "the hinge of NATO."²

Only in one respect is our interest in the Middle East fundamentally different from that of other outside powers: we are tied to Israel by bounds of culture and sentiment and by the special attachment of our American Jewish population. These bonds represent a perfectly valid basis for the definition of a national interest and for the making of a valid commitment based on that interest—provided that the commitment is made in an appropriately constitutional manner, and provided too that it does not infringe upon or derogate from other valid interests. As matters now stand our commitment to Israel is de facto and undefined: we do not really know the extent of our own obligation, which could be very great, while Israel does not know what in the way of American support she can rely on. This uncertainty in turn appears to have driven Israel to greater militancy and inflexibility in her attitude toward the Arabs. For our

¹ Bernard Gwertzman, "Soviet Role in Mid-East," *New York Times*, August 3, 1970, p. 2.

² Televised interview of July 1, 1970.

part, the lack of a constitutionally legitimate commitment, candidly based on the sentimental and cultural bonds which are the real source of our interest in Israel, drives us to rationalize our involvement in terms of grandiose geopolitical concepts.

The assumption appears to be that there is something illegitimate about sentiment as the basis of a national interest and that we must therefore disguise it behind a facade of tough-sounding realpolitik. Reading the statement of the American Jewish Committee which I quoted earlier, for example, I could not help suspecting that the authors did not really believe all that stuff about the Russians testing the intentions of the free world in the Middle East and challenging the national will of the United States, any more than I believe it. The impression I had was that the authors of the statement feel a cultural and religious attachment to Israel but do not feel they can persuade the U.S. Government to pursue a policy designed to serve that attachment unless it can also be justified in terms of the grand strategy of the cold war. I regret this attitude very much, for one reason because there is nothing wrong with a policy based on sentimental attachment as long as it does not intrude upon other interests, but primarily because the introduction of cold war rationalizations can have—and to a great extent has had—the dangerous effect of expanding a local issue into a global one.

Both President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have tended to speak in those terms. In his televised interview of July 1, for example, President Nixon spoke of the Middle East as being “terribly dangerous, like the Balkans before World War I, where the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a confrontation that neither of them wants.” Five days earlier, Mr. Kissinger had said exactly the same thing:

What makes the situation in the Middle East so potentially dangerous is the fact that it has many similarities with the Balkans before World War I.

Pressing the analogy, Mr. Kissinger con-

tended that “no one caused World War I;” that it came about as an accident; and that the situation in the Middle East is roughly analogous, Israel and the Arab States each being allied to a superpower. He said:

Each of them to some extent is not fully under the control of the major country concerned.¹

This tough talk, it has been explained, was designed to scare the Russians, not to be taken literally. Whatever effect it had on the Russians, I must say that it scared me, because it reveals a dangerously outmoded way of thinking about international politics. The catastrophe of war is conceived as something fated, controlled by quarrelsome client states if not by the iron laws of power politics. Implicit in this outlook is the supposition that the coming of a great war is beyond the control of statesmen—even beyond the control of the Pentagon computers, or of Mr. Kissinger’s staff of experts in the White House basement.

The outlook is faulty, and so is the analogy. World War I was not primarily an accident, and it was certainly not predestined. It came about, as recent German historians have shown, because Germany was willing for it to come about and aided and abetted the events which led to the explosion. It was within Germany’s power at any time to restrain her Austrian client and, in so doing, to prevent war. The German leaders knew they had this power but consciously chose not to exercise it because they thought they could win a general European war and judged that it would derogate from German pride and grandeur if the great German Empire shrank from war.

That is why war came in 1914 and that is why it will come again, if it does come again. It will be, as it was in 1914, the result of human choice, human pride and human folly. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis have the power to bring on a world war. Only the superpowers have that option and—whatever the political usefulness of historical misanalogies—they had better not forget it.

At least twice in his two background

¹ Background Briefing, San Clemente, Calif., June 26, 1970, p. 20.

briefings at San Clemente, Mr. Kissinger referred to the American interest in the Middle East deriving from our allies' dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The Japanese, Mr. Kissinger pointed out, get 90 percent, and the Western Europeans 75 percent, of their oil from the Middle East—"which again is one reason why we can have an overwhelming interest in preventing this area from being dominated by the Soviet Union."¹

For those who are worried about "neoisolationism" Mr. Kissinger's words should provide ample reassurance that the policeman-of-the-world spirit is still a living force in American foreign policy. Without explanation or elaboration it is taken for granted that, because Japan and Western Europe need Middle Eastern oil, the United States has to protect the oil supplies from "the Soviets and their radical clients." What about the Japanese and the Europeans? Why have they not had anything to say about all this? Why do they not send their fleets to keep the Mediterranean from becoming a "Soviet lake?" Or at least why do they not participate in the enterprise? And why do we not expect them to?

The answer appears to derive from the laws of geopolitics. The "responsibilities of power"—or what used to be called "providence" in the age of faith—have imposed upon us the duty of serving as the Hessians of the free world, with the lesser free world countries at liberty to provide a regiment or two, if they wish, to put a nice face on things.

I do not care much for this geopolitical hocus pocus. Whatever the reasons of strategy or preference that induced the administration to employ it, there is far more to be said for the sensible, conciliatory approach which has brought about the cease-fire and the renewal of the Jarring mission. The administration of course may contend that the renewed peace talks would not have come about but for the carrot-and-stick approach combining the Rogers overtures with the Nixon-Kissinger threats. Perhaps so, but the Russians seem equally convinced that

it was they who brought the Americans to reason by sending pilots, missiles and other armaments to Egypt. Each side seems to cherish the view that it has intimidated the other. Spending so prodigally as they do on the instruments of intimidation, they naturally have a vested interest in having something to show for their money.

One would not begrudge them the conceit except for the fact that this attitude—this confidence in one's ability to intimidate an adversary into compromise and peace—seldom achieves the desired result. It has not achieved it in Indochina, and in the Middle East mutual intimidation has had a restraining effect—if indeed it has—only because both sides, for once, have been rational enough to recognize their common interest in peace and, therefore, to override their natural response to the other's threats, which is to feel challenged rather than intimidated, to be provoked and to respond provocatively.

The geopolitical formulations of America's interest in the Middle East are dangerous, historically unsound and basically romantic. There is no relevance in the Balkan analogy of 1914, which purports to show that we are helpless, and we have no automatic, unilateral vital interest deriving from the oil requirements of Europe and Japan. There are, to be sure, important American political and economic stakes in the Middle East, but our major specific interest is a cultural and sentimental attachment to Israel, rooted in the strong preference of a majority of the American people and their elected representatives.

We also have a nonspecific interest, which we share with the Arabs, with the Israelis, with the Soviet Union, and with the rest of the world. That interest is in the vindication of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace. The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which Secretary Rogers has said "will be the bedrock of our policy,"² em-

¹ Background Briefing, San Clemente, Calif., June 30, 1970, p. 9; June 26, 1970, p. 23.

² Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 27, 1969.

phasizes "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," and it reminds the Middle Eastern parties of their obligations under article 2 of the United Nations Charter, of which paragraph 3 states that—

All Members shall settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

This is where the fifth perspective comes in, over and above that of Arabs, Israelis, Russians, and Americans. If a United Nations perspective can be developed and brought to bear, we might come out of the Middle East crisis with something better than a peaceful settlement. We might come with a precedent too, with processes to draw upon in the future.

III. TOWARD PEACE

For most of the life span of both entities the United Nations and the State of Israel have been intimately, if not always cordially, involved with each other. Israel was legally initiated by the United Nations; since then its status, borders, and policies have been the subject of a series of United Nations resolutions. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency still has primary responsibility for the Arab refugees; a United Nations peace force was placed between Egyptian and Israeli forces after the 1956 war and United Nations observers have been stationed along the Suez Canal since the June war of 1967. The Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, is still the most complete, impartial, and generally accepted policy statement for a Middle East settlement, and is still the best hope for a viable peace. If there has ever been an issue which is ripe and appropriate for peaceful settlement under United Nations auspices, it is the conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

First and foremost, a just settlement must vindicate the principle, as spelled out in the Security Council resolution, of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This principle goes to

the heart of the Charter; article 2, paragraph 4 states—

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

The return of the conquered territories is the major single requirement for peace as stated by both President Nasser and King Hussein. As King Hussein put it:

Israel may have either peace or territory—but she can never have both.¹

Restoration of the occupied territories is also American policy. In his notable speech of December 9, 1969, Secretary Rogers said:

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the preexisting lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the resolution provides.

In return for withdrawal from all of the territories occupied in 1967, Israel would be entitled to firm and specific guarantees of her security. One such guarantee might be the stationing of sizable United Nations forces in militarily neutralized zones on both sides of the borders at all of the points which are critical to Israel's security. This would certainly include the Golan Heights from which, before the 1967 war, Syrian guns tormented the Israeli settlements below. United Nations forces might also be stationed on what is now the occupied west bank of the Jordan River; in and around the Gaza Strip and the old border between Israel and Egyptian Sinai; and perhaps too at Sharm el Sheikh to guarantee Israel's egress through the Strait of Tiran. In all cases, it should be specified that the United Nations force could

¹ Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1969.

be removed only by consent of both Israel and the Arab government concerned. Perhaps too the consent of a majority of the United Nations Security Council might be required, either to remove the United Nations forces or to terminate the neutralized status of the zones in question.

Another necessary provision of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement would be a mutual disavowal of any further efforts by either side to alter the frontiers of 1967. The Security Council Resolution of November 1967 specifies the right of every state in the area to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." The Arabs, it must be remembered, are as frightened of the Zionist doctrine of unlimited Jewish immigration leading to a drive for lebensraum as the Israelis are of an Arab "holy war" to destroy Israel. Both sides are entitled to explicit guarantees against these deeply rooted fears. This can be accomplished by writing into a treaty a more explicit and detailed version of that provision of the Security Council resolution which would require "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area."

Israel is entitled to free access through the Suez Canal as well as the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. That too is called for in the Security Council resolution and should be guaranteed in the definitive instrument of peace.

As to Jerusalem, I have no specific recommendation. I think it well, however, to recall that the United Nations General Assembly unanimously condemned Israel's unilateral annexation of the city¹ and that its status cannot be considered "nonnegotiable." Some form of international status would seem to be the appropriate solution. The Friends' study suggests the desirability of "some sort of federal condominium to govern an undivided and demilitarized Jerusalem" and makes the further contention,

in which I concur, that Jerusalem "cannot peacefully become the sole possession of one religion or one national state."² There may also be merit in Dr. Nahum Goldmann's suggestion that the old Arab section of Jerusalem be constituted "an autonomous enclave with an international status administered by its inhabitants." Such an internationalized city, Dr. Goldmann suggests, might become a "center for world organizations" as well as a center for three great religions.³

Probably the most difficult and intractable of the issues to be resolved is that of "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem" as called for in the Security Council Resolution of 1967. In justice and law—the latter in the form of numerous United Nations resolutions—the Palestinian Arab refugees are entitled to one of two forms of restitution: either repatriation or compensation. As a practical solution it should be feasible to work out an agreement under which Israel would take back within its 1967 borders an agreed number of refugees who would be accepted as Israeli citizens and whose former properties would either be restored or compensated for. For the majority of refugees, repatriation would probably be neither feasible nor desired. A commitment by the Arab States to accept them and assist in their resettlement—as in part they have already done—should be accompanied by generous Israeli financial support, both to compensate these refugees for their losses and to facilitate their resettlement. With contributions from friends abroad, and with the relief from military costs which peace would make possible, Israel should have no great difficulty in meeting these costs, which in any case ought to be accepted as an elementary moral obligation.

In due course the Palestinian Arabs will find it necessary to accept the existence of the state of Israel and to recognize that further, futile efforts to destroy the Jewish state will only compound their own

² *Search for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 56.

³ "Israel and the Arabs—An 'Unrepresentative' View," *Le Monde*, Weekly Selection, May 27, 1970, p. 4.

¹ On July 4, 1967, by the vote of 99 to 0, the United States abstaining.

suffering. The Palestinians have been done a great historical injustice but it cannot now be undone in the way they would have it undone. Indeed, after 22 years of Israel's existence as an independent state, it would now be as great an injustice to disrupt that society as it was for the Jews to drive the Arabs from their land in the first place. A certain rough justice accrues to any existing state of affairs, insofar as it affects people's lives and homes; once people are established and living in a place—regardless of how they got there—it becomes an injustice, even if it were a practical possibility, to disrupt and expel them.

This must be a bitter pill for the Palestinian Arabs to swallow, but, myths and realities being what they are, they are going to have to do it if they want an end to futile guerrilla warfare. Whether, whenever, and however they do, the Palestinians are entitled to some form of self-determination on the non-Israeli territory of Palestine. Whether they will wish to form an independent Palestinian State, or rejoin the Kingdom of Jordan, or federate with it in some way, is beyond the reach of a foreigner's judgment, and perhaps beyond the feasible scope of any foreseeable peace settlement in the Middle East.

Central and indispensable to a peace settlement based on the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 would be the guarantee of the entire settlement by the United Nations. Such a guarantee would properly take the form of a specific commitment by the United Nations Security Council to enforce the peace and all of its specifications, including the "secure and recognized boundaries" of both Israel and her Arab neighbors and the neutralized status of designated border zones. The agreement should also specify strict limitations on the sale or provision of arms to Middle Eastern states by outside powers. As permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France would have major responsibility for enforcement of the peace terms, but that obligation would fall upon them not in their capacity as "great powers" but as

members of the Security Council, which is entrusted by article 24 of the Charter with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

It might also be appropriate and desirable for the Security Council's guarantee to be ratified formally by the legislative bodies of the signatory states. Such action would represent a mark of the seriousness attached to this new commitment by members of the Security Council, although it might not be regarded as juridically essential since, by ratifying the Charter in the first place, every member of the United Nations is already committed, under article 25, to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council." It would do no harm, however, by formal parliamentary act, to remind the members of this frequently forgotten obligation.

For reasons of varying merit Israel has indicated on numerous occasions a lack of confidence in the United Nations. In order to accommodate this attitude and provide Israel with an added assurance of security, I, for one, would be willing to supplement a United Nations guarantee with a bilateral treaty—not an executive agreement but a treaty consented to by the Senate—under which the United States would guarantee the territory and independence of Israel within the borders of 1967. This guarantee should neither add to, nor detract from, nor in any way alter the multilateral guarantee of the United Nations—which would obligate us, as a member of the Security Council, to defend the "secure and recognized boundaries" of both Israel and her Arab neighbors. The supplementary, bilateral arrangement with Israel would obligate the United States to use force if necessary, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to assist Israel against any violation of its 1967 borders which it could not repel itself, but the agreement would also obligate Israel, firmly and unequivocally, never to violate those borders herself.

I conceive of an American treaty of guarantee with Israel as an instrument

which would come into effect after—and only after—the multilateral guarantee of the United Nations had been agreed upon and ratified by all parties. The bilateral treaty with Israel would represent no more than a repetition of and an additional assurance of, our intent to honor the multilateral guarantee of the United Nations. Essentially, the bilateral arrangement would serve as an accommodation to the fact of Israel's mistrust of the United Nations. It would repeat a commitment which every member of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, would also have made through their multilateral guarantee of the borders of all of the states concerned.

At this hopeful moment of at least temporary truce and renewed contracts between the principal belligerents, the situation in the Middle East presents the world community with an important, indeed an unprecedented, opportunity. At its present juncture the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is the most significant issue since the end of World War II in which the Soviet Union and the United States have identified enough in the way of common interests to allow of a peaceful settlement mediated and guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council. I do not think one can exaggerate the importance of the opportunity. A settlement mediated by the great powers in their capacity as great powers quite possibly could be a fair and durable one, but a settlement mediated by the United Nations could serve as a precedent for the settlement of other conflicts through the procedures of international organization. Perhaps, if the precedents accumulated, and with further advances in civilization, it might even be found possible to apply these procedures in conflicts involving the great powers themselves. That, after all, was why we created the United Nations in the first place—to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Mr. President, one other comment in response to the observations a moment ago of the Senator from Connecticut. I can only emphasize what I said, that I do not have

overwhelming faith that the Russians or other nations are going to live up to every agreement; but I do not think that is sufficient reason for not trying to make the agreements which I have suggested. No doubt there are many views as to how the agreements can be implemented. I have suggested a number of things, such as the stationing of a United Nations force in areas which are sensitive and critical points from a point of view of security. I reminded the Senate of suggestions that really have been made by people far more knowledgeable than I of the problem of Jerusalem, which is very complicated because of the deep emotions involved therein. I made the suggestion not because I am confident in it as the solution, but as illustrative of the kind of problems that will arise, and to prompt discussion and to show that I recognize, at least, these problems as a part of the overall question. These matters of detail are the very essence of negotiations which must take place.

But the overall reason for the speech is largely, as I have said, the conditions that have arisen both in the Middle East and outside the Middle East, which indicate that there may now be an opportunity to arrive at an arrangement with the Russians which they would consider to be in their national interest, just as I think we would consider it to be in our national interest, to bring about a settlement in the Middle East.

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Statement in Speech by Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Brezhnev on the Need for a Political Settlement of the Middle East Conflict¹

Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, August 28, 1970

There is an opportunity now for approaching the Middle East conflict from the standpoint of realism and responsibility.

The situation in the Middle East, as in the past, merits serious attention. Israel's aggression and military provocations against Arab countries, which continued for over three years, were dictated by a scheme on the part of international imperialist circles—that of liquidating the progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries and striking a blow against the national liberation movement as a whole. Thanks to the staunch, courageous stand taken by Arab countries and the active support given them by the socialist countries and other progressive forces, that scheme was thwarted.

Ever since the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East the Soviet Union, in close interaction with other socialist countries, has invariably striven for a political settlement on a just basis. Such a basis is provided by the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of November 22, 1967.

The Soviet government has proceeded and is proceeding now on the basis of the belief that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be ensured through any rewarding of the aggressor for the crimes he has committed. Such a peace can be ensured only by the complete removal of all the consequences of Israel's aggression, and in particular as a result of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories. We have come out and we continue to come out

in favour of assuring the national rights, security and independence of all the states in the area, including assurance of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

As is well known, on August 8 the governments of the United Arab Republic and Jordan announced their agreement to suspend armed actions for three months. What is intended is that during this period fresh efforts will be made to find a mutually acceptable political settlement of the Middle East conflict. The United Arab Republic and Jordan appointed their representatives to discuss ways of settling the situation in the Middle East.

These actions by Arab states compelled the ruling circles of Israel also to agree to a cease-fire and declare for the first time, through clenched teeth, their readiness to comply with the provisions of the Security Council's resolution. Representatives of the parties concerned are said to have established the first contacts through the representative of the United Nations secretary-general, Gunnar Jarring.

The Soviet Union, naturally, takes a positive view of this development of events. Our country has always insisted that Gunnar Jarring's mission, which was entrusted to him by the Security Council, should be carried out fully and effectively.

The Soviet Union has welcomed with satisfaction the constructive attitude adopted on this matter by the government of the United Arab Republic, headed by President Gamal Nasser, an outstanding statesman with whom we recently had very frank, friendly and useful talks in Moscow.

Opportunities now exist for approaching the settlement of the Middle East conflict from the positions of realism and responsibility. What is needed now is not new provocations and subterfuges designed to circumvent or violate the cease-fire agreement, but honest observance of the agreement reached and real steps in favour of peace. Those who have been trying in recent years to impose their will "from a position of strength" on Arab countries and who have carried out aggressive actions, now have the chance to

¹ Excerpted from the English text of Brezhnev's speech in *Soviet News*, No. 5558 (September 1, 1970), pp. 73-74.

think better of it and to abandon that hopeless and adventurist line which is dangerous to world peace.

We are deeply convinced that an end to the conflict in the Middle East would meet the vital interests of both the Arab countries and Israel. The Arab peoples need peace for the progressive development of their national economy and for raising the living standards of the working people, while for Israel a war with neighbouring countries is not only hopeless but also extremely dangerous for her further destinies.

Only a little step towards peace has been taken so far in the Middle East, but this step has already met with sharp opposition from supporters of continued military actions and from all the adherents of an aggressive policy. It is very important now for the peace forces in the Middle East not to let the initiative in settling the conflict slip from their hands and not to allow the enemies of peace to wreck the agreement reached or use it to cover up their own aggressive schemes.

It is in the general interests of the peoples to do everything possible for a settlement of the Middle East conflict and for the present cease-fire to become a good beginning for a just, firm and lasting peace in the Middle East. As for the Soviet Union, this country, loyal as it is to the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among the peoples, will do everything in its power to contribute towards rebuffing the aggressors, eliminating hotbeds of war and the danger of war, and strengthening world peace.

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Order Confiscating Arab Land in Jerusalem Issued by the Government of Israel¹

August 30, 1970

Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, 1943

The public is hereby notified that the lands described in the annex hereto are unreservedly required by the Minister of Finance for public purposes and that the Minister of Finance is prepared to negotiate the acquisition thereof.

Any person who claims any right in or usufruct of the said lands and who wishes to obtain compensation therefor is invited to forward to the Director of the Land Registration Division, within two months of the date of publication of this notice in the official Gazette, a statement of his right in or usufruct of the said lands, together with evidence in support of his claim, including details of the entry, if any, in the land register and an itemized statement of the compensation applied for and the amount claimed in respect of each item.

The public is also hereby notified that the Minister of Finance intends to take immediate possession of the lands in question, inasmuch as they are urgently required for the public purposes for which it is proposed to acquire them, and the Minister of Finance hereby orders any person who is in possession of the said lands to relinquish possession thereof forthwith.

Annex

1. A plot of land having an area of approximately 470 dunums, situated at Jerusalem, in and around the place known as Neve Yaakov.

The said plot of land is marked red on Plan No. HS/A/112/322, drawn on the scale of 1:2500 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

¹ *Official Gazette*, Yalkut Ha-Pirsumim, No. 1656 (August 30, 1970), p. 2808.

2. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 4,840 dunums, situated to the north-west of Jerusalem.

The said plot is marked in red on Plan No. HS/121/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

3. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 2,240 dunums, situated to the south-east of Jerusalem, marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on plan No. HR/122/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

4. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 2,700 dunums, situated to the south-west of Jerusalem, marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Plan No. HR/123/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

5. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 1,200 dunums, situated at Jerusalem, in and around the place known as Kalandia.

The said plot is marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Plan No. HR/123/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

6. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 130 dunums at Jerusalem, consisting of a combination of parcels and parts of parcels, the boundaries being those numbered 3020, 3031 and 3032 and the boundary specified under No. 30029. The said lands are marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Area Plan No. HF/120/1322, drawn on the scale of 1:1200 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

7. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 100 dunums at Jerusalem, consisting of a combination of parcels and parts of parcels, the boundaries of which are numbered 30033 and 30034. The said lands are marked in red on Area Plan No. HF/126/322, drawn on the scale of 1:1250 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

Copies of the plans in question are deposited at the Jerusalem District Land Registration Office and at the Jerusalem District Headquarters and any interested persons are entitled to inspect them during office hours.

30 August 1970

PINHAS SAPIR
Minister of Finance

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U.S. Television Interview with Prime Minister Meir of Israel on Prospects for the Jarring Talks and Israeli Relations with the U.S.¹

Tel-Aviv, August 30, 1970

Q: Prime Minister Meir, an Egyptian government official has said that the peace talks are not going to succeed in the scheduled 90 days because, in his words, Israel will never withdraw to the 1967 borders in accordance with the United Nations resolution. What is your comment?

Mrs. Meir: Well, maybe at the very beginning of the peace talks, we have come to an agreement—no withdrawal to the 1967 borders. I suppose that this official realizes that it is not something that he can really expect us to do.

Q: Madame Meir, Foreign Minister Eban has said—he said, in fact, several times that the world will be astonished at the extent and nature of the Israeli concessions in final peace talks, but they do not include, I gather total withdrawal?

Mrs. Meir: Certainly not total withdrawal, and the care that our borders in the future, as the President of the United States said so well, defensible borders. I think what the Foreign Minister had in mind was that

¹ Broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System television and radio program, "Face the Nation"; "Face the Nation" is the property of CBS News, and is a publication of Holt Information Systems, a Division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

so many people try to picture us as though our main aspiration is territorial expansion, just for the sake of having more territory, which of course is not true. I admit there are some people in this country who say that the borders, the final borders, must be the same identical with the cease-fire line, but even they have in mind the question of security. But what we are really after, after all that has happened to us, including the 6-day war, is finally to have agreed, secure and recognized borders, and since borders cannot be drawn in the air, they have to be on the ground, and since the '67 borders were not proven to be secure borders—they were attacked and destroyed—therefore, I think this is what Eban had in mind, that the world will realize that we are not out for territorial expansion. All we want are secure borders.

Q: Mrs. Meir, on the question of security, you and some of your ministers have said or implied very broadly that one of the prime reasons you have gone into the cease-fire and the peace settlement talks is on the basis of assurances given you by the United States. One assumes perhaps they involve some bearing on your security. Two questions—could you tell us what those assurances were?

Mrs. Meir: I don't think so.

Q: Well, then, could you tell us whether they are being carried out?

Mrs. Meir: I must say that—yes—maybe we were never given assurances that we'd get everything we want, but I think they're being carried out.

Q: Mrs. Meir, I wonder if we could go back to withdrawal for a minute. It appears that Jordan and Egypt are emphasizing the issue of withdrawal very early in the peace talks. Is Israel willing to give Ambassador Jarring an idea or an outline of withdrawal that he could present to the Arab ambassadors in New York?

Mrs. Meir: Well, let's see why did we go into this—to participate in what is called the American peace initiative? We've gone into it hoping, not being sure but hoping, maybe there is a desire on the part of our

neighbors, this late date as far as we are concerned, to make peace with us. What we are after—what we have been after, immediately after the 6-day war, is that this time we conclude this entire chapter with firm peace agreements between our neighbors and ourselves. Therefore, the basic question is, are our neighbors prepared to make peace with us? Their general formula, as we often hear them say when they talk about peace—and they mention that terrible word—they say peace in the Middle East. As far as we are concerned, it's very vague and doesn't mean very much. What we want is assurance from them, is under any circumstances—we are not talking now about borders or what they will be manned or what we will agree to—we have our ideas but we set no preconditions for either side. Everything can be put on the table. There is only one condition, that all this is worthwhile if it leads to peace agreements, or, as you people in the United States call it, contractual, binding, mutually obligating agreements.

Q: Can such agreement be reached without face to face talks between the two parties?

Mrs. Meir: No, I don't think so.

Q: Can such agreements be reached, Mrs. Meir, with the attitudes both of Israel and the Arabs going into the talks? I think there is a great deal of suspicion here on Arab motives, there is a great deal of hostility still existing among the Arabs as far as Israel—can these factors be mixed or emulsified into a peace agreement?

Mrs. Meir: I think there is really only one thing that is essential. You can't expect—it would be too much for anyone of us to expect that after all that has happened over 20 years of fighting, because actually there has never been peace between us and our neighbors. There have been wars, and little wars between the big wars. And nobody gets up one early morning and says, well, really nothing has happened, we have always been very peaceful neighbors. What is really necessary is that our neighbors

should come to the conclusion, whether they like it or not, that they have tried to get us out of this area, they have failed, and now they have to live with us. And we, at any rate, are not coming to the negotiating table as a victorious power negotiating with those who have lost one war after another that they have initiated. No, we have called them over and over again to come to the negotiating table as equals. What is necessary is that both sides want peace.

Q: Mrs. Meir, what inducement, though, could Israel offer the Arabs to arrive at a successful peace settlement?

Mrs. Meir: Peace between them and us. You see, many people make this mistake that peace is necessary for Israel. Israel wants peace. The Arab countries, 33 million people in Egypt and the millions of people in Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and so on, as far as they are concerned it doesn't matter whether it's peace or war. This is a fallacy. Therefore, we are often asked what can we give, what are we prepared to pay for peace? I maintain that peace is as necessary at least to our neighbors, to the tens of millions of Arabs in the area, as it is to our people. And we say we want peace, and we need peace. We are not ashamed to say it.

Q: And yet General Moshe Dayan said just the other day that Egypt has accepted the cease-fire only as a tactic, I think were his words, part of an effort to do what they had failed to do in the last three years—destroy us. He seems to think that the Egyptians do not want peace.

Mrs. Meir: I didn't say that the Egyptians—that I'm convinced—now let us differentiate. I spoke about tens of millions of Arabs in the area, and among these tens of millions of Arabs there are only three or four people that really decide, and whether Nasser really wants peace or not, I don't know. But we have gone into this hoping that maybe by now that's what he wants. I want to tell you when there was one moment that I began to believe that he wants peace. That was when at this con-

ference, the so-called Socialist Union in Egypt, he made a speech explaining why he accepted the proposition to go into these discussions and the cease-fire, and this was the first time in his argument with Iraq and Syria, who are against the cease-fire—he said yes, but there are tens of my men being killed and wounded every day. Now this rings a bell. The minute that he really is concerned with these tens of young men that are dead and wounded, and is really being concerned about what has happened to his country as a result of these wars, and with the hundreds of thousands of people that evacuated the cities and the Suez—and I'm sure they didn't go immediately into housing in the interior—if this is true, if he was honest at that moment, and if that goes on, then maybe there's a hope for peace.

Q: How does his moving of missiles into the demilitarized zone fit with that?

Mrs. Meir: That's where my colleague Dayan comes in. He says that it doesn't look good.

Q: What do you think?

Mrs. Meir: It doesn't look good. It's very bad, because both the Egyptians and the Russians, according to the information that was given to us by the Americans, and I'm sure that the information was right, both agreed to the cease-fire, and a very vital element in the cease-fire agreement is stand still, and it was spelled out what standstill means.

Q: Well, Mrs. Meir, the standstill cease-fire is now three weeks old and Israel has made a number of allegations that Egypt has violated the cease-fire by moving missiles closer to the canal and reconstructing missile batteries, and so far, at least the public response from the United States has been inconclusive. Now, is the removal of those missiles, or the delivery of arms to Israel to offset the missile movement a condition for Israel's meaningful and fruitful participation in the Middle East talks?

Mrs. Meir: First place, I believe that the United States, since that public declaration,

having studied the matter further, I'm inclined to believe that they feel that they have more conclusive evidence now, and the information that we had given two weeks ago or more. Secondly, we have gone into these talks, but we all, all the parties concerned accepted certain agreements. The cease-fire was very important. It is unthinkable that a party with whom you are going into negotiations—honest negotiations—with all the good will, no matter how doubtful you are as to the results of with a real, sincere attempt to reach a peace agreement. The first thing that happens to you is that this very vital element of this entire operation is being violated, and I think that the United States, who was the party acted as go-between and made all these arrangements and brought us the answers from Egypt and Moscow, I believe that they're more or less duty bound to see that the situation is corrected.

Q: Well, does that mean that this issue first, the matter of the cease-fire violation, has to be resolved before the discussions can move on a meaningful plane?

Mrs. Meir: If you say before the discussions can move on a meaningful plane, that's different, but I'm not prepared to say that this is at this point, at any rate, a condition. I want to say one more very important point for us in the cease-fire agreement is not being kept very well, and that's the question of the treatment of our prisoners of war. Now, all we asked for is, not that we decide how they should be treated and when Red Cross representatives can visit them; we said that the Red Cross should decide, but the Red Cross decides, asks to see our men, and the facts are that, for instance in Egypt, now, for the first time they've seen two, three of our men, after two months, in Syria the other day only after three months, and we asked in the cease-fire agreement—of course, they should have acted differently according to the Geneva Convention—but knowing by sad experience, we included that in the ceasefire agreement, and it was adopted, that both

parties, we and the Arab states are to act in accordance with the decisions of the Red Cross. That, too, is being violated.

Q: Mrs. Meir, another factor in this current operation, as you call it, the Palestinian guerrillas; the Arabs are insisting on the restoration of the full rights of the Palestinian guerrillas. How do you interpret that, and what is Israel's stand on recompense or on return of the Palestinian refugees?

Mrs. Meir: Ever since the war of liberation—by the way, again, it was not instigated by us; you people, I am sure, will remember that a resolution that was adopted in the United Nations on the 29th of November, 1947, for the partitioning of the then Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, we accepted. It was the Arabs that went out to fight against it, and destroyed that partition. And what was left of what was supposed to have been the Arab state, the western bank, nobody decided that that should be annexed to Jordan, and one bright day, my friend, the late King Abdullah just annexed it. Nobody cried out in horror, it's immoral to annex any land, but that's what he did.

Now, we say, we carry no responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem. We didn't drive them out, we didn't declare war. That's entirely upon the—the responsibility for that is entirely on the Arab states and the Arab leaders who asked them actually to leave the territory that subsequently became Israel. Since then, this question could have been settled very, very easily, with no question of people going into foreign lands, among foreigners, a different language, a different religion, a different way of life. There was money coming in, internationally—from international fronts through the United Nations, and we perhaps said right along that we are prepared to compensate those who have property here, whether it is land or houses or anything. As a matter of fact, there is a special commission in the United Nations that works on this subject, and I believe that they have never said that we did not cooperate with them when they've come to the country trying to ascertain what is the value of the property that was left behind.

Now, we have experience of solving refugee problems. Since the State of Israel was established, over a million Jews have come into this country. If a refugee means somebody that had to leave the country in which he lived, he brings nothing with him—no skills, no money. These are the refugees, 25 percent of those who have come in, that we have received. You go through Israel now, you don't see anybody running around barefooted, you don't see people sleeping in the streets, you don't hear of hungry people. When I took over the Labor Ministry in 1949, housing was then included in the Labor Ministry—in 1949 there were 200,000 men, women and children in tents, with very often two families in one tent. You don't see that any more. It's true we got aid from Jewish communities throughout the world; we went on a very austere program; we got help from the United States government; and we solved our refugee problem.

Q. Now you have the problem of peace and refugees, and they seem to be fairly inextricably entwined together. Is Israel prepared to show some magnanimity, to make some move, some offering in this refugee problem for the sake of peace, without reference to historical responsibility?

Mrs. Meir: But with reference to the existence and security of Israel?

Q. Yes. Well, I mean that's obviously your condition—I'm not setting it.

Mrs. Meir: Yes. Compensation, yes. We have never said not one refugee. Tens of thousands of refugees have been returned with our consent. But the idea that somebody else should decide that we must—that the choice to come or not to come is merely on the part of these Arab refugees—and who are they now? The refugees—when the Arab refugee problem was created by the Arabs, they were children two years old, three years old, five years old—they were taught in the schools with textbooks that had such wonderful lessons, for instance, in arithmetic. There were five Israelis, we killed three, how many were left? Well, you know what grade these complicated arithmetic problems are being

taught. That means children from their infancy were brought up to an ideal of killing us. For them to choose to come back, I say Arafat then has the choice. Either he will destroy us from the other side of the border, or he should march in with his army to destroy us from within. These are not getting refugees back. This is one of the worst Fifth Column, this is an army that proclaims that that is what their aim is, to destroy us.

Q. Let me go to a related question, the refugees, the Palestinian guerrillas. Is there a possibility, even of a peace settlement, as long as the guerrillas maintain the status they now hold?

Mrs. Meir: We make peace with states, with governments. Now, Hussein, I saw in the paper the other day, said that he doesn't mind if afterwards Jordan may be called Palestine-Jordan, Jordan-Palestine. As far as we're concerned, it's perfectly all right to us; we've never made it a matter of principle or faith with us that Jordan must be called Jordan. By the way, Jordan up to '22 was part of Palestine.

Q. Can you make peace with Jordan and still have a state of non-peace with the guerrillas?

Mrs. Meir: I maintain that the question of guerrillas has caused a greater headache to, for instance, the King of Jordan, than it has to Israel.

Q. Mrs. Meir, are you prepared to recognize a representative Palestinian organization and sit down and negotiate a solution to the refugee problem with an organization?

Mrs. Meir: We negotiate only with states, and heads of states. No organization, certainly just because there are terrorist organizations and their ideal is to kill Jewish men, women and children and attack buses with children, does not make them eligible for negotiations.

Q. Let me, just for a moment, get it back to the present treaty situation. When I left the United States, papers were filled, almost every paper that I read was filled with headlines about friction between the United States and Israel. Madame

Meir calls Joseph Sisco in the morning to say that there should be something in the announcement about secure and recognized borders—disappointment, friction, unhappiness between the two allies. Is that a reasonable assessment of the state of affairs, either past few days or present day?

Mrs. Meir. Let me catalogue it in the following—

Q. Well, we don't have an awful lot of time for cataloguing.

Mrs. Meir. I think there was serious misunderstanding. I can say that everything has been cleared up. After all, what's past is past. There are still outstanding problems between the American government and Israel.

Q. Could you name a few of them?

Mrs. Meir. No. But I must say that we have never forgotten, no matter how strong the friction is or how great the misunderstanding is, nor how serious the problem over which we have a misunderstanding that we are dealing with a very, very friendly country and a friendly government. The only one that we can have heated arguments with are with our friends. With our enemies we just don't talk, or they don't talk to us, and we can't even argue with them—only with friends. And never for one moment have we lost sight of the fact, which gives us a lot of satisfaction and is extremely important to us, that from the very beginning we have been dealing with a government and a people that basically is interested in the welfare of Israel, the security of Israel—after that, it's natural that even between two friendly governments, there should be differences of opinion.

Q. Nonetheless, in a recent speech, you answered the rhetorical question: who does Prime Minister Golda Meir trust? Nowhere mentioned was the United States or the Nixon administration. Do you think, particularly over the recent weeks, there has been an erosion of the United States support for Israel, particularly toward the cease-fire issues, and the talks at the United Nations under Ambassador Jarring?

Mrs. Meir. No, I am not prepared to say that there has been an erosion. I said there were misunderstandings. One of the things still outstanding is the question on the cease-fire. I think one argument has been solved, as to what has really happened on the ground. Now the question is, how do we clear that up? Or when I say we, I mean rather the United States government—I mean together how do we go about it, and the United States government does what it can, successfully, I hope, to bring it back to the stage where it was before the cease-fire was decided upon.

Q. Do you think the United States government was hampered by its commitment in Viet Nam, its preoccupation with Southeast Asia, and cannot give you full attention, the attention that you feel you need?

Mrs. Meir. I don't think so.

Q. Do you think President Nixon's era of negotiations with the Soviet Union is reacting to Israel's disadvantage?

Mrs. Meir: I don't want—excuse me just a moment—I don't want to leave one question unanswered, because my not answering it may be misinterpreted. I want to say we have not lost faith in the United States government. The government certainly lost no faith in—whatever was said by President Nixon—I have no doubt whatsoever in his and his government's concern for the State of Israel, their desire to see that everything that is possible for the security of Israel should be forthcoming. Now, it's not a question of trust. It's a question of interpretation, what is good for Israel, what borders are good for Israel, what is needed for Israel for its security and so on. I didn't want that to be left unanswered.

Q. One last question on the cease-fire. The other day Foreign Minister Abba Eban said Israel is observing the cease-fire in the Suez Canal on the basis of reciprocity. Now, Egypt has accused Israel of violating the cease-fire. Does Israel feel now not only bound to the spirit of the cease-fire, but also the letter, or does it feel that it in fact can build new facilities, new military installations along the Canal, just as it's claiming Egypt has?

Mrs. Meir. I think legally and morally, since both sides have accepted the cease-fire agreement, I suppose Israel could get up one morning and say, what's good for the other side—or let's say, what's bad for the other side, the same for us, but so far we are sticking to the cease-fire.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Mobutu of Congo (Kinshasa) to Yugoslavia (Excerpts)¹

Belgrade, August 31, 1970

At the invitation of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joseph Désire Mobutu, made an official visit to Yugoslavia from August 29 to 31, 1970.

Presidents Tito and Mobutu agreed on the necessity of unconditional and strict adherence to the UN Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967 with a view to ensuring a just settlement of the Middle East crisis.

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French Magazine Interview on Israeli Policy Towards the Palestinians with Police Minister Hillel of Israel²

late August 1970

Q. Would Israel agree to negotiate with the representatives of the Palestinian resistance organizations?

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 490 (September 5, 1970), p. 22.

² Translated from the French text in *Nouvel Observateur*, No. 303 (August 31-September 6, 1970), p. 14; © Le Nouvel Observateur; reprinted by permission.

A. For us, Jordan is actually the Palestinian state. We are prepared to talk with any person delegated by the government of that country. We do not wish to negotiate with the representatives of the resistance organizations. But if the Jordanian government decided to name Yasser Arafat or George Habbash as his country's delegate to talks, we would see no impediment to negotiating with them. By the same token, if Yasser Arafat were at the head of the Jordanian government, we would be ready to talk with him.

Q. In the case of the failure of peace negotiations, would you consider creating a Palestinian state on the West Bank?

A. No. The population is opposed to it. Moreover, nothing can be done against the will of Jordan. This solution would be that of despair.

Q. What do you see as the solution to the refugee problem?

A. It would be absurd to envisage a massive return of refugees to Israel. Their villages no longer exist or are inhabited by others. One can foresee only a partial return and indemnification of the refugees who do not return.

Q. Does Israel have the means for this?

A. No. But I think there would be no shortage of lenders. On the other hand, numerous Jewish refugees from Arab countries, where they abandoned their property, have been received in Israel. We will raise this problem of Jewish property in the Arab countries in the course of negotiations.

Q. What are the chances for peace?

A. Infinitesimal, but they do exist. We have taken enough military risks along the Suez Canal and made enough political concessions so that these chances would exist. We will do still more if the neighboring states agree to peace—which is not the case today. Our aim is peace. The Arab states must know that. To achieve this peace, we are prepared to return most of the occupied territories.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Premier Etemadi of Afghanistan to Yugoslavia (Excerpt)¹

Belgrade, September 1, 1970

The Prime Ministers of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan hailed the ceasefire in the Middle East brought about through the mediation of the UNO. They agreed that support should now be extended to all positive efforts to establish a lasting peace in that area on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories which Israel had occupied during the war in June 1967, acknowledgement of the legitimate rights of the Arab population of Palestine and implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967.

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Press Release of the Autumn Meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers (Excerpts)²

Oslo, September 1, 1970

The Nordic Foreign Ministers met for their autumn meeting in Oslo on 31st August and 1st September.

Recently events have taken a not unfavourable turn both in regard to relations between East and West and in regard to the conflict in the Middle East.

The Governments of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan have now

approved the proposal for a cease-fire in the Middle East, and talks led by Mr. Jarring have now commenced. Both the parties to the conflict and the Great Powers should take this opportunity of laying the foundations for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Nordic Governments are still prepared to receive in a constructive spirit any requests that may be made to them for assistance to the UN in connection with the implementation of a peaceful settlement.

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U.S. State Department Statement on Alleged U.A.R. Violations of the Middle East Cease-Fire³

Washington, September 3, 1970

Our latest evidence confirms that there have been violations of the cease-fire standstill agreement. We are not going into details. We are taking up this matter with both the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. through diplomatic channels. We are continuing to watch the balance closely and, as we have said previously, have no intention of permitting Israel's security to be adversely affected. In the meantime, we believe it is of utmost importance that the talks between the parties under Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices proceed forthwith.

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 490 (September 5, 1970), pp. 23-24.

² Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy*, New Series I: C: 20 (Stockholm, 1971), p. 72. The Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

³ Read to news correspondents by State Department Press Spokesman McCloskey; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1630 (September 21, 1970), p. 326.

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Resolution on the Middle East Adopted by the Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches¹

Frankfurt, September 4, 1970

The Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches takes note of the recent favourable developments in attempts to settle the Middle East conflict through peaceful negotiations rather than by force of arms. We are especially heartened that the states in the area have accepted the plan proposed by the United States and supported by the USSR as a starting point of discussions, thus providing the occasion for the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission.

In these circumstances we would affirm that:

a) The initial negotiations among the parties involved under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring should be continued uninterrupted;

b) The time limit agreed upon for the cease-fire should not be an inhibiting factor upon Ambassador Jarring's mission;

c) Any agreed solution should be reached in the fullest possible collaboration with all the affected parties in the area; and

d) Such a solution should involve guarantees that protect and ensure the legitimate rights and aspirations of all the peoples and nations in the area.

The Executive Committee calls upon all Christians to support this new initiative for peace within the framework of the United Nations and to pray ardently for its success.

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Speech by Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien of China at a Banquet in Honor of Special Envoy Yunis Representing Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Chairman Arafat²

Peking, September 5, 1970

For years the Palestinian people, holding high the banner of anti-imperialism and persisting in armed struggle, have been waging a courageous struggle against U.S. imperialism and Zionism and for national liberation and the recovery of the rights they have been deprived of. The Palestinian guerrillas, which have become a strong shock force in the Arab national-liberation movement, enjoy a high reputation among the people of the world. The Chinese Government and people profoundly admire your heroic fighting spirit of fearing no brute force or sacrifice and your confidence in victory.

U.S. imperialism and its collaborator have all along regarded the unity of the Arab countries and the Arab people and the armed struggle waged by the Palestinian people as a big obstacle to their aggression in the Middle East and to their pushing the "Munich" scheme there. The "Rogers plan" now being stepped up for a so-called "political settlement" of the Middle East question is a criminal scheme plotted by one or two "superpowers," in disregard of the destiny of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples, to redivide their spheres of influence in the Middle East and strangle the cause of the liberation of the Palestinian people at the expense of the interests of the Arab people. While carrying out their political scheme, U.S. imperialism and its collaborator have instigated the reactionary forces in Jordan to carry out repeated armed provocations against the Palestinian guerrillas in a vain attempt to disrupt the unity of the Arab countries and the Arab people so as to realize their scheme of making Arabs fight Arabs. But the battle-seasoned Palestinian people and other Arab peoples have not been taken

¹ *Quarterly Newsletter from the World Council of Churches' Committee on the Church and the Jewish People*, No. 3/1970, September 1970, pp. 3-4.

² *Peking Review*, XIII, 37 (September 11, 1970), p. 30.

in by U.S. imperialism and its collaborator. The recent emergency meeting of the Palestinian National Council held in Amman formally declared that it refused and opposed the "Rogers plan" and reiterated that armed struggle was the only way for realizing the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian guerrillas have also taken the initiative in attacking the enemy in the battlefield, dealing incessant blows to the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. This is their most resolute and resounding answer to the "Munich" scheme in the Middle East.

Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people, pointed out in his solemn statement issued on May 20 this year: "A weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big." We firmly believe that no matter what imperialism may resort to, military repression or political deceit, the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples will certainly defeat U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism and win victory in the war of national liberation provided they guard against the scheme of U.S. imperialism and its collaborator to sow discord among them and split them up, constantly strengthen their militant unity, make every preparation and persist in protracted people's war.

The Chinese people will always stand on the side of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples and that of the people of Indo-China and the whole world. The anti-imperialist struggle waged by the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples is a powerful support for the Chinese people and the revolutionary people of the world. We will, as always, firmly support your just struggle.

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Interview with Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on the Middle East Cease-Fire Situation and His Position in the Government¹

September 5, 1970

Q. Much has been said, Mr. Dayan, of the danger of losing options if the Suez situation grows worse. In what way and what options?

A. First, as long as the cease-fire did not exist, from the time Abd an-Nasir declared that the cease-fire was void, we prevented the missile batteries from being brought nearer to the Canal by military means. Now that we are bound by a cease-fire and the other side is not implementing it, options or no options, we are not firing and they are bringing the missiles forward. You can call it what you like.

Q. What political options are we losing in the present situations?

A. In my opinion the negotiations as they are now being conducted must have an alternative—that is, while we are discussing the peace arrangements with the other side, accompanied by forceful "in-laws" on all sides, and let us assume that we are unable to reach a compromise with them to a common formula, we must be in a position in which we can say: Well, if not, then we will return to the previous situation. And the previous situation is the situation in which we found ourselves hitherto and which in my opinion we still find ourselves, that is, the capability of being able to hold the cease-fire lines without fear that the other side can make us retreat from them by force.

So the political negotiations will not be held on the basis of our not being able to hold the cease-fire lines. Naturally we would prefer to exchange them (a) for peace, and (b) for peace borders. But not out of necessity, because we have no position to retire to. The negotiations must be held while we have

¹ Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3476/A/4, A/5, A/6, A/7 and A/8; reprinted by permission.

a free hand to agree or not agree to proposed peace settlements. And if we do not agree to them we can return to a house in good condition—to the same cease-fire lines we have held for over three years, and which in my opinion we can continue to hold as in the past.

Q. This is desirable but this is not the situation at the moment. How in your opinion can the situation be rectified?

A. This is precisely the situation at the moment, and only someone with a psychological breakdown could imagine that this is not the situation at present. Moreover I think our position on the lines at present is better than it was six months or a year ago, and so on. We are now at the beginning of the fourth year of the war. Four years—a period which first gave the Egyptians a respite to renew their army, to receive equipment, to receive Soviet aid, to establish an eastern front, to develop Fatah, and all the troubles that can be counted.

Is our military situation now really worse than it was a year ago, on the Jordanian border, on the Syrian border, with Fatah, with the Arab population in the territories? We have taken it upon ourselves—not without hints from the USA—to stop the bombing in the interior [of Egypt]. But war is war—war is war. And I do not think this is a desirable situation; I think this is the situation as it is; and in practice the situation as it is is that we have greater military strength than in the past. And if the Arabs try to cross the Suez Canal I estimate that they will leave behind such a wave of broken tanks that what they left behind in the six-day war would only be a sample.

Q. Mr. Dayan, if it were clear that there would be no additional violations would you be satisfied with this, or in your opinion must the situation be restored to what it was before?

A. An agreement is an agreement. The agreement says missiles must not be introduced and they must return the missiles to their original place. But I say this in principle: I do not want to talk of what might have

been. In political situations, in life, and in military situations there is no precise possibility of turning the clock back. So I cannot say that everything must return to exactly the same situation as previously. But there must certainly be an agreement to be fulfilled by both sides. There may be one possibility of returning everything to what it was originally, and there may be a possibility of sitting down and saying: We can talk things over again.

There cannot in my opinion be a possibility of an agreement existing, when one side does not keep to it, and the other side regards itself as obliged or entitled or justified in continuing to keep to it. Not that. If things cannot be restored to what they were before, the agreement does not exist.

Q. Israeli leaders did not expect Soviet intervention to the degree it has now reached. Did you also not expect such intervention?

A. Why should I try to reconstruct the past? And I do not know about degree. I never ruled out the possibility that the Soviets would actively intervene in the war, in the fighting, on the Arab side, in this case on the Egyptian side, although they have a sizable presence, not so active, but a sizable presence—in Syria also. But one must not exaggerate the extent of their active participation today in the Egyptian fighting.

I do not think it is true that the Soviet Union stands shoulder to shoulder with the Egyptians in their fight with us. What does exist in Egypt is a manifestation of Soviet military capability. If they wanted to put their full weight or even considerable weight behind the Egyptians there would be much fiercer intervention. What I want to say is that there is Soviet intervention, but it is impossible to say that the Soviet Union has been forced into a war against us.

Q. What do you expect in the future regarding this intervention?

A. I think the same factors that determined—or that they set for themselves—regarding their quantitative and qualitative restraint, that is, the number and quantity of

men and weapons with which they are participating and the extent of their intervention in the war—for they are not intervening to a great extent in the war—I believe these considerations and factors which influenced them into restraining themselves still exist and will exist in the future. I do not accept the imaginary picture which says: What will happen if they bring in 1,000 aircraft? I do not believe they will bring in 1,000 aircraft; they have had plenty of time to bring in 1,000 aircraft in these three years, and they brought in what they did, and intervened as they did, within a many-angled and many-sided framework of limitations.

I do not think there will be a basic change here. That is, I do not think they will leave, or that they will extract the finger which is stirring up and interfering in the war in one way or another. But I do not think they will jump into this war with both feet and both fists.

Q. Reports are coming in of the preparation of crews to repair the Suez Canal. Is the Israeli principle that either everyone passes through the Canal or no one sails on it still in force?

A. The Israeli principle is that the Suez Canal today is territory between the firing lines, and neither side is entitled unilaterally to resume using it. In this case of resuming dredging of the Canal, the principle applies. It cannot be done without our agreement, and even the Egyptians agreed—I think it was a year ago—in an additional clarification. What the Israeli stand will be if Israel receives a proposal, at a time and place when our soldiers are sitting on the east bank of the Canal—what our stand will be if, under these conditions, it is said to us: Let us allow the Egyptians to dredge the Canal and resume navigation—this the Government will have to discuss if such a proposal is made. I do not think there will be such a proposal. I assume that Abd an-Nasir is firm and consistent in his stand that he, in his own interest, does not want to operate the Suez Canal while we are sitting on its east bank, because he fears that this will be regarded as normal-

isation of the situation, and the world will leave things as they are.

Q. How in your opinion should the fact that Ambassador Tekoah is being delayed in Israel be understood?

A. I do not know if there is a delay. He is in Israel on home leave, he has come here for consultations, and there is a great deal to consult about now. One of the things on which consultations are very worthwhile is whether, while the other side is not keeping to the agreement, we are obliged to sit vigorously at the negotiating table, while instead of the standstill—not at the negotiating table but at the Suez Canal—missile batteries are being placed opposite us. This is a matter for consultations.

Q. From the Defence Ministry's viewpoint, in what way is there disagreement with the USA?

A. At this stage in the issue, the USA was the sponsor and intermediary of this agreement and first and foremost—even if it is not responsible for its fulfilment, for it is not the USA who is positioning the missiles there—first and foremost it must be what is called an “honest broker”. It must be an honest broker in this matter and put its full weight behind the honouring of the agreement. If it sees that the other side is not honouring it, it must in my opinion come and say: We are very sorry, but what we proposed to you does not exist in the same form, and this agreement as it existed in the past is not being kept by the other side, and at the moment it does not bind you either.

If they really cannot regulate matters, the USA must in my opinion do two things: first try and bring about the honouring of the agreement as stipulated, that is, that the missiles be removed from the area into which they were moved contrary to the agreement. And if it cannot do this it must come to us and say: You are not bound by it.

Q. Do you think the USA is trying to tie our hands, both politically and by turning off the [arms] taps?

A. I do not think they would want us to stop the talks, despite the fact that they know

that the Egyptians moved the missiles forward contrary to the agreement.

Q. Mr. Dayan, what is your opinion of the proposal to install a red line between Washington and Jerusalem?

A. I do not know what a red line is. We have a telephone and we have no difficulty contacting them. What do you need the colour for?

Q. During the week many reports have been published that you are considering leaving the Government. Have you considered leaving?

A. On this issue of our reaction or conduct regarding agreement to the Jarring talks and the cease-fire, namely, should we continue to observe what was laid down in this agreement, that is, to embark on talks with Jarring and refrain from opening fire while the other side violates both these things and does not observe what was laid down, both as regards the talks and as regards the cease-fire—what our conduct should be on this issue is in my opinion a very important question, one of basic military significance, and has many repercussions on our ability to conduct political negotiations with a free hand. Or in other words, to agree to what we agree to and not to agree to what we do not agree to, and not to enter into negotiations with these millstones around our necks—I refer to the violations of the agreement by the other side.

I regarded this issue as one of great importance and I indeed considered the possibility of bearing the responsibility for a decision which, were it to be made, is contrary to my understanding of the situation. Could I really regard myself as part of the collective responsibility for determining a policy line which I would regard as a serious mistake in respect of Israel's interests? I am happy to say that matters did not reach this crisis.

Q. Did you consider passively leaving the Government or organising a group to win a majority in the Knesset?

A. In my considerations I reached exactly the point I mentioned, and this was based

on so many maybes that this was quite enough for me. My consideration was what I told you. In this situation, on this issue, if such a policy were accepted, which would be so far from what I understand to be right, could I regard myself as part of the collective responsibility? Further than this question—which you put to me with a question mark—I did not go, and matters were discussed and clarified; and finally it was decided. And at this stage the decision taken does not place me on the other side of the fence from the other members of the Government.

Q. Finally let us return to the policy and military front: What sort of an autumn and winter do you expect, Mr. Dayan?

A. I hope the negotiations to end the war will continue. I think I already said at the Air Force graduation ceremony that I estimate that we are in the final stages of the war and are about to determine the peace arrangements. I hope this will be achieved. Of course each side envisages a different peace, and there may be vigorous efforts from the various sides as we move towards decisions and settlements to obtain more for what they regard as their own interests.

However, I believe and assume that we are in the stage of ending this war, which not only we do not want, but which is very hard on the Arabs. The USA certainly does not want it, and I assume the Russians also do not want it, and when the main parties to the matter want it so little, I assume that ways will be found to reach a peace settlement—or at least an arrangement to stop the war.

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Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on Government Attitudes to the Middle East Cease-Fire Situation¹

September 5, 1970

Q. Ambassador Tekoah is still in Israel. He has not yet gone back to New York to resume his talks with Dr. Jarring. Is there any connection between this and the Israeli demand that the missiles be pushed back?

A. Well, there are one or two connections: First of all there's what I would call the connection of preoccupation—instead of devoting ourselves to a discussion of what would happen in the peace talks and how to approach them, we have been involved for hours and days in the prior and urgent consideration of how to deal with this violation of the cease-fire agreement. Then there is the formal connection—the Jarring talks are part of a programme of three paragraphs, of which one is the establishment of the cease-fire, and it's impossible to say that an international programme of which there are three parts can be carried out in the other two parts, irrespective of what happens to the third. And finally there is the psychological connection. What are the Jarring talks about? What are they for? Their purpose is to reach agreement between Israel and Egypt, amongst other things for the establishment of peace.

Well, here we are discussing a new agreement, while an existing agreement is being torn up and trampled upon. Surely the integrity of the existing agreement is a factor in creating credibility for a new agreement? So for all of these reasons, though we have never tied the things together in a sharp conditionality, there is an objective connection, and it isn't surprising if the atmosphere and the pace of the Jarring mission are affected by the serious violation of the cease-fire.

Q. Would it be correct then to say that Israel will hold up its participation in the Jarring mission until it gets satisfaction on the matter of the Egyptian missiles?

A. Well, I'm not going to have my hands tied by any hard and fast conditions of this kind. We watch it day by day. Now we have heard that the United States is making efforts in Moscow and Cairo, and I can say that we are going to have some discussions about the Israeli position on the problem of peace. So that we will look at the situation from time to time.

Q. Is the Cabinet pretty much united on these points now?

A. Yes I think the press—perhaps not all through its own fault, but by speculation and for other reasons—has exaggerated the dissension. At any rate, I've attended all these meetings and I haven't seen anything that could be called a crisis or a tension, or anything that goes beyond the normal exchange of ideas on problems which are mostly not problems of principle. After all, nothing could be more grotesque than to attempt to divide the Cabinet—as some journalists have—between a majority which is apathetic and indifferent about violation of the cease-fire and a minority which has an exclusive concern. That is absolute nonsense. We are all united in our concern.

Now the question: What should be done on the particular day? What is the best method of exercising our option? That is an intellectual question; it is a question of expediency, of pragmatic experience. It is not a question of principle, and therefore there has never been any justification whatever to talk about divisions which could affect the composition of the Cabinet.

Q. Mr. Eban, it was announced yesterday that Prime Minister Golda Meir is leaving for the United States earlier than had been anticipated. In the next two weeks, I believe. What is behind this change in plan?

A. The object of this visit is very important in itself. We tend to lose sight of the centrality

¹ Excerpted from Eban's interview broadcast on "Radio Newsreel" on Israeli radio in English; reprinted by permission from BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3476/A/8 and A/9.

in our world of the connection between Israel and the largest Jewish community in the world. Now this is one of the most important assets that we have, and this in itself would justify such a journey, and of course the quicker the better. Now in so far as we can expect that the Prime Minister's presence in the United States would also be used for political activity, then obviously the sooner the better, because we are dealing with very urgent issues, so when it became apparent that the conferences of Jewish organisations would take place earlier, we welcomed that both for its own sake, for the sake of our economy, and also because any political work that the Prime Minister does obviously refers to matters which are very urgent and which are developing very quickly.

Q. Mr. Eban, when are you planning to go to the United States?

A. Well, I expect that at an early meeting the Government will appoint its delegation to the next ordinary session of the UN, and I expect to be the head of our delegation. Now the session opens on the third week of September.

Q. Finally, Sir, if I may ask you, what do you think is going to happen now? Or anyway what is the optimistic attitude? What is the pessimistic attitude?

A. Well, the optimistic hope is that we will get certain results; correct violations of the cease-fire, prevent their recurrence, and have success—we are having some success—in reinforcing Israel's strength to meet the old and the new challenges to our security. The optimistic hope is that there will be revealed amongst the Arab Governments a disposition for serious negotiation. Serious negotiation means a willingness to talk about peace and an understanding that peace means the negotiation of agreed boundaries. Whether these optimistic predictions will come about, I cannot say. I wish that I could be more sanguine than I am. I think we should pursue those hopes, but also have a more realistic and cautious view.

It is possible that these things will not

happen. It is possible that we shall have to stick our feet in and face difficult conditions for a longer period. I think that in our national mood we should be prepared both for the tenacious defence of our security—with all that involves—and also be vigilant in case there should emerge some opening towards peace.

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Statement Issued by the Government of Israel Announcing Withdrawal from the Jarring Talks Until Alleged U.A.R. Violations of the Cease-Fire Are Reversed¹

September 6, 1970

The Israel Government's resolution (dated August 4, 1970) concerning acceptance of the American peace initiative and the appointment of a representative to the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring remains in force.

The Egyptian Government has gravely violated the cease-fire agreement and the standstill, and this violation is continuing.

Scrupulous observance of the cease-fire agreement and the standstill is one of the central elements of the American peace initiative and the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. Therefore, until such time as the cease-fire agreement and the standstill are implemented fully, and the original position is restored, Israel will not be able to participate in these talks.

Ambassador Tekoah, who is returning to his post as head of Israel's permanent delegation at the U.N., has been authorised to bring this decision of the Israel Government to the attention of Ambassador Jarring.

¹ *Israel Digest*, XIII, 19 (September 18, 1970), p. 3.

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Radio Interview with Prime Minister Meir of Israel Explaining the Israeli Government's Decision To Withdraw from the Jarring Talks¹

September 6, 1970

Q. Mme. Premier, what is the significance of the decision taken today by the Government?

A. On 4th August the Government took a decision regarding its participation in the talks under Jarring's auspices at US initiative. One of the main parts, one of the most important parts, of the proposal was a proposal concerning a cease-fire. One of the most important parts of the cease-fire decision was the clause that during the cease-fire period, as long as the cease-fire lasts, there must be a standstill of all activity on both sides of the line. And since our negotiations were not with the Egyptians or with the Russians but only with the USA, not only did the USA agree but they informed us that both the Russians and the Egyptians accepted these conditions. On this condition we embarked—we agreed to join the talks under Jarring's auspices. To our surprise we saw that within a matter of hours of the cease-fire coming into force the Egyptians began to move missiles towards the Canal. And in fact this has not stopped to this day.

This means that the Egyptians are exploiting the cease-fire period to strengthen their position and make it more difficult for us, if and when shooting resumes. Our position will be more difficult in this respect than it was prior to the cease-fire. Clearly it cannot be demanded of us to continue to keep our part of this agreement while the other side violates it hourly.

We applied to the USA, and when we reached the moment at which there were no more disagreements between the USA and ourselves concerning the facts, the time came for them to act. To the best of our knowledge

they are acting. I hope they succeeded. And in the meantime we could not see ourselves sitting at the Jarring talks, and this continues. The Israeli Government has not altered its decision of 4th August regarding its agreement to participate in talks at US initiative. This exists. But since Egypt has violated the cease-fire agreement, the Israeli Government has decided that as long as the situation is not restored to what it was originally, the Israeli Government is unable to participate in these talks.

As you know, the Israeli Government decided that our Foreign Minister would be our representative at these talks and his stand-in would be Ambassador Tekoah, who is head of the permanent delegation to the UN. Now the Assembly draws near and he must do his work as head of the delegation; he will return to his work. In addition, we have charged him to submit the Government's decision today to Dr. Jarring.

Q. In other words, returning the missiles to the situation that prevailed before the cease-fire came into force?

A. Precisely, precisely.

Q. Is there any basis for believing we can obtain this demand by political means?

A. There are two alternatives. If the Soviet Union and Egypt entered into talks at the initiative with a sincere willingness, they must observe it. If they do not observe it and are unwilling to rectify it, what is the point of all this talking, or even of all these agreements to be signed, if they are signed at all? I want to believe that the US Government really wants to restore the situation to what it was, and is making efforts in this direction, but it is important for us that it and the other parties involved know exactly—so that they do not misunderstand and act accordingly—the decision we have informed them of.

Q. Was this decision taken after consultation with the USA?

A. No, the decision was not taken afterwards—we do not consult the USA on what

¹ Broadcast on "Radio Newsreel" on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3476/A/9, A/10 and A/11; reprinted by permission.

decisions to take. But the decision was taken after close contacts with the USA for many days, in fact ever since we discovered that the cease-fire was being violated, and I am certain this decision will not come as a surprise to the USA.

Q. Is there not a danger that the USA will disapprove of this decision, which in fact affects its own initiative?

A. I do not know how it will regard it, but I do not agree that this decision harms the initiative. There is something that really does harm the initiative, and that is the actions of Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Q. Is there no danger that some form of pressure will be exerted to make us change this decision?

A. Look, I am almost unaware of any period since the establishment of the State of Israel—this period or another period, in one matter or another—when no pressures were exerted. Policy is comprised to a great extent of someone applying pressure, and the person affected must find the strength to withstand the pressure.

Q. Do we have the strength?

A. So far, thank God, we have withstood pressure the whole time and I have no doubt that the Israeli Government can withstand it now. The main thing is that the matter is just.

Q. Madam, if the missiles are not removed in the next few weeks or months, does this mean Ambassador Tekoah or Minister Abba Eban will not meet envoy Farring any longer?

A. If the situation is restored to what it was before, naturally they will meet him. If it is not restored, then I do not know what there is to meet about.

Q. Are the political means—these means or others—are these the only means by which we shall try to get the missiles moved further back?

A. We are now discussing the decision taken by the Israeli Government, and it demands that the USA do all in its power

to influence both the Soviet Union and Egypt to act honestly at the outset. But if this is what happens, then this must be rectified. Otherwise there is no point in continuing on our way.

Q. When you visit the USA next week, Madam, will you clarify these issues with the leaders of the Administration and with President Nixon?

A. All I can say now is that in exactly two weeks from today I shall have an opportunity, which I am very happy to have, to meet with a large public of thousands of Jews in New York, who will come from all corners of the USA, representatives of hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of Jewish communities who are thirsty to hear at first hand what is happening in Israel and what Israel's problems are, and I shall do my best to present this to them. That's all.

Q. What about meetings with the President or leaders?

A. At the moment I cannot add anything to what I have said.

Q. Is there any question of a meeting with the UN Secretary-General or envoy Farring?

A. I have no plans for such meetings. I do not expect to be in New York long.

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International Committee of the Red Cross Announcement of Activities Designed To Protect Airline Passengers and Crews Held Hostage in Jordan¹

Geneva, September 7, 1970

The International Committee of the Red Cross, on 7 September, held an extraordinary plenary meeting and decided to strengthen its delegation at Amman by sending a special mission that is to leave tonight for Jordan.

¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1970* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1971), p. 59.

Its instructions are to extend its assistance, without distinction of nationality, to the passengers and crews of the two aircraft hijacked on 6 September. It is to get in touch with the Jordanian Government and the Palestine organizations and, if necessary, may act as intermediary between the latter and the governments involved.

The ICRC points out that its role is purely humanitarian. It goes without saying that any decisions to be taken with regard to the conditions laid down for the release of the passengers and crews and for the return of the two aircraft must fall within the sole competency of the governments concerned.

The ICRC underlines, too, that it is incumbent upon the authorities or persons holding the passengers and crews to treat them in conformity with humanitarian rules.

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Speech by President Kaunda of Zambia Opening the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)¹

Lusaka, September 8, 1970

While the world has succeeded in avoiding a Third World War, we have not achieved peace. Major powers have, at best, attained an armed peace for themselves, but they have, unfortunately, been at the root of the violence in the rest of the world. Conflicts in Asia, Latin America and Africa have deprived millions of innocent men, women and children of the much-needed peace for their development.

The crisis in the Middle East has, for a long time, undermined the peace and security in that area. We therefore welcome the cease-fire now in force and the efforts of the United Nations to build a platform for meaningful peace based on justice. We in

Zambia stand very firmly by the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council of November 1967 which still provides the best framework for stable peace and relations in that area.

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Speech by President Tito of Yugoslavia to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpts)²

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

We who advocate the respect of the principles of International behavior contained in the United Nations Charter, must jointly resist all manifestations of force and all forms of domination, show a greater degree of solidarity and act jointly. Especially when it is necessary to give support and assistance to those non-aligned and other countries and peoples which, as the victims of aggression, find themselves in a difficult situation.

Such policy of force and foreign intervention comes to expression in its most flagrant form in Indochina and the Near East today.

The same has been the case with our attitude towards Israeli aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries. Why Yugoslavia, from the very first day, has given all possible support to these countries? Because it has been clear since the very beginning that what is in question is aggression with far-reaching imperialist aims. Anyway, this has been proved by later Israel's behaviour which has not accepted the Security Council Resolution and which, in different ways, has been preventing the peaceful solving of this crisis. Developments have shown that Israel's existence has not been brought into question

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 491 (September 20, 1970), p. 19.

² English text in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 491 (September 20, 1970), pp. 14, 15.

and that aggression on the Arab countries has not been motivated by defence but by conquering aspirations. We have positively assessed the fact that Israel has accepted Rogers' proposal for talks on the peaceful solving of the conflict with the Arab countries. As we can see, however, it has quickly been proved that this has been merely a manoeuvre, for Israel has interrupted the talks before they have actually started. This is completely the style of Israel's behaviour since 1948 onwards.

We cannot and must not remain indifferent towards such a state of affairs. For, if all the problems of this region fail to be radically solved this time, too, which—above all presumes the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the invaded Arab territories and the exercise of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine, i. e. the ensurance of its right to existence—we shall be faced with new dangers which may have far-reaching consequences on world peace.

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Speech by President Nguabi of The Congo (Brazzaville) to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpts)¹

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

We have all spoken about the People's Republic of China. We have all talked about the problem of apartheid, the problem of the minority regime in South Africa, the racist regime in Rhodesia, the problem of the colonial regime of Portugal in Africa; we have spoken of Zionism, we have spoken of American imperialism in Asia, we have referred to economic problems. But in actual fact, what are we really doing here?

This is not the first conference at which we have tackled these problems, whether

at the regional level or in the Organization of African Unity. I think also that these problems were tackled at the non-aligned conference, and they will always be tackled there in the same manner. These problems should be tackled, but we should also try to find some practical solution for them of course, bearing in mind our modest resources. There have been too many speeches and too many condemnation, and we would like to give you an example.

When a year ago we were in Addis Ababa condemning Zionist aggression, Israel had an opportunity, while the Heads of State were in meeting in Addis Ababa, to commit aggression against a brother territory, UAR—that is to say, for them the dog barked but the caravan moved on. We can shout and condemn but in fact, colonial imperialism will continue to act in the same manner.

We have spoken of the Middle East, asking for the withdrawal of troops from these territories and we have agreed to support the need for a peace plan as proposed. We agree that any peace plan could lead to a solution but we think that the peace plan must respect the vital problem of the existence of the Palestine State. What led Israel to conquer territories? That is the basic problem, the existence of the Palestine State. If we accept the plan it will be because it is feasible, but it must have respect for and recognize the main problem which is the existence of the Palestine State.

¹ English translation in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 36.

208

Speech by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)¹

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

The unhappy and tragic state of affairs in the Middle East is another issue that demands the attention of this Conference. Every year the solution to this problem seems to have grown more intractable. More than three years have elapsed since the Security Council unanimously passed the resolution of 22 November 1967, which deals specifically with the steps to be taken to restore peace in the region. Unfortunately, this resolution has so far not been implemented. Meanwhile, blood has been shed and precious resources wasted. We strongly believe that this resolution must remain the basis of the settlement of the issue. In recent weeks, the acceptance of the Rogers Peace Plan by the contending parties has given hope for optimism in this connexion. To this end the Conference should urge the parties concerned to implement the resolution with the assistance of the United Nations negotiator, Dr. Gunnar Jarring.

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Speech by Vice-President Tolbert of Liberia to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)²

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

It should be our fervent wish that the negotiations now taking place under Dr.

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 12.

² *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 14.

Jarring, representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the Middle East, to resolve the war in the Middle East will achieve the success we all earnestly desire, while congratulating the President of the United Arab Republic and the Prime Minister of Israel on their wisdom and magnanimity in accepting the Rogers formula. With anxiety we look forward to the execution of the United Nations resolution of 22 November, 1967, and the occasioning of peace with justice within this part of our world.

210

Speech by Parliamentary President Maka of Guinea to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)³

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

There are certain serious events which face the non-aligned world. In Israel we see the bridgehead of international imperialism where aggression has been committed on the Arab countries and where Israel refuses to leave those territories occupied by its forces, flouting all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and preventing the Palestinian people from recovering their land and country which has been usurped. In Viet Nam war is still raging, despite the negotiations by the United States with this martyr country. Viet Nam seeks only to enjoy its independence and territorial integrity. We stress that there should be an unconditional withdrawal of imperialist foreign troops from this country and settlement of the Vietnamese problems by the Vietnamese themselves. Korea is still split into two antagonistic camps because of impe-

³ English translation in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 29.

rialism whereas its people are seeking only to achieve their unity.

211

Speech by Foreign Minister Akripo of Nigeria to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)¹

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

Be it in Africa or in the Middle East, Indo-China or any other region of the world where people are fighting to regain their rights of sovereignty, freedom, national unity and patrimony, Nigeria's support for freedom and justice remains unequivocal.

The situation is intolerable in which the will and resolutions of the United Nations are defied with impunity. The Security Council resolution 242 of November, 1967, which provides the basis for a just settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, should be urgently implemented. It is regrettable that so soon after the Organization of African Unity Summit resolution supporting the present efforts of the United Nations special representative to implement that resolution, Israel, a party to the conflict, should refuse to participate in the search for peace in that troubled region of the world. Let us hope that what has happened will only be a temporary setback and that we shall use our influence to ensure strict implementation of that resolution.

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Speech by Vice-President Moi of Kenya to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)²

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

The situation in the Middle East continues to be of grave concern to us. My delegation hopes that the Jarring Mission for peace negotiations in the Middle East will bear fruit. It is Kenya's sincere wish that impediments recently encountered will be overcome, and that we soon shall enjoy a situation conducive to peace and international goodwill in this part of the world.

213

Speech by Foreign Minister Garcia of Cuba to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)³

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

The position of Cuba on the so-called Middle East crisis is well known, hence it is unnecessary to repeat views that have already been expressed. Cuba unreservedly supports the Arab peoples in their struggle against imperialist invasion, headed by Israel, and considers there should be no delay in the abandonment of the occupied territories of the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Jordan, as well as the unconditional recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people whose intrepid devotion and tenacity constitute a source of pride and encouragement for

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 30.

² *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), pp. 30-31.

³ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 37.

the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

214

Speech by Foreign Minister Mercado of Peru to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)¹

Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970

Within this context, Peru has come to Lusaka to express among other concepts its full support for any efforts which attempt to find a solution to the serious problems which endanger world peace, abiding by the constitutional norms and resolution of the United Nations condemning threat or the use of force in the international sphere.

According to that position we hope that the Middle East crisis, which is of great concern to all of us, can be solved in compliance with the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967. There is no nation in the world that at one time in the course of its history has not had to fight for its independence or for the respect of its national personality. No one can consciously deny the legitimate right to freedom of those countries which are as yet subjects of a foreign State. On the other hand, all men on earth, whatever their racial characteristic may be, belong to the same human gender and as such they have equal rights, obligations and aspirations. Therefore, it is repugnant to the very conscience of mankind to see any form of aggression, discrimination or racial segregation that ignores or affects the dignity and the equality of human beings.

215

Speech by Prime Minister Gandhi of India to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Excerpt)²

Lusaka, September 9, 1970

I have touched upon certain general points, but, on such an occasion, one cannot ignore some of the explosive situations which confront the world.

I should like to take this opportunity to convey our admiration and best wishes to President Nasser for his statesmanship and courage in accepting the cease-fire. We disapprove of Israel's intransigence. Israel should be prevailed upon to comply fully with the U.N. Security Council Resolution of November, 1967. We cannot deny to the people of Palestine their inalienable right to the homelands from which they were exiled.

216

Statement by Foreign Minister Schumann of France to the French Council of Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East³

Paris, September 9, 1970

Le gouvernement s'était réjoui de l'acceptation par les parties intéressées d'une reprise des négociations menées sous l'égide de M. Jarring en vue de parvenir à un règlement politique du conflit israélo-arabe.

Les événements qui viennent de se dérouler depuis quelques jours au Moyen-Orient sont malheureusement de nature à troubler

¹ English translation in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 492 (October 5, 1970), p. 38.

² India, Ministry of External Affairs, *The Unfinished Revolution: Speech of Shrimati Indira Gandhi at Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries* (New Delhi: October 1970), pp. 4-5.

³ *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, Second Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), p. 60.

les perspectives de règlement politique qui semblaient se dessiner. Le refus annoncé par l'une des parties de participer à ces conversations tant que certaines conditions ne seront pas remplies, la tension qui a reparu dans la zone du canal de Suez, les troubles qui ont affecté la Jordanie, constituent autant de motifs de préoccupation.

Le gouvernement français est persuadé qu'aucun obstacle préalable ne doit être soulevé à l'ouverture effective des négociations et que tout doit être mis en œuvre pour préserver le cessez-le-feu et le maintien de la stabilité politique dans la région.

Le gouvernement estime toutefois que l'heureux aboutissement de ces négociations implique qu'aient pu être formulées des recommandations substantielles et équilibrées sur toutes les mesures d'application de la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du 22 novembre 1967, qu'il s'agisse des modalités de retrait, de la reconnaissance des frontières, des conditions de navigation, de la juste solution du problème des réfugiés palestiniens. De telles recommandations doivent être établies en commun par les quatre membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité. Le gouvernement a procédé à un échange de vues sur les moyens de protéger la liberté de la navigation aérienne internationale.

217

Resolution on the Middle East Adopted by the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries¹

Lusaka, September 10, 1970

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries:

Reaffirm previous resolutions adopted by non-aligned countries which have drawn attention to the dangerous situation in the Middle East as well as to the fact that con-

tinued Israeli occupation of the territories of three non-aligned countries constitutes a violation of United Nations principles, a challenge to the aims of non-alignment, and a grave threat to peace;

Consider it impermissible for Israel to keep the territories of three sovereign and non-aligned countries under occupation and continually to pursue the policy of flagrant use of force and to use the occupation of these territories as a means of pressure for imposing solutions;

Reiterate the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and call for the immediate withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied after the 5th of June, 1967;

Declare that full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine is a prerequisite to peace in the Middle East;

Call for the full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in their usurped homeland and reaffirm their support in their struggle for national liberation and against colonialism and racism;

Reiterate the necessity of abiding by and implementing UN resolutions adopted in this regard;

Express their support to the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967;

Deplore Israel's obstruction of these efforts aimed at establishing peace based on justice and, in particular, its interruption of the talks undertaken by the United Nations Special Representative in carrying out the task entrusted to him by the Security Council resolution;

Recommend to the UN to take adequate measures against Israel if it continues to disregard UN efforts to establish peace based on justice in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 491 (September 20, 1970), p. 29.

218

Resolution on Israeli Attacks on Lebanon Adopted by the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries¹

Lusaka, September 10, 1970

The Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Lusaka from September 8th to 10th, 1970:

Having heard the report given by the head of the Lebanese delegation on the latest aggression by Israeli forces against southern Lebanon;

Considering that this aggression will inevitably increase tension in this area;

Being informed of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on September 5, 1970, which calls for the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory;

In view of continued Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory;

Having in mind that the preservation of peace is one of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the non-aligned nations;

Completely aware of its responsibilities in connection with the preservation of international peace and security;

Taking into consideration the resolution of the Security Council which calls for the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory;

Expresses its deep concern because of the frequent Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory;

Calls for all member states of the world organization to make all the necessary efforts and undertake all measures to prevent a repetition of such acts of aggression.

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Announcement of Plans To Combat Hijacking by U.S. President Nixon²

Washington, September 11, 1970

The menace of air piracy must be met—immediately and effectively. I am therefore announcing the following actions to deal with this problem:

1. To protect United States citizens and others on U.S. flag carriers, we will place specially trained, armed United States Government personnel on flights of U.S. commercial airliners.

A substantial number of such personnel are already available and they will begin their duties immediately. To the extent necessary they will be supplemented by specially trained members of the armed forces who will serve until an adequate force of civilian guards has been assembled and trained. We will also make antisabotage training available to airlines personnel.

2. I have directed the Department of Transportation to have American flag carriers extend the use of electronic surveillance equipment and other surveillance techniques to all gateway airports and other appropriate airports in the United States and, wherever possible, in other countries. The Federal Government will provide enforcement officers to work with this equipment, to conduct searches when appropriate and to make necessary arrests. Such equipment and techniques have already helped to reduce the problem of air piracy in many areas.

3. I have directed the Departments of Transportation, Treasury and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Science and Technology and other agencies to accelerate their present efforts to develop security measures, including new methods for detecting weapons and explosive devices.

At the same time, the Departments of Defense and Transportation will work with

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 491 (September 20, 1970), p. 35.

² *New York Times*, September 12, 1970, p. 11. © 1970 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

all U.S. airlines in determining whether certain metal detectors and X-ray devices now available to the military could provide immediate improvement in airport surveillance efforts. To facilitate passenger surveillance, appropriate agencies of the Federal Government will intensify their efforts to assemble and evaluate all useful intelligence concerning this matter and to disseminate such information to airlines and law enforcement personnel.

4. I am directing the State Department and other appropriate agencies to consult fully with foreign governments and foreign carriers concerning the full range of techniques which they use to foil hijackers. Some foreign airlines—though they are particularly susceptible to hijacking—have been successful in deterring hijackers and in coping with piracy attempts. We want to learn all we can from their experience.

5. It is imperative that all countries accept the multilateral convention providing for the extradition or punishment of hijackers which will be considered at the international conference which will be held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization. I affirm the support of the United States both for this convention and for the Tokyo convention, which provides for the prompt return of hijacked aircraft, passengers and crew. I call upon other governments to become parties to these conventions.

I further call upon the international community to take joint action to suspend airline services with those countries which refuse to punish or extradite hijackers involved in international blackmail. For this purpose and in order to consider other ways and means of meeting this new international menace, I have directed the Secretary of State to ask the president of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization immediately to convene that Council in an emergency meeting.

6. It is the policy of the United States Government to hold the countries in which hijacked planes are landed responsible for

taking appropriate steps to protect the lives and the property of U.S. citizens.

7. An additional indication of our deep concern with the hijacking menace is the request which the United States and the United Kingdom made earlier this week for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider this problem. I am gratified by the unanimous action of the Security Council in calling upon the parties concerned immediately to release all hijacked passengers and crews.¹ I am pleased, too, that the Security Council has asked all nations to take all possible legal steps to protect against further hijackings or other interference in international civil aviation.

These are not the only steps we will take in the coming months to meet the threat of airplane hijacking. But they do provide a decisive program for the immediate future. The Secretary of Transportation will direct this program and take responsibility for preparing further proposals. In this capacity he will work closely with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense.

Piracy is not a new challenge for the community of nations. Most countries, including the United States, found effective means of dealing with piracy on the high seas a century and a half ago. We can—and we will—deal effectively with piracy in the skies today.

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Resolutions Relating to Hijacking and to Israel's Withdrawal from the Jarring Talks Adopted by the Political Bureau of the United Labor Party of Israel (Mapam)²

September 11, 1970

The Political Bureau of Mapam favours any initiative taken to eradicate the acts of piracy and of terror in the air.

¹ For the text of the Security Council resolution, see United Nations section, below, Document 342.

² English text in *Mapam Bulletin*, No. 19 (October 1970), p. 4.

The hijacking of airplanes is aimed at kindling anew the Middle East conflagration. The United Nations Organization and other international factors are called upon to take measures to prevent and thwart further acts of piracy which endanger peaceful aviation and undermine the initiative to bring about peace and a settlement in the Middle East.

The Political Bureau rejects with horror the attempts of the terrorists with the tacit agreement of the nations to separate the Jewish from the other passengers of the hijacked planes and affirms that this hints at a revival of racialist manifestations, with members of the Jewish people being exposed to criminal violence.

The credibility of the positions taken by the community of nations will be tested according to its ability to uproot crimes which expose aviation transport to anarchy and murder. Urgent penal measures on the part of the United Nations, as well as the world powers, are called for against those who sabotage civil aviation, and sanctions against the states which offer them shelter and coverage.

The Political Bureau of Mapam establishes that the decisions of the Government of Israel of September 6 state specifically that Israel abides by its positive response to the U.S. initiative for peace talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

The Israel Government's decisions concerning the temporary suspension of Israel's participation in the Jarring talks are a result of the unceasing violations by the Egyptians of the cease-fire agreement and the military standstill along the Suez Canal. Israel acceded affirmatively to the U.S. peace initiative and to the Jarring peace talks on condition that the cease-fire agreement be abided by in full.

The U.S. Government, which initiated the agreement, should take action immediately to cancel the military advantages gained by the Egyptians by their infringements of the standstill.

The Political Bureau calls on the Government of Israel to make every possible effort to get the Jarring talks under way, since in

them lies the chance of ending the war and of replacing a military showdown with negotiations in which the parties concerned may finally achieve peace, through understanding and reciprocal concessions.

The Mapam Political Bureau express its concern at certain positions and measures taken by certain political elements in Israel, which are liable to be interpreted by world public opinion as an attempt to foil the peace talks and retain the existing situation.

Full maintenance of the cease-fire agreement is a condition for the generation of the climate suitable for the start of contacts for peace, and for their progress along a positive path.

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Commentary on U.S. Supplies of Phantom Aircraft to Israel Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda (Condensed)¹

Moscow, September 12, 1970

Rumors that the United States government has decided to supply Israel with a new shipment of Phantom fighter-bombers have been officially confirmed in Washington. The press, referring to the U.S. Defense Department as its source, has announced that in accordance with the adopted decisions Israel is to receive an additional 18 of these up-to-date, offensive-type machines....

It has been reported that the first Phantoms are to be delivered in September in accordance with the new agreement. In fact, it is this exceptional haste that completely reveals the true plans of those delivering armaments and those receiving them.

The appetites of Israeli expansionists will not be limited to this. Tel Aviv, seeking additional American military aid, has includ-

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 37 (October 13, 1970), p. 12. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

ed in its order for the next two years—in addition to the Phantoms—helicopters, radar devices and other armaments costing a total of \$800,000,000.

Specialists from Israel are in the United States now to study American electronic equipment designed to jam the anti-aircraft defenses of their enemy. In its coverage of the Israelis' visit, *Time Magazine* hints that the Israelis would like to use this equipment in their operations in the Suez Canal zone.

These facts point out that for all its talk about a desire to restore peace in the Near East, Washington is taking new and dangerous steps. The decision to extend deliveries to Israel of offensive weapons can only assist the Tel Aviv extremists in their attempts to obstruct a peaceful political settlement. This decision can only be evaluated as encouraging the Israel aggressors to continue their adventurous policy against the Arab countries. Characteristic in this respect is Golda Meir's statement in which she hinted that Tel Aviv perhaps would violate the cease-fire agreement, i.e., that it would renew its aggression against neighboring Arab states.

In light of the refusal of Israel's representative Tekoah to take part in contacts begun in New York in accordance with the temporary cease-fire agreement, one can clearly see that this new and dangerous deal between the U.S.A. and Israel can lead only to serious complications in the situation in this part of the world and compound the difficulty of the mission of [Gunnar] Jarring, the U.S. Secretary General's special representative. . . .

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Radio Interview with Deputy Premier Allon of Israel on Hijacking by Palestine Commandos¹

September 12, 1970

Q: After previous hijacking incidents, things used to start with Israeli [word indistinct] statements and end with submission, probably unavoidable, and silence. What is the situation today?

Answer: With regard to the past, we should not complain angrily about the Government at that time because it did not rush to exchange terrorists for El Al crew or Israeli passengers on a foreign airline who were held by force in this or that Arab country [words indistinct] including warnings, threats, mediation and even more far-reaching notions, and only when all these methods had been exhausted and a way was found of returning all the Israelis that did not necessarily involve submission, was the thing done.

Therefore, in the case of Algeria we did not actually respond to Algeria but to a special request by the Italian Government, which exerted great efforts not only in maintaining contact with Algeria concerning the fate of our men, but also in dealing with their release. I think we did well then.

Q: Was this not the root of all evil?

Answer: Listen, if they seized the El Al aircraft without precedent, then is not this also the root of all evil? It is a fact that they took this course. In my opinion, in the case of the El Al aircraft in Algeria, we tried many ways. Our men suffered considerably. They waited a long time. We did not rush. And finally the thing was done on the initiative and through the offices of the Italian Government—to a great extent in a reasonable way, more or less.

Q: What is the difference now?

¹ "Weekly Newsreel" program on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3482/A/3, A/4 and A/5; reprinted by permission.

Answer: Up to this moment Israel is not involved directly in the aircraft hijackings in Jordan. It is a fact that there were Jewish passengers on these aircraft from various countries, including Israelis with Israeli passports and Jews with two passports or nationalities, Israeli and US. At least at this stage all the Governments concerned claim they are demanding the release of all the passengers without discrimination.

Q: Have they not been a little late in beginning to make these claims?

Answer: They were very late. In my opinion they hurried more than necessary in agreeing to release the terrorist prisoners who had been sentenced in Germany and Switzerland following attempts to attack El Al aircraft. However, the moment the United States entered the picture a kind of club of the countries concerned was organised. We are not members of this club but we are, I can say, observers, since we are indirectly involved.

Q: Are we observers or partners by necessity without admitting it?

Answer: It is possible that gradually we are coming to a situation in which they will want us to be partners also. It seems to me that at this stage the countries concerned are not interested in Israel appearing as a full partner so as to reduce as much as possible the political basis of this miserable affair.

Q: There are reports from Switzerland that Israel will not use force to release the hijacked passengers.

Answer: Listen, the problem is very complicated. There are many passengers from various nations in danger. We are dealing with irresponsible people, with people I would describe as unruly and cruel. Therefore I would not suggest that we start speaking at this early stage about military means. It is necessary to give the countries concerned the chance to exhaust their influence in the Arab States and through the Red Cross in order to release all the

passengers without discrimination. We shall wait and see how matters develop.

Q: Mr. Allon, there is a possibility, which could occur, that all the passengers would be released except those considered by the hijackers as Israelis.

Answer: If we take as an example the experience of the TWA aircraft that was hijacked to Damascus, you are right. We all remember that all the passengers, including the crew of the aircraft, left the two Israelis, who had been taken to Damascus involuntarily.

Q: Cruel logic says that if we can save 98 out of 100, why not do so?

Answer: This is cruel, but I doubt if it is logic. In my opinion if the passengers and crews unite out of solidarity and say "we will not move from here unless all the passengers leave", I am sure they will achieve their goal. This time the question is not so simple, because the non-Israeli Jews are citizens of other countries, and according to the constitutions of those countries it is difficult to imagine that they can ignore citizens just because they are Jewish. This rule also applies to Jews with dual citizenship, US and Israeli. From an Israeli point of view they are Israelis and from American point of view they are American. The United States is handling this, not Israel. I cannot imagine that the United States, which has a very good constitutional tradition and includes a pluralist society of various ethnic, religious and national groups, would be able to give up citizens carrying US passports just because they are Jews.

Q: Not give them up, but ask Israel to make a gesture.

Answer: I do not know what the United States might do in the future. So far it has not referred to us on this subject, but I am worried by the reports, which are so far unconfirmed, that the terrorists want to distinguish between Israelis and others. I also do not know if they are including those carrying US passports with the other

Israelis. It is difficult to know what is going on. Reports are often contradictory. Regarding our friends—the Governments of the aviation companies—they should see that all the passengers are released. It is in their power to bring about their release and we have to put on political pressure—perhaps at this stage more covertly than overtly—in order to ensure the release of all those hijacked.

Q: How do you view the movement of the Sixth Fleet into our region?

Answer: I can only suppose that the United States wants to be in a state of preparedness near the scene. Whether or not the United States is thinking of military intervention, I do not know. But it appears to me that should the countries concerned, apart from Israel, also reach the conclusion that there is room for military intervention to guarantee the security of the passengers, or at least to threaten the terrorist organisations and the Kingdom of Jordan that such a force might intervene, it must be an international force and not a single-nation force. I am sure the United States would not want to use force of its own alone in such a complicated matter.

Q: Wouldn't an international task force turn into a two-edged sword as regards Israel in the future?

Answer: I do not think that we must always live in the fear of [words indistinct] that every international force is intended against Israel. What I mean is that the world Powers, whose aircraft have been hijacked and their passengers taken captive by cruel pirates, are entitled and even obliged to create a temporary ad hoc force with which to safeguard the lives of passengers should danger threaten them.

Q: Isn't the conclusion at present that Jordan is actually not a sovereign State but rather a lawless region?

Answer: From a judicial point of view it is still a sovereign State. However, there is a sort of a civil war there at present. Undoubt-

edly the unruly behaviour of the terrorist and sabotage bands—particularly on the issue of aircraft hijackings and the mistreatment of passengers—have so proved the helplessness of the Jordanian Government that I begin to doubt whether Jordan's present sovereignty will last very long.

Q: Isn't it so much so that Israel will seize this lawless region and so protect itself?

Answer: When a country loses its sovereignty, it does not necessarily mean that lawlessness takes over. Sometimes a new sovereign State is born. But Israel, as a neighbour State maintaining a proper ceasefire, has special interests in the [word indistinct] of this country, and we have to follow what is taking place in order to guarantee our security.

Q: Israel is selling Uzi submachine-guns to other countries. Does it also have know-how regarding air security to sell to aviation companies?

Answer: We are not selling Uzi submachine-guns to all countries of the world, but only to those worthy of carrying them. As for the sale or exchange of technical knowledge, there is no doubt El Al—with the guidance of authorised institutions—has developed a very interesting method of ensuring [words indistinct] in its aircraft, and I have no doubt that it will put its experience in this connection at the disposal of any friendly company that would like to learn from our experience and set up similar arrangements in their own aircraft. Of course this will not rehabilitate Israel's balance of payments, but it will be a sort of act of solidarity among world aviation companies which are co-operating with one another.

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**Address by Pope Paul VI on Hijackings
(Excerpt)¹****Castel-Gandolfo, Italy, September 13, 1970**

We cannot but speak of the drama which is arousing world opinion at present: the civil aircraft hijacked and illegally held with the hundreds of people on board being held as hostages in order to free individuals imprisoned for terrorist acts. What a confusion of hatred, on crime and evil, of suffering, of mental and political trauma. This sad affair may be losing some of its urgency, but it is not over yet.

Acts of piracy such as these show that this interminable war knows neither respite nor moderation. Even if they do afford a glimpse of the desperate need for understanding and justice that gives birth to such reactions, these acts of terrorism cannot but be openly deplored. Whoever their perpetrators may be, they are excesses whose victims are people foreign to the conflict, in particular women and children. These excesses compromise the inviolable safety of international transport; they pile up destruction and resentment, to the greatest detriment as well of those who instigate them; they retard the cause of peace in foreshadowing appalling and not improbable disasters. Just as with other practices condemned by the entire civilized world—the detention of innocent persons, the torture of political prisoners, the clandestine and lucrative traffic in drugs, etc.—these atrocious acts of piracy, of unjust reprisals and inadmissible blackmail, must not happen again.

We must tell you that here too we have done all in our power to intervene and find a solution to this deplorable incident. We are ready to cooperate with any constructive initiative on the part of responsible authorities and humanitarian organizations. Our *Caritas*

is still at work at the scene. All that is left to us is to hope that the present peace initiatives may be blessed with the generous and resolute concurrence of all concerned and of all the mediators of peace. We shall pray for this intention.

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Press Release Issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross on ICRC Activities on Behalf of Airline Crews and Passengers Held Hostage in Jordan²**Geneva, September 14, 1970**

The International Committee of the Red Cross held an extraordinary plenary meeting on 14 September 1970. It welcomed the members of the special mission, headed by Mr. A. Rochat, who had intervened on behalf of the passengers and crews of the three aircraft in Jordan, and expressed its warm appreciation of all they had done and of the results they had obtained.

The International Committee also took note of the reports submitted by the President, Mr. Naville, and the Vice-President, Mr. Freymond, on the work of the special mission in Amman, and on their meetings in Berne with representatives of the governments concerned.

After having examined these reports, the ICRC reiterated its determination to continue its action for the protection without distinction of all persons detained in Jordan, and to keep in touch with all governments and parties concerned. To this end, it granted to its delegation in Amman facilities to accomplish this task.

In conclusion, the ICRC urgently appeals to all parties to the conflict to refrain from carrying out any reprisal action.

With the aim of ensuring the continuity of its action on behalf of those still detained

¹ Italian text in *L'Osservatore Romano*, September 14-15, 1970; this text is a translation of the French text published in *Documentation Catholique*, No. 1571 (October 4, 1970), p. 861.

² International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1970* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1971), pp. 60-61.

in Jordan following the hijacking of the three Swissair, TWA and BOAC aircraft, the International Committee of the Red Cross has asked Mr. P. Boissier, Director of the Henry-Dunant Institute, and Mr. M. Boisard, at present Head of the ICRC delegation in the United Arab Republic, to leave for Amman immediately.

Mr. Boissier will fly from Geneva tomorrow, Wednesday, 16 September, while Mr. Boisard, who is still in Cairo, is expected any moment at ICRC headquarters before proceeding to the Jordanian capital.

The two special delegates of the ICRC will be assisted on the spot by the ICRC permanent delegation in Jordan, headed by Mr. G. Winteler, which will, at the same time, carry on its customary activities on behalf of the victims of hostilities.

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Telegram on Hijackings from World Council of Churches General Secretary Blake to the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Amman¹

mid September 1970

For more than two decades the World Council of Churches, through its statements and programs, has expressed its concern for justice and peace for all peoples in the Middle East. We recognize that you have felt unjustly excluded from various governmental and international forums which have made decisions profoundly affecting your future. Until now, the world community has not been able to satisfy your demands for justice and self determination.

This week, one Palestinian liberation movement has hijacked a number of civilian aircraft thus endangering the lives of 250 innocent men, women and children who are being held as hostages. Wanton

material destruction and considerable disruption of international air travel also has resulted.

While understanding the frustration of the Palestinian Arabs and your desire to focus world attention on your situation, we must strongly condemn these reckless acts of anarchy and blackmail which disregard the basic human rights for which you are striving. We urge you to take note of the almost universal condemnation of these acts which is most likely to lead to reprisals that will only cause further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. It is our judgement, therefore, that it is in your own best interest to:

1) refrain from further indiscriminate bombings, attacks and hijackings which increasingly threaten innocent civilians;

2) negotiate with the I.C.R.C. the speedy repatriation of all hostages currently held, without respect to their religion or nationality;

3) exercise the utmost care to maintain the health and safety of those now held and insure that under no circumstances will injury or murder take place.

At this critical moment when fresh prospects for peace in the Middle East have begun to emerge, the World Council of Churches reaffirms the overwhelming importance of continuing negotiations that could lead to a peaceful settlement. We urge you to reconsider your negative position with regard to the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission and concentrate your efforts on insuring that your interests are included in all subsequent negotiations.

¹ *Quarterly Newsletter from the World Council of Churches' Committee on the Church and the Jewish People*, No. 3/1970, September 1970, pp. 4-5.

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Commentary on Hijackings Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda (Excerpts)¹

Moscow, September 17, 1970

The international public is again focusing its attention on events in the Near East. By inflating the clamor over the regrettable hijackings of civilian aircraft by extremist groups of the Palestinian guerillas, the reactionary press in Israel and in the western countries is striving to divert attention from what is paramount: the danger of a breakdown in contacts begun in New York between diplomats of the U. A. R., Jordan and Israel through Gunnar Jarring, the U.N. Secretary General's representative, on the political settlement of the Near East conflict....

Removing the spotlight from those who are actually opposed to a peaceful settlement in the Near East, the Israeli extremists, is the goal of the noisy anti-Arab campaign of Israeli, and other, Pharisees....

One should observe that the hijacking incidents to some extent helped pro-Israeli propaganda divert attention from the gist of the matter and inflate the anti-Arab campaign, even though the Arab countries and the Central Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as is known, denounced the hijacking of civilian aircraft.

"The Palestinian guerillas were incorrect in using the hijacking of civilian aircraft as a method of struggle," the British newspaper Morning Star wrote. "To condemn only one side and say nothing about the repressive acts of Israel, however, would be hypocritical. The Israeli occupationists' piracy and banditry on Arab territories they have seized exceed the terrorist acts of the Palestinian extremist groups many times over."

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 37 (October 13, 1970), p. 12. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

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Statements by U.S. State Department Press Spokesman McCloskey on Secretary of State Rogers' Meetings with Visiting Prime Minister Meir of Israel²

Washington, September 18, 1970

FIRST STATEMENT

Prime Minister Meir and Secretary Rogers met for almost 2 hours, just short of that, before Mrs. Meir went to the White House. The discussion focused on the question of the resumption of the Middle East political talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] in light of the changed circumstances.

The second principal topic was that of the hostages in Jordan. That discussion was on the basis of our common position that all hostages should be released without discrimination.

Lastly, and to a lesser extent, there was a review of the general situation in the area, with most attention obviously on Jordan.

It is probable that they will meet again later this afternoon at a time yet to be determined and in part depending on Mrs. Meir's own schedule.

SECOND STATEMENT

The Secretary's meeting with Prime Minister Meir lasted from about 5:20 to 6:40, roughly.

I must say quite candidly I have very little to add to what the Prime Minister herself said from our side or that would elaborate on the nature of conversations. Let me just say that our objective continues to be to have the negotiations resumed for the political talks. We are encouraging both sides to continue observing the cease-fire.

The Secretary told the Prime Minister we will continue our diplomatic efforts aimed at obtaining rectification of the violations on the Egyptian side.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1633 (October 12, 1970), pp. 412-413.

They did spend some time—I don't know how much in fractions of the total time—on the political talks. Certainly we feel that while we will continue to urge the resumption of these talks, it would as a matter of reality be difficult for the talks to resume in the light of the situation in Jordan.

It is the Secretary's opinion that the door to the talks is still open and that we will turn every effort toward keeping it open and having the parties come through it to get back into talks.

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Statement on the Situation in Jordan Issued by the U.S.S.R. News Agency TASS¹

September 19, 1970

In the Jordanian capital Amman and a number of other localities in Jordan bitter fighting, in which artillery and tanks are being used, is raging between government troops and the Palestine armed units. There are numerous casualties, both killed and wounded, including civilians.

The fratricidal conflict in Jordan is jeopardising the vital interests of Jordan and of the Palestine resistance movement and the interests of the national liberation struggle of the Arab nations, and is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Arab nations, especially as Israel is continuing her aggression.

In this connection one cannot but be alarmed by the reports of the present movement to the Eastern Mediterranean of the U.S. Sixth Fleet which, as is well known, has been used on more than one occasion as a weapon against the national liberation movement in the Arab East. Other reports indicate that plans for foreign military intervention in the conflict in Jordan are

being hatched by definite circles in certain countries.

Such a development of events would aggravate the situation in the Middle East and would not only endanger the independence of Jordan and of other Arab countries but would essentially complicate the whole international situation.

The situation in and around Jordan is giving rise to deep concern in the Soviet Union and among all friends of the cause of freedom and independence for the Arab peoples.

Soviet official circles express the hope that the peoples of Arab countries, their leaders and governments, and Arab organizations will do every thing in their power to achieve the speediest possible ending of fratricidal war in Jordan and to prevent events in the Middle East from developing in a dangerous way.

It is believed in the Soviet Union that foreign armed intervention in the events in Jordan would aggravate the conflict and would hamper the struggle of the Arab nations for the removal of the consequences of Israel's aggression, for a lasting peace with justice in the Middle East and for the restoration of their violated rights and national interests. No one who cherishes the cause of peace and stands for the strengthening of international security can tolerate such a development.

The Arab countries and peoples can be confident that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the policy of supporting their just struggle to ensure their complete independence and national development and to preserve and strengthen the peace of the world.

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5561 (September 22, 1970), p. 97.

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Televised Airport Interview with U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Douglas-Home on the Situation in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

London, September 20, 1970

Q: We seem to have heard very little about your plans for getting the British hostages out of Jordan. What in fact are you doing?

Douglas-Home: Well, of course at the moment the civil war has intervened. When the civil war started, we were in touch through the International Red Cross and they were saying on what terms—or trying to get from the Fedayeen—what terms they wanted for an exchange of prisoners. Of course that was stopped, so the situation has changed. But we are ready, a statement was put out yesterday by the five Governments, to resume negotiations when we discover where the hostages are and who has control of them.

Q: Does that mean, then, that the civil war has for the moment brought to a halt any hope of getting the British hostages out?

Douglas-Home: Well, we've got to locate them—find out whose control they're in, and when that is done then we can be able to make plans and try and get the exchange going.

Q: There have been reports that the Americans might be considering a sort of rescue raid into Jordan. Have you any similar plans? Would you ever contemplate such action?

Douglas-Home: No, I think any military intervention of any sort into Jordan is not contemplated by the British Government at all. And of course, I think the Americans have said they are only standing by in case some big rescue operation had to be undertaken. But I have no doubt this will depend on the course that the war takes. And at the moment the King's army seems to be in control of Amman.

Q: In view of what has happened, in view of the fact that British lives may very well be in danger, do you think it might have been better for the British Government to have gone it alone and released Leila Khaled?

Douglas-Home: No, I think you've got to recollect that you're dealing with hijackers and blackmailers who will double their price, and so I think it was right for the five countries to stand together to try to get all the hostages out. When we find out, of course, where the hostages are, then it will be a matter of seeing how we can get at them, and in what circumstances they can be rescued and how many of them. But I think, after all, in the course we pursued and followed, 375 passengers have been returned. And this looked like making headway until the civil war intervened.

Q: May I ask you a general question about the British Government's sympathies in the Middle East. Are we on the one hand supporting America—in turn supporting Israel—and on the other hand wanting to see King Hussein, who is an enemy of Israel, back on his throne in Jordan?

Douglas-Home: When you say King Hussein is an enemy of Israel, I would not think that this is accurate. I think that obviously all the Arab countries are in some sense, as you say, I suppose, enemies of Israel: but King Hussein wants a settlement. I think now Egypt wants a settlement. One of the reasons why I am going to New York, of course, is that many of the principles in this longer term consideration for the Middle East and the ceasefire and all that, are there: and one will be able to have conversation with all of them.

¹ London Press Service; text provided on request by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.

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Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers Alleging Intervention from Syria into Jordan¹**Washington, September 20, 1970**

We have been informed that tank forces have invaded Jordan from Syria during the night and have moved toward Ramtha. We have also been informed that Jordanian armor is resisting this invasion.

We condemn this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan. This action carries with it the danger of a broadened conflict. We call upon the Syrian Government to end immediately this intervention in Jordan, and we urge all other concerned governments to impress upon the Government of Syria the necessity of withdrawing the forces which have invaded Jordan.

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Declaration on the Jordan Civil War Issued by the Government of China²**Peking, September 21, 1970**

For some time now the development of the Middle East situation has attracted the attention of the Chinese people and of the other peoples of the world.

On September 17, U.S. imperialism instigated the reactionary military government of the Kingdom of Jordan flagrantly to dispatch large numbers of troops to launch frenzied attacks, unprecedented in scale, against the Palestinian guerrillas in a wild attempt to wipe out the revolutionary armed forces of the Palestinian people at one stroke.

In these circumstances the Palestinian guerrillas rose valiantly to fight back in self-defense. At the present time they are heroically conducting a bitter and bloody battle. In order to face up to this counter-revolutionary atrocity committed by the reactionary military government of Jordan at the instigation of American imperialism, the peoples of Palestine, of Jordan and of the other Arab countries, rising against the common enemy, are engaging in the struggle, and a new revolutionary tempest against American imperialism is being unleashed in the Middle East.

This reactionary atrocity committed by the reactionary military government of Jordan was premeditated and stirred up solely by American imperialism. The Palestinian guerrillas, whose power is developing and growing, are posing an ever more serious obstacle to aggression and to control of the Middle East by American imperialism. For a long time now American imperialism, with its fierce hatred and mortal fear of the Palestinian guerrillas, has been making every possible effort to smother the burning flames of the revolutionary armed struggle of the Palestinian people, but to no avail. This present incident constitutes a new military attack, of increased seriousness, launched by the reactionary Arab forces after their failure in the armed repression to which, at the instigation of American imperialism, they successively subjected the Palestinian guerrillas in October 1969, and in February and June 1970. The night of September 15, Nixon personally convened a meeting at the White House to "examine the Jordanian crisis." On the 16th, the pro-American military clique in Jordan formed a reactionary military government. On the 17th, this government hastened to give the order for the unleashing of a general offensive against the Palestinian guerrillas. On the 18th, the United States Department of Defense openly announced that it was in the process of reinforcing its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and its airborne units based in Turkey. On the same day, the White House declared that "plans for unforeseen

¹ Read to news correspondents by State Department Press Spokesman McCloskey; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1633 (October 12, 1970), p. 412.

² Translated from the French text in *Bulletin d'information* published by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in France, No. 107 (September 22, 1970); reprinted in *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, No. 45 (November 6, 1970), p. 28.

contingencies" had been worked out, thus having recourse to military threats. At the same time Israel, instrument of American aggression and imperialism, massed troops on the West Bank of the Jordan, watching out for an opportunity to go into action. The facts could not be clearer: this was an instance of serious provocation waged against the Palestinian people by American imperialism, and also of a new and monstrous crime committed by it against the Arab peoples.

The government and people of China vigorously condemn the new plot of military aggression recently concocted in the Middle East by American imperialism, its collaborator and its lackeys. They vigorously condemn American imperialism for having incited the reactionary military authorities of Jordan to launch military attacks against the armed forces of the Palestinian people. They firmly support these forces in their counter-attack made in legitimate self-defense; they firmly support the Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples in their just struggle against American imperialism and its lackey, Israeli Zionism. If American imperialism dares to embark upon a new military adventure in the Middle East, it can bring about no result other than to tighten more and more the noose which is already around its neck and to hasten its own downfall. The revolutionary struggle of the Palestinian people is "a just cause always enjoying wide support." We are of the conviction that the Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples, so long as they hold fast to their unity, persevere in the armed struggle, hold threats in contempt and refuse to allow themselves to be duped, will certainly be able to repulse every military attack and every political plot of American imperialism.

The Palestinian people and the other Arab peoples will be victorious! American imperialism, its collaborator and its lackeys will be defeated.

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Commentary Issued by "Authoritative Sources" in France on the Situation in the Middle East¹

Paris, September 21, 1970

Depuis le début de la crise au Proche-Orient, le gouvernement français est en contact permanent avec les gouvernements de Londres, de Moscou et de Washington —particulièrement avec ce dernier—pour éviter une extension de la violence. Le gouvernement français souligne les dangers que les opérations militaires font courir aux personnes, en particulier aux otages. Sur le plan politique, le monde arabe tout entier court également des dangers. Enfin, la détente est affectée par cette situation.

Il va de soi que l'action de la France s'est exercée et s'exercera avant tout dans les capitales intéressées du Proche-Orient, notamment à Damas.

Ces principes inspireront l'attitude du représentant de la France devant le Conseil de sécurité, qui, croit-on savoir, se réunirait incessamment. Ce représentant fera valoir qu'une pacification véritable et durable au Proche-Orient ne saurait être le résultat d'un partage de la puissance et de l'influence, mais qu'elle exige une action concertée de la communauté internationale. Le rôle des quatre puissances qui participent à la concertation n'a de sens que si celles-ci sont d'accord pour ne pas prendre d'initiatives isolées.

Les événements actuels justifient pleinement les craintes exprimées depuis si longtemps par la France. Mais il n'est pas trop tard pour arrêter l'escalade de la violence. Tout l'effort du gouvernement français va dans ce sens.

¹ *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, Second Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), p. 69.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad to Spain¹

Madrid, September 22, 1970

At the invitation of the Spanish Minister of External Affairs Senor Lopez Bravo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmud Riad, paid an official visit to Spain from 16 through 21 September 1970 at the head of a delegation which included the under-secretary and other high officials of his department.

During his stay in Spain, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic was received by the Spanish Head of State, by the Prince of Spain and by the Vice-President of the Government. Mr. Riad held a number of interviews with the Spanish Minister of External Affairs and his delegation held working meetings in the Palace of Santa Cruz.

In the course of these conferences and meetings, which were held in an atmosphere of friendship, frankness and understanding, much emphasis was placed on general cooperation between Spain and the United Arab Republic. The two parties proceeded also to a comprehensive exchange of views on the situation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean area, as well as on other international problems of special interest to either of the two parties.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic explained in detail that, as a consequence of the Israeli decision not to carry on talks with the Special Representative of the United Nations, the situation in the Near East is at present very dangerous.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic and the Minister of External Affairs of Spain confirmed their support for the efforts being made under the auspices of the United Nations towards the achievement of a peaceful and just solution.

They expressed their firm conviction that urgent measures should be taken to assure the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the borders of June 5, 1967. In accordance with the principle of no acquisition of territories by means of war, they were also in agreement on the necessity for complete application of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, as well as all other U.N. resolutions relevant to the question. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be the object of due consideration.

Both parties judged that the powers which should contribute most decisively and directly to safeguarding the peace of the world have a special responsibility and a serious obligation in this regard. The Middle East question has implications for the entire Mediterranean area and in an obvious way affects the peace of the world.

The Spanish Minister of External Affairs, while reiterating Spain's firm friendship and sympathy for the Arabs' just causes, urged the necessity for unity in the Arab world and added that it would be possible to obtain very positive results from the common action of all the Arab states and that they should overcome their differences of all kinds in order to attain the fundamental goals which they are seeking.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.A.R. expressed once again his government's appreciation for the aid given by Spain to the Arab cause and for the efforts made by various means to bring about a rapid and satisfactory end to the conflict.

On examining the relations between the two countries, the ministers expressed gratification at the confidence which exists between their respective governments and peoples. They agreed that there should be further contacts and consultations on international political matters at all levels and whenever necessary for the furtherance of bilateral relations in economic, commercial and cultural matters.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic expressed his gratitude for the most cordial reception which his delegation had received from the Ministry

¹ Translated from the Spanish text provided on request by the Embassy of Spain in Beirut.

of External Affairs and the Spanish Government, and his satisfaction at the talks held which he considered most fruitful and constructive.

Mr. Mahmud Riad invited Mr. Lopez Bravo to make an official visit to Egypt and the invitation was accepted with pleasure. The date will be set at a later time.

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Statement Issued by the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. on Soviet Contacts with Various Governments Concerning the Situation in Jordan¹

Moscow, September 23, 1970

In connection with the armed clashes in Jordan between units of the Jordanian Army and Palestinian units, the USSR Embassy in Amman and also the Embassies of the USSR in Damascus and Baghdad have, on instructions from the Soviet government, established contact with the leaders of Jordan and those of Syria and Iraq.

Firm confidence has been expressed from the Soviet side that everything should be done to end as soon as possible the fratricidal fighting which started in Jordan, fighting which can only play into the hands of forces which are not interested in establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Permanent contact is being maintained with President Nasser of the United Arab Republic on all questions linked with the developments in Jordan.

In view of the increasing concentration of the forces of the American Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as other war preparations by the United States in the area, the Soviet government called the attention of the government of the USA, through the Embassy of the USSR in Washington, to the need for all states to display caution in their steps in connection with the

present complicated situation in the Middle East, and also to the fact that any interference from outside into the events in Jordan would further complicate the situation in the Middle East and the international situation as a whole. It was also stressed that the government of the United States could use its influence with the government of Israel in order that Israel should not try to exploit the Jordanian events for its aggressive aims.

The British government was informed of Soviet views on current events through the Embassy of the USSR in London. In doing so, the Soviet side expressed the hope that Great Britain, for its part, would not permit any interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the area.

The French government was contacted through diplomatic channels in order to exchange opinions and information on the current events and on steps taken both by the Soviet and French sides.

The Soviet Mission at the United Nations is keeping in contact with the U.N. secretary-general and with the missions of a number of states who are members of the Security Council.

The necessary steps will be taken further to help bring the conflict in Jordan to an end and prevent intervention by external forces in this conflict.

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Press Release Issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross on ICRC Activities To Alleviate Suffering in Jordan²

Geneva, September 23, 1970

In order to cope with the situation arising from the tragic events occurring in Jordan, the ICRC has set up within its Operations Division, in Geneva, directed by Mr. R. Courvoisier, a relief co-ordinating group

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5562 (September 29, 1970), p. 108.

² International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1970* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1971), pp. 64-65.

led by Mr. K. Warras, Secretary-General of the Finnish Red Cross and Vice-Chairman of the League of Red Cross Societies.

The group's first emergency measure was the immediate dispatch to the Jordanian capital of a four-member mission comprising Dr. R. Marti, ICRC medical consultant, Mr. O. Burckhard, former ICRC delegate to Amman, Mr. A. Beaud, head of ICRC Relief Section, and Mr. H. Mathiessen, Norwegian Red Cross relief expert.

The objective of the mission, which left Geneva on 23 September, will be to determine from each party to the conflict the scope for ICRC action and to step up the relief work already started by the International Committee.

With a view to obtaining the necessary support for its mission, the ICRC, in liaison with the League of Red Cross Societies and after consulting a number of Red Crescent Societies in the Middle East, has launched an appeal to all National Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion and Sun Societies on behalf of the victims of the conflict.

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Statement Urging a Truce in Jordan Issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross¹

Geneva, September 23, 1970

The International Committee is seriously alarmed by the tragic situation prevailing in the Jordan capital where many military and civilian wounded are uncared for and in grave danger.

The ICRC therefore appeals to the governments and all forces operating in Jordan to apply in all circumstances the universally recognized humanitarian rules which demand that in every conflict, whatever its form, all wounded be collected and cared for.

The ICRC urges the parties involved to conclude a 24-hour truce within Amman and a radius of 20 km round the town, starting at 5 a.m. GMT on 25 September, to permit the removal and treatment of the wounded.

Such truces are provided for in the Geneva Conventions in the following terms: "Whenever circumstances permit, an armistice or a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or local arrangements made, to permit the removal, exchange and transport of the wounded left on the battlefield."

The ICRC also asks the fighting forces to grant its delegates the necessary protection and facilities to enable them to discharge their mission. Its delegates are ready to be of service to the authorities concerned in implementing the truce and relief operations.

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Statement on the French Position on the Middle East Situation Issued After a Cabinet Meeting by Official Spokesman Hamon of the Government of France²

Paris, September 23, 1970

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères a fait un historique des événements pour rappeler la position de la France.

Au cours de ces derniers mois, la Conférence à Quatre avait paru progresser et permettre un rapprochement sensible des points de vue. Là-dessus, le gouvernement américain a lancé le "Plan Rogers," sur lequel il a obtenu, avec l'appui de l'U.R.S.S., un accord de l'Égypte, de la Jordanie et d'Israël. La France n'a pris aucune part à l'élaboration ni à la présentation du plan. Son acceptation étant acquise, la France a appuyé ce qui constituait la seule tentative de paix susceptible d'être immédiatement mise en œuvre. De fait, l'intervention du

¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1970* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1971), p. 65.

² *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, Second Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), p. 74.

cessez-le-feu était un signe particulièrement encourageant. Mais ce cessez-le-feu temporaire n'avait de sens réel que s'il débouchait sur l'ouverture rapide des négociations menées par l'Ambassadeur Jarring.

Depuis, tout s'est dégradé.

D'une part, les négociations n'ont pu s'ouvrir, le gouvernement israélien ayant invoqué la violation par l'Egypte des conditions du cessez-le-feu. Sans prendre parti sur l'existence ou la gravité des faits et constatant qu'en tout cas la situation sur le Canal de Suez est calme, le gouvernement français estime que les négociations devraient commencer sans délai et sans préalable.

Par ailleurs la situation en Jordanie s'est brusquement aggravée et une véritable guerre s'est instaurée entre les forces de l'armée royale et les formations militaires palestiniennes.

La France réprouve évidemment l'action menée, par la voie de détournements d'avions, contre des innocents devenus victimes ou otages dans un conflit qui ne les concerne pas et où ils n'ont pas de responsabilité personnelle. Elle a agi avec insistance et opiniâtreté pour en réduire les effets.

Mais elle ne peut que déplorer qu'en retour se soient déclenchées des opérations sanglantes et dont les victimes civiles sont particulièrement nombreuses.

Voici maintenant que le conflit s'élargit et que des formations venues de Syrie, et dont il apparait bien qu'elles ne sont pas purement palestiniennes, pénètrent en Jordanie et engagent le combat contre l'armée royale jordanienne. La menace d'autres interventions étrangères plane sur l'ensemble.

Dans ces conditions, le gouvernement français estime qu'en premier lieu le conflit doit être circonscrit, que tous les efforts déployés par certains gouvernements arabes pour y mettre fin doivent être appuyés et qu'aucune intervention extérieure ne doit se produire sous peine de créer un risque extrêmement grave pour la paix mondiale.

Le gouvernement français constate, d'autre part, la situation déplorable de masses palestiniennes chassées de leurs foyers et vouées à une existence incertaine et miséra-

ble. Il en conclut que tout accord futur qui ne tiendrait pas compte de ce fait humain et, par conséquent, politique, porterait en lui-même les germes de sa précarité.

C'est dans l'esprit de ce qui précède que l'action diplomatique du gouvernement s'exerce auprès de toutes les parties en présence, dans la conviction que les membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité ont des responsabilités particulières à l'égard de la Communauté internationale.

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Commentary on the Situation in Jordan Published in the People's Daily of China¹

Peking, September 24, 1970

After its setbacks in instigating the reactionary military government in Jordan to launch frenzied attacks on the Palestinian guerrillas, U.S. imperialism is stepping up its military deployment in preparation for an armed intervention so as to directly suppress the Palestinian revolutionary armed forces. This cannot but arouse the serious attention of the Arab people and the people the world over.

While making its troop deployment, the Nixon government is taking pains to fabricate pretexts for an armed intervention. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers made a statement on September 20, alleging that forces "have invaded Jordan from Syria," and clamouring that there is "the danger of a broadened conflict" in Jordan. The Associated Press conceded that Rogers' statement "did appear to be a step in diplomatic preparation for a later American intervention." It is a shameless act of intimidation on the part of U.S. imperialism against the Palestinian people, the Syrian people and people of other Arab countries, which completely unmasks its ferocious features as a gangster.

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, XIII, 40 (September 30, 1970), p. 21.

The counter-attack made by the Palestinian guerrillas in self-defence against the rabid attacks of the reactionary Jordanian military government is an entirely just action. The Palestinian revolutionary armed forces stationed in Syria and other Arab countries are fully entitled to join in the battle to defend the Palestinian revolutionary cause. The Palestinian Liberation Army, which is an armed force of the Palestinian people themselves, naturally cannot stand by with folded arms and watch their own brothers being massacred at will by the reactionary Jordanian military government under the instigation of U.S. imperialism. It is indeed the height of arrogance that U.S. imperialism should now go so far as to make threats against Syria on the pretext that the Syria-based Palestinian Liberation Army is conducting operations jointly with the Palestinian guerrillas.

The Palestinian people's struggle in valiant resistance to the armed repression by the reactionary Jordanian military government is in essence a struggle against U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism. They are defending not only their own right to existence but also the common interests of the Arab nation's cause of liberation. The powerful support given to the Palestinian guerrillas by the Syrian Government and people and by other Arab countries and peoples embodies the fraternal unity between the Syrian people, the people of other Arab countries and the Palestinian people; it embodies the common will of the Arab people to get united and resolutely oppose the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. Therefore it has won the praise of the people of the world. Is it conceivable that U.S. imperialism is allowed to support the Israeli aggressors and the reactionary Jordanian forces in their onslaught on the Palestinian people while Syria and other Arab countries are forbidden to support the Palestinian people in their counter-attack in self-defence?

Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "U.S. imperialism, which looks like a huge monster, is in essence a paper tiger, now in the throes of its deathbed struggle."

On September 20, Syrian Head of State Nureddin Atassi solemnly refuted the allegation of U.S. imperialism that Syrian forces had entered Jordan, and he pointed out that U.S. imperialism and its lackeys "will never succeed in hiding their crimes by lavishing accusations on Syria." On September 22, a statement by the spokesman of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that "the American intervention shall be met with the stubborn resistance of our people." The heroic Palestinian people are not to be intimidated; nor are the Syrian and other Arab peoples who have a glorious tradition of struggle. The U.S. imperialists' threats of war and armed intervention will never be able to put out the flames of the Palestinian people's revolutionary struggle; nor will they be able to prevent the Syrian people and other Arab peoples from giving militant support to the Palestinian people. A new revolutionary storm against U.S. imperialism is now rising in the Middle East. If U.S. imperialism dares to risk a new military adventure against the Arab countries and people, it will meet with the same staggering blows and disastrous defeat as it did in Indo-China.

The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the Palestinian people in their valiant struggle of self-defence, resolutely support the solemn stand of the Syrian Government and people in assisting the Palestinian people, and resolutely support the people of all Arab countries in their just struggle against the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. U.S. imperialism and its collaborator and running dogs will be defeated! The Palestinian and other Arab peoples will win!

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Resolution on the Middle East Adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe¹

Strasbourg, September 24, 1970

The Assembly,

1. Recalling its Resolution 446, on the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
2. Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East;
3. Condemning the aggression committed by certain Palestinian terrorist organisations and the Syrian intervention in Jordan;
4. Urging all States to do their utmost to help the victims of the civil war in Jordan;
5. Also condemning the recent strengthening of the Egyptian-Soviet missile force in the Suez Canal area, which constitutes a serious violation of the cease-fire agreed upon last July;
6. Calls upon all parties concerned, and especially on the great powers, to do their utmost to prevent a further escalation of violence in the Middle East;
7. Appeals to the Arab States and Israel to start rapidly—on the basis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 1967—negotiations which should lead to a peace settlement enabling Israel and the Arab States to live within secure and recognised borders, and providing for an equitable solution to the problems of the Palestinian populations.

¹ Resolution 465 (1970), Twenty-Second Ordinary Session. Assembly debate on 23 and 24 September 1970 (17th and 18th Sittings) (see. Doc. 2822, report of the Political Affairs Committee). Text adopted by the Assembly on 24 September 1970 (18th Sitting).
Text provided on request by the Council of Europe.

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Newspaper Interview Statement by Foreign Minister Nenni of Italy on Prospects for a Middle East Settlement²

Rome, September 25, 1970

Q. What are the hopes and fears for the Middle East?

Nenni: If the position in Jordan were to stabilize itself for a while, they should certainly return to negotiations, based on the so-called Rogers Plan, which very probably is a Rogers-Kosygin Plan, and which however leaves many blanks to be filled quickly. There are two main points: the security of the boundaries claimed by Israel, and the solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. This indeed is no longer a problem of camps or of charity; it has become a national problem which must find its solution by restoring a national home to the Palestinians. One can no longer ignore the Palestinians. But this ought not to create impossible conditions for Israel, who has never prejudiciously denied the existence of a Palestine problem, even as a national problem.

We should not deceive ourselves that a solution is near.

² Excerpted and translated from the Italian text of Nenni's interview in *La Stampa* (Turin), September 26, 1970, p. 1.

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**U.S. Press Conference Statements by
U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Douglas-Home on the Situation in
Jordan, on Efforts Towards a Resumption
of the Jarring Talks and on the
Status of the Palestinians¹**

New York, September 25, 1970

Douglas-Home: During the week I have been here, everybody has been gravely concerned by the civil war in Jordan, because the object of the Fedayeen of course was to disrupt the Jarring mission and therefore to make peace talks between Israel and Egypt impossible.

This in itself was a very serious situation before there was the danger of foreign intervention, and particularly intervention from Syria.

Therefore this week has been taken up with intense diplomatic activity to try to limit the war to Jordanian war without foreign intervention at all. And the situation was eased greatly the day before yesterday when the news came that the Syrians have, in fact, withdrawn from Jordanian territory.

Now, I think the task must be for everybody to try as hard as they possibly can to get Dr. Jarring's mission on the move again. Otherwise we will be back in the old position of the escalation of armaments on both sides with always the ultimate danger that this could bring about a war of much greater dimension than that of the confrontation between Israel and Egypt.

And so the situation now as I see it is eased in that the Syrian withdrawal has left Jordan to settle its own affairs in its own way. The King's army seems to be in control of Amman and probably most of the country, perhaps with the exception of a small area in the north. And so an opportunity may occur again if the breaches of the ceasefire

can be got over for a resumption of Dr. Jarring's mission.

Now it is optimistic at the moment to say that this will be possible, but this I have no doubt whatever is the objective and aim to which all the countries concerned should be devoting their attention now.

Q. *What's being done to bring about some arrangement by which the Israelis can return to the talks?*

Douglas-Home: I think it very largely rests with the two sides, with Israel and Egypt and perhaps particularly with Egypt. The accusations have been made by each side that there have been breaches of the ceasefire and before talks can begin that minimum area of trust has to be reestablished.

I notice that the Permanent Representative of the UAR a few nights ago made a statement on television. Now this could be the kind of opening which could be given, perhaps to reestablish what I call that minimum area of confidence, by healing the breaches that have been made in the ceasefire agreement. One can only hope, as I say, that everybody will try and find ways and means of reestablishing that confidence because otherwise the outlook is very bleak.

Q. *Do you think that just words can reestablish the confidence or will the Egyptians have to act as well in a logistic sense to move missiles backwards?*

Douglas-Home: Well I think it is very difficult to say that words alone could achieve the result. I would think that probably action has to be taken by both sides but I think it is better really that this should be examined by the two sides, both of whom I think want a resumption of talks.

I have no doubt that any other country would be very anxious to help the two sides back to negotiation. But I think this is very largely a matter for the Israelis and the Egyptians and I hope that they will try—each will try—to see what can be done to restart the talks which are really essential if we are to have any real hope of peace in the future.

¹ London Press Service; excerpted from a text of Douglas-Home's press conference provided on request by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.

Q. I believe the Egyptians have said that they might consider returning to the status quo ante if there were a guarantee against surprise attack by Israel. Would the United Kingdom be willing to join with others of the big Powers in guaranteeing Egypt against a surprise attack from Israel?

Douglas-Home: I think it is too early to forecast what other countries might be able to do to help in this case. But what you are referring to is substantially I think what the permanent delegates here of the UAR did say. No doubt this will want further interpretation before the Israelis could be satisfied but this is the kind of way perhaps in which the deadlock could be broken.

Q. Do you see any particular way in which a British or Big Four initiative could be helpful in starting the process rolling?

Douglas-Home: Well I think we have got to give a good deal more thought to that. I think this cannot be done in a hurry. Confidence has been too badly broken for the moment. I think we want to proceed with great caution. I just did note this statement by the Permanent Representative to the UAR as a possible beginning of a willingness, or readiness perhaps, to seek to try and get back to talking again with Dr. Jarring.

Q. I would like to ask you how would you foresee that the refugee question will be handled? In the Big Four? Or with the help of perhaps other middle or smaller Powers doing some fact finding? Just how do you see this thorny question being handled?

Douglas-Home: I am quite sure that if there is to be a settlement of this Middle Eastern situation that the most elaborate plans for the resettlement for the refugees is an absolute necessity.

At some point that has to be dovetailed into the whole of the plan. And it of course needs a great deal of capital, a great deal of planning and it will need a great deal of arrangement as to what countries take the refugees and what numbers.

A great deal of preliminary work I think has been done on this already and this operation is certainly possible. But I have no doubt

whatever that this has to be part of the comprehensive plan and I think it is very important that it should be worked out and possibly the four Powers can help in this, because it is the four Powers by and large that have the resources that are necessary for a complete plan of resettlement, which will take years.

Q. You have stressed the need for a settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem as a solution to the situation in west Asia. But you have curiously used the word resettlement. That would obviously mean that you are not contemplating the right of large numbers of Palestinians to be able to return to Palestine.

Douglas-Home: Well, I do not think you must misunderstand the word "resettlement". No doubt a number which we cannot quantify of refugees would be resettled in Israel. Equally certainly a number of refugees would have to be settled in other Arab countries. Do not interpret the word "resettlement" as meaning that no Arab refugees would be resettled in Israel. It would be wrong interpretation.

Q. Do you think that after the events of the last two weeks, of the hijacking and all these dramatic things, that the resolution 242 corresponds still quite well to the needs and that the Palestinians ought to be considered as refugees and not in any other way?

Douglas-Home: I think that resolution 242 provides the only basis that we have got so far for starting talks. How those talks would develop and if they would include any representation or if at any point they should include any representation of the Palestinians I think it is much too early to say.

But I think the resolution 242 is the only resolution before the United Nations. It is the resolution I think with which practically all the countries concerned feel that talks can be started. It embraces the main elements of a settlement. And therefore I think that we had better stick to 242 and as Dr. Jarring makes his contact he will have to decide and suggest how he thinks that resolution can best be interpreted.

Q. Do you see any circumstances under which Palestine representatives could participate directly in Middle East peace talks?

Douglas-Home: It would be rash really to forecast that or make any definite statement on this—at this time. I think you must get the principals into action first and this must be Dr. Jarring's objective. Later on circumstances may change and something of this sort could happen but I think it would be unwise to suggest that it should happen.

[In view of the reported release of West German and British hijack hostages, Douglas-Home was asked if Leila Khaled would continue to be held by the British until the American hostages were released.]

Douglas-Home: The hostages I think, as you know, were released by the Jordanian Army and therefore presumably they will return to their various home countries as soon as possible. Therefore the sort of old basis on which we were operating clearly doesn't hold anymore. But inside the Berne Group we have always been looking for a global solution to the problem of the hostages.

I think that the Berne Group will obviously look at the situation anew in the light of the fact that a certain number of hostages have been released but it is still immensely important to get all the hostages out.

I cannot give any definite answer to a question about Miss Khaled's future.

Q. You say the Berne Group will have to look at the position again, in view of the 15 hostages. Does this mean that Britain will remain within the Berne Group for this review of the position now?

Douglas-Home: I cannot tell you what attitude the Berne Group will be taking. I can only tell you what attitude we have been consistently taking. And that is that all the hostages, all the prisoners, should be released and I think that this is a factor which still remains valid.

It would be a very dreadful thing if the rest of the hostages were not released. And the Berne Group will undoubtedly be considering the latest situation with the attitude

that they have always taken very much in mind.

[Asked about a reported new initiative by the British Government on behalf of the hostages, Douglas-Home said:] No initiative has been taken by the British Government alone on behalf of the hostages.

We have consistently in the Berne Group with our colleagues, the Americans, the Germans, the Swiss and the Israelis, sought a solution in which it would mean that all the prisoners are released and that as far as I know is still the position. As I have just said, our hostages and the German and the Swiss have been found and released by the Jordanian Army. But they apparently have not, so far, found the others.

[Asked for his opinion on the Syrian withdrawal from Jordan—was it the work of the Jordanian Army or the pressure from the Big Four?—Douglas-Home said:] I would think it was a mixture of both, but I think the Jordanian Army perhaps played the biggest role.

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Radio Interview with Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army Bar-Lev on the Military and Political Situation in the Middle East¹

September 26, 1970

Bar-Lev: The events which occurred and are occurring in Jordan were not of a nature requiring any military action to be taken by us. This, of course, does not imply that in the future events may not happen in Jordan which will oblige us to take military action, and the Israel Defence Forces are indeed prepared to act if circumstances should demand this.

I can visualize a state of deterioration in Jordan or one that is connected with Jordan,

¹ English translation in *Jerusalem Post*, September 27, 1970, pp. 3, 5.

which would warrant military steps to be taken by us. For example, and perhaps a most obvious one: a state of deterioration along our borders, as a result of terrorist activities or a combination of terrorist and regular army activities, would be quite likely to warrant military action on our part—but this would differ in scope and nature from our other activities to date.

Should Israel be confronted with a choice between evacuating settlements and civilians from the border, and taking military steps of a serious dimension, I assume that the second choice would be the one taken. But this is only one example.

Q. What, in your opinion, were Syria's motives for military intervention in Jordan, and what brought about the evacuation of the Syrian force at the end of the week?

A. Syria's motives, in so far as we can judge today, were to strengthen the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Jordan, and perhaps also to bring about the downfall of Hussein. These aims were not achieved. While the Syrians did enter Jordan with a substantial armoured force, this force was checked near the border. It succeeded in penetrating some 25 kms. into Jordanian territory, and stopped. Two or three days later, the force was compelled to evacuate the area. Their aims may have had quite some potential, but the results were definitely poor.

This Syrian intervention was in the guise of the Palestinian Army. That is to say, both the Syrian soldiers and their tanks carried Palestinian emblems, and the Syrian Government did not announce having taken any military action inside Jordanian territory.

Q. What can we learn about the standard of the various forces which took part in the battles in Jordan?

A. The Iraqi force stationed in Jordan did not take part in the battles. It made way for the Syrians, entrenched itself deep inside Jordan, and made do with a few demonstrative moves of support for the ter-

rorist organizations. I believe that the reason for this is that the Iraqis, as opposed to the Syrians, would not have been able to camouflage their operations as a Palestinian army. We all know that Iraq maintains an expeditionary force in Jordan, which we attacked a number of times, and I believe that the Iraqis feared the consequences of steps taken by them which would have an implication as far as Israel was concerned. It is for this reason that they said to themselves: "We had better remain on the sidelines."

As for Syria: Syria invaded Jordan with a relatively large armoured force consisting of some 250 tanks, but all she succeeded in doing was to take over a comparatively small area. The Syrians got as far as Irbid—about 20 kilometres: It was there that their momentum was halted and they made do with conducting battles with the relatively small Jordanian forces, which were lined up in the area, and with the Jordanian armour, by whom they were being attacked. The fact that the Syrians did not, in fact, exploit their full armoured strength—250 tanks in such a small area represents quite a large force—testifies that they are still unable to utilize their armour to its full capacity.

I do not know exactly how many Syrian tanks were destroyed. The Jordanians say more than 100. I am not sure about these figures, but it is clear that after a short time the Syrians realized that they should not make any further progress. They were also worried about the possible consequences of local developments, in the battles against the Jordanians. In the final analysis, they lost out.

As for the Jordanian Army: In the first phase, the Jordanians waged delaying battles—and folded. I think this was also unnecessary, because they had enough forces in order to halt the Syrians even closer to the border. However, as soon as the Syrian momentum was halted, the Jordanians retrenched, apparently succeeding in concentrating considerable fire power—artillery, aircraft and, of course, tanks which subsequently compelled the Syrians to withdraw.

Q. And what about the terrorists?

A. The terrorists established themselves in built-up areas, in both Amman and Irbid, waging battles from inside the houses and from densely-populated areas. It apparently was difficult for the Jordanian army to overcome the pockets of resistance in these built-up areas. As a matter of fact, up until the time of this interview, there are still pockets of resistance—even inside Amman itself.

Q. This was the première of the Jordanian Air Force. What do you have to say about it?

A. It is difficult to tell how many tanks and vehicles were destroyed by the Jordanian planes. The figures publicized by the Jordanians are not necessarily accurate. But one must recall that no interceptors were sent up against these planes; while the Syrians were prepared to send in tanks in the guise of Palestinian units, they presumably had difficulty in employing planes under similar disguise. Perhaps they were also more anxious about factors outside Jordan with regard to employing the air force. The Jordanian planes were thus able to operate unhindered by interceptors and without risking serious anti-aircraft fire. They did not have to face surface-to-air missiles, nor numerous heavy anti-aircraft guns and the principal weapons employed against them were machineguns. As far as we know, one Jordanian plane was shot down.

This was the première of the Jordanian Air Force, as you call it. On the whole, the Jordanian Air Force's plane, the Hunter, is a good plane for such missions, and it seems as though, at least in this case, the Jordanian pilots "rolled up their sleeves" and went to work.

Q. How will the clashes in Jordan affect terrorist activity in the future?

A. It seems to me that it is still too early to foresee future developments, since the struggle between King Hussein and the terrorist organizations is not yet over. What is clear, is that the events of these past days

will probably, in the long run, have their reflections on the relations between the Jordanian Army and the terrorist organizations. Should these relations remain as they are today, the Jordanian Army will almost certainly restrict the terrorist organizations' movements. Should the plan which King Hussein publicized recently materialize—that is to say, should there be a situation in which the terrorist organizations abandon the towns and descend to the Jordan Valley, free to act against us from there—we must assume that their activity will increase. In the first stage, however, this opens up opportunities for us which we did not have before these developments. But it is still too early to evaluate what direction matters will take.

Q. What are the present up-to-date facts regarding the Egyptian missile movements in the Canal zone?

A. Since the cease-fire went into effect, the Egyptians have advanced about a dozen Sam-2 missile batteries and, during the past few days, a number of Sam-3 batteries into the sector to which the military standstill applies under the terms of the cease-fire agreement. They also prepared scores of missile positions; some of them are newly-constructed emplacements, while others are existing positions that were destroyed in I.A.F. attacks and which have now been rehabilitated. All this, in flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement.

Q. What can the I.D.F. do to neutralize and destroy a massive anti-aircraft missile system like that established west of the Suez Canal?

A. You are asking a definitely operational question, and I think we all agree that this is neither the time nor the place for operational questions. But since I cannot completely evade the issue, I will say only that, so far, there has never been a weapons system anywhere in the world to which there is no answer—or more exactly—to which there are not a number of possible answers. That also applies to the missile build-up.

Q: Is a greater than present Soviet intervention likely? Is there any possibility, that the Soviet army might engage in full-scale warfare in certain circumstances?

A: I believe that the Soviet Union is prepared for additional involvement. But I do not believe that in the foreseeable future—it is hard to say what will happen in another five or ten years, but certainly until my next interview with you—the U.S.S.R. will be prepared to play an active part in Egyptian offensive action. In other words, if the Egyptians attempt to cross the Canal, I think they would do so using Soviet equipment and as a result of planning and training carried out under Soviet supervision. Perhaps it would be carried out with indirect Soviet assistance, with missile units on the side of the Canal being operated by the Russians and some kind of air cover provided by them for the crossing force. But I do not believe that the Russians themselves would take action on this side of the Canal. That was my evaluation in the past, and it is still my evaluation today.

The Egyptian aim—since 1968, I believe—has been to arrive at the ability of crossing the Canal, by one strategy or another. But so far, the Egyptians know very well that they cannot achieve this, and they have not tried. I believe that if the present political effort should not turn out to the Egyptians' liking, this basic trend will extend into the future. However, there is a huge gap between the Egyptians' intentions and wishes, and their power of execution. I do not think Egypt is able to achieve strategic aims on the east bank of the Canal. The Egyptians can, of course, cross in limited force, for a number of hours, a limited period, before returning. Should they try to remain, they will be removed. I believe that the Egyptians will not have the actual potential for a crossing in force to realize the ambition in the future, although it remains their aim.

Q: Do we have more complete information today on the direct part played by the Soviet Union in what is happening at the Suez Canal?

A: There have been Russians in Egypt

—as advisers, technicians and instructors—for many years. Since the Six Day War Soviet involvement has deepened and was given particular impetus during the past year because Egypt had come to realize that on its own it would be unable to keep up its policy of a war of attrition.

Just before the cease-fire, Soviet involvement was also expressed in the presence of Soviet operational units in Egypt, in the form of interception squadrons, anti-aircraft missiles operated by Soviet crews and protective forces for these missiles, anti-aircraft guns and other protective means. The present picture is more or less as follows: We believe that there are about 12,000 Red Army personnel in Egypt today, half of them advisers and instructors and the other half purely Soviet units. The Soviet advisers who in the past were really advisers have in recent months gradually moved into the sphere of control and direction to the point that today the factor which determines what is and what is not to be done, and how the Egyptian army is to act—are the Russian personnel in the form of these advisers.

Q: Does an operation such as the hijacking of four aircraft at one time indicate any measure of improvement in the level of operations by the terrorists?

A: If you are referring to their purely professional level, then I believe that to hijack an unguarded and unprotected passenger airliner presents no problems whatsoever. By way of exaggeration I would be prepared to say that a child or an old woman armed with a revolver or a hand-grenade would be capable of hijacking an unguarded passenger plane. And indeed we witnessed the fact that they hijacked several such aircraft without any problems or difficulties. But when they made their attempt on a guarded plane, I do not believe that this indicates any particular operational abilities.

In broader terms, however, it is obvious that the hijacking of aircraft shows they are prepared to take extreme and most serious measures. In what I would call organizational terms a certain ability was

proved here—in terms of the number of crews operating at more or less the same time. But that really does not require tremendous skill.

Q: The terrorist organizations stated that they would step up their activity. Has there been any intensification of terrorist activity in the administered territories and along the borders?

A: The statistics show that since the cease-fire there has been a slight increase in terrorist activity along the Lebanese border and a decline in such activity along the Syrian and Jordanian borders. There could be various reasons for this. In Jordan, the terrorists are busy with each other at the moment, and if this were not the case they might perhaps be stepping up their activity along the borders. In Syria—since our armoured action there—both the Syrians and the terrorists (who do not act without the approval and the directives of the Syrians) are keeping the scope of activity pretty low.

We must bear in mind that the more the terrorists are freed from internal problems in Jordan, they will try to step up activity along the borders. Whether or not they succeed in this, is a different question.

In the administered territories—in Gaza, Judea, and Samaria—there has been no increase in terrorist activities. In fact their activity was somewhat less than, let us say, during the 40 days preceding the cease-fire.

Q: Are you prepared to make an overall review of the situation on the lines today?

A: First of all, in the Egyptian sector, the agreed cease-fire consists of two factors: One, no shooting, which is maintained. Neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis are shooting. The other part of the agreement is the military standstill within a 50-kms. sector from the Canal. The Egyptians are not complying with this aspect of the agreement.

Since the 7th of August the Jordanian army has not been firing. And this represents a change, since the Army had previously been assisting the terrorists—and

would also open fire on its own initiative from time to time. The army now is not shooting, but the terrorists are active, although on a smaller scale than before the cease-fire. But, however, to sum it up, the cease-fire does not exist along the Jordanian border. It is not necessary for us to determine who is doing the shooting, who is firing Katyushas or shells, or whether a military force crossing into our territory for the purpose of acting against us is a regular army force or not.

With the exception of one incident in which they fired a number of shells at Tiberias, the Iraqi force has not been firing for a period of nine months, since the heavy blow inflicted on them by the air-strike in December, 1969. Along the Syrian border, the situation is similar. The army has not been shooting for some three months, since the armoured attack. The terrorists are active, especially across the border.

The Lebanese army does not initiate incidents, but on the other hand it does not effectively prevent terrorist activity. Therefore since the cease-fire, the Lebanese sector is the only one in which the number of incidents is higher than that of a similar period before the 7th of August.

Q: What can you say about the I.D.F.'s development during the past year, and about anticipated progress in the area of weapons and equipment for the coming year?

A: We have strengthened ourselves to a great extent—in the air, at sea, and on land. Most of the developments in this area have been mentioned and publicized—the main ones being the Phantoms and Skyhawks that arrived and became operational this year, the anti-aircraft apparatus and all the supplementary equipment for air warfare. I think the Phantom has become operational for us in record time.

At sea, the main item which has become part of our operational apparatus is our missile boat with the "Gabriel" missile. On land, central items consist of the American tank, publicized for the first time this year—a tank of the most advanced American

type—mobile guns, and many other types of lighter weaponry.

For the past year we concentrated, in addition to purchases, on the study and the application of the operational lessons learned from all actions carried out during the year—and that is an enormous task. Every air-battle is followed by a series of analyses and discussions of its significance. After every action, every incident, and after every hitch that occurs, all contributing factors are carefully analyzed, so that the right conclusions may be drawn.

We also carried out last year, a large-scale training programme including an armoured group exercise in December.

Q: What do you believe Nasser wants from the Farring Talks?

A: Unless Nasser favoured some political move, he would not have undertaken it. I also believe that if he could have stayed away, he would have done so. It follows that Nasser now wants those talks. My own estimate is that Nasser would not have taken a political move unless he had realised his inability to achieve a military solution. But since things went the way they did, he went to those talks with the intention to obtain an optimal political settlement.

There is, of course, a wide gap between a settlement that would suit Nasser and one that would suit us, and the talks have not yet started. If they do start, only then will it become apparent to what degree that gap can be bridged. But I do not doubt for one moment that Nasser has reached an impasse, from which he could only hope to extricate himself by a political solution.

Q: From time to time there were reports of opposition in various Egyptian circles, including the army, to the increasing Soviet penetration.

A: We know, and we assume, that the attitude of the Egyptian people, the leadership and the Egyptian intelligentsia towards the Russians and Russian penetration is largely an ambivalent one. On the one hand, both the Egyptian people and its leadership admit that they could

not have held out without Soviet support. Every Egyptian, for example, has credited the U.S.S.R. with the fact that Israel's air attacks in the Egyptian rear have ceased or were broken off at some stage. On the other hand, Egypt, a Moslem nation, has some definite moral as well as factual misgivings about foreign involvement.

Unless I am mistaken, it is a common historical phenomenon that small nations dislike it when big nations are trying "to take over." It is especially difficult for Egypt, which is, after all, a Moslem nation, to accept a Communist, atheist Soviet Russia as "Big Brother."

Both attitudes find expression: Nasser, for example, stressed and reiterated in all his recent speeches that Soviet Russia did not "come" to Egypt, but was invited there. At the same time, there are also several indications of the other attitude: A few days ago, a leftist author, Dr. Lewis Awad, analyzed the problem in *Al-Ahram*. The relationship between Egypt and the U.S.S.R., explained the author, was that between the poor and the wealthy, between the weak and the strong—and this was not a healthy and desirable relationship.

Q: How do you view the abrogation of the Eastern Command?

A: The Eastern Command had, in fact, existed only on paper; it had no operational significance, and its commander had no real operational powers.

Military cooperation in the Arab world, and not only in the Arab world, is of course a function of political tendencies—and when there is a gap in the political tendencies, the result is a split in military and defence effort. As we know, the Eastern Command has now been replaced by what is called the Northern Front, i.e. Syria, and the Eastern Front, which is Jordan.

I can sum up by saying that the disbandment of the Eastern Command affects us neither positively nor negatively, but this is a symptom of the struggle now raging throughout the Arab world.

Q: What is known at this moment about our prisoners in Egypt and Syria?

A: Red Cross personnel visited all our prisoners in both those countries. The visits were not of an extent and in a frequency provided by the Geneva Convention.

Red Cross personnel saw all our men held by the Egyptians and the Syrians. We have the first-hand reports, and not only letters, which arrive in good order. We can send them parcels and money through the Red Cross, and of course we do. We maintain a correspondence with them, and are informed in detail about the state of each prisoner.

All this is still a far cry from the provisions of the Geneva Convention, according to which the Egyptians should return several wounded prisoners to Israel. The Convention also provides for Red Cross visits to be more frequent, and to be made at the site of internment.

Our prisoners in Syria, for instance, were not visited by Red Cross personnel at their place of internment, but at some other location. All those are breaches of the Geneva Convention—but we know today that they are all alive and well. Those who are wounded suffered mainly from fractures, and their lives are not in danger.

[The remaining minutes of Bar-Lev's interview concerned conditions of service in the Israeli army and were not printed in full in the *Jerusalem Post*.]

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Statement Issued by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers Announcing American Aid to Jordan¹

Washington, September 26, 1970

The Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 24 issued a joint appeal to

member states to provide humanitarian aid for Jordan. As the evidence mounts that human suffering in Jordan is reaching major proportions, the United States has decided to act.

The President has announced that we are providing two airborne hospital units which have been held in standby status in Europe for use in meeting the emergency in Jordan. Additionally, we are preparing other transport aircraft to dispatch urgently needed foodstuffs and medicines.

Other governments have also moved to meet this emergency. We urge all those in a position to do so to join in common actions to alleviate the tragic situation in which the people of Jordan find themselves today.

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Statement by U.S. President Nixon on the Death of U.A.R. President Nasser²

On Board the U.S.S. *Saratoga*, September 28, 1970

I was shocked to hear of the sudden death of President Nasser. The world has lost an outstanding leader who tirelessly and devotedly served the causes of his countrymen and the Arab world. This tragic loss requires that all nations, and particularly those in the Middle East, renew their efforts to calm passions, reach for mutual understanding, and build lasting peace.

On behalf of the American people, I extend deep sympathy to his family and to his people.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1633 (October 12, 1970), p. 413.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1636 (November 2, 1970), p. 513.

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Toast Proposed by President Saragat of Italy to Visiting U.S. President Nixon (Excerpt)¹

Rome, September 28, 1970

You have come to Rome at a time when the situation in the Middle East is causing grave concern. Your presence among us shows that the United States fully appreciates the importance of the Mediterranean and the seriousness of the present crisis.

In one of your speeches which made a strong impact throughout the world, you stated that our area should not be one of armed confrontation, but one of negotiation. We share that view and therefore welcomed as an event of major political significance the presentation of the Rogers peace plan by the United States and its acceptance by the parties concerned. Of course, we have feared and still do fear that recent events may adversely affect the outcome of long and patient diplomatic preparations for a peaceful solution to the crisis.

You know, Mr. President, that Italy's actions are aimed to support and strengthen each and every effort made to arrive at a fair solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as an indispensable prerequisite to achieving political stability in the Middle East.

We therefore welcome the initiatives taken by the United States to contain the crisis and channel it toward negotiations which would prevent it from degenerating into a broader and more dangerous conflict.

The main objectives to be attained in the Middle East today are beyond all doubt, on the one hand, the respect by all of clearly recognized frontiers and guarantees for the territorial inviolability and political independence of the countries in the region and, on the other hand, a breakthrough toward a rapid, comprehensive, and definitive solution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1636 (November 2, 1970), pp. 508-509.

One reason to hope, in a situation so fraught with danger, lies in the fact that hostilities between Arabs and Israelis have not been resumed as yet. This positive factor should make it possible to reactivate the interrupted negotiations and give a new impetus to Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] peace mission. We believe that it is the right path to follow, though we are aware of the obstacles and difficulties which lie ahead.

Mr. President, we are certain of your determination to serve the cause of peace, and we are grateful to you for it. We want to assure you that we on our own part will spare no effort to promote by our assiduous action, and in every possible way, the achievement of those vital objectives—justice and peace.

It seems to us that it is necessary today to pick up the threads of the patient work of diplomacy which has already begun, in order that a serious and constructive dialogue may begin at last for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of the 22nd of November 1967.

As I have said, Italy is making its contribution to this, and Europe will do likewise—the Europe we are building, of which we have spoken and will speak again, and which we trust will be united, outward-looking, and instrumental to progress and peace.

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U.S. Television Interview Statements on U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel²

New York, September 28, 1970

Mr. Buckley: I would like to ask you, if I may, Mr. Minister, what was it that

² Excerpted from Eban's interview broadcast on William F. Buckley, Jr.'s program "Firing Line," Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Transcript provided by "Firing Line."

caused your government—which is, allegedly, sophisticated—to assume that the Soviet Union would observe the terms of the cease-fire; was it simply because Mr. Nixon assured you?

Mr. Eban: First of all, whenever you sign an agreement, you must take its violation into account.

Buckley: You must what?

Eban: Take the prospects of its violation into account. But that doesn't mean to say that because an agreement might be violated, you should never take any risk, and never sign one.

Buckley: Uh-hm.

Eban: We really did put our trust in this because the United States received this engagement from the Soviet Union and expressed the view that the Soviet Union, for the sake of a few dozen missiles, would not want to undermine its credibility with the United States at a time when it sought agreement with the United States on so many issues around the world.

Buckley: You were very surprised.

Eban: It was based on an American view that the Soviet Union wants a kind of co-existence with the United States. We were skeptical, but now, I think, everybody who has seen these missiles being brought up should draw deductions in total international terms—it sheds a vivid light on what Soviet policy is. It is not a policy of co-existence at all; it is a policy of competition and of tension. And I think this is ...

Buckley: May I ...

Eban: ... an important international event.

Buckley: May I ask, were your doubts voiced explicitly, or only confidentially to your own government.

Eban: In our dialogue with the United States, we have been all along saying that the record of the Soviet Union in the Middle East ...

Buckley: Was not reassuring.

Eban: The fact that it caused the war in 1967—that it prevented peace at the end of '67—that it is now escalating and enlarging the war: all of this leads us to a negative view of what the Soviet policy is. Our interlocutors in the United States—you are probably right, we also were suspicious—but, we will reach your conclusion only after empirical evidence—there may be a better diagnosis of their situation, let's try. I had always found the President very skeptical of Soviet policy—and Secretary Rogers. But their skepticism was accompanied by the statement, well—who knows, let's try it, let's see.

Buckley: But—again I say this, not because I have a pre-conceived answer, but I really want to know: why didn't you just hire a detachment of United Nations things, or Swiss Guard, or something, so that you wouldn't be left with your confidence down. Do you see what I mean? It seems to me humiliating both to your government and especially to my own ...

Eban: I don't know what any United Nations attachment can do for any purpose ...

Buckley: Oh, for just ...

Eban: ... except to march. I really don't know what it means.

Buckley: Well, they're around; they performed certain services before 1967 in the Gaza area ...

Eban: Happily, no one ...

Buckley: But just three people to say, wait a minute: you can't move the Sam missile there. And they call you up and say, they're moving the Sam missile there ...

Eban: Simply because it was arranged in this agreement between us and the UAR that each party would report its own violations and the government which sponsored the cease-fire, which was the United States, would also ascertain ...

Buckley: Yes.

Eban: ...and the United States has ascertained and supported our conclusions, and it has photographically supported—and there is no question of evidence because the UAR says, Sure, we have done this—we've moved up the missiles. The Soviets say we have moved up the missiles more than you know. They go on to justify it—there isn't any question about the facts.

Buckley: You see my point, I hope, because I think it's an important one. As things now stand, the credibility of the United States is in deep disrepute. You made that in a recent speech in the United Nations; you made that point. Now...

Eban: It's not so; I didn't.

Buckley: Well—that's how it was read—let me put it this way: Mr. Nixon, having assured you that the terms of the cease-fire would be observed—the terms of the cease-fire not having been observed, you do believe that somebody has been humiliated, don't you?

Eban: Yes. But, it's not Mr. Nixon who has brought these missiles up—so, it's the credibility of Egypt and the Soviet Union [rest unclear in cross-talk].

Buckley: But the reassurance did come from Nixon ...

Eban: He can't commit the Soviet Union. He can say that he will use ...

Buckley: He warranted it. He warranted it.

Eban: No. How can the United States Government warrant an action of the Soviet Union? You don't exercise sovereignty over the Soviet Union. Or over Egypt. No government can be the warrant of anything that it cannot possibly control [crosstalk].

Buckley: If that government completely guarantees it.

Eban: It wasn't a guarantee. He thought that the Soviet Union for general and international reasons would not wish to carry out an action of deceit. Well, he's wrong, we're wrong, everybody is wrong. But, I think, he and others would say that it was impossible

to reach that conclusion without putting the matter to empirical evidence. And in the search for peace one has to take certain actions of trust and be rather prepared for disillusionment; otherwise, you're not going to move an inch until you have 100% certainty ...

Buckley: No, no ...

Eban: ... your trust will be vindicated ...

Buckley: I don't know about that. My point is that if we had said that a commission of Swiss Guards, or whatever, is going to patrol the border, this means that we haven't said we are prepared to take the Soviet Union's word for it. And this leaves us in a net better situation than we're now in.

Eban: But there are UN observers up and down the border, and they don't have the means of knowing whether the missiles are 15 kilometers away. The United States has those means. But, Mr. Buckley, there isn't any problem because everybody is united on this. The United States, Israel, the Soviet Union and the UAR all admit they've brought the missiles up.

Buckley: Mr. Eban, may I ask you this: Are there considerable implications, extending even beyond the Mid-East, to this rather gross violation by the Soviet Union of its word and, if so, what are they?

Eban: Well, there are three implications. First, there is a change in the military balance. Then there is a collapse in Israel's mind of Egypt's credibility. That's very important because if we're going to negotiate peace, what will the negotiation mean. It means we'll be asked to give up territory for an agreement and, therefore, the integrity and the validity of Egypt's signed word is very vital.

Buckley: Would the death of Nasser affect that?

Eban: Yes, until there is a new spirit or a new policy. At any rate, we, on the strength of an Egyptian signature, made a certain act of abstention and sacrifice, so we're going to be more suspicious in the future

—unless they rectify this. But, finally, as you indicate, the fact that the Soviet Union has given its endorsement to this act of violation ought to make people think on every continent of the world about what Soviet policy is. And I've heard in Europe, in Latin America, in Africa, everywhere, expressions of interest in what this means for the rest of the world. Because there has been a tendency in the past few years, to give the Soviet Union the benefit of many doubts. Well, I think, the benefit of that doubt ought to be greatly reduced.

Buckley: Is it improper to ask you, under the circumstances, whether you believe that the United States would make a mistake, for instance, in deferring its ABM program?

Eban: My impression is that the moving up of missiles in the Canal area, in violation of a Soviet engagement, is causing many people in Washington to take a much more cautious view about the degree of trust that can be put in Soviet policy anywhere else.

Buckley: Is the word, "cautious," what in other context would be called, "hawkish?"

Eban: Suspicious, I think—I think a certain sanitary suspicion.

Buckley: Uh-hm.

Eban: I'm not interested much in the ornithological definition: I don't know whether a hawk is a complimentary term or not. My experience is that the dove was the only bird in Noah's Ark that knew what it wanted. It went out there three times and it came back with the olive branch—and discovered dry land.

Buckley: The notion that the Soviet Union is to be trusted is something that we need to find out as superstitious—how often, would you say?

Eban: I think that's the central theme of all policy.

Buckley: Uh-hm.

Eban: Every government must ask itself that question. The United States must ask that question more incisively than anyone

else because it, alone, has a deterrent power. But, our advice is to take a very suspicious interpretation of Soviet policy. And the more so in the light of what we've seen in the Middle East.

Buckley: Uh-hm. Now, in the light of your own experience with American politics, it, no doubt, has occurred to you that we need, oh, a treachery from the Soviet Union about every two or three years to sort of restore our batteries—of skepticism—and there is a sense, I suppose, in which the events in Egypt might be salutary in the strategic sense, once we have, of course, redressed the balance which, presumably is militarily possible to do. Is this something here that would be illustrative of the . . .

Eban: Yes. I sent to all members of the United Nations last week a map which showed what's happened with the moving up of missiles. On the seventh of August, this is where the easternmost line of the missiles was. So that if the thing was respected, if this agreement was kept, there ought to be no missiles any nearer the Canal than here. By the ninth of August, there was a line of missiles here. By the twenty-fourth of September, there was this line of missiles there. All of this is in violation—every day, day and night, of this agreement. And the real question is, what we're now trying to defend is the integrity of agreement.

Buckley: And can you tell me what the military implications of that are?

Eban: The military implications are that the missiles in these positions—if the UAR decides to cancel the cease-fire when it expires on November 5, they can bombard with artillery across the Canal. Before that, if they tried to bombard us, then we would retaliate on their artillery by our air force. Now the missiles could prevent the air force from bombarding the artillery. The artillery of Egypt would, therefore, have a clear run, and next they would try to cross the Canal and try to bring about Israel's withdrawal without peace, whereas the international policy is: withdrawal only when there is peace, and then, withdrawal to secure and

recognize boundaries to be determined in the peace negotiations.

Buckley: What, in the opinion of your generals, would be necessary to bring back an equilibrium in the existing situation—a military equilibrium?

Eban: All this is very mobile, and we think we should take the following attitude: Egypt is interested in the talks under Jarring's auspices. We're interested in those, but so are they. The position that we're taking, and the United States is taking, is that if the UAR and the Soviet Union want those talks to proceed, then they ought to restore confidence by taking these missiles back to the line from which they should not have...

Buckley: And if they refuse to do so?

Eban: And if they fail to do so, we say that there does not exist the trust necessary for peace talks.

Buckley: In which case you have no further obligation. But meanwhile—things aren't the way—meanwhile, you would like the status quo ante, but you are not in a position to achieve it, unless you have what? More artillery, more airplanes, what? What do you need to make up for the disadvantages of the last sixty days?

Eban: Well, obviously, the disadvantage creates a problem for us which requires reinforcement, and there is an understanding in the United States of the need to reinforce Israel, amongst other things, in relation to this new threat. But you can never fully solve two problems; you can never fully solve the military threat; and you cannot by any compensatory action solve the deeper question of confidence. I put much more stress on this. They have violated an agreement; therefore, they have created a situation where it's difficult to go into a room with them to work out a new agreement unless we settle the question of the integrity of the previous agreement. They've put a road block on the road to peace talks.

Buckley: Yes—I happen to agree with you. As a purely military matter, do you believe that the United States insofar as it was instrumental in

persuading you into the cease-fire, has now a residual obligation to make up for the military consequences of having trusted the Soviet Union? Because I do.

Eban: Yes, I do as well.

Buckley: Yes.

Eban: I don't believe the government of the United States would question that in principle—whether they agree with us about how intensely they should act is another matter.

Buckley: Yes. Now—what are Soviet intentions in that part of the world—I don't mean to ask, to be banal, because we know what their stated intentions are all over the world; but they seem to feel that a very special leverage in Europe can be exercised by getting the lower flank of the Mediterranean and totally controlling it. Do you feel it likely that they see the elimination of Israel as indispensable, or merely a psychological subjugation of it?

Eban: I don't think they want the elimination of Israel because what they want is the Arab-Israeli conflict. They don't want the elimination of Israel. The paradox is, you can't have a conflict between Israel and the Arab States unless Israel exists.

Buckley: Uh-hm.

Eban: If the conflict didn't exist, I think they would try to invent it. What they gain by...

Buckley: In that case, they want equilibrium, too—right?

Eban: I think—no—they want a tension which does not reach the point of explosion. And what they achieve...

Buckley: It's the kind of thing we're having now.

Eban: Yes. The question is, whether you can always control the explosion—but that's what they want. Therefore, they don't want peace; they don't want war because this would involve escalation and possible confrontation. The gains which they make by this policy are as follows: They outflank the southern defense system of Europe; they

gain a very important foothold in Africa—after all, about a thousand Soviet troops in Egypt, which is Africa, are cancelling out the whole spirit of African independence. And they are changing the international equilibrium and moving towards predominance in the Mediterranean, which is probably what brought the United States Government at its highest level to take an interest in the Mediterranean defense.

Buckley: But you consider your own country metaphysically opposed to Communism—that is to say, a country which would never submit to satellization by the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances, why wouldn't it suit the convenience of the Soviet Union to eliminate you?

Eban: Because what they're interested in is the tension. First of all, I think they believe, and I think they're right, that we're not so easily eliminated. It requires a certain cooperation of the victim to be eliminated. He has to be rather more passive and docile than Israel is reputed to be. Secondly, they believe that the United States has a commitment not to support all Israel's policies, but to prevent Israel from being destroyed. Everybody in the United States Government whom I talked to believes that. There are others who believe that if the United States allowed Israel to be eliminated, through any negligence on the part of the United States, nobody would have any trust in the American security commitment anywhere else.

Buckley: Like Vietnam.

Eban: Asia, Europe, Latin America. People would say, if you didn't care about Israel, why should you care about Berlin, or about the NATO countries or even about Latin America. So, there would be a complete collapse of the credibility of the American deterrent. And American security is based on that. Therefore, the Soviet Union thinks that the elimination of Israel would be a very explosive thing to try—there's no reason why they should want to try it...

Buckley: Under the circumstances...

Eban: And to support the Arabs in the

conflict—this brings them very big dividends.

Buckley: Well, then, do you, therefore, venture to say that the Soviet Union will see to it that the arms it makes available to the Arab powers will never be sufficient to overwhelm Israel?

Eban: I think it's very hard to make them sufficient because the Arab States don't know how to make the best use of them. Now, if you put the arms that the Soviets have given to the Arab States into the hands of more competent military nations, there is almost nothing that they couldn't do. We have a great respect for the MIG 21 and the 23—and the SA 2 and the SA 3.

Buckley: But now they have Russian pilots.

Eban: Yes, they have the Russian pilots—and they've flown some operation missions. At that point the Russians sought disengagement through the cease-fire because they were becoming too much physically involved.

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Message from U.S.S.R Premier Kosygin to the Government and People of the U.A.R. on the Death of President Nasser¹

Moscow, September 29, 1970

In these days of great hardship for the Egyptian people, the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government wish to reaffirm emphatically the Soviet policy of developing all-round relations with the UAR, defence of the interests of the Arab peoples in their just anti-imperialist struggle and the strengthening of their independence and their economic and defence potential. This policy

¹ Quoted on Moscow radio, September 29, 1970; English translation in *Mizan: Supplement A*, No. 5 (September/October, 1970), pp. 15-16.

is determined by the common aims and struggle of the people of the Soviet Union and the Arab peoples against the forces of imperialism and aggression. It is tested by time and accords with the fundamental interests of the peoples of our countries. The Soviet Union will continue giving support to the national liberation movement of the Arab people. Friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations, to the development of which the late President Jamal Abd an-Nasir attached prime importance, contribute to the mobilization of the forces of the Arab people in their just struggle for the liberation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel and the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Near East. The line of seeking a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, of which the late President Nasir was a convinced champion, will continue to have our all-round support.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Yahya Khan of Pakistan to Nepal (Excerpts)¹

Katmandu and Islamabad, September 30, 1970

At the invitation of King Mahendra Bir Bikramshah Dev, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan, paid a four-day State Visit to the Kingdom of Nepal from September 27 to September 30, 1970.

On the Middle East situation, the two Heads of State also agreed that lasting peace in the region could be achieved only by faithfully implementing the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

They felt that no solution to the Middle East problem could be permanent unless

special consideration were given to the question of Palestinian Arab refugees.

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Statement Issued by the United Kingdom Government on the Release of Palestine Commando Leila Khaled²

London, September 30, 1970

On September 12, the British Government stated that they were prepared to release Miss Leila Khaled as part of a satisfactory solution of the problem of the hostages from the three hijacked aircraft.

Negotiations with those holding the hostages were begun by the International Red Cross acting for the governments concerned. The British Government also asked the Government of the UAR to enlist the help of the governments attending the Arab Summit Conference at Cairo.

As a result of these negotiations, in which both the ICRC and the Government of the UAR have taken part, all the hostages have now reached safety. The British Government has therefore arranged with the Governments of the Federal German Republic and Switzerland for Miss Khaled, together with the six Palestine Arabs in the custody of the German and Swiss authorities, to be flown out as soon as the necessary arrangements have been made with the UAR Government.

¹ English text in *Pakistan Documents Series*, VII, 11 (October 1970).

² Text provided on request by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.

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**U.A.R. Radio and Television Speech
by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin During
His Visit to Egypt for the Funeral of
the Late President Nasser (Condensed)¹**

Cairo, October 1, 1970

In these sorrowful days of farewell to Gamal Abdel Nasser, the eminent and never-to-be-forgotten son of the Arab people, we are here in your country and are suffering with you the bitter taste of loss. A man who gave all of himself to his people's struggle for national liberation, for a status of equal rights in the world, for the strengthening of independence and for prosperity and the progress of your state, has passed on. . .

In recognition of President Nasser's services and as a sign of deep respect for him, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, the Soviet government and the entire Soviet people have sent us to the United Arab Republic. The Soviet Party-and-government delegation has also been entrusted with assuring the leaders and the people of your country of the Soviet Union's unaltered course for development of all-round relations with the U.A.R., for safeguarding the interests of the Arab peoples in their just anti-imperialist struggle and for strengthening their independence and economic and defense potential. We assure you that our feelings of friendship, brotherhood and fighting solidarity have not changed.

The Soviet Union, as a friend of the Arabs, advocates a lasting peace in the Near East so that all peoples can enjoy their inalienable right to independent existence in conditions of peace and security. But let no one have doubts about our combining, henceforth, of a striving for peace with the rendering of every possible assistance to the United Arab Republic and to other Arab states defending

the progressive achievements of their peoples.

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**Statement on the Situation in the Middle
East in a Televised Speech by U.S.S.R.
Communist Party General Secretary
Brezhnev²**

Baku, Azerbaijan, October 2, 1970

All who hold dear the cause of peace and the security of the peoples cannot but feel concerned over the situation in the Middle East. The contacts which were started between the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel through the United Nations representative, Dr. Jarring, have not been developed, because of the policy of the ruling circles in Tel Aviv, who, with the support of the United States government, are doing everything in their power to thwart Dr. Jarring's mission.

Behind a smoke-screen of cooked-up accusations against the United Arab Republic, the Israeli military command is trying in every way to strengthen its positions in the occupied Arab territories, particularly on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and is building up forces for fresh piratical blows against Arab countries. With characteristic impudence, Israeli leaders are declaring, for the whole world to hear, that they are not going to pull back to the frontiers of 1967, i.e., they are not going to return what they have stolen by means of aggression.

The United States government is continuing to connive with the Israeli aggressors, actually encouraging their policy of frustrating the talks, and sending ever new consignments of offensive weapons to Israel for new attacks on her neighbours. It seems that Washington, while talking about peace, is

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 40 (November 3, 1970), p. 15. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

² Excerpted from the English text of Brezhnev's speech in *Soviet News*, No. 5563 (October 6, 1970), pp. 3-4.

actually sowing the seeds of discord and animosity.

Unfortunately, the bloody clashes that flared up recently in Jordan between government troops and armed units of the Palestine organisations have done great harm to the common cause of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinian Arabs. This fratricidal struggle is truly tragic. The Israeli aggressors rubbed their hands with glee as they watched it, and the imperialists across the ocean took the opportunity to bring up forces in the hope that there might be an opportunity for fresh military intervention in the affairs of the Arabs, so as to make it easier for them to strangle the liberation movement of the Arabs and plunder their national wealth.

However, nowadays it has become very dangerous to trifle in such a cynical way with the destinies of independent states and peoples. By so doing it is possible not only to burn one's fingers but even to lose one's whole arm. It is not hard to imagine what stormy reactions and what outbursts of anger on the part of the people would be aroused by fresh armed intervention by the imperialist powers in the Middle East.

As for the Soviet Union, its position is absolutely clear. We have tried to contribute in every possible way towards a final ending of the fratricidal struggle in Jordan and towards stopping the extermination of the units of the Palestine resistance movement. We have believed, and we believe now, that any foreign military intervention in the events in Jordan is categorically inadmissible.

It is our firm belief that the main task of all freedom-loving and peace-loving forces in the Middle East today is to achieve a peaceful settlement by political means, eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression and bring back peace and tranquillity on a sound and durable basis to all peoples in the area.

The untimely death of the hero of the liberation struggle of the Arabs, the President of the United Arab Republic and chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, Gamal Abdel Nasser, is a great loss to the Arab people and

to the cause for which they are fighting. He was a great patriot, a courageous fighter against oppression and aggression and for freedom, independence and social progress, a wise statesman and one of the most authoritative leaders of the Arab world. We Soviet people mourn the loss of our comrade-in-arms, our comrade in the joint anti-imperialist struggle, a true friend of our country and of the entire socialist community.

Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of those who laid a sound foundation for the great friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, and all Arab countries. We know for certain that the magnificent edifice of our friendship, built on this foundation, will grow and become stronger, because this friendship is an expression of a profound necessity of historical development and is destined to flourish for ages.

I take the opportunity to extend from this rostrum warm and comradely greetings to our good friends, the leaders of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser's associates, who, we are sure, will continue to work with honour for the cause of the late President, a cause that is so important for the United Arab Republic, for the entire Arab people and for the forces of peace and freedom throughout the world.

Our Arab friends must know that the Communist Party and government of the Soviet Union and all Soviet people will continue to pursue unswervingly the policy of sincere friendship and fraternal cooperation with the United Arab Republic. We shall continue to give all possible support to the just struggle of the Arabs to liberate their territories which have been occupied by the aggressors, and to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.A.R. of a U.S.S.R. Delegation Attending the Funeral of President Nasser (Condensed)¹

Cairo, October 3, 1970

A Soviet Party-and-government delegation headed by A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, was in Cairo from Sept. 29 to Oct. 3, 1970, in connection with the untimely death of an eminent state and political figure, Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic and Chairman of the Arab Socialist Union....

A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and members of the delegation held meetings and talks with Anwar Sadat, interim President of the U.A.R., members of the Arab Socialist Union Central Committee's Supreme Executive Council [and others]....

Gamal Abdel Nasser, who contributed immensely to the cause of establishing fraternal Soviet-Egyptian relations, laid the foundation of the foreign policy that the United Arab Republic, which he headed, maintained steadfastly and that gained universal recognition and helped strengthen the U.A.R.'s prestige and role in the international arena.

The governments of the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. have always viewed friendly relations between our countries as a constant factor, independent from the various twists taken in the international situation. These relations have been invariably based on full equality, mutual respect and solidarity in the joint struggle against the forces of imperialism and reaction.

Mutual resolve to continue to strengthen on this basis the close ties of friendship and cooperation uniting the Soviet Union and the Soviet people with the United Arab

Republic and its people was expressed unanimously during the talks....

During this crucial period, it was emphasized, the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. express unanimous resolve to continue to develop all-round Soviet-Egyptian relations, as President Gamal Abdel Nasser continually advocated.

Henceforth, both sides intend to combine and coordinate their efforts in the cause to resolve the Near East conflict and other major international questions. They reaffirm the need to liquidate immediately the consequences of Israeli aggression and to establish in the Near East a lasting peace for all peoples of that area. To achieve these goals, they will maintain the line that the two sides have worked out jointly. The solidarity and rallying of the Arab countries have acquired particular importance in solving the urgent problems of the Arab peoples' struggle to strengthen their independence under the conditions of ceaseless machinations by imperialist forces. The government of the U.A.R., headed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, always devoted first-priority attention to these same noble goals.

Both sides are confident that the unity of action of all Arab countries, on an anti-imperialist basis, will further the success of the Arabs' just struggle for national independence, progress and the most rapid settlement of the Near East conflict during the present difficult situation in the Near East.

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Report from the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross Relief Operation in Jordan²

October 4, 1970

It is hard to assess the present situation, owing to the dearth of reliable information and statistics. The precise number of killed and wounded will probably never be known.

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 40 (November 3, 1970), pp. 15-16. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

² International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1970* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1971), p. 67.

An immense amount of damage has been caused in some areas, while in others it has not been as serious as it was said to be. Living conditions are gradually improving although the lack of water and electricity is still a major problem. In the medical sphere, eleven teams comprising 516 doctors and nurses, plus the technical personnel, have treated 5,107 patients. Despite all the difficulties, the activities of these teams have been effective and extremely well co-ordinated, thanks to the daily meetings held by the personnel as well as the use of the wireless network made available by the British team. The preliminary emergency phase may be regarded as ended; we are now entering upon the second stage, the stage of consolidated action, which will enable us to meet the continuing needs created by the situation.

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Remarks by U.S. President Nixon on the Purpose of His European Trip in Regard to the Middle East¹

Newmarket-on-Fergus, Ireland, October 4, 1970

The purpose of this trip, just as has been the purpose of my other trips abroad, is to strengthen the structure of peace throughout the world, and particularly to strengthen the structure of peace in the Mediterranean area, which, because of recent events, has been an area of very great concern for all those interested in peace.

Now, in analyzing what the threat to peace in the Mediterranean is, we must realize that it is not the conventional threat of one nation possibly engaging in overt action against another. It is more difficult than that. It is more difficult because it is the threat which arises from irresponsible radical elements which might take action which in turn would set in the course of

events, the train of events, set in motion—I meant to say—a train of events that would escalate into a possible confrontation between major powers in the area. That is what we saw in the Jordanian crisis, and that is the kind of threat to the peace that we will have to be guarding against in the months and possibly the years ahead in the Near East and the Mediterranean generally.

Now, when you have that kind of a threat, in order to meet it the primary need is for elements of stability in the area—economic and political stability, yes, but primarily, where the threat is irresponsible and where it resorts to violence, unexpected and unpredictable violence, without reason, without cause—sometimes—there must be military stability and military strength. That is why I first visited the 6th Fleet.

The 6th Fleet is one element of military stability in the Mediterranean. After visiting the 6th Fleet and being briefed by its commanders and our commanders there, I became convinced that the 6th Fleet is able to meet its mission of deterring irresponsible elements in the Mediterranean area.

After meeting with the 6th Fleet commanders and also having discussed this matter with our NATO allies and with our Ambassadors from the Mediterranean countries, I am convinced that it is essential that the 6th Fleet continue to have this capability in the event that other powers with other designs on the area, other than ours and our friends, who have no designs except the peace in the area and the right of each individual nation to maintain its own integrity—in the event that other forces, naval forces, should threaten the position of strength which the 6th Fleet now enjoys, then the United States must be prepared to take the action necessary to maintain that overall strength of the 6th Fleet.

So what I am saying here is the 6th Fleet presently can meet its mission and, second, we shall be prepared to increase its strength in the event that its position of overall strength is threatened by the actions of other powers who take another position in the area than we do.

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's remarks to members of the press as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1636 (November 2, 1970), pp. 528-530, 531.

Another element of strength in the Mediterranean area is, of course, NATO, and particularly its Southern Command. Without going into the specific conversations that we had with the NATO southern commanders, I would emphasize here that this provided an opportunity for me to state very strongly and unequivocally these principles with regard to the United States association with NATO.

Considerable concern, I find, had arisen among many of the NATO nations, the major nations and the smaller NATO nations, as a result of some comments by political figures in the United States as well as some of those commenting upon the American role in the world, that the United States might not meet its NATO responsibilities and was on the verge of reducing its contribution to NATO. I stated categorically to the NATO commanders, and I do here publicly again, that the United States will under no circumstances reduce unilaterally its commitment to NATO. Any reduction in NATO forces, if it occurs, will only take place on a multilateral basis and on the basis of what those who are lined up against the NATO forces—what they might do. In other words, it would have to be on a mutual basis.

I know that the Nixon doctrine has sometimes been inaccurately described as one that would allow the United States to reduce its responsibilities in the world. That is not the case. The purpose of the Nixon doctrine is to provide a policy under which the United States can meet its responsibilities more effectively in the world by sharing those responsibilities with others. And in NATO that is our policy.

To summarize, with regard to NATO, we will maintain our present strength. We will not reduce it unilaterally. We will continue to talk with our NATO allies with regard to how, overall, we can meet our responsibilities together.

Moving from NATO now to the Mideast, I found in the conversations that I had with all of the leaders that I met—and as you know, they covered not only our allies and

friends but also they covered President Tito of Yugoslavia, a nonaligned state—I found general agreement on these propositions: strong support for the American cease-fire initiative and, second, I found that, as far as that cease-fire initiative is concerned, there is not the pessimism that we sense in some quarters as a result of what happened in Jordan and as a result of the new instability that inevitably will follow the death of President Nasser, that the cease-fire initiative days were numbered.

I do not suggest that the road ahead is not difficult. But I think we have to separate our peace initiative into two parts: one, the cease-fire part of the initiative and, second, that part of the initiative that has to do with negotiation.

With regard to negotiation, the prospect for immediate negotiation between the two or three or other parties involved on either side—as far as those prospects are concerned—they are, at this time, not bright because of the introduction of missiles into the 50-kilometer zone.

The reaction of the Israelis, of course, has been not to participate in negotiation. However, we are going to continue to attempt to get the negotiating process started and, of course, in the process, to do what we can diplomatically to see that there are no further violations of the standstill, and dealing, of course, diplomatically, with the violations that have occurred.

On the cease-fire side of it, however, I think I can say quite unequivocally that neither party—and by neither party, I say neither the Israelis on the one side or the other nations, the U.A.R. and others involved in the cease-fire initiative—will gain by breaking the cease-fire. That is why we believe that our acting and talking strongly in behalf of an extension of the cease-fire for another 90 days is the proper course and that it has considerable chance to succeed. Any party at this time that would break the cease-fire initiative would have very, very little support in the world. It would be acting alone against the whole weight of the world public opinion and also against the

public opinion, I should say, in the United States.

Another comment with regard to the Mideast that I think should be made: We tend in the United States to see our role as being predominant, and of course, it is because of our strength. On the other hand, we must recognize—and this trip brought this home to me and underlined it again—that there are other powers in the Mediterranean area that can play, that are playing, and that must play, a significant role in the peacekeeping area.

The Italians, for example, have a very significant interest in the Mediterranean and have contacts that we do not have that are better than ours. The Spanish also have very significant interests in the Mediterranean and have been very helpful. And the British, in addition, of course, have had a traditional, longtime interest in the Mediterranean area. My talks with the leaders of these three countries were very helpful in that respect because it is not a healthy situation in the world for the United States to be alone, whether it is in the Far East, where we welcome the fact that the British are maintaining a presence there, or whether it is in the Mideast or in the Mediterranean.

That is why the Secretary of State and I have worked, both before we arrived on this trip and during this trip, on developing not only consultation but participation on the part of other Mediterranean powers who share our views about the area and participation in responsibility for keeping the peace in that area.

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Statement Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on Allegations by the U.S. and Israel of U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Violations of the Middle East Cease-Fire¹

Moscow, October 3, 1970

Officials in the United States have lately been spreading various falsehoods, saying that the situation in the Middle East was deteriorating as a result of the Soviet Union's position and alleging that the Soviet Union was "violating its commitments" in connection with the cease-fire in the Suez Canal zone.

Obviously incited by official circles, the United States press has launched a campaign of slander against the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the aim of this campaign is to misrepresent the policy of the Soviet Union and at the same time to exonerate Israel's ruling circles, which are directly responsible for the present worsening of the situation in the Middle East, for the violation of the cease-fire agreement and for the difficulties which the mission of the United Nations Middle East peace envoy, Dr. Jarring, has come up against. Attempts are being made to mislead world public opinion and to shift the responsibility for the situation that has arisen in the Middle East on to the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. These attempts are groundless and in complete contradiction with the facts, however.

What do the facts show?

Consistently declaring itself in favour of using the possibilities offered by Dr. Jarring's mission, the Soviet Union, for its part, has worked actively to ensure that practical steps should be taken to establish contacts, so that talks could begin between the sides through Dr. Jarring. The USSR government stated to the United States government that, taking a positive view of the possibilities of Dr. Jarring's mission, the Soviet side was ready to continue to make its con-

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5564 (October 13, 1970), pp. 13, 19.

tribution so that the talks could be started at the earliest possible date and to promote their success.

The Soviet government also received positively the readiness of the governments of the United Arab Republic and Jordan to agree to a cease-fire, if Israel also assumed the same commitment.

At the same time, as the United States government is well aware, the Soviet Union did not take part in drafting any of the cease-fire terms in the Suez Canal zone. These terms were put forward by the American side. For its part, aware of the great importance of this step, the Soviet Union from the very outset consistently advocated a cease-fire and did everything in its power to facilitate the mission of Dr. Jarring, through whose mediation the sides were to start an exchange of views.

Contrary to all these facts, which are of course known to the American government, a campaign of slander was instigated in the United States, clearly aimed at casting aspersions on the Soviet Union's position and imputing that it had violated a definite agreement. In particular, false rumours were circulated that ground-to-air missiles manned by Soviet crews had appeared in the Suez Canal zone, which is also a deliberate fabrication.

The assertions by American as well as Israeli officials concerning alleged violations by the United Arab Republic of the cease-fire terms were refuted in the official statement by the UAR Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, on September 4 of this year to the United States' representative in Cairo, as well as in the statement by Mahmoud Riad on Cairo television on October 6.¹ It follows from this statement that the real situation has nothing in common with the fabrications now being circulated in the United States.

These fabrications were obviously put into circulation in order to create another far-fetched excuse for Tel Aviv to wreck the contacts which Dr. Jarring had just established with both sides. It is none other than

Israel that is violating the cease-fire terms. Israeli war planes intrude almost daily into the UAR's air space. Israeli troops are continuously building fortifications, laying communications and carrying out other work using machinery and motor transport within the limit of the 50-kilometre zone east of the Suez Canal. New emplacements for tanks, artillery, self-propelled guns and missile installations are being built.

All this is evidence that Israel, and the United States which is supporting it, are responsible for Dr. Jarring being unable to begin to implement his mission. At the same time the aggressors, who have seized the territory of neighbouring Arab states and continue to flout international law, go to such lengths as to give hypocritical lessons in the rules of behaviour to the Arab side, the victim of aggression.

One cannot overlook the fact that the United States itself is taking actions leading to an exacerbation of the Middle East situation. Evidence of this, for example, is the further U.S. naval build-up in the Mediterranean and the "show of strength" by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the provocative character of which was accentuated by the personal presence of the President of the United States.

It was precisely at that time that the United States Administration held a series of talks with Tel Aviv, took the decision to give Israel another consignment of Phantom planes and granted Israel a new credit for buying military machinery and equipment from the United States.

It would not be amiss to point out that the United States is trying to assume the "right" to carry out reconnaissance flights over the territory of the United Arab Republic. The Soviet side has officially declared to the United States government that such actions by the United States side worsen the situation in the area still further and are a gross violation of sovereignty of the United Arab Republic.

The United States leaders have spoken a great deal about the trust which is indispensable in international relations. Do they think that their actions in the Middle East

¹ For the text of Riad's statement, see Arab World Section, below, Document 506.

area, and the deception of public opinion through the unscrupulous distortion of facts, help to strengthen trust in the policy of the United States in the Middle East?

In a situation in which the United Arab Republic and Jordan have confirmed their readiness for talks between the sides through Dr. Jarring and when the state of cease-fire is, in fact, being observed, it depends on the position of Israel and the external forces supporting it whether these favourable possibilities will be used in the interests of a political settlement in the Middle East. The United States must choose what aims its policy in the Middle East will serve. It must decide whether it will continue to encourage Israel's reckless aspirations, or whether it will really take the path of the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967 and the path of promoting the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union has been and remains firmly in favour of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the implementation of all aspects of this Security Council resolution.

The Soviet government will continue to promote this in every way, within the framework of bilateral meetings and at consultations between the four powers which are permanent members of the Security Council.

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Interview on the Middle East After Nasser with Former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of Israel (Excerpts)¹

Sde Boker, Israel, October 8, 1970

I was comfortable a few weeks ago because I thought it was quite possible that Nasser had at last changed his mind. He had the

idea that if he would destroy Israel, he would be the head of the Arab world. His aim was to be head of the Arabs—well, he couldn't achieve it.

I have certain reasons to think that he changed his mind in the last months. Maybe this will be true of those who come after him—I don't know—but if there is a change, we must take every chance to bring peace.

And I mean, give back the territories—we have a right to keep them, but we don't need them. There's room for all the Jews in the world in that small part which we had before the six-day war.

If I had been in the Government right after the six-day war, I would have tried for peace first thing with Egypt—we don't need the territories we conquered and except for Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, we should give them all back. If I had to choose between territories and peace, I would choose peace and take every chance to get it.

For many reasons I believe with the next 10, 12 years there will be peace between the Jews and the Arabs. Nasser had many many opponents in Egypt—one of them he oppressed bitterly, the largest opposition, the Moslem Brotherhood, they call themselves. These people still exist. Then there are more than 120,000 young people in Egypt who studied in universities—many of these are well aware of the position of the Egyptian people. These young people, together with the Moslem Brotherhood, together with the army officers who were against Nasser's policy—and he suppressed some of the best officers—these will bring about new relations between Israel and Egypt.

[Speaking of King Hussein of Jordan]:

Hussein is a great admirer of his grandfather, the only Arab leader who declared openly that he wanted to have peace with Israel. Hussein would like to do as his

¹ *New York Times*, October 13, 1970, p. 14. © 1970 by the New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

grandfather did, but he hasn't got the same courage.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on Alleged U.A.R.-U.S.S.R. Violations of the Cease-Fire and Prospects for Resumption of the Jarring Talks¹

Washington, October 9, 1970

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Government has flatly denied that Russian-manned missiles have been moved into the Suez Canal cease-fire zone. Do we have evidence that they have moved these missiles in there?

A. Yes, we have evidence that they have moved missiles in. And the evidence is conclusive that they have moved missiles in. When I say "they," I mean there have been SA-3 sites constructed since the day of the cease-fire, and we are convinced, I think beyond a doubt, that the Soviet personnel are there to assist in the construction and manning of those sites.

It is interesting to notice that in the discussions that we have had with other governments the question of whether there have been violations and whether the Soviet Union has been involved in the violations has never arisen. I think it is taken for granted that that is the case. And when I talk to Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.] I can give him the evidence of the violations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the Russian diplomats in Washington are saying to people we talked to when they are charged with having violated the agreement that they were never party to the agreement. Could you give us any indication as to just

how firmly Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the United States] was pinned down on this agreement? Did he ever initial it? Or did you get the clear understanding that he accepted it on behalf of the Soviet Union?

A. Well, I don't think we have to get into that at the moment, because now they say they didn't violate it anyway. So it isn't a question of whether they were party to it. They said there were no violations. But there was no doubt about the fact that all parties agreed that after the cease-fire there would be no improvement of the military situation in the 50-kilometer zone. And the language is perfectly clear. I notice some press accounts to the effect that the language was fuzzy. That is not the case. The language says, as clearly as language can be stated, that there will be no construction of new missile sites in the 50-kilometer zone during a 90-day period. Now, the evidence is conclusive that there has been new construction of missile sites, and a number of them, during the cease-fire period. I spent 4 hours going over all of the photographs myself with the technicians, and I can tell you that there is no question about the violations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what now are the prospects of rectifying that situation, in the first place, and secondly, of reviving the talks under Gunnar Jarring?

A. Well, of course the violations have made it more difficult. And the situation, God knows, is complex enough. It has been going on for 20 years, and it is going to be difficult to bring the parties together.

On the other hand, the fact is that both sides now seem to be willing to extend the cease-fire for another 90 days. And there also are many indications to the effect that the parties would like to end the conflict.

Obviously war is not a viable policy. Everyone suffers. The economic consequences are great for all parties. And when you consider the prospects of further war and how it might come out and who would benefit, you have to say to yourself that it is a no-policy, it is desperation.

¹ Excerpted from Rogers' news conference as published in the *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1635 (October 26, 1970), pp. 474-476, 478.

Now, on the other hand, if an agreement could be worked out, the prospects are quite bright for the area. There are plenty of resources. There is a good deal of manpower and great ability in the area. There is unlimited opportunity for expansion. So that all parties could benefit if they could work out a solution. And we would hope that that will dawn on people. We would hope that although there are all kinds of recriminations, we have all kinds of problems, that we could get the negotiations started. And I myself believe that we have reasonably good prospects to get the negotiations started.

There is no alternative. No one has a policy except that. What's the alternative? I ask all parties: "How do you see the future? Just killing each other for the next 20 years? Is that a policy?"

So I think there is a probability that we can get negotiations started. And in discussions that I have next week and the week after that in New York with those concerned—I hope that Foreign Minister [of the United Arab Republic Mahmoud] Riad will be there, and possibly the Foreign Minister of Jordan—I hope we can get negotiations started.

I think you should keep in mind that our proposal had two parts: one, a cease-fire which has been observed and is in effect, and the other, negotiations. And if we can get negotiations started, we can get the situation back on the track.

Also I would like to have you keep in mind that two major hurdles have been overcome. First, Israel used the word "withdrawal"—they would be willing to withdraw in accordance with the Security Council resolution—which was a major hurdle because it hadn't used that word. On the other hand, Egypt agreed that Israel had the right to exist, right of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. And that is a major hurdle because the Arabs had not agreed to that before.

And so if we can get negotiations started, I still think there is a hope—though we have to look at it realistically—there still is a hope that the parties could settle this conflict.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Riad. He, the other day, said, in denying the charges they violated the cease-fire, he said the United States violated the peace treaty by supplying Israel with arms.¹ Is there a clause in the cease-fire standstill agreement to prevent the United States from supplying arms to Israel?

A: No, there was no provision at all in the cease-fire or standstill agreement that we would not provide arms. As a matter of fact, we have proposed several times that there be an arms limitation agreement in the area. And that has always been rejected by the Soviet Union.

So the United States never agreed not to provide arms. We did say that we would act with restraint during this period in providing arms, and we lived up to that agreement. We did not provide more arms than we had previously agreed to provide. But in view of the fact that the violations occurred and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union has been supplying military equipment to the U.A.R., of course we are under no restraints at all insofar as providing assistance to Israel.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, may I ask you this on the Middle East? Given the fact that the Israelis say they will not return to the negotiations without taking the missiles out, and the Egyptians' denial of the violations, what do you mean, what does the United States mean by the word "rectification"?

A: Well, "rectification" means a condition which we might bring about which would satisfy both parties, and then to start negotiating.

¹ For the text of Riad's statement, see Arab World Section, below, Document 506.

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News Conference Statement on French Policy in the Middle East by President Pompidou of France During His Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹

Tashkent, October 11, 1970

Il n'y a pas d'identité de vue sur ce problème entre la France et l'Union soviétique. Mais il y a des thèses qui sont assez proches les unes des autres. Nous avons ensemble le désir qu'une paix véritable s'installe sur des bases solides: évacuation des territoires occupés, reconnaissance du droit d'existence pour tous les Etats y compris Israël. Les derniers événements n'ont pas simplifié les choses. La crise en Jordanie, la mort du Président Nasser ont ajouté encore un certain nombre d'inconnues. Ce qu'il faut c'est dissiper les malentendus et les inconnues. Pour cela le meilleur moyen est que la mission Jarring puisse reprendre et reprendre tout de suite. C'est ce que nous essayons de faire par des conversations bilatérales et par la concertation à quatre. La France regrette la décision des Etats-Unis de ne plus participer aux travaux de la concertation à quatre au niveau des suppléants qui faisaient un travail préparatoire et dégageaient des indications utiles pour M. Jarring.

¹ Excerpted from Pompidou's news conference as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, Second Semester 1970 (Paris: Documentation française, 1970), p. 95.

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Television Interview Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird on U.S. and U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East and on Prospects for Extension of the Cease-Fire and Resumption of the Jarring Talks²

October 11, 1970

Mr. Peterson: Secretary Rogers, we have been talking about tough Soviet response to the proposal for peace in Indochina. The Soviets reacted also in a very tough manner to the Middle East peace proposals. In spite of what you said Friday about there being no question that Russia has helped the Egyptians violate the standstill cease-fire there, Pravda and Tass said the charges are false, part of an anti-Soviet campaign of slander in the American press instigated by the United States Government. What is your reaction to those charges?

Secretary Rogers: I think, Mr. Peterson, it is well to keep in mind when we initially made the peace proposal dealing with the Middle East that the Soviet press reacted unfavorably but subsequently the initiative was agreed to.

Now, in this case, we understand that the public position that they take in the press does not necessarily coincide with the true attitude. In this case, in the case of President Nixon's proposal dealing with Indochina, they have said that they have not rejected it officially yet, and also Hanoi has said that it is a preliminary response; so we are not sure what the response is going to be. We have hopes it will be a favorable and affirmative response, possibly in private talks.

Now, as far as the Middle East is concerned, there again we are not discouraged by the fact that they have said these things. We believe what I said at the press conference;

² Excerpted from the Rogers-Laird interview broadcast on the American Broadcasting Company television and radio program "Issues and Answers"; transcript in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1636 (November 2, 1970), pp. 544-547, 553.

we believe there have been violations. On the other hand, there have been indications from the Soviet Union and from Egypt that they would like to extend the cease-fire, the 90-day period in the Middle East. And if they do, we have hopes that the negotiations can start again.

Peterson: You said there would be an extension of the cease-fire. I believe the Egyptian Foreign Minister was just quoted yesterday as saying that the Egyptians are not ready to extend the cease-fire.

Rogers: No, I don't believe that is what he said.

Peterson: He said there were conditions. The Israelis—I can't find the exact quote here, sir, but he said there were conditions and unless they were met—

Rogers: We believe that both sides would like to extend the cease-fire. We have hopes that that is the case. We will be discussing these matters with both the Soviet Union and the Foreign Minister from Egypt in New York next week, and I would hope that the parties can find some formula to permit negotiations to start.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you said in Friday's news conference that you can present evidence to Foreign Minister Gromyko when you meet with him in New York this weekend to prove that the Soviets have violated that cease-fire. Will you produce that evidence?

Rogers: It will depend on how the discussions go.

Scali: But you will be in a position to show him aerial photos if necessary?

Rogers: I don't want to go into what I will show him, but I think we can convince any reasonable person there have been violations. There is some question about whether the language of the standstill was clear or not. The language is perfectly clear. The language said there will be no construction of new missile sites within the 50-kilometer zone during the period of the cease-fire. Now, we have evidence which I believe is

conclusive, showing that there have been a good deal—there has been a good deal of construction of missile sites in the 50-kilometer zone.

Scali: Do you think this will be conclusive to someone like Mr. Gromyko?

Rogers: I am not sure. We have no interest in litigating this in public. That is not the point. The point of the discussions will be to try to get the parties to negotiate. There has been enough debate about the Middle East in the past in the United Nations and the public press, and so forth. What we are going to try to do is see if it's possible to get negotiations to start again.

Scali: The Soviets are taking the position, Mr. Secretary, that they haven't violated any agreement because they didn't sign anything. What do you say to a position like that?

Rogers: Well, we will discuss that with them. I don't think that is a very valid position. There is no doubt there was an understanding. The Soviet Union was part of it. They understood it. We will discuss that. As I say, I haven't any interest and the United States Government has no interest in trying to prove something in public. That is not the point. The point is that we are very anxious to get the negotiations started to see if it is possible to work out a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. We have a feeling that maybe the Soviet Union would like to have a settlement. Possibly not. Possibly that is wrong, but we will find out. We will find out whether the Egyptians want to or not.

But I think it is wise to keep in mind that during this 90-day period, because of the events in the Middle East, probably not much ground has been lost any way because negotiations could not have been held in a practical way in view of the civil war in Jordan and in view of the very tragic death of President Nasser. So we would hope that now that the situation in Jordan has stabilized some and that there is a new President in Egypt, that it will be possible to get the parties to negotiate under Ambassador

Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices.

Peterson: Secretary Rogers, I wonder if—you brought up the death of President Nasser—is that going to help or hinder, do you have a reading on the Middle East as yet? What are the prospects for peace?

Rogers: I think it is too early to tell. I notice President Sadat said he would follow the policies of President Nasser. It is quite clear President Nasser in accepting the cease-fire was at least thinking about working out a peaceful settlement. He did face up to the fedayeen problem in accepting our initiative. So we have some hope that President Sadat would follow the same policy and seek a peaceful settlement.

Scali: Secretary Laird, your Defense Department is in charge of carrying out aerial reconnaissance on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. Is there any doubt in your mind that the Soviets have cooperated with the Egyptians to violate that standstill cease-fire?

Secretary Laird: There is no doubt in my mind that construction has gone on within the 50-kilometer area, and that sites have been constructed and work has gone forward during this cease-fire period.

Scali: Do these violations include SAM-3's as well as the additional movement of SAM-2's?

Laird: It includes the construction of both SAM-3 and SAM-2 missile sites.

Scali: Do we continue to believe that the SAM-3 is completely operated and guarded by Soviet personnel?

Laird: Well, we feel that the Soviet technicians and Soviet help is needed as far as the SAM-3 sites are concerned. I don't think that necessarily will be the case forever, but the Soviets are training the Egyptians so they will be able to handle the SAM-3. But there is no question that Soviet technicians have been involved as far as the SAM-3 missile sites are concerned that have become operational in Egypt.

Peterson: Secretary Rogers, what explanation can you give for Russia's continuing to deny that they have violated the cease-fire agreement in the Middle East when you have unchallengeable proof that they have?

Rogers: Well, I am not sure. Of course, they take the position that whatever happened in the 50-kilometer zone is a result of Egyptian action, and it is understandable why they take that position; but we will know better after we talk to them this week what their position is.

It think it is well to keep in mind that our initiative was divided into two parts. First we said stop fighting and start talking. Now, the parties have stopped the fighting, and the cease-fire has been effective. The standstill part of it was a part of the agreement, but the fact is that the fighting has stopped and for the first time in a long time there is no fighting in that part of the world. We would hope that we do not lose sight—when I say “we” I mean all concerned—do not lose sight of the fact that our purpose is to try to get the talking started, because until the parties start talking about how they can solve these problems, there is no chance for peace in the area; that is, a permanent peace.

The area is a very prosperous area of the world. If they could work out a peaceful settlement, the whole area would benefit. There are plenty of resources, there is fine manpower, great brainpower. They have plenty of everything that is required. There is great opportunity for expansion of the industry and so forth, and all that is required is to sit down and try to work these problems out.

Now, obviously they are complex problems. They can't be solved by the great powers alone. We can't sit down and work out the solutions to problems that involve the people in the Middle East. They have to sit down and talk about them, and we can be helpful. The Soviet Union, if it wants to, can be helpful. We can play a useful role. But we can't impose a settlement on the other side. So our purpose and the purpose of our foreign policy in this area of

the world is to keep the cease-fire in place so the fighting stops and remains stopped; and two, to see if we can get the parties to negotiate these very complex problems, because if they could settle it, the world would be so much benefited and they, all the people in the area, would be benefited. We could provide great financial assistance to all parties concerned, including the Palestinians.

Scali: Secretary Laird, Radio Moscow has been accusing you of helping to crank up this anti-Soviet tone, or at least what it claims is an anti-Soviet tone, by saying that you are cranking out scare stories from the Pentagon primarily to influence Congress at budget time so that Congress will give the Pentagon a bigger defense budget. What do you say to that?

Laird: When I was in the Congress, I was critical of the Department of Defense from time to time for not putting out information in a timely fashion. Since I have been Secretary of Defense, we have tried to put out information as rapidly as we can regarding not only the Soviet threat but also the movement of Soviet naval vessels, the development of new strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. We believe that the American public has a right to this information, and we have tried to make it available in a timely fashion. I think that this forthcoming position that we have had in releasing this information is a good policy, and we intend to follow it.

The Soviet Union has talked one way about what they are going to do with their tremendous momentum that they have built up in the military area; their actions do not coincide, however, with the words they speak and the momentum that they have in the submarine construction program—we recently returned from the Mediterranean, where in a period of about 5 or 6 years they have gone from 750 steaming days in the Mediterranean Sea to over 18,000 steaming days. We have seen them place Y-class submarines on station, missile-firing submarines on station, off the coast of the United States which are capable of reaching our shores. We have seen them go forward

with the large SS-9 missile construction program. When I estimated last year that they had in being or under construction 230, people thought that I was wrong. My estimate was conservative. They now have over 300 of these large SS-9's in being or under construction. This is also true with their SS-11 and SS-13 program. So they have tremendous momentum, while we are going down, while we are trying to move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation. The Soviet Union has been increasing its military strength, and we have taken a different action here as far as our defense budget and our defense requirements are concerned. Unless we have success in SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] and these other negotiations areas, we are going to have to face up to some hard, tough decisions here which could require a tremendous increase as far as defense expenditures are concerned.

Scali: President Nixon, after visiting the 6th Fleet, was impressed enough with it to say that it has performed a very fine job and that, indeed, he might consider reinforcing it. Would you favor such a move now, sir?

Laird: We have reinforced it. Of course, it has been on a temporary basis. We have three carriers operating in the Mediterranean today. We have increased the number of destroyers. I think this exercise has shown that we can augment on a temporary basis the 6th Fleet from time to time should emergencies require; and I think it was important, the action which the President took in the increasing and augmenting on a temporary basis the size of the 6th Fleet during this very tense situation that did exist in the Middle East 2 or 3 weeks ago up through about 10 days ago.

Peterson: Is that going to remain on a temporary basis? Do you have any plans to do it permanently?

Laird: As you know, covering the Pentagon, we do not announce our ship movements in advance, but this was an augmentation—it was ordered on a temporary basis, but it can be done from time to time.

Peterson: Mr. Secretary, earlier in the program you mentioned something about we were willing to provide aid for the Middle East, including the Palestinians.

Rogers: Yes.

Peterson: Are we talking about setting up a separate state for the Palestinians, doing something on that order?

Rogers: No, I wasn't talking about anything specific. I was saying we have to take into consideration the welfare of the Palestinians. The United States has provided the greatest amount of money for the welfare of the refugees from the beginning, and we are prepared to assist in the future.

Laird: We still are, and I think it is important to point out the tremendous program we have going on in Jordan right now—not only in the way of food; we have some 50 flights of our aircraft into Jordan; we put in an Air Force hospital, an Army hospital. We have had 700 major surgical operations that have gone forward in these hospitals that we have provided. We are providing food in there to these Arabs, Arab people on both sides. This is a great humanitarian act that is being carried on, and our Air Force, our Army, has done a tremendous job in this area within the last few days.

Scali: In the 30 seconds that are left, gentlemen, could you tell us whether we have gone ahead to supply arms to the Government of Jordan as President Nixon has said we would do?

Laird: Well, we certainly, through our Military Assistance Program, are providing military assistance to Jordan, and that particular program will continue as planned and as approved by the Congress.

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Answer to a Parliamentary Question on U.S.S.R. Policy in the Middle East by External Affairs Minister McMahon of Australia¹

Canberra, October 13, 1970

Mr. B.W. Graham, M.P. (Liberal Party): My question is addressed to the Minister for External Affairs. I refer to the crisis in the Middle East. Has the Minister heard of the comments made by United States Secretary of State, Mr Rogers, about the movement of USSR Surface to Air Missile sites into the Suez Canal zone? Has he any precise and confirmed information about these missile installations, installed in defiance of the cease-fire arrangements? Does this information confirm the flexibility of communist integrity?

The Minister: This question must be judged against the recent background of the activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, particularly its naval operations in the seas and oceans of the world, including the Mediterranean Sea; the difficulty that has been experienced with the negotiations amongst the four powers over West Berlin; the problems of the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and now a development which I believe is as bad as any of those, the movement of SAM 1, 2 and 3 sites into the Canal zone. There is no doubt at all that despite the agreement that was reached between the USSR and the United States of America a large number of SAM 2 and 3 sites have been moved. The SAM 3 sites are manned and operated by USSR personnel and there can be no doubt whatsoever that USSR personnel as well as armaments are in this zone. The agreement was that there would be a cease-fire and no movement of any kind of arms or equipment into this zone.

Consequently, against the background that I have mentioned, recent developments have thrown a great question mark upon the

¹ *Current Notes on International Affairs* (Australia), XII, 10 (October 1970), p. 557.

integrity of the USSR. It is highly regrettable that these arms and equipment should have been moved at this time, when it did appear as though it was possible for Mr Jarring, the United Nations mediator, to get negotiations under way. These movements have, I think, invited retaliation from other countries. They are particularly regrettable in view of the fact that there had been a cease-fire between the Jordanian and Palestinian and Syrian forces and consequently it appeared that there was some prospect of a settlement. I can make no other comment than this: it is matter of great regret that these movements have occurred. Verification has been possible by U2 flights and other methods of identification and there is no doubt whatsoever that these SAM 2 and 3 sites have been moved. It is also most regrettable that this has caused some pause not only in the negotiations for a cease-fire but also in negotiations for peace in the Middle East which it was hoped to arrange.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Pompidou of France to the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)¹

Moscow, October 13, 1970

The President of the French Republic and Mme. Pompidou were the guests of the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Soviet Union from October 6 to 13, 1970. The President of the French Republic was accompanied by Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann.

The two sides note with satisfaction the efforts made for a cease-fire in the Middle East. They express the hope that, already in the very near future, discussions will be

started in a constructive spirit through Ambassador Jarring, the special envoy of the United Nations secretary-general, which will lead to an agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace based on the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and including provisions both for Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied territories and for recognition by each of the countries concerned of the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all the countries of this region.

The two sides are of the opinion that the four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council should step up their consultations in order to work out appropriate recommendations for Dr. Jarring so as to promote the success of his mission.

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Article Published in the U.S.S.R. Daily Pravda Reviewing and Explaining Soviet Proposals for a Middle East Settlement²

Moscow, October 15, 1970

For more than three years now the Middle East conflict has remained unsettled, a factor which keeps not only that area but the entire world in a state of tension.

The Israeli government, backed by the ruling political circles of the United States, continues its obstructive actions aimed at thwarting a political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Many facts which determine developments in the Middle East are presented in the reactionary bourgeois press in an entirely different and sometimes conflicting light, others are juggled with, while still others are not mentioned at all.

David Nes, former U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in the United Arab Republic, has publicly admitted that it is absolutely impossible to

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5565 (October 20, 1970), p. 23.

² English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5565 (October 20, 1970), pp. 21-22.

obtain a factual and accurate picture, through the information channels of the USA, including the press, radio, television, books and periodicals, of recent history or current events in the Middle East.

Israel, who attacked the Arab countries in June 1967, who is occupying extensive Arab territory in defiance of the United Nations resolution, and who is continuing to carry out piratical armed raids against the Arab states, is presented by U.S. propagandists as a kind of "defenceless islet" in a hostile Arab sea which is ready to swallow it up.

At the same time, certain people in Washington are perfectly well aware that the actions of Israel—in 1956 when, in retaliation for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, a piratical tripartite attack was made against Egypt, in 1967 when the extremist leadership in Tel Aviv, with U.S. support, tried with one blow to get rid of progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria, and again at the present time, when the unbridled Israeli military command is dreaming of bringing 100 million Arabs to their knees—are aware that all those actions have nothing to do with a "fight for existence."

Whenever the Soviet Union's attitude to events in the Middle East is involved, such methods as distortions, insinuations and the suppression of the true facts are employed to a still greater degree in the American and the pro-Zionist West European press.

The Soviet Union's approach to these developments is based on its assessment of the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet Union regards the Middle East crisis, not as a clash of national interests, but as an attempt by world imperialism, with the assistance of the Israeli leaders in pursuit of their own expansionist aims, to deal a blow at the national liberation movement in the Arab countries.

The right-wing bourgeois press spares no effort to impress upon public opinion the view that the United States has stepped up its diplomatic action, that it is seeking a political settlement in the Middle East.

Any manoeuvre by Washington is called a "new initiative".

At the same time, this press maintains complete silence—as though they do not exist at all—over the Soviet proposals on the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967—proposals which are concrete, spelt out and capable of bringing peace and security to all the Middle East countries.

It should be pointed out that the Soviet proposals were worked out on the basis of an analysis of the Middle East situation, taking into account the positions of the parties to the conflict, as well as bilateral and quadripartite consultations on questions concerning a Middle East settlement. The Soviet plan was submitted in due course to the countries concerned, and it was clarified and supplemented.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union did not present any ultimatum: its proposals were prompted only by the desire to make a practical contribution to a settlement of the drawn-out conflict and to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

So what is the Soviet plan for the normalisation of the Middle East situation?

First, in drafting our proposals, we proceed from the need for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is precisely a lasting peace that we have in mind, and not a precarious truce.

It is quite natural that peace of this order cannot be ensured by encouraging the aggressor and cannot be made stable unless Israeli troops are withdrawn from the extensive Arab territories which they have seized.

The Soviet Union has always proceeded, and continues to proceed, on the basis of the right of all Middle East states to a safe and autonomous national existence. The statement adopted at the Soviet Parliament's most recent session once again emphasised:

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR fully approves the Soviet government's policy of giving all-round assistance to the Arab states in their courageous struggle against the Israeli

aggression, a policy whose aim is to achieve a just and peaceful political settlement in the Middle East conflict.

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR maintains that every state in the Middle East enjoys the right to autonomous national existence and to independence and security.

A just solution to the Middle East crisis must be worked out not only because it is morally necessary—even though the moral factor is of extremely great importance. Without justice—that is to say, without the ending of the Israeli occupation of seized Arab territories, and not only without an end to the state of war, but also without the establishment of peace between states in this area, and equally without recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs—there will be no reasonably stable settlement.

Engels once wrote that the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine had made war a permanent factor in European politics. Is there any less reason to believe that Israel's present occupation of Arab territories turns war into an inevitable prospect in the Middle East?

Meanwhile, we know that there are a number of United Nations resolutions which provide for the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees or for compensation for their property. It is clearly necessary to decide the question of the Palestinian refugees in order to have a stable peace in the Middle East. All the more so do we regard as impermissible attempts to have "self-determination" for one people or a set of peoples on the basis of other peoples being completely deprived of their national rights.

Secondly, our proposals provide not just for the simple proclamation of peace in the Middle East, but for an understanding between the sides which would impose commitments on both of them. A tangible way to this now could be provided by contacts through the U.N. secretary-general's special envoy, Dr. Gunnar Jarring.

The Soviet Union has been and is in favour of the implementation of the Jarring mission. But is this mission an aim in itself? Of course not. What is needed is to establish

contacts between the sides through Dr. Jarring; the Jarring mission is required to find concrete ways of implementing the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

It should be remembered that this resolution provides for the evacuation of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, the ending of the state of war between the Arab countries and Israel, their right to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers, the freedom of shipping along sea lanes and a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

In the Soviet view, for the Jarring mission to be successful it is first of all necessary for the two sides, straightforwardly and unequivocally, to declare their readiness to implement the U.N. Security Council resolution all along the line.

A statement of this kind has already been made by the government of the United Arab Republic, which is contributing most to the effort to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression.

From the formal point of view Tel Aviv also seems to have consented to implement this resolution. However, this was done too indefinitely and in too general a form. Meanwhile, subsequent pronouncements by the Israeli leaders conflict with the provisions of the resolution to so great a degree that one cannot but doubt the sincerity of this Israeli consent.

Thirdly, the Soviet proposals guarantee the practical implementation of the entire complex of provisions of this Security Council resolution.

It is particularly important today to stand firm on the two main lines of settlement, which are: Israeli evacuation from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the simultaneous establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Both issues are organically fused and must be viewed as one composite entity.

The Soviet proposals thus coordinate the solution of these questions: the moment the final document, as co-ordinated through Dr. Jarring, is deposited with the United Na-

tions, the two sides must refrain from all action that would operate against the termination of the state of war; juridically, the termination of the state of war and the establishment of peace will begin the moment the first phase of the Israeli troop withdrawal from the territories occupied in June 1967 is completed—the evacuation may be carried out in two phases.

The Israeli leaders often indulge in talk about what they call "secure frontiers"; in practice it is uncurbed expansion for Israel that is being talked about under the guise of establishing "secure frontiers." Thus, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Army went so far as to say that the River Jordan would constitute a "secure frontier" for Israel.

It is absolutely plain that today, in this age when armaments are rapidly developing, the safety of this or that frontier is not at all ensured by shifting it a few miles away, but by having it universally recognised.

Were the present Israeli leaders really concerned about anything other than expansionist projects for territorial "acquisitions," Tel Aviv would pay closer heed to proposals guaranteeing the frontiers of the states in this area, including the frontiers of Israel, which would accord with the demarcation lines that existed on June 4, 1967.

As for guarantees for the frontiers of the Middle East states, the Soviet proposals ensure them by having the two sides adopt specific commitments to recognise, in conformity with the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, the impermissibility of acquiring territory through war, to respect one another's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence, to do all in their power to prevent hostile acts against one another from their respective territories, and mutually to refrain from interference in one another's internal affairs.

The Soviet proposals also stipulate demilitarised zones on either side of the frontier: such zones would give no advantage to either side, and their regime would incorporate

restrictions of a purely military character, the introduction of U.N. troops at a number of points and direct guarantees from the Big Four Permanent Members of the Security Council or from the U.N. Security Council itself.

Such are the Soviet proposals. If the Israeli leaders, who are supported by the imperialist circles of the USA, had not blocked their adoption, a just and lasting peace would long ago have become an established fact in the Middle East.

What do the Israeli leaders hope for? Do they think the Arabs will capitulate or do they think the USSR will reduce its help in this just cause against aggression? Neither is possible.

The Soviet position, which is one of full support for the Arab countries in their struggle to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression, remains unchanged as ever. This was once again stated by Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CPSU central committee, in Baku on October 2.

The same thing was also said in the joint communiqué issued on the recent visit to the United Arab Republic of the Soviet party and government delegation led by Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Could it be that Tel Aviv or Washington thinks that the Soviet position will change following President Nasser's death? Empty, illusory hopes! The Soviet policy of all-round support for the Arab states which are the victims of Israeli aggression rests on objective and unchanging factors.

Hopes of achieving success by exerting pressure on the USSR—whether it is a question of alleged "violations" of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal zone or Big Four meetings on the Middle East crisis—are equally shortsighted and without foundation.

Desiring a lasting and just peace in the Middle East—an area which is directly contiguous to its borders—the USSR is presenting a balanced, detailed programme for an Arab-Israeli settlement. It is in the interests of all peoples to make these proposals the groundwork for a basis that will lead to

lasting peace in this part of the world, which is fraught with danger.

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Statement by a U.S. State Department Spokesman on the Role of the Palestinians in a Middle East Settlement¹

October 15, 1970

The Palestinians will have to be a partner in the peace and their legitimate interests and aspirations will have to be considered in any such peace settlement. We have no preconceived ideas about what form Palestinian participation might take. We do note that more and more Palestinians seem to be talking about some entity. It is fair to say that we believe that most Palestinians want a political solution despite the fact that the militant *fedayeen* refuse to accept the idea of peaceful co-existence with Israel. . . . We of course deal with the established Arab governments in the area. They and Israel through negotiations will have to determine what might emerge in any peaceful political settlement. . . .

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Message from U.S.S.R. Leaders Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin to U.A.R. President Sadat Congratulating Him on His Election (Excerpts)²

October 16, 1970

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express confidence once again that you,

together with other loyal comrades-in-arms of the outstanding son of the Arab people Gamal Abdel Nasser, will continue with honour the work to which he devoted his entire life, and that the friendship and co-operation existing between our countries and peoples will continue to develop and grow stronger in the interests of progress, national independence, peace and security in the Arab East and throughout the world.

In assuring you of the unchanging nature of our feelings of friendship, fraternity and solidarity with the people of the United Arab Republic and of our unshakeable determination to pursue consistently the policy of developing all-round relations with the United Arab Republic and rendering support to the just struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialist Israeli aggression, we express firm confidence that the United Arab Republic, marching in the vanguard of the national liberation movement in the Arab East, will steadfastly follow the chosen path of national independence and social progress.

We express firm confidence that the peoples of the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries, strengthening their unity on an anti-imperialist basis and in close co-operation with the peace-loving peoples of the entire world, will achieve the removal of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the establishment of a just and a lasting peace in the Middle East.

¹ Excerpted from a statement by State Department press spokesman John King; *International Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1970, pp. 1, 2.

² English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5565 (October 20, 1970), p. 32.

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Radio Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on His Talks with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the Middle East Cease-Fire Situation¹

Jerusalem, October 16, 1970

Q. Foreign Minister, [words indistinct] discussing how Israeli-American relations have evolved in a thoroughly positive direction?

A. (I am absolutely certain of this development). Certain principles which were laid down in general terms have now become more concrete. I believe that amidst the turbulence of recent weeks—the fighting in Jordan, the circumstances in Egypt, the violations of the cease-fire—that Israel stands out in the American consciousness as an example of stability, vigilance, restraint—much more appreciation I think, of the basic attitudes of Israel towards the Middle Eastern crisis. In addition the United States is convinced that we are the injured party in the developments which have led to the paralysis of the Jarring mission, and that responsibility should be placed upon the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic, to create conditions for the renewal of that mission by rectification of the violation.

Q. The Americans are reported to be working for a partial rectification on the missiles. What would Israel's response be to this?

A. I am sure the United States would not object if by some chance it were possible to get a complete rectification, and in that sense we should understand the State Department spokesman's remarks. When I left Secretary Rogers the spokesman said that the United States expressed full sympathy with the Israeli position, as I had explained it to Mr. Rogers. It probably means that they are doubtful about the feasibility of obtaining a total Soviet and Egyptian response—to which I reply that we see no reason

whatever for modifying our request, which is a request in principle, and there is no point in negotiating with ourselves about compromises that don't exist. The situation is that the Soviet Union and the UAR have given an equally vehement No to the Israel formula of restoration and to the American formula of rectification. Therefore for the United States and Israel to start arguing about the rectification versus restoration would be very much like the old Talmudical precept [few words in Hebrew] that the egg hasn't been laid and there's no point in discussing it.

Q. Did redress of the military situation at the Canal come up in your talks with Secretary of State Rogers?

A. Yes, this was the major point that we discussed in the first part of our talks and we discussed it also at the dinner in the Ambassador's home. I pointed out that there were really two parts of this subject. There's the military aspect of it: the UAR has derived an illegitimate military advantage as a result of the observance of the cease-fire by Israel. If we had not observed the cease-fire, they wouldn't have been able to bring up this missile system in such convenience and in such numbers. But there is also the other aspect of it, no less important. The question is what validity can be ascribed to Egyptian undertakings and to Egyptian signatures. Now if we were to go into the Jarring talks without reference to this violation, what would the object be? The object would be—if we were successful—in getting an agreement. Now Israel would withdraw to secure recognised boundaries, not yet determined, in return for what? In return very largely for the credibility of an agreement to live with peace in Israel and to carry out all the obligations of a peace-loving State. Therefore, the question of the integrity and credibility of the Egyptians' signature is a question of transcendent importance—they have got to restore a degree of confidence in the utility of agreements with them. Simply to go on with a new agreement without caring whether the old one was being trampled upon

¹ Excerpted from Eban's interview broadcast October 17, 1970 on Israeli radio in English; reprinted by permission from BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3512/A/7 and A/8.

would be a very quixotic procedure—and I have found understanding for that in my talk with Mr. Rogers, and Mr. Sisco gave public expression.

tories in the struggle against aggression by U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism.

TUNG PI-WU
Vice-Chairman of the
People's Republic of China

CHOU EN-LAI
Premier of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China

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Message from Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu of China to U.A.R. President Sadat Congratulating Him on His Election¹

Peking, October 17, 1970

His Excellency Anwar el Sadat,
President of the United Arab Republic

On the occasion of your being elected President of the United Arab Republic, we extend warm congratulations to you on behalf of the Chinese people and Government.

The U.A.R. people have a glorious tradition of fighting imperialism. In order to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty, they have since the 1952 revolution waged long and unremitting struggles against imperialism and Israeli Zionism. The Chinese people and Government will, as always, firmly support this just struggle of the U.A.R. people till complete victory is won.

The Chinese and U.A.R. peoples have forged a profound friendship through their common struggle against imperialism and colonialism over a long period. We believe that with the joint efforts of our two sides, the friendship between our two peoples and the friendly relations between our two countries will further develop.

May the U.A.R. people under Your Excellency's leadership achieve continuous vic-

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Resolutions Adopted by the Twelfth Session of the Constituent Assembly of the World Islamic League (Excerpts)²

Mecca, October 18, 1970

I. Palestine

Having discussed the report of the Secretariat-General on Palestine, the Constituent Assembly adopted the following resolutions:

A. The Assembly calls on all the Islamic peoples to do their duty by waging a holy war to rescue Palestine and to liberate all of its territory from the Zionist gangs, to purge the Aqsa Mosque and the whole of the Holy Land of occupation, and to protect all Arab Islamic countries from the aggression which the enemy is plotting against them. It also resolves that it is the duty of these peoples to cooperate with loyalty, sincerity, devotion and sacrifice in this holy war which Almighty God has made obligatory for Muslims to protect their lives and all that is holy to them and to defend their homelands and their honor.

B. To support the holy war for the liberation of Palestine, the Aqsa Mosque, the Sanctuary of Abraham and all the holy places in Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories from this criminal aggression,

¹ *Peking Review*, XIII, 43 (October 23, 1970), p. 4.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Bilad* (Jedda), October 27, 1970. The session met from October 3-18, 1970.

and to provide the heroic fighters of the holy war with all they require to enable them to continue the war and achieve their noble aim, which is to rescue the country from occupation and to restore it to the fold of Islam and the Arabs, where it is held in such honor and affection.

C. While appreciating the praiseworthy efforts that the Islamic governments and peoples are making on behalf of their common goal of liberating Palestine, the Assembly calls on them to make still further efforts and to coordinate them.

D. The Assembly affirms that Israel has expansionist and colonialist designs on the Arab and Islamic countries which it is implementing step by step, and that force exerted by Arabs and Muslims is the only way to recover their usurped rights.

E. The Assembly urges the Arab and Islamic countries not to be deceived by Israel's pretended desire for peace or by the Rogers Plan, the only object of which is to strengthen Israel's hold on Arab and Islamic territories, and not to accept any solution of the Palestine problem which is not acceptable to the Palestinian people.

The Assembly also requests the Arab and Islamic countries to make themselves as strong as possible in order to recover their rights in the Holy Land and in all the other occupied territories, and to arm themselves with the greatest possible caution and vigilance.

F. The Assembly calls on those responsible for the armed forces engaged in the holy war to do all they can to strengthen the spirit of Islam in the forces under their command and to ensure their spiritual mobilization so that they may be more profoundly aware of the lofty values of their religion and the heroic episodes of their history.

G. Having learned the distressing details of the way in which the criminal Zionists have violated the sanctity of the Aqsa Mosque by their destructive excavations beneath its walls and historic buildings, the Constituent

Assembly of the World Islamic League, which is meeting in Mecca, is of the opinion that the excavation which aggressive Zionism is undertaking beneath and around the Aqsa Mosque can only be regarded as an act of flagrant aggression and a grave violation of the sanctity of a mosque which is one of the holiest places in Islam, and that the Zionists' object is to destroy it completely and erect their temple on its ruins.

The Assembly wishes to emphasize the following facts:

1. The Wailing Wall, which the Jews are using as their pretext for carrying out excavations in this area, is the western wall of the Aqsa Mosque. This was affirmed by the report of the international commission that was formed by a resolution of the League of Nations on January 14, 1930, which states that:

To the Moslems belongs the sole ownership of, and the sole proprietary right to, the Western Wall, seeing that it forms an integral part of the Haram al-Sharif area, which is a Waqf property.

To the Moslems there also belongs the ownership of the Pavement in front of the Wall and of the adjacent so called Moghrabi [Moroccan] Quarter opposite to the Wall, inasmuch as the last-mentioned property was made Waqf under Moslem Sharia Law, it being dedicated to charitable purposes.

2. The excavations the Jews are carrying out in the city of Jerusalem, which are resulting in buildings being so seriously damaged that they have to be evacuated, and their demolition of houses, mosques, schools and Islamic Waqf property, on the pretext that this is necessary for the completion of the excavations in the Aqsa Mosque, are aggressive measures aimed at changing Jerusalem from an Arab and Islamic city into a purely Jewish one.

The United Nations has adopted a whole series of resolutions on the status of the City of Jerusalem, all of them branding Israel as an aggressor and calling on it to refrain from all measures liable to result in such a change.

But the Israeli authorities have persisted in their aggressive activities, in utter contempt of all these resolutions.

Therefore, in view of the afore-mentioned facts, the Assembly has resolved that it is necessary that the following measures be taken:

1. That a detailed memorandum be sent to the United Nations, to all Islamic countries and to all Islamic organizations in the world, describing the aggressions which the Zionists are committing with the object of destroying the Aqsa Mosque, Judaizing the City of Jerusalem, changing its character and evicting its inhabitants, and calling on them to spare no effort to check this flagrant aggression against all that is most sacred to Muslims, and against their rights and sentiments.

2. That this memorandum be sent to the Secretariat-General of the Islamic Countries and the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, calling on them to contact the Security Council, the United Nations and other international bodies to ensure the implementation of the afore-mentioned resolutions on Jerusalem, drawing their attention to the Israeli aggression in defiance of these resolutions, and asking them to send an international commission to observe this aggression in Jerusalem and to submit a report on it to the international quarters concerned.

3. That Islamic and world public opinion be informed of what the Zionists are doing in Palestine in general, and in the Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem in particular, through all available information media, including broadcasting, the press, television and the issuing of statements.

Having studied the question of the confiscation by the Jews of Arab Islamic lands in the City of Jerusalem, and having perused the memoranda submitted to it on this subject, the Constituent Assembly of the World Islamic League, meeting in Mecca, came to the conclusion that there is a Jewish plan which aims at the destruction of a

considerable part of the Arab houses in Jerusalem, the eviction of tens of thousands of its Arab inhabitants, the elimination of the majority of the religious and historic buildings which link the present of Arabs and Muslims with their past in this holy city, with the object of Judaizing it and completely obliterating its Islamic character, in defiance of all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the United Nations since the occupation in 1967, which have called on Israel to desist from all measures liable to change the status of Jerusalem. The Assembly therefore resolves the following:

1. To protest to the United Nations against the Jewish plan to Judaize Jerusalem, and to call on it to ensure the implementation of its resolutions on Jerusalem.

2. To send a full memorandum to the Secretariat-General of the Islamic countries, the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, all Islamic governments and all Islamic bodies and organizations, describing the dangers to which Jerusalem and its holy places are exposed, as also the city and mosque of Hebron, and calling on them to take all measures to prevent Israel from continuing its iniquitous aggression against these Muslim holy places.

3. To employ all information and publicity media to acquaint Islamic and world public opinion with the facts about the Jewish criminal aggressions against Jerusalem, the Aqsa Mosque and the city and mosque of Hebron.

II. The Assembly supports the agreement reached by the Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo on Rajab 26, 1390 A.H. [September 27, 1970 A.D.] on ending the ordeal of the Arab nation in Jordan, which agreement was signed by the Kings, Presidents, Heads and Leaders of the following Arab countries: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, the Tunisian Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Central Committee of the Palestinian

Resistance, the State of Kuwait, the Yemeni Arab Republic and the Sudanese Republic.

This Conference formed a higher committee, headed by Mr. al-Bahi al-Ladgham, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Tunisia, to follow up the enforcement of this basic agreement and of such subsidiary agreements as it may give rise to with the purpose of coordinating activities and relations between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian Resistance so that security may be established and the situation be restored to normal.

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Statement on Resumption of the Jarring Talks and Extension of the Cease-Fire Issued by the Government of Israel¹

October 25, 1970

[The Government of Israel has re-emphasized] Israel's readiness to participate in the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring in response to the U.S. Government's initiative, on condition that all the clauses of the cease-fire agreement between the countries concerned be reciprocally observed.

Israel is opposed to acquiescence in the violation of the cease fire agreement, and the restoration of the status quo ante in the standstill area will renew the possibility of returning to the talks under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, on condition of the meticulous reciprocal observance of all the clauses of the agreement.

The Government of Israel is prepared to extend the cease-fire for an indefinite period in order to facilitate progress in the talks for the achievement of peace.

The Government regards the Egyptian-Soviet initiative for the holding of a debate in the General Assembly as a move calculated to sabotage the possibility of holding peace talks.

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Declaration Urging Israeli Resumption of the Jarring Talks Issued by the Israel Movement for Peace and Security²

Tel-Aviv, October 26, 1970

The Council of the Movement for Peace and Security has decided to hold a number of sessions aimed at a comprehensive discussion of the latest Mid-East developments and their implications concerning the prospects for peace or the renewal of hostilities. In its last session the Council arrived at the following resolutions:

1. The Movement for Peace and Security calls on the Israeli Government to resume urgently the Jarring peace talks, without any preliminary conditions.

2. The displacement of the missiles by the Egyptians is a serious violation of the cease-fire agreement. The Government should consider every possible means to counter the resultant military threat, as long as it does not jeopardize the peace talks or lead to a war outbreak.

3. Recognizing the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-definition, the Movement calls on the Government to see to it that a Palestinian representative body takes part in the peace talks.

4. The recent statements of the Prime Minister and some others, accompanied by maps involving the annexation of large areas and the expansion of settlements in the administered areas, place the peace talks in jeopardy. The Movement stands opposed to any annexation and reiterates its position that the Israeli Government must seek a peace agreement based on secure and recognized borders consistent with the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 in its entirety.

¹ *Israel Digest*, XIII, 22 (October 30, 1970), p. 1.

² *Jerusalem Post*, October 26, 1970, p. 5 (Advertisement).

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko to the U.K. (Excerpts)¹

London, October 29, 1970

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, made an official visit to the United Kingdom at the invitation of the British Government from October 26 to 29, 1970.

Particular attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East. Concern was expressed at the continuing tension in the area and the importance was emphasised of achieving a peaceful political settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. There was agreement on the urgent need for progress towards such a settlement and for the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission at the earliest possible date: and also for the exertion of utmost efforts to search for possibilities through the agreement of the parties directly concerned to extend the observance of the cease-fire for a period to be determined. The two Governments would continue to work for agreement in the New York consultations of the representatives of the four powers.

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Radio Interview Statements on the Administration of the Occupied West Bank by Police Minister Hillel of Israel²

October 31, 1970

Q: A proposal was made recently by a number of Ministers for the establishment of self-government in the West Bank. As a man who has dealt with West Bank affairs for a long time, what is your opinion of this proposal?

Answer: I do not know anything about a proposal by some ministers. You can ask me my opinion on issues raised, not by some ministers, but on specific issues which you raise. If you ask me about self-government, I am ready to state my opinion. I think that to the extent that the reference is to normal administration, the independence which exists in the administration in the administered areas under the Military Government is maximal. It is almost something that has no equal or precedent. I think that we, even for our own needs, interfere little in their daily affairs.

Q: Mr. Hillel, there are many who believe that self-government means separate political self-government for the West Bank residents.

Answer: The question then is not a question of normal administration, but a question of a different political solution for the West Bank so long as there is no political solution between us and Jordan. I want you to remember that there are Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank, but they constitute the minority of the Palestinians residing in Jordan. I do not imagine that any logical person would want us to separate the fate of the Palestinians living here from the entire problem between us and Jordan—where the majority of the Palestinians live.

Q: Why?

Answer: Because we are present in the

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5567 (November 3, 1970), pp. 45, 46.

² Excerpted from Hillel's interview broadcast on Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3524/A/11 and A/12; reprinted by permission.

administered areas as a result of a war which was imposed on us by the surrounding Arab States—by Jordan. We are now ready to end the war and reach a settlement with the State of these residents—to determine a settlement, borders and norms of life. We are not at war with isolated residents or towns, God forbid. It is very clear to me that the aim, desire and demand of the residents of the administered areas—the only political demand which is acceptable to all of them—is that we should not be present in the administered areas. But we say we will continue to hold these territories until we reach a peace settlement between us and the principal State, which is the State of the Palestinians—between us and Jordan.

Q: Mr. Hillel, you recently held talks with many notables and leaders of the West Bank. Was the possibility of self-government raised by them or any other proposal calling for a different political solution to the present situation?

Answer: The residents of the administered areas regard themselves as an inseparable part of the residents on the other side of the Jordan river. They do not think there should be anything to separate the West Bank from the East Bank. I did not meet anyone of authority who thought a separate solution was possible.

Q: Some of them, for example, demand UN supervision of the administered areas.

Answer: I prefer a hundred times to reach a settlement with Jordan—with their State—and to reach a settlement which may be less good than to reach a settlement which will lead to the return of the UN and its observers to the area. We had enough experience with the UN. I am not excited when someone says I want you to go so that the UN will come here. This, from Israel's point of view, is not a solution which will be accepted [words indistinct].

Q: Attempts have been made during the three years of Israeli rule to hold conferences of Arab leaders, particularly in Judaea and Samaria. Often—in fact in most cases—the Military

Government did not permit such conferences. I do not mean regional conferences, but a conference of leaders from the entire West Bank, or from several regions in it. Why is the Israeli Government not interested in political conferences in the areas?

Answer: This is not accurate. We allow political meetings. The leaders hold political meetings among themselves whenever they want. If we allow leaders to travel to Amman, Beirut or Cairo to meet other political leaders, how can one think we prevent or try to prevent political leaders from Nablus, Hebron and Jericho meeting and exchanging views. The truth is that all this should be done within an acceptable framework of the Military Government. I think, by the way, that for anyone who envisions free political campaigns—differing views—and asks why we should not allow them to be expressed in a manner they are accustomed to, it is probably better for him to look at what is happening on the East Bank of the Jordan, where political arguments are taking place in such a manner that the Government has disintegrated—one murders the other, one shoots the other, and one shells the other.

Q: Since Israel entered the areas and even before that, no municipal or local council elections have taken place. Is there an inclination to hold such elections?

Answer: I have not heard any mayor make such a request nor have I heard any of the residents. I have not faced this question, but I assume that if a municipality wants to renew the mandate of the mayor, or a mayor asks for renewal of his mandate, I personally see no reason why I should stop them.

Q: Finally, Mr. Hillel, so far we have spoken about solutions with which you do not agree. What is your solution? What should be done in the areas?

Answer: I think we are exploiting this period of military government in a positive way. We are exploiting it to establish relations not only with the residents of the areas, but beyond them. The open bridges

are a very serious contribution. What we are trying to do is to establish relations with different understanding between us and the Arabs and between us and the neighbouring Arab States, despite the state of war imposed on us [sentence as heard] . . .

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Speech on the Bases of a Middle East Settlement Delivered to a Conservative Party Meeting by U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas-Home¹

Harrogate, October 31, 1970

Since the general election, we as Conservatives have set out to apply in international affairs a coherent view of Britain's interests. There are certain areas of the world where Britain is directly involved: there we have set out to define our commitments and to give a balance to our priorities so that our resources may be deployed to maximum effect. In other areas, Britain's interests are less direct. But as a trading nation, with many of our resources vulnerable, we have one overriding interest: and that is stability and peace. And from that point of view, there is one problem which is the most difficult and dangerous of all those with which your Government is faced in foreign affairs. It is not new; indeed, there is a sense in which it is one of the oldest problems in the world. That is the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

The Middle East is the cradle of Western civilisation; but it is also the oldest battlefield in the world. The 19th century saw the European Powers drawn into the rivalries of the region—at first the French, and then ourselves, the Russians and others following.

These interventions began a process of tremendous change. New Arab States were created, exposing traditional societies to the

new tensions that come with political independence and economic growth and international contact. Then the emergence of Israel as a State with ideals to capture the imagination, but with a troubled history which has resulted in dangerous tensions with her neighbours, tensions which have given rise to war on three occasions in the last 25 years. Finally there has been the spread of a political revolution through the Arab States, with violent change and drastic shifts of alignment.

Throughout this turbulent period the Great Powers have retained their deep involvement in the region. Partly this is a matter of historic commitment. Partly it is a matter of vital oil reserves on which the Middle Eastern economy is based. And partly it is, as it has always been, a question of strategy, in the context of international politics and security; because in spite of the changes our century has seen in transport and communications and the art of war, this region still lies across Europe's way to the east and Russia's way to the south. That is part of the background to 22 years of recurrent violence in the Middle East—tangled strands of emotion, religion and ideology, with each side sure of the justice of its own cause.

The Arabs believe that Arab lands have been usurped by Israel. They point to the sufferings of the Palestinian refugees, now swollen to nearly a million and a half, as evidence that their land was unjustly taken. The idea of Arab unity, which in its modern form has grown up in our lifetime, has become linked with this cause; and the status of Jerusalem is once again a rallying cry of Muslims, just as it was for other religions in earlier centuries when they too felt dispossessed. That is why Arabs for long refused to recognise Israel; that is why some have on occasion pledged themselves to Israel's destruction. And since the war of 1967, it has seemed legitimate and necessary to many Arabs to drive Israel by violence out of Arab territories, occupied at that time, which to them Israel seems determined to keep. That is why the guerilla activities of

¹ Text provided on request by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.

Palestinian nationalists find ready support in Arab countries, however much their activities may be condemned in the international community, as adding fuel to fire—an international community which recognises in stateless freedom-fighters a new threat to peace and security.

On the other side, for the Israelis, as an elected member of the United Nations, the main and rightful concern is their own survival and security. They feel that the very existence of their State is threatened; to them this justifies the use of force in self-defence, something for which the Charter of the United Nations provides. Since the 1967 war, they have believed that the Arabs will make peace only if they see that every attack is met by deterrent force. This determination is strengthened by a mixture, which is just as potent as the Arabs' own, of history and nationalism and religion.

So both sides believe that they are right. Both sides believe that force is legitimate and necessary for them to achieve their goals. And so the dispute drags on from crisis to crisis, with all the waste and bloodshed that involves—above all, waste of opportunities for economic development in the region, development which could be bought with all the undoubted wealth of the region, which would relieve poverty, but is instead being squandered on unparalleled defence expenditure.

And waste is not the only evil. For it is this dispute which has enabled Soviet influence to penetrate the Arab world—a penetration which will continue as long as these tensions are not resolved, and which brings the area of the Middle East, and perhaps more than the area, to the brink of a major conflict; for it carries with it the appalling risk that any future war between Arabs and Israelis will involve the Super Powers.

How can these tensions be resolved? An equilibrium is needed in the Middle East which both sides would be prepared to accept. The actual issues in dispute are of a kind which can be solved. The fabric of a settlement consistent with the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 which

would be fair and should be workable can easily be produced. Agreed solutions on all the separate elements would have to be incorporated into a formal and binding agreement which would be endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. But like the Resolution of November 1967, any such settlement must be based on two fundamental principles: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need for a just and lasting peace, in which every State in the area is guaranteed the right to live in security. This means, as the Security Council Resolution said, that Israeli Armed Forces must withdraw from territories occupied in the conflict; and that, on the other hand, the state of belligerency which has existed in the Middle East must be ended, and the right of every State to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, must be recognised.

At its simplest, the Arab/Israel dispute has been about two things, land and people. I believe that a settlement should establish a definitive agreement on territorial questions. Such an agreement would be the answer both to Israel's fear for her existence and, at the same time, to Arab fear of Israeli expansionism. This is why the balance between the provisions for Israeli withdrawal and secure and recognised boundaries is so important.

No outsider can prescribe exactly where these boundaries should be. If they are to be recognised, they must first and foremost be agreed by the countries concerned. Between Israel and Egypt, an international boundary has existed for a long time. I believe that this boundary should once again be recognised in a settlement, subject to whatever arrangements might be made to deal with the special problems of Gaza—problems that derive from the immense concentration of refugees in the Gaza area, whose future would have to be resolved by a settlement. Between Israel and Jordan, the problem is more difficult; there has never been a recognised boundary between the two countries. But I believe that the Resolution implies that secure and recognised boundaries should be

based on the Armistice Lines which existed before the war of 1967, subject to minor changes which might be agreed between the two countries. Between Israel and Lebanon there is no problem; the present boundary, though troubled by fighting like so many other areas in this troubled region, has never been questioned and should remain. Between Israel and Syria there is of course the very sensitive problem of the Golan Heights. Syria has not accepted the Security Council Resolution; it is therefore impossible yet to discuss how the dispute between Israel and Syria should be resolved. But I would expect that, once Syria accepted the Resolution, the general principles governing the location of the other boundaries would also govern the boundary between Israel and Syria.

There is one special problem, which in some ways symbolises the Arab/Israel problem as a whole: I mean the problem of Jerusalem. The complexity of this problem, and the depth of feeling about the city, are so great as to make any compromise between the positions of the two sides hard to conceive. Some agreement providing for freedom of access to the Holy Places, and for their protection, seems to be the only answer, and will be an essential part of a settlement. But this may have to be almost the last problem to be tackled.

The second main pillar of a settlement would be the binding commitments which the Arab countries and Israel would make to live at peace with one another. These should include the establishment of a formal state of peace. They should cover an obligation on all States to refrain from any act or threat of hostility, and to do all in their power to prevent the planning or conduct of any such acts on their territory.

There are, of course, other problems. One, which I should like to emphasise, is that of the Arabs who were refugees from Palestine during and after the fighting of 1948. When I spoke earlier of the Arab/Israel dispute being a problem of people, it was above all of the refugees that I was thinking. For many years the international

community as a whole has agreed on how this problem should be settled. It is agreed that those refugees who wish to return to their homes, and are prepared to live in peace with their neighbours, should be allowed to do so; and that those who choose not to should be enabled to resettle elsewhere with compensation. The need for a just settlement of the refugee problem is pressing, although it is unrealistic to suppose that a settlement will be reached before the other issues of which I have spoken are resolved; it must be a part of the whole. And we must not ignore the political aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs, and their desire to be given a means of self-expression. We cannot support any political programme which should involve the disappearance of the State of Israel; this is what the Palestinian resistance organisations at present demand. But we must work for a settlement which will attract the agreement of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinians, and which takes account of their legitimate aspirations—resettlement in dignity and honour.

There is also the problem of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. Firm guarantees will be required for all three.

All these are matters which are capable of solution. They are matters on which practical action can be taken, action which would remove the distrust which has so far stultified progress. Now that for a time the shooting has stopped, now that the fighting has ceased in Jordan, now that the four major Powers and all the parties agree that peace should be made, now is the opportunity; and it should be seized.

There are many problems ahead. There is the problem of how a settlement would be achieved. There is a more important problem of the charges and the counter-charges of violations of the military standstill on the Suez Canal. These are all questions which must be resolved. I believe that a simultaneous effort by all concerned, a simultaneous decision to grasp the opportunity of making peace which I think exists, would allow progress to be made. Britain launched the

Resolution on which Dr. Jarring's peace mission rests. If this opportunity to relaunch it is lost, we may face another 20 years of tension and strife—20 years or more in which the peace which the region so desperately needs will be lacking—and with the risks of confrontation between the major Powers increasing. This is a price which I believe none of us, neither Arab nor Jew, neither Russian nor American, certainly not we in Britain, should be prepared to pay.

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Final Statement Issued by the Third Annual Convention of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates¹

Evanston, Illinois, November 1, 1970

The Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., an organization dedicated to informing the American people as to issues pertaining to the Arab world, at its Third Annual Convention held at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, on the 30th, 31st October and the 1st November, 1970, examined the relationship of the Arab people with various European, American and Afro-Asian states of the world. Through its principal addresses and a series of panel discussions by leading Asian, African, European and American scholars and active participants in effecting relations between the Arab people and other peoples of the world (as perceived by the Arab people), the Association recognized the growing collaboration between the Arab and Afro-Asian communities to obtain a greater measure of dignity, equality and justice for all people. Further, the Association recognized the growing hostility between the Arab people and the Western European and American governments resulting from the exploitative practices of the latter and their

persistent attempts to continue to deny the developing communities of the world their just demands for a dignified existence. After detailed examination of the totality of the relationship between the Arab people and the rest of the world, the Third Annual Convention, in its efforts to bring to the American people an understanding of the feelings and thinking of the Arab people, unanimously adopted the following statement:

"No sooner has the Arab people succeeded in articulating their demands for the establishment of a secular unitary Arab State that would encompass all who share the bond of Arabism, and for the full participation of all its citizens in the conduct of public affairs on a basis of complete equality than European imperialism subjugated the Arab peoples. The object of imperialism has been to exploit the vast human and material resources of the Arab people by instituting a system of oppression and frustrating their social, economic and political aspirations. To effect that exploitation, they dismembered the Arab world and increased the internal fragmentation of Arab society by encouraging and promoting national, religious, social and political differences. The national struggle against colonialism was waged in the name of a secular national ideology and the implementation of social justice. The independence of the major part of the Arab homeland was accomplished through the tremendous sacrifices which Arab people made in confronting the enormous power of various imperialist countries.

"While the Association salutes the Arab people who struggled for freedom, it notes with serious concern that certain parts of the Arab homeland remain under European and colonial subjugation. The Association, therefore, calls upon the Arab people to intensify their struggle against vestiges of European imperialism in the Arabian Gulf areas and calls upon the independent Arab States to render full material and moral support to the valiant struggle of the Arab people in South Arabia.

¹ AAUC Newsletter, III, 4 (December 1970), pp. 4, 6.

"At the same time, the Association notes anew that the just and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people continue to be denied. In this connection, the Association reaffirms its statement of September 2, 1970.

"The Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., adheres to the position expressed in its December 7, 1969, statement; namely that the conflict in the Middle East emanates from the continued denial by the combined forces of Zionism/imperialism of the Palestinian right of self-determination. This right was reaffirmed by the United Nations as recently as December 10, 1969. The Jordanian Army attacks on the Palestinians constitute another attempt to deprive the Palestinian people of their legitimate exercise of self-determination and liberation. The Association deplores these attacks and calls upon all concerned to bring about an immediate halt to these attacks. The Association deplores all forms of foreign military intervention in the Middle East and believes that such intervention constitutes a flagrant violation of international law, is most detrimental to world peace. The Association calls upon all anti-war elements in the United States and throughout the world to mobilize their efforts to frustrate intervention and to render all possible support to the just cause of the Palestinian people and thereby contribute to an enduring peace in the Middle East.

"The Association salutes the Palestinian people in their just struggle against Zionism/colonialism and their fellow-travelers and assures them of its continued total support. It further calls upon all free people everywhere to rally behind the Palestinian people, to mobilize their efforts to frustrate the attempts of colonialism/Zionism to administer the final solution to the Palestinian people, and to frustrate all military and political efforts which seek the capitulation of the Arab people to Israel and her imperialist supporters.

"Further, the Association notes with alarm that the United States government has been pursuing a policy of duplicity

and imperialism in the Middle East and the Third World. The United States government, against the wishes of the large majority of the American people, has pursued a policy of military and economic support to racist settler regimes, to colonial and Fascist regimes throughout the world. The Association deplores the military support that the United States has been rendering to Israel which has enabled the latter to conduct a racist war against the Arab peoples. Similarly, the Association deplores the continued support which the United States has been rendering to the colonial regime of Portugal which is oppressing the gallant fighters of Mozambique and Angola. Also, the Association feels that the United States should revise its policies with regards to the settler regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. The Association believes the continued military support which the United States has been rendering to the settler regimes of Israel, Rhodesia and South Africa and to the colonial regime of Portugal lies at the heart of the continued success of these colonial/Fascist regimes in thwarting the principles of liberty, dignity and equality and is a living affront to the best ideals of the American people. The Association therefore, calls upon the American people to exercise their rights to persuade the Administration to suspend diplomatic relations with these settler regimes. The failure of the United States to do so and to pursue a policy based on the principles of justice, liberty and dignity invites definite alienation of free people throughout the world and may become a factor leading to certain world conflagration.

"The Association notes that the Arab states have been forced over the past few years to concentrate their efforts and to mobilize their resources to wage successful resistance against colonialism and its agents in the region. While the Association welcomes the efforts of the Arab people to defend themselves against colonial aggression, it believes that the successful defense of the Arab people is contingent upon the full and scientific mobilization of the human

and material resources of the Arab people, upon the full political integration of the Arab States and upon liquidation of all manifestations of colonial exploitation and oppression. The Association calls upon the progressive forces of the Arab world, to eject colonialism in whatever form it expresses itself and to wage a relentless war against corrupt and oppressive domestic reactionary systems. Only by doing so will the full weight of the Arab people be brought to bear on the final confrontation with the forces of colonialism/Zionism in the region.

"The Association believes that with the successful continuation of the Arab Revolution that received a considerable assistance from the nationalist Revolution of Egypt in 1952, the Arab people would be assured not only of the support of all oppressed people throughout the world but would eventually succeed in establishing an Arab society in which the full potential of all citizens would be fulfilled on the basis of justice, equality and dignity. Not only are the Arab people entitled to the support of all oppressed people, but they in turn have the moral responsibility to render all possible support to the just struggle of all oppressed people in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas."

Resolution passed at the conclusion of the Third Annual Convention of the Association

The AAUG recognizes the Palestine Resistance Movement as the only legitimate liberation movement of the Palestinian people and as the vanguard of the Arab revolution. As was stated in the resolution of the Second Annual Convention meeting, held in Detroit, Michigan, in December, 1969, and further recognizing that recent attempts by Zionism, Jordanian reaction and Western imperialism to liquidate the Palestine revolution have resulted in the promulgation of a dismembered so-called Palestine entity. The AAUG resolves that:

1. No Arab or Palestinian speaks for or can enter into negotiation on behalf of the Palestinian revolution. The Palestinian revo-

lution, which is the revolution of the Palestinian people, speaks for itself by having gained the complete support of the Palestinian masses. Its aim is the complete liberation of Palestine, and not a symbolic part thereof.

2. The Palestinian resistance is part of the Arab revolution and it is only within the context of the Arab revolution that the problem of Israel will be solved. The rights of the minorities, including the Jewish minority, are related to the outcome of the Arab revolution. It is therefore the obligation of oppressed people, Jewish and Arab, and of progressives everywhere to support the Palestine revolution.

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An Appeal by a Group of Black Americans Against U.S. Support For Israel¹

November 2, 1970

We, the Black American signatories of this advertisement are in complete solidarity with our Palestinian brothers and sisters, who like us, are struggling for self-determination and an end to racist oppression.

The recent bloodbath in Jordan, resulting in tens of thousands of dead and wounded Palestinians, would not have been possible without the encouragement, armaments and financial aid of the United States Government.

America's support for King Hussein's slaughter of Palestinian refugees and freedom-fighters is consistent with its support of reactionary dictatorships throughout the world—from Cambodia and Vietnam to South Africa, Greece and Iran.

We stand with the Palestinian people in their efforts to preserve their revolution, and oppose its attempted destruction by American Imperialism aided by Zionists and Arab reactionaries.

¹ Published as an advertisement in the *New York Times*, November 1, 1970; this text from *Action* (New York), November 2, 1970, pp. 6-7.

We state that we are not anti-Jewish. We are anti-Zionist and against the Zionist State of Israel, the outpost of American Imperialism in the Middle East. Zionism is a reactionary racist ideology that justifies the expulsion of the Palestinian people from their homes and lands, and attempts to enlist the Jewish masses of Israel and elsewhere in the service of imperialism to hold back the Middle East revolution.

The Zionist Organization of America in an ad in the New York Times of Sept. 17, 1970 stated: "It is appropriate for the United States to begin to treat Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, as a de facto ally for the safeguarding of American interests."

According to the National Observer of May 18, 1970, the world Zionist movement is big business. "When the blood flows, the money flows," observes Gottlieb Hammer, chief Zionist fund collector in this country.

We state that the Palestinian Revolution is the vanguard of the Arab Revolution and is part of the anti-colonial revolution which is going on in places such as Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola, Brazil, Laos, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Because of its alliance with imperialism, Zionism opposes that anti-colonial revolution and especially revolutionary change in the Middle East.

We state that Israel, Rhodesia, and South Africa are three privileged white settler-states that came into existence by displacing indigenous peoples from their lands. Israel and South Africa each have about 4,500 political prisoners—most of whom have not been brought to trial.

J. Weitz, director of the Department of Colonization of the Jewish Agency for Israel, stated . . . "The only possible solution lies in creating a Palestine . . . without Arabs . . . and there is no other way to do this than to transfer all the Arabs to neighboring countries, to move all of them out of here." —Davar (Pub. in Israel), Sept. 29, 1967.

The South African Government supported Israel during the June, 1967, war. Dr. Vorster's government not only permitted South African volunteers to work in civilian

and paramilitary capacities in Israel, but more than \$28 million was raised by pro-apartheid South African Zionists and sent to Israel. "After the June 1967 Middle-East war, there was considerable speculation about an Israel-type action against Zambia and Tanzania, countries which share a firm anti-apartheid policy and support the African Liberation Movement . . . In September 1967, South Africa's top Army and Air Force officers learned at first hand about Israel's tactics in the Middle East war from General Mordechai Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force. He addressed between 50 and 100 officers at the Air Force College, Voortrekkerhoogte."—Johannesburg Sunday Express, Sept. 10, 1967.

We state that Israel continues to support United States policies of aggression in Southeast Asia, policies that are responsible for the death and wounding of thousands of black youths.

The N.Y. Times of Nov. 9, 1969 stated that Jacques Torczyner, head of The Zionist Organization of America, "appealed to American Jews to support Nixon's Vietnam policies. Mr. Torczyner, who recently returned last week from Israel said that "People there are in general accord with President Nixon's Vietnam policies."

The Nov. 17, 1969 N. Y. Times stated that "Administration sources Nov. 16 released a message from Israeli Premier Golda Meir calling President Nixon's Nov. 3 Vietnam speech 'meaningful.' It contained, she said in a personal message to Mr. Nixon congratulating him on the speech, "much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations."

We state that the exploitation experienced by Afro-Americans, Native Americans (Indians), Puerto Ricans, and Chicanos (Mexican-Americans) is similar to the exploitation of Palestinian Arabs and Oriental Jews by the Zionist State of Israel. Meir Ya'ari, General-Secretary of the Left-Zionist Mapam (United Workers Party) at the Party's 4th Congress in 1963 said, "This social exploitation helps hold the Oriental communities, one-half of the population, in

their state of economic, social and cultural discrimination. The common denominator of the two problems is that the Arab workers must live in a hut or hovel on the outskirts of the Jewish towns, and the worker of the Sephardic community is packed into a crowded slum."

We state that despite the ultra-nationalist, racist policies of the State of Israel progressive programs of the Palestinian liberation movements are popularly supported by most of the Arab masses.

In January, 1969, Fatch spokesman, Yassir Arafat stated, "Our political vision for a free Palestine is a democratic, secular, non-racial state where all Palestinians—Christians, Jews, and Muslims—will have equal rights."

The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine presented the following in a resolution introduced to the Palestine National Congress in 1969: "The Palestine National Congress will struggle for a popular democratic Palestinian state where Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights without discrimination, where all forms of national and class oppression shall be abolished."

We state that opposition to the policies of Zionism also exists within Israel and among world Jewry. The following are excerpts from thesis submitted for discussion to the Israeli Socialist Organization in 1966. "Israel will be de-Zionized, i.e. all present laws and practices discriminating between Jews and non-Jews implementing Jewish supremacy will be abolished... Israel will adopt an anti-imperialist foreign policy, actively supporting the forces struggling for socialism and unification in the Arab world..."

We state that Israel supported the United States in the Korean War; aided France and the Terrorist Secret Army Organization in Algeria against the Algerian Revolution; opposed the anti-colonial independence movements in Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia and elsewhere; trained the counter-revolutionary para-commandos of General Mobutu who was one of the persons responsible for the murder of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, and presently provides arms and

other equipment to the Portuguese troops fighting against the Angolan and Mozambican freedom fighters.

We demand that all military aid or assistance of any kind to Israel must stop. Imperialism and Zionism must and will get out of the Middle East. We call for Afro-American solidarity with the Palestinian People's Struggle for National Liberation and to regain all of their stolen land.

Hannibal Ahmed
Chairman, Harlem Youth Federation
Harlem, New York

Mahde Mohammad Ahmed
Third World Poets
Jamaica, N.Y.

Dan Aldridge
All-African Peoples Union
Detroit, Mich.

S.E. Anderson
Black Co-ordinator, Sarah Lawrence College
Bronxville, N.Y.

George Banks
Pres. of the Berkeley Branch of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees
Berkeley, Calif.

Francis Beal
Third World Womens Alliance
New York City

Vince Benson
Co-National Co-ordinator National Association of Black Students
Washington, D.C.

Grace Boggs
Lecturer, Writer
Detroit, Mich.

James Boggs
Writer
Detroit, Mich.

Paul B. Boutelle
Chairman C.O.B.A.T.A.M.E.
Harlem, New York.

Ronald C. Boutelle
Supervisor, Dept. of Social Services
 Harlem, New York

Les Campbell
The East
 Brooklyn, N.Y.

Delores Clayou
Secretary, Black Faculty Union,
San Francisco State College
 San Francisco, Calif.

Cynthia Chambers
Member of American Federation of Teachers and
Vice-President of Black Resistance Party
 Newark, N.J.

Rev. Albert B. Cleage
Shrine of the Black Madonna
 Detroit, Mich.

Ella Collins
Organization of Afro-American Unity
 Harlem, New York

Clifton DeBerry
Socialist Workers Party candidate for Governor
of New York State

Asher G. Dottin
Afro-Caribbean Mobilization Committee
 Brooklyn, N.Y.

Richard Dunn
Black Student Union, California State College
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Herman Fagg
Socialist Workers Party candidate for Governor of
California

Frank G. Greenwood
Station KPFK Communicastor
 Los Angeles, Calif.

John Hawkins
Student Mobilization Committee
 Detroit, Mich.

Charles Hightower
Washington Director American Committee on Africa
 Washington, D.C.

Ban Howard
Executive Director, Black Workers Alliance
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Phil Hutchings
Former Chairman of SNCO

Keito (L. McKeithan)
Third World Poets
 Brooklyn, N.Y.

Florynce R. Kennedy
Attorney, Media Workshop
 New York City

James G. Lewis
Student Mobilization Committee
 Harlem, New York

Conrad Lynn
Attorney
 New York City

Phillip Mason
Black Student Union, California State College
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Maurice McKinney
Black Student Union, California State College
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Lewis H. Michaux
National Memorial Bookstore
 Harlem, New York

Steven Miller
Black Student Union, California State College
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Una G. Mulzac
Liberation Bookstore
 Harlem, New York

Charles J. Nealy
Black Workers Alliance
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Bernard Nicholas
Co-National Co-ordinator of the National As-
sociation of Black Students
 Washington, D.C.

Earl Ofari
Writer, member of the Afro-American Cultural
Association
 Los Angeles, Calif.

Willie F. Petty
Third World Solidarity Committee With Vietnam
Chicago, Ill.

Jacqueline Rice
Third World Task Force of the Student Mobilization Committee
Detroit, Mich.

Patricia Robinson
Writer, Co-chairwoman C.O.B.A.T.A.M.E.
New Rochelle, N.Y.

Charles E. Simmons
U.N. Correspondent
New York City

A.B. Spellman
Co-editor, Rythym Magazine
Atlanta, Ga.

Askia Muhammad Toure
Editor-at-large, Journal of Black Poetry
New York City

Halima Agila Toure
Editor-at-large, Journal of Black Poetry
New York City

Robert F. Van Lierop
Attorney—Secy. Treas. of C.O.B.A.T.A.M.E.
New York City

B.R. Washington
Rank and File Caucus, Transit Workers Union
New York City

Kenneth J. Watson
Executive Committee of League of Revolutionary Black Workers
Detroit, Mich.

Ruth Webb
Black Representation Organization of Columbia University
New York City

Barbara A. Wheeler
American Society of Political Science
New York City

Harold Williams
President of the Black Resistance Party
Newark, N.J.

Lydia A. Williams
Co-Chairwoman C.O.B.A.T.A.M.E., Adult Advisor, Youth Unlimited
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Maxine Williams
Third World Womans Alliance
New York City

Robert F. Williams
Detroit, Mich.

Reginald Wilson
Director of the Center for Black Studies, University of Detroit
Detroit, Mich.

Gwendolyn Patton Woods
Co-Chairwoman C.O.B.A.T.A.M.E. Former National Co-ordinator of the National Association of Black Students
Washington, D.C.

Robert Wright
Northern Virginia League for Progress
Bailey's Crossroads, Va.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of External Affairs Minister Singh of India to Turkey (Excerpts)¹

November 5, 1970

At the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, His Excellency Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister for External Affairs of India, paid an official visit to Turkey from 2nd to 5th November, 1970.

Regarding the situation in the Middle East, the two Ministers expressed the hope that present efforts would lead to a speedy and peaceful solution of the crisis. They reaffirmed the necessity of the early and full

¹ English text in *Disisleri Bakanligi Belleteni* (Turkey), No. 74 (November 1970), pp. 45, 46.

implementation, including the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories, of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. For the attainment of these objectives, the two Ministers stressed the need to maintain the ceasefire and to reactivate Ambassador Jarring's Mission.

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Statement on French Middle East Policy in a Speech by Foreign Minister Schumann to the National Assembly of France¹

Paris, November 5, 1970

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Mais c'est au Proche-Orient que nous devons choisir entre l'absence et la forme de présence que nous a suggérée le service de la paix. L'absence? Un récent article de M. Masmoudi, ministre tunisien des Affaires Etrangères, nous dirait, s'il en était besoin, pourquoi elle nous est interdite. "Si la situation est préoccupante pour les pays riverains—écrivait-il—c'est parce qu'elle fait de la Méditerranée l'un des centres de rencontre ou d'affrontement des deux plus grandes puissances mondiales (comme a été l'Europe au cours des années 50), ce qui signifie que son destin lui échappe pour une part." Après quoi, M. Masmoudi se tourne tout naturellement vers la France, d'abord à cause de son passé et de son rayonnement, ensuite parce qu'un devoir particulier incombe—du fait même qu'ils sont inaccessibles à la tentation de la tutelle—aux pays qui, sans être au tout premier rang de la puissance, siègent en permanence au Conseil de Sécurité.

Certes, nous n'écartons aucun des moyens qui peuvent, à titre complémentaire, faire progresser les chances de règlement. Nous avons donné notre accord à l'initiative prise au mois de juin par Washington et connue sous le nom de plan Rogers. Nous nous sommes, en premier lieu, félicités du cessez-le-feu auquel cette initiative a conduit et qui sera heureusement poursuivi, à la suite notamment du débat de l'O.N.U. auquel nous avons pris une part décisive. Quel était l'objet de ce commencement de détente? Permettre l'ouverture de conversations entre les parties sous l'égide de M. Jarring, représentant du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies. Mais, dès alors, nous ajoutons deux mises en garde: d'une part, pour que les conversations soient fructueuses, il fallait que M. Jarring pût présenter aux parties des recommandations équilibrées et substantielles; d'autre part, ces recommandations ne pouvaient venir que des Quatre. Le fait est que les entretiens ont immédiatement tourné court. Nous n'avons pas à nous prononcer sur les contestations qui se sont élevées à propos d'arrangements dont nous n'avons été informés qu'a posteriori. Mais notre devoir était de contribuer, dans la mesure de nos moyens, à limiter et, si possible, à arrêter la dégradation fatale que nous avons ensuite observée et déplorée. Quand une nouvelle explosion de violence a ensanglanté la Jordanie, nous avons agi, là où il convenait, pour faire en sorte qu'elle ne gagnât pas de proche en proche et qu'aucune intervention extérieure n'aggravât la menace. Nos démarches—nous le savons—contribuèrent à l'apaisement. Nous n'avions pas d'autre but.

Mais comment renouer maintenant les fils du rapprochement et de la négociation? Si nous ne voyons qu'une réponse, c'est parce que—le débat à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies l'a encore démontré—personne n'en a proposé d'autre.

Il faut que des recommandations soient élaborées, non pas au bénéfice d'un Etat, d'une ethnie, d'une confession, d'une culture, mais pour refaire d'une région qui a déjà tant donné à l'humanité une zone de coopé-

¹ Excerpted from Schumann's speech as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, Second Semester 1970, pp. 176-177; for the text of the entire debate, see *Journal officiel de la République française*, National Assembly, Session of November 5, 1970, pp. 5178 ff.

ration entre toutes les ethnies, toutes les confessions, toutes les cultures qui s'y côtoient, dans le respect des frontières et des droits de tous les Etats. Il faut aussi que ces recommandations soient communes, c'est-à-dire que—loin d'être ramenées à une sorte de moyen de pression d'un Etat sur un autre—elles proposent des modalités d'application à la fois substantielles et équilibrées (je me répète à dessein) de toutes les règles posées par la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité, qu'il s'agisse de l'évacuation des territoires conquis ou des garanties de paix, de la liberté de navigation ou du droit des Palestiniens.

L'alternative est claire: ou bien nous faire complices des retards qui exacerbent les passions, ce qui ramènera l'affaire devant le Conseil de Sécurité sans écarter le risque d'une nouvelle flambée belliqueuse; ou bien hâter l'accord des Quatre qui, publiquement déclaré, aurait un effet de persuasion décisif et permettrait de faire reconnaître, par l'ensemble des pays de la région, le droit pour chacun d'eux à l'existence, à la liberté, à l'indépendance derrière des frontières sûres et reconnues. Pourquoi renoncions-nous à la seconde branche de l'alternative, puisque la déclaration que M. Thant a faite le 23 octobre à l'issue d'une longue consultation avec M. Rogers, M. Gromyko, Sir Alec Douglas-Home et moi-même, a prouvé qu'elle était à notre portée? Pourquoi la France se laisserait-elle, au risque de se donner tort quand les faits lui donnent raison? Pourquoi décevrait-elle l'attente des peuples qui comptent sur sa persistance pour amener tous ses partenaires à franchir, en fin de compte, le grand pas vers l'objet de leur vœu commun: la paix?

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Speech Reviewing the History of the American June 19 Proposals by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco¹

San Francisco, November 6, 1970

Many of us as Americans have referred to the Viet-Nam problem as our most anguishing problem. And if Viet-Nam is our most anguishing problem, the Middle East is the most dangerous problem for the United States as we look ahead over the next decade. And as we talk about the Middle Eastern problem, we must fully realize that there is more than one Middle Eastern problem.

In the first instance, there is the Arab-Israeli dispute—a reflection of the very deep suspicions that have long existed in the area and which are so deeply rooted among the people there today, young and old. Secondly, there are intra-Arab issues superimposed on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arab world is characterized by very considerable disunity—moderate governments versus more extreme governments; established governments versus revolutionary movements, as reflected by the Palestinian movement; and guerrilla warfare against established Arab governments. So that it is little wonder that the Middle Eastern issue is both complex and complicated.

As if this were not enough, there is the fact that this is an area of potential cooperation or of potential conflict between the major powers, and in particular the United States and the Soviet Union.

From the point of view of the United States, we have an interest in maintaining friendly relations with all of the countries in the area because the Middle East is important to us strategically. It is a key area of communication. We have significant economic and commercial interests in the area.

One national interest is above all others. The major powers could be drawn into a confrontation even though neither wants it. Our overriding national interest and objec-

¹ Speech made to the Commonwealth Club; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1643 (December 21, 1970), pp. 748-751.

tive therefore is to try to assure by every means of diplomacy that a peaceful settlement will be achieved, a binding peace that will reduce the inherent risks of major-power confrontation in the Middle East.

Last June the United States put forward a new peace proposal which was designed to get the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, the United Nations Representative. The genesis of that peace initiative can be attributed to a 2-hour discussion which I had in April with President Nasser.

As I recall that conversation, I think there was one thing that came out clearly. There was a great deal of emphasis in that conversation on the desire of the U.A.R. for a political solution. I came away with the impression that Egypt was not entirely comfortable, given the amount of Soviet influence in that country. And the principal impression that I came away with was that some new American move toward a political solution would be welcome.

That conversation took place in April. On May 1 President Nasser made a very important speech.¹ He coupled a vitriolic attack on the United States with a direct appeal to President Nixon to make some new move toward a political solution. We read that speech as a second signal. And from those two particular moves we, the President, the Secretary of State, a number of us, developed the American peace proposal of last June.

Now this, the American peace proposal of last June, is a very simple proposition. In the first instance, it called for a limited 90-day cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. I say Egypt and Israel because it was only Egypt and not Jordan that a year before had declared null and void the four Security Council resolutions on the cease-fire. So this proposal called for a 90-day cease-fire.

It also called for the beginning of talks under the auspices of the United Nations Representative based on explicit commitments of the parties. These were very signifi-

cant commitments.

For the first time Israel committed itself to accepting the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 1967. That was the resolution that contains the principal elements of a Middle Eastern settlement. So for the first time Israel committed itself to that resolution and to carrying it out in all of its parts.

For the first time Israel committed itself to begin discussions indirectly rather than on a direct face-to-face basis, which had long been the Israeli position.

For the first time Israel committed itself to the principle of withdrawal in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolution.

And in return Egypt and Jordan committed themselves to make a binding peace with Israel based on reciprocal commitments between them. And for the first time Egypt and Jordan explicitly recognized Israel's right to exist within so-called secure and recognized borders.

The U.S. peace proposal was characterized in the media of the Middle East as primarily a procedural proposal designed to get talks started. In actuality, while this proposal was of significance procedurally, it was of far greater significance from a substantive point of view simply because of the commitments that were undertaken by the parties as a basis for talks between them.

Those talks got started, but they were quickly suspended as a result of the violations by both Egypt and the Soviet Union of the cease-fire standstill agreement. Part of the understanding was that during the 90-day period of the cease-fire, both sides would stand still militarily in a zone 50 kilometers west and east of the Suez Canal. In other words, when the parties accepted the American proposal, they accepted the fundamental principle that neither side would try to use the cease-fire period to improve its relative military position in respect to the other.

Now, there has been a good deal of discussion as to whether in fact there have been violations of the cease-fire-standstill. Let me make it explicitly clear that our evidence is categoric and incontrovertible.

¹ For the text of Nasser's speech, see Arab World section, below, Document 382.

There were several types of violations.

First, in a number of instances where no positions existed at the time of the cease-fire, weeks later positions had been constructed—new positions.

Second, in a number of instances positions had been partially begun at the time of the cease-fire. Weeks later these positions had been completed.

Third, there were a number of positions already constructed at the time of the cease-fire in which there were no missiles or no missile-related equipment. Yet weeks later missiles were in these positions, both SAM-2's and SAM-3's, and many of them in an operational capacity.

And fourth, positions and missiles were moved more closely to the Suez Canal itself.

All of these violations were contrary to the basic principle that there should be no military advantage for either side deriving from the cease-fire. Standstill meant standstill.

There were also violations on the Israeli side. There were overflights that were conducted across the Suez Canal into the 50-kilometer zone west of the canal. There were also other charges made by Egypt with respect to construction on the Israeli side, which we conveyed to the Israelis on behalf of the Egyptians.

What has been the effect of the violations on the military balance? We have never claimed that the violations have had a decisive effect on the military balance. We have made the judgment, however, that the violations placed Israel at a greater disadvantage militarily than at the time of the cease-fire. And so the United States had to take into account not only the violations of the cease-fire-standstill but also the fact that during this period substantial military supplies were going to Egypt from the Soviet Union. During the period of the American peace proposal we made it clear to all concerned that we would approach the question of arms with restraint. And we did pursue a policy of restraint. By September 1970, however, it was clear that it was necessary to take fully into account the violations and ongoing Soviet military supply of Egypt. Concrete steps

were taken to give effect to the statements of President Nixon and Secretary Rogers that the United States would not permit the military balance to be upset.

We believe the long-range answer to arms deliveries is an arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. We have in the past 18 months made a number of proposals to this end. However, we have not been successful in getting the Soviet Union to agree to any arms limitation talks on Middle East deliveries of conventional weapons.

Now, whatever judgment one might make with respect to the military balance, the fact is that the missile violations have also created a situation where there is even less confidence between the parties than that which was present at the time of the cease-fire itself. So it is the political-psychological climate that has also been affected. Will an agreement be honored in the future by the parties? It is this factor that has created obstacles to the beginning of the talks between the parties. It has also raised some serious questions as to the Soviet role in the Middle East. No such violations could take place without Soviet knowledge and complicity.

In the last 10 days the Middle Eastern question has been discussed before the U.N. General Assembly. And just 48 hours ago the Assembly adopted a recommendation to the parties that the cease-fire be extended and that negotiations get started.¹ You will have noted that in the last 24 hours both Egypt and Israel have indicated explicitly an intention to abide by the cease-fire. And we feel in the U.S. Government that there is a reasonable chance that the cease-fire will hold for another period. The first half of the American peace initiative of last June, the proposal relating to the stopping of the shooting, still continues in effect. And our job in the days ahead is to make the second half of the American proposal an operative reality: to get the parties talking about peace.

We will have to find some formula that will provide the basis for a resumption of the

¹ For the text of the resolution, see United Nations section, below, Document 330.

talks envisaged in the United States proposal of last June. This will take a little doing, since new uncertainties have developed in the area. For example, in Egypt today a new government is only now beginning to find itself. Jordan in recent weeks has experienced the agony of a civil war as well as the agony of outside intervention; the situation there seems improved. In the area itself, time is not on the side of either of the established governments, whether they be Arab or Israeli. This is because the area is in ferment—the Palestinian movement which is committed to a solution by force is crystallizing into a much more formidable political movement centering on the idea of the need to satisfy the aspirations and the concerns of the Palestinians by means of some kind of a political entity.

In this area of turmoil and instability the risks of confrontation between the major powers are great. If a political solution that stabilizes the area can be achieved, the risk of major-power involvement would diminish rapidly. We are under no illusions. The differences with respect to negotiating positions between the parties are very great. The gulf is wide, and each of the sides has expressed its negotiating positions in maximum terms.

On the one hand, the Arabs are insisting on total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before the June war. On the other hand, Israel is insisting on major changes in the borders in order to take into account what it considers to be serious security problems as well as the unique history that surrounds the holy city of Jerusalem. Negotiations are apt to be long, drawn out, tortuous, complex, and difficult.

The role of the United States will be to encourage both sides to move toward positions in any negotiation which will meet the legitimate concerns of both sides. Our national interest goes beyond any one state in the area, and it is up to us to try to help move the parties. Our involvement is a major deterrent in the area. And I mean this from the standpoint of Israel as well as from the standpoint of the Arab world. The major-power

talks, whether they be bilateral with the Soviet Union or four-power talks at the United Nations, are not a substitute for agreement between the parties. They are not a substitute for negotiations between the parties. The major powers can be the catalyst, but the first and foremost objective is to get the parties to talk to one another on the basis of the United Nations Security Council resolution of November 1967 in hopes that the broad gap between them can be bridged by slow and patient effort. Time is not on the side of either the Israeli establishment or the Arab establishment, but the options for a peaceful settlement remain open. A reasonable settlement is essential because the Middle East is a most dangerous trouble spot. We will do all we can to grasp the opportunities which are present in the fluid and evolving situation in the Middle East.

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Commentary on Proposals for a Palestinian State Published in the People's Daily of China (Excerpt)¹

Peking, November 9, 1970

Recently, U.S. imperialism and its lackey Israeli Zionism have been going all out to realize a new criminal scheme to strangle the Palestine revolution. On October 2, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made a big noise about establishing a so-called "Palestinian state" by the Jordan River. On October 15, a U.S. State Department spokesman clamoured that the United States supports the conception of forming a so-called "Palestinian entity." Meanwhile, a number of puppets controlled by U.S. imperialism and its lackey Israel came out into the open, rushing about and shouting themselves hoarse in an attempt to rig up a "free provisional government of Palestine." This string of conspiracies has been strongly condemned by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples.

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, XIII, 46 (November 13, 1970), p. 28.

The U.S. imperialists said that their call for the formation of a "Palestinian entity" was out of consideration for the "legitimate interest and aspirations" of the Palestinians. This is sheer humbug. Scrutiny of this conspiracy by the U.S.-Israeli aggressors shows it to be a sinister political trap designed by U.S. imperialism. Its criminal aim is to drive the Palestinian people and guerrillas into one or two small restricted areas where they would be exposed to attacks from the front and rear and thus restrict, disintegrate and annihilate the Palestinian revolutionary armed forces and quell the revolutionary flames of the Palestinian people.

The "Palestinian state" designed by the U.S.-Israeli aggressors is diametrically opposed to the national interests and aspirations of the Palestinian people who have long been shedding their blood and fighting valiantly for the sole purpose of recovering their lost territory, returning to their homeland and achieving the complete liberation of the Palestinian nation. But what U.S. imperialism is attempting is to bring about a "permanent solution" of the Palestine issue by marking out one or two small areas and settling up a so-called "Palestinian state" under the condition that Israel retains the vast territory of Palestine and other Arab countries which it has forcibly occupied for more than the past 20 years. In other words, this is an attempt to permanently legalize the status quo of Israeli aggression and write off at one stroke the sacred right of the Palestinian people to fight for national liberation.

The "Palestinian state" schemed by the U.S.-Israeli aggressors is in fact an out-and-out puppet state. U.S. imperialism is trying to establish neo-colonialist rule over the Palestinian people by buying over a handful of scum of the Palestinian nation as its agents. This means reducing the broad masses of the Palestinian people to colonialist slaves of the U.S.-Israeli aggressors and gravely imperilling the Arab people's national-liberation movement. It is only natural that this can never be accepted by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples.

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Statement on the Middle East in an Address to the Council of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization by the Head of the U.S.S.R. Delegation Tabeyev (Excerpt)¹

Tripoli, Libya, November 10, 1970

The peoples and progressive regimes of the Arab East have felt in full measure the force of the international solidarity and support from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The adventurist plans of Israel and its imperialist patrons have failed. The aggressors have not succeeded in stopping the growth of progressive trends in the Arab world.

On the contrary, anti-imperialist revolutions have taken place during this time in the Sudan and Libya and positive internal changes have taken place in a number of other Arab countries.

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Resolution on the Middle East Adopted by the Ninth Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization²

Tripoli, Libya, November 12, 1970

The situation in the Middle East, which is becoming more tense as a result of the continued Israeli aggression against the three Arab countries and the Palestinian Arab people, is threatening world peace and security and the world liberation movement.

The Council of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, which met in Tripoli

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5569 (November 17, 1970), p. 73.

² Translated from Libyan News Agency Arabic text in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3535/E1/1, 2 and 3; reprinted by permission.

between 8th and 11th November 1970, examined with great concern the continuation of the supply to Israel by US imperialism and other imperialist countries of all kinds of modern weapons such as aircraft, tanks and electronic weapons, in addition to its [US imperialism's] attitude at the UN supporting the aggression and protecting the aggressor as well as allowing US nationals to join the Israeli army by maintaining their nationality.

The Council draws the attention of the Afro-Asian peoples to the imperialist plan in this region which aims at striking at the Arab Resistance movement against aggression and at weakening the Arab Liberation movement and at harming the world liberation movement.

The events of last September in Jordan and the frightful massacres committed against the Palestinian and Jordanian people, which were the outcome of an American imperialist-Zionist-reactionary plot, were aimed at liquidating the Palestine Arab Resistance, paralysing the Arab liberation movement—brushing aside one of the basic elements in the battle, namely the Palestine Resistance—and at weakening the Arab countries' front in confronting the aggression. In spite of the failure of this plot, the (? Council) warns against the dangers surrounding the Palestine Resistance and calls for its protection.

The Council considers that the struggle of the Arab peoples against the Israeli-imperialist aggression for the liberation of the occupied Arab land is a just and legitimate struggle.

The Council supports all efforts and steps by the Arab countries to strengthen their defense capability for the liberation of their land. It therefore supports the efforts made by the UAR to use every means to defend its territory. It also denounces the Zionist-imperialist campaign of fabrication against the UAR over the use of rockets in any part of its territory, since this is a national action that protects its land and serves the cause of peace.

The Council calls on the Afro-Asian countries to take immediate and effective action to remove the traces of the 1967 aggression

whose aim was to overthrow the progressive Arab regimes. The liberation of the Arab land and the guarantees for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and the protection of the progressive regime in the Arab world are the main and basic conditions for establishing a just peace in the Middle East.

In its previous meetings, the Council of the Organisation supported the campaign of the Arab Palestinian people for a return to their homeland and for regaining their lawful rights as well as their right to self-determination on their land. Since the adoption by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation of the resolutions on the existence of the Zionist regime in Palestine, which led to the expulsion of the Palestinian people from their homeland, as an aggressive action directed by imperialism and colonialism against the entire Arab people and also against the Afro-Asian peoples, events have shown that Israel's role in the service of colonialism and neo-colonialism—the role which aims at striking at the Arab liberation movement and which is reflected in the frequent acts of aggression, the most prominent of which was the 1967 aggression—emphasises the fact that it is the duty of all African and Asian peoples and also of all the peoples of the world to stand with all their resources and mobilise all their efforts to support the Arab liberation movement in general and the Palestine liberation movement in particular—the movement which is engaged in a heroic struggle against the most hideous forms of settler-colonialism racial discrimination, awful nazism and exploitation in the 20th Century.

The struggle of the Arab Palestinian people, which is an inseparable part of the international liberation movement, deserves the support of all honest forces in the world. The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation states that consolidation of the Palestinian Arab people's struggle in its armed revolution is a consolidation of the struggle of the Arab, African and Asian peoples and also of the struggle of the peoples of the world. The armed struggle is a legitimate right which has been exercised by all the persecuted peoples throughout history,

peoples longing for their freedom and for sovereignty in their homelands and for the right to self-determination.

The great efforts of the Arabs and the mobilisation of their resources in every country and at every general Arab level is a vital factor in confronting the Zionist aggression and the imperialist conspiracy with a view to foiling them.

While supporting the mobilisation of Arab resources in the battle and calling on the peace-loving countries of the world which are working for the removal of the traces of Israeli aggression on the basis of the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council issued in November 1967, the Council supports every effort aimed at a just and dignified political solution on the following basis: (i) Complete withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories; (ii) guarantee of the national (Arabic: qawmiyyah) and legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The Council calls on all the friendly organisations to work jointly with a view to getting world opinion on the side of the Arab peoples' struggle and the Palestinian Arab people, and exposing the role of Israel and US imperialism in a way that will enable world opinion to exert pressure on the Governments which support aggression and protect the aggressor.

The Council likewise warns the peoples of Africa and Asia and their Governments against the danger of Israeli infiltration into the two continents.

The Council salutes all the peoples, the organisations and the friendly countries which stood in support of the Arab peoples in their just struggle—particularly the Soviet Union which from the start stood by the Arab peoples and furnished them with all sorts of help and assistance, enabling them to resist all the imperialist and Israeli plans.

The Council likewise salutes the countries of Asia and Africa which stood by the Arab right and confronted the US imperialist challenge at the UN General Assembly.

The Council salutes the triumph of the Arab people in Sudan and Libya for the revolutionary upsurges in May and September 1969 which emerged to strengthen the

Arab peoples' front against the imperialist-Israeli aggression. It likewise salutes the resistance of the Arab masses and the forces of the Palestine Resistance which succeeded in foiling the aims of the Israeli-imperialist aggression.

The Council is confident that the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of their territories from the aggression relies above all on strengthening their own forces and secondly on the support of the friendly countries, that permanent peace will not be realised in the Middle East except by the liberation of the Arab territories, the recovery of the complete rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland, and the liquidation of the roots of racism and Zionism from the soil of Palestine. Victory is on the side of the Arab peoples in this battle.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko to Italy (Excerpt)¹

November 12, 1970

The two sides agree that joint efforts by all States concerned are needed to ensure security and establish peaceful good-neighbourly relations in the Mediterranean.

The two Governments voiced serious concern over this [Middle East] situation, stressing that it is necessary to reach a peaceful political settlement and remove tension from the area. With these aims in view, the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Italy will make appropriate efforts and contribute towards the solution of this question on the basis of the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, in all its provisions. The two sides also agreed that it was necessary to resume without delay the

¹ English translation in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 9-16, 1971, p. 24385.

mission of Ambassador Jarring, the special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of President Yahya Khan of Pakistan to China (Excerpts)¹

November 14, 1970

At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the President of Pakistan General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China from 10th to 14th November, 1970.

The two sides expressed deep concern over the situation in the Middle East where Israel, in total disregard of world opinion, continued to enjoy the fruits of its aggression. Both sides held that Israel must vacate all Arab lands that it had seized by aggression. They reaffirmed their resolute support to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and Israeli Zionism and for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

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Foreign Policy Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel (Excerpts)²

Jerusalem, November 16, 1970

[She said that Hussein,] who had allowed the terrorists to organize in his country, decided far too late to ensure his authority

in his own country, and soon found himself in a dangerous confrontation with the terrorist organizations, which had had time to entrench and strengthen themselves under the cover of his rule.

[There is "no doubt" that] "hundreds of Syrian tanks" penetrated into the sovereign territory of Jordan "with the knowledge, if not the encouragement, of the Soviet Union."

The Jordanian regime appeared to be on the verge of collapse. It may very well be that during these brutal battles King Hussein managed to understand that whoever permits these terrorist organizations to take root and establish themselves, helps them to take control of his country and undermine the position of the legitimate regime. I hope that this lesson has been learned, not only in Jordan.

The Syrian invasion was a shameful failure. Israel did not intervene in the internal struggle in Jordan, or in the war between her and Syria, but we naturally followed military developments in the neighbouring state with close attention. Israel could not remain indifferent to the attempt to alter by violence the political and military *status quo*. Such a change would have posed a most dangerous threat to our eastern frontier.

There can be no doubt that the very fact that Israel was ready and able to do everything required for her defence did not escape the knowledge of the Syrians, the Iraqis and their military and political advisers. I have reason to believe that the Syrian and Iraqi authorities took this factor into account when the Iraqis decided not to intervene and the Syrians chose to call home the armoured forces that had penetrated into Jordan. The clear stand of the U.S. in this crisis, and the political and tactical steps she took, undoubtedly served as a contributory factor to prevent a deterioration in the situation and the restoration of stability.

¹ English text in *Peking Review*, XIII, 47 (November 20, 1970), pp. 8, 9.

² English translation in *Jerusalem Post*, November 17, 1970, p. 5.

Jordan would do well if she stopped making agreements with the terrorist organizations, in the hope that she will achieve quiet and stability by activating the terrorists against Israel and concentrating them on our border. Quiet in the streets of Amman is not to be bought at the price of terrorist military actions against our population. The Government of Jordan ought to keep this in mind.

[Turning to Egypt, Mrs. Meir said she had "no intention" of evaluating Nasser's personality or summing up his actions, but would permit herself to say that]: Nasser was undoubtedly a powerful leader. By virtue of Egypt's central position and by the power of his own personality, he could have directed policy in the Middle East towards the goals of prosperity and social progress. Unfortunately, the Egyptian President did not utilize his unique status in order to lead his people and the Arab peoples in a struggle against poverty and illiteracy and towards an era of peace and development. Instead he led them into unjust wars and defeats.

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To our regret, however, we find the new regime as well has not stilled the voices of war.

In the course of the recent turbulence in the Arab states, the Eastern Command has also collapsed. While the collapse of the Eastern Command is proof of the deterioration in relations between the Arab states, it also points to the instability and dissension in each of them, as we can learn from the internal situation in Jordan, Iraq and, lately, Syria. At this stage it is still too early for an accurate evaluation of the *coup* in Syria.

I can only presume that the Syrian debacle in Jordan was one of the reasons for the present instability and strife. There is not only a struggle for power between individuals, but a trenchant debate between opposing political approaches, including policy on terrorist operations and other adventurous plans. We will continue to follow developments alertly and assiduously.

Members of the Knesset, in the centre

of our relations with our neighbours, we have been most concerned lately with the cease-fire. This cease-fire includes a paragraph on a military standstill, as part of the American peace initiative to which Israel replied affirmatively at the end of July this year. But while the undertaking to stop shooting has been observed, the Egyptians violated the standstill condition which, as I have said, was an integral part of the American peace initiative.

[When Israel replied affirmatively to the American peace initiative,] our main goal was twofold: to stop the killing and destruction and end the war, and to advance towards a peace agreement as the outcome of fruitful talks between ourselves and the representatives of the Arab states. . . . We acted in hope, but with no illusions. In our hearts we still doubted whether Egypt was indeed bent on peace.

Indeed, it became clear to us that Egypt had accepted the cease-fire out of military necessity, and not as a stage on the road to peace.

Before agreeing to the cease-fire, Egypt stepped up her demands upon the Soviet Union and no doubt received substantial additional commitments from the Soviets. There is no doubt that, in consenting to the American initiative, the Egyptians took into account Soviet readiness to cooperate with them in advancing their missile system in the direction of the Canal in order to alter the strategic balance in the Canal Zone to Israel's detriment.

[From the outset, the Egyptians and Russians intended] to exploit the cessation of shooting in order to violate the standstill clause. They openly disregarded the express obligation which they had undertaken. . . . The premeditated violations continued, accompanied by repeated denials, even after Israel had exposed the deceit to the whole world.

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It is important to reiterate emphatically that all these operations, especially the advancement of the missiles, could not have

been performed without the close cooperation of the Soviet Union. This Super-Power, which is taking part in the Big-Four talks, the Big-Two talks, and the deliberations of the Security Council, which announced its agreement to the cease-fire and the standstill arrangement of 7 August, has cooperated actively in the violation of this agreement and is responsible for the violation no less than the Government of Egypt.

We regarded it as our paramount and urgent duty to present to the world, and first of all the Government of the U.S., the facts about these violations, including all the findings known to us. Regrettably, some 12 days passed from the time the violations began before the U.S. Government, too, acknowledged the justice of our contentions and the correctness of our findings, and joined our demand for the correction of the violations. Hostile elements, led by the Soviet and Egyptian propaganda machines, tried to twist and distort the information in our possession, so as to cover up their violations of the cease-fire agreement. They began falsely accusing Israel of simply inventing the Egyptian violations in order, as they put it, to get out of the Jarring talks. These twistings and distortions were rebutted, after great effort, thanks to the close observation, the information and the skill of the Israel Defence Forces, as well as the tireless information efforts of our representatives the world over. It would appear that today there is not a single unbiased international factor that doubts the correctness of the facts to which Israel has called attention, or that does not realize the gravity of the betrayal of the agreement by the Egyptians and the Soviets.

The struggle against the violation of the standstill clause became a paramount necessity the moment the advancement of the missiles in the area was discovered. The Government's decision of September 6 on the suspension of the talks with Ambassador Jarring was a natural and elementary expression of this struggle and the realization that to acquiesce in the violation of the standstill clause would be to aid the Egyp-

tians and the Soviets in carrying on their work of deception and make it easier for international factors to behave as if nothing had happened.

It would have been a political error of the gravest sort had we heeded "realistic" advice to enter into talks while ignoring the violation of the agreement and without the forceful demand that what had been done must be corrected and the *status quo ante* restored, without mobilizing the best of the maximum political effort to do all that was called for in the face of this criminal violation. I was never prepared to undertake that our struggle would lead to the fulfilment of our just demand in its entirety, and in full. But I am still convinced that without this struggle, which is not yet over, we should have been faced with a situation far graver—whether from the point of view of the military balance, or from the political point of view.

In the course of my conversations with the heads of state and of government I made it clear that the plots now being made by our enemies to bring about a withdrawal by Israel without peace have no basis or substance. And indeed I found understanding for our position that without peace Israel will have to maintain her positions along the cease-fire lines, in all sectors, while striving for a lasting peace with agreed, defensible borders.

The clarification of our stand in the face of the violation was the main subject of the political talks that I held at the U.N., in the U.S., Canada and Britain. In view of the evidence which we had gathered and submitted, not a single one of the statesmen with whom I have spoken has questioned the facts to which we pointed. In these talks, we drew urgent attention not only to the Egyptian attempt to alter the balance of forces by deceit, but also to the global significance of the violation of a binding agreement by a member-state of the U.N., a Great Power, the undermining of whose credibility must be of the most dangerous import for global subjects of grave significance.

In my talks I also encountered some states-

men who, for all their understanding of our desire for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries, tried to persuade us that security boundaries can also be attained with the aid of international guarantees and various arrangements under U.N. auspices. Our disappointments following the shattering of international arrangements—at Sharm e-Sheikh, in Gaza, and on the Syrian and Jordanian frontiers—are sufficient to show why we cannot place our confidence in the United Nations or entrust our security to it. The latest resolution of the U.N. General Assembly is additional evidence in this regard.

Israel, like most other nations, will see nothing binding in the resolution, apart from additional proof of the regrettable state of the U.N. This resolution does not entail any change in our situation. Nor has Ambassador Jarring's mission been changed in any sense. His mission and authority are not derived from a one-sided Assembly resolution, but from a resolution of the Security Council. The resolution has not been removed, rather an obstacle has been added in the way of Ambassador Jarring's mission. In due time, when the conditions are created and talks on a genuine peace open, they will be based on agreed foundations and not upon this resolution, which has placed further obstacles and complications in the path to peace.

I made it clear in the U.S. that we have not changed our decision to reply affirmatively to the American initiative, including participation in talks under Dr. Jarring's auspices. And as evidence of this, I stated that, as Jordan is not a party to the violation of the standstill clause in the cease-fire agreement, we have not objected to the holding of talks with Jordan under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The Cabinet has approved this statement, further to its previous decisions.

We cannot ignore the behaviour of the countries participating in the Two-Power talks. We cannot ignore the conduct of France in the General Assembly, when she applied herself to making the pro-Arab resolution more acceptable and effective.

Nor can we ignore the British Foreign Secretary's speech on his Government's policy in the Middle East. Everyone is aware of the Soviet Union's hostility. These factors strengthen our consciousness that we cannot expect objectivity from the Four-Power talks and justify our reservations, from the outset, as to their deliberations and their competence to deal with our affairs.

Against the background of these latest political developments, the responsible behaviour of the U.S. Government becomes even more apparent. It withdrew from the meetings of the Big Four deputies, worked against the Arab resolution at the U.N., and is helping to strengthen Israel's capacity to defend herself. President Nixon, in his address to the Assembly, defined the situation well when he called for "the creation of confidence, in which peace efforts can go forward."

The political struggle against the violation of the cease-fire must continue, especially after the U.N. Assembly. This struggle is vital for our military position in the Canal Zone and for the real value of agreements in the future, for the honouring of agreements in their entirety and not of arbitrarily selected clauses. This grave account has not yet been settled and there is no reason why we should be in any hurry to ignore it.

... We are alive to the desire of many in the world to see the talks renewed in the hope of bringing peace nearer. But I must make it clear that in all the approaches to us no arrangements have been proposed so far which the Government could regard as satisfying our demand for the correction of the violations, and conditions have not yet been created which could justify a change in the Government's decision to suspend the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

Accordingly, we have to do all we can for the creation of such conditions. On this subject we are continuing our dialogue, mainly with the American Government.

[Israel continues to observe the cease-fire]

and we hope that it will continue even after the 90 days and will bring an end to the war. We regard the cease-fire as a continuation of the agreement reached between all the parties on August 7, a logical and binding outcome of the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions of June, 1967.

[She said she] would advise the new President of Egypt and the Commander of its army not to repeat the mistakes of the past—mistakes that the Egyptian army and people have dearly paid for.

[Concluding, Mrs. Meir recalled that, on August 4, she said]: We have grounds for believing that Israel would not find herself weaker if the Arabs decided to resume hostilities.

Today I can confirm with certainty that this evaluation has been confirmed and that our strength in all areas is increasing. Any attempt on the part of our neighbours to resume aggression would encounter the crushing force of the Israel Defence Forces. As in the past, however, we have no wish to put our strength to the test once more, or to score new victories. We welcome the continuation of the cease-fire, and we shall be meticulous in maintaining it on the basis of reciprocity. We firmly believe that the solution to the problems of our region lies not on the battlefield but at the negotiating table. What we and the Arabs need is a dialogue for the making of arrangements and the solution of problems, a dialogue which will result in a peace treaty on the basis of respect and mutual security. We hope that the way will be found to lead us from the cease-fire to the complete end of the war, and to the establishment of permanent peace.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Foreign Minister Hartling of Denmark to Turkey (Excerpts)¹

November 17, 1970

At the invitation of Mr. Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Poul Hartling, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark, accompanied by Madame Hartling, paid an official visit to Turkey from November 12 to 17, 1970.

Regarding the Middle East, the Ministers expressed their concern for the situation prevailing in the area. They stressed the importance of the extension of the cease-fire and of resuming the talks with the assistance of Ambassador Jarring in order to find a peaceful solution to this conflict in conformity with the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967.

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Remarks on Yugoslav Policy in the Middle East Delivered by President Tito to the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia (Excerpts)²

Belgrade, November 18, 1970

With a view to further promoting friendly relations and cooperation with the countries of the African continent I have visited Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, the United Arab Republic and Libya

¹ English text in *Disisleri Bakanligi Belleteni* (Turkey), No. 74 (November 1970), pp. 59, 60.

² Excerpted from the English text of Tito's foreign policy address in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 495 (November 20, 1970), pp. 15, 18-19.

at the beginning of the year. I have spoken in March to this House of the results of this visit with regard to the development of bilateral relations and the promotion of cooperation with these countries in the international sphere.

... We noticed that there is deep concern in these countries owing to the aggravation of the crisis in the Middle East and the situation in the Mediterranean region. There is not only concern, but also a strong desire to find a way out of the present impasse. All are aware of the danger of a big power confrontation in the Middle East which could have imponderable consequences for world peace, and particularly for the European countries who are very near this focus of conflict.

I do not wish on this occasion to repeat our well-known views and speak of all that Yugoslavia has done so far in extending support to the Arab countries and to the efforts aimed at achieving an equitable solution of this crisis. I must say, however, that the rigid and aggressive attitude of Israel precludes all progress in this respect. It seemed that Rogers' Plan—though incomplete and with certain weaknesses—would pave the way to talks and open some prospects for the enforcement of the Security Council Resolution. However, the talks were broken off, Israel being to blame, even before they had really begun. I believe that even those who maintained a benevolent attitude to Israel's policy, are now fully aware that it is stubbornly striving to legalise the fruits of aggression. I therefore stressed in the talks I have had that a large share of the responsibility for so intransigent an attitude of Israel is borne by those who supported it from the very beginning, or avoided to condemn its flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter and of the United Nations decisions. I repeat that it is more than ever necessary to-day that those who can influence Israel should do so without delay. Otherwise the situation will grow steadily worse and inevitably lead to further conflict. The interests of all countries of that

region, as well as security in the Mediterranean regions and the broader area, render it imperative to put an end to the present impasse as soon as possible and begin solving this difficult and dangerous crisis once for all.

The basic premise for any progress in this respect—let me repeat this once again—remains the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territory. Besides, as we have always stated, there can be no lasting solution in the Middle East without an equitable solution of the problem of Palestine. It is essential to realize in this connection that the Palestinian movement is a factor which can no longer be ignored in any attempt or plan to find a complex and lasting solution of the Middle Eastern problem.

I would wish particularly to warn of the dangers immanent in any attempt to take advantage of the situation created by the death of President Nasser who was a symbol of resistance and of the peaceful and progressive aspirations of the Arab peoples, all the more so as the leaders of the United Arab Republic are showing in practice that they adhere steadfastly to the positions of President Nasser, remaining loyal to the aims for which he strove so consistently and tirelessly.

When we are urging a solution of the crisis in the Middle East, we do not do so only because we support the just cause of the Arab peoples, but because the continuation of this crisis affects the interests and threatens the security of our country and all Mediterranean countries. Because as long as this crisis continues, there can be no security in the entire Mediterranean region where two mighty fleets face each other and where the danger of a big power confrontation is ever-present. We consider, however, that the Mediterranean belongs to the Mediterranean countries and that it should serve the peace and not be a focal point of war and international conflict.

I also spoke of this subject among other things with President Nixon during his recent visit to Yugoslavia. He showed keen interest in our views and received them with attention.

We are living at a time when every people and every country must think about the fate of other countries and peoples, regardless of geographical distance. All that is happening in any part of the world, is reflected in one way or the other on the entire international community. It is not only the rights of the peoples of Indochina, Arab countries and the African south that have been brutally violated in Vietnam, the Middle East and South Africa, but also the basic principles of the Charter wherein certain irrevocable values of international relations are solemnly proclaimed. These are primarily the right of every people to decide on their fate and paths of development by themselves, free of all outside interference and of any attempt to impose the will of others upon them. The world must resolutely oppose every infraction of the basic rules of international behaviour. Otherwise we will more than ever be faced with power politics and the right of the stronger. It is therefore imperative that all peace-loving and progressive forces increase their efforts in order to open brighter prospects to mankind.

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Requests for Middle Eastern Countries in U.S. President Nixon's Foreign Aid Message to Congress¹

Washington, November 18, 1970

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Nowhere is our support more necessary or more closely linked with our efforts to achieve peaceful solutions than in the Middle East. Peace will come to the Middle East when all parties feel secure from the threats of military

dominance and recognize that the only permanent way to resolve deep-seated differences is by negotiation and never by war. We must now act to preserve the delicate military balance in this area, which will encourage those negotiations leading to peace.

ISRAEL

Israel has demonstrated a strong will to survive in freedom. We had hoped that recent agreements and arrangements in the Middle East would lead toward peace and make it unnecessary to provide large amounts of military assistance to any of the belligerents in the area. This hope has not yet been realized. Continued large-scale shipments of military equipment by the Soviet Union are a fact that cannot be denied. The build-up of the surface-to-air missile complex in the cease-fire zone west of the Suez Canal, in disregard of the cease-fire standstill agreement, requires us to redress the imbalance it has caused.

As authorized by the Defence Procurement Act, I request that the Congress appropriate \$500,000,000 to provide Israel with the credits that will assist her in the financing of purchases of equipment that have been necessary to maintain her defence capability, and to ease the economic strain caused by her expanded military requirements.

JORDAN

A stable and viable Jordan is essential if that nation is to make a positive contribution toward working out an enduring peace settlement which would serve the interests of all nations in the Middle East. The Jordanian Government has recently demonstrated its determination and capacity to resist aggression by forces which oppose a peace settlement and threaten to weaken the stability of that country. But Jordan, which has previously paid for its military equipment, cannot afford to meet this new defence burden, and has asked us for assistance. I request that Congress provide \$30,000,000 toward meeting Jordan's request.

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's foreign aid message as published in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, November 21-28, 1970, p. 24307.

LEBANON

Lebanon, which has also been threatened, has taken a moderate stance and a positive approach in the search for peace. To assist Lebanon to maintain a stable domestic base for responsible engagement in the search for peace, I request Congress to appropriate \$5,000,000 toward meeting Lebanon's request.

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Radio Interview with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel Immediately After His Talks with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, November 19, 1970

Eban: I informed the Secretary of State of the Premier's Knesset statement on behalf of the Government and about Israel wanting to create conditions—or wanting conditions to be created—for resuming talks, but then these conditions have not so far been created.

Q. The US newspapers, inspired by the State Department to some extent, say that Israel has changed its policy on the talks, not only in the light of the statement by the Defence Minister, Dayan, but also in view of the wording used by the Premier in her address.

A. They noted the fact that the definition made by the Premier is different although the policy is the same. We believe there is a need to restore the situation to the status quo but it has been made absolutely clear to us that there is no chance of this. We do not believe we can now pass over the whole matter of violations in silence. The Premier therefore used a comprehensive phrase—that is, the creation of conditions which will enable the talks to take place—but she added that such conditions do at present not exist.

¹ Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3540/A/9 and A/10; reprinted by permission.

Q. What is your impression of Roger's reaction to what you told him?

A. We certainly hold identical views, and it can be said co-operation in three fields [as heard] leaves its impression on every contact and every talk.

Q. Did you bring up the problem of continuing arms supplies with Mr. Rogers, even after the present supplies are delivered?

A. I worded the situation as follows: This business of balance is not a charter that will end at the end of this year. Our estimation of what has been done in 1970, both regarding the selling of arms and granting credit, must not have a line drawn below it. There is a chance or possibility of negotiations in 1971. In the course of that year, Egypt will continue to strengthen itself in the political, defence and economic spheres with Soviet aid. The question now is how can conditions for balanced negotiations be ensured.

Q. Is there any hope that the United States will agree not to put pressure on us on the border issue when borders are discussed at the Jarring talks?

A. They contend that they do not intend to put pressure on us, but I am not sure that we should be satisfied with such an undertaking. In all our contentions, we say one of the difficulties we are encountering on the road to negotiations is doubt concerning the extent of our leeway and freedom to negotiate.

Q. When do you think the Jarring talks will be resumed?

A. I am not willing to be a prophet because this depends on the Government's decision, and the Government has not yet met to discuss the matter.

Q. Mr. Eban, what do we want in exchange for our agreeing to resume the talks? What are we asking from the United States?

A. We shall decide at the Cabinet session what to ask for. Meanwhile, we have presented our urgent problems to the United States. We have arranged that, during the coming days and weeks, we are liable to

submit proposals to them or receive proposals from them. On the eve of such talks, the Government will want to know the US Government's thoughts about Israel's security, its economic problems and the political problems inherent in negotiations.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Foreign Minister Çağlayangil of Turkey to Hungary¹

November 21, 1970

At the invitation of Mr. Janos Peter, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Hungary, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, paid an official visit to Hungary from November 17 to 21, 1970.

The ministers also examined various international conflicts.

They expressed their anxiety regarding the present situation in the Middle East, the dangers inherent in the continuation of the conflict. They emphasized the importance of extending the cease-fire and the necessity for a resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission. They pointed out, in addition, the necessity for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, in conformity with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which is a promising basis for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab countries.

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Statement Issued by the Government of Israel Reiterating the Government's Position on Resumption of the Jarring Talks²

November 22, 1970

The Government will act in accordance with the policy expressed in the Prime Minister's statement to the Knesset on November 16, for the creation of conditions justifying implementation of the Government's resolution of September 8, 1970, which was approved by the Knesset, concerning the holding of talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring including consolidation and extension of the cease-fire agreement, with the aim of progressing from a cease-fire to a complete end to the war and to lasting peace.

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Article by Former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Harriman Advocating a Lend-Lease Plan for Arms Supply to Israel³

New York, November 24, 1970

President Nixon's request to the Congress for \$500 million for arms to Israel makes urgent the immediate reconsideration of how we should aid Israel in her struggle for survival.

After Israel's success in the Six-Day War, the immediate military threat posed by its enemies disappeared and it was hoped that a peaceful settlement guaranteeing her security would shortly follow.

Unfortunately, no settlement was reached and hostilities continued. Meanwhile the Soviet Union poured arms into Egypt and Syria. The United States tried both through representations to the Soviets and by holding back on military supplies for Israel to check a Middle Eastern arms race. However, the

¹ Translated from the French text in *Disisleri Bakanligi Belleteni* (Turkey), No. 74 (November 1970), pp. 68-69, 70.

² *Jerusalem Post*, November 23, 1970, p. 7.

³ *New York Times*, November 24, 1970, p. 39. © 1970 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

Russians built up Egypt's and Syria's armaments far beyond what they had been before the Six-Day War.

The flow of Soviet weapons, provided in substantial part virtually as gifts, has required an economically costly and increasingly burdensome Israeli response. Israel is currently spending at least 25 per cent, and perhaps 30 per cent, of its gross national product on national security.

The American percentage for military expenditures, including Vietnam, for fiscal 1971 is about 7.7 per cent. Prior to the Six-Day War, Israel spent less than \$200 million annually on military imports. The cost of military imports has quadrupled. Israel's balance of payments now shows an annual deficit of \$1.2 billion on a current accounts basis.

The Israelis have the determination and ability to defend their democracy without support from outside forces—provided Israel's military equipment is adequate—not inferior in quality although obviously inferior in quantity. It is clearly essential to insure that Israel has sufficient weapons to defend herself. But it is also vital that Israel not be compelled to spend herself into bankruptcy or to undermine the fabric of her society. The recently passed Jackson amendment to the military procurement authorization bill recognizes Israel's need for financial relief by authorizing the sale of military equipment on a credit basis.

But credits must be repaid, and a skyrocketing external debt would further strain Israel. I well remember the unfortunate situation that occurred as a result of the inability of various nations to repay the large loans we made to them during World War I.

One possible alternative would be for the United States to make military equipment available to Israel on a grant (free) basis. Almost every nation threatened by Communist or Communist-supplied arms has at some time received American military grant assistance. Even such Arab countries as Jordan and Iraq have been given American arms. Israel is virtually unique in having had to contract to pay for all arms she received from

the United States. Arab arms have been supplied without cost by not only Russia and China but also by Great Britain and France. However, at this late date to begin to give free arms to Israel would be seen by the Arabs as a provocative act and might impede our effort to bring about peace.

In December 1940 President Roosevelt made a brilliant proposal "to get away from the dollar sign" while providing arms to nations whose survival we wanted to support. He devised Lend-Lease—the loaning of military equipment on the basis that when it was no longer needed the unexpended part would be returned to the United States.

It seems to me that a similar program should now be adopted in supplying to Israel certain needed sophisticated military equipment. The great advantage of Lend-Lease is that under Lend-Lease the Arab nations could be assured that after peace had been achieved, major items of sophisticated military equipment would not be kept by Israel but would be returned to the United States.

We must recognize that many Arabs have a real, although unrealistic, fear, based in part on misinformation on what brought on the June 1967 war, that Israel is an imperialistic state bent on expanding her position. The knowledge that in the event of peace Israel would relinquish much of its sophisticated armament could serve as an incentive for the Arab states to negotiate. Equipment supplied under Lend-Lease should be carefully limited, as Israel, like her neighbors, must be encouraged to accept the fact that security lies not in strength of military forces but in a genuine peace settlement.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Prime Minister Busia of Ghana to Yugoslavia (Excerpts)¹

Accra and Belgrade, November 25, 1970

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Ghana, Dr. Kofee Abrefe Busia, and Madame Busia paid an official visit to Yugoslavia from November 21st to 25th, at the invitation of the President of the Federal Executive Council, Mitja Ribičič.

In an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding Mitja Ribičič and Dr. Busia discussed bi-lateral cooperation and current international problems.

They pointed out that the situation in the Middle East was highly alarming and that there was a danger of further outbursts of tension and larger military conflicts. For this reason they consider it to be of the utmost importance that negotiations be started as soon as possible with the representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, with the purpose of implementing the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and thus establishing the conditions for the unhindered and free development of all states and peoples and organizing a stable peace in the Middle East.

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Statement on the Middle East in a Televised Speech by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brezhnev (Excerpt)²

Erevan, Armenia, November 29, 1970

In the Middle East, another centre of international tension, the aggressor is being given an ever more resolute rebuff and the international isolation of the aggressor is becoming more and more evident.

The just struggle of the Arab peoples for the speediest elimination of the aftermath of the Israeli aggression is obtaining growing support from all peace-loving states.

It is not accidental that when the 25th session of the United Nations General Assembly recently discussed the Middle East question, one speaker after another condemned the aggressor, Israel.

The resolution passed by the General Assembly on November 4 clearly says that the Arab territories seized by Israel must be returned and that the decision of the Security Council on the settlement of the Middle East conflict must be carried out in full.³

The forces of the national liberation movement in the Middle East continue to grow in strength in the course of the joint struggle against imperialist aggression. Their friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states is also growing in strength.

It is difficult now to predict with precision how events will develop in the Middle East, where the struggle of the forces of aggression and of reaction against the forces of peace, progress and freedom continually goes on in different forms.

It is possible, however, to say this with complete certainty about the main thing: the rebuff to the aggressor is growing stronger

¹ *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXI, 496 (December 5, 1970), pp. 20, 21.

² English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5571 (December 1, 1970), p. 86.

³ For the text of the resolution, see United Nations section, below, Document 330.

and the aggressor's international isolation is increasing.

All this creates favourable conditions for the elimination of the centre of international tension in the Middle East. The peace-loving forces should make appropriate use of these conditions and bring greater moral and political pressure to bear on the aggressor and his patrons.

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Remarks on the Middle East in an Address to the French Senate by Foreign Minister Schumann of France Reporting on a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community¹

Paris, November 30, 1970

Sur le Proche-Orient, chargé également du rapport, j'ai pris comme point de départ le récent débat de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies et les positions divergentes que nous y avons prises. "C'est un cas-limite," ai-je ajouté. Raison de plus pour que nous le regardions en face.

C'est dans la perspective d'une négociation de paix que les Six Etats de l'Europe ont intérêt à se concerter pour étudier en commun le problème du Moyen-Orient qui les intéresse en raison de leurs responsabilités propres dans cette région, de l'importance de leurs intérêts et de l'influence que le conflit actuel risque d'avoir sur l'équilibre mondial.

Il n'est pas question pour les Six de se substituer aux membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité, ni d'élaborer les détails d'un règlement. Mais il est important que

tous en commun, nous cherchions à nous informer réciproquement de la situation au Moyen-Orient et de nos positions à l'égard des multiples problèmes qu'elle suscite. Nous pourrions, peut-être, dégager ainsi les principes d'un certain consensus sur les différents aspects d'un règlement possible.

Pour éviter—ai-je ajouté—que nos travaux ne se perdent dans des considérations générales, je crois que nous aurions intérêt à les concentrer sur des points précis, concrets, qui permettraient d'étudier réellement les problèmes et de vérifier la possibilité, à laquelle je crois, d'un accord entre tous.

C'est pourquoi, je vous propose de porter notre attention sur les trois questions suivantes:

—Liberté de navigation dans le Golfe d'Akaba, le Détroit de Tiran et le Canal de Suez.

— Etablissement de zones démilitarisées entre Israël et les Etats arabes (étendue de ces zones, nationalité des troupes stationnées, autorité dont elles relèveraient, durée de leur présence).

— Définition d'un status de Jérusalem (trois des quatre "Puissances catholiques" sont membres des Six; aussi est-il bon que les Six justement étudient le status de la ville, la protection des lieux Saints et la liberté de leur accès).

A ces questions qui—vous l'avez remarqué—se rattachent toutes au thème central des garanties de sécurité, indispensable contrepartie de la nécessaire évacuation des territoires occupés, une quatrième fut ajoutée, à notre grande satisfaction: le problème palestinien "problème humain donc politique," selon la formule de Monsieur Georges Pompidou.

Mais il fallait, pour que cette décision ne fût pas sans lendemain, la compléter par un accord de procédure. J'ai donc proposé que se tint—dès le mois de janvier—une réunion d'experts, dont le rapport sur les questions arrêtées d'un commun accord sera transmis au Comité politique, puis soumis à la discussion des Ministres. Cette proposition fut approuvée. Je m'abstiens de tout commentaire, sinon pour dire que l'Europe fera peut-

¹ Excerpted from Schumann's address as published in *Politique étrangère de la France: textes et documents*, 2nd Semester 1970, (Paris: Documentation française 1970), pp. 202-203. For the complete debate, see *Journal officiel de la République française*, Senate, Session of November 30, 1970, pp. 2408 ff.

être entendre sa voix au moment où celle de la sagesse aura le plus de chances d'être écoutée.

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Statement on the Middle East Issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States¹

Berlin, December 2, 1970

There is still a situation menacing peace in the Middle East. It is for more than three years now that the Israeli troops have occupied Arab areas. The imperialist policy of the ruling circles of Israel and the forces of international reaction supporting Israel create ever more obstacles for a political settlement in the Middle East. Due to the international importance of this area, the extent of the dangers arising from this must not be underestimated.

There are two contrasting directions concerning the Middle East questions. One of them involves a consistent course to bring about a settlement with political means which guarantee to all Middle East peoples, including the Israeli people, independent, secure national existence and their frontiers, and which would make it possible for them to use their strength, their resources and energies to satisfy their urgent needs. But there can be no peace in the Middle East as long as the Israeli troops have not evacuated all occupied Arab territories. As long as this is not effected it is unimaginable that the peoples of the Middle East can live together in relations of good neighbourliness.

The followers of this course—the UAR and other Arab states and the socialist and other peace-loving states which support them advocate the fulfilment of all stipulations of

the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 which constitutes the basis for the restoration of peace in the Middle East. As next practical steps they insist on the bringing about of contacts and negotiations between the parties engaged in the conflict, through the mediation of the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, Ambassador Jarring.

The other direction is aimed at upkeep, with all means available, the annexation of the occupied areas of the Arab states and the tensions in the Middle East, at overthrowing the progressive Arab regimes and undermining the Arab national liberation movement. Israel and its backers do stubbornly sabotage everything necessary for a just settlement. They attempt to force their imperialist demands upon the Middle East peoples declaring that these demands have to be approved and that otherwise there will be no peace. This policy was recently again condemned at the XXVth session of the UN General Assembly.

The forces of world imperialism, primarily American imperialism, are fully responsible for the fact that the Middle East is still one of the most dangerous hotbeds of tension in the world. The ruling militarist circles of Israel, boasting of their aggressive plans and programmes for creating a "Greater Israel" are actually jeopardizing the vital interests of the Israeli people.

The conviction was expressed during the Session that the attempts of the imperialist countries at splitting the Arab countries and at playing them off against each other will also in future be counteracted by efforts of the Arab states and peoples to cement their unity and cohesion.

The participants in the Session are convinced that the machinations of international reaction against the progressive Arab regimes are doomed to failure, just as it was the case in the past. In this connection they expressed their deep gratification at the declarations of the leading politicians of the United Arab Republic that they are willing to unswervingly advance on the road pursued by the UAR in the life-time of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, that they advocate a political solution

¹ English text in *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, (G.D.R.) X, 35 (December 14, 1970), p. 271. The Warsaw Pact states include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the U.S.S.R.

of the Middle East conflict, reject world imperialism, and stand up for independence, freedom, and progress, for friendship with the socialist countries, for peace and international understanding.

The participants in the Session reaffirm their preparedness to continue their resolute support for the just struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, against the imperialist policy of aggression in the Middle East, for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories, for freedom and social progress.

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Final Communiqué of the NATO Ministerial Meeting (Excerpt)¹

Brussels, December 4, 1970

8. Ministers took note of a report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions by the Council in Permanent Session. They noted that the evolution of events in the area gives for concern and justifies careful vigilance on the part of the Allies. They recommended that consultations on this question should continue, and they invited the Council in Permanent Session to keep the situation under review and to report fully thereon at their next meeting.

9. As a result of their review of the international situation and its positive and negative aspects, Ministers emphasised that these developments in Europe and the Mediterranean all affect the Alliance directly or indirectly, and have a bearing on the possibilities of reducing tensions and promoting peace.

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Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers to the U.S. Appropriations Committee Supporting the Administration Request for Additional Foreign Aid to Israel, Jordan and Lebanon (Excerpts)²

Washington, December 8, 1970

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your committee in support of the President's supplemental assistance request. This request has a common objective in two very different parts of the world, the Middle East and East Asia. In both regions the purpose of our proposed assistance is to advance the cause of peace and stability while minimizing or reducing the risk of United States direct military involvement in support of our national interests. In the Middle East, where our forces have not been engaged, we wish to see a negotiated settlement emerge from the present cease-fire. In East Asia, we wish to continue to carry out the United States troop withdrawals we have undertaken in Viet-Nam, Korea, and other countries without diminution of total security.

You are familiar with the content of the appropriation request, the Israel component of which has already been authorized in the Defense Procurement Act. It includes:

—\$500 million in military credits, some concessionary, for Israel.

—\$30 million in grant military assistance for Jordan.

—\$5 million in grant military assistance for Lebanon.

—\$150 million in grant military assistance to initiate the modernization program for the Republic of Korea's armed forces. We also seek authority to turn over to Korea equipment of United States forces being withdrawn from Korea.

—\$255 million in new obligational authori-

¹ NATO Press Communiqué MD (70) 2-19.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1646 (January 11, 1971), pp. 61-62, 65. Secretary Rogers made very similar statements to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 25, 1970 (see *Bulletin*, LXIII, 1642 (December 14, 1970), pp. 713 ff.) and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 10, 1970 (see *Bulletin*, LXIV, 1645 (January 4, 1971), pp. 19 ff.).

ty for Cambodia. Of this, \$85 million is for military assistance, \$70 million for supporting economic assistance, and \$100 million to restore funds to other military and economic programs for such places as Taiwan, Greece, Turkey, Viet-Nam, and Latin America. Up to now, we have transferred \$40 million from other military assistance programs and \$50 million of supporting assistance funds from economic assistance programs to the military assistance program for Cambodia and may have to transfer an additional \$10 million from economic programs in the near future.

—\$65 million in economic assistance for Viet-Nam to support commodity import and land reform programs.

—\$13 million in grant military assistance for Indonesian civic action and internal security programs.

—\$17 million to cover the shortages in anticipated recoveries of funds from earlier years' military assistance programs.

In the past year I believe we have advanced far in putting flesh on the bones of the administration's foreign policies. Our guiding principle has been to reduce direct American involvement while helping our friends to carry the prime burden of their defense. We have also had to contend with totally unanticipated developments in such places as Jordan and Cambodia.

This is no ordinary foreign aid request. Part of the appropriation which we have requested is required to consummate foreign policy programs that were only in the initial stages of formulation when the regular budget was presented last March. Part of the appropriation is required to cope with the events we had not foreseen or to take advantage of the opportunities presented by those events.

Taken as a whole, the appropriation will play a vital role in implementing national policies aimed at preserving United States interests and security while promoting world peace and stability.

It is also urgent that the funds be appropriated promptly. Otherwise, opportunities may be lost and the consequences for peace in the Middle East and East Asia may be adversely affected.

ISRAEL

The Middle East has been torn by strife and violence, at times by full-scale warfare, for many years. Despite the high degree of tension that persists, the United States has been able to avoid direct military involvement. Our ability to do so has rested in part on the maintenance of a military balance in the area. While we have worked closely with others interested in bringing about a more lasting peace to reach agreement on arms limitation, thus far we have not succeeded. We were, however, successful in persuading the parties to the conflict to agree to a cease-fire last August with the understanding that effort would be renewed to arrive at a more enduring negotiated settlement.

This cease-fire continues in force today, but the military balance has been jeopardized by the heavy deployment of surface-to-air missiles in the Suez Canal area by the U.A.R. in collaboration with the Soviet Union.

The funds requested for Israel will be used largely for aircraft and electronic equipment, which will help restore the military balance. Without this aid, Israel would be confronted with a virtually impossible financial burden.

JORDAN

As one of the more moderate regimes in the Middle East, Jordan appears to regard its interests as best served by a peaceful settlement. As you are aware, King Hussein recently withstood successfully efforts on the part of his enemies within Jordan, backed by some of Jordan's hostile neighbors, to overthrow his regime. The fighting resulted, however, in heavy losses of military equipment and much damage to the national economy. The \$30 million in grant aid requested for Jordan is intended to help it meet its most urgent requirements for military materiel replacements. Although Jordan has paid for its purchases from the United States in recent years, we believe this assistance is justified in view of the economic difficulties the country has been experiencing.

LEBANON

Lebanon also has consistently advocated moderate solutions to the problems of the

Middle East, despite pressure from those who would prefer to resort to arms. Lebanon has also maintained good relations with the United States and other Western countries. The \$5 million requested for military assistance will help Lebanon maintain its security and integrity and continue to pursue a course of moderation.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that a number of questions have been raised about this appropriation request. Let me try to answer some of them.

First, would this appropriation contribute to the search for peace in the Middle East? I am convinced that it would.

Throughout the period of violence in the Middle East we have worked to get the fighting stopped and talks started. The cease-fire which began in August is a direct result of our efforts. But continuation of the cease-fire, and establishment of a negotiated settlement which we hope will follow, necessarily depend on the continued existence of a military balance and moderate regimes in the Middle East.

Over the years, this country has tried its best to bring about an international understanding on arms limitation in the Middle East. I wish I could tell you these efforts have been successful, but they have not. Since the cease-fire last summer, Soviet arms have continued to go to the U.A.R., and Soviet-supplied missiles have been emplaced closer to the Canal. Failure to sustain the military balance would impair Israeli confidence, which is essential to peace negotiations.

As I indicated, this appropriation will enable Israel to purchase weapons to help sustain the military balance.

It will also help Jordan and Lebanon, moderate Middle East states that have an interest in a lasting peace, to maintain their independence.

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Statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird to the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee Supporting the Administration Request for Additional Foreign Aid to Israel (Excerpt)¹

Washington, December 8, 1970

We must assign highest priority to making it possible for Israel to acquire the military equipment she so desperately needs to replace losses and maintain a military posture strong enough to insure her survival. Much as we should like to see a cessation of military assistance deliveries to all potential belligerents in the area, we cannot stand idly by while the Soviet Union continues to upset the military balance by pouring arms into the area.

The \$500m. amount was necessary to cover sale of materiel already delivered to Israel, to prevent default on payments owed by that country and to finance orders for materiel now under procurement.

Unless we can provide the necessary credit in Fiscal Year 1971, Israel will face a serious financial crisis and may be forced to default on payments due this year. Failure to provide such credit would also cause an even more serious crisis of confidence between Israel and the United States and worst of all, result in the very arms imbalance in the area we seek so earnestly to prevent. Both to protect our immediate interest in keeping peace in that area, and to preserve the military balance upon which we base our hope for a permanent settlement of the differences which threaten that peace, we must have the means to facilitate Israel's acquisition of the weapons she needs for her defence and survival. I therefore consider the granting of our request as a matter of the greatest urgency and highest priority.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1970, p. 6.

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News Conference Statement by U.S. President Nixon on the American View of Middle East Settlement Terms¹

Washington, December 10, 1970

Question: Mr. President, sir, does it remain United States policy in the Middle East that Israel must withdraw from all occupied Arab territories excepting what Secretary Rogers called insubstantial alterations?

The President: Well, the policy is based basically on the '67 U.N. resolution. Now, that is a matter for negotiation, and to be more precise than that I do not think would be helpful at this time. I would only say that the cease-fire should continue; that I trust that we get the legislation through for the supplemental, not only there but for Southeast Asia, so that we can keep the balance of power in that part of the world, so that the parties involved on both sides will be willing to negotiate, and that eventually they start talking.

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U.S. Television Interview with Defense Minister Dayan of Israel on Israeli Conditions for Resumption of the Jarring Talks and on Settlement Terms²

New York, December 13, 1970

Miss Frederick: Mr. Minister, you have said you are very much in favor of Israel's participating in the UN peace talks under Ambassador Jarring. Can you tell us when Israel plans to return to those talks?

General Dayan: Our Cabinet decided that

we shall try to have the right conditions established in order that we shall think that we can go back to the talks, because you know that we once decided on going to the talks, and then we had to walk out, even before it started. Now we think that we should have proper conditions established, and only when and if they are established, then we can go to the talks.

Frederick: Could you please tell us what those proper conditions will be?

Dayan: Not exactly, because this is being discussed by the government, but I suppose I can give you an idea about what worries us. Let's put it like that. To being with, the political ones. I am afraid that the composition of the Security Council and of the United Nations Assembly just now is such that they can take any resolution against Israel, and we don't want to find ourselves negotiating with the Egyptians and under the threat that at any time a resolution by the Security Council can be passed against us and that the other party, the Egyptians will be in a position of telling us, "Unless you accept what we suggest to you, then we shall call you to the Security Council and have such a resolution passed." This is just as an example.

Frederick: Mr. Minister, if you want a change in the composition of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the talks can't possibly get under way for years, can they?

Dayan: That is not exactly what we want to do, but we want to be sure that we will be in a position to negotiate freely and that the Security Council will not intervene and will not try to impose on us a solution. We really don't mind if the Security Council stays as they are, but we would like to be sure that while we go to negotiate they will not interfere.

Frederick: You accepted the American initiative to enter into these peace talks and did so last August. You withdrew because you said Egypt had violated the stand-still arrangement, and I believe you were instrumental in influencing the cabinet to withdraw

¹ Excerpted from Nixon's news conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1644 (December 28, 1970), p. 771.

² Broadcast on National Broadcasting Company television and radio program "Meet the Press"; text provided by Merkle Press for NBC.

from those talks. Why now have you dropped those conditions for returning to the talks and brought up new conditions?

Dayan: I was not instrumental. I am a member of the cabinet, and I am the Minister of Defense. The cabinet decided what they decide.

The Egyptians at the time violated the cease fire agreement, and the only reaction that we could have taken at the time was to walk out. If the other party doesn't respect the agreement, there is no point to go on sitting with them.

Time passed and the Egyptians prolonged the cease fire once and twice, and we think we should try again, just like that. Try again, provided that proper conditions are secured.

Frederick: Will you be taking back to Israel information as a result of your conferences in Washington that might indicate those conditions could be met as far as the American position is concerned?

Dayan: No. No. I was not negotiating it here, this subject. As a matter of fact, it is being dealt with by way of letters and clarification between our Prime Minister and your President. I was not negotiating about it, and I am not taking back any concrete answer about any of our requests about it.

Mr. Lisagor: General Dayan, from your answer to Miss Frederick's question—is your government asking the United States to guarantee in advance that it will veto Security Council action that might intrude upon your wishes or desires in the matter?

Dayan: I am sorry, I did say right from the beginning that I cannot answer a specific question like that. What I can say is to try to explain to you what kind of worries we have about it. But being a member of the cabinet, I cannot spell out exactly how we intend, how we plan to get these assurances that we want to achieve.

Lisagor: You, in the first instance, demanded a rollback of the missiles in the Canal Zone when the stand-still was violated.

Dayan: Implementation of the cease fire agreement?

Lisagor: Right.

Now, you have dropped that condition for a rollback. Does that mean that the United States government has somehow assured you that you are not in a disadvantaged position in a military way?

Dayan: No, no. We haven't dropped it, but we have to face the facts of life and we want to try again and to see whether there is any substitute, perhaps something else, not the rollback of the missile site, but other substitute in the military way that can give us the framework so that we can go to the talks—not exactly the same thing that we wanted in the beginning but we have, let me say, to accept it, but to find some compensation in the military way.

Lisagor: Does that compensation mean additional weapons and military equipment from the United States?

Dayan: If you don't mind, I will again speak in generalities about it. Such compensation should insure us that we shall not find ourselves in the position that unless we accept the proposals submitted to us by the Egyptians, then we have no alternative in the military way because we shall be too weak. We don't want to find ourselves too weak to stand on our demands, so we have to maintain our strength, military strength, during the negotiations so that we can say "No," and still believe that we can go back to the line and, if necessary, to fight it out.

Lisagor: In this connection, General Dayan, what is the purpose of your proposal for a mutual thin-out on both sides of the Canal? As I understand it, you would have both sides pull back and thin out. Is it related to this position you just mentioned?

Dayan: I read about it. I read about it, but I haven't submitted any such proposals, not to my government, or anywhere else. So such a proposal, a concrete one, submitted by me, simply doesn't exist.

Mr. Smith: Looking ahead to the actual nego-

tations, General Dayan, you and a number of other Israeli officials have been quoted from time to time as saying that as part of a settlement Israel must retain the Golan Heights of Syria, Arab Jerusalem, Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, perhaps settlements on the West Bank.

Dayan: Et cetera.

Smith: *Et cetera.*—Are these fixed requirements or is there some room for compromise in the negotiations?

Dayan: These I should say are points—not—what is concrete about it is that we don't want to go back to the old line, I mean not even if there is some minor rectification. We don't accept that formula. We just don't want it, you see, per se. This is unacceptable to us.

When we have to draw a kind of a map to explain what is our concept about it—we speak about the Golan Heights and Jerusalem and the Jordan as a security line, and Sharm-el-Sheikh and so on—but when our government decided, and then it was approved by our Parliament to go to the Jarring talks, we said there that the talks, even when they take place, will be without prior condition. That is to say, we shall come to the table and say, "Gentlemen, that's the way that we see it. We understand that the Arabs see it differently. We shall hear from them, and then we negotiate."

Smith: Are you saying then that there is some room for compromise after each of you have set out your basic position?

Dayan: If I quote the decision of the Cabinet and of Parliament in saying that they said that there are no prior conditions, now the interpretation is for you; you are quite good in that.

Smith: But you are not suggesting that Israel will have to hold to its maximum position throughout the negotiations and expect to get a settlement, are you?

Dayan: I hope that we shall do very well through the negotiation; why not? When

you go and you enter into negotiation, you hope to get the maximum of your requirement, but we shall have to make a decision and to make up our minds whether we reject the other party when it comes to the end of the negotiation, or whether we compromise on something. But at the beginning we state what our position is, and you mentioned it about the Golan Heights and the Jordan and so on, and then we say, "Let's go and negotiate without prior conditions because we did hear what the Arabs say; it is not the same as what we say," so what can you do? One party says one thing; another one, another thing. It is all right. We know—each one of us knows what the other thinks. Let's sit down to the table and negotiate.

Mr. Estabrook: General Dayan, last summer when Israel accepted the initiative of Secretary of State Rogers, it said that it accepted also the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. That resolution calls as part of a package deal for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war. You have just now said that Israel will not withdraw from Sharm-el-Sheikh, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and so forth. Do you view this as a repudiation of the terms of the 1967 Security Council Resolution?

Dayan: The Security Council Resolution is not our Bible, sir. It is not our Bible, and what the cabinet and then the parliament decided was—let me quote—"within the framework of the Security Council Resolution."

So we have our own views about where the security borders should be, and I did mention that before, and we did say that we are ready to negotiate within the framework of the Security Council Resolution. I think this gives us quite a room to negotiate.

Estabrook: Do you foresee the possibility of demilitarization of some of these sensitive points under international control?

Dayan: I wish I knew what that means. To say the least, we have very, very bad and bitter experience about that. So something much better than we experienced in the past

should be suggested to us now if anyone wants that as a substitute for our security, a substitute to our own forces.

I haven't heard anything till now that convinced me that demilitarization—supervised by whom—can be a substitute and worked out instead of our own troops stationing there.

Estabrook: In view of your experience in 1967 with the United Nations troops, would you envisage having a new United Nations contingent and would you permit it on the Israeli side of the border as well as the Arab side?

Dayan: Certainly not on the Israeli side. What do we want them there for? We didn't do any war. We don't want them to supervise us, but—we haven't suggested any demilitarization and what we experienced in the past just didn't work, just didn't work. I haven't heard yet any—well, excuse my saying, any sensible explanation, what this demilitarization means. What is it? Can you explain it? What does it mean demilitarization? Who is going to supervise it?

Spivak: General Dayan, may I ask you a question? As I understand from what the Israeli government has said and what you say today, that you are prepared, Israel is prepared, to negotiate without prior conditions?

Dayan: That is right.

Spivak: But you are not prepared to enter negotiations without prior conditions, is that correct?

Dayan: That is correct.

Spivak: What sense does that make?

Dayan: It makes the sense that we want to negotiate without prior conditions but to be free, on equal ground, while we negotiate. Let me say that we two are negotiating; you are sitting with a gun, and I without it. Well, I can't negotiate with you. Not me. I will say, "Now, look here, you take off your gun or otherwise you will dictate to me what to do."

So that means, without prior conditions while the negotiations take place, but in order that the two parties will be in the same condition, we have to have the assurance that

we will be in a position to negotiate freely without pressure. I just gave as an example, we want to be sure that the Security Council will not dictate to us what to do, or let me take a military example: we don't want to run out of ammunition. I think that you have here the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and he quoted a letter that he got from some American official that promised him that Israel will not get any American airplanes during the negotiation time, and of course that didn't hold for the Egyptians. They got all their supplies from the Russians all through the negotiations. This gentleman Riad could have told me, "Look here, but you can't go back. You have to accept my deal because you don't have any airplanes to fight with, but I have got them because I am getting from Russia, everything that I wanted."

Spivak: But you haven't accepted the dictation of the Security Council before in any resolutions that they have passed, that you have ignored. Why would you necessarily feel that you had to accept them again and have that as part of your negotiations? I don't understand that.

Dayan: There is one thing if you make a decision and I ignore it, and it is another thing if we undertake to accept it.

When we go to the negotiations and say, "We are going to negotiate within the framework and to sit down," we do it. If the Security Council assembles and they pass a resolution which we don't like, it is all right; we couldn't avoid it, but that doesn't necessarily mean that we have to carry it out. But when we say we shall carry it out, that means a lot.

Frederick: Mr. Minister, in line with what you were saying a moment ago, that Israel could not negotiate without ammunition, is there any possibility Israel would not have ammunition with the United States so completely back of it?

Dayan: I hope that Israel will have munitions, not as much as the Egyptians have, and certainly not with Russian, or in this case, American soldiers with ammunition, but I do hope that Israel will not find itself too weak. But I wouldn't like to repeat the experience

that we had at that time, that Mr. Riad will have a promise given by the American authorities that we shall not get American military supplies while the negotiations take place, and he will go on getting all the Russian supplies. We wouldn't like to repeat that.

Frederick: Are you saying that what supplies the United States has given you and promised you has not yet brought about balance with the supplies Egypt has received, for example, from the Soviet Union?

Dayan: No, I am not expecting anything like such a balance anyway, never. We are counting two and a half million, and we don't expect the United States of America or ourselves to acquire so much ammunition, all this equipment, which is very expensive, like the Arabs have, but we don't want an embargo; we don't want a suspension; we don't want a closing down of all the taps. So I hope that people will understand that when we speak about perfect conditions that will allow us to negotiate freely, that we should not find ourselves in such a position without ammunition.

Lisagor: General Dayan, when Egyptian President Nasser was alive, he was regarded as the real arbiter on the Arab side of a peaceful settlement, whether you get one or not. Now that he is gone is it easier or more complicated to reach a settlement?

Dayan: I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know. I didn't think too much of Nasser as a peacemaker. I don't know whether they are going to make peace now.

I think the fact is that Nasser decided to renew the cease fire, and they still keep the cease fire now. I think they do that because this war doesn't pay them. I hope this is the real issue and the real element, not so much Nasser, or Sadat, but when the Egyptians realize that the war doesn't do any good to them they will try the peaceful means.

Lisagor: Do you believe that the Russians want a settlement in the Middle East, particularly in view of their desire to reopen the Suez Canal?

Dayan: I don't know what the Russians want. I think that—I don't think they are

pushing now the Arabs to renew the war. I don't think they are pushing them for a renewal of the war. I wouldn't say that the Russians in Egypt are working for peace. No, I wouldn't say that.

Spivak: We have less than three minutes.

Smith: To listen to you talk a little earlier, I would have thought Israel, not the Arabs, had lost the 1967 war. I wonder whether or not you feel that Israel now has military superiority over the Arabs?

Dayan: I don't know about superiority. It is not as simple as that. I think that if the Arabs renew the war and try to conquer Israel, they will fail. I wouldn't say that Israel has such a superiority that we can take Cairo and Amman and Damascus and all that, but I think that if the Egyptians, with all the other countries, try to cross the Canal and attack us, I think that they are about to lose such a war.

Smith: Could you repeat the 1967 victory today, do you think?

Dayan: Not exactly the same, and we are not in the same position. We are at the Canal now. Why should we repeat it? It went very well when it was done. If we shall have another war, we shall do it under new conditions.

Estabrook: Mr. Minister, some Arabs say that they think it would be easier to negotiate with you because you are a sabra, born in Israel.

Dayan: Me personally?

Estabrook: They understand you.

Dayan: They don't know me.

Estabrook: Would you like to be Prime Minister?

Dayan: No, sir.

Estabrook: If you were Prime Minister—

Dayan: You don't like my answer but no, sir.

Estabrook: I believe you. If you were Prime Minister, sir—

Dayan: No, I wouldn't.

Estabrook: *You wouldn't? All right.*

Dayan: It is not compulsory, no.

Spivak: *Mr. Minister, do you expect a resumption of negotiations in view of the conditions that Israel has set?*

Dayan: I hope that we shall manage to create the condition. I hope we shall not go to the negotiations unless such conditions are established, but I do hope that the decision of our Cabinet—that we shall try by our own initiative to create such condition positively. I hope that we shall succeed, that we shall work hard in order to obtain such condition and that they will be established. Then we shall be able to go to negotiation. We want to go to the negotiation.

Frederick: *Mr. Minister, I am sure you know that some critics say Israel is delaying its return to the peace talks in order further to entrench itself in the occupied areas and that will make more difficult any effort to have it withdrawn.*

How do you answer critics like that?

Dayan: We don't want to withdraw, Madam. I just said it right away, we don't have to entrench ourselves. We don't want to go to the old lines, and we are not trying to hide it; we say it. But we do say that we want to finish the war. There is no point for us or for the Arabs to go on with the war. We want a peace agreement, and we are ready to sit down with the Arabs, knowing that they have a different concept altogether from ours, and negotiate peace without prior conditions. What's wrong with that?

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Interview with Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem Kollek on Plans Prepared in Israel for the Future of the City¹

Jerusalem, mid December 1970

Kollek: I would like to say something else that may cause a new scandal but that's all the same to me: if Jerusalem is to be enlarged—as the Jordanians, by the way, had already planned—to include Ramallah, and Bethlehem, the major Arab institutions must be moved into this Greater Jerusalem so that there will be an Arab presence worthy of the name... and this in the context of a single municipality. Obviously, everything depends on the conditions under which the Arab-Israeli conflict is ended. But in the meantime, it is good to create a metropolitan area because of the great number of needs in common—sewers, health services, firemen, and what have you—which must be met for that impressive agglomeration which Greater Jerusalem will be.

Q. Is one to understand that all your plans for Jerusalem are not bound to its political future or to that of the areas surrounding it?

Kollek: I draw a clear distinction between everyday life in a city with a mixed and diverse population and the political status of that city.

Q. When you speak of a "mixed population," do you mean "Jews and Arabs" or "Israelis and Jordanians or Palestinians"?

Kollek: I am talking about the Jews and Arabs who will live together in this city for hundreds of years to come. I repeat that the political aspect doesn't interest me; I leave that to governments. We are going to prepare a city in which populations will live whose way of life, culture and religion differ, and above all we want to keep Jerusalem from meeting with the fate of Belfast, of Louvain or even of certain American cities. How to prevent that—that's the question I ask

¹ Translated from the French text in *Le Monde*, December 22, 1970, p. 8.

myself, the question I'm looking for an answer to. The best solution, it seems to me, lies in the formula of division into boroughs as in London and Paris, each one with broad autonomy in the realms of education, city planning and such things. Jerusalem being smaller than the two capitals I have mentioned, with us the division will be on the basis of language, ethnic affiliation or religion. And so that no one of us will have the painful feeling of being dominated by a foreigner everyone must be allowed a maximum of liberty and autonomy. For centuries this city has been a mosaic of quarters (Jewish, Muslim, Armenian, Copt, Roman Catholic, Greek, etc.). It will perhaps be good to preserve this formula inherited from a long past and to view the future of Jerusalem from the angle of city planning rather than from that of politics. Jerusalem will thus demonstrate that people can live together even if they don't like each other very much.

Q. All the same, you calculate that Jews must always constitute the majority?

Kollek: Such a majority has existed since 1940 and, like it or not, there will always be a Jewish majority in Jerusalem.

Q. On the creation of an Arab university, you were in opposition to the government: the latter wanted it built at Ramallah and you wished it to be in Jerusalem?

Kollek: I believe that there are valid arguments for both points of view. First of all, it is not up to us to build a university; it's up to the Arabs to do it.

Our only duty is to help them if they ask us to. I thought that they would like to have their own university in Jerusalem. But now they tell me that have given in to the numerous pressures to choose Ramallah, which is located in the occupation zone where Jordanian law is still in force. I think we must help them build this university wherever they want it: that will keep them from being considered "collaborators." At the same time, in 1954 Mr. Anwar Nusseibeh, then Jordanian Minister of National Education, wanted to endow Jerusalem with a

university. The Jordanian government opposed it, fearing it would give the city too much importance. They built it in Amman.

Q. What place do you reserve for Christian religious institutions in your Greater Jerusalem plan?

Kollek: We have always helped them. Just after the war, we paid indemnity to all the communities whose property was damaged in the fighting and we encouraged the building of the ecumenical university of Tantour, which is to be inaugurated in several months.

Q. How do you see the Jerusalem of the future?

Kollek: Jerusalem must certainly remain the capital of Israel, a capital which takes into consideration the feelings of hundreds of millions of human beings throughout the world, whose eyes are turned towards it. We must preserve its special character even if this should impede us on the material level. We shall always be obliged to take into account what this city represents for so many people and for the entire world. We are so conscious of it that we have insisted on bringing in representatives of a number of countries in working out the master plan for Greater Jerusalem and for this purpose we have appealed to historians, archaeologists and architects of renown, and to representatives of various religions. That doesn't mean though that Jerusalem should be an international city. We want it to be universal.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit to the U.A.R. of a Delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Condensed)¹

December 20, 1970

At the invitation of the Central Committee

¹ English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 51 (January 19, 1971), pp. 1, 2-3. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

of the Arab Socialist Union, a delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by B. N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, was in the United Arab Republic from Dec. 10 to Dec. 20, 1970.

The C.P.S.U. representatives had meetings and conversations with a delegation of the Arab Socialist Union, headed by Abdel Mohsen Abu el-Nur, member of the Supreme Executive Committee and General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Union.

There was an exchange of opinions on the situation in the Near East. The two sides reaffirmed the identity of the positions of the C.P.S.U. and the Arab Socialist Union of the U.A.R. on the question of ways for the settlement of the Near East crisis on the basis of the full implementation of the Nov. 22, 1967, U.N. Security Council resolution.

The two sides stated their resolute condemnation of the policy of procrastination and sabotage that the Israeli aggressor is employing, with the moral, financial and military assistance of U.S. imperialist circles, for the purpose of frustrating a just settlement of the Near East conflict.

During the talks, the two sides reaffirmed that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied by Israel as a result of the June, 1967, aggression and the implementation of the Nov. 22, 1967, Security Council resolution, as well as respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the fulfillment of the U.N. decisions on this question, provide the basis for achieving a just peace in the Near East.

It is necessary without delay to carry out concrete measures, including the elaboration of a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from all occupied Arab territories and the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution.

The C.P.S.U. delegation expressed its high appreciation of the U.A.R.'s consistent efforts aimed at establishing peace and preventing the resumption of armed conflict in the Near East.

The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the growing support for the U.A.R.'s just position on the part of peace-loving forces. They expressed the determination of the Arab Socialist Union and the C.P.S.U. to continue their efforts aimed at enlisting ever broader circles of the world public in active support of the just cause of the Arab peoples and at exerting pressure on the aggressor.

The two sides reaffirmed that the struggle of the Egyptian and all the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression and the imperialist forces supporting it is an important component of the anti-imperialist struggle of the world national-liberation movement. This struggle receives the active support of all freedom-loving forces and the forces of socialism, progress and peace.

The C.P.S.U. delegation declared its party's full support for the Arab Socialist Union's course aimed at the mobilization of all the strength and potential of the U.A.R.'s people to rebuff the Israeli aggressor and to eliminate the consequences of aggression.

The C.P.S.U. delegation reaffirmed the Soviet Union's firm resolve to extend comprehensive support to the U.A.R. in its struggle against imperialist Israeli aggression, for the withdrawal of the aggressor's troops from the occupied territories and for freedom, peace and socialism.

The two sides emphasized the great importance of the activity of the governments and peoples of the Arab states aimed at the further solidarity and coordinated action of these states in the common struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and war.

The Arab Socialist Union representatives noted the great importance of the joint actions of the socialist countries in support of the just anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, and especially the statement issued by the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States, which was held in Berlin on Dec. 2, 1970.

The Arab Socialist Union representatives highly appreciated the C.P.S.U.'s position on questions of the struggle against imperialism

and its consistent support for the movement of the peoples for national and social liberation. They expressed profound gratitude to the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Union for their comprehensive support to the people of the U.A.R. in their struggle for the assertion of political and economic independence, for social progress and for overcoming the imperialist Israeli aggression.

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U.S. Television Interview Statements by U.K. Prime Minister Heath on the Process of Middle East Settlement Negotiations¹

December 20, 1970

Prime Minister: My position here is that I don't think we shall get a firmly based peace in the Middle East unless we have a settlement which is freely and willingly agreed between Israel and the Arab countries.

Q. Face to face?

Prime Minister: Well, that's the last stage, I think, but at this stage, therefore, I don't think that we really can put forward particular adjustments in the boundaries.

What I have been feeling for some time is that we do need to have a rather more constructive form of diplomacy in operation between the two sides in order to see what sort of basis there is for settlement, and this really means that Dr. Jarring, or somebody like him, has to be not only a letter box, in which he puts questions to each side and then the replies come back, which are bound to be extreme, because they're bound to be public.

But he can put forward options to each

side, and say, well now how do you react to this one, how do you react to that one, and as he gets closer towards a synthesis, then I think you might get into a situation, what is commonly known as the Rhodes solution, in which they are meeting in the same building, or something and then finally they meet in the lift and then they come together because they are at the point at which they can reach the settlement, and then when it's freely agreed, it'll last.

Q. Do you have any doubt that Dr. Jarring is going to be undertaking this mission?

Prime Minister: I don't know what Dr. Jarring wants to do. I think that so far he doesn't feel that his efforts have been successful. Well, that is obviously true.

What is much more important is that the powers should get to work in thinking ahead as to what these sort of options are going to be and then they can provide them to Dr. Jarring. I think he's got to work out solutions on his own and offer them to people, or else the solutions have got to be provided and then he can offer them.

Q. Do you see signs that this process is under way or beginning?

Prime Minister: No, it isn't under way at the moment, and I'd like to see it get under way, and it's tied up with this question of a secure frontier. I've found difficulty in trying to get an answer to the question, what does Israel herself want for secure frontiers? Is it to be some sort of international zone? Is there to be a guarantee from one power, two powers, three powers, four powers? Is there to be a United Nations force? Exactly what would Israel feel gave her secure frontiers once she started to withdraw?

Q. Israel says that this is something that has to be obviously taken care of in the course of the negotiations and—

Prime Minister: Well, this is true, but where is the initiative going to come from? That's the point. Either Israel herself will have to say, We regard this is a secure form of frontier, whatever it may be, or else somebody

¹ Excerpted from Heath's interview recorded December 18, broadcast December 20, 1970. London Press Service, Verbatim Service 357/70, December 21, 1970; text provided on request by the Embassy of Great Britain in Beirut.

has got to put to the two sides, Now would this give you the security and confidence which you need?

Q. Well, do you have any thoughts on that? Have you presented any ideas to the Israelis?

Prime Minister: We've not presented any ideas in a hard form, no. I don't think that's the job of a single power. I think what we need to do is to talk amongst ourselves as to what the various options are, within the course of conversation with the Israeli Prime Minister and other ministers, I'd say, well, does a neutral zone suit in this particular area which you are worried about, or do you actually want forces on the ground, and if so, whose forces do you want and who is to control them, and so on.

Now, these are difficult things to settle and I don't believe one should wait. I think one should be thinking ahead.

Q. Would you endorse the notion of a Soviet-American force in the Middle East to guarantee a peace settlement?

Prime Minister: Well, in my view, this depends on whether it is satisfactory to the Israelis and to the Arabs. If it's not satisfactory to them, then there's no point in my endorsing it, or even in the two super powers offering it.

One must approach this from the point of view, What are they prepared to accept as secure frontiers? This is what they maintain: they will withdraw, but they want secure frontiers. How do we give them that security?

Q. Knowing what the position of the Israelis is, and the Egyptians, do you see the outline of a settlement?

Prime Minister: Not in specific detail, no.

Q. Do you feel, sir, that if the Big Four were to come up with the idea of guaranteeing a settlement in the Middle East, that Britain would be prepared to provide troops for that kind of force, if it were under the U.N.?

Prime Minister: Why, there are a number of hypothetical aspects to that question.

Q. I understand it's being discussed. That's why I asked you.

Prime Minister: Well, I think one has first of all got to see whether this is the answer to the Arab and Israeli problem, from the point of view of secure boundaries. If you say that we're going to provide it under the United Nations, that again raises further questions as to how a force like that in that situation is going to be commanded and so on. Now, I think we'd better look at this in detail and see what's involved. That's why I say, we've got to think ahead.

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Speech by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin at a Luncheon Given in Honor of a Delegation from the U.A.R. Headed by Vice-President Sabry (Excerpt)¹

Moscow, December 21, 1970

Now that we are here together with our Arab friends, we can declare with full certainty that the Israeli aggressors and those who back them will never attain the goals pursued by their expansionist policy in the Near East. Those in Israel who have not lost a sense of responsibility for the fate of their own people, who do not want to be accomplices in a crime against peace, cannot fail to understand that the way out of the present situation in the Near East must be found along lines of the urgent implementation of the Nov. 22, 1967, resolution of the U.N. Security Council.

¹ English text in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXII, 51 (January 19, 1971), p. 4. Published weekly at the Ohio State University by American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; copyright, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1970; translation reprinted by permission.

Why do we regard the Security Council resolution as a suitable basis for a peaceful settlement to the Near East conflict? First of all, because it rules out the possibility of encouraging the aggressor and requires the restoration of justice, which the aggressor has flouted. This resolution speaks of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war and calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the establishment of a just and lasting peace and the recognition of the right of every state in this area to live in peace without being subjected to threats of force or the use of force. If the ruling circles of Israel avoid making an unambiguous commitment to act in accordance with these principles, this only emphasizes the aggressive essence of their constant policy.

The Israeli extremists must not think that they will be able to get some kind of price for their consent to a peaceful settlement in the Near East. No one is asking peace at any price from Israel and its imperialist protectors. The principles that guide the peoples in the struggle for their national liberation, independence and freedom cannot be sold or bought. The Israeli aggressors must learn this well.

The United Arab Republic is following the path outlined by that great son of the Egyptian people, Gamal Abdel Nasser. We welcome the efforts of the U.A.R. government aimed at the cohesion of the Arab countries and the mobilization of all their possibilities in the struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression. We sincerely wish complete success to the U.A.R. government and the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union in implementing the "March 30 program," in deepening the agrarian reform in the interests of the Egyptian peasants and the people as a whole, and also in carrying out other progressive social and economic measures.

The majestic Aswan complex, the construction of which has now been successfully completed, will always be a vivid expression of the Soviet people's fraternal feelings for the people of the United Arab Republic, of our

desire to give all-round assistance to the U.A.R. in the development of its peaceful economy.

We would like once again to assure the leaders of the United Arab Republic and the Arab Socialist Union and the people of the U.A.R. as a whole that the Soviet Union will continue to stand firmly on the side of the Arab people in their just struggle. The Soviet-Egyptian exchange of opinions held today on many questions of our relations and the present international situation reaffirms the identity of our positions on a broad range of questions; it reaffirms the desire of our states to continue developing and strengthening broad cooperation in the political, economic, defense and other fields; our exchange of opinions convincingly demonstrates that our cooperation is developing on a firm basis of growing mutual trust.

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Report on the Middle East and American Security Policy Prepared by U.S. Senator Jackson (Excerpt)¹

December 21, 1970

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the central problems in our efforts to bring peace to the Middle East has been a preoccupation with the notion that the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations lies at the core of the instability we seek to alleviate. One result is that we have been far too sanguine in our hopes for Soviet cooperation in resolving that unhappy conflict.

The Soviets understand that a Middle East characterized by peace and harmony, by stability and cooperative Arab-Israeli relations, would deprive them of their access to the continuing penetration of the Arab

¹ Henry M. Jackson, *The Middle East and American Security Policy*, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1970), pp. 17-19.

world. A genuine peace in the Middle East would diminish the importance of Soviet military support to Egypt; Syria and Iraq would not require large numbers of Soviet tanks any more than Egypt would require the presence of the Russian Air Force if a secure negotiated settlement could be obtained. The unhappy truth is that the Soviets, far from urging the radical Arab states to make peace with Israel, are determined to keep tensions high and to nurture the distant hope that Israel will one day be destroyed. If the Arab states were ever to despair of the eventual destruction of Israel, and if they were left free to determine their own best interests, I believe that the problems of the Palestinians could be solved, Israel could obtain recognition for defensible borders, and the countries of the Middle East could set about the business of cooperating in economic and political development.

American policy in the Middle East has not been sufficiently sensitive to these considerations. We have often, and especially recently, acted on the assumption that because the Soviets do not want all-out war in the Middle East they must desire all-out peace. When we come to appreciate that between the desire to avert war and the desire for peace there is an enormous range of Soviet policy objectives, we shall have taken the first essential step in designing an effective Middle East policy.

Nothing is so likely to facilitate Soviet policy in the Middle East as a settlement imposed on Israel that leaves her in the vulnerable and exposed position that existed prior to the Six-Day War. Such a settlement would guarantee that the tensions upon which Soviet policy is based would continue to be exploited with tragic consequences for Arab and Jew alike.

In summary, these are my recommendations:

1. We need to recognize that the central problem in the Middle East is the Soviet drive for hegemony, and that

2. The maintenance of a high level of tension between Israel and the Arab states

is the primary vehicle by which the Soviet Union seeks to accomplish this objective.

3. We should assume, therefore, that for the foreseeable future the search for peace and stability in the Middle East will be resisted, rather than supported by Soviet policy.

4. We should recognize that the best prospect for peace in the Middle East lies in discouraging radical Arab hopes for the eventual military defeat of Israel—hopes that lead to a menacing and destabilizing alliance with the Soviet Union and that deepen Soviet influence in the region as a whole.

5. We should recognize, and make clear our determination to resist, the Soviet threat to our friends and allies in the Middle East, particularly Greece and Turkey, Iran and those moderate Arab nations who desire our support. To that end:

(a) We should actively encourage our NATO allies to join with us in a strengthening of our common defensive capabilities in the region; and

(b) We should take immediate steps to explore measures to increase the strength and effectiveness of the U.S. 6th Fleet.

6. In the special case of Israel, whose security is directly and immediately affected by American policy, I would recommend the following:

(a) We should faithfully implement the basic policy expressed in section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act of 1971—which is now the law of the land—to furnish to Israel the means of providing for its own security, in order to restore and maintain the military balance in the Middle East.

(b) Recognizing that the Israeli economy can no longer sustain its recent high level of defense procurement, we should stand ready to assist Israel not only by credit sale but with grant aid for certain military equipment essential to her security.

(c) We should assist Israel in the development of an improved indigenous defense

production capability in certain areas through the provision of production rights for equipment of U.S. manufacture.

(d) We should drop the "Rogers formula" of supporting only "insubstantial alterations" in the 1949 armistice lines, substituting, in its place, a formula that recognizes the primacy of establishing defensible borders for Israel.

(e) Our approach to a settlement should, above all, emphasize concrete, physical arrangements to assure Israel's security which, if imperiled, merely invites Soviet exploitation and plants the seed of future war.

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News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers on the American Role in a Middle East Settlement¹

Washington, December 23, 1970

Q. I say: What is the United States prepared to do—what kind of guarantees is the United States prepared to give Israel to bring her back to negotiating talks, and specifically, are you prepared to moderate or modify your language suggesting that only insubstantial changes must be made in Middle Eastern borders?

A. Well, we think the situation as of today is very sensitive. We are doing all we can to encourage the parties to renew negotiations. I suppose that really "to begin negotiations" would be a better way to put it. And we have had very active discussions with all concerned toward achieving that objective. We have, I think, in our relations with Israel convinced Israel that they should have no concern about our support for their continued existence, and we have made that clear by word and by deed.

We have also had, I think, very useful exchanges with King Hussein and other mem-

bers of his government, and I have had several recent discussions with members of the new government of the U.A.R.

I don't want to say anything at this time which might in any way impair the opportunity and the chances that now exist for negotiations to begin. We have reason for hope that the negotiations may start. We have no assurances, but certainly we have reason for hope.

We think 1971 may be a year of decision in the Middle East. We think the climate is very good. I think the fact that we are now entering the fifth month of the cease-fire, the fact that people in the area realize how important peace is, how much it means to their lives, gives hope that they may be in a more flexible frame of mind.

Now, insofar as guarantees are concerned—and let me, before I finish the thought I was just on, say our initiative consists of two parts: One, stop fighting; two, start talking. At the time we announced it, we realized it was going to be a rocky road—nothing easy about the Middle East. It is a very complex, difficult situation. It's possible that it can't be solved at all by negotiations, but we hope it can.

And the second part of our initiative was to start talking, so we are going to put all our emphasis on that phase, to see if we can get the parties to start talking, and we would hope that the parties not take public positions from which it is difficult to retreat.

As far as we are concerned, we have said consistently that we think the responsibility for working out a peaceful settlement for an agreement rests among the parties, U.A.R., Jordan, and Israel. We do not have any blueprint as such. We do not have any plan that provides security as such. We think those matters should be negotiated among the parties. They have to live with each other, and they have to have sufficient assurance among themselves that they can protect their own countries. So, we think, in the first instance, that the parties have to negotiate an agreement and obviously they have to be satisfied that they have sufficient strength to protect themselves.

¹ Excerpted from Rogers' press conference as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV, 1646 (January 11, 1971), pp. 43-44, 45-46.

Now, having said that, the United States has indicated that it is prepared to play a role in providing guarantees; Security Council Resolution 242, that is the basis for these discussions, refers to such guarantees. We think of guarantees as not a substitute for an agreement among the parties, but as supplementary and complementary.

What form those guarantees would take will depend on what the parties would want and what other nations involved would want. We are perfectly prepared to play a responsible role in providing guarantees, and the only way that can be worked out is by negotiation. It can't be worked out by public pronouncements. And so we have indicated to all concerned that we are prepared to play a role in providing guarantees—a responsible role, a role that's satisfactory to the parties—we are prepared to play a role economically, to help those who have suffered from the turmoil of war in the Middle East, including the refugees; and we're prepared to play a very active role diplomatically, and that's what we're doing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it still American policy, as you stated in your December speech, that in a final settlement Israel should withdraw to the prewar boundaries with the exception of insubstantial alterations in the boundaries?

A. Well, as I say, I'm not going to get involved in any statements that might do anything to impair the prospect of the beginning of negotiations. Our policy has been made clear over these last several months—year and a half. The policies that I have announced, that my name is attached to, are not my policies; they are policies of this administration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we get on to Europe, or is there an objection?

A. Well, if—one more question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is some expectation that the peace talks will start January 5. Is there any basis for this hope?

A. Well, as I said, we have hopes, but we have no assurances.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we have one more on the Middle East?

A. I'll come right back to you.

Q. Could I just follow up on your saying that the United States is prepared to play a role. Specifically, would the United States be prepared to take a leading part in a U.N. peacekeeping force?

A. Well, I hesitate to use words like "leading." As I say, we are prepared to play a responsible role. We haven't had any very definitive discussions about it because it requires, first, the agreement among the parties. We certainly are not going to play a role that is unwelcome. But if the United States can, by its participation, contribute to the stability of that area of the world, we are prepared to play a role.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe the Soviet Union is seriously interested in seeing that the peace is kept in the Middle East?

A. Well, I think it's difficult to answer that question. Certainly, the experience with the missile emplacements was not very encouraging. I think it's quite clear that in some ways the Soviet Union benefits by continued difficulty in the Middle East. Whether they feel that some kind of an agreement would be desirable now or not, I don't know. We'll have to find out when negotiations start.

I think it's important for Americans to understand that when we're talking about a settlement, now, we're not talking about a temporary arrangement which will permit continued belligerency in the area. We're talking about a permanent contractual peace that is agreed to by all those involved and which will have as much assurance as it is possible to give in international life.

Q. I want to ask a clarifying question on the Middle East: When you say that the United States is prepared to play a role in peacemaking or peace preservation out there, do you include the possibility of U.S. participation physically with troops in an international peacekeeping force of some kind?

A. Well, let me say that, as I said before, we have not formed any conclusions on that subject because we think, first, there have to be negotiations, and whatever is done in that sphere should be done in a way that is supplementary to an agreement and is acceptable to the parties.

There have been some speculations that we might be willing to consider a joint Soviet Union-United States peacekeeping force, just involving the two nations. We have never given any thought to that concept. I think that concept, with just the two of us involved, would be totally impractical, and we have never given any thought to it.

Now, we have not excluded the possibility that the United States might play a peacekeeping role if it was accepted by the parties themselves, and that it was not a substitute for agreement, but it would be an added assurance that the agreement would be observed. And if it could be done under the auspices of the Security Council of the United Nations, that's something else.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is something that in a practical sense as of now would have to be considered in the future in the light of the circumstances?

A. Yes, that's right. As I say, I don't want to leave the impression that this is a policy that we have formulated. I just say we have not excluded that possibility. As a matter of fact, at the inception of the United Nations, this was one of the concepts that it was felt would provide great stability in the world, would be peacekeeping forces.

Now, as I say, I don't want the thought left that we have come to that conclusion. I'm just saying that we have not totally excluded that as a possibility.

Q. But you do seem to have excluded the possibility of the United States and Soviet Union alone. Why?

A. Because I think it would be impractical.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, did the Soviet Ambassador—

A. Totally impractical.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of a Visit to the U.S.S.R. by a U.A.R. Delegation Headed by Vice-President Sabry¹

Moscow, December 26, 1970

The party and government delegation of the United Arab Republic, headed by Ali Sabry, Vice-President of the UAR and member of the supreme executive committee of the Arab Socialist Union, paid a friendly official visit to the Soviet Union from December 20 to 26, 1970, at the invitation of the CPSU central committee and the Soviet government. The delegation included Dr. Aziz Sidqi, Deputy Premier and Minister of Industry, Oil and Mineral Resources, Mahmoud Riad, Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Mohammad Fawzi, War Minister, and the UAR Ambassador in the USSR, Muhammad Murad Ghaleb.

During its stay in Moscow, the party and government delegation conducted talks, in which the following took part on the Soviet side: Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU central committee, Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Boris Ponomarev, secretary of the CPSU central committee, Vladimir Novikov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, USSR Minister of Defence Andrei Grechko, USSR Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev, Semyon Skachkov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, Vasily Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador in the UAR, and M. D. Sytenko, head of the Middle East department of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Relations between the USSR and the UAR and the present international situation were discussed during the talks, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding, and a

¹ English text in *Soviet News*, No. 5574 (December 29, 1970), pp. 109-110.

coincidence of views on these questions was again noted. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the state of relations between the USSR and the UAR, which are based on sincere friendship and fruitful all-round cooperation, the groundwork of which was laid during the lifetime of President Gamel Abdel Nasser. Both sides reaffirmed their determination to continue co-operation between them in all fields.

New agreements on a further development of trade and economic co-operation between the USSR and the UAR were reached in the course of the talks. The sides agreed on the conclusion of long-term agreements in the field of trade and economic co-operation.

The UAR delegation declared that its country was fully resolved to advance firmly and consistently along the road of socio-economic development with the aim of ensuring the people's welfare. At the same time, in co-operation with all Arab states and all peoples striving for peace and progress, the UAR is doing all in its power to eliminate the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression and to secure the return of occupied Arab territories.

The Soviet side declared the immutability of the Soviet Union's policy of developing all-round relations with the United Arab Republic and of supporting its efforts directed at the progressive development of the country and at upholding and strengthening the UAR's independence and sovereignty. The Soviet Union will further aid and support the Arab peoples in their struggle for the liberation of occupied territories and the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.

The two sides stressed the great importance of the friendly relations established between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Union, and expressed their mutual desire to develop these relations still further in the interests of strengthening the bonds of friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the UAR, of countering the designs of imperialism and colonialism and of supporting the struggle of the peoples

for national independence, peace and social progress.

Special attention was given to discussion of the situation in the Middle East that has arisen as a result of Israel's aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab states and the danger arising from the continuation of the present situation created by the desire of Israel to continue the occupation of the territories of the UAR and other countries.

The two sides believe that Israel would not be able to pursue this aggressive and expansionist policy without the constant support it has from the imperialist forces, above all the United States of America. The sides also point out that the aggressive expansionist policy of Israel is a constant violation of the United Nations Charter and generally recognised standards of international law, to say nothing of the fact that it is a source of danger to peace and security. A full coincidence of views was noted on all these questions.

The two sides state that Israel's policy, which creates obstacles to the mission of Ambassador Jarring, the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general, prevents peace from being achieved in the Middle East and is an open challenge to world public opinion. Continuation of the present situation must lead to an aggravation of the danger to world peace.

The sides expressed their firm confidence that the only way to achieve a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East is by the full implementation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, as well as the implementation of the U.N. resolution concerning the legitimate rights of the Arab-Palestinian people.

The two sides reaffirmed their support for the efforts, made both inside and outside the United Nations, towards achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

The UAR delegation stated that the

statement of the Berlin conference of the political consultative committee of Warsaw Treaty member-countries concerning the establishment of a lasting peace and security in the Middle East is a great support for the Arab states in their struggle against Israel's aggression and the forces of imperialism and for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories.

Both sides regard the visit by the party and government delegation of the UAR to the Soviet Union as an important step in strengthening friendly and truly fraternal relations between the two countries and as a demonstration of the mutual trust and fruitful and growing co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic in the struggle against the forces of imperialism and for the right of the peoples to independent development and for progress and world peace.

The Soviet delegation expressed gratitude for the good feelings and wishes expressed by President Anwar Sadat to the CPSU central committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet government and all Soviet people.

The UAR Vice-President Ali Sabry expressed deep-felt gratitude to the CPSU central committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government for the hospitality and warm reception accorded to the members of his party during their stay in Moscow.

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Cabinet Communiqué on the Resumption of the Jarring Talks Issued by the Government of Israel¹

Jerusalem, December 28, 1970

The Government decided that the present political and military conditions enable and justify the termination of the suspension of Israel's participation in talks under the

auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

The Government decided to authorize the Foreign Minister to inform those concerned, of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the Jarring talks—in accordance with the basic principles of the Government's policy and on the basis of its resolutions of July 31, 1970 and August 4, 1970, as approved by the Knesset, concerning Israel's affirmative reply to the American peace initiative.

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Communiqué Issued by the Second Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers (Excerpts)²

Karachi, December 29, 1970

In conformity with the resolution of the Jeddah Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers adopted March 25, 1970, the Second Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Karachi December 26-28, 1970. The following countries participated in the Conference: Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, and Yemen Arab Republic.

2. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization attended the Conference as observers.

MIDDLE EAST

10. The Conference

Reaffirmed the resolutions of the Rabat Islamic Summit Conference and the Jeddah Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers which had drawn attention to the dangerous situation in the Middle East and the fact that

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, December 29, 1970, p. 1.

² English text in *Pakistan Documents Series*, VIII, 1 (January 1971).

Israeli occupation of the territories of three Islamic countries constitutes a violation of the United Nations Charter, a defiance of the United Nations resolutions and a serious and permanent threat to peace.

Considered it intolerable that Israel should continue its occupation of the territories of three Islamic countries and persist in a policy of force.

Reiterated the inadmissibility of the annexation by force of territories and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories.

Declared that respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is indispensable for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Demanded the restoration of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine to their usurped homeland and reaffirmed its support of their struggle of national liberation.

Reaffirmed the determination of the participating states to:

- intensify their political, moral and material support to the Palestinian people in their rightful struggle for liberation,

- facilitate the establishment of representation of the Palestinian liberation movement in the Islamic countries, and

- denounce the Zionist movement as a racial, aggressive and expansionist movement conflicting with all the noble human ideals and constituting a permanent threat to world peace.

Demanded the implementation of resolutions which the United Nations had adopted on these questions.

11. The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers viewed with satisfaction the Cairo and Amman agreements calling for fraternity and cooperation between the Government of Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation Organization and for a complete joint coordination of their efforts against the Zionists.

12. The Conference, therefore, appealed to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and to other concerned parties to adhere to these agreements in letter and spirit for the realization of complete Jordanian-Palestinian national unity.

13. The Conference noted the support given by Christians to the defense of the sanctity of holy places and to the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine. It welcomed cooperation between Muslims and Christians in order to safeguard and strengthen human spiritual values and voiced its appreciation of Lebanon's outstanding role in promoting such cooperation internally as well as internationally.

14. The Conference recalled the declarations of the Rabat Summit and Jedda Conference following the desecration of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which took place under the military occupation of the Holy City by Israel, and reaffirmed their decision to commemorate August 21, 1971, as Al-Asqa Day.

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Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir of Israel Reviewing and Explaining Israel's Decision to Rejoin the Jarring Talks¹

Jerusalem, December 29, 1970

Mr Speaker, Members of the Knesset, On July 31, the Government of Israel, having considered the appeals of President Nixon, taking into account the clarifications provided by the Government of the United States and in strict adherence to the basic principles of the Israel Government policy, decided to reply affirmatively to the American peace initiative.

¹ English translation in *New Middle East*, No. 29 (February 1971), pp. 45-46.

On August 4, I presented the subject to the House, and the Government's decision was approved by the Knesset and conveyed to Ambassador Jarring and to the U.S. Government. On August 12, I made it clear, from this rostrum, that the text approved by the Knesset on August 4 was the only text that would guide the representatives of Israel. On August 23, the Government appointed its representatives to the talks.

It will be recalled that the cease-fire went into effect on August 7. Within a few hours, however, we discovered that the Egyptians and the Soviets had violated the standstill clause of the cease-fire agreement. These violations, as I told the Knesset, altered for the worse the conditions which had prevailed before the cease-fire went into effect. It also became clear that, in order to secure the military and political elements required in view of the forward deployment of the missiles into the Canal zone, it would not be sufficient for us to protest the violation and persuade international factors of the correctness of our findings. Under the conditions that had been created, it became impossible to continue the talks, and the Government found it essential, on September 6, to suspend our participation in the talks, and to struggle for the restoration of the original situation.

Knesset Members will not, of course, expect to hear from me a detailed report in the plenum on our political contacts and on their detailed results, and I must confine myself to a generalisation. On the result of our struggle since August 7, I can only say to the Knesset and the nation that Israel is now prepared to meet the immediate future, and the challenges and tests that lie ahead, with a steadfastness based upon very important achievements in the military and political spheres.

In my statement in the Knesset on August 4 and again on November 16 I said that "we have grounds for believing that Israel would not find herself weaker if the Arabs decided to resume hostilities." I can now reiterate and confirm this assumption with certainty. The principle in American policy of preserving the balance of power in the

Middle East, lest it be upset to Israel's disadvantage, has recently received strengthening and consolidation.

Great value attaches to the clarification of United States policy towards Soviet involvement in our region. In his report to Congress on February 18, 1970, President Nixon said: "The U.S. would view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern."

I have no doubt that this position of the United States also refers to Israel's welfare and security. This position is well known to the Government of the Soviet Union, and it is hardly necessary to emphasise the importance of the matter.

The efforts towards an agreed solution between the parties, to be brought about as a result of free negotiations between them, constitutes one of the principles of United States policy in all that concerns a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. This policy has important implications in relation to the Jarring talks, and the discussions of the Security Council and of the powers.

In accordance with this principle, we have grounds for assuming that the United States Government will not be a party to the determination, by the Security Council, of solutions pertaining to territorial issues, the refugee problem and other subjects, the solution to which is a matter for negotiation and agreement between the parties.

Recently, we have been reinforced in our conviction that:

The United States administration is not of the opinion that we ought to enter negotiations, or conduct them, from a position of weakness.

The United States holds that Israel is entitled to defensible borders, and does not accept the Arab demand that Israel should withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 demarcation lines.

Furthermore, she does not accept the Arab plans on the refugee problem.

We have been reinforced in our conviction that the basic principle is still in force, that the Israel-Arab conflict must

be ended by a contractual, binding peace agreement. Until such agreement is reached, not one Israeli soldier will be withdrawn from the administered territories. This attitude is in accord with, and reinforces, our position that in the absence of peace, Israel is entitled to maintain the cease-fire lines on all fronts without withdrawal. The cease-fire lines will be replaced only by secure and recognised boundaries which will be determined in peace agreements.

The United States Government regards, as does Israel, the observance of the cease-fire on all the fronts, including the Egyptian front, a continuous and uninterrupted obligation, based on the Security Council resolution of June 1967 on this matter.

In the course of the discussions which we have held, with the United States Government, we have reiterated, time and again, in the most authoritative and definite manner, our position on the central issues, in accordance with the basic principles of the Government's policy, its decisions and authorised statements.

These clarifications included our position on the subjects which I mentioned in my address to the Knesset on August 4, when we were on the threshold of possible talks with the Arab states under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

I shall mention the main ones: our right to defensible, agreed and recognised boundaries; United Jerusalem—the capital of Israel; our maintaining the cease-fire lines until a contractual and binding peace is reached; Security Council Resolution 242 is a framework for negotiations in order to reach agreement, signature, and implementation of obligations to be included in the contractual agreement to be reached.

We have reiterated, time and again, that we continue to oppose any change in Ambassador Jarring's terms of reference, in any form whatsoever, whether by an attempt by the four powers to interpret or guide his mission, or by the Security Council itself, or by resolutions of the Assembly. Ambassador Jarring's mission derives solely from the terms of reference laid down in the Security

Council resolution of November 22, 1967. And, indeed, this principle was recently confirmed by Ambassador Jarring himself.

In emphasising the common denominator reached between us and the United States Government on fundamental issues in the political and security sphere, we should not disregard the differences of opinion which exist between us, especially with regard to proposals put forward by the State Department in Washington, in October-December 1969, on the territorial issue. We continue to oppose these proposals completely. Moreover, the military and political developments which occurred in the region recently have added force and justification to our negative attitude to these proposals.

The negotiations for the determination of agreed and defensible boundaries must be free from all restrictive definitions determined from without. Israel and the Arab states must come to an agreement on this subject within the framework of the peace treaties. This position, as well as our attitude to the complex of political-security issues, has been clarified publicly, mainly within the framework of the talks held recently—by the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence, our Ambassador in Washington and myself—with the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and their assistants. These talks provided appropriate opportunities to present our clear view on these important questions. It must be emphasized again and again: the US initiative calling for talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring does not entail any undertaking on Israel's part to agree to proposals made by the Secretary of State, or to any other territorial plan.

Recently, ideas have been mooted again concerning a solution by way of guarantees. I wish to re-emphasise that there can be no doubt regarding our position that no guarantees can replace secure, defensible boundaries and the maintenance of our capacity to defend ourselves.

In my address to the Knesset on November 16, 1970, I said:

I was never prepared to undertake that

our struggle would lead to the fulfilment of our just demand in its entirety and in full. But I am still convinced that without this struggle, which is not yet over, we should have been faced with a situation far graver—whether from the point of view of the military balance, or from the political point of view.

Since then, I have been confirmed in my assessment. In summarising our political efforts since September 6, I must conclude that we acted rightly in our decision to suspend the talks. Perhaps, had it not been for that decision—had we been content with protests alone—we would not have obtained military, economic and political conditions vital for us.

I shall not say that we received all that we asked for. First of all, we did not succeed in bringing about a restoration of the original situation, and in other matters, too, not all our demands were satisfied. But I can say to the Knesset and the nation that the effort was not in vain. Since August 9, there has been a great improvement in our capacity to maintain our position. The Government summed up its deliberations in its decision of December 28, 1970 as follows:

The Government decided that the present political and military conditions enable and justify the termination of the suspension of Israel's participation in talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

The Government decided to authorise the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform those concerned, of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the Jarring talks—in accordance with the basic principles of the Government's policy and on the basis of its resolutions of July 31, and August 4, 1970, as approved by the Knesset, concerning Israel's affirmative reply to the American peace initiative.

We shall go to the talks in accordance with our statement of August 4, in an effort to reach a peace agreement. We continue to believe that in order to attain this goal, the talks must develop into direct negotiations

between the parties. We shall take part in the talks in a sober attitude, without illusions, in a desire to examine every prospect, however slight, which might bring peace.

In accordance with the guidelines of Government policy we are going to negotiations without prior conditions, willing and prepared, not only to put forth our positions but also to listen to the proposals of the other parties in these talks. At the same time, we reject all threats of the renewal of firing or the putting forward of any prior conditions whatsoever. The talks will be of value only if they be held in an atmosphere of tolerance and a mutual desire to reach some agreement.

I should like to emphasise, as simply as possible, our desire for a cease-fire without time limitations or prior conditions. With this, I must point out that we are prepared at all times for the danger of a renewal of firing by Egypt. I permit myself to say that just as Egypt had, and still has, sufficient reasons to regret the 1967 war and the war of attrition, she will have reasons to regret the resumption of firing, if indeed she decides on such a course.

With the change-of-guard in the Egyptian Government, I expressed the hope from this rostrum, that the new leadership would display the responsibility and courage to set out on the road to peace. At this moment, too, I call once again on the Egyptian rulers to open a new page in the relations between our countries. The Government of Israel is ready for this wholeheartedly.

In my address today, I have reiterated—in accordance with the policy of the Government—our position on the main issues connected with negotiations for a permanent peace. These will serve as guidelines for our representatives at the talks.

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Radio Interview with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on Israel's Renewed Participation in the Jarring Talks¹

Jerusalem, December 30, 1970

Q. It is assumed that the talks will begin soon. What is the first issue to be discussed?

A. It is desirable to try to determine procedures and principles because there is a certain professionalism in the art of peace and because wise decisions concerning the venue and agenda can promote the chances of success. I believe the aim of the dialogue should be placed in the forefront of this procedure. Do the sides have an agreed aim? In other negotiations on a peace agreement or a contractual peace—and I have studied them a great deal—the sides began with a common definition of their aim. Our aim is to establish peace, and I want to describe what this concept entails, what is allowed, and what is forbidden to countries looking for peaceful relations. If there is no willingness to establish peaceful relations, only one conclusion can be drawn: we shall remain on the cease-fire lines until a true peace is established. On the other hand, if there is a desire in principle to reach a true and agreed-on peace, then various chances can be taken into account. The range of possibilities becomes much wider.

Q. Do you believe any genuine progress can be made before 5th February, the date on which, in Egyptian opinion, the cease-fire will expire?

A. This, of course, depends a lot on Egypt's attitude. We shall not make progress if Egypt contents itself with making speeches about its intention to open fire if it does not obtain some sort of time-table. The problem is the date for the signing of a peace document. When we know the date for signing a peace agreement, then it will not be difficult to agree on a plan to implement all the clauses of the peace agreement, including its defence

and territorial clauses. In addition to the special emotional background, the problems are many and complex by their very nature. If the atmosphere was better than it is today, one could solve such problems as the nature of peace, obligations arising out of a peace, determination of the border, security problems, a regional and international solution to the refugee problem, the Suez Canal question and the problem of navigation. Let us assume that such is the case and that it is possible to reach clear and lasting agreements quickly—but this is not practical or serious.

Q. Mr. Eban, from what you say it seems that one of the most important things at the moment is to discuss the continuation of the cease-fire. With whom can such a discussion be held?

A. The problem is not so much one of discussion but one of decision. The basic element in stabilising the cease-fire is the continuation of the cease-fire. This is important to all sorts of technical procedures which may be determined or discussed with Jarring. I do not know if this issue will be raised with Jarring's [word indistinct]. I think envoy Jarring ought to be interested in the political aspect of the cease-fire. He is acting through a US initiative, one which states that in order to make it easier for Dr. Jarring to establish his mission, the sides must carefully observe the cease-fire for at least 90 days. The US interpretation is that, even after the 90 days, the duty to observe the cease-fire is still there.

¹ Israel Home Service in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3572/A/2 and A/3; reprinted by permission.

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Annual Report for 1970 of the International Committee of the Red Cross: The Middle East Conflict and the Jordan Civil War¹

Geneva, end of 1970

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

As fresh outbreaks in hostilities broke out, the International Committee of the Red Cross sent, on 11 April, the following message to the Powers engaged in the Middle East conflict.

Despite the cease-fire, acts of war continue to occur in the Middle East. It is alarming to observe the escalation of hostilities in regions where military installations sometimes co-exist with civilian populations, thus involving ever greater suffering.

In view of the tragic development of this situation, the International Committee of the Red Cross urgently appeals to the governments and all the forces engaged in that part of the world to apply, in all circumstances, the universally recognized rules of humanity.

It emphasizes that when signing the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Powers solemnly undertook to observe a series of standards which demand, *inter alia*, that non-combatant populations shall be spared and that no attacks shall be directed against them, that military and civilian detainees shall be treated in a fitting and humane manner, and that no maltreatment and reprisals shall be directed against persons and property. Hospitals shall enjoy particular protection.

The International Committee of the Red Cross urges the parties concerned to give its delegates greater support and increased facilities for the discharge of their mission. It is imperative that, through its representatives in the area of conflict, the ICRC be permitted to carry out its plans to provide more effective protection for non-combatants.

The Committee, which has often confronted

the responsible authorities with their obligations, earnestly requests them to observe the essential rules of humanity and to abstain from all acts likely to make efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict more difficult.

A new cease-fire agreement was concluded on 7 August.

The ICRC continued its humanitarian action for prisoners of war, civilian internees and detainees and the civilian population. To that purpose, it continued to maintain its delegations in Israel and the occupied territories, the United Arab Republic (UAR), Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The number of delegates amounted to more than 20 persons, in addition to a large complement of locally recruited personnel.

Mr. André Rochat, ICRC delegate-general for the Middle East, carried out a series of visits, to various countries: Jordan (March), Israel (April and May), UAR, Syria and Lebanon (May). In all those countries, he examined with the authorities concerned the humanitarian problems arising from the Middle East conflict.

PRISONERS OF WAR

On 5 and 6 December 1969, the ICRC had organized the general repatriation of all prisoners of war in the Middle East. But, as further prisoners had been made since then, it resumed its action in this sphere in the three countries holding prisoners in 1970, namely, Israel, the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Middle East cease-fire agreement concluded on 7 August 1970 stipulated in its last article: "Both sides will abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, and will accept the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out their obligations under that Convention." On 18 August, the ICRC sent a note to the Israeli, Jordanian, and United Arab Republic authorities in which it recorded with satisfaction the renewed determination of the Parties to respect the obligations they undertook when acceding to the Third Geneva Convention. It called upon them, moreover, to furnish it

¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1970* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1971), pp. 46-70. The text published here is that of the Middle East Section of the Report's First Chapter, "Operations," excluding only those sub-sections on ICRC activities in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Iran.

with all possible assistance in carrying out its mission on behalf of prisoners of war.

The mission, it may be recalled, consists principally in visiting all places of detention where prisoners are held in order to examine the application of the rules laid down in the Convention. The visits are followed by reports which are later transmitted to the Detaining Power and to the Power of Origin. If necessary, the ICRC approaches the authorities of the Detaining Power with a view to the implementation of the provisions laid down in the Convention.

(a) *Israel*

The delegates of the ICRC paid regular visits to the 122 Arab prisoners of war in Israel, who were interned in the prison of the military camp at Sarafand; they were authorized to do so within a period varying from 2 to 25 days after their capture. Among the prisoners of war, there were 72 Egyptians, 39 Syrians, 10 Lebanese and one Jordanian, captured at the end of December 1969 and during 1970. Another Lebanese prisoner of war, who had been wounded when taken prisoner on 12 May, was repatriated on 1 June under ICRC auspices.

During their visits, which took place on an average once a month, the ICRC delegates handed over to the prisoners of war books, writing material, records, games, food and cigarettes. They enquired if any of them had any special wish to be fulfilled and saw to the forwarding of family mail. The above observations also applied to Israeli prisoners of war in the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.

(b) *United Arab Republic*

The delegates of the ICRC also visited the 13 Israeli prisoners of war who had fallen into the hands of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic at the end of 1969 and in 1970. With the exception of two of the prisoners of war, who had been severely wounded and had been visited the day after their capture, the delegates had to wait 6 to 12 weeks before they could see the Israeli

prisoners of war. The ICRC expressed its deep concern over this situation and repeatedly insisted that the visits should take place without delay. It made several representations regarding this matter, not only in Cairo, to the authorities there, through its delegation and the delegate-general for the Middle East, but also in Geneva to the Permanent Mission of the UAR.

Once the first visit had been authorized, the ICRC delegates obtained thereafter all facilities to carry out visits at regular intervals to the Israeli prisoners of war who were interned at Abbassieh military prison and to the wounded lying in Maadi Hospital near Cairo.

The ICRC also approached the UAR authorities with a request for the unilateral repatriation of 5 seriously wounded Israeli prisoners of war, in accordance with Articles 109 and 110 of the Third Convention. The UAR authorities agreed to give effect to ICRC requests in a single case, that of the Israeli pilot of an aircraft shot down on 3 August, who had been wounded and was lying in a critical state. The repatriation was carried out by plane on 15 August, via Cyprus. The ICRC dispatched to Cairo its chief medical adviser who accompanied the wounded pilot to Nicosia, where the latter was taken in charge by two ICRC delegates in Israel. The delegates found that, from the time he was captured to the date of his repatriation, the prisoner had received the requisite care to be given to a person in his condition.

At the request of the Israeli authorities, the ICRC also arranged for the repatriation of the mortal remains of an Israeli pilot who had died the day after his capture on 4 August. In October, the ICRC transmitted to the Egyptian Government a complaint from the Israel Government regarding the circumstances surrounding this pilot's death.

(c) *Syria*

In Syria, too, despite urgent representations made orally and in writing, the ICRC was not allowed to see three Israeli pilots who had fallen into the hands of the armed forces of the Syrian Arab Republic in 1970 until

eighteen weeks, in the case of two of them and eight weeks in the case of the third, had elapsed since their capture. Later, the ICRC delegates were allowed to visit them at regular intervals, but never, contrary to Article 126 of the Third Convention, at the place of detention.

(d) *Repatriation of the dead*

In 1970, the ICRC delegates arranged for the bodies of about 50 Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli soldiers who had fallen in enemy territory to be repatriated.

CIVILIAN DETAINEES AND INTERNEES

(a) *Civilian Arab detainees in Israel and the occupied territories*

Visits: In 1970, the ICRC continued its visits to people from the occupied territories and nationals of various Arab countries held in Israel or in prisons situated in the occupied territories. ICRC delegates carried out 8 series of visits to 14 places of detention, namely the prisons of Ashkelon, Beer-Sheba, Chat-tah, Damoun, Kfar-Yona, Neve Tirza, Ramleh and Yagour Jalame in Israel; the prisons of Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Tulkarem on the West Bank of the Jordan, and also the prison at Gaza. As is customary, these visits were followed by reports, which were transmitted by the ICRC to the Detaining Power and to the Power of Origin.

At the end of the year, ICRC delegates in Israel and the occupied territories visited about 3,300 civilians. The delegates managed to see, generally a month after their arrest, those prisoners held under what are designated as security regulations (sentenced, accused and administrative prisoners) and common law prisoners (sentenced and accused), and to talk with them without witnesses.

In the field of assistance to detainees, the ICRC delegates continued providing aid at various levels. They strove to give those younger detainees who wished to carry on with their studies the possibility to do so. They handed over to the Prisons Service for

each prison a complete set of books used in schools on the West Bank, as well as 10,000 exercise-books and 4,000 pens.

They also distributed once a month parcels containing fruit, biscuits, cigarettes and soap to detainees who did not receive visits from their families. About 6,500 parcels were distributed in 1970.

Detainees' families who could not afford to go and see their relatives in prison were given the possibility of taking advantage of aid provided by the ICRC, which organized and paid for 470 trips by coach. Over 30,000 relatives of detainees were transported free of charge to the prisons in this way.

At the request of some of the prisoners, ICRC delegates also enquired into the plight of a certain number of indigent families and drew the attention of the Ministry of Social Affairs in Israel, whose duty it was to provide for the essential needs of the poorer sections of the population, to their case.

In addition to the 14 places of detention mentioned above, delegates of the ICRC visited on several occasions 16 Arabs from Gaza interned in Israeli military camps in Northern and Central Sinai. They were all allowed to return to their homes in 1970.

Release of detainees: Following a further request submitted by the ICRC in May 1970, the Israeli authorities released 55 Palestinian Arab detainees, captured at Karameh in March 1968 in the course of a raid by Israeli armed forces into territory east of the Jordan. The repatriation operation took place at Allenby Bridge, on 13 May, under the auspices of delegates of the ICRC in Israel and Jordan.

The ICRC also requested the release of two civilian Arab detainees who had been seriously wounded when captured in 1970. The Israeli authorities agreed to release these two disabled civilians although they had been condemned to life imprisonment. After having obtained the consent of both detainees, ICRC delegates moved them to Jordan in December.

Military courts: ICRC delegates were present at several hearings of Arabs from occupied territories accused of acts committed

against the security of the State. These hearings were conducted by Israeli military courts in the occupied territories.

(b) *Civilian Arab internees in Israel*

Egyptian seamen: At the end of December 1969 and in January 1970, Israeli naval forces captured four Egyptian fishing-boats with 46 seamen on board. The ICRC immediately approached the competent authorities to allow visits to be made to those men; its delegates were able to visit them on four occasions.

In March, the Israeli authorities handed over to the ICRC nine seamen to be repatriated; they were sent across to the west bank of the Suez Canal on board three boats. The ICRC pursued its efforts for the release of the remaining 37 seamen, who were repatriated under its auspices on 6 May at El Qantara. An Egyptian civilian who had crossed into occupied territory and had been captured three months before was also repatriated at the same time.

On 5 September 1970, Israeli naval forces rescued several shipwrecked seamen from the Greek vessel "Maria Kristina". There were among them 14 men of UAR nationality. When ICRC delegates visited them on 7 September, the seamen stated that they wished to return direct to Piraeus, where they were employed. The Israeli authorities having decided to release them, the seamen were accompanied by the ICRC delegates to Lod airport, whence they were flown to Athens on 12 September.

Algerian civilian internees: On 14 August 1970, the Israeli authorities arrested two Algerian nationals who were on board a BOAC aircraft that had made a landing at Tel-Aviv on a flight from Hong Kong. The ICRC delegation in Israel at once approached the authorities and asked for the two men to be released. The latter were visited by delegates eight times and were allowed to leave on 14 October.

Lebanese and Jordanian civilian internees: ICRC delegates in Israel visited and repat-

riated several Lebanese and Jordanian civilians who had inadvertently crossed the border. They also approached the authorities on behalf of Lebanese civilians captured in the course of Israeli raids in Lebanese territory. All those persons were released within a length of time varying from a few days to one month after being captured.

(c) *Israeli civilian internee in the hands of Palestinian resistance organizations*

On 1 January 1970, a Palestinian commando group operating from Lebanese territory captured an Israeli civilian guard. The ICRC at once approached the parties concerned with a view to getting news of the man, obtaining the authorization to visit him and to forward family messages, and negotiating his release. Delegates of the ICRC were able to see him six times, at first in Jordan and later in Syria. Only the last two visits took place in the actual place of detention, near Damascus.

(d) *Israeli civilian internees in Lebanon*

ICRC delegates repatriated several Israeli civilians, released shortly after being captured, who had crossed the border into Lebanese territory.

CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

(a) *Reuniting of families*

United Arab Republic and Gaza-Sinai: Operations organized under ICRC auspices, for the two-way reuniting of families from and to the United Arab Republic and the occupied territories of Gaza-Sinai, continued during all 1970. Nearly 850 persons, some of whom were from the United Arab Republic and some from Gaza, were able to join their families in Egypt and in the Gaza Strip respectively, bringing to 6,300 the total number of people who have been repatriated either one way or the other since the beginning of this action, in 1967.

In addition, the ICRC organized the transfer to the United Arab Republic of about a

thousand Palestinian students who had passed their baccalaureate examination in occupied territory and wished to continue their studies in UAR universities, and had obtained the necessary authorization from the Egyptian and Israeli authorities. Other groups of students, who had been authorized to return to their families in the occupied territory of Gaza for their holidays or at the end of their studies, crossed the canal in the opposite direction in five transfer operations carried out between 24 February and 22 March 1970.

In October, the ICRC also stepped in, in order to organize the transfer to Lebanon of a dozen Gaza students, who had been admitted to Beirut University.

Syria and the Golan Heights: Over 130 persons, displaced in Syria by the war of June 1967, were able, through the ICRC, to rejoin their families on the occupied Golan Heights. The total number of persons repatriated since reuniting operations were begun in March 1969, reached about 600, at the end of 1970.

Jordan and West Bank: All arrangements for the reuniting of families between Jordan and the occupied territory on the West Bank of the Jordan were organized by the Occupying Power from the beginning of 1968. Delegates of the ICRC continued to lend their support only in a certain number of urgent cases for members of separated families. In 1970, out of 119 cases submitted, 75 were accepted.

Central Tracing Agency activities: During 1970, 190,000 family messages were forwarded by the ICRC from and to Arab countries and the territories occupied by Israel. By the end of the year, the total number of messages exchanged since June 1967 reached nearly 1.5 million.

Since the beginning of hostilities, the ICRC received some 13,000 enquiries concerning missing soldiers and civilians, and was able to provide answers in respect of over 3,000 cases brought to its notice; in about 50 percent of the cases the answer was negative, the missing person not having been traced despite the efforts undertaken to that end.

(b) *Assistance to civilian inhabitants in occupied territories*

Expropriations: The ICRC delegation in Israel was asked to deal with several cases of expropriation, by the Israeli authorities, of land belonging to the inhabitants of occupied territory, the most important cases being those of Beit-Sahour and Kirbet-Beit Zakaria, west of the Jordan. In the former case, the ICRC delegation in Israel was informed by the local population, at the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970, that the authorities in occupied territory intended to expropriate for military reasons a considerable portion of the district of Beir Sahour, near Jerusalem; the delegates took the matter up several times with the authorities on behalf of the persons affected. In the second case, the ICRC delegation in Israel again approached the authorities at the request of a number of landowners concerning the projected establishment of kibboutzim at Kirbet Beit Zakaria; in November, it delivered orally a note on this subject at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the ICRC delegation was informed that the Ministry did not wish to pursue this matter any further.

Evacuation of people: The delegation visited on several occasions, in the new areas assigned to them, three groups of Bedouins from Sinai and Gaza, who had been moved inside those areas for security reasons. After seeing for themselves on the spot the living conditions of the Bedouins, the ICRC delegates took several different steps on behalf of these people. In particular, they approached the military authorities with requests that the displaced persons might be allowed to return, at least temporarily, to their former dwelling areas in order to tend their trees (mainly palm groves) and gather their crops.

Destruction of houses: In reply to the ICRC's various demands that the destruction of houses in the occupied territories should cease, the Israeli authorities confirmed that they could not consider giving up that method of combating subversive activities. The ICRC delegates, while reaffirming their fundamental position based on Article 53 of

the Fourth Geneva Convention, thereupon concentrated on providing assistance to the victims.

At the end of March, at the request of the inhabitants of the Fadous district at Beit Lahiya north of Gaza, the ICRC delegation approached the military authorities in order that swift measures should be taken to re-house some 280 persons whose homes had been destroyed. In addition, it sent 40 tents and 200 blankets to the Ministry of Social Affairs in Israel to be given out to the homeless.

Emergency relief was also distributed in co-operation with the Ministry of Social Affairs, following the destruction of other houses in Gaza and in parts of the West Bank.

On the Golan Heights, the delegates of the ICRC at Kuneitra found, during 1970, that the Israeli Army was demolishing Arab villages that had been abandoned by their Syrian inhabitants during the June 1967 war. The delegation, on several occasions, approached the authorities concerned on this matter, but without any effect. The Israeli authorities argued that the destruction of these abandoned houses had been ordered for security reasons, as they were used by Palestinian commando groups as arms depots and springboards for attack.

Expulsions: The delegation communicated to the Israeli authorities several times the ICRC's deep concern and its objections over the renewal on an increased scale, during the second half of 1970, of expulsions to Jordan of Arabs from the occupied territories, who were suspected of having taken part in activities endangering the security of the State.

The ICRC had received numerous complaints from the Jordanian authorities, as well as from the Jordanian Red Crescent Society which had sent it a list containing several hundred names of persons expelled.

Examination of the health situation in Gaza and Sinai: In June 1970, a doctor-delegate of the ICRC visited all government and private hospitals and dispensaries in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai. His findings and suggestions

were incorporated in a detailed report, which was sent to the two Governments concerned, namely Israel and the United Arab Republic.

Following the appearance of some cases of cholera during the second half of 1970, the delegation enquired from the public health authorities as to the measures taken to combat the disease. Thanks to these measures, the epidemic had been practically stemmed by the end of the year.

Action for the disabled: Since 1968, the ICRC delegation in Gaza had started to draw up a list of war disabled, in Gaza itself and in Northern Sinai, in need of artificial limbs. It was found that there were 130 persons requiring assistance. Thanks to the financial aid provided by the German Red Cross in the Federal Republic of Germany and to the co-operation of the Magen David Adom (MDA), which had agreed to examine amputees free of charge at its Jaffa clinic and to carry out their functional rehabilitation after they had been fitted with an artificial limb produced by a Tel-Aviv specialized firm, an action for the disabled was begun in November 1969.

This was continued all through 1970, when 32 disabled men were fitted with 35 kinds of appliances. They were brought to the MDA by the ICRC delegation which arranged for their transport on several different occasions to Jaffa for medical examination and for fitting the artificial limb.

Hardship relief: The Israeli authorities having given their consent to the ICRC for the dispatch of foodstuffs to the civilian population of Gaza-Sinai and the West Bank of the Jordan, an initial consignment of 300 tons of flour, donated by the Swiss Confederation, was unloaded at the port of Ashdod in November. The consignment was collected and distributed by the Ministry of Social Affairs in Israel, in co-operation with the ICRC delegation in Gaza. By the end of the year, 150 tons of flour had been distributed among some 57,000 Bedouin inhabitants of Northern and Central Sinai.

In September, the ICRC opened a credit of 100,000 Swiss francs for the implementa-

tion of a material and technical assistance programme to be extended to the ten local branches of the Jordanian and UAR Red Crescent Societies in the occupied territories. The programme was submitted at the end of December 1970 to the Israeli authorities for approval.

(c) *Assistance to civilian populations in Arab countries*

Jordan: In August 1970, the ICRC dispatched 400 tons of flour, a gift from the Swiss Confederation, to the Jordanian Red Crescent, so that it might supplement, with extra food, the parcels which it had been distributing regularly to persons displaced because of the June 1967 war and who did not receive a monthly food ration from UNRWA.

United Arab Republic: The Head of the ICRC Relief Section went to the United Arab Republic in August 1970, to examine the question of food relief allocations to displaced persons from the Suez Canal Zone. As a result of this visit, the European Economic Community dispatched 500 tons of flour to the Ministry of Social Affairs in the UAR, which was responsible for its distribution, in co-operation with the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Republic and with the ICRC delegation in Cairo.

ICRC medical mission to southern Lebanon: After the numerous border incidents that occurred in the southern part of Lebanon during the first half of 1970, the ICRC sent to that area a medical team with instructions to offer its co-operation to the Lebanese Red Cross action on behalf of the victims. The team, consisting of a doctor-delegate and a male nurse, left Geneva on 14 July.

The members of the team were based at Saïda, and their mission was to care for persons wounded through military operations and to provide medical aid to civilians in remote villages.

From mid-July to mid-November, they visited about 30 villages in the southern border zone (from Nakoura to Chebaa) as well as groups of people who had temporarily

left their villages situated close to the frontier and had gathered in the open fields, living in tents without any medical assistance whatsoever (around Nabaal Haman, Dardera, Bab-et-Tniyé and Saradat). During their rounds, they examined up to 180 patients daily.

In August, the Lebanese authorities had to combat an outbreak of cholera. At their request, the ICRC and the Lebanese Red Cross played a large part in the vaccination of the inhabitants of southern Lebanon. Thus, between 16 August and 3 September the ICRC team vaccinated nearly 10,000 persons in the villages which it used to visit regularly.

This medical aid was terminated in mid-November.

Finally, it should be mentioned that, on two occasions, at the time of the aircraft hijackings and during the Jordan events in September, the team was sent in all haste to Amman, to help in providing care for the victims.

EVENTS IN JORDAN

HIJACKING OF PLANES

On 6 September 1970, two aircraft—one belonging to Swissair and the other to TWA—were diverted to the aerodrome at Zerka, in Jordan, by the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). A similar attempt was made on an aircraft belonging to the El Al company, but the attack failed and the plane finally landed in London, where a Palestinian girl and the dead body of the man who was with her were handed over to the British authorities.

On 9 September, a BOAC plane was forced to land at Zerka.

At the request of the countries concerned, the ICRC took action by affording the passengers and the crew of the diverted planes protection and assistance.

On 6 September, the PFLP contacted the head of the ICRC delegation at Amman. He agreed to proceed to Zerka where he ascertained the conditions under which the passengers were being held. The PFLP stated

the terms they laid down for the release of the Swissair passengers: the three Palestinians detained in Switzerland were to be freed within seventy-two hours.

On the following day, the PFLP clarified its position and announced that it would hold the West German, American, British, Israeli and Swiss nationals until the following conditions were fulfilled: release of the six Palestinians detained in Europe, namely three in the Federal Republic of Germany and three in Switzerland; release of the Palestinian girl handed over to the British authorities on the previous day, and release by Israel of a number of Palestinian detainees. The time limit set was seventy-two hours, namely 10 September at 02.00 hours GMT (subsequently extended to 08.00 hours GMT).

The representatives in Berne of four countries (Federal Republic of Germany, United States of America, Great Britain and Switzerland), whose nationals were among the persons detained, entrusted the International Committee with an assignment to act as a neutral intermediary.

ICRC activities designed to ensure protection for persons held: On 7 September, the ICRC accepted the proposed assignment. It decided to send a special mission to Amman, and made the following announcement on that same evening:

The International Committee of the Red Cross, on 7 September, held an extraordinary plenary meeting and decided to strengthen its delegation at Amman by sending a special mission that is to leave tonight for Jordan. Its instructions are to extend its assistance, without distinction of nationality, to the passengers and crews of the two aircraft hijacked on 6 September. It is to get in touch with the Jordanian Government and the Palestine organizations and, if necessary, may act as intermediary between the latter and the governments involved.

The ICRC points out that its role is purely humanitarian. It goes without saying that any decisions to be taken with regard to the conditions laid down for the release of the passengers and crews and for the return of the two aircraft must fall within the sole competency of the governments concerned.

The ICRC underlines, too, that it is incumbent upon the authorities or persons holding the passengers and crews to treat them in conformity with humanitarian rules.

On its arrival in Amman on 8 September, the special mission contacted the Jordanian Government and the two Palestinian organizations, the OLP and the PFLP. As already mentioned, its primary purpose was to assist the persons held and, if need be, request and supervise the improvement of conditions of detention. It could also act as an intermediary between the parties concerned in organizing the evacuation of the passengers, provided there were no discrimination.

On that same day, the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland informed the ICRC of their intention to release the Palestinians detained in those countries and asked the ICRC to inform the Palestinian movements of their decision.

Following various approaches made to the Palestinian leaders, on 10 September the special ICRC mission succeeded in having the PFLP ultimatum extended for a further seventy-two hours, to end on 13 September at 08.00 hours GMT. The PFLP proposed releasing the women and children against the release of the Palestinians detained in Europe, and the men against the release of a number of Palestinian detainees in Israel. The Governments were averse to this proposal as being of a discriminative nature.

On 11 September, it appeared that the Palestinian leaders had decided to evacuate to Amman those still held at Zerka. The evacuation was finally carried out on 12 September, under the auspices of the ICRC, but it was coupled with the seizure of fifty-four hostages. The persons released left Amman for Nicosia on 13 September, mainly in planes chartered by the ICRC.

Mr. Jacques Freymond, Vice-President of the ICRC, went to Amman on 11 September to contact the special mission and review the situation. On the following day, being unable to ascertain some of the PFLP claims regarding Israel and faced with the discriminative

attitude adopted by the Front—which proposed to negotiate the release of the hostages country by country—the Vice-President of the ICRC decided to suspend negotiations for the time being. On 13 September, he returned to Geneva with part of the special mission, while the ICRC delegation at Amman, along with the special delegates including a doctor who had remained behind, pursued their efforts towards improving the lot of the fifty-four hostages.

In the evening of 13 September, Mr. Marcel A. Naville, President of the ICRC, and Mr. Freymond proceeded to Berne to contact the representatives of the Governments concerned. On the following day, the ICRC held an extraordinary plenary meeting at the close of which it issued the following press releases:

The International Committee of the Red Cross held an extraordinary plenary meeting on 14 September 1970. It welcomed the members of the special mission, headed by Mr. A. Rochat, who had intervened on behalf of the passengers and crews of the three aircraft in Jordan, and expressed its warm appreciation of all they had done and of the results they had obtained.

The International Committee also took note of the reports submitted by the President, Mr. Naville, and the Vice-President, Mr. Freymond, on the work of the special mission in Amman, and on their meetings in Berne with representatives of the governments concerned.

After having examined these reports, the ICRC reiterated its determination to continue its action for the protection without distinction of all persons detained in Jordan, and to keep in touch with all governments and parties concerned. To this end, it granted to its delegation in Amman facilities to accomplish this task.

In conclusion, the ICRC urgently appeals to all parties to the conflict to refrain from carrying out any reprisal action.

With the aim of ensuring the continuity of its action on behalf of those still detained in Jordan following the hijacking of the three Swissair, TWA and BOAC aircraft, the International Committee of the Red Cross had asked Mr. P. Boissier, Director of the Henry-Dunant Institute, and Mr. M. Boisard, at present Head of the ICRC delegation

in the United Arab Republic, to leave for Amman immediately.

Mr. Boissier will fly from Geneva tomorrow, Wednesday, 16 September, while Mr. Boisard, who is still in Cairo, is expected any moment at ICRC headquarters before proceeding to the Jordanian capital.

The two special delegates of the ICRC will be assisted on the spot by the ICRC permanent delegation in Jordan, headed by Mr. G. Winteler, which will, at the same time, carry on its customary activities on behalf of the victims of hostilities.

At a press conference held on 14 September, the President of the ICRC said: "The ICRC has no intention of giving up the assignment it has accepted in the matter of the hijacking of aircraft. It must secure a clearer statement from the Palestinian organizations regarding the conditions they lay down for the release of their hostages."

The ICRC continued its negotiations—which were further hampered by the outbreak of civil war in Jordan, on 17 September—for visits to, and the release of, the fifty-four hostages. On 25 September, the Jordanian authorities handed over to the ICRC delegation in Amman sixteen hostages found by the Jordanian armed forces and who left the country shortly afterwards. On 26 September, another thirty-two were released, handed over to the ICRC delegation in Amman through the UAR Embassy, and repatriated by the ICRC on the following day. The remaining six hostages were handed over to the ICRC delegation in the same manner, on 29 September, and left Amman the next day.

On 1 October, an RAF plane flew to Cairo with the seven Palestinians released by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland.

Assistance to detainees: Concomitantly with its action to ensure the protection of the persons detained, the ICRC also gave them assistance. On 6 September, the ICRC delegation in Amman visited the 281 passengers detained in the two aircraft grounded at Zerka. The ICRC medical team attached to the Beirut delegation proceeded there im-

mediately, and on 9 September it was joined by a team sent out from Geneva.

Following the diversion of a third aircraft to Zerka with 150 persons aboard, on 9 September, the ICRC chartered an aircraft which left Geneva for Amman on 10 September, with two doctors, several nurses, and a large consignment of medical equipment, tents, blankets, toilet requisites and medicines.

On 11 September, however, following rumours about foreign military intervention, a state of emergency was declared at Zerka aerodrome. The Palestinian commandos ordered an ICRC doctor and the nurse who had come with him to leave the aircraft, and the ICRC convoy carrying relief supplies was prohibited access to the aerodrome.

The ICRC delegates approached the Palestinian leaders several times with the request that the passengers be evacuated from the aircraft and taken to a safe place, and arranged for those who benefited from this measure to be transported to Amman.

The ICRC already had occasion to intervene in a similar matter on 23 July, when an Olympic Airways plane was captured by Palestinian commandos as it was about to land at Athens airport. The authors of that attempt demanded the release of seven Palestinians who were being detained in Greece and threatened to blow up the plane and all its occupants if their demand were not complied with.

In the meantime, another aircraft, with Mr. A. Rochat, Delegate-General of the ICRC for the Middle East, on board, was flying in from Cairo and preparing to land. Mr. Rochat noticed that the aircraft was not being brought in to land the usual way, and, on enquiring, was informed by the pilot of what was taking place on the airport runway down below. As soon as his aircraft had touched down, Mr. Rochat introduced himself to the Chief of Police at the airport and offered to do what he could to save the passengers from the death that was threatening them.

At the request of the Greek authorities, Mr. Rochat first spoke to the commandos

from the control tower. It was only after he had pleaded with them for a long time that the ICRC Delegate-General was able to persuade the Palestinians to allow him to approach the aircraft and finally to enter and to engage in negotiations for the release of the passengers.

After the commandos had obtained from the Greek authorities a promise that their comrades would be released within 30 days, they agreed to let the occupants alight, but insisted on keeping Mr. Rochat with them as a hostage, to ensure that the plane would take off with them. The aircraft ultimately left Athens with eight members of the crew, the seven commandos and Mr. Rochat. After proceeding first towards Beirut, the aircraft changed course for Cairo where it landed early in the evening.

CIVIL WAR

Preliminary measures taken by the ICRC

On 17 September, about ten days after the aircraft were diverted to Zerka aerodrome, civil war broke out in Jordan. From the very start, the building housing the ICRC delegation in Amman was the centre of the fighting area. Before long the delegation's radio station was destroyed and communications with Geneva came to a stop. Incessant shooting prevented the ICRC delegates in Amman—six persons including a doctor and a radio operator—from leaving the building for four days.

Yet on 16 September the ICRC in Geneva had received a last message from its delegation in Amman, asking it to prepare for any contingency and to organize a medical team which could leave at short notice. On 18 September, the ICRC decided to send a large medical team, composed of a surgeon and six nurses, to Amman. It also chartered a plane which left on the same day, carrying 7 tons of medicaments, surgical instruments, tents, blankets and other relief supplies. It asked the medical team attached to its delegation in Lebanon to proceed to Amman without delay. Mr. Boissier and Mr. Boisard, who were held up in Beirut owing to the outbreak

of civil war in Jordan, were instructed to do everything possible to assist the victims of the hostilities.

To enable the aircraft it had chartered to fly from Beirut to Amman with two delegates and a medical team of two doctors and three nurses, the ICRC secured the agreement of the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian representatives. On 20 September, the aircraft, bearing the red cross sign was the first to land at Amman since the beginning of the fighting. As soon as the aircraft was unloaded, it returned to Beirut. The following day it took off for Amman with 4 tons of various medical supplies provided by the Kuwait Red Crescent and 600 bottles of blood plasma from the Lebanese Red Cross, escorted by an ICRC delegate. On 21 September, it returned to Beirut with an initial convoy of civilian casualties, who were hospitalized by the Lebanese Red Cross.

Meanwhile the ICRC had received appeals for aid from the "Palestinian Red Crescent". The King of Jordan also appealed to various Governments for emergency aid and asked the ICRC to co-ordinate all relief operations for the victims of hostilities. On-the-spot enquiries made by the ICRC delegates showed that the medical and food requirements were immense. Unfortunately it was virtually impossible to move about in Amman owing to the intense fighting, and even the possibilities of providing relief were limited.

The supply problem was acute, and on 22 September a further ICRC flight carried some 6½ tons of food to Amman (bread, tinned food and cheese) which, like the relief supplies flown in two more flights the following day, came from the UNRWA and UNICEF stocks in Beirut.

In view of the size of the relief operation, the ICRC decided, on 23 September, to establish a relief co-ordinating group. It issued the following press release:

In order to cope with the situation arising from the tragic events occurring in Jordan, the ICRC has set up within its Operations Division, in Geneva, directed by Mr. R. Courvoisier, a relief co-ordinating group led by Mr. K. Warras, Secretary-

General of the Finnish Red Cross and Vice-Chairman of the League of Red Cross Societies.

The group's first emergency measure was the immediate dispatch to the Jordanian capital of a four-member mission comprising Dr. R. Marti, ICRC medical consultant, Mr. O. Burckhard, former ICRC delegate to Amman, Mr. A. Beaud, head of ICRC Relief Section, and Mr. H. Mathiessen, Norwegian Red Cross relief expert.

The objective of the mission, which left Geneva on 23 September, will be to determine from each party to the conflict the scope for ICRC action and to step up the relief work already started by the International Committee.

With a view to obtaining the necessary support for its mission, the ICRC, in liaison with the League of Red Cross Societies and after consulting a number of Red Crescent Societies in the Middle East, has launched an appeal to all National Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion and Sun Societies on behalf of the victims of the conflict.

Alerted to the situation by its delegates in Amman, the ICRC released the following statement on the same day:

The International Committee is seriously alarmed by the tragic situation prevailing in the Jordan capital where many military and civilian wounded are uncared for and in grave danger.

The ICRC therefore appeals to the governments and all forces operating in Jordan to apply in all circumstances the universally recognized humanitarian rules which demand that in every conflict, whatever its form, all wounded be collected and cared for.

The ICRC urges the parties involved to conclude a 24-hour truce within Amman and a radius of 20 km round the town, starting at 5 a.m. GMT on 25 September, to permit the removal and treatment of the wounded.

Such truces are provided for in the Geneva Conventions in the following terms: 'Whenever circumstances permit, an armistice or a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or local arrangements made, to permit the removal, exchange and transport of the wounded left on the battlefield'.

The ICRC also asks the fighting forces to grant its delegates the necessary protection and facilities to enable them to discharge their mission. Its delegates are ready to be of service to the authorities

concerned in implementing the truce and relief operations.

Under a temporary cease-fire agreement concluded by the two parties to the conflict, the mission responsible for making a survey of the requirements was able to proceed to Amman on 24 September.

The ICRC called a meeting at its headquarters of representatives of several National Red Crescent Societies from Arab countries (Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Republic). A representative of the "Palestinian Red Crescent" was also present. The meeting discussed measures for co-ordinating the relief supplies provided by Arab countries and forwarding them to Jordan through ICRC channels. A Tunisian Red Crescent delegate was appointed to represent Arab National Societies on the relief co-ordinating group set up by the ICRC.

Again on 24 September, the ICRC launched an appeal to all National Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Lion and Sun Societies, followed by two further appeals, on 6 and 9 October. The response was immediate. A statement of the contributions is given on page 133 of this Report.

Relief action

Even before hostilities ceased, on 27 September, the ICRC was arranging for the dispatch of the relief supplies already assembled to the regions devastated by fighting whose needs were immense. The operation was developed in several sectors:

- in Amman, where the two aircraft chartered by the Red Cross continually flew in food and medical supplies from Beirut (from 20 September to 31 October there were 92 flights which carried 582 tons of food and other relief supplies);
- from Israel to Jordan; a relief convoy led by the head of the ICRC delegation to Israel had crossed Allenby Bridge as early as 24 September. In the days following, several convoys escorted by ICRC delegates carried almost 1,000 tons

of relief from the ICRC, UNRWA, the West Bank population and municipalities, and the Israeli Government;

- from Syria to Jordan. The ICRC endeavoured to send relief to the north of Jordan from Damascus. A delegate and three doctors went to the Irbid area on 30 September.

At the ICRC's request, as from 26 September a number of National Societies sent medical teams to work under the ICRC flag. In addition, about fifty aircraft sent by the United States, British and French Governments landed field hospitals in Jordan. Shortly afterwards, a medical team sent by the Government of the USSR joined the field hospitals, which were placed under the red cross sign and co-ordinated on the spot by the ICRC.

Towards the beginning of October, with the arrival of additional personnel and the installation of medical teams in given sectors, order was in part re-established. Bases were set up in the King Hussein Hospital and the Amman municipal stadium. A central supply depot was established, and a more effective system of relief distribution came into operation.

The permanent delegations of the ICRC in Lebanon, Syria and Israel provided the logistic support required by the bases and the teams in the field. Radio communication was established between Beirut, Amman, Damascus and Geneva, and also by means of the two Red Cross aircraft. Moreover, the ICRC delegation in Beirut, one of the main ports of the Middle East, had splendid co-operation from the Lebanese Red Cross, which played a major part in the general effort.

The administrative staff from Geneva headquarters made regular trips into the field. The head of the relief operation arrived in Jordan on 4 October, and the report which he made gives a clear idea of the situation:

It is hard to assess the present situation, owing to the dearth of reliable information and statistics. The precise number of killed and wounded will

probably never be known. An immense amount of damage has been caused in some areas, while in others it has not been as serious as it was said to be. Living conditions are gradually improving although the lack of water and electricity is still a major problem. In the medical sphere, eleven teams comprising 516 doctors and nurses, plus the technical personnel, have treated 5,107 patients. Despite all the difficulties, the activities of these teams have been effective and extremely well co-ordinated, thanks to the daily meetings held by the personnel as well as the use of the wireless network made available by the British team. The preliminary emergency phase may be regarded as ended; we are now entering upon the second stage, the stage of consolidated action, which will enable us to meet the continuing needs created by the situation.

Following this report, plans were immediately drawn up for the second and more important phase of the operation. In Geneva, two further appeals were made for funds and supplies. The recruitment of additional and replacement staff was successfully launched.

Better working conditions were prevailing in Jordan. Plans were laid for regular distribution, in co-operation with the Jordan National Red Crescent Society and the "Palestinian Red Crescent". Thus the situation gradually improved even though security was still relative. The Red Cross co-ordinated the activities of the medical teams. Planning was undertaken with a view to assessing the amount and the duration of the medical care to be given to about 150 wounded civilians who, owing to their condition, still required hospitalization.

The third and last phase of the operation was planned and carried out at the end of October. It called for the gradual withdrawal of the medical teams and for a regrouping of the wounded who were still under medical supervision in a single hospital. This was done under an agreement between the Red Cross and the Jordanian Ministry of Health whereby the King Hussein Hospital was made available to the Red Cross. The staff was jointly supplied by the Ministry of Health, the Army Medical Services and the

Red Cross medical units. By 30 October everything had been got ready. Moreover, the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States of America agreed that the equipment of their medical teams be assigned to the Red Cross hospital, which was thus able to work efficaciously. In addition to this material it received supplies from various Societies and from individual donors.

By 30 November, the 174 wounded who had been transported to Lebanon by the ICRC at the outbreak of hostilities had left the Lebanese hospitals. Only twenty-three of them, who were still receiving treatment and therefore not ready for repatriation had to wait until 29 November before they could be flown to Jordan. From the case files held by the Red Cross and the medical teams sponsored by various Governments, it emerges that about 2,500 patients were admitted to the hospitals in which the teams were working. More than 2,300 operations were carried out, and more than 7,850 out-patients came for consultations.

From 1 November to the closing of the operation, the distribution of relief was carried out by the Jordan National Red Crescent Society and the "Palestinian Red Crescent", under the supervision of the Jordan relief co-ordinating group. In the confusion which set in at the start of the conflict, it was not possible to register the arrival of all supplies in systematic fashion. The records show, however, that more than 1,800,000 kg of relief supplies were received and distributed by the teams taking part in the Jordan operation. The supplies included 1,500,000 kg of food, 112,000 kg of pharmaceuticals and medical material, plus a considerable number of tents, blankets, clothing and other articles.

On 1 December, talks were initiated with the officials of the King Hussein Hospital regarding wounded persons still in hospital. The number of patients was decreasing from day to day, and the Jordanian medical authorities decided, in agreement with the Red Cross doctors, that the local medical personnel were perfectly able to provide the care required. It was therefore agreed that

the remaining Red Cross medical personnel should leave Jordan on 10 December. On that day the hospital had only fourteen in-patients.

The last relief convoy for Jordan left Beirut on 5 December with food, medical supplies, clothing and tents. It reached Amman on 6 December and the Red Cross immediately carried out the distribution of supplies with the aid of the "Palestinian Red Crescent." On 9 December this last mission ended, and on 10 December the doctors, nurses and other Red Cross personnel left for home.

Throughout the relief action, the ICRC benefited from the support of a number of National Societies, which helped it bring its task of co-ordination to a successful conclusion by delegating experts, both in Geneva and Beirut. These experts worked with ICRC officials particularly in the field of relief, transport, information and public relations.

Conventional activities

Prisoners: Parallel to the relief action described, the ICRC applied itself to carrying out the traditional tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The ICRC permanent delegation in Amman approached the Jordanian authorities with a view to visiting prisoners. On 26 September, it had access to three Syrian prisoners-of-war. It also visited several hundred Palestinian detainees. A few days later, the Jordanian authorities informed the ICRC that all prisoners of war had been released.

Family messages and tracing requests: In the absence of postal communications between Jordan and the territories occupied by Israel, and as it had been impossible to establish any contact between Jordan and the outside world since the beginning of the civil war, the ICRC delegation in Amman was faced with a large influx of messages received

through the ICRC's various delegations in the Middle East and the Central Tracing Agency in Geneva. The Agency immediately sent one of its officials to Amman to set up at the delegation's headquarters a card index of the names of all persons to be traced, whether soldiers or civilians. This office, once it was installed, followed the system used in Geneva. A locally recruited Jordanian official was trained to apply the methods and subsequently continued the work, under responsibility of the ICRC delegates.

In the first place, some 25,000 messages had to be transmitted to the addressees. With the efficient co-operation of the Jordan National Red Crescent Society, the Jordanian postal authorities (who gave priority to messages from the delegation) and a large number of volunteers throughout the country, the messages were distributed and most of them returned within four weeks to the enquirer, with a reply.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the ICRC representatives travelled throughout the country to inform the inhabitants of remote villages and hamlets that they could write to the delegation in Amman, which would undertake to forward family messages, to trace missing persons and to help everyone solve any other problem of a purely humanitarian nature, where the intervention only of a neutral institution such as the Red Cross was possible.

It will be recalled that the ICRC was already active in Jordan before the outbreak of civil war, in June 1970. At the request of the governments concerned and after securing the agreement of the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian movements, it organized the evacuation from Jordan of 540 nationals of different countries, on 12 and 13 June, in flights by the two planes chartered for the purpose.

On 13 June, in flew out 6 tons of medications for the wounded in the Amman hospitals.

United Nations

PART I

Annual Documents Submitted to the General Assembly

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Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1969—15 June 1970 (Excerpts)¹

September 14, 1970

IV. THE MIDDLE EAST AND CYPRUS

42. A year ago I was obliged to report to the General Assembly that the situation in the Middle East had markedly deteriorated, that there was an unprecedented breakdown of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council, that the prospect of even a first step towards a peaceful settlement seemed remote and that the situation, apart from its disastrous effects in the area itself, had also created a crisis of effectiveness for the United Nations and its Members. At that time, I noted the efforts of the Security Council, of my Special Representative in the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, and of four permanent members of the Security Council, and, in commenting on their lack of success, concluded that a will to attain peace by the parties themselves was the decisive factor. That discouraging situation persisted until this summer.

43. It was therefore with satisfaction that I took note, in August 1970, of a more favourable turn of events in the Middle East, which at least gave a chance for progress towards the peaceful settlement which members of the United Nations had so earnestly desired for so many years. I was aware that this development was only a beginning, a welcome first step, and that the road ahead would be long, arduous and uncertain.

But at least there was a first step. Unfortunately, it was immediately followed by serious and, until now, continuing difficulties which have prevented further progress.

44. Until early August of this year, the Jarring mission, although it was never actually suspended or inoperative, had been relatively inactive for some time. This was because the circumstances seemed utterly unfavourable for a further effort by Ambassador Jarring. The breakdown of the Security Council cease-fire, especially in the Suez Canal sector, had created an impasse related to the differing positions of the parties concerning the cease-fire itself. One side refused to continue to observe the cease-fire, which it regarded as, in effect, perpetuating foreign occupation of its sovereign territory, while the position of the other side was that it would observe the cease-fire as soon as, and as long as, the other party was willing to do so. The efforts of four permanent members of the Security Council, and the separate efforts of the two super-Powers, to reach agreement on guidelines which might strengthen Ambassador Jarring's hand seemed doomed to frustration by this impasse. In spite of all the difficulties, however, the Governments concerned eventually accepted a proposal initiated by the United States of America which included a strict ninety-day observance of the Security Council cease-fire and made possible the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission. This agreement provided a favourable opportunity for all concerned with the Middle East problem to make a new effort—an opportunity, I should add, which may not come again. This fact makes the difficulties encountered in early September all the more alarming and deplorable.

45. The agreement of Israel, Jordan and

¹ U.N. doc. A/8001/Add.1, pp. 12-13 and 39-40.

the United Arab Republic to the peace proposal initiated by the United States, in providing a basis on which Ambassador Jarring was able to renew his contacts with the parties, created at the time an atmosphere of cautious hope which had been conspicuously lacking in recent years. It also served to demonstrate some important truths about the Middle East and about the United Nations itself. In the first place, it was a tentative indication that at long last there might be among the parties a will to peace, which is indispensable for any hope of progress. Now, in mid-September, there can be no doubt that the effort in the Middle East has suffered a severe set-back. Israel has charged that the cease-fire standstill conditions in the Suez Canal sector have been continuously violated by the United Arab Republic and has insisted that, until the original situation is restored, Israel will not participate in the talks.

46. Despite all the difficulties, however, I feel very strongly that we should not foresee failure as inevitable, nor should we conclude that there is no longer any scope for constructive peace talks. On the contrary, this is the time to exert every possible effort towards resumption of the talks. Ambassador Jarring remains at United Nations Headquarters, fully available to all the parties, and has been carrying on his efforts throughout the crisis of the standstill arrangement, with regard to which he has no relationship and for which he has no responsibility. The matter of the standstill arrangement involves, of course, neither Ambassador Jarring nor the United Nations, but only the United States and the two parties concerned. This is an area in which the United Nations has no responsibility because none has been given to it.

47. On the positive side, at the moment, the actual cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector is being scrupulously observed. There is no fighting.

48. It is to be hoped that the talks can soon be resumed. We must, I feel, persevere in this effort, because I am convinced that

this is probably the one chance of a breakthrough to peace in the Middle East. Only when the talks get under way and the parties begin to deal with substance will it become clear whether they are prepared, in the interests of peace, to accept those compromises, and even to take what they believe to be those risks to their vital interests, which are the inescapable price for a peaceful settlement. No one should underestimate the statesmanship and the courage which such decisions will require of the Governments concerned.

49. The current peace move, even though it has now encountered serious obstacles, has also shown that the Member States, and especially four of the permanent members of the Security Council, working together both within and outside the United Nations, can reach agreement even on the most difficult and controversial problems and, by reaching that agreement, can provide the firm base upon which United Nations organs and machinery can play a useful and constructive role. In particular, the concurrence of the two super-Powers, buttressed by France and the United Kingdom, in a positive course of action is of decisive importance. This is, I firmly believe, the way the United Nations was and is intended to work on difficult and dangerous political problems, and it will be a happy augury for the future if, in its twenty-fifth anniversary year, an impressive demonstration of this process could be given to the world.

50. The great basic problems of the Middle East all still lie before us. To surmount them will require patience, persistence, forbearance, courage, ingenuity and statesmanship. If the will to peace of the parties and the will to help of the Members of the United Nations can be maintained, I believe that the efforts of the Governments concerned, of the Security Council and of Ambassador Jarring can, in the end, succeed. It goes without saying that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat are always available to assist them in whatever way may seem useful.

149. In this twenty-fifth anniversary year, the United Nations will be considering means for increasing its effectiveness and for strengthening international peace. One such means would be for each Member to review its own obligations under the Charter, particularly those of pacific settlement under Article 33, with full attention to the injunction in Article 36 that "legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice". I appeal to the Members to give serious consideration to the advantages of final settlement by an impartial tribunal on the law binding on both sides. This is the viable alternative to lingering disputes which carry the risk of becoming increasingly inflamed and of involving the parties in explosive violence against their true interests.

150. In addition, States should bear in mind that, in the long run, the cost of compromise resulting in peaceful settlement is considerably less than keeping a dispute open with the consequent diversion of resources which might otherwise be devoted to national development.

151. It would also help if Member States could consider declaring their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, with as few reservations and limitations as possible. At the present time, only some forty-five States—hardly more than a third of the membership of the Organization—have done so. A number of declarations are also accompanied by crippling reservations that make them largely illusory. While acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction is by no means necessary for the submission of cases to the Court, it will tend to promote such submission as a normal procedure in international relations, instead of the very exceptional one it is at present.

152. Member States will have noticed the recent efforts of the Court to make itself better known and its functions better understood in the international community. This end is served by annual reports submitted by the Court to the General Assembly and

by closer contacts between the Court and other principal organs of the United Nations. Now the Court is engaged in the important work of revising its Rules, the outcome of which will no doubt enable the Court better to meet the needs of modern international life.

153. If these proposals are accepted and implemented, I am confident that during the next twenty-five years we shall see more progress towards eliminating the "scourge of war" and towards achieving another aim set out in the Preamble of the Charter, namely, "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".

*Unlawful interference with
international civil aviation*

154. My concern over the increasing incidence of hijacking of civil aircraft has grown considerably during the year, and acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft and of sabotage and armed attacks against civil air transport have now reached unprecedented proportions, to the point where confidence in the safety of international civil aviation would be seriously undermined.

155. A start at least has been made to seek effective measures for combating the problem. Since the adoption, on 12 December 1969, of General Assembly resolution 2551 (XXIV) on the forcible diversion of civil aircraft in flight, the International Civil Aviation Organization has continued its persistent efforts to combat unlawful interference with international civil aviation. The Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization took up the problem as a matter of urgency during an extraordinary session, the second in its history, which was convened last June to deal with the subject of safety in international civil aviation. A wide range of security measures was developed with a view to the protection of air passengers, civil aviation personnel and civil aircraft. A highly important declaration was adopted by which the Assembly condemned all acts

of violence against international civil air transport and urgently called upon States not to have recourse, under any circumstances, to such acts, but rather to take effective measures to deter and prevent them and to ensure the prosecution of those who commit them. The declaration also requested concerted action on the part of States to suppress acts which jeopardize the development of international civil air transport, and requested application, as soon as possible, of the decisions and recommendations of the Assembly.

156. As in the past, I fully support any international action which is required to prevent and repress acts of violence against international civil aviation. I hope, therefore, that States will give effect at once to the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization for national action. I also hope that those States not yet parties to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963, will heed the appeal of the General Assembly to ratify or accede to that Convention. The entry into force of a new convention, drafted by the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which is to be submitted to a diplomatic conference at The Hague in December, is clearly a matter of the utmost urgency and importance. All means which may contribute to accelerating the process by which States will become parties to the new convention deserve the serious attention of the conference. One suggestion which has been made in this regard is that States which sign the convention should undertake to submit it within a specified period for whatever constitutional process is necessary in order to enable them to become parties, and that States should also, if they find it impossible to become parties within a specified period, undertake to give notice to the International Civil Aviation Organization, stating their difficulties. Such provisions might perhaps be helpful and would have precedents in international practice.

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**Annual Report of the Secretary-General
on the Work of the Organization, 16 June
1969-15 June 1970 (Excerpt)¹**

August 1970

**CHAPTER I: THE SITUATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST**

During the year covered in the present report, the situation in the Middle East remained before the principal Organs of the United Nations. The Secretary-General, in a special report to the Security Council issued in July 1969, made an appeal to the members of the Security Council, and to all Members of the United Nations, to exert all influence and to take all measures which might be helpful in making the cease-fire effective and the peace efforts successful in the vital interests of the whole world. A note issued by the Secretary-General on 21 October at the request of the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, contained the text of a statement released on 20 September by the Foreign Ministers of those countries. It stated that the four Foreign Ministers had met with the Secretary-General to discuss the situation in the Middle East, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent. They reaffirmed that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be supported and implemented, agreed that a durable peace should be established in the Middle East, reaffirmed that all States in the Middle East had an inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign States, and, with the above objectives in mind, indicated that the conversations and contacts already established by the four Powers would be continued.

The question of the situation in the Middle East was included in the agenda of the twenty-

¹ U.N. doc. A/8001, p. 3. The body of Chapter I is not reproduced here, since the same subjects are covered in more detail in the Annual Report of the Security Council (below, Document 314) and the Annual Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General (below, Document 316).

fourth session of the General Assembly, but was not discussed as a separate item, although the Assembly did consider, as usual, the question of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which is dealt with in chapter IV, section O, below. On 17 December, at the closing meeting of the session, the Assembly decided to include the item in the provisional agenda of the twenty-fifth session, following the President's announcement that consultations which she had held with various delegations had led her to believe that the general feeling was that the item should be deferred until the next session. Consequently, the developments of the past year have been dealt with primarily in connexion with the discussions in the Security Council, and cover the communications and reports submitted to that body even though many of those documents were issued simultaneously by the General Assembly and by the Security Council. Those developments are described in greater detail in the annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly for the period from 15 July 1969 to 15 June 1970.

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Annual Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1969-15 June 1970 (Excerpt)¹ November 1970

CHAPTER I: THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. Communications, reports of the Chief of Staff and discussion by the Council concern- ing the status of the cease-fire

I. COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL

Communications to the Council from 16 July 1969 to 15 June 1970

1. In a letter dated 12 August 1969 (S/9386), Jordan, after referring to its letter

of 16 May 1969 (S/9211), charged that its territory had been subjected further to intensified shelling and air raids by Israel. It added that on 27 July several squadrons of Israel jet aircraft had bombed and strafed Jordanian positions in the Irbid district. The attack had resulted in three military personnel being killed and sixteen injured. The day before that, two civilians had been killed and two injured, following the shelling by Israel forces of the village of Shunah Shamaliyah. Jordan also submitted a list of ninety cease-fire violations by Israel during the period between 5 May and 23 July 1969.

2. In a second letter dated 12 August (S/9388), Jordan charged that on 10 August Israel jet aircraft had attacked the East Ghor Canal, a vital irrigation project in Jordan, causing further damage and destruction to that project. Jordan further charged that, within two months, Israel had twice attacked the Canal with the intention of destroying the agricultural economy of Jordan.

3. In a letter dated 20 August (S/9399), Israel, in reply to Jordan's two letters of 12 August (S/9386 and S/9388), stated that Jordan had been encouraging aggressive activities against it and that armed attacks had been carried out from within the Jordanian territory with the participation of Jordanian regular and irregular forces, reinforced by military units from Iraq. Israel also charged that Syria had introduced some units of its armed forces into Jordan.

4. In a letter dated 26 November (S/9512), Jordan stated that on 24 November an Israeli patrol had crossed the armistice line in Ghor Fetah, south of the Dead Sea, killing four Jordanian shepherds and kidnapping a fifth one. It added that on 17 November Israeli soldiers had kidnapped three civilians in the area south-west of Maïen.

5. In a letter dated 8 December (S/9543), Jordan stated that two Israeli torpedo boats had fired on the Japanese ship *Shinkai-Maru* in the Gulf of Aqaba while the ship was heading to the Jordanian port of Aqaba. The letter added that Israel had done so, even

though it had full knowledge of the ship's identity and its commercial cargo.

6. In a letter dated 9 December (S/9546), Jordan stated that on 6 December Israeli jet aircraft had attacked with rockets the area of Al Rayhanat in the northern part of the Jordan Valley, and that on 8 December Israeli artillery had shelled the city of Irbid, with many civilian casualties and damage to property resulting from both attacks.

7. In a letter dated 16 December (S/9560), Israel, in reply to Jordan's above letter, stated that, in view of the continued attacks against Israeli villages in the Beit Shean valley by terror squads operating from Jordanian territory, Israeli aircraft had taken action against a terrorist base on the east bank of the Jordan and that on 8 December the town of Beit Shean had been shelled from Jordan with Katyusha rockets. Israel claimed that it had returned fire in self-defence.

8. In a letter dated 22 December (S/9578), Jordan stated that Israeli aircraft had raided three villages near Irbid, using rockets, bombs and machine-guns, and that the raid had resulted in six soldiers killed and nineteen wounded. On the same day, Jordan added, the city of Irbid itself had also been shelled, causing injuries to civilians and damage to property. The letter concluded by stating that the frequency of the Israeli attacks indicated that Israel seemed to be following a premeditated official policy and, therefore, more effective international action was required.

9. In a letter dated 5 January 1970 (S/9592), Israel charged that in the last week of December 1969 more than 120 attacks had been carried out from Jordan against Israeli villages in the Jordan and Beit Shean valleys, including artillery shelling on 27 December 1969 of a nursing home in the Kibbutz Masada. Those attacks had continued throughout the first days of January 1970. Israel, after recalling that the observance of the cease-fire should be reciprocal, reserved its right to act in self-defence.

10. In a letter dated 9 January (S/9596),

Jordan stated that Israel had intensified its attacks against Jordanian civilians and their means of livelihood. After charging that more than 220 acts of aggression had been carried out by Israel against farms, villages and towns in the northern and central parts of the Jordan valley, the letter gave details of some of those attacks and the destruction they had caused to life and property.

11. In a letter dated 13 January (S/9600), Israel replied that the Jordanian letter had made no reference to the armed attacks against it from Jordanian territory. Because of those continued attacks, Israel was compelled to take defensive measures to protect its territory and the life of its citizens.

12. In a letter dated 19 January (S/9608), Jordan charged that on the previous day Israeli forces had opened mortar fire on Jordanian farmers in Tall-As-Sukkar in the northern part of the Jordan valley, killing four farmers and wounding six others. In a letter dated 21 January, Jordan stated (S/9610) that on 20 January an Israeli battalion, supported by Israeli aircraft, had crossed the armistice demarcation line south of the Dead Sea in the area of Ghor-Es-Safi and Fetah and had engaged Jordanian forces until the next day, while Israeli jet aircraft had bombed and strafed military and civilian targets in the area.

13. In a letter dated 22 January (S/9613), Israel, after referring to its letters of 16 December 1969 and 5 January 1970, charged that in recent weeks the area of armed attack from Jordanian territory had included the Dead Sea region and that on 19 and 20 January the Dead Sea Potash Works had been shelled. Acting in self-defence, units of Israeli Defence Forces had entered the Safi area south of the Dead Sea to clear the area of terrorist squads.

14. In a letter dated 27 January (S/9618), Jordan charged that Israel's indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Jordan villages and cities had caused the loss of innocent life and destruction of property. The letter transmitted photographs of women and child-

ren who had been victims of those attacks. Israel replied, in a letter dated 29 January (S/9623), that the cease-fire was being constantly violated by acts of aggression carried out by regular and irregular forces from Jordanian territory against Israeli villages and their civilian inhabitants and that the bloodshed and damage caused by those acts had been reported to the United Nations. As a result of Jordanian armed attacks and Israel's counter-measures, suffering and grief had been caused to both sides, for which the Arab States, including Jordan, should be held responsible.

15. In a letter dated 21 April (S/9761), Jordan stated that Israeli armed forces, in violation of the principles of international law, had been engaged in constructing a three-kilometre road into Jordanian territory in Ghor-Es-Safi, south of the Dead Sea, in an attempt to occupy the sources of water in Jordanian territory with the aim of controlling those water sources and linking them to Israeli potash factories.

16. In two letters dated 24 April (S/9764 and S/9765), Jordan, after referring to its letter of 9 January, stated that from the beginning of the current year and up to 10 April, Israeli forces had continued their attacks against civilian centres across the Jordan River. In some of those attacks, jet fighter bombers, artillery and rockets had been used. In an attack on 10 April, Israeli jet aircraft had strafed a funeral procession in the village of Shunah Shamaliyah, killing six civilians and wounding eighteen others.

17. In a letter dated 26 April (S/9766), Israel stated that, according to a Middle East news agency report, the Foreign Minister of Jordan had declared his agreement with a statement by the President of the United Arab Republic that the cease-fire between the Arabs and Israel had been non-existent. In Israel's view that declaration constituted a development of the utmost gravity concerning Jordan's attitude towards its obligations under the cease-fire resolutions. Israel considered that the cease-fire was unconditional except for being based on reciprocity

and that the Security Council had rejected all proposals to link it to any other matters, including the question of withdrawal.

18. In a further letter of the same date (S/9767), Israel, in reply to the two Jordanian letters of 24 April (S/9764 and S/9765), stated that those communications were designed to cover Jordan's own disregard for the cease-fire. The acts of aggression carried out from Jordanian territory by regular and irregular forces were continuing, and the operations of the irregular forces were co-ordinated with the Jordanian authorities. The air raid on civilian targets in the area of Shunah Shamaliyah on 10 April and Muthalath Es-Salt on 24 April referred to in Jordan's letters had simply been action taken against the sources of attacks on the Israeli town of Beit Shean and against a known base of irregular forces.

19. In a letter dated 1 June (S/9816), Jordan stated that Israeli forces had shelled the town of Irbid from the occupied Syrian heights, killing one six-year-old child and wounding twelve civilians. On the same day, a letter from Israel charged (S/9817) that rockets, fired indiscriminately from Jordan, had fallen in the vicinity of three schools, killing a ten-year-old girl and wounding three other children. Israel further charged that, from 26 April until the end of May, there had been 281 armed attacks from Jordan, in which six Israelis had been killed and sixteen wounded.

20. In a letter dated 3 June (S/9818), Israel stated that another rocket attack from Jordan against Beit Shean had killed two children and wounded ten others. In two letters of the same date (S/9819 and S/9820), Jordan stated that Israel had carried out air raids against the villages of Shunah Shamaliyah and Kuraimah, killing two children and wounding nine other civilians. In other jet aircraft and artillery attacks against villages in the northern part of Jordan seven civilians had been killed and thirty-three others wounded. Jordan added that those attacks by Israel had created a grave situation, increasing tension in the

area and causing a serious threat to international peace.

2. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire from 16 July 1969 to 15 June 1970

21. In two communications dated 17 and 18 July 1969 (S/9337 and S/9339), the United Arab Republic and Israel, respectively, submitted charges and countercharges regarding the handling of the bodies of five United Arab Republic soldiers killed on the east bank of the Suez Canal.¹ The United Arab Republic charged that Israel had been procrastinating concerning removal of the bodies in order to reinforce its position. In reply, Israel charged that it was the United Arab Republic which had frustrated the attempt to remove the bodies of the dead soldiers by firing on the recovery location, thus compelling the party in charge to withdraw.

22. In supplemental information dated 18 July (S/7930/Add.271 and Corr.1), Lt. General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) stated that Israel had informed him that the bodies of five Egyptian soldiers had been found on the east side of the Canal and that arrangements had been made to recover and repatriate the bodies on 24 June. However, the recovery attempt had not been completed, as mortar rounds fired by United Arab Republic forces had landed at the recovery location, and compelled the party in charge to withdraw. The United Arab Republic had later insisted on the immediate return of the bodies and had rejected a proposal to complete the recovery and hand-over on 24 June. Subsequently, it was agreed to make a new attempt on 17 July. As preparations for the recovery were being made, machine-gun fire had been

heard from the west side of the Canal, and bullets had passed within 20 to 30 meters of the recovery site. Mortar and artillery fire had been exchanged, and the recovery operation had been halted. A cease-fire proposal later had been accepted by Israel, but no reply had been received from the United Arab Republic.

23. In a letter dated 20 July (S/9343), the United Arab Republic charged that Israeli forces had that day attempted to take over "Green Island" located in the south part of the Suez Canal. In another letter of the same date (S/9344), the United Arab Republic further charged that Israeli jet aircraft had attacked civilian centres and economic installations in several cities of the Suez Canal zone.

24. In a letter dated 22 July (S/9349), Israel stated that, faced with continuous attacks by the United Arab Republic armed forces, Israel had no choice but to resort to measures of self-defence. Those measures, however, were directed exclusively against United Arab Republic military positions and against bases from which attacks against Israeli forces had originated.

25. During the period from 16 to 31 July, the Secretary-General received supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.267, 268, 270, 271 and Corr.1, 290 and 292), relating to incidents of firing across the Canal with rifles, light and heavy machine-guns, artillery mortar, tanks and rockets. The reports of the Chief of Staff also contained information relating to aerial activities and to incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and installations.

26. In supplemental information dated 27 July (S/7930/Add.284), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that Major B. R. Plane of the Swedish Army, a United Nations military observer on duty on the west bank of the Suez Canal, had been killed by artillery fire. In a special report on that incident dated 30 July (S/9368), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had received a report from the Chief of

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/7602)*, chapter 1, para. 255. [This footnote is part of the report.]

Staff of UNTSO, containing the findings of the board assigned to investigate the death of Major Plane. After examining all the circumstances leading to the death of Major Plane, the board had concluded that Major Plane had died in the course of duty as a result of being hit by a fragment of an artillery shell that had exploded outside his observation post. From the evidence presented to the board and from its own independent inquiries, the board had further concluded that the artillery shell in question had come from a north-easterly direction from an area occupied by Israeli forces. In addition to reporting the findings of the board, the Secretary-General observed that the tragic death of Major Plane had given grim reality to the fears felt about the situation in the Suez Canal sector and recalled that he had already drawn attention to the steadily deteriorating conditions under which United Nations military observers were carrying out their duties and to the increasing danger to which they were exposed. The daily supplemental information reports to the Security Council on the Suez Canal sector frequently mentioned firing on the United Nations military observers, their posts, vehicles and equipment.

27. From 1 June to 29 July 1969, the Secretary-General added, there had been seventy-four instances of firing at or near United Nations posts or personnel by United Arab Republic forces and fifteen such instances of firing by Israeli forces. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO had made persistent efforts to improve the various means of safeguarding United Nations personnel; but those measures had not yet achieved the desired result. During the same period, intense aerial activity across the Canal had also been reported, and on five occasions United Nations observation posts had sustained damage as a consequence of that activity.

28. After pointing out the risks involved in attacks on the United Nations military observers, the Secretary-General again appealed to the parties themselves to abide by the cease-fire and respect the observers who

supervised it and co-operate with efforts made within the United Nations for a peaceful settlement. He appealed also to the members of the Security Council to do their utmost, individually and collectively, to influence events in a new and constructive direction and to improve the working conditions of the observers in the Suez Canal sector. It was increasingly evident, he added, that the absence of an early prospect of the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 was one of the factors that tended to increase the incidence of cease-fire violations in all sectors of the Middle East. After paying his personal tribute to the memory of Major Plane and to other observers, the Secretary-General also expressed his appreciation to the Governments who had provided those observers for their co-operation and understanding and concluded that, after consultation with those Governments, he would make further recommendations to the Security Council.

29. During the month of August, supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.292, 294-297, 299-311, 313, 314, 316, 317, 319 and 321-326) was received and circulated almost daily. The reports referred to heavy exchange of fire and to some aerial activity. Between 6 and 29 August, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported twelve instances of firing at or close to United Nations installations and observation posts located on the east side of the Canal by United Arab Republic forces.

30. In supplemental information dated 19 August (S/7930/Add.311) the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that, because of United Arab Republic artillery fire at an unoccupied observation post on the east side of the Canal and in view of the lack of assurance to ceasefire on the part of the United Arab Republic authorities, the working party at that post had had to withdraw. In a letter dated 23 August (S/9405), Israel informed the Security Council that on the night of 20-21 August, the work on construction of the United Nations Observation Post Orange had been stopped at the request

of the observers, who had been advised that the United Arab Republic authorities were opposed to continuation of the work on the shelter. In a letter dated 27 August (S/9417), the Secretary-General informed Israel that, according to the reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, work had continued at Observation Post Orange since 21 August without interruption and that the shelter had been completed on 25 August.

31. During the month of September the Secretary-General circulated thirty-seven documents containing supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO including eight separate reports on aerial activities (S/7930/Add.327, 328, 330-344, 346-367). In that period also there were ten instances of firing at United Nations observation posts.

32. In supplemental information dated 22 September (S/7930/Add.355), the Chief of Staff, reporting on the closing of Observation Post Mike, stated that in his meetings on 10 and 11 September with the United Arab Republic and Israeli authorities he had discussed the problem faced by the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector. In his discussions with United Arab Republic authorities, the question of encroachment on the observation posts, in particular Observation Post Mike, had been raised. The Chief of Staff reported that since 25 July there had been eight instances of firing at or close to Observation Post Mike from the east side of the Canal. On 27 July, artillery fire close to that post had resulted in the death of Major B. R. Plane, and, on 21 September, the post had been hit again by heavy-weapons fire. In view of the serious damage caused by the above-mentioned firing and the danger to the lives of the observers, the Chief of Staff stated that he had no other alternative but to close Observation Post Mike temporarily, with effect from 24 September.

33. In supplemental information received in October (S/7930/Add.368-402, 404 and 405), the Chief of Staff reported that the firing incidents had continued as in previous

months, increasing in frequency and involving the use of light and heavy weapons. He also reported continuation of aerial activity involving Israel jet fighters and bombers crossing the Canal from east to west and anti-aircraft fire from the United Arab Republic forces.

34. Throughout the month of November the Secretary-General circulated supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.406-411, 413-423, 425-441) indicating that the exchange of fire had continued unabated in the Suez Canal sector, including intensification of aerial activity. The Chief of Staff also reported that Israeli Phantom jets had been observed crossing the Canal on 29 November to carry out attacks on the west bank of the Canal.

35. In supplemental information dated 9 November (S/7930/Add.416), the Chief of Staff reported that observers at the Kantara Control Centre at Rahba, on the east bank of the Canal, had heard heavy shelling and had seen muzzle flashes about ten kilometres north-north-west of the control centre and that the target seemed to be the area of Romani. At the same time, aerial activity and anti-aircraft fire had been observed. On that day, Israeli authorities had informed the UNTSO operation officer that on the evening of 8 November two United Arab Republic destroyers and three torpedo boats had shelled the Romani area for about forty-five minutes and that Israeli aircraft had been employed against those vessels. The Chief of Staff also reported that in several instances the United Arab Republic forces had fired at points close to the United Nations observation posts, although no Israeli military personnel had been in the vicinity of those posts. During the same period Israeli jets had continued to attack targets on the west bank of the Canal.

36. During the month of December supplemental information from the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add.442-446, 448, 450, 452, 454, 457-463, 465, 466, 468, 470 and 472-480) indicated that exchange of fire in the Suez Canal sector had continued with the same

intensity as before. The reports also indicated that there had been twenty incidents of firing on or close to United Nations installations and observation posts during that period that had caused damage. In one incident, on 8 December (S/7930/Add.448), an observer had received leg, face and eye injuries from explosives that had detonated alongside the roadway. Frequent firing at Observation Post Yellow had made it necessary for the Chief of Staff to close that post and relocate it at a new site, which had been agreed upon with Israeli authorities.

37. In a letter dated 4 December (S/9540), the representative of the United Arab Republic recalled his conversation with the Secretary-General on 2 December, in which he had expressed the grave concern of the Arab delegations with regard to the use of United States-built Phantom jet aircraft by the Israeli armed forces against towns and villages in the United Arab Republic, and quoted from relative supplemental information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.439). He added that the use of those aircraft by Israel bore out the warnings expressed repeatedly by the Arab countries regarding the serious repercussions of providing Israel with such offensive war weapons. Moreover, such military aid assumed a disturbing character, coming as it did from a permanent member of the Security Council.

38. In the month of January 1970 there were thirty-two supplemental reports from the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add.481, 483-487, 489, 490, 493-498, 500-502, 504, 506, 508, 510, 512-516, 518, 520, 522, 523, 525 and 526) on firing incidents, overflights and firing on United Nations observation posts in the Suez Canal sector.

39. In a letter dated 26 January 1970 (S/9626), the United Arab Republic charged that on 25 January Israeli aircraft had attacked an unarmed United Arab Republic civilian vessel while it was sailing in the Red Sea at a distance of twenty kilometres from the Egyptian town of Ghadarka. The attack, which had resulted in the wounding of six

civilian members of the crew, was carried out by Israel in violation of international law.

40. Israel, in a letter dated 2 February (S/9635), replied that the United Arab Republic's above charges were unfounded and were, in fact, intended to divert attention from that State's repudiation of the cease-fire. The boat in question was an auxiliary craft in the service of the United Arab Republic Army, and Israeli forces were under strict orders not to strike civilian vessels.

41. In a letter dated 20 February (S/9656), the United Arab Republic charged that an attack carried out on 12 February by Israeli Phantom jet planes against the National Products Factory of metallurgical works at Abu Zaabal in the United Arab Republic had resulted in the death of eighty persons and injuries to still a greater number of workers. As would be clear from the reports of the international press, that factory was situated far from any military installation. The letter added that the attack, which had been carried out by Phantom jets, had demonstrated the kind of use to which Israel was putting the aircraft allegedly provided to it for defensive purposes and belied Israel's claim that its forces were under strict orders not to strike at civilian targets.

42. By a letter dated 20 February (S/9657), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Secretary-General a TASS statement dated 16 February concerning the reported attack by Israeli aircraft on an Egyptian metallurgical plant near Cairo on 12 February 1970. After charging that the Israeli leaders had disregarded the principles of humanity and international law in order to undermine a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, the statement indicated that, by escalating their aggression, the Israelis believed that they would be able to force the Arab States to surrender their lawful interests. It added that as long as the aggressor continued its defiance of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter

and the Security Council resolutions, the Soviet Union would be obliged to provide the necessary support to the Arab States in strengthening their capacity to defend their security and their rightful interests.

43. In a letter dated 21 February (S/9658), Israel stated that, acting in self-defence, it had taken air action against the military camp at Al-Khanka, but when a spokesman for the United Arab Republic had announced that bombs had fallen on a steel plant located near the camp, resulting in civilian casualties, an investigation had been ordered. The letter then added that a spokesman for Israeli Defence Forces had declared that the plant could have been hit only as a result of an error and that Israel's policy continued to be to take action only against military targets. The Israeli spokesman also had announced that a debriefing of the pilots had revealed "that there was a possibility that due to a technical error, the bombs of an aircraft had been released outside the target" and that the Israeli Minister of Defence had requested the representative of the International Red Cross and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to inform the United Arab Republic authorities that, among the bombs dropped, there had been one weighing 400 kilogrammes set to explode after an interval of twenty-four hours and that it was necessary to defuse it in time to prevent explosion. In a letter dated 27 February (S/9669), Israel said that the TASS statement that had been transmitted to the Council had disregarded Israel's policy aimed at concluding a peace agreement in the Middle East and, instead, had exalted Soviet support of the so-called Arab war of attrition.

44. During the month of February, the Secretary-General circulated twenty-nine supplemental reports from the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add.528, 530, 532, 534, 536, 537 and Corr. 1, 538-542, 544, 546, 548, 550, 552, 554, 555, 557, 559-564, 566, 567 and 569), relating to firing incidents and indicating intensified aerial activity. The supplemental information on aerial activity dated 10 February (S/7930/Add.541), indicated that a number of unidentified aircraft had

crossed the Canal from west to east and had attacked with bombs targets north of Observation Post Silver on the east bank of the Canal. During the attack, one bomb had fallen seventy-five metres from the observation post. Later on the same day, one artillery shell fired by United Arab Republic forces had landed near Observation Post Caravan. By the same document the Chief of Staff also reported that a number of Israeli jet aircraft had crossed the Canal and attacked targets on the west bank and that one bomb had landed in the Canal about sixty metres west of Observation Post Silver.

45. During the month of March, thirty-one supplemental reports on incidents in the Suez Canal sector were circulated by the Secretary-General (S/7930/Add.572, 573, 575, 577, 579, 581 and Corr., 1, 583, 585, 587, 589, 591, 593, 595, 597, 598, 600, 602, 604-606, 608, 610, 611, 613, 615, 617, 619, 621, 622 and 624), indicating intensified aerial activity and transmitting information on damage to United Nations installations.

46. In two supplemental information reports dated 6 and 7 March (S/7930/Add.579 and 581 and Corr.1) the Chief of Staff had stated that Observation Post Yellow, which had been temporarily closed on 11 December 1969, pending its relocation to a safer site, had resumed operation from 5 March. On 31 March, he reported (S/7930/Add.626) that the United Arab Republic authorities had complained that United Nations vehicles had been moving in the midst of a number of Israeli vehicles and that the local commander had not fired because of the presence of the United Nations vehicles. The United Nations officer-in-charge of Kantara Control Centre had replied that a United Nations relief patrol, on its way to Observation Post Green, had inadvertently become involved with the Israeli vehicles. The United Nations personnel was under instruction to avoid other vehicles.

47. In a letter dated 8 April (S/9744), the United Arab Republic stated that Israeli Phantom jets had attacked a primary school in the village of Houssaineya in Sharkia

Province, resulting in the death of thirty-one school children and the wounding of many other civilians.

48. In a letter dated 9 April (S/9745), Israel replied that the air action referred to by the United Arab Republic had been undertaken against Egyptian military installations situated at Salahiye and that air photographs taken before and after the action had clearly indicated identifiable military installations. The letter stated that press releases from the United Arab Republic has indicated that authorities there had prevented journalists from visiting the site of the reported Israeli air action. Press releases had also mentioned that some of the wounded boys that journalists had seen in the hospital were dressed in khaki uniforms and apparently had participated in premilitary training in the Salahiye camp. In a further letter dated 14 April (S/9752/Rev. 1), Israel stated that United Arab Republic authorities had taken five days to arrange for a visit of press representatives to the target area, thus allowing themselves time to remove traces of military installations.

49. By a letter dated 15 April (S/9755), the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General that sixteen other school children had died of wounds suffered during the Israeli air attack and attached photographs to show that the children were so young as to refute the Israeli allegation that they had been undergoing paramilitary training in a military compound. The United Arab Republic's letter further quoted from a Reuter's dispatch of 15 April declaring that the press correspondents had seen only agricultural projects work but no sign of military equipment at the site of Israeli air action.

50. In a letter dated 15 April (S/9756), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the Security Council the texts of statements issued by the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African Countries and the USSR Union of Journalists, as well as a copy of the cable from the Committee of Soviet Women and the USSR Academy of Pedagogic Sciences, all protest-

ing Israel's bombing of a primary school in the United Arab Republic.

51. In a reply dated 17 April (S/9757), Israel stated that the USSR had aided the propaganda services of the United Arab Republic and that the prime responsibility for the losses sustained by both sides in the "war of attrition" rested with the United Arab Republic.

52. During the month of April, the Secretary-General circulated further supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add. 626, 628, 630, 632, 634, 636-638, 640, 642-646, 648, 650, 652, 654, 656, 657, 659, 661, 663, 665, 668, 670, 671, 674, 676 and 678) relating to incidents in the sector, including reports of firing on and damage to five observation posts and the Ismailia Control Centre.

53. In a letter dated 1 May (S/9775), the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that during the preceding few days Israeli authorities had embarked upon a campaign of falsification about the so-called increasing involvement of Soviet pilots in the Egyptian air force, with the twofold aim of providing justification for receiving more Phantom jets from the United States and diverting the attention of world public opinion from its persistent aggression and its defiance of the United Nations.

54. In a letter dated 5 May (S/9782), Israel stated that the United Arab Republic had neither denied the facts concerning Soviet military involvement in Egypt, which, it charged, had introduced a new dimension into the regional conflict, nor indicated any change in its policy of hostility towards Israel.

55. By a letter dated 4 May (S/9778), the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitted the text of an appeal addressed on 1 May 1970 to the President of the United States from the President of the United Arab Republic, asking the United States to persuade Israel to withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 or, if that was not within its power, to withhold further military, political and economic support from Israel.

If the United States was not prepared to make either move, it would be abundantly clear that it agreed to and supported Israel's continued occupation of those lands and the imposition of Israel's will on the Arab States.

56. During the period from 1 May to 15 June, the Secretary-General circulated further supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.680, 682, 684, 686, 688, 690, 692, 694, 696, 698, 699, 701, 703, 705, 707, 709, 711, 713, 715, 717, 719, 721, 723, 726, 728, 730, 732, 734 and Corr. 1-2, 735, 737, 739, 741, 743, 745, 749, 752, 754, 755, 757, 759, 760, 762, 764, 766, 768, 770, 772, 774 and 776). The reports indicated that firing incidents had continued with the same intensity as before and that aerial activity had increased. They also indicated that several observation posts had been damaged by firing from both sides and that two of them had to be closed temporarily.

57. On 8 June, the Secretary-General informed (S/9825) the members of the Security Council of a letter he had addressed to the States whose nationals were serving as United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector. After declaring that the observers were rendering dedicated and courageous service to the cause of peace through their work with an operation instituted by the Security Council and being maintained to the extent possible in the absence of any contrary action by the Council, the Secretary-General stated that the physical safety of peace-keeping personnel was always a foremost consideration, particularly under the hazardous conditions prevailing in the Suez Canal sector. He drew attention to a statement included in his report of 27 May (S/7930/Add. 734) in connexion with the closure of some observation posts that representations and protests concerning firing on or close to United Nations personnel, installations and equipment had been of no avail in reducing the number of such incidents and that, on the contrary, there had recently been an increase in such firings from the United Arab Republic side. Recognizing the difficulties involved in limiting firing in

what amounted to a war situation, the Secretary-General, nevertheless, registered his deep concern at the constant and increasing danger to which United Nations personnel were exposed in that sector and his distress that the risks were greater than at any previous time. Because of conditions beyond his control, therefore, the Secretary-General was no longer able to guarantee the physical safety of the men engaged in the observation operation and was painfully aware that in the existing situation, where near-misses were an almost daily occurrence at the observation post in the Canal, it was something of a miracle that casualties among the observers had not been much higher. The Secretary-General added that he had felt obliged to write frankly on the matter, so that the Governments might be in no doubt as to the situation in which their officers were serving the United Nations.

58. Replies to the Secretary-General's letter were received from Austria, Chile, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.

59. By a letter dated 7 June (S/9826), the representative of Chile expressed his Government's confidence that the Secretary-General would be able to find ways and means of overcoming the difficult situation, in order to ensure, so far as reasonably possible, the safety of the observers, possibly with the urgent assistance of the Security Council.

60. In a letter dated 15 June (S/9857), the representative of Ireland stated that the physical protection of the observers and the preservation of their status were matters of deep concern to his Government. His Government welcomed the assurance that the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO would continue to take every possible precaution for their safety and trusted that the Secretary-General would receive the full co-operation and support of all concerned in whatever action he might deem appropriate to take in order to reduce the current dangers.

61. In a letter of the same date (S/9845), the representative of Finland stated that the situation underlined once again the need of

an urgent new effort for peace in the Middle East. The position of the Finnish Government in this regard had been made clear in the Security Council during its consideration of the situation in the Middle East in May 1970, and he reaffirmed that position. As to the situation of the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector, whose function was part of the general United Nations effort to maintain peace in the Middle East, the Finnish Government was aware that the Secretary-General was doing whatever could be done for their physical safety.

62. In a letter dated 16 June (S/9840), the representative of Sweden conveyed his Government's belief that it was the Secretary-General's responsibility to take the necessary measures in any given situation to protect the lives of the men who served the United Nations as members of a peace-keeping force or observation group. The growing danger to the safety of the observers in the Suez Canal sector was but a symptom of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East and underlined the vital necessity of achieving a peaceful settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

63. In a letter dated 29 June (S/9855), the representative of Austria stated that his Government had full confidence that the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO would take all appropriate and necessary measures to protect the lives of the men serving as United Nations observers in the Suez Canal sector. Further his Government wished to recall that the cease-fire observation in the Suez Canal sector was being carried out under the authority of the Security Council, which, therefore, must also bear ultimate responsibility for its execution. In that respect, the Austrian Government also wished to express its deep concern about the developments in the Middle East situation and the urgent necessity for achieving a peaceful, political settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

3. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) *Communications to the Council from 16 July 1969 - 12 August 1969 and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire and request for a meeting*

64. In supplemental information dated 17 July 1969 (S/7930/Add.269), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received a Lebanese complaint that on 16 July an Israeli patrol had penetrated into Lebanese territory in the area of El-Megidieh, destroying three houses and taking two Lebanese nationals by force into Israeli territory. United Nations military observers investigating the incident stated that two witnesses had confirmed the forced removal of two Lebanese civilians by the Israelis, that there was physical evidence of three houses having been destroyed and fourteen sheep killed, and that one unexploded hand-grenade with Hebrew markings had been found.

65. In a letter dated 11 August (S/9383), Lebanon charged that Israel's jet aircraft had attacked six villages near its southern border with napalm bombs, rockets and machine-guns and that four civilians had been killed and three wounded. By a letter dated 12 August (S/9385), Lebanon requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaint regarding an Israeli attack on villages in southern Lebanon.

66. In a letter of the same date (S/9387), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider its complaint about several armed attacks against it from Lebanese territory, charging that in the preceding few months, twenty-one attacks by shelling, firing and mining had been carried out against Israeli localities, during which civilians had been wounded. Israel added that in self-defence it had been compelled to take action on 11 August against irregular terrorist encampments in Lebanese territory.

(b) *Consideration by the Council at the 1498th-1502nd and 1504th meetings (13-15, 18 and 26 August 1969)*

67. At its 1498th meeting, on 13 August 1969, the Council included the complaints by Lebanon (S/9385) and Israel (S/9387) in its agenda, listing them separately under the item "The situation in the Middle East". The representatives of Lebanon and Israel were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussions without the right to vote.

68. The representative of Lebanon stated that an unprovoked attack had been carried out against his country by Israel, charging that on 11 August Israel fighters and bombers had raided six villages in southern Lebanon, using napalm, machine-guns and rockets, killing four civilians and wounding three others. In justification of its attack, he said Israel had claimed that its action had been taken in retaliation for attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory. If Israel had serious and plausible reasons for complaints, it should have resorted to the United Nations machinery established under the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement, which continued to be valid and in force. Lebanon had respected its obligations under that Agreement, but Israel had refused constantly to resort to the Mixed Armistice Commission or to permit any investigation to establish the facts. The United Nations had adopted several resolutions condemning Israel's aggression in the past, but Israel, instead of implementing those resolutions, had taken action unilaterally in defiance of international law. Lebanon could not be held responsible for the actions of the Palestinian commandos who were struggling to establish their legitimate rights. As a small and defenceless country, Lebanon relied on the rule of law and on the action which could be taken by the Security Council. After recalling that the Security Council, in its resolution 262 (1968), had issued a solemn warning to Israel that in case of recurrence of acts of violence, the Council would have to consider further steps, the representative of Lebanon urged the Council to take steps as provided in the Charter,

including sanctions, and to hold Israel responsible for the damages inflicted against civilian life and property.

69. The representative of Israel stated that, despite the 1967 cease-fire, terrorist operations had continued unabated and that the regular armies of the Arab States had intensified their attacks against Israel. Along with other Arab countries, Lebanon had allowed itself to become a base of terrorist operations against Israel, and the Lebanese Government seemed unable or unwilling to curtail those operations. Israel, which had been subjected to Arab aggression for more than two decades, had had to take action in self-defence, carefully directing the action against the saboteurs' concentrations. In Israel's opinion, Lebanon could not be absolved of its responsibility for the use of its territory by terrorist organizations. It was well known to Lebanon that Israel's aim was to maintain the cease-fire and that the action taken by it was in self-defence.

70. At the 1499th meeting of the Council, on 14 August, the representative of Algeria stated that the flagrant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty by Israeli aircraft was part of Israel's plans to expand and occupy more Arab territories under the pretext of security needs. By its aggression of 11 August against Lebanese territory, Israel had aimed at occupying the region of the Hasbani River, in order to control all the tributaries of the Jordan River. As in previous instances, Israel had again carried out a policy of destruction, compelling the inhabitants to flee their homes, thus making the area ready for colonization. Israel's aggression and its occupation of Arab territories should not hide the deeper reason for the conflict, which was the loss of their homeland by the Palestinian people, who were now undertaking their own struggle. It was up to the United Nations to assume its responsibility in that respect and to settle the problem. For years, the Security Council had adopted resolutions condemning Israel and warning that further acts of aggression would oblige it to take further steps to give effect to its decisions. That warning was included in resolution 262 (1968), when the

Security Council had considered the case of an earlier Israeli aggression against Lebanon. In view of the current Israeli air attacks against Lebanon, the time had come to consider those further measures. If the Council were unable to meet its responsibilities in that respect, it would be up to the Palestinians and the other Arab peoples to liberate their own territories.

71. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that Israel's latest act of aggression against Lebanon was an expression of its general aggressive policies towards the Arab States and its stubborn refusal to agree to a political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East on the basis of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The Security Council had repeatedly condemned Israel for acts of retaliation and had warned that, if those acts were repeated, more effective measures would be taken against it. It was Israel, not Lebanon, that had violated the Armistice Agreement and had thwarted the work of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission. The acts of Arab partisans were not subversive acts, as Israel had charged, but the legitimate struggle of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression and occupation of their lands. If Israel really wanted peace in the Near East, it should comply with all the provisions of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The Council must strongly condemn Israel for its current acts of aggression, and the Soviet Union was prepared to support any effective measures that it might decide upon to restrain the aggressor and bring about a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.

72. The representative of France stated that the new incident on the border of Lebanon illustrated the dangers inherent in the absence of a political solution to the Middle East conflict. Furthermore, acts of reprisal had always been condemned by the United Nations and were contrary to all United Nations resolutions. His Government was particularly concerned, because Lebanon was linked to France by old ties of friendship; and it was also aware that Lebanon had made every

effort to avoid the creation of a new source of trouble. His delegation, therefore, considered that acts of reprisal by Israel would only aggravate the situation. As a member of the Security Council, France was making every effort for a lasting peace in the area and was ready to support any measures that might be helpful in the search for peace. For all those reasons, and bearing in mind the basic objective of the search for peace, France could only deplore all acts of violence of any kind and from any source.

73. The representative of Pakistan stated that the Council was again confronted with a situation resulting from an armed attack by Israel on Lebanese territory during which napalm had been used, resulting in civilian casualties. It might be recalled that Lebanon had not been involved in the 1967 hostilities and that the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement had existed since 23 March 1949. Moreover, Lebanon had made every effort to insulate its territory from the fighting which was a result of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Bearing that in mind, the Council must take all measures to make Israel desist from attacking Lebanon. In its resolution 262 (1968), the Council had warned Israel that further steps would be considered to give effect to its decisions, if aggression against Lebanon was repeated. In view of Israel's latest attack, the Council must decide upon those measures. Israel's excuse that Lebanon had harboured terrorists was inadmissible, as Lebanon had simply given refuge to Palestinians who had been forcibly evicted from their homes and who had the inherent right to struggle to regain their homeland. There was nothing in the Charter of the United Nations and principles of justice and humanity that required that the Governments of the Arab States should suppress their struggle and thus help Israel to consolidate its illegal possessions. The Council should hold Israel responsible for the damage to civilian life and property and proceed to take effective measures, in accordance with its past decision, to protect Lebanon against a recurrence of attacks against its territory.

74. At the 1500th meeting of the Council,

on 14 August, the President appealed to members of the Council, and also to representatives who had been invited to participate in the discussion, to endeavour as far as possible to confine their remarks to the agenda that had been adopted. He also wished to point out that, as President of the Council, he could not allow attacks to be levelled, either directly or indirectly, against the Council's authority and dignity. The Council was one of the principal organs of the United Nations, and Member States had conferred on it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and had recognized that the Security Council, in fulfilling its functions, was acting on their behalf.

75. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was concerned not only with the loss of life that had resulted from the recent events in the Middle East but with the fact that the accumulation of such incidents could gradually undermine the hope for a lasting peace in that area. In the United Nations four-Power talks and elsewhere, his Government had been making strenuous diplomatic efforts to support the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, to promote a peaceful settlement in accordance with the Council's unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967). For the success of that mission it was of utmost necessity to establish a favourable atmosphere to which the Council and the parties concerned must make an essential contribution. His delegation realized that the task of the Council was rendered difficult by the absence of United Nations observers who could send impartial reports on incidents on the Israel-Lebanon border. The United States would suggest, therefore, that the Governments of Israel and Lebanon consider the possibility of stationing UNTSO observers along their border. It hoped that that measure might help to prevent some of the incidents that had led to the situation under discussion. However, whatever might be the reasons for those incidents, the United States could not condone Israel's attack on Lebanon in violation of the cease-fire. At the same time, it could not completely exonerate Lebanon from its

responsibility for attacks carried out from its territory. The general deterioration of the cease-fire could not fail to make the Council's task more difficult, and the Council must, therefore, insist on strict observance of the cease-fire.

76. The representative of Senegal stated that his delegation deplored Israel's air attack on civilian villages in Lebanon, a country that was devoted to peace and had shown moderation in the Middle East conflict. Moreover, Senegal was opposed to resorting to violence for the settlement of international disputes. It equally condemned acts of reprisal, which it considered to be in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

77. The representative of Hungary recalled that the Council had repeatedly condemned Israel's attacks against Arab territories. Israel, which itself had defied the resolutions of the Security Council, always placed the responsibility of observing the cease-fire solely on the Arab States. It was Israel, however, which had been occupying Arab territories and forcing people either to flee or to surrender. Moreover, it was Israel which had so far frustrated all efforts towards a political settlement of the problem. Israel's reference to self-defence was nothing but a cover-up for its own aggression. Hungary would continue to give its full support to a political solution of the Middle East question, which should include the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied Arab territories. In consideration of the current cases, the Council must unanimously condemn Israel for its aggressive policy and take effective measures to make Israel abide by Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968.

78. At the 1501st meeting of the Council, on 15 August, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation deplored all violations of the cease-fire. Recalling that his Government had pledged all its help to bring about a settlement on the basis of Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, he stated that constructive thought should be given to means of prevent-

ing further incidents perhaps by the reinforcement of UNTSO. While his Government opposed the use of violence and deplored the actions referred to in the respective complaints of the parties, it considered that the provocation resulting from the attacks about which Israel had complained to the Council could not justify the bombing attacks on southern Lebanon. It regretted the loss of civilian life and was sad to see that the area of conflict had extended to Lebanon, which had been foremost in the pursuit of peace and conciliation.

79. The representative of Finland stated that the essential facts in the case before the Council were not in dispute. Both Israel and Lebanon had an equal obligation to maintain the cease-fire that they had agreed to respect. However, the breaches of the cease-fire could not be treated in isolation from the realities of the situation in the Middle East. The Secretary-General had repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the situation resulting from daily fighting and had also pointed out the unjustified risks to which the unarmed United Nations observers were being subjected. He also stressed that never before had there been such complete and sustained disregard for a cease-fire ordered by the Security Council. If that situation continued, it could break the entire structure of the internationally supervised cease-fire in the Middle East and put an end to efforts to establish peace in the area by international action and through the use of United Nations services. The cease-fire was by its very nature a temporary arrangement. It was the first step towards making peace. As the months went by, the lack of progress towards agreement was bound to strengthen on both sides those who did not believe in the possibility of real peace or did not want it. The Security Council could not, however, afford to despair of a peaceful solution of the conflict. The four major Powers would be continuing their talks, thus acknowledging their special responsibility for preventing the conflict in the Middle East from endangering international peace and security. Similarly, Ambassador Jarring remained ready to renew his efforts to assist the parties

to reach agreement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967. For the success of these efforts the maintenance of the cease-fire was essential. The Secretary-General, in his report of 30 July, had appealed to the members of the Council to do all within their power to influence events in the Middle East, and the Council had now an opportunity to respond to that appeal. The Finnish delegation believed that the Council could best do that by making it clear that no violations of the cease-fire could be condoned or justified and by calling upon the parties to co-operate constructively in the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement.

80. The representative of Nepal stated that the facts concerning the incident before the Council raised the question whether a Government, in the name of self-defence, was justified in launching air attacks on encampments in a foreign State and also whether a Government could claim immunity from responsibility for hostile armed activities carried out from its territory against another State. Nepal considered that no acts of reprisal had any justification; nor could a Government be absolved of its responsibility for attacks from its territory. Nepal felt, however, that the Council should consider the case under discussion in the context of the worsening situation in the Middle East and therefore insist on absolute respect for the cease-fire. The Council must also give its full support to all efforts towards the implementation of resolution 242 (1967).

81. The representative of Lebanon stated that the Armistice Agreement was still valid in law and that it was Israel which had unilaterally nullified it. After pointing out that there had been discussion to provide Israel with a guarantee of security, he stated that consideration must also be given to the security of the Arab Palestinians. The Council, and especially the four big Powers, must not ignore the root of the Palestinian problem and consider the future of the Palestinian people, who were the rightful owners of the land of Palestine. In any event, Israel's attack on villages in southern Lebanon had not

been provoked by the Lebanese Government, which was doing everything in its power to promote conditions of peace in the area.

82. The representative of Israel stated that the facts emerging from the debate had clearly shown that irregular forces from Lebanon had attacked civilian populations in Israel, which had found itself compelled to act in self-defence. Lebanon had disclaimed its responsibility for those attacks and its knowledge of the existence of the terror bases in its southern region. However, Lebanese newspapers had published regularly news about those terror organizations and their activities. Lebanon's contention that those activities were the actions of disgruntled refugees from Palestine was unconvincing and could not absolve it of its responsibility to control the activity of terrorist organizations in its territory. There would be complete tranquillity on its border, if Lebanon were to abide scrupulously by the cease-fire.

83. The representative of Zambia stated that the considerations which had guided his delegation in the discussion of the item were his country's friendly relations with both Israel and Lebanon and its conviction that force could not solve any problem. Peace between the two countries was also an essential consideration, and United Nations machinery existed to settle any conflict, provided both parties were prepared to use it instead of resorting to arms. Lebanon had reiterated its adherence to the Armistice Agreement. Israel, instead of resorting to that United Nations body, had acted unilaterally. His country was perturbed that one party to the dispute continued to exercise its policy of reprisals and to hold its neighbours responsible for attacks by Palestinians. With 150,000 refugees on its land, Lebanon was doing everything possible to respond to the United Nations appeal for assistance to Palestine refugees. Zambia felt that the Council should lend its support to the peace-loving countries, so that they could live without fear of attack from their militarily strong neighbours. Israel should be warned to use the existing international machinery instead of resorting to force.

84. In a letter dated 15 August (S/9392) addressed to the President of the Council, Israel charged that on the night of 14-15 August the village of Metullah had been hit by bazooka fire from Lebanese territory and saboteurs had crossed from Lebanon to Israel and had blown up water conduits and an electric pole near the Lebanese frontier.

85. At the 1502nd meeting of the Council, on 18 August, the President drew the Council's attention to a note of the same date by the Secretary-General (S/9393). In that note, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that on 16 August he had addressed to Israel and Lebanon identical letters on the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector, which was under discussion in the Council and involved serious breaches of the cease-fire. Because there had been no effective United Nations observation operation in that sector since June 1967, it had not been possible for him to provide the Council with accounts of incidents, including the recent ones under discussion in the Council: and he pointed out that lack of verified information could not but adversely affect the Council's consideration of the question. He therefore had proposed to both Governments that an adequate number of United Nations observers should be stationed on both sides to observe and maintain the Security Council cease-fire, as he believed that that would provide an important deterrent to further incidents. The Secretary-General added that if replies from both Governments were favourable, he would request the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to consult immediately with the two Governments and to recommend to him the number of additional observers which might be required and other necessary arrangements for their stationing on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon sector.

86. In a letter dated 18 August (S/9393/Add.1), the representative of Lebanon replied that since the Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949, observers of the Mixed Armistice Commission had been stationed on Lebanese territory enjoying full freedom of

operation, and that their status had not been altered by the June 1967 hostilities. Furthermore, the Armistice Agreement, which in Lebanon's opinion remained valid and applicable, contained no provision for unilateral termination of its application and, therefore, could not be revoked unilaterally. The representative of Lebanon added that whereas Israel, for more than two years, had not allowed the United Nations observers to operate on the Israel side of the armistice line, the Government of Lebanon had continued to adhere to the Armistice Agreement and would agree to strengthening its machinery.

87. In a letter dated 25 August (S/9393/Add.2), the representative of Israel replied that his Government's policy rested on reciprocal respect for the cease-fire, which had been disturbed in the Israel-Lebanon sector because terrorist groups operating from bases in Lebanese territory had carried out acts of armed violence in defiance of the cease-fire. Having accepted the cease-fire, Lebanon was responsible for preventing violations from its territory and for restoring the relative quiet previously existing in that sector. Regarding the Secretary-General's proposal for stationing United Nations observers, he stated that inasmuch as Lebanon, in its reply (S/9393/Add.1), had asked that the observers be stationed only within the framework of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, even though international policy since June 1967 had been to move beyond the cease-fire to a permanent peace, Israel found no point in studying the proposal in further detail. However, should Lebanon be willing to accept the proposal as defined in the Secretary-General's letter, the Government of Israel would then submit its views and would be willing to work for the effective reinforcement of the cease-fire in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

88. At the 1502nd meeting also, the representative of Colombia expressed his delegation's feeling that the current incidents on the Israel-Lebanon border had diminished the possibilities of conciliation. His Government felt that a policy of reprisal was contrary to international norms and ethics. It was also

painful because it involved the loss of lives of innocent persons. Violations of the cease-fire should be censured, regardless of their origin or reasons, and his delegation was ready to consider any measures that might be proposed to prevent the recurrence of similar events.

89. The representative of Paraguay stated that the events reported to the Council reflected the extension of the border clashes to an area which had, until then, been free of them. The Council's concern should be, first to restore calm in that area and, then, to renew its efforts for a lasting peace. That could be done through resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. However, the strict observance of the cease-fire was a basic condition. Israel and Lebanon should consider seriously the Secretary-General's proposal that United Nations observers be stationed on both sides of the border.

90. The representative of China stated that it was unfortunate that over two years had passed since the 1967 war without the restoration of peace to the Middle East. In fact, the situation had deteriorated, as the Secretary-General had indicated in his special report of 21 April 1969 (S/9171) on the ineffectiveness of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. The state of active warfare had now spread to a country which had not participated in the June 1967 war and which had shown moderation and restraint. Therefore, his delegation considered that the Israel air attack on Lebanon, taken as a retaliatory action, was contrary to the Charter. The Council must take measures to prevent further deterioration of the situation, and his delegation welcomed the proposal of the Secretary-General that United Nations observers be stationed in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

91. The President, speaking as the representative of Spain, said that Israel's aggression against Lebanon on the pretext of self-defence was unjustified and deserved condemnation. To try to place preventive war and reprisal within the framework of self-defence was contrary to the Charter of

the United Nations. Furthermore, Lebanon had complied with its international obligations and with the 1949 Armistice Agreement. His delegation considered that as long as the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remained unimplemented, there would always be a risk of incidents. Therefore, the Council must meet its responsibilities by adopting a resolution condemning Israel's premeditated attack against Lebanon and issuing a warning against a recurrence of those attacks.

92. At the 1504th meeting, on 26 August, the President announced that as a result of intensive consultation among Council members, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1498/Rev.1,

"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of Lebanon (S/9383),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

"Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life and property,

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

"Recalling the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949 and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolution 233 (1967) and 234 (1967) of 6 and 7 June 1967, respectively,

"Recalling its resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968,

"Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

"1. Condemns the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and Security Council resolutions;

"2. Deplores all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire;

"3. Deplores the extension of the area of fighting;

"4. Declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts."

Decision: *At the 1504th meeting, on 26 August 1969, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 270 (1969).*

93. Following the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government wished to reaffirm its support of the Secretary-General's proposal to station United Nations observers on both sides of the Lebanon-Israel border. Every outbreak of violence and every reprisal represented a setback to the efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. The deteriorating situation could be stopped not by exhortation or condemnation but by making the lasting settlement proposed in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) a reality.

94. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation had voted for the resolution in the interest of ending the violence impeding the work for peace in the Middle East. In his delegation's view the resolution lacked balance; nevertheless, it clearly established the Council's disapproval of all cease-fire violations, regardless of origin. The resolution had, therefore, referred not only to acts of military reprisals by one of the parties but to violent incursions made across the frontier from the territory of the other party. He added that the United States did not consider that the reference to the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement prejudiced the position of the parties, who held conflicting views regarding its status and continued validity.

95. The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution because it condemned any act of reprisal and believed that cease-fire violations, carried out by regular or irregular forces, were contrary to the interests of peace and needed to be condemned.

96. The representative of Finland stated that only by acting unanimously, as it had just done, could the Council make its influence felt. The Council also had made it clear that it could neither ignore nor condone violations of the cease-fire, regardless of whether they were committed by regular Israel forces or by irregular forces crossing the cease-fire line; therefore its decision should strengthen respect for the cease-fire. A major step towards preventing recurrence of violence in the area would be the acceptance by the parties of the Secretary-General's proposals to place United Nations observers in the area.

97. The representative of Paraguay stated that, in the opinion of his delegation, paragraph 2 and the expression "other grave violations of the cease-fire" contained in paragraph 4 should be clarified because of possible differences of interpretation in the future.

98. The representative of Paraguay stated that, in the opinion of his delegation, the responsibilities of respecting truce, armistice or cease-fire agreements had been defined in past resolutions adopted by the Council, and any breach of those responsibilities applied to all violations and deserved equal condemnation. For that reason, operative paragraph 2 should have included condemnation of all violations particularly with regard to its link to the preambular paragraphs.

99. The representative of Algeria stated his delegation would have wished the Council to go beyond the warning it had issued in its resolution 262 (1968) and take measures to give effect to its decisions. It must be stated that the present resolution was directed solely to Israel and the interpretations given to it subsequently would remain alien to that resolution. Also attempts had been made to question the struggle of the Palestine liberation movement. This meant denying the Palestinians their legitimate right to struggle for their self-determination.

100. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation had consistently main-

tained that any assertion by Israel of the so-called right of reprisal was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to international law. His delegation had supported the resolution, but it reserved its position on paragraph 2, because as it had stated previously, it did not consider that the alleged sporadic acts of terrorism were to be equated with the large-scale military attacks by Israel against the Arab countries.

101. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the resolution just adopted by the Council constituted a further moral and political defeat for Israel, whose guilt was not denied even by those delegations which had tried to place the aggressor's acts on the same level as the legitimate liberation struggle of the Arab peoples. The aggressive policies of Israel and its rejection of a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) were a threat to international peace.

(c) *Communications to the Council from 3 September 1969 to 12 May 1970 and requests for a meeting*

102. In letters dated 3 and 5 September, 6 October and 4 December 1969 (S/9429, S/9433, S/9465 and S/9530), Lebanon charged that its southern villages had been bombed and shelled by Israeli jet aircraft, resulting in casualties and damage and that on 3 October an Israeli helicopter-borne force had landed in a village inside Lebanese territory and had kidnapped three civilians and wounded four others.

103. In letters dated 5 September, 10 October and 15 December 1969 (S/9431, S/9470 and S/9556), Israel charged that villages on its border near Lebanon had been subjected to increasingly frequent attacks from Lebanese territory, in which rockets, mortars, bazookas and small arms had been employed, and that those attacks had resulted in casualties and property damage. It also charged that infiltrators had planted mines and abducted Israeli citizens.

104. In letters dated 3, 9 and 26 January 1970 (S/9590, S/9597 and S/9617), Lebanon complained of air attacks carried out by Israeli jet aircraft against several villages located in southern Lebanon. By a letter dated 12 January (S/9599), the representative of Lebanon transmitted the text of a note addressed on 10 January by Lebanon to the Governments of the four permanent members of the Security Council. The note stated that increasing acts of aggression had been accompanied by public threats by Israeli leaders against the security and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The violence was being directed against the civilian population and was no longer even based on the pretext of reprisals for acts by members of the Palestinian resistance movement for which Lebanon could not be held responsible.

105. The presence and activities of Palestinians in Lebanese territory were the direct result of the aggressive policy of Israel, which had provoked their exodus and which refused to comply with the decisions of the United Nations. Recalling that it had made specific denunciations of Israel's aggressions on each occasion to the Security Council, Lebanon added that, in placing the matter before the four Powers, which had special responsibilities in the Council, it was invoking not only its own legitimate interests but the elementary conditions of life for civilized mankind.

106. In letters dated 5 and 15 January (S/9593 and S/9604), Israel further charged that villages on its border area near Lebanon had been subjected to increasingly frequent attacks from Lebanese territory in which rockets, mortars, bazookas and small arms had been employed, resulting in casualties and damage to properties. After referring to Lebanon's letters of 9 and 12 January (S/9597 and S/9599), Israel stated that Lebanon was attempting to evade its responsibility for the increasing tension caused by continued aggression from Lebanese territory, which was serving as a base for the training of terrorist organizations. Those attacks appeared to have been carried out with the Lebanese Government's approval, in confor-

mity with an agreement concluded in Cairo on 3 November 1969 between the Government of Lebanon and the terrorist organizations. Lebanon had permitted those organizations to operate in and from its territory, and in those circumstances it could not shirk its responsibility for the deterioration of the border situation. Israel was obliged to take defensive measures for the protection of its territory and its population.

107. In letters dated 27 February, 4 and 10 March (S/9670, S/9678 and S/9691), Israel again charged that attacks against it from Lebanon had continued unabated and that Israel had to take action in self-defence. In letters dated 28 February and 7 March (S/9672, S/9683), Lebanon charged that its southern villages had been shelled by Israeli artillery and that Israeli forces had crossed the border to destroy civilian property and kidnap Lebanese civilians.

108. In a letter dated 17 March (S/9711), the representative of Lebanon stated that between the hours of 2 and 3 p.m. on the preceding day, Israeli artillery had shelled the heights situated between Rachayya-A-Fakhar and Kafrahamam and had repeated that following day its attacks against other villages in southern Lebanon. Israel had carried out those attacks in violation of the Armistice Agreement, which constituted a breach of international law.

109. By a letter dated 18 March (S/9713), the representative of Lebanon, after referring to the charges contained in his letter of 17 March, transmitted to the Council the text of a statement issued on 18 March by his Government, drawing attention to Israeli propaganda attempts, consisting of accusations and threats, to lead international opinion to view its violence against Lebanon as necessary acts of reprisal because of the presence and activity of the Palestinians. If the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon had become combatants struggling for their homeland, the statement continued, it was because Israel had always refused to implement the United Nations resolutions concerning their right to return to Palestine.

Israel had also refused to implement other United Nations resolutions adopted before and after the hostilities of 5 June 1967. To restore peace in the area it was essential that Israel should carry out its obligations under those resolutions and international law.

110. In a letter dated 25 March (S/9722), Israel stated that Lebanon, instead of recognizing its obligations as a Member of the United Nations, had served notice that it would support warfare against Israel, in violation of the Security Council cease-fire. Whatever Lebanon's internal situation might be, that should not affect its international obligation to prevent the use of its territory as a base of aggression. Israel could not leave its territory and its citizens undefended, and it was incumbent upon Lebanon to abide by its obligations under the Security Council cease-fire.

111. In a letter dated 10 May (S/9790), Israel charged that a series of attacks against it had been carried out recently from Lebanese territory. The letter supplied details of a number of attacks between 22 April and 10 May and stated that eight civilian and military personnel had been killed and seventeen wounded and that there had been considerable damage to property. As those attacks had been made from Lebanese territory, Israel held Lebanon responsible for those cease-fire violations and reserved its right to act in self-defence.

112. By a letter dated 12 May (S/9794), the representative of Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider a grave situation endangering the peace and security of Lebanon and the area. He charged that early that morning Israel armed forces had launched an invasion of southern Lebanon, penetrating its territory with armoured and infantry units and bombarding towns and villages by air force and artillery, in flagrant violation of the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement and the provisions of the Charter.

113. In a letter of the same date (S/9795), the representative of Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council

to consider attacks from Lebanese territory against its towns and villages, in violation of the Charter, adding that particulars of those attacks had been communicated previously to the Security Council.

(d) *Consideration by the Council at the 1537th to 1542nd meetings (12-15 and 19 May 1970)*

114. At the 1537th meeting, on 12 May, the provisional agenda, listing the letters of Lebanon and Israel (S/9794 and S/9795) under separate headings, was adopted. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and subsequently Morocco and Saudi Arabia, were invited, at their request, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

115. At the same meeting, the Secretary-General stated that he had been informed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that the Acting Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Commission had been informed by the Lebanese delegation that Israeli forces had launched an attack early that day on Lebanese territory in the general area of Mount Hermon. The Acting Chairman had also reported receiving information that the senior Israeli representative had stated in a telephone conversation with a Lebanese representative to the Commission that the current Israeli action in the El-Arkoub area was aimed at the destruction of *fedayeen* commandos and that it was not the intention of Israeli forces to act against the Lebanese army or population, provided that they did not support the *fedayeen*. The Secretary-General added that it was understood that, at the time of the above report, Israel ground forces, supported by artillery and air force, had reached El Khraibe and that action was continuing. The Secretary-General recalled his long but unsuccessful effort to increase substantially the number of United Nations observers on both sides of the border. His failure was one of the reasons for his lack of detailed information about the current action in the area.

116. The representative of Lebanon said that at 4.45 a.m. on 12 May, Israeli ground and air forces and heavy artillery had at-

tacked three districts in southern Lebanon, aiming their attacks at the civilian population and at the defensive positions of the Lebanese army, causing vast destruction of property and loss of life. Israel's current aggression had been preceded by threats in the past few months, in particular, a threat to turn southern Lebanon into an area of desolation comparable to that of the Suez Canal zone. He further charged that, since its attack on Beirut airport in December 1968, Israel had carried out numerous attacks against Lebanon. In its resolution 262 (1968), the Council had issued a solemn warning to Israel that if those acts were to be repeated the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions. The Lebanese Government that day had delivered to the Ambassadors of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States a note in which it placed on Israel full responsibility for the current acts of aggression on Lebanese territory and requested the Security Council, particularly its four permanent members, not only to condemn Israel but to find sufficient reason to impose on it respect for international law and the Charter. It would not be sufficient, the Lebanese representative continued, to adopt a resolution condemning Israel. In addition to a strong condemnation of Israel and the application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it was necessary to take positive action to secure the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Lebanese territory.

117. The representative of Israel stated that he had requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the armed attacks carried out from Lebanese territory against his country and its population. Israel had repeatedly drawn the Security Council's attention to the intensification of aggression from Lebanon. Since 1 April, there had been sixty-one acts of aggression against twenty-two Israeli villages and towns. Israel had called upon Lebanon to comply with its cease-fire obligations and also had asked organs of the United Nations Nations and Member States to apprise

Lebanon of the gravity of the situation. The acts of aggression, however, had not ended. On the contrary, they had grown in number, compelling Israel to act in self-defence. Its action on 12 May was directed solely against the concentration of terrorist organizations in south-east Lebanon, east of the Hasbani River. Israeli forces, whose mission was to comb the area of the terrorist squads, would leave the area on completion of their mission. Under the cease-fire and the United Nations Charter, Lebanon was responsible for armed attacks carried out from its territory against Israel and that responsibility was particularly evident in the light of the official agreements between Lebanon and the irregular forces operating from its territory against Israel. The representative of Israel stated that he had just received a *communiqué* from his Government declaring that the military operation had been concluded and that Israeli forces were deploying to leave the area.

118. The representative of Spain then proposed a draft resolution (S/9800) as an interim measure and asked that it be put to vote during the meeting. Other representatives took the view that the draft resolution should be put to the vote immediately. The draft resolution, which was supported by Zambia, read as follows:

"The Security Council

"Demands the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory."

119. The proposal to proceed immediately to vote on the Spanish draft resolution received 7 votes to 2, with 6 abstentions, and having failed to receive the required majority, it was not adopted.

120. The representative of Israel said that the draft resolution proposed by Spain was clearly divorced from reality. It would be unfortunate if the Council should then vote and adopt a draft resolution which was marked by an absence of equity and fail to recognize the facts of the situation.

121. The representative of Spain reiterated

that the draft resolution was only an interim measure submitted in view of the seriousness of the situation. Israel had acted in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which enjoined all Members to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State. His delegation had introduced the draft because a principle of the Charter had been violated, without prejudice to whatever further action the Council might decide to take.

122. The representative of the United States then proposed an amendment which would add the following phrase at the end of the draft resolution: "and an immediate cessation of all military operations in the area".

123. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed a sub-amendment to the amendment of the United States to add the words: "and stopping of Israeli aggression against Lebanon".

Decisions: *At the 1537th meeting, on 12 May 1970, the USSR sub-amendment was rejected by 3 votes to none, with 12 abstentions. The United States amendment was rejected by 2 votes to none, with 13 abstentions. The draft resolution submitted by Spain (S/9800) was adopted unanimously as resolution 279 (1970).*

124. At the 1538th meeting of the Council on 12 May, the representative of Morocco stated that, despite the warning given to Israel in the Council's previous resolutions, and despite the fact that the consequences of its action had been explained to Israel by some major Power, that State had deemed it fit to attack Lebanon and had issued a challenge to both the Council and the major Powers. In that respect, Israel seemed to have been encouraged by certain international circumstances which insured its impunity. Israel, at the same time, had been trying to provoke, in Lebanon, disturbances and conflict between Palestinians and the Lebanese Government. Those attempts had not been productive, because the Palestinians had reached an understanding with the Government of Lebanon to exercise their rights. The Council had already adopted a

resolution asking Israel to withdraw its troops. That was intended to put a stop to Israel's aggression. However, according to all information available to his delegation, the Israeli troops had not yet withdrawn. In that connexion, the Council was under an obligation to see that its resolutions were fully implemented, that aggression was not only stopped and condemned but that it did not recur. The Council must take effective action to achieve those aims and in that respect it should go beyond the present events and examine their long-range political implications.

125. The representative of Lebanon said that according to a communication he had just received from Beirut, Israel's forces had not shown any indication of withdrawing, as the representative of Israel had claimed. He said that his Government was grateful for the prompt action of the Council and that it was then for the Council to ascertain whether the Israeli troops were withdrawing as the resolution had demanded. Referring to the Secretary-General's proposal to station observers on both sides of the border, he said that Lebanon had agreed to strengthening the Armistice machinery but that Israel had refused for the last two-and-a-half years to allow observers to be stationed on its side of the border.

126. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the case before the Council was one of aggression by proxy. By its action, Israel had wanted the Arab States to suppress the Palestinians; but no Arab State would ever be able to suppress a people fighting for its homeland and establishing its right to self-determination, a right which he was glad to note was increasingly being recognized by the youth of Israel.

127. The representative of Israel said that his delegation had taken note of the fact that the Council had adopted a one-sided text that ignored the facts. The Council had refused to call for a cessation of all military operations in the area. He then said that the Israeli troops had stayed on Lebanese soil in order to avoid any shooting incidents at night.

128. The representative of Syria said that the Israeli representatives had claimed that the Israeli troops had not been able to withdraw because of the dark. However, the dark had not prevented the Israelis from attacking Lebanon. Israel must abide by the decision of the Security Council, otherwise the Council, acting under Article 40 of the Charter, would have to take account of Israel's failure to comply with the provisional measures. The representative of Syria then said that his delegation would appreciate it if the Secretary-General would communicate to the Council any reports which he might have received from UNTSO about the current situation in the area.

129. At the 1539th meeting of the Council, on 13 May, the Secretary-General stated that, because of the lack of adequate means of observation on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon sector, the acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO had been able to provide only limited information about military activities in the area. The Secretary-General also expressed his regret that he had not yet received any information from the acting Chief of Staff on the implementation of Security Council resolution 279 (1970), explaining that verification of reports was not possible in the absence of direct means of observation.

130. At the same meeting, a communication dated 13 May (S/9801), containing a statement by the Prime Minister of Israel, was read out.

131. After acknowledging receipt of the text of resolution 279 (1970), it stated that the Israeli operation, which had been carried out according to plan, had been concluded and that Israeli forces were deploying to leave the area. The forces involved in that defensive action had returned to their bases, and Israel continued to hold Lebanon responsible for all acts perpetrated from its territory.

132. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had not hesitated on the previous day to agree with the demand for withdrawal of Israeli troops from an

action which he could not possibly condone. However, the perpetration and intensification of conflict had made it urgent to find a way out of the current situation, and it was therefore time to redouble the efforts to bring about peace and justice in the area on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). His delegation hoped that the Big Four would be able to report to the Secretary-General soon, enabling the Secretary-General to ask his representative, Ambassador Jarring, to resume his consultations with the parties in the area.

133. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation was satisfied to hear the news of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. It could not condone the new attack on Lebanon, which had twice been the victim of attacks within the last two years. He hoped that the Council would continue its work towards peaceful conciliation and that the Big Four would resume their efforts for a speedy solution of the problem.

134. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that Israel aggression against Lebanon with American-made aircraft and scorched-earth and bombardment tactics was against all norms of international law and in defiance of the Security Council warnings which had twice been given to Israel. Instead of complying with resolution 242 (1967), Israel had continued its refusal to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territories. Israel had committed its new aggression on the pretext of fighting Arab patriots and resisters. However, if Israel were to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories, the question of resistance movement and guerrilla struggle would come to an end. Israel's new aggression had been strengthened by continuation of deliveries to it of the most modern American weapons and by official promises of future arms. It was no coincidence that during the discussion of that question in the Security Council, a parallel had been drawn between the Middle East and South-East Asia, where United States aggression had intensified, since Israel was striving to con-

duct that same policy of aggression and increase tension in the Middle East. However, world public opinion was decidedly against Israeli aggression, and the vote in the Council on resolution 279 (1970) had indicated that Israel must realize that its future lay in good neighbourly relations with the Arab States and not in fighting them. The Soviet Union was firmly in favour of a lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 242 (1967), and the only road to a peaceful settlement was the withdrawal of the aggressor from all occupied territories. The Security Council must also condemn Israel for its new act of aggression and must take further and more effective measures to call a halt to that aggression.

135. The representative of Finland said that violent incidents had been occurring daily in the Middle East to which the Security Council had responded only by recording them. It was currently meeting to consider a complaint of a large-scale incursion by Israel armed forces into Lebanese territory. It was indeed gratifying to see that the Council had unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. Condemnation of acts of violence in itself served nothing. The Council, however, had dealt with the symptom rather than the core of the problem. The latest Israeli raid had illustrated the breakdown of the international arrangements established in 1967 for cease-fire and for making peace. Consequently, the impact of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) the implementation of which formed the natural second stage after the cease-fire, was itself in danger of fading. To progress towards peace his Government had always supported the four-Power talks, because no genuine settlement on the conflict was possible unless it was backed by some measure of agreement among the permanent members of the Council. It was essential that the four Powers and the parties themselves should make a new effort to reverse the trend towards increasing violence and set in motion a process leading to a just and lasting peace in the area. The only effective way

to put an end to those kinds of attacks and all acts of violence in the Middle East was to work for a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.

136. The representative of Syria said that, while the attack on Lebanon by Israel was under consideration, it might be recalled that the General Assembly, under its resolutions 2535 (XXIV) and 2546 (XXIV), had given special responsibility to the Security Council. In its resolution 2535 (XXIV), the General Assembly, after drawing the Council's attention to the grave situation resulting from Israeli practices and policies in occupied territories, had requested the Council to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. In its resolution 2546 (XXIV), it had condemned Israeli policies and practices of collective and area punishment. The Council, therefore, must not miss the current opportunity to affirm the rule of law and to take effective measures against aggression.

137. The representative of Lebanon stated that Israel had claimed that its armed forces could not withdraw at night. However, at 3.30 a.m., that is, during the night, the Israelis were still bombing villages in southern Lebanon, and it had been confirmed that the Israeli air force had bombed and shelled Lebanon military positions and civilian centres during the night.

138. At the 1540th meeting, on 14 May, the representative of Zambia reminded the Council that his delegation had earlier condemned Israel's policy of punitive reprisals, which represented a disregard of the authority of the Council and established dangerous precedents. The new Israeli attack on Lebanese territory was a grave violation of the cease-fire and a further impediment to peace efforts. In spite of those efforts, there had been no progress towards a settlement. Since the four Powers had assumed the special responsibility of helping to promote a settlement, the situation had visibly deteriorated. His Government would urge the four Powers to make a serious

and deliberate effort to achieve a settlement and to help Ambassador Jarring to resume his duties.

139. The representative of Poland stated that his delegation's vote for the Spanish draft resolution—as a provisional measure dictated by the urgency of the development of the situation—was a clear indication of its condemnation of Israel's act of invasion against Lebanon. Israel's invasion was one of the links in the chain of aggression committed by Israel every day in the Middle East. The Council had heard Israel term its act a "clearing-out operation to rid the area of terrorists". That made the analogy between the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the American invasion of Cambodia obvious. Both from the point of view of the substance of the item and of its international implications, the Council was duty bound to take energetic and effective measures to condemn the aggression of Israel and to put an end to its geographic and qualitative expansion. The discussion had to touch the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the occupation by force of foreign territory as well as the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Poland maintained its support of a peaceful settlement and continued to believe that the primary condition for such a settlement was the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied after June 1967 and an end to the acts of aggression of Israel.

140. The representative of the United States said that a number of charges had been made with regard to starting the Middle East war. However, a large share of that responsibility would rest with Syria, which also had refused to accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The Council had met again because that situation had been further exacerbated. There had been more *fedayeen* attacks from Lebanon against Israel, and Israel had mounted a major military operation into Lebanon to end those attacks. His Government could not but oppose all acts of violence across frontiers in violation of the cease-fire from any source, and it believed that the only way to end the violence was to make an all-out effort to bring about a

peaceful political settlement of the conflict, starting with cessation of the cycle of attack and counter-attack and a restoration of an effective cease-fire on the Lebanese-Israel border. That could be done with the help of United Nations observers. The United States Government supported the Secretary-General's earlier suggestion to station observers in adequate number on both sides of the border between Israel and Lebanon and would urge that consultations should be renewed between the parties and the Secretary-General to that end. The United States continued to attach very great importance to Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity and could not condone any threat to its integrity from any source. At the same time, it supported Israel's independence and territorial integrity. It would use its influence with the parties to the conflict to reduce violence and tensions. In search for a lasting settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), his Government believed that all the parties should re-examine their attitudes towards what sort of peaceful settlement they were prepared to accept and should know that there could be no peace in the area until each of the parties concerned was prepared to abandon his maximum demands and agree to compromise solutions that served the interests of all. His Secretary of State and other United States spokesmen had stated that the United States supported the principle of withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in June 1967, in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and contrary to statements made earlier by the representative of the USSR was fully committed to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. The United States, as a party to the bilateral and four-Power negotiations, had shown willingness to accept suggestions of others on many points not identical to its own. The United States had exercised restraint by deciding not to respond favourably to Israel's request for additional aircraft and had hoped that such actions would inspire similar actions by the USSR. Instead the USSR had continued to move additional and more advanced weapons into

the area and had introduced a large number of its own military personnel directly into the area of conflict. The United States would make an appeal to the Soviet Union, Israel and its Arab neighbours, and to the Palestine Arabs, to join with it in a redoubled effort to bring about a just settlement of all the problems of the Middle East.

141. The representative of Burundi stated that his delegation could not condone Israel's policy of disproportionate reprisals, because the policy of conquest and infinite extension of war could not guarantee peace. His delegation could not but offer its sympathy and feelings to the victims of aggression and reiterate the demand that Israel should withdraw its troops.

142. The representative of Nepal said that his delegation, which had given its full support to the Council's demand for immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops, had received with satisfaction the Israeli declaration that its forces had been withdrawn from Lebanese territory. At the same time that it welcomed that news, the Nepalese delegation could not but express its strong disapproval of the action of a Member State in mounting a large-scale military incursion inside the territory of another Member State on the grounds of military reprisal. The Security Council had condemned punitive actions on several occasions. However, condemnation would, in itself, achieve nothing, and the Council should avoid running the risk of losing track of its goal set forth in the Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Under the circumstances, all members of the Council should support and encourage the process of reconciliation and peace, through the continuing talks between the four permanent members of the Council. In that respect his delegation was encouraged to learn that some definite proposals on certain vital aspects of the problem had been submitted and that the parties concerned had defined more precisely their position on those questions. His delegation also hoped that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, would soon be able to resume his mission.

143. The representative of Israel stated that he wished to inform the Council that a unit of irregular forces had penetrated from across the Lebanese border and had attacked the village of Manara with bazooka fire. The fire had been returned, and four of the attackers had been killed. He added that during the night before the village of Kfar Blum had been attacked by Katyusha rockets from two Lebanese villages and that early that day irregular forces had attacked an Israeli border patrol. These were the acts of hostilities, said the representative of Israel, that had compelled his Government to take action in the defence of its citizens and territory.

144. The representative of Nicaragua said that the willingness of Israel to comply with resolution 279 (1970) was a hopeful first step towards negotiations and agreement. The Council had heard charges and counter-charges of violations of international law. It was obvious that, if the situation was not normalized, it might result in a serious threat to international peace and security. It was also clear that partial solution could not contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace in the region. Therefore it was necessary that the resolution that the Council might adopt should urge the parties to resort to the means established by international law for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

145. The representative of Lebanon stated that in the area that Israel had occupied in its last military action, three Lebanese civilians and seven soldiers had been killed and three civilians and eighteen soldiers had been injured. There had also been considerable loss of property. It was clear that Israel's armed attack had not been directed against the Palestine freedom-fighters, as Israel had claimed, but against Lebanon itself, a State Member of the United Nations.

146. At the same meeting, a communication from the Secretary-General stated that the Acting Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had informed him that the complete withdrawal

of the Israeli forces from Lebanon had been officially confirmed by the Lebanese authorities and that the official time of the withdrawal of Israeli forces was given as 1030 hours GMT on 13 May.

147. The representative of Syria stated that the United States representative had mentioned that Syria had rejected resolution 242 (1967). However, in that respect, he would like to recall that there were cease-fire resolutions 235 and 236 (1967), which had been unanimously adopted by the Council long before resolution 242 (1967) had been adopted. Israel had disregarded those two cease-fire resolutions, with the help of the United Kingdom and the United States, and had been able to occupy the Syrian territory of the Golan Heights and still controlled it. Moreover, Israel, according to a statement of its Minister of Defence, had rejected resolution 242 (1967), and many of Israel's responsible personalities had reiterated Israel's intention to keep the occupied territories. Many reports received from General Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, had made it clear that Israel had initiated attacks and had violated the cease-fire. There had been many united resolutions condemning Israel for violating human rights in the occupied territories, as well as reports on that problem by Amnesty International and by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

148. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that if the United States was in favour of the total withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories, then that would provide the basis for reaching agreement. However, the question of so-called rectifications of frontiers referred to by the United States representative would give Israel *carte blanche* to demand frontier alterations, whereas resolution 242 (1967), had explicitly asked for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories. If agreement were reached by the four Powers on that key question of settlement—on immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories—agreement could

then be reached on other outstanding questions and a Middle East settlement could be worked out in a kind of package deal. The Soviet Union was in favour of the continuation of consultations between the four Powers, on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Although the United States representatives had tried to make out that the United States was opposed to the supply of arms to countries in the Middle East and that the Soviet Union was continuing arms deliveries, the fact was that the United States had not stopped supplying Israel with arms—which, under the terms of previous contracts, were flowing in abundance from the United States to Israel. That constituted direct assistance by the United States of America to the aggressor, support of his aggression and encouragement for Israel to undertake new adventures. The Soviet Union, for its part, was assisting the victims of aggression—namely the Arab States, part of whose territory had been seized by Israel. The United States proposal to stop arms deliveries before the achievement of a political settlement in the Middle East was designed to disarm the victims of aggression and leave the Arabs defenceless in the face of the military superiority of Israel, which was over-supplied with arms from the United States.

149. The representative of Israel said that the few casualties mentioned by the representative of Lebanon as a result of Israeli defensive actions had, in fact, been members of the terrorist organizations who had not laid down their arms in response to Israeli appeals. The structures demolished, which amounted to sixteen camps and bases, had been structures used by the irregular forces. Those forces had themselves issued press releases stating that they had been the target of the attack.

150. At the 1541st meeting, on 15 May, the representative of Colombia said that, in the case before it, the Council should look beyond the immediate conflict to consider stable solutions, because the interim measures could not, by themselves, eliminate the real cause of the conflict. The measures taken

by the Council in the past had not been complied with, and despite efforts by the Secretary-General and by the four Powers, the six-day war, which had been prolonged to three years, threatened to spread both in time and space. His delegation, therefore, would suggest that the proposal of Brazil to set up an *ad hoc* committee should be considered in that respect, concurrently with the four-Power talks. A three-member Council committee could be created to take note of the effort at negotiations made by the Secretary-General and could be given access to the political formulae of the great Powers to submit them to the Council in a series of proposed solutions to all aspects of the Middle East question.

151. The representative of Spain said that he was gratified by Israel's compliance with resolution 279 (1970) and recalled that in August 1969 the Council had had to meet to consider Lebanon's complaint because of the shelling of its villages by Israeli armed forces. Israel had submitted charges of armed attacks by Palestinian guerrillas against its territory. Spain deplored all violations of the cease-fire resolution, which often resulted in the loss of innocent lives. It might, however, be recalled that cease-fire resolutions were essentially of a temporary nature. It had been hoped that resolution 242 (1967) would be implemented without much delay, in order to give the Security Council time to prepare plans for a final solution. However, two and a half years had elapsed, and all efforts to implement it had so far failed. It was well known that the non-permanent members of the Council had been deeply concerned at the lack of progress in the four-Power talks. His delegation hoped that there would be some progress on those talks and that the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, would be allowed to resume his mission. The main cause of the current situation had been the lack of compliance with resolution 242 (1967). It was deplorable that an important decision of the Council remained unimplemented and that territories taken by force had not been vacated.

152. The representative of China said that his delegation had deplored the policy of retaliation, especially in the case under discussion, when it was directed against a country that had played a moderating role in the problem of the Middle East. After expressing his satisfaction at the withdrawal of Israel's troops from Lebanon in compliance with the Council's resolution 279 (1970), he urged the Council to look beyond the current conflict and to search for a final settlement. He pointed out that the situation was deteriorating very fast and that efforts to reach a peaceful settlement had not yet succeeded. He appealed to the parties concerned for compromise and conciliation and expressed his hope that it would be possible for the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, to continue his consultations.

153. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of France, said that the unanimously adopted resolution 279 (1970) was not a one-sided resolution but an expression of the collective will. The Council should continue to strive to bring similar agreement among its members which alone could help it in fulfilling the task entrusted to it. After referring to the military action against Lebanon, the representative of France stated that his country could not remain indifferent to what affected Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and integrity and, therefore, it considered Israel's intervention inadmissible, not only because it had been contrary to the Charter but also because it had escalated the conflict, making it more difficult to achieve a peaceful settlement. Expressing his delegation's satisfaction at the withdrawal of Israel's troops from Lebanon, he said that there was then a greater need for finding a political solution to the Middle East situation. His country was not among those who had resigned themselves to the prolongation of the Middle East war. What needed to be overcome was the atrocious fact of history which had pitted people against each other when they should have been brought together by every possible tie of a community of suffering, humiliation and

destruction. France believed that Israel had the right to exist and to secure guaranteed frontiers, but those frontiers could not be the frontiers of occupation and annexation. Israel, which owed its existence to the United Nations, must undertake unreservedly to apply resolution 242 (1967). That would be a great step towards settlement of the Palestinian problem. In that respect, the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, had not been futile, and the statements in the current debate had shown a large measure of agreement. His delegation hoped that discussion of the Lebanese complaint would advance the efforts that were being made at all levels to find a peaceful solution of the Middle East situation.

154. At the 1542nd meeting, on 19 May, the representative of Morocco said that on behalf of the Arab representatives to the United Nations he wished to submit an important statement to the Council. The Council would recall that the question of the supplying of weapons to Israel by the United States had been at the very heart of the Middle East situation. Many parties concerned had reiterated the gravity of such a step. The President of the United States himself had decided to suspend part of Israel's request for planes. However, the conditions surrounding that decision had caused concern and anxiety because the question had been open. There were, unfortunately, indications that the decision was now being reconsidered. As the Council was considering Israel's use of weapons to attack Lebanon, he, on behalf of the Arab delegations, wished to draw the attention of the Council to the serious and inevitable consequences that might result from such a decision. The strengthening of Israel's military power would necessarily compel the Arab countries to take into account the feelings and demands of their own people.

155. At the same meeting, the representative of Zambia stated that, as a result of consultations among members of the Council, a draft resolution (S/9807), reflecting to a large extent the views expressed in

those consultations, had emerged, which he was submitting to the Council as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1537,

"Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/9794) and of the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/9795),

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and of Israel,

"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from violations of resolutions of the Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 and 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969,

"Convinced that the Israeli military attack against Lebanon was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned in nature,

"Recalling its resolution 279 (1970) of 12 May 1970 demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory,

"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to abide by resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969);

"2. Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;

"3. Declares that such armed attacks can no longer be tolerated and repeats its solemn warning to Israel that, if they were to be repeated, the Security Council would, in accordance with resolution 262 (1968) and the present resolution, consider taking adequate and effective steps or measures in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter to implement its resolutions;

"4. Deplores the loss of life and damage to property inflicted as a result of violations of resolutions of the Security Council."

156. The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation would abstain on the draft resolution submitted by the repre-

sentative of Zambia. His delegation would have preferred to have a more balanced text which, while censuring the Israeli military action, should have issued a warning against frontier operations by Palestinian guerrillas. However, it was abstaining because it believed that the text of the draft resolution before the Council would not advance the cause of peace, as it did not incorporate any new ideas.

157. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the initial proposals in the consultations among the members of the Council had aimed at an unambiguous condemnation of Israel's action against Lebanon and the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. However, through the efforts of certain delegations, those important provisions had been eliminated from the draft resolution. None the less, the final text, which provided condemnation of Israel's attack and a warning of further effective measures if such an attack were repeated, might play a positive part in sobering the aggressor.

Decision: *At the 1542nd meeting, on May 19 1970, the draft resolution was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and United States of America), as resolution 280 (1970).*

158. After the vote, the representative of Finland said that the Council, while condemning Israel's armed attack against Lebanon, remained gravely concerned about all violations of Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, the members of the Council had expressed deep concern about the continuing deterioration of the situation and the Council's inability to come to grips with the problem. The parties to the conflict themselves had a primary responsibility to co-operate fully in any effort to set in motion the process of making peace. The debate of the last days in the Council demonstrated the strong hope of the members of the Council that the four Powers would intensify their efforts in order to facilitate and expedite the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and to enable the Special Representative to

resume at an early date his activities designed to promote agreement and assist in efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement.

159. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had always been prepared to condemn the escalation of violence, but they had not been prepared to vote for a draft resolution that could be considered one-sided. The Council had to take into account violations of Council resolutions, regardless of their source. It was regrettable that the Council had not been able to say anything in agreement about the future, because the aim of achieving a settlement must always be kept in mind. In that respect, the four-Power talks should not be frustrated but encouraged to proceed with all speed and with a greater sense of conciliation and urgency.

160. The representative of Syria said that, although his delegation had voted for the resolution just adopted by the Council, it wished to make it clear that the text had fallen short of what had been considered necessary to meet the situation. In his delegation's opinion, the resolution should have contained a reference to Chapter VII of the Charter. That had been omitted because it had been said that the Council would be unable to implement a decision based on Chapter VII. According to his delegation, such a view of the Council's incapacity would tend to undermine its authority for ever. Nevertheless, his delegation would interpret paragraph 3 to mean that the Council's next step would be under Chapter VII.

161. The representative of the United States, after reiterating his country's support for Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity, said that it condemned massive and disproportionate attacks such as that carried out by Israel against Lebanon on 12 May. His delegation, however, could not overlook the serious provocations from Lebanese territory that had preceded the attack, and it believed that the resolution just adopted was still unbalanced, not having taken sufficient account of the repeated cease-fire violations

from Lebanese territory that had resulted in numerous civilian casualties. His delegation's abstention from the vote should not be construed as equating those provocations with Israel's response. His delegation had abstained because it believed that adoption of a one-sided resolution would not be helpful to efforts to bring about a lasting settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), all the provisions of which must be implemented without reservation.

162. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation had great sympathy and respect for Lebanon and, although he had supported resolution 279 (1970), requesting Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory, he did not believe that the current resolution would facilitate the cause of peace. Its stipulations had already been expressed in the Council's previous resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969). Moreover, peace in the Middle East would not be achieved by piecemeal measures. The important thing was to settle the fundamental issues permanently and as a whole.

163. The representative of Poland pointed out that Israel had chosen in the past to ignore resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969), by which the Council had twice condemned its premeditated military attacks and warned that should they be repeated, the Council would have to consider more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter in order to enforce its decisions and to prevent such acts in the future. The latest defiance of Israel should not be tolerated by the Council. Any effort to preserve the "balanced approach" towards the aggressor and the victim of aggression could lead to further aggravation of the situation. Appropriate measures, in accordance with the provisions under Chapter VII, must be taken to make the aggressor feel the impact of the Council's condemnation of and curb its aggressive activities.

164. The representative of Israel said that the resolution had confined itself to his country's defensive action and had failed to mention the acts of aggression committed

against Israel from Lebanese territory. By that double standard, the resolution appeared to undermine further the Council's ability to deal with the Middle East question equitably and constructively.

165. The representative of Lebanon said that his delegation would have liked the Council to adopt a stronger and unanimous resolution. The Council appeared reluctant to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, thus allowing the aggressor to find sanctuary for its actions.

(e) Communications to the Council from 22 May to 15 June 1970

166. In a letter dated 22 May (S/9810), Israel stated that on that day a terrorist squad from Lebanon had ambushed a school bus transporting children from villages along the northern frontier of Israel, resulting in the death of seven children and two adults and wounding twenty-three children. In a letter of the same date (S/9811), Lebanon charged that Israeli artillery had begun a massive shelling that morning of four villages in south-eastern Lebanon, killing twenty persons and wounding forty. The letter stated that it was unprecedented for a State to claim the right of reprisal not only against the victims of its aggression but against the civilian population of a country in which they had taken refuge. Responsibility for the presence and activities of part of the Palestinian people in Lebanon rested, in the first instance, on Israel for its refusal to abide by United Nations resolutions and international law, and, in the second instance, on those members of the international community which had so far failed to take the necessary steps to ensure the implementation of those resolutions.

167. In a further letter dated 5 June (S/9822), Lebanon maintained that Israel had been deliberately and systematically continuing its aggression against Lebanon in violation of the Council's resolutions 262 (1968) and 280 (1970), the Charter, the Armistice Agreement and international law, as was evidenced by the daily crossing into

Lebanese territory of Israeli tanks, half tracks and armoured vehicles, the shelling of civilian centres and military targets and other specific incidents. As a result, the letter stated, 50,000 persons had been forced to seek refuge in other areas of Lebanon, and Lebanon believed that Israel was following a calculated plan aimed at occupying large sectors on the Syrian-Lebanese borders, using as a pretext the allegation that its forces were pursuing commandos.

168. In a letter dated 12 June (S/9834), Israel stated that it regretted that Lebanon was trying to complicate the situation on the Israel-Lebanon border still further by describing it in a false and tendentious way. Israel's policy, the letter added, rested upon respect for Lebanon's political independence and territorial integrity and non-intervention in its internal affairs; on negotiation and agreement on a final Israel-Lebanon peace settlement on the existing territorial basis; on scrupulous maintenance by both sides of the 1967 cease-fire; on a basis of reciprocity which included the unequivocal responsibility of the Lebanese Government to prevent armed attacks from its territory against Israel; and on the right of self-defence against attack by all appropriate means.

4. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire from 16 July 1969 to 15 June 1970

169. In supplemental information dated 31 July, 1 and 4 August 1969 (S/7030/Add. 291, 293, 297), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that aircraft of the MIG-19 and MIG-21 type had that day attacked Israeli forces positions on Mount Hermon and that a few minutes later Mirage aircraft had crossed the cease-fire lines. Observers reported also exchange of artillery and machine-gun fire.

170. In a letter dated 1 August (S/9371) Syria charged that on 30 July six Israeli aircraft had bombed Syrian positions and that a complaint about the attack had been

submitted to the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Commission.

171. In a letter dated 6 August (S/9379), Israel referred to the Syrian letter of 1 August (S/9371) and stated that in recent weeks Syria had increased its acts of aggression along the cease-fire line and had also pledged itself to wage a war of attrition. Israel therefore had been compelled to take self-defence measures.

172. In a letter dated 8 August (S/9381), the representative of Syria stated that the official Israeli statements, as quoted by the news media and a report by *The New York Times* on 4 August 1969, indicated that Israel had made a firm decision to retain most of the area occupied by it in 1967, including the Golan Heights.

173. In a letter dated 19 August (S/9398), Israel charged that saboteurs from Syrian territory had crossed the cease-fire line and had fired bazooka shells in the direction of a United Nations observation post. It added that, during that attack, Captain H. W. J. Leask, a United Nations military observer, had been injured by glass splinters and that two United Nations vehicles had been damaged.

174. In the period from 19 August to the end of December 1969, the Secretary-General circulated a number of supplemental information reports on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.312, 315, 318, 320, 329, 347, 403, 412, 424, 432, 447, 449, 451, 453, 455, 456, 464, 467, 469 and 471). In general, the reports related to occasions when observers had seen aerial activity involving Israeli Mirage jets and Syrian MIG-21 jets, exchanges of small-arms and machine-gun fire and crossings of the cease-fire line. Towards the end of the year the reports indicated the use of mortar and tank fire and occasionally noted minor damage to United Nations observation posts.

175. In a letter dated 1 October (S/9459), Syria charged that Israel was deliberately

pursuing the demolition of Syrian villages and the colonization of Arab lands with intensive settlement. The letter stated that between 18 September 1968 and 13 July 1969, Israeli authorities had demolished no less than seventeen new Syrian villages in the occupied Golan Heights. A listing of the names and locations of Israeli settlements built on the ruins of those villages was annexed to the letter. Another annex contained excerpts from an article published by the *Christian Science Monitor* on 23 September concerning reported Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights.

176. During the months of January and February 1970, the Secretary-General circulated additional supplemental information on the Israel-Syria sector from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.482, 488, 491, 492, 499, 501, 503, 505, 507, 509, 511, 517, 519, 521, 524, 527, 529, 531, 533, 535, 544, 545, 547, 549, 553, 556, 558, 565 and 568). Those reports indicated intensification of firing incidents and, in particular, increased aerial activity. There were also reports of occasional firing close to the United Nations observation posts and minor damage to United Nations installations.

177. In a letter dated 2 February (S/9634), Israel stated that Syria was intensifying its aggression. It charged that more than sixty armed attacks had been carried out by Syrian forces in violation of the cease-fire during January and stated that the attacks employing mortars, rockets, artillery and bazookas, were continuing, as were mining raids and air overflights. In a further letter dated 11 February (S/9646), Israel stated that Syria's Minister of the Interior and his country's chief delegate to the Rabat Conference had stated at that Conference on 19 December that "there was no alternative to struggle" and that "all Arab States participating in the Conference should place all their economic, political and military capabilities in the service of that objective". Israel added that that policy was translated into action through the continued initiation by Syrian regular forces of armed attacks against Israel and through the Syrian Gov-

ernment's support for, and participation in, the terrorist warfare pursued by irregular forces.

178. In a letter dated 9 February (S/9643), Syria drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the continuation and intensification of aggression by Israeli regular armed forces against it and added that, contrary to Israeli allegations in its letter of 2 February (S/9634), Israeli forces had begun in January a campaign of terror against Syrian villages, population and cities. The letter further charged that Israeli military aircraft had flown over Syrian cities, producing supersonic boom and terrorizing the population.

179. During the period from 1 March to 15 June, the Secretary-General circulated supplemental information from the Chief of Staff on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector (S/7930/Add. 571, 574, 576, 578, 580, 582, 584, 586, 588, 590, 594, 596, 599, 601, 603, 607, 609, 612, 616, 618, 620, 623, 625, 627, 629, 631, 633, 635, 639, 641, 647, 649, 651, 653, 655, 658, 660, 662, 664, 666, 667, 669, 672, 673, 675, 677, 679, 681, 683, 685, 687, 689, 691, 693, 695, 697, 700, 702, 704, 706, 708, 710, 712, 714, 716, 718, 720, 722, 724, 725, 727, 729, 731, 733, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 747, 748, 750, 751, 753, 756, 758, 761, 763, 765, 767, 769, 771, 773 and 775). The communications continued to report that incidents involving the use of artillery, tank, mortar, and rocket fire were taking place on an almost daily basis and that aerial activity had increased.

180. In a letter dated 16 March (S/9706) Israel charged that Syrian aggression was continuing and that armed attacks by regular forces from Syrian territory had intensified in recent days, causing loss of life and damage. Since the beginning of 1970, the letter added, there had been 148 Syrian attacks and, in the preceding four days, those attacks had resulted in the death of three Israeli soldiers and the wounding of twelve. In a further letter dated 30 March (S/9727), Israel charged that on 23 March Syrian armed forces had crossed the cease-fire line and clashed with Israeli forces. Eight of the

attackers had been killed, and their bodies had been returned to Syria through the International Red Cross. The letter also stated that on 27 March the Syrian regular army had carried out another attack on an Israeli military position during which one Israeli soldier had been killed and another wounded.

181. In a letter dated 3 April (S/9736), Syria charged that Israeli air force and army units had attacked Syria and that Syrian air force and ground army units had had to take action in self-defence. Sixteen Syrian soldiers had been killed and thirty-seven others wounded as a consequence of that attack. Israeli forces had also attacked Syrian towns and villages, killing a number of civilians, including women and children, and destroying a number of houses. The letter added that Israel's violations of the cease-fire from 1 January until 18 March totalled 1,045.

182. In a letter dated 6 April (S/9739), Israel stated that its defence action on 2 April was aimed at Syrian military targets and that its objective was to thwart Syria's aggressive actions, which had intensified in recent weeks, as had been reported in its letters of 11 February and 16 and 30 March.

183. In a letter dated 5 June (S/9823), Syria, referring to its letter of 9 February (S/9643) regarding the annexation by Israel of occupied Syrian territory, stated that, according to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on 1 June, Israel had approved a \$48 million five-year plan to expand Israeli settlement in the Golan Heights. That new manifestation of Israeli illegal military occupation, the letter added, violated Security Council resolutions 235 (1967) and 236 (1967), the Charter, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and all of the General Assembly's humanitarian resolutions. The situation again was attributed to the support Israel continued to receive from the United States Government.

B. Question concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories and related matters

184. During the period covered by this report, the Security Council received a number of communications from Arab countries concerning the treatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war in territories occupied by Israel and the replies sent by Israel.

185. In a letter dated 26 September 1969 (S/9456), Jordan complained that the people of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Beit Sahur had been subjected to intimidation, economic strangulation, arbitrary arrest and torture. The Israeli Army had spoiled goods in stores, deported people to the East Bank, blown up houses and imposed a curfew for twenty-two hours a day.

186. Israel replied on 7 October (S/9466) that, after a series of acts of sabotage in the areas of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Beit Sahur, causing the death of several civilians, Israeli authorities had been compelled to take preventive and police measures to ensure the safety of the population.

187. By a letter dated 15 October (S/9474), the United Arab Republic charged that one of its citizens who was a member of the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, had been subjected to illegal arrest and arbitrary trial in disregard of the immunities enjoyed by officials of the United Nations.

188. In a reply dated 17 October (S/9478), Israel stated that the person in question had been duly tried and convicted for several security offences falling outside her official duties and that the Court had dismissed as inapplicable the contention that she was immune from prosecution under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

189. In three communications dated 10, 21 and 25 November (S/9501, S/9507 and S/9511), the representative of Jordan trans-

mitted the texts of articles published in the London *Times* and *Sunday Times* concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israeli-held territories, which, he said, showed the intensification of measures of collective punishment inflicted by Israel on innocent civilians. He also transmitted the texts of some "letters to the editor" published by the *Times* on the same subject. Israel replied by transmitting on 18 November (S/9506) the texts of other "letters to the editor" appearing in the same newspaper on the treatment of civilian populations and on 19 December the text of a letter addressed to the *Sunday Times* from the Embassy of Israel in London (S/9575).

190. In communications dated 23 and 30 January, 6 and 9 February 1970 (S/9614, S/9639, S/9629 and S/9642), Syria charged and Israel denied that two Syrian pilots had been ill-treated while imprisoned in Israel. Syria complained that the ill-treatment, which was in violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of War Prisoners, had taken place between the visits by representatives of the International Red Cross in territories occupied by Israel. It quoted excerpts from a published letter of the Secretary-General of Amnesty International and from General Assembly resolution 2456 (XXIV) to support its charges. Syria further charged that Israel had refused to permit the representatives of the Secretary-General to visit the occupied areas in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) and 259 (1968). It had also refused to allow a visit by the Special Working Group of Experts established by the Commission on Human Rights to investigate violations of human rights in occupied territories or by the three-member Committee established under General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII). Israel, for its part, denied the charges of ill-treatment and stated that the conditions of detention of the two Syrian pilots were in full accord with the provisions of the above-mentioned Geneva Convention. The Syrian charges were an attempt to divert attention from the situation created by membership in the Security Council of a

Government which persisted in violating provisions of the Charter. With regard to visits to Israeli-held territories by a representative of the Secretary-General, the Special Working Group of Experts or the three-member Committee, Israel stated that it had no objection to visits by such representatives provided they also investigated the question of oppression of Jews by Arab régimes.

191. In a letter dated 9 June (S/9832 and S/9833), Israel noted a statement by the Foreign Minister of Somalia to the effect that his country considered itself at war with Israel and pointed out that Somalia was one of three members of the United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories established under General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII). Another member of that Committee was Yugoslavia, which had broken relations with Israel and openly identified itself with the political positions of the Arabs States. It also noted (S/9841) a declaration on 14 June by the Prime Minister of Ceylon, announcing that diplomatic and other relations with Israel would be suspended until the settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries. The Foreign Minister of Israel had stated the following day that Ceylon's decision encouraged all the extremist factors that were rendering peace in the Middle East more distant. Israel asserted that the three-member Committee, which was composed of three States inimical to Israel, had been functioning as a tool of Arab propaganda since its illegal establishment during the twenty-third session of the General Assembly and that its activities were devoid of all moral or legal validity.

C. *Communications concerning the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places*

(a) *Communications to the Security Council concerning the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem*

192. In a letter dated 21 August 1969 and addressed to the President of the Security

Council (S/9401), Jordan stated that at 7.20 that morning fire had broken out in the Al Aqsa Mosque, lasting for more than three hours and causing complete destruction of the southern part of the ceiling and the twelfth-century pulpit and severe damage to the walls. The letter added that Jordan held Israeli authorities responsible, as that act had taken place when the Holy City and all the Western Bank were under Israeli military occupation. Jordan asked the Security Council for effective measures against Israeli authorities who had failed to show any regard for the United Nations resolutions concerning Jerusalem.

193. In letters dated 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 August and 2 September the representatives of Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, Pakistan, India, Syria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, the USSR and Maldives (S/9404, S/9402, S/9412, S/9409, S/9413, S/9415, S/9418, S/9422, S/9426 and S/9435), respectively, expressed the shock and grief felt by the people and Government of their respective countries at the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque.

194. By a letter dated 12 September (S/9447), the representative of Jordan forwarded to the Security Council the texts of seventeen communications by heads of States and officials of Governments and the texts of fifty-eight other communications conveying world-wide shock and dismay at the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque.

(b) Request for a meeting of the Council

195. In a communication dated 22 August addressed to the Secretary-General (S/9407), the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Yemen drew the attention of the Members of the United Nations to the grave event of 21 August 1969 in Jerusalem, when the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of the holiest shrines of Islam, had been extensively damaged by

arson. They added that the occurrence of that outrage while Jerusalem was under the military occupation of Israeli authorities had filled the population of their countries with profound horror and grief. After stating that the occurrence of such events aggravated further the threat to peace, they emphasized the urgency of suitable action by the United Nations towards (a) instituting an impartial investigation into the grave events resulting in fire; (b) preventing the recurrence of any act of vandalism of the Holy Places in Jerusalem; and (c) enabling the representatives of Governments of Islamic countries to assess the damage to the Al Aqsa Mosque and to prepare and execute plans for its repairs.

196. Pursuant to the above communication, the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Yemen, in a letter dated 28 August addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/9421 and Add.1 and 2), requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the grievous situation resulting from the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem".

(c) Consideration by the Council at the 1507th to 1512th meetings (9-15 September 1969)

197. At the 1507th meeting, on 9 September 1969, the Security Council included the above request in its agenda. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Indonesia, Israel and the United Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At subsequent meetings, similar invitations to participate without vote were extended to the representatives of Ceylon, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Somalia.

198. At the same meeting, the representative of Pakistan stated that never before had

the Council considered a question which transcended the conflict of national interests and constituted a set-back for human civilization itself. In considering the item, therefore, the Council could not but view it in the perspective of civilization as a whole. The confidence that vandalism against the monuments of human spirit had become unthinkable was shattered on 21 August when, under the military occupation of Israel, the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque had been damaged by arson. Although the intention of submitting the question of the fire in Al Aqsa to the Council was not to prejudge the issue of criminal responsibility or imply the complicity of Israeli authorities in that act, it could not be denied that the environment produced by Israel's military occupation of the Holy City provided an element of encouragement to those responsible for the crime. But for Israel's military occupation, carried out in defiance of the Security Council and the General Assembly resolutions, it was inconceivable that conditions would have prevailed permitting such an act.

199. After giving a brief account of the historical and religious importance of the Holy City of Jerusalem to Moslems all over the world, the representative of Pakistan stated that, in considering the incident of 21 August, the Security Council would recall that the United Nations Charter did not allow acquisition of territory by force and that that principle was specially applicable to Israel, whose very establishment was founded on a resolution of the United Nations. The withdrawal of Israeli control from the Old City of Jerusalem was imperative, if the conflict in the Middle East was not to be allowed to become uncontrollable. That conflict was already grave, and the addition to it of a conflict involving the cherished sensibilities of vast populations from all parts of the world would make it limitless in its repercussions. Although the signatories of the two communications to the Security Council (S/9407, S/9421) covered a wide range of nations and peoples with different geographical locations and foreign policies, they were, however, all united on the

proposition that Jerusalem should not be annexed by Israel. That stand was in accordance with Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969), which had confirmed that all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel to alter the status of Jerusalem were invalid.

200. Taking into consideration the above resolutions and the repercussions felt throughout the world, particularly in the Islamic communities, the Council's response to the outrage of 21 August must be to take urgent measures to prevent any recurrence of that event. Those measures should not be limited only to the Holy Places, because they formed an integral part of the City of Jerusalem and their sacred character could not be preserved for any length of time if Jerusalem itself continued to remain under military occupation. Security Council's action must, therefore, be directed towards releasing Jerusalem from its current agony.

201. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that the crime perpetrated against Al Aqsa Mosque on 21 August had caused shock and grief throughout the world, as Al Aqsa, being one of the most sacred shrines of Islam, formed part of the spiritual and cultural heritage of humanity. The widespread repercussions of that act had aggravated further the threat to international peace and security.

202. The sacrilege of the Al Aqsa Mosque also demonstrated the duplicity of the Israeli pronouncements. During previous consideration of the question of the status of Jerusalem, the representative of Israel had stated at the Council's 1482nd meeting, on 30 June 1969, that his Government had drawn plans for the preservation of Jerusalem's historical monuments and religious shrines. In view of later developments, Jordan's warning about the ominous aspects of Israel's so-called plans had become all too justified. Already, Israel had taken measures against a number of public buildings, including a mosque, a religious court and a Moslem school, alleging that they were threats to public security. Because of its policy and

attitude to Arab Jerusalem and its holy shrines, Israel must be held responsible for the act that took place on 21 August against the Al Aqsa Mosque.

203. Israel had been carrying out its policy of destroying Arab houses of long standing religious learning and education for a long time, and parallel to that was a campaign of official and unofficial pronouncements with the avowed purpose of erecting the Temple of Mount at the site of the Al Aqsa Mosque.

204. The offence committed against the Al Aqsa Mosque was another addition to Israel's series of offences against peace and humanity, which included the denial of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine and a policy of resorting to force to further its expansionist aims as had been done in 1948, 1956 and 1967. Instead of withdrawing from the territories it had occupied by force, Israel had made their annexation its official policy, as could be testified by many official statements, including that of its Defence Minister and that of the ruling party in Israel. Moreover, that policy of annexation was not confined to mere verbal declarations. Plans had been drawn and put into effect to establish new settlements in Israeli-occupied areas. Israel also had committed gross violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention concerning the civilian population of those territories. Its oppressive measures included the arrest, detention, torture, dispossession and expulsion of Arab civilians from their homes and the deportation of their leaders.

205. Israel also had continued its defiance of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the question of the status of Jerusalem. For that reason, the burning of Al Aqsa could not be treated in isolation. It was inherently linked to the continued Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the various measures taken by that State in defiance of United Nations resolutions. It was obvious, therefore, that there would be no safety as long as the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem continued. Moreover, Israel's

policy of occupying Arab territories by force and its refusal to withdraw from those territories had created a situation fraught with grave dangers for international peace and security. In the light of such a situation it was imperative that all Member States should repel aggression and bring the aggressor back into the realm of international authority. Any assistance, military or economic, given to Israel would only abet the aggressor. It was therefore necessary that more effective measures, including application of sanctions, should be taken by the Security Council to bring about full implementation of the United Nations resolutions, the restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the complete termination of Israeli aggression.

206. The representative of Indonesia stated that the people of his country had been shocked on receiving news of the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque. In a telegram to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, the Indonesian delegation had already requested measures to establish an impartial investigation, to prevent recurrence of the 21 August event and to enable representatives of the Government of Islamic countries to assess the damage and to prepare plans for the repair of the Mosque.

207. The Indonesian Government was ready to take an active part in the rebuilding of the Al Aqsa Mosque and had donated one million rupiahs for that purpose. In addition, voluntary contributions had been made for reconstruction of the Mosque. That spontaneous help by the Indonesian people was symbolic of the feeling of solidarity for the cause of Palestinian Moslems who still lived in the shadow of continued war and misery. It could not but be emphasized again that the fire at Al Aqsa could not be separated from the military occupation of Jerusalem, which had been repeatedly deplored and condemned by the Security Council, more recently, in its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969). In defiance of those resolutions, Israel had carried out certain measures in Jerusalem, and the Council had also heard charges of acts of demolition and desecration.

The extent of those charges could not be determined because Israel had refused to allow the special representative of the Secretary-General to make an impartial survey of the situation. In the light of that situation, it was all the more necessary that the Security Council should take immediate steps to have its resolutions concerning Jerusalem fully implemented.

208. The representative of Israel stated that his Government shared the sense of shock at the damage caused to the Al Aqsa Mosque and had promised already that its swift repair would be carried out as soon as possible. However, all decent public opinion had been revolted at the false accounts of that tragic occurrence and its deliberate exploitation for political purposes. His delegation believed that a number of the Moslem States requesting Security Council consideration of the matter had done so only out of genuine concern for a Moslem holy place, without any desire to increase tension.

209. As in the case of natural calamity, when the inherent understanding of human beings for each other's distress came to the fore, there were elements of precisely the same understanding in the case of the fire on 21 August 1969 in the Al Aqsa Mosque. Both Arabs and Jews had striven side by side to overcome the fire. Arab-Jewish co-operation continued in efforts to apprehend the person responsible for the fire, and the official inquiry into the circumstances of the fire was being conducted by a commission composed of Arab and Jewish personalities, before which Arab and Jewish witnesses were appearing in an endeavour to ascertain the facts.

210. The representative of Israel then gave an account of the events of 21 August, when the fire at the Al Aqsa took place. He said that the Prime Minister of Israel and the Israeli Cabinet, which had met urgently in a special session, had issued statements expressing deep regret at the outbreak of fire in the Holy Mosque and the readiness of the Government of Israel to give all aid and co-operation necessary for the repair and

restoration of those parts of the building that had been damaged. The official communications also expressed revulsion at the efforts to attribute to Israeli culpability for causing the fire. The President of the Supreme Court of Israel had appointed a commission of inquiry. A preliminary investigation made by Arab engineers had indicated arson.

211. On 22 August, an Australian visitor, Michael Rohan had been arrested by the Israeli police on the basis of evidence submitted by the Moslem guards at the Al Aqsa Mosque, and formal charges had been filed against him.

212. The representative of Israel then stated that those were the facts that the Israel Government wished to put before the Council. Its own reaction had been summed up in his Foreign Minister's statement of 24 August, in which he has said that the Al Aqsa was a part of the universal culture and, as a result of damage to it, that a part of the human legacy had been injured and that everything must be done to restore it as far as possible to its full splendour. It was in that spirit that the Security Council must consider the incident, and its action must not cause further division and hostility. The Arab population in Jerusalem, which was shocked by the fire in the Al Aqsa, had remained calm, despite attempts by some groups, prompted by foreign broadcasts, to exploit the situation. Their leaders had expressed their satisfaction at the measures taken by the Israeli authorities and the progress that had been made with regard to investigation of the fire. The Jerusalem Moslem Council had established an Al Aqsa Repairs Committee, which had announced the creation of a special fund for repairs and had also considered what further security measures might be taken to protect the Mosque quarter. For its part, the Israeli Government was prepared to make available all necessary assistance, including the admission of experts from abroad.

213. At the 1508th meeting of the Council on 10 September, the representative of Algeria stated that the burning of the Al

Aqsa Mosque had raised once again the problem of the occupation of Arab territories and the need to deal urgently with the Palestinian conflict in its true context. It would be useless merely to deplore the new crime if steps were not taken to achieve peace based on justice. It was obvious that Israel, after its totalitarian and massive eviction of the Palestinian people, had begun a new stage in the execution of its programme of wiping out all traces of Arab-Islamic civilization. As statements of Zionist personalities indicated, Israel was continuing to cultivate the messiano-theological spirit which had permeated the atmosphere before the fire at Al Aqsa. Israeli propaganda had found in religious fanaticism a way of recruiting persons who were ready to carry out sinister undertakings. A fanatical group of persons, under the name of The Church of God, had held a general assembly in Israeli-occupied territory and had perpetrated the idea of building the Tabernacle of David at the site of the Al Aqsa.

214. Israel had continued systematic destruction of entire villages and of buildings that had been the glory of Jerusalem, and it had continued the oppression of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. The people of Palestine were left with no alternative but to undertake an armed struggle against the continued and oppressive occupation of their country. The military occupation by Israel also entailed risk of endangering international peace and security. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Security Council to ensure that its resolutions were implemented scrupulously and that concrete steps were taken to follow up its decisions. The ineffectiveness of the Council was due essentially to the attitude of the United States, which, despite its obligations under the Security Council decisions, had continued to give Israel the most modern weapons to crush the Palestine liberation movement. Nevertheless, there was growing understanding and sympathy for the Palestinians throughout the world, as was evident from the many countries that had requested the Council to consider the item under debate.

215. The representative of India stated that the act of vandalism that had caused fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque had been condemned throughout the world, including his country. The Prime Minister of India had stated further that the damage to Al Aqsa had increased tension in the area, which could have worldwide repercussions.

216. India, with its firm belief in secularism, had felt especially grieved at the desecration of a place of worship, and numerous and religious leaders of many faiths had expressed their profound shock. Nevertheless, it must not be believed that the question before the Council was a religious issue. Any attempt to create such a diversion would do incalculable harm and present fresh difficulties in solving the west Asian problem. India considered that the incident was a direct consequence of the illegal occupation by Israel of Jerusalem and other Arab areas. Israel thus could not be absolved of its responsibility for the incident of 21 August.

217. Although the Council had under its consideration a specific complaint, the question raised therein had wider implications and concerned the juridical status of Jerusalem. Under General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) and Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969), Israel had been asked to desist from taking actions that would tend to change the status of Jerusalem. Those and other resolutions had reaffirmed the principle that territory could not be acquired by military conquest. Thus, as long as Israel continued its current policy of defiance and refused to withdraw from the occupied territories, the tension in west Asia would increase, posing a threat to peace and security far beyond the Israel-Arab borders. The current episode had brought out more forcefully than ever before the need to make Israel carry out fully and faithfully the various United Nations resolutions.

218. The representative of Somalia stated that the violent reaction throughout the Moslem world to the Al Aqsa catastrophe

could be understood only if one were to realize the strong spiritual and emotional ties that Moslems attached to that holy shrine. The Security Council must take note of all those demonstrations concerning Al Aqsa, because they made clear that the problem of Jerusalem transcended national frontiers and was of vital concern to Moslem communities throughout the world.

219. The burning of Al Aqsa could be considered only against the background of the attitudes and actions of Israeli authorities in the occupied territories. There had been protests, including one submitted to the representative of the Secretary-General, against Israel's demolition and desecration of places of worship in old Jerusalem. Israeli excavations in the area of the Mosque to uncover the Temple of Solomon had assumed a provocative character when a prominent group of Israelis had declared their intention to restore the temple of Judaism on the site of the Al Aqsa Mosque. Moreover, he continued, the statement of Sheikh Hilmi Al Muhtasib, Chairman of the Supreme Moslem Council in Jerusalem, had declared that the fire in Al Aqsa had been caused deliberately and that the Israeli firemen and police had been less than helpful in extinguishing the fire. The second statement of the Supreme Moslem Council also expressed dissatisfaction with the work of Israeli authorities in extinguishing the fire and decided to establish an Arab committee of investigation. It also raised the question of the position of Holy Places vis-à-vis the status of Jerusalem.

220. The Somali representative then recalled that Israel had been asked to rescind all measures taken to change the status of Jerusalem. Moreover, all questions concerning Jerusalem could not be considered in isolation from the situation resulting from Israel's aggression of 1967. There could be no hope of peace until Israel had withdrawn its troops from the areas it had occupied. As for the immediate question of the Al Aqsa fire, the Somali delegation would urge the United Nations to conduct an impartial investigation into the grave events of 21 August

1969 and would like the Security Council to recognize that any acts of destruction or desecration of the Holy Places were likely to endanger international peace and security.

221. At the same meeting, the representative of Israel said that in his statement at the previous meeting he had quoted the principal points from the statement of Sheikh Hilmi Al Muhtasib, the President of the Jerusalem Moslem Council. The excavation to which the representative of Somalia had referred as affecting the sacredness of Al Aqsa and its compound were the repair work carried out by the Moslem Wakf on the dome of the Mosque, which had been damaged during the 1967 hostilities, when the Jordanian army had used it for its machine-gun emplacements. Israel's official position was to respect and preserve all holy shrines of all religions and it recognized that it was natural and legitimate for Moslem States and communities to have special interests in the restoration of the Al Aqsa Mosque.

222. At the 1509th meeting, on 11 September, the representative of Somalia stated that in referring to his previous statement the representative of Israel had again omitted some relevant points from the statements of Sheikh Hilmi Al Muhtasib, to which he had drawn the attention of the Council, namely, that the Sheikh had commented on the ineffectiveness of Israeli firemen in extinguishing the fire and had pointed out that it had finally been extinguished by Arab firemen brought from distant towns. Moreover, the Israeli representative's claim that his Government had taken all necessary precautions to protect the holy shrines was contradicted by a statement on 21 August of the Supreme Moslem Council which had declared that Israeli authorities had desecrated the Holy Places many times, including a recent military parade inside the Al Aqsa Mosque. It was clear that the statements of the Israeli authorities concerning the fire and the holy shrines conflicted with the world press reports and with the statements of the Jerusalem Supreme Moslem Council, and only an impartial investigation could establish the facts.

223. The representative of Jordan stated that in previous discussions in the Council his delegation had drawn attention to the steps taken by Israel to bring about the complete annexation of Jerusalem. The latest event had greatly shocked the people of Jordan. Israel had tried to absolve itself of the crime, but, according to press reports emanating from Israel itself, the person suspected of arson had been brought from Australia by a Jewish agency to work for Israel in a kibbutz and had entertained dreams of building Solomon's Temple. Moreover, there had been other acts of desecration by some Israeli groups which clearly indicated Israel's designs with respect to Al Aqsa Mosque. The burning of Al Aqsa was not only a premeditated act burning a sacred monument but an open defiance of the feelings of the people who cherished the cultural heritage represented by Al Aqsa.

224. Israel's attitude and statements immediately after the fire had given rise to many questions, including why Israel, even before any investigation, had attributed the fire to an electric contact and why it had insisted on keeping the key to one of the main gateways of Al Aqsa. It was not a secret that Israel, and various Zionist organizations as well, had been working to change the character and status of Jerusalem against the wishes of its people and in defiance of United Nations resolutions. The Al Aqsa incident, could not be viewed as an isolated event. Moreover, it was not that event alone that had aroused the fears of 750 million Moslems and other peace-loving people but all the other changes that Israel had made in the status of Jerusalem.

225. The law under which Israel had established a commission of inquiry and the law under which it was trying the suspect had been declared invalid by the Security Council. It was clear that Israel was trying to have those laws validated by the Council by stating that due process of law were being observed. However, the Council could not be expected to endorse illegal actions, especially actions which could lead to further aggression. Israel must be told that only by

implementing fully all United Nations resolutions could it expect co-operation in the restoration of peace in the area.

226. In reply, the representative of Israel pointed out that the fact that the suspect, Michael Rohan, had been working in an Israeli kibbutz was no proof of Israel's complicity in the crime or that he had been preparing for arson while working at the kibbutz. It was also baseless to suggest that Israeli authorities had not promptly and effectively put out the fire. In fact, the fire had been extinguished after one hour, and thereafter the firemen had been busy with the embers.

227. Arab propagandists and some of the statements made before the Council, he continued, had attempted to blame Israel for the fire and had used that incident for vilifying it. However, as representatives of the Committee for Human Rights of Switzerland and the education ministers of Dahomey and Gambia, who had visited Israel after the fire, would point out, any attempt to involve Israel or its people in the Al Aqsa fire would be most unjustified. Other leaders, including the Pope, had cautioned against exciting passions and hatreds that might further prejudice the cause of peace and justice. The Council, the Israeli representative said, must take every step to prevent exploitation of the incident of fire for political ends; instead of giving support to charges which had no basis, it should contribute to restoring trust among the peoples of Jerusalem.

228. The representative of Hungary stated that although his country was a secular State, it nevertheless understood fully the feelings of shock of those States that had requested Council consideration of the barbarous attempt to destroy the Al Aqsa Mosque by arson. In his attempt to absolve his Government from any responsibility for the act of arson, the Israeli representative had depicted the event as bringing the Arabs and the Jews closer. The basic question which could not be denied, was that it was the Israeli occupation that had nurtured a

favourable climate in which an act of arson could take place. To prevent such acts it was necessary that Israel should withdraw its forces from the Arab territories, including Jerusalem. Moreover, General Assembly and Security Council resolutions had declared clearly that no change in the legal status of Jerusalem was acceptable. If Israel really wished to seek peace, as its representatives often professed, it should comply fully with Security Council resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and declare its agreement with the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force. However, Israel, instead of complying with United Nations resolutions, had continued in its policy of expansion. Therefore, the one way by which tension could be reduced in the Middle East region was the full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

229. The representative of Jordan referred to the fact that the Israeli representative had quoted from a number of press reports in support of his point that the fire in Al Aqsa should not be exploited for political purposes and said that he, too, had tried to gauge world reaction to the event. He had found, from more than one hundred communications sent either to the Secretary-General or to the President of the Security Council, that there was, first, universal expression of shock and, second, a prevailing opinion that Israel could not be absolved of its responsibility for the fire at Al Aqsa. Those communications also had expressed the views that Israeli violations in Jerusalem encouraged the commission of such an act and that to prevent its repetition or any similar acts Israel must withdraw its forces from Jerusalem and other Arab territories. There was no question of exploitation of the event for political ends. The world, by itself, had been so shocked that it considered United Nations action absolutely essential; and because a number of States considered the situation fraught with danger for international peace and security, they had submitted the matter to the Security Council.

230. The representative of the United

Arab Republic stated that although the Arab representatives had given assurance of full co-operation in implementing all United Nations resolutions, Israel's representative had not, just as he had not replied to the questions concerning the fire put to him by the representatives of Somalia and Jordan. He had, however, protested statements by Arab leaders that the current year would be the year of liberation. Having omitted to quote their statements to the effect that the Arab States had opened every door for peace but that Israel had closed them all, he had objected to Arab hopes that the coming year would be the year of implementation of Security Council resolutions that would lead to the liberation of occupied territories, inasmuch as those resolutions reiterated the established principle of the inadmissibility of the seizure of territory by the use of force.

231. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that Israel's continued defiance of the United Nations resolutions posed a serious threat to the authority of the Security Council. The Council, as well as the General Assembly, had adopted a number of resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem; yet Israel continued its plans to change the character of that city and to destroy its holy monuments. It was being said that the act of arson was committed by a religious fanatic from Australia, but similar excuses had been used before. There had been numerous statements expressing a desire to reconstruct Solomon's Temple. Israel was attempting to establish its claims to Jerusalem because Judaism had flourished there once. Beside being an archaic argument, the logic contained therein must then also recognize the claims of Christians and Moslems. The whole of Palestine, according to modern conception of nationhood, belonged to the people of Palestine, not to people who had migrated there from central and eastern European countries under Zionist pressures. The Palestinians were determined to regain their homeland, and even the Arab States would not be able to stop them from that resolve. The Council could help the Palestinians in their fight to establish their right of

self-determination. If, however, it failed to give such support, that would not stop the Palestinians from their struggle to regain their ancestral homeland.

232. At the 1510th meeting, on 12 September, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed his delegation's feeling that in its consideration of the question there were three propositions on which the Council could readily agree. First, the Council must reaffirm its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) concerning the status of Jerusalem. The future of the Holy City of Jerusalem was a matter of the deepest concern to the Council, and any unilateral attempt to prejudice it could not be tolerated. The second proposition on which there was common agreement was that the Council should deplore the dreadful crime of attempting to burn the Mosque. His delegation believed that that crime was condemned by everyone in all countries and that it would be unjustified to reach any conclusion regarding the complicity of any State in the absence of adequate evidence. The third proposition on which there was general agreement was that, despite obstacles in the implementation of the Council's resolution 242 (1967), the Holy Places must, nevertheless, be fully preserved and protected. Their control should be in the hands of the religious authorities concerned. With a decision based upon these three propositions, the Council then could press further its search for a lasting peace in the Middle East. However, if the Council were to depart from the above consensus, it might hamper its efforts in that respect.

233. At the same meeting, the representative of Ceylon stated that on 23 August his Prime Minister, after deploring the damage done to Al Aqsa, had stated that, whatever might be the cause of the incident, it was essential for world peace that the matter should be investigated by an impartial tribunal and that full restoration and retribution be made. As far as international peace and security were concerned, the fire at Al Aqsa differed from other fires in holy places, because the territory on which Al Aqsa stood

was under foreign occupation, which was maintained in defiance of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and in violation of the basic principle of the United Nations Charter of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. Under those circumstances, he stated, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) still remained the soundest basis for a just and peaceful settlement. In that respect, his delegation had already expressed its concern over Israel's failure to implement that resolution. The responsibility of the international community, in particular of the four major Powers, to bring about a settlement in accordance with the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) could not be overstressed.

234. The representative of Malaysia stated that the people and the Government of his country had felt profound horror and grief at the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque. In the Holy City of Jerusalem, which was respected equally by the three great religions of the world, the Moslems had shown themselves tolerant to both Jews and Christians. It had been a sad tragedy to civilization that that atmosphere of tolerance had deteriorated with Jerusalem's annexation by Israel. The date of 21 August 1969 would long be remembered as a day of great tragedy. As had already been pointed out, such an event could only have taken place in an atmosphere such as that created by Israel's military occupation of the Holy City. It was therefore imperative, as had been requested in the letter of the twenty-five member States, that an impartial investigation of the tragic event of 21 August should take place, that appropriate actions should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such vandalism and that the representatives of the Governments of Islamic countries should be permitted to assess the damage to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque and to prepare and execute plans for its repair. The Council must also put an end to Israel's defiance of resolution 252 (1968) and 267 (1969), in which the Council had declared invalid all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel.

235. The representative of Israel stated

that, although some press reports had mentioned extensive damage to the Mosque, the fact was that only one tenth of the Mosque had been damaged. However, in that one tenth, the roof over the southern wing and the pulpit—the minar—had been totally destroyed. Nine tenths of the Mosque had remained untouched by the flames. He reiterated that the fire lasted from 7.20 to 8.30 a.m. and that thereafter the firemen had been occupied with the embers. With regard to construction of the ancient Hebrew Temple, he said that official Israeli policy held that the Temple would be built when the Messiah had come; it was therefore inconceivable that any plans for it were being made at the current time.

236. At the same meeting, the representative of Pakistan submitted the following draft resolution submitted by his delegation:

“The Security Council,

“Grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel,

“Mindful of the consequent loss to human culture,

“Having heard the statements made before the Council reflecting the universal outrage caused by the act of sacrilege in one of the most venerated shrines of mankind,

“Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the city of Jerusalem,

“Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

“1. Reaffirms its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

“2. Recognizes that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security;

“3. Determines that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel’s desisting from acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem;

“4. Calls upon Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international laws governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation that Council may desire from countries with predominantly Moslem population and from Moslem communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem;

“5. Condemns the failure of Israel to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to implement forthwith the provisions of these resolutions;

“6. Reiterates the determination in paragraph 7 of resolution 267 (1969) that in the event of a negative response or no response, the Security Council shall convene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

“7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date.”

237. In submitting the above draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan stated that the draft reflected the consensus of the twenty-five Member States which had requested the Council to meet on the question. Under that draft, the Security Council would recognize that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places in Jerusalem might seriously endanger international peace and security. Those Member States had requested the Council’s consideration of the 21 August event not merely to obtain the Council’s condemnation of the actions of a fanatic; they had done so because they had

felt the implications of the event to be so grave that they could indeed endanger the prospects of world peace.

238. At the 1511th meeting, on 15 September, the representative of France stated that his country fully shared the deep emotion that had been aroused throughout the world at the news that one of the most highly revered places of worship and one of the most celebrated works of art in the Middle East had been damaged by fire. France considered that works of art, in whatever country they might be found, formed part of the cultural heritage of all mankind and that any harm to them harmed the entire world community.

239. The repercussions of the fire at Al Aqsa had been all the more pronounced, since the disaster had taken place in that section of Jerusalem that had been under Israel's occupation since June 1967. Jerusalem constituted one of the most delicate points in any solution of the Middle East situation and one most likely to inflame passions. In order to prevent an increase in tension, the Security Council, on 3 July 1969, had asked that there should be no change in the status of Jerusalem and had censured, in the strongest terms, all measures to change the status and declared them to be invalid. The reactions aroused in the world by the burning of Al Aqsa had justified the Council's anxieties. France shared the wish for a full and impartial investigation that would establish responsibility for the incident and contribute to restoring calm in the area. For several months, France had already been preparing a procedure to break permanently the vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence and to reach an equitable solution of the Middle East situation on the basis of the unanimous will expressed by the Council in its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. It believed that the regrettable affair which had been brought to the Council's attention made it even more necessary and more urgent to arrive at a comprehensive, just and durable settlement of the problems of the Middle East.

240. The representative of Lebanon stated

that, as pointed out by the representative of France, the concern expressed in July 1969 during the discussion in the Council of the question of Jerusalem was well justified, as subsequent events had proved. Great concern was being expressed by the people of Lebanon for other Holy Places in Jerusalem, including the Holy Sepulchre Church and the Church of the Nativity. Those fears could be dispelled only by the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the old City of Jerusalem and from the other occupied areas. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Security Council to put an end to that occupation and to set in motion those provisions of the Charter which would compel Israel to abide by its decisions, particularly resolution 242 (1967).

241. The representative of Tunisia stated that the request of the twenty-five Member States had amply stressed the point that the situation resulting from the fire at Al Aqsa was a threat to international peace and security. In joining that request, Tunisia once again reaffirmed its confidence in the ability of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to take effective steps against situations which were a threat to international peace and security. In his statement to the Secretary-General, the President of the Republic of Tunisia, after expressing the shock of his people, had stated that the act of arson in the Al Aqsa Mosque had rendered even more difficult the search for a just peace in the Middle East. Tunisia also considered that the responsibility of the occupying Power in that act was directly involved. The basic fact was that military occupation had created an atmosphere conducive to the commission of the act of burning Al Aqsa Mosque. Tunisia had never wished to give a religious dimension to the conflict in the Middle East, but it was Israel that had introduced it by making race and religion its yardstick in the make-up of its policies, thereby introducing fanaticism. Moreover, in classic colonial manner, Israel wished to wipe out the soul of the people under control and was therefore attempting to eliminate the Holy Places of Islam and

Christianity in Palestine. Israel was forgetting, however, that people had always resisted cultural destruction, and its policies would lead only to further conflagration in the Middle East. In those circumstances, the responsibility of the Security Council and its four permanent members was all the greater to see that military occupation of Arab territories was brought to an end and that Palestinians were restored to their land in order to save the world from new wars.

242. The representative of Senegal stated that his country, which had tried constantly to find a just and lasting solution of the Middle East situation, considered that events like the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque had made that search even more difficult. The setting on fire of the Mosque had constituted an attempt to infringe upon the spiritual values that were fundamental elements of the human mind. That explained the indignation that had been felt by believers of all religions throughout the world. Although Israeli authorities also had publicly expressed their indignation at the event, the basic question was, indeed, that of the status of Jerusalem. Only the withdrawal of Israel from Jerusalem and other occupied territories would be able to assure the security of the Holy Places.

243. The representative of the United States said that his country was profoundly shocked and dismayed by the fire on 21 August at the Al Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. The United States agreed with the signatories of the request to the Council that the facts surrounding the tragedy must be investigated thoroughly and impartially. There was also merit in the proposal that a group of distinguished Moslems should assist in determining the extent of damage to the Mosque and be associated with the necessary repairs. The representative of Israel already had stated that his Government had no objection to the proposal. That would also reaffirm the widely held view that Jerusalem was a legitimate concern of the international community. There was also no disagreement on the necessity for more adequate precautions against repetition of such a desecration.

244. After carefully examining the facts that were so far available, he continued, the United States had seen no evidence to support the allegation that the act of suspected arson that had occurred at the Haram-as-Sharif on 21 August had been other than an individual act. It would be unfortunate if the international community, which had an abiding interest in the shrines of Jerusalem, were diverted from formulating a positive response to the current situation by allegations in support of other objectives. The United States had noted that Israel had taken immediate steps to institute a commission of inquiry composed of representatives of all three religions with Holy Places in Jerusalem. It was also welcome news that hearings by that commission would be open to the public and to observers from any country or faith. The United States also learnt with satisfaction that Israel would continue its co-operation with the Director-General of UNESCO, in applying the 1964 Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It was hoped that the Convention would be applied in such a manner as to assist in resolving the legitimate question regarding the circumstances of the fire at Al Aqsa Mosque and also serve as a basis for preventing recurrence of similar acts in future. Only nine weeks ago, when the Security Council had unanimously reaffirmed the special interest of the international community in the City of Jerusalem, the United States delegation had given in detail its viewpoint on the subject of Israel's responsibilities as an occupying Power. It was not necessary that the question of the fire in Al Aqsa be used to re-examine the question of the status of Jerusalem or the whole matter of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The draft resolution, which was before the Council, had gone beyond the purpose of the current discussion and the points raised in the letter (S/9445) of the twenty-five member States. Those matters were concerned with the maintenance, repair and protection of the Holy Places. Since portions of the draft resolution were inappropriate in that context and were not well

calculated to advance the ends in view, the United States delegation would abstain from voting on it. Moreover, restraint and co-operation of the parties were absolute requirements to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, especially at a time when the Foreign Ministers of the States most concerned and the four permanent members of the Security Council were at Headquarters and a search for peace was continuing.

245. The representative of Nepal stated that his delegation shared the sentiments of profound sorrow and indignation expressed in the debate at the burning of Al Aqsa Mosque. The Council's overriding concern should be to ensure that an objective and full investigation into the matter be held and that a swift restoration of the Mosque be effected. Steps should also be taken to prevent the recurrence of such acts of vandalism.

246. In the absence of a full and objective report on the matter, the Security Council was not in a position to attach responsibility to one party or another, and the Nepalese delegation regarded the expression of grief and anguish by Israel to be sincere. Nepal also noted that Israel had recognized the special interest of Moslem States and communities in the Holy Places and had welcomed their co-operation in the restoration work at Al Aqsa Mosque. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that the incident of 21 August had occurred at a time when Jerusalem was under Israel's military occupation and that Israel had failed to comply with specific resolutions concerning Jerusalem adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Thus, although Israel had shown its readiness to seek co-operation in the restoration of the damage done to Al Aqsa, it should, at the same time, be reminded of its obligations as an occupying Power and abide by United Nations resolutions. Because of those considerations and because it had supported the earlier resolutions on the question of Jerusalem, Nepal would cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution (S/9445) submitted by Pakistan.

247. The representative of Colombia stated that his country, with its tradition of respect for deep-rooted religious convictions, felt great concern at the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque and the damage done to that Holy Place. A careful analysis of the facts before the Council did not lead his delegation to feel that the Government of Israel had harboured deliberate plans of damaging the integrity of the Al Aqsa Mosque. In fact the situation that had resulted from the fire in Al Aqsa had shown clearly that Israel could gain no advantage but only increase concern and uncertainty. The tragic event of fire should be investigated without, however, linking it to any motivation.

248. The representative of Israel stated that, in reply to a number of statements by the representatives he would only wish to state that fires had occurred in Jerusalem's Holy Places prior to 1967 and that the hazard of fire in the shrines had been generally recognized. Those facts could be verified from the press reports published on the earlier fires. Moreover, it could not be denied that prompt and energetic efforts by Israeli authorities had restricted the damage to the Mosque. In contrast to the attitude of Israel towards all Holy Places, Jordan, during the time that part of Jerusalem was under its occupation, had not only shown neglect but, in fact, on a number of occasions had brought them under fire. However, Israel would not like the Council's debate to end on a note of acrimony but in a manner which would unite the various interests. That draft resolution before the Council, however, would exacerbate the conflict without contributing any constructive element towards understanding or co-operation.

249. The representative of Zambia stated that his delegation believed that the burning of any Holy Place belonging to any religion was a monstrous crime. Nevertheless, it would be inconclusive to discuss the burning of Al Aqsa in purely religious terms, without taking into account the political circumstances that had surrounded that event. The fact that it had occurred in circumstances of occupation and also without the protection

of the people to whom the Mosque belonged compelled his delegation to conclude that it was a direct consequence of the Israeli occupation of the Holy City of Jerusalem. There was also no doubt that the burning of the Mosque had aggravated the already grave situation in the Middle East, and Zambia hoped that the Council would be able to adopt measures to lessen the tension in the area and to resolve the root cause of the conflict.

250. The representative of Finland stated that the damage suffered by one of the most important religious shrines in the world was a loss to civilization as a whole. It was fortunate that the greater part of the Mosque could be saved and that it continued to serve as a centre of worship. However, the incident raised the issue of the safety and protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, and that was a matter of universal concern. It was for that reason that, in August 1967, Ambassador Thalman, the personal representative of the Secretary-General, was specifically requested to investigate the situation concerning all the Holy Places in Jerusalem. That mission represented an example of an agreed procedure by which the United Nations had been able to obtain the relevant information.

251. The unanimous adoption of resolution 267 (1969) had made it quite clear that the international community could not accept as valid any measures that might tend to change the status of Jerusalem. The wave of emotion that swept over Islam after the fire had further increased the tension in the area where the strain was already close to breaking point. Nobody stood to gain from that unfortunate event; it was a tragedy for all the parties to the conflict. In those circumstances the Security Council, committed as it was to a search for a peaceful solution of the conflict of the Middle East, should deal with the question before it in such a manner as to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. This formed the primary criterion by which the Finnish delegation would determine its stand on the draft resolution introduced in the Council.

252. The representative of Paraguay stated that the fire, which could have destroyed the Mosque entirely, had aroused universal concern and condemnation. His country, which believed that the Holy Places venerated by any religion must be fully protected, felt the greatest repugnance at that act and unreservedly condemned it. The Paraguayan delegation also believed that there was an urgent need to preserve the international character of Jerusalem as defined in General Assembly resolutions. Moreover, the question of the juridical status of Jerusalem was closely tied to the over-all question of peace and security in the Middle East. His delegation had already stated its position on that question when the Council had unanimously adopted its resolution 267 (1969), asking Israel not to change the status by administrative and other measures. As regards the draft resolution (S/9445) submitted by Pakistan, his delegation would abstain from voting on it; but that did not imply any alteration in the traditional stand of his delegation on the juridical status of Jerusalem.

253. At the 1512th meeting, on 15 September, the representative of Jordan stated that the United States and the United Kingdom had expressed the view that the fire on 21 August at Al Aqsa had been the work of an individual and that no Government could be involved in it. However, in view of the political circumstances that had led to the crime of arson, the United Kingdom and the United States might have good reason to believe that Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories had created the situation which led to the committing of the crime. On 3 July, the Security Council, by a unanimous vote, including that of the United States, had reiterated the invalidity of all legislative measures taken by Israel that aimed at the annexation of Jerusalem. The Committee of inquiry, the establishment of which was welcomed by the United States, was being created by Israel under those invalid laws.

254. It was also being suggested that the question of Al Aqsa be taken in isolation and that the question of the status of Jerusalem

not be examined at the same time. However, the Security Council was convened to consider a situation threatening world peace and security and, therefore, could not ignore the circumstances that had led to that situation. Furthermore, the resolutions of the Security Council were not adopted only to be subsequently reaffirmed but were to be respected and implemented. Instead of forcing Israel to implement the Council's resolution, the Western Powers, in particular the United States, were supplying Israel with weapons, including Phantom jets, and enabling that State to continue and escalate its aggression in the area. The United States abstention on the draft resolution (S/9445) would not contribute to the restoration of peace but would only damage its image in the area.

255. The representative of Spain stated that the maintenance by Israel of its military occupation of the Holy City, contrary to the unanimous decision of the Security Council, was the one important factor underlying the case under discussion. It was, therefore, appropriate that the draft resolution (S/9445) submitted by Pakistan should have reiterated the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. In fact, Israel's reiterated will to ignore the resolutions of the United Nations must be condemned by the Security Council. By its various resolutions, often adopted unanimously, the Security Council had sought to find a solution of the Middle East situation on the basis of justice and respect for the interests of the parties concerned. However, in view of Israel's continued defiance of those resolutions, Spain would vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Council which, in its operative paragraph 5, condemned the rebellious attitude of Israel regarding the United Nations resolutions. During the current debate, the representative of Israel had made an appeal for co-operation and goodwill, and Spain hoped that, in accordance with the spirit of that statement, Israel would be ready to accept and comply with the Security Council's resolutions, which contained the basis for a just and negotiated settlement.

256. At the same meeting the President, speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that the General Assembly and the Security Council had devoted considerable time to the question of Jerusalem. Their resolutions on that question were based on the basic principle that reflected the legal consciousness of Member States, that Israel's military occupation of Jerusalem was an unlawful act and that Israel had no right to change that city's status. By its resolution 242 (1967), the Security Council had called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, without making any exception of Jerusalem or any other Arab territory. All decisions of the Security Council were binding upon the Member States. It was an obligation, without exception and without conditions, assumed by each Member State under Article 25 of the Charter. However, the facts were that Israel was not implementing the decisions of the Security Council on Jerusalem. Instead, it was advancing annexationist claims to Arab lands and was following a policy of forcible Israelization of occupied territories. The Security Council itself was in receipt of many official communications concerning attempts by the occupying forces to eradicate the Arab character of the Old City of Jerusalem. Those attempts included forcible expulsion of Arab inhabitants, destruction of Arab quarters and subjecting the economic life of the Arab part of Jerusalem to the requirements of the Israeli military economy. It was that atmosphere of repression that had led to the act of vandalism that had occurred, resulting in the damage to the Al Aqsa Mosque. The people of the USSR had known, through their bitter experience of the Second World War that aggression went hand in hand with the use of most barbarous methods to destroy historical monuments and religious sites. Therefore, the fact that fire had been set to the Al Aqsa Mosque under a continuing military occupation was not an accident but a direct result of Israel's aggression, for which the Israeli authorities would never be able to divest themselves of the responsibility.

257. The Al Aqsa fire also had drawn the attention of the world to the threat to international peace and security resulting from Israel's aggressive policy towards the Arab States. An impartial evaluation of the situation would no doubt lead to the conclusion that Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands had prolonged that dangerous situation. It was, therefore, imperative for the Security Council to take effective action to compel Israel to implement its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and other decisions. For that reason, the Soviet Union would support the draft resolution (S/9445) submitted by Pakistan on behalf of the twenty-five Member States.

258. At the same meeting, the representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the United Nations could not countenance the forcible occupation of Jerusalem, which did not belong exclusively to the Jews. Moreover, religion could not be identified with nationality, and Jerusalem belonged, in accordance with the right of self-determination, to the people who had lived there and not to those Jews who had migrated there from other parts of the world. By no criteria could Jerusalem be described as the "capital of the Jews", as the representative of Israel had once attempted to describe it. The whole problem relating to the Middle East situation could be settled only through the application of the principle of self-determination. In that respect, a heavy responsibility lay with the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. They alone possessed the necessary power to issue an ultimatum to Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories.

259. At the same meeting, the representative of Pakistan stated that his delegation already explained the principal considerations for submitting its draft resolution (S/9445). The current debate had brought out certain points, which must be kept in mind in order to enable the Security Council to discharge its responsibility in the situation placed before it by the twenty-five Member States. First of all, the Council must realize that the event of 21 August had caused such

anguish that, if the Council failed to take a meaningful action, a sense of the gravest injustice was bound to grow, creating a situation which could not but be a danger to international peace and security. As the Security Council was not a court of justice, its concern was not to determine the issue of criminal responsibility for the act of arson but to deal with the political circumstances surrounding that act. Those were inextricably associated with Israel's occupation of the Old City. The Security Council was, therefore, dealing with a political matter, not a religious conflict. Indeed, it was the desire to avoid such a conflict that had motivated the twenty-five Member States to request the Council to resolve the situation. They did not seek a condemnation of the evil act of 21 August, which stood self-condemned; nor did they seek to have the Council pronounce itself in such a manner as to imply complicity on the part of the Israeli authorities. Thus, although the draft resolution before the Council did not contemplate that it should pronounce itself on the issue of criminal responsibility, the Council must assert its authority by removing the causes that had led to the act and created a situation which could be a threat to international peace and security.

260. The representative of Pakistan then stated that references had been made not only to the Geneva Convention but to international law as governing the rights and responsibilities of military occupation. He therefore amended operative paragraph 4 to include the words "and international law", after the words "Geneva Convention".

261. Before the Pakistan draft resolution (S/9445), as amended, was put to the vote, the representative of France requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 4. His delegation would have preferred that paragraph to include a reference to the 1954 Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

Decision: *At the 1512th meeting, on 15 September 1969, operative paragraph 4 of the*

draft resolution was adopted by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions (Colombia, Finland, France, Paraguay and United States).

The draft resolution, as a whole, was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Finland, Paraguay and United States), as resolution 271 (1969).

262. After the vote, the representative of Finland stated that the reasons for which his delegation had abstained from the voting had been indicated already. He wished to emphasize, however, that although his delegation joined in condemning the act of arson against the Al Aqsa Mosque and in reaffirming the position taken by the Council on the status of the City of Jerusalem, it was not prepared to accept without an impartial investigation, the charge of Israeli responsibility that was implied in the text of the draft resolution. It was a matter of regret to his delegation that none of the suggestions concerning an investigation had been taken up.

263. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation had maintained that a unanimous result of the Council's debate was possible as well as desirable. His delegation, however, welcomed the statement of the representative of Pakistan that the resolution adopted by the Council did not allege complicity by Israel in the fire. The United Kingdom Government did not consider Israel guilty in that respect and deplored the accusations that had been made without adequate evidence. However, on the agreed understanding which the representative of Pakistan, as sponsor of the draft resolution, had put before the Council, although they were still unhappy about certain sections of the draft resolution, his delegation had been able to vote in favour of it. It had voted, however, with the hope that the Council would next turn its attention to an urgent endeavour to search for the ground of agreement on which a just settlement might be built.

(d) Report of the Secretary-General

264. On 16 December, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/9559) to the

Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 7 of resolution 271 (1969). He stated that he had communicated that resolution to the Government of Israel the day it had been adopted, but, having received no information, he had addressed a note to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 24 November, requesting the necessary information regarding the implementation of resolution 271 (1969), inasmuch as it was his intention to submit a report to the Security Council not later than mid-December 1969.

265. On 16 December, the Secretary-General received a reply from the Permanent Representative of Israel which stated that the genesis of resolution 271 (1969) was an attempt by the Arab States to exploit the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque for political and propaganda purposes and that the tension and antagonism thus deliberately created had damaged further the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The Israeli representative added that the report of the commission of inquiry that had been appointed by the President of the Israel Supreme Court had been published. The trial of Denis Michael Rohan, accused of arson in connexion with the fire, was then in progress. In the meantime, temporary repairs to the Mosque had been carried out, and prayers were being conducted as usual.

D. General statements and other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connection with the situation in the Middle East

(a) General statements

266. During the past year, general statements concerning the situation in the Middle East have been brought to the attention of the Security Council. They are briefly noted below.

267. By a letter dated 2 October (S/9460), the representative of Morocco transmitted the text of the Final Declaration of the Islamic Conference held at Rabat from 22 to 25 September 1969, in which

statements were made concerning the fire in Al Aqsa Mosque, the Islamic shrines in Jerusalem and the continued Israel occupation of Arab territories.

268. In a letter dated 7 November (S/9500), the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General concerning the representation of India in the Islamic Conference held at Rabat.

269. On 9 October, the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in New York, by a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (S/9468), transmitted the text of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government of the OAU at the sixth ordinary session, held in Addis Ababa from 6 to 9 September 1969, on aggression against the United Arab Republic and the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

270. By a letter dated 3 November (S/9496), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted a TASS statement of 25 October to the effect that the United States Embassy in Lebanon, on the pretext of expressing concern for the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon, had circulated a statement which, in fact, had advanced United States claims to the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The TASS statement added that if the United States were genuinely interested in preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Arab States, it should direct all its efforts towards a speedy implementation of the decisions of the United Nations regarding the situation in the Middle East.

271. In a reply dated 4 November (S/9497), the United States declared that the TASS statement and other statements concerning the Middle East recently emanating from Moscow had contained unfounded allegations against the United States, which had appeared at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were actively engaged in confidential discussions about a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israel

dispute. The United States had recently reiterated that it was for peace in the area and did not support any policy of expansionism. It would continue to support the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its provisions and to pursue discussions among the major Powers to facilitate a settlement.

272. By a letter dated 2 December (S/9520), the representative of Bulgaria transmitted the text of a statement on the situation in the Middle East, in which a group of socialist States had expressed concern about the increased tension in the Middle East resulting from Israel's policies.

273. By a letter dated 8 December (S/9545), Israel, in reply, transmitted a Foreign Ministry statement declaring that the statement published in the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and five other socialist States and communist parties was a further contribution by the Soviet Union to the perpetuation of the dispute in the Middle East and demonstrated that the USSR was not qualified to participate in unprejudiced consultations on the establishment of peace.

274. By a letter dated 30 December (S/9588), the representative of the United States transmitted the text of a statement made by the United States Secretary of State on 9 December 1969 concerning United States policy towards the situation in the Middle East. Outlining the policy of the United States Government on the various elements of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the Secretary of State declared that peace must be established through agreement between the parties themselves and that it must be based on clear and stated intentions to bring about fundamental changes in the attitudes and conditions which were characteristic of the Middle East situation. Peace also must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides through the establishment of demilitarized zones and related security arrangements. The Security Council resolution had endorsed the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and had called for withdrawal of Israeli armed

forces from territories occupied during the 1967 war. The United States supported that part of the resolution, including withdrawal, just as it had supported all other elements of the resolution. Regarding the problem of the Palestinian refugees, the Secretary of State stated that there could be no lasting peace without a just settlement of that problem, which took into account the desires of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the Governments in the area. As regards the status of Jerusalem, the United States could not accept unilateral action by any party to decide the final status of the city. The future of the city could be determined only through an agreement between the Israel and Jordan Governments, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community.

275. By a letter dated 19 February 1970 (S/9654), the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan, Syria and the United Arab Republic transmitted the text of a *communiqué* issued at the close of the conference of five Arab States held in Cairo between 7 and 9 February, in which the "front-line States" condemned United States support for Israel.

276. By a letter dated 24 February (S/9662/Rev.1), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Mongolia transmitted the text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic urging a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East as advocated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

277. By a letter dated 10 March (S/9695), the representative of the Sudan transmitted part of the joint *communiqué* issued at the conclusion of the Sixth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, held in Khartoum from 20 to 28 January 1970, reiterating the call of the OAU for implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

278. By a letter dated 20 May 1970 (S/9808), the representative of Saudi Arabia transmitted the text of the joint *communiqué* issued at the conclusion of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Jeddah,

Saudi Arabia, from 23 to 25 March 1970, urging the great Powers to intensify their efforts to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied since the hostilities of June 1967.

(b) *Communications concerning airplane hijacking and other air incidents*

279. In a note dated 3 September 1969 (S/9428), the Secretary-General circulated the text of a cable he had received from the President of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA) and his reply to that cable.

280. In his cable dated 1 September, the President of IFALPA requested a meeting with the Secretary-General in connexion with the problem of hijacking. On 29 August he had conveyed to the Foreign Minister of Syria his organization's anxiety over the hijacking of a TWA aircraft to Syria on 28 August, the reported detention of two passengers by the Syrian authorities and the failure of the Syrian Government to punish the hijackers. He stated that that case was part of the alarming growth of the hijacking problem and illustrated the projection of the problem beyond the point of air safety into the political field, which might bring into play actions that could threaten world peace. Accordingly, the Security Council should take the necessary measures to secure the release of the two passengers detained in Syria and to punish the hijackers.

281. In his reply dated 3 September, the Secretary-General agreed to meet with the representatives of the IFALPA. He stated, in connexion with the incident of the TWA aircraft, that he was greatly concerned with the need for the prompt release of all of the aircraft passengers and crew and the aircraft itself. His position on the matter of hijacking had always been that no advantage should be taken by anyone of the criminal act of hijacking, for to do so would only encourage further such reprehensible acts.

282. In a letter dated 25 September (S/9457), the representative of Canada

transmitted copies of an exchange of telegrams between the President of the Canadian Airline Pilots Association and the Prime Minister of Canada concerning possible action by the United Nations to find a solution to the problem of unlawful interference with international civil aviation.

283. In a letter dated 12 February 1970 (S/9647), Israel stated that, on 10 February 1970, an attack by Arab terrorists had taken place at Munich Airport against passengers about to board an Israeli civil aircraft on an international flight from Tel Aviv stopping over at Munich. In the attack one Israeli citizen had been killed and many wounded. It transmitted a statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs denouncing the attack and requesting Governments and international bodies to take necessary measures to ensure the freedom of civil air transport. The letter also recalled that the Security Council, in resolution 262 (1968), had expressed its deep concern about the need to assure free uninterrupted international civil air traffic and that, in resolution 2551 (XXIV) of 12 December 1969, the General Assembly had expressed its deep concern over all acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation. Israel placed the responsibility for the attack at Munich on the Arab Governments, which, it claimed, were supporting the terrorist organizations.

284. By a letter dated 24 February (S/96-61), Israel transmitted the text of a statement by the Prime Minister of Israel concerning an explosion on a Swissair plane on route to Israel, in which forty-seven passengers and crew had lost their lives. The statement charged that terrorist organizations were responsible for such acts of sabotage.

(c) *Communications concerning service in the Israeli armed forces by United States citizens*

285. In a letter dated 17 October (S/94-77), the United Arab Republic drew attention to a statement made in Tel Aviv by the United States Embassy, which it interpreted as meaning that United States citizens could retain their American nationality,

even if they became citizens of Israel and enlisted in its armed forces. By that, it charged, the United States was undermining Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which it had pledged to support and was encouraging its citizens to take arms under the Israeli flag against the Arab peoples.

286. By a letter dated 20 October (S/9479), the representative of the United States transmitted a statement by his Government, denying insinuations that it was in any way encouraging Americans to serve in any foreign armed forces. Americans residing abroad were subject to induction for military service, if the law of their country of residence so required, and such service did not automatically entail loss of United States citizenship. In regard to other allegations, the official statement continued, no members of the United States armed forces were operating American aircraft purchased by Israel or serving in the Israeli armed forces.

287. In further letters (S/9480, S/9481 and S/9487), the United Arab Republic, Libya and Iraq expressed the view that the position taken by the United States in permitting its citizens to fight under Israel's flag could only lead to further escalation of the conflict in the area and might lead the Arab Governments to seek support from other nations outside the region.

288. By a letter dated 20 October (S/94-84), the United States representative reiterated his Government's stand, stating that State Department officials had made clear to Arab ambassadors that the United States sought to discourage service in the armed forces of foreign countries by its citizens, that no United States military personnel were serving in Israel's armed forces, that some persons with dual nationality might be serving in foreign forces and that United States consular officials assisted dual citizens who sought to avoid induction into the armed forces of another State. Those policies were applied world-wide, and no special status was accorded any country in the Middle East or elsewhere.

(d) *Communications concerning the circulation of documents of the Security Council*

289. In March 1970, certain communications were sent to the President of the Security Council in connexion with a statement made on 4 March by the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, which had been circulated as an official document of the Security Council (S/9680).

(e) *Communication concerning the protection of permanent missions of Arab countries*

290. In a letter dated 4 December (S/95-32), the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen informed the Secretary-General that about forty members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for the Jewish Defence had entered the premises of the Permanent Mission of Syria in New York the previous afternoon and had staged a "sit-in" for one and a half hours. That was the second time since October 1966 that the Syrian Mission had been subjected to such acts by American Zionists. Furthermore, in the past, several Arab missions to the United Nations and other Arab offices had been subjected to violent acts, including threats to the lives of the Arab ambassadors. After stating that these demonstrations and threats had made their work difficult, they expressed their strong protest and requested the transmission of their protest to the host country of the United Nations and urged that all necessary steps be taken to protect their Missions.

E. *Note by the Secretary-General on the four-Power talks*

291. On 21 October, the Secretary-General, at the request of the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued a note (S/9485) setting forth the text of a statement released on 20 September by the Foreign Ministers of those four countries. The note

indicated that the four Foreign Ministers had met with the Secretary-General for a discussion on the situation in the Middle East, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent. They reaffirmed that resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council should be supported and carried out, agreed that durable peace should be established in the Middle East, reaffirmed that all States in the Middle East had an inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign States and, with the above objectives in mind, indicated that the conversations and contacts already established by the four Powers would be continued.

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Annual Report of the Economic and Social Council, 9 August 1969-31 July 1970 (Excerpts)¹

September 1970

313. The Council was informed (E/4816, chap. XI) that the Commission on Human Rights had adopted a resolution (10 (XXVI)) in which it had noted with dismay the refusal of Israel to co-operate with the Special Working Group of Experts established by the Commission under its resolution 6 (XXV), and had endorsed the conclusions of the Working Group concerning the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to all the occupied areas and the existence of violations of that Convention in the Israeli-occupied territories. In the resolution the Commission had further condemned Israel for its refusal to apply that Convention and had called upon it to observe strictly its provisions in the occupied territories. The Commission had also decided to continue the mandate of the Working Group to investigate and report on the

¹ U.N. doc. A/8003, pp. 47-48.

violations by Israel of that Convention in the military-occupied Arab territories, and had called upon Israel to receive and co-operate with the Working Group. It had also requested the Secretary-General to give the widest possible publicity to the Working Group's report.

316. The Council was informed (E/4816, chap. VI) that pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2597 (XXIV), the Commission on Human Rights had considered the interim report of the Secretary-General on human rights in armed conflicts (A/7720) prepared under Assembly resolution 2444 (XXIII) and had decided to transmit the observations of its members on the report to the Council and to the General Assembly.

317. During the debate in the Council,¹ attention was drawn to the importance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Some representatives were of the opinion that most of the violations of human rights in armed conflicts could be avoided if the existing conventions were properly applied; others considered that additional provisions of some sort were needed in view of the magnitude of internal armed conflicts, the use of new methods of warfare, and new methods of mass destruction. Mention was made of the desirability of cooperation between the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross in the matter.

318. The Council decided,² under rule 66 of its rules of procedure, not to take a vote on a draft resolution in which it would have recalled that, according to the United Nations Charter, in order to guarantee human rights effectively, all States should devote their efforts to averting the unleashing of aggressive wars and armed conflicts; condemned the actions of those countries that continued to conduct aggressive wars

in violation of the United Nations Charter, defying the accepted principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925; expressed the view that the principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be strictly observed and that States violating those instruments should be held responsible internationally; affirmed that participants of resistance movements and freedom fighters in southern Africa and in colonial and occupied territories, if arrested, should be treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions; expressed the view that massive air bombardments of the civilian population and the use of napalm and other types of chemical weapons constituted a flagrant violation of those Conventions and of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report (A/7720) and requested him to take into consideration the comments made in the Commission on Human Rights and in the Economic and Social Council.

319. The Council approved³ the decision of the Commission on Human Rights referred to above (paragraph 316), requesting the Secretary-General to transmit to the General Assembly the observations of the members of the Commission on the report of the Secretary-General (A/7720) and also requested him to forward the views of the Council to the Assembly.

¹ E/AC.7/SR.636-641, 643-645; E/SR.1693. [This and subsequent footnotes are part of the report.]

² E/AC.7/SR.645.

³ E/SR.1693

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Annual Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General, 1 July 1969-30 June 1970¹**October 1970**

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¹ U.N. doc. A/8013, pp. iii-vi and 1-100.

Letter of Transmittal

5 September 1970

The President of the General Assembly
United Nations
New York

Sir,

I have the honour to submit my annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970, in compliance with the request contained in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 and paragraph 8 of resolution 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958.

The report is presented in three main parts.

The introduction seeks primarily to make Member States aware of UNRWA's financial situation. As is clearly stated by the Secretary-General in his latest communication to all Member States, reproduced in document A/8040, a breakdown is now unavoidable sometime in 1971 unless substantial additional resources become available soon. I have no doubt that the General Assembly will wish to prevent developments of such gravity, the implications of which both for the refugees or displaced persons and for the United Nations would be extremely serious. In addition, the introduction recalls the continuing sad plight of the refugees, particularly those who were displaced again as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. It also endeavours to convey to the General Assembly an idea of some other operational problems which, while not entirely new, deserve the Assembly's attention.

Chapter I gives an account of the Agency's activities during the twelve months ending 30 June 1970 and includes a section on the many legal problems with which UNRWA is confronted.

Chapter II presents the Agency's budget for the calendar year 1971 for consideration by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, and the revised budget for 1970.

Statistical tables relating to various aspects

of the Agency's work are included in annex I to the report. Resolutions adopted following discussions of UNRWA's education and health activities by the World Health Assembly and the UNESCO Executive Board, are reproduced in annexes II and III.

The advisory Commission of UNRWA has considered this report and its views are set forth in a letter dated 21 August 1970 from its Chairman, of which I attach a copy. Although in drafting the report I have had the benefit of the advice of the members of the Commission, it should not be assumed that the Governments represented on the Commission necessarily subscribe to all the views I have expressed.

Since a major part of UNRWA's operations during the past year have been conducted in areas under the control of the Government of Israel, I also considered it appropriate to show the report, in draft, to its representatives and have taken their views and comments into account in preparing the final text.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Laurence MICHELMORE
Commissioner-General

Letter from the Chairman of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

21 August 1970

Dear Dr. Michelmores,

At its meeting on 20 August 1970, the members of the Advisory Commission of UNRWA stated their views on the content of the annual report which you propose to submit to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

While individual members of the Commission have reserved the position of their respective Governments on a number of matters discussed in the report, as in previous years, the Commission as a whole believes

that your report in general accurately describes the Agency's activities and the hardships experienced by the refugees and displaced persons during the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970.

The Commission commends the Agency's staff for the manner in which they have carried out their tasks in exceptionally difficult circumstances. It does not underestimate the difficulty of the problems (aggravated by the hostilities of 1967) which increasingly hamper the Agency's operations.

Above all, however, the Commission is concerned by the financial situation of the Agency, the extreme seriousness of which is well described in the annual report and which jeopardizes the Agency's ability to pursue, as it ought to, its action for the Palestine refugees. The Commission therefore can only express the firm hope that during its twenty-fifth session the General Assembly will manage to solve this problem in a way which will enable the Agency to carry on its indispensable mission without any reduction in its services.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Fouad SAWAYA
Chairman
Advisory Commission

Dr. Laurence Michelmore
Commissioner-General
United Nations Relief and Works Agency
Beirut

INTRODUCTION

1. It has become customary for the Agency to report, year after year¹—subject to excep-

tional circumstances such as those in 1967—that it has been able to maintain its relief and health activities and even expand its education programme, in spite of a number of problems, old and new, which, with the passing of time, become integral parts of the Agency's conditions of work: foremost among them is the Agency's ever-increasing financial needs, mainly the result of substantial annual increases in enrolments in UNRWA/UNESCO elementary and preparatory schools, and its deteriorating financial

assistance to Palestine refugees. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (A/4121).

- D. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787).
- E. Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:

- (i) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/1451/Rev.1);
- (ii) *Ibid., Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A* (A/1905 and Add.1);
- (iii) *Ibid., Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A* (A/2171 and Add.1);
- (iv) *Ibid., Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A* (A/2470 and Add.1);
- (v) *Ibid., Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A* (A/2717 and Add.1);
- (vi) *Ibid., Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A* (A/2978 and Add.1);
- (vii) *Ibid., Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A* (A/3212 and Add.1);
- (viii) *Ibid., Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3686 and A/3735);
- (ix) *Ibid., Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3931 and A/3948);
- (x) *Ibid., Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4213);
- (xi) *Ibid., Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4478);
- (xii) *Ibid., Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4861);
- (xiii) *Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/5214);
- (xiv) *Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5513);
- (xv) *Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5813);
- (xvi) *Ibid., Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6013);
- (xvii) *Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6313);
- (xviii) *Ibid., Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6713);
- (xix) A/6723 and Add.1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*, documents S/8001 and Add.1;
- (xx) A/6787 and Corr.1;
- (xxi) A/7060;
- (xxii) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/7213).

¹ Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work will be found in the following annual reports and other United Nations documents:

- A. Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC.25/6, parts I and II).
- B. Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees: *Official Records of the General Assembly Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes*, vol. II, (A/1060), p. 14.
- C. Proposals for the continuation of United Nations

position owing to the failure of contributions to keep pace with needs and the adamant opposition of the Governments of the host countries to action to decrease costs by reducing services. This analysis remains basically unchanged: in spite of the Commissioner-General's statement in last year's annual report that "a decision of this kind [concerning the method of future financing or on the scope of the services the Agency is to provide] can no longer be delayed, for the Agency can hardly go forward into 1970 in such uncertainty", the Agency was left in just such uncertainty.¹

2. Meanwhile, too, the human problem persists and becomes more complicated: the continued deferment of the hope of the Palestine refugees² for return and the failure to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III); the fact that the refugees therefore

(xxiii) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/7614).

F. Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 212 (III) of 19 November 1948; 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December 1950; 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952; 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954; 916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957; 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958; 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959; 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961; 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962; 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965; 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966; 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967; 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968; 2535 (XXIV) of 10 December 1969.

G. Pertinent Security Council resolutions:

237 (14 June 1967); 242 (22 November 1967).
[This and subsequent footnotes are part of the report.]

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/7614), para. 33.

² Throughout this report, the term "refugees", "displaced refugees" or "newly displaced refugees" refers to those persons who were registered with UNRWA prior to the June 1967 hostilities; the term "displaced persons" or "other displaced persons" refers to those who were displaced after the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities, but who were not registered with UNRWA.

regard themselves not simply as refugees, but as temporary wards of the international community whom they hold responsible for the upheaval which resulted in their having to leave their homes, and UNRWA rations as their entitlement and a recognition of their position; the persisting effects of the 1967 hostilities, including military occupation with its manifold implications and the maintenance of high tension in the area; the continuing displacement for a third year, despite the calls of the General Assembly and the Security Council for their return, of hundreds of thousands of persons who fled in 1967; the growing decisive impact of the policies and activities of the various *fedayeen* movements on the situation in some host countries and on the attitudes of the refugees in all of them.

3. If the Agency did maintain, on the whole, the integrity of its services, and indeed expand its education programme, so much so that in 1970, for the first time in its history, education—including technical education, vocational training, teacher training etc.—has become the main item of expenditure (45 per cent), surpassing the relief programmes (42 per cent) which for many years were the major preoccupation of the Agency, this was made possible only as a result of a deliberate decision by the Commissioner-General, in full agreement with the Secretary-General, who was then making personal efforts to improve the Agency's financial position, not to put into effect, for the time being, all of the significant curtailments in the Agency's programme which the General Assembly was informed at its twenty-fourth session would have to be proceeded with during 1970. Consequently, as explained in section F of Chapter I below, the Agency, whose financial capacity to carry out its mandate has reached breaking point, will be virtually insolvent at the end of 1970.

4. Moreover, and simultaneously, the Agency's conditions of work were perturbed by occurrences which represented serious obstacles to the orderly accomplishment of its task within the present formal frame-

work of its operation as a United Nations agency. Their conjunction with a serious financial problem must be a matter of real concern, especially since they may have repercussions on each other: for the financial situation, in particular, if not redressed in one way or another before the beginning of 1971, is bound to lead either to a breakdown in operations or to drastic curtailments in the Agency's programme, either of which, in turn, cannot fail to have far-reaching, possibly dramatic, repercussions on the policies and politics of the host countries and on the attitude of the Palestinian refugee community. Inasmuch as UNRWA has become, by virtue of its twenty years of existence and the scope of its activities, a *de facto* element of stability in some of the host countries, any major diminution of its role could only add to the combustible material in an already inflammatory situation.

5. The main elements of the situation are briefly reviewed below.

Finance

6. At the start of 1970, the Agency's financial position was so critical that the Commissioner-General considered there was no alternative to substantial reductions in the Agency's programme unless he could be assured of an increase in income sufficient to cover the deficit then facing the Agency and estimated at nearly \$5 million. Despite very strenuous efforts by the Secretary-General, the Commissioner-General and others, the increase in income has barely covered unavoidable increases in expenditure, so that the deficit facing the Agency for 1970 must still be estimated at about \$5 million.

7. Nevertheless, as stated in paragraph 3 above, the Commissioner-General, after consulting the Secretary-General and taking into account the views of the Governments of the host countries, decided to delay major budget reductions directly affecting the refugees until the General Assembly had had a further opportunity of dealing with the

problem of financing the Agency's operations. This delay was made feasible by the withholding of payment of \$1.3 million of health, education and other subsidies to host Governments, by other economies which brought the total saving to about \$1.5 million in 1970, by an improvement in the cash position resulting from donations in kind that made purchase unnecessary or otherwise generated cash, and by acceptance of the risk for the future involved in a further drawing down of cash and the working reserve.

8. While the Agency should in this way be able to maintain operations until the end of 1970 without major reductions, and continue some way into 1971 if contributions for 1971 are paid promptly in that year, it will be in an even weaker financial position than at the start of 1970. Cash or assets readily convertible to cash will have been reduced to such a low level that liabilities owed by the Agency will exceed such assets by over \$1.5 million, while the remaining assets of the Agency (principally supplies) will barely be sufficient to provide the necessary "pipeline" of supplies. Expedients will have been exhausted and, in default of adequate additional income, there will be a breakdown in 1971.

9. The fact of receiving, year after year, less than an adequate income confronts the Agency with problems of three related types, which differ according to the time factor. They are:

(a) Availability of cash in hand from month to month to meet payrolls, pay suppliers etc.; a crisis was barely avoided in 1970—indeed only the timely payment in last April of a large contribution enabled the Agency to meet its payrolls that month. It is clear that, with a materially smaller cash balance in hand at the start of 1971, the risk will be very great that at some time that year the Agency will find itself temporarily without cash and hence unable to meet payrolls and pay creditors.

(b) Availability of sufficient cash over the whole budget year to cover that part of the budget not covered by contributions in

kind; this problem, while unlikely to face the Agency in 1970, will undoubtedly do so in 1971, unless adequate income is received. If income in 1971 does not exceed the estimate for 1970 (approximately \$41 million), the Agency will face a deficit of the order of \$6 million and is likely to run out of funds by September 1971.

(c) Availability of sufficient cash to meet outstanding liabilities if operations were to cease; this type of problem will face the Agency from the end of 1970 on. As noted above, the Agency will in all probability end the year with its liabilities exceeding its cash assets by \$1.5 million or more. Although the problem will not become acute so long as the Agency can meet its current liabilities, it is highly questionable whether the Agency should use for current operations cash needed to meet long-term liabilities that would fall due if operations were to cease, notably staff separation costs (for both international and local staff). (It may be mentioned here that the Agency's present allowance of \$5.8 million for such staff separation costs assumes that a high proportion of its staff will not qualify for termination indemnities because they obtained continued employment. Should this assumption prove invalid, the Agency's liabilities in this respect could amount to \$4 million more than the present allowance.)

10. It seems hardly conceivable to the Commissioner-General that the Agency could continue operations through 1971 in these conditions. It is therefore, in his view, a prerequisite for continuation that the Agency's budget for 1971 should be balanced either by the assurance of adequate income to maintain the existing level of services or by a radical review of the Agency's role and programme, in order to prevent a complete breakdown in the Agency's services at some point in 1971. Since a decision in this regard cannot be delayed much beyond the beginning of 1971, the Commissioner-General must ask the General Assembly to exercise its responsibility and take whatever action it deems appropriate at its twenty-fifth session.

11. The Commissioner-General considers it his duty to ask the Assembly for an unequivocal decision. There can be little doubt that, at their present level, reductions in the relief and health services on the scale necessary to eliminate the estimated deficit for 1971 are impossible. Education is the only sector in which the amount required could be found, but the effect, unfortunately, would be to deal a grievous blow at the most constructive part of the Agency's activities and the only one to go beyond mere relief and look towards the future of the Palestine refugee youth.

General

12. It has seemed appropriate to assess the financial situation described above in isolation in the first place because of its unprecedented gravity, before considering the background against which it should be viewed—a background not only of deepening frustration, uncertainty and fading hopes, but also of a marked change in the Agency's environment due primarily to a transformation in the political role of the Palestine refugee community, which has not been without effect on the 13,000 Palestinians serving the Agency, and the acceptance by the refugee community and by host Governments of a representative, negotiating role for the Palestine politico-military organizations. While this development did not affect equally each of the Agency's five fields of operation, it can be considered, on the whole, as the most significant feature of the year under review and, unless some progress is made in the near future towards a just settlement of the refugee problem, as the factor which, with the Agency's financial position, may require a radical reconsideration of UNRWA's role, methods and programme.

13. In the West and Gaza, the Agency has been confronted with the same operational problems, in general, as last year: actions taken by Israeli military authorities on security grounds, such as curfews; screenings (sometimes in Agency installations); detention or deportation of staff members,

and in two instances banishment to Sinai for six months; demolition of shelters, with damage to adjacent installations; intrusions into Agency premises, including vocational training centres, with arrest of trainees. There was also damage to Agency property by mines or grenades, in the course of incidents. In the year ending 30 June 1970, there were, in the West Bank, fourteen new cases of detention of staff members, and in Gaza, fifty-seven new cases. Further details will be found in paragraph 147 below. The number of staff under detention or serving sentences of imprisonment at any one time has remained about forty; some of them have been sentenced for substantial periods, others have been sentenced and later released, many have been released without being brought to trial, others have remained in prison for periods up to and in excess of one year without any charge having been brought against them, or have been released after detention of varying periods, also without charges against them. In addition, it has still proved impossible to supply many of the prescribed textbooks to UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories (see paragraphs 100-105 below). There have also been problems over the movement of supplies into the occupied territories and over travel permits for staff. The Agency was also confronted with a new type of problem as a result of the decision of the Israeli military authorities to build new, wide roads in several camps of the Gaza Strip and their demolition of shelters on twenty-four hour notice to the inhabitants and without informing the Agency's Field Director beforehand. After representations by the Agency, the authorities agreed that there would be no more demolition until alternative shelter had been made available, and that the Agency would be reimbursed with the costs of the new construction.

14. In Syria, the Government authorized the Agency, in May 1970, to replace tents by concrete block shelters in the emergency camps; this decision is most timely, since many tents needed constant repair, and only a mild winter prevented the situation in

these camps from becoming serious. The Commissioner-General is glad to report also that in June 1970 the Government arranged for the evacuation of the Agency's training centre in Homs, which had been occupied since 1967, without prior consultation with the Agency, by Syrian displaced persons. Problems for which no final solution was reached included issue of visas to locally recruited staff and posting of international staff (see chapter I, section E below).

15. In Lebanon and in east Jordan, however, the Agency was confronted with other developments which caused it grave concern. The developments in question differed in the two countries in several respects, but they had a common source in the considerable growth in numbers, fire-power and influence of the Palestine politico-military organizations, in the enhanced political consciousness of the Palestine refugee community, which raised basic questions of authority and identification, and in the reflection of these developments in the attitude of the Agency's locally recruited staff.

16. The position in the refugee camps in Lebanon was described to the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly by the Commissioner-General during the last session (S/SPC/PV.665). Since then, protracted negotiations have been taking place between the Lebanese authorities and representatives of the Palestine organizations, but they have not so far resulted in the return of police or other Government officials to the camps, or in the release of occupied Agency installations. On the other hand, it must be said that no essential installations are occupied and that Agency services have been maintained without interference (though field investigation for ration roll rectification has not yet been resumed).

17. The Commissioner-General regrets to report, however, that, in May, members of one organization intruded into the Agency's headquarters building and into its main warehouse, both in Beirut, and that the organization made and published threats

against staff members which constituted also a challenge to the authority of the Agency over its staff. As a result, the Government made appropriate police dispositions. The Commissioner-General trusts that there will be no sequel to these disturbing developments, which threaten the essential conditions for the Agency's continued operation. The situation at the Siblin Training Centre in Lebanon, where there were continual strikes by staff and students and a virtual breakdown in discipline, also gave cause for concern for the future of the institution. The Agency has been in close and constant contact, at the highest levels, with the government authorities in regard to these difficulties and has met with understanding and assurances of co-operation.

18. In east Jordan, it is perhaps sufficient to say that the successive confrontations between the Government and the Palestine organizations have posed many problems for the Agency and have had repercussions on its work and on staff relations. The Commissioner-General is glad to report that, throughout the period, there has nevertheless been cordial and fruitful co-operation between the Agency and the Government in dealing with the common task of caring for Palestine refugees and, to the extent the Agency is in a position to help, other displaced persons, and that outside interference with the Agency's operations has been generally avoided.

19. The transformation in the attitude of the Palestine refugee community to which reference has already been made is bound progressively to have a profound effect on the environment in which the Agency operates. Under successive resolutions of the General Assembly, there have been references to co-operation with the Governments of host countries in which the Agency operates and these Governments are also represented on the Agency's Advisory Commission. As a result, consultation with them is continuous, whether on policy or on problems of execution of policy, sometimes by means of well-established procedures, sometimes on an *ad hoc* basis. There is no reference, however,

to consultation with the refugee community. Consultation does take place in practice either through the host Governments or informally between headquarters staff or field directors and individuals or groups, such as Mukhtars, who have some—but not necessarily a continuing—representative quality. There are already signs that, just as the refugee community now exercises an agreed right to consultation with Governments in host countries in some form or another, it will increasingly expect to be consulted on Agency affairs in the same way that the Governments of host countries are consulted by the Agency, though not necessarily on the same subjects. In the field of education, the question of consultation has, in fact, now been raised formally by a recommendation from the Arab host Governments at the tripartite meeting on education in June between the Governments, UNESCO and UNRWA, that representatives from the Palestine Liberation Organization should take part in future meetings on education on the same basis as the representatives of the Governments of the Arab host States. As the tripartite meetings are jointly convened by UNESCO and UNRWA and are the subject of an agreement between the two organizations, the response to this recommendation will be a matter for consultation between the Commissioner-General and the Director-General of UNESCO.

20. The Commissioner-General wishes to record his appreciation of the many instances of initiative and devotion to duty in crisis by agency staff, in the best tradition of service to the refugee community. As a result, essential services have continued with little interruption even in the most difficult, and sometimes dangerous circumstances.

* * *

21. In addition to the information given in chapter I below, it may be appropriate to refer briefly in this introduction to health, education and to the Agency's relations with other organizations.

Health

22. In general, the standards of the Agency's health services are simple, basic and similar to services provided by the Governments of the Arab host countries to their indigent populations free of cost. Because of the growing financial inability described earlier, these services have had to be severely restricted, over the past few years, as regards expansion and improvement, to the extent to which donations from voluntary sources for specific purposes have been available and these have been rather limited. Strict economies have also been applied in their operation. In these circumstances, it would be impossible to reduce further any of the health services without an unacceptable risk to the life and health of the refugees, in particular the vulnerable groups. The refugee community is largely dependent on the health services provided by UNRWA and is in no position individually or collectively, socially or economically, to bear the burden of restrictions or cuts in these services. The hardships that would result would be severe generally and very harsh in many cases especially where hospitalization and medical care costs are concerned. Over the past years, UNRWA's health programme, comprising preventive, curative and environmental sanitation services, has contributed much, and at a relatively low cost to the Agency, towards the health protection and relief of suffering as well as the prevention of epidemics which could prove disastrous and affect local national populations as well. Despite the difficulties which have been faced in the last year, the health of the refugee population has not worsened, nor has there been a deterioration in the nutritional state of the refugees.

23. The Director-General of the World Health Organization, who by virtue of the UNRWA-WHO Agreement is responsible for the technical direction of the Agency's health services, has expressed deep concern over the possibility of cuts in the health programme.

Education

24. The 1969-1970 school year began badly, with strikes by teachers in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan, as a result of a dispute over conditions of service. The disagreement was resolved at the beginning of November, but disturbances in east Jordan and Lebanon interfered with school work on several occasions during the remainder of the year. On the West Bank and in Gaza, the schools were less affected by interruptions than in the previous year. Enormous difficulties were caused in both areas, especially serious in Gaza, by the shortages of text-books. This problem, which has continued to engage the Director-General of UNESCO, is described in more detail in chapter I below (paragraphs 100 to 105). As may also be seen in section C of chapter I, there were a number of positive accomplishments during the school year 1969-1970. It was possible to admit to the UNRWA-UNESCO schools an increased number of refugee students. The successful functioning of the Institute of Education significantly improved the qualifications of teachers in these schools, and thus helped advance the quality of education. The physical plant used for education was further enlarged and improved by the construction and expansion of schools and training centres, with funds received as special contributions for these purposes.

25. The importance attached to education by the whole Palestine refugee community, which justifies the Agency's concentration on the provision of education and technical training services, now its major preoccupation as well as its largest item of expenditure, and hence the major factor in its recurring deficits, explains why the Commissioner-General must view with particular concern any curtailment in this programme.

*Relations with other organs of the
United Nations system*

26. As in the past, UNESCO and WHO have collaborated with UNRWA in the conduct of education and health programmes. Their participation, as essential as

ever, has provided the necessary guarantee of the professional competence of UNRWA's policy and activities in these two fields. Reference may be made, in addition, to the report of a study carried out by a WHO Maternal and Child Health/Nutrition team in 1968, which helped UNRWA to review its related programmes.

27. A number of the Agency's vocational and technical instructors have once more received fellowships at the ILO's International Centre for Advanced Training and Vocational Training in Turin, Italy. The ILO also provided the Agency with the services of an expert, from October 1969 to March 1970, to study the possibilities for extension of vocational training activities. The report and recommendations of this expert are now under study.

28. The Agency's accounts for 1969 have been audited by the United Nations Board of Auditors, and their report will be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. The Agency's report on its administration, budget and financial procedures, prepared in response to a proposal made in the Fifth Committee during the twenty-third session, has been submitted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

Assistance from voluntary agencies and other non-governmental organizations

29. In recording his gratitude to the many voluntary agencies and other organizations and individuals who have provided assistance for refugees and displaced persons during the past year, the Commissioner-General wishes to make special mention of contributions that have made it possible to carry out programmes which, in the Agency's critical situation, might otherwise have been allowed to lapse. The projects financed by these contributions and the names of the donors are noted in the appropriate sections throughout this report, and include the American organization NEED (Near East Emergency

Donations, Inc.); American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen); OXFAM, United Kingdom; Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE), Australia; the Pontifical Mission for Palestine; Diakonisches Werk, Federal Republic of Germany; Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO); the Near East Council of Churches and many others. All contributions made direct to UNRWA from non-governmental sources for regular programmes are shown in table 21 of annex I below. The Commissioner-General wishes to pay tribute to the continued, generous assistance and untiring efforts on behalf of the refugees by voluntary agencies, both international and local, based in the area of the Agency's operation (see table 18 of annex I). He wishes also to acknowledge the unrecorded, free services provided for refugee patients by institutions such as the St. John's Ophthalmic Hospital in Jerusalem, and the Caritas Children's Hospital in Bethlehem.

Summary and conclusion

30. The most significant feature of the year under review was a marked change in the Agency's operational environment. This is due to a transformation in the political dimensions of the Palestine refugee problem, reflected in the attitudes of the refugees themselves (and inevitably in the Agency's staff drawn from the Palestine refugee community) and to a deterioration in public security in some areas. The Agency has sought, in the interest of the refugees for whose welfare it has a mandate, to adapt itself to a changing situation while seeking at the same time to maintain the integrity of its operations incumbent on a United Nations agency. But the pressures to which it has been subject in 1969-1970 have been very great, and, if they continue to grow, they could seriously jeopardize future operations.

31. Concurrently, the Agency's finances have continued to be drained and unless the General Assembly takes adequate positive action at its twenty-fifth session, this may be

the last report on the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The urgent need for effective action has been emphasized by the Secretary-General in a recent letter to States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies.¹ Only an increase in income of about \$5 million will enable the essential work of the Agency to be maintained. Unless sufficient income can be assured, there will inevitably be substantial cuts in the education programme, which would deal a grievous blow at the most constructive sector of the Agency's work and produce repercussions that might well shatter the Agency to the point of disintegration. No less than the continued existence of the Agency is, in fact, at stake.

CHAPTER I

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE AGENCY FROM

1 JULY 1969 TO 30 JUNE 1970

32. The following section of the report describes UNRWA's main activities during the year ending 30 June 1970. Supplemental information on the estimated expenditure for each activity in the calendar year 1970 and the actual expenditure in 1969 is given in chapter II below, which presents the Agency's budget for the year 1971.

A. Relief services

33. The General Assembly, at its twenty-fourth session, recalled its resolutions of the twenty-second and twenty-third sessions calling upon the Government of Israel "to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the [occupied] areas since the outbreak of hostilities" and requested the Security Council to ensure the implementation of these resolutions. None the less, there was little movement during the year by UNRWA-

registered refugees or displaced persons assisted by UNRWA. Few of these were able to return to the West Bank under the "family reunion" scheme (handled by the Government of Israel through municipal authorities on the West Bank), or to Gaza from the United Arab Republic under the auspices of the International Red Cross.

34. The special identification procedures at distribution centres referred to in last year's report were maintained in Gaza, the West Bank and east Jordan throughout the year to assist in the correction of the Agency's registration records.

35. The major task of identifying refugees who became displaced as a result of the hostilities has now been completed and the Agency's records corrected. It has not been possible, however, to process all routine changes in family composition in east Jordan and a large number of births subsequent to June 1967 in that Field still remain unrecorded. The following statistics should therefore be read with these deficiencies in mind.

36. The number of refugees registered with the Agency on 30 June 1970 was 1,425,219 compared with 1,395,074 on 30 June 1969, an increase of 2.2 per cent. However, the number of UNRWA rations issued in June 1970 was 836,926 including issues being made on an emergency basis, compared with 840,353 in June 1969, a decrease of 0.4 per cent, resulting mainly from employment by the Agency or graduation from UNRWA-sponsored training centres. It will thus be noted that only some 58.7 per cent of registered refugees received rations in June 1970. Tables 1 to 3 of annex I below give statistics of registered refugees, the categories of service to which they are entitled and changes in the composition and entitlement of refugee families as recorded by the Agency.

37. In addition to its normal programme of distribution of rations to registered refugees, the Agency, as requested by the Jordanian Government in 1967 and subject to reimbursement by that Government of most of the additional costs, has continued to dis-

¹ See document A/8040 of 17 August 1970 for the letter of the Secretary-General and accompanying statement.

tribute rations to displaced persons in east Jordan, whereas in Syria, the Government is responsible for meeting their needs. In the month of June 1970, 217,557 rations were issued to such persons in east Jordan, compared with 242,483 in June 1969, a decrease of 10.3 per cent.

Eligibility and registration

38. The disruption of registration records in east Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank caused by the major movement of refugee population following the hostilities in 1967, has now been rectified. The checks made in Gaza and on the West Bank on the existence and presence of refugees resulted in the removal of a substantial number of unreported dead and absentees from the ration rolls and, as a result, a further 11,878 rations were issued to needy children in these Fields who, although registered with the Agency were not previously in receipt of rations.

39. In Lebanon, the Agency has not been in a position to carry out the normal investigation programme since October 1969, when governmental authorities withdrew from the camps. The relatively small number of rations which became available through the delegation of ineligible refugees were issued to the children of needy refugees for whom no rations were previously available within the ceiling established for Lebanon.

40. There has been no progress in rectification in Syria, and the Government's opposition to field investigation by the Agency has been maintained. Agency records continue to be amended in respect of deaths and prolonged absences on the basis of Government refugee records, and ration entitlements are adjusted accordingly.

41. In all areas of the Agency's operations, the names of 37,686 persons, including 29,197 ration recipients, were removed from the rolls during the twelve months ending 30 June 1970, compared with 72,433 (of whom 61,877 were ration recipients) in the twelve months ending 30 June 1969. Among the additions to the rolls were

13,327 rations issued to children on the waiting list whose families were found to be suffering hardship. For other rations issued, see table 2 of annex I.

42. The Agency has continued to maintain a limit on the maximum number of ration recipients in each country with no allowance for population increase. As a result, the number of children over the age of one year for whom no rations are available on a permanent basis continues to grow. By June 1970, these children totalled 324,187, of whom 170,422 were in east Jordan, 63,867 on the West Bank, 14,926 in Lebanon, 37,368 in Syria and 37,604 in the Gaza Strip.

43. However, only 268,070 of these children were without rations, for 56,117 of them received temporary rations: in east Jordan, 12,624 children of displaced refugees residing in the emergency camps have been issued with rations by the Agency as a continuing temporary measure, and the children (40,502) of displaced refugees living outside camps have been issued with rations donated by the Government; similarly, in Syria, 2,991 children of displaced refugees in the emergency camps have been issued with rations by the Agency.

Basic rations

44. The calorific content of the basic food ration, which provides approximately 1,500 calories per day in summer and 1,600 in winter, remained unchanged during the period covered by this report, but, since November 1969, there has been some substitution of additional flour for part of the pulses and rice components of the ration, in order to utilize donations of flour received as contributions to the Agency over and above normal requirements (see table 4 of annex I below). The costs of basic rations, including the costs of distribution, accounted for approximately one third of the Agency's budget.

Supplementary feeding

45. The Agency's nutrition and supplementary feeding services include regular

and careful surveillance of the nutritional status and requirements of the specially vulnerable refugee groups. These groups comprise those in the age of growth and development (infants, pre-schools and school children), pregnant and nursing women, tuberculous outpatients, selected medical cases and displaced refugees, particularly those still accommodated in the emergency camps in east Jordan and Syria.

46. The protection of their health and nutrition is of paramount importance, because the UNRWA basic ration is nutritionally unbalanced, lacking as it does not only proteins of animal origin, but also fresh food items, and also because the average refugee, in his difficult economic circumstances, is hardly in a position to make good these dietary deficiencies.

47. In general, it can be stated that the nutrition of the refugees has been maintained satisfactorily during the period of this report. Regular and careful surveillance has been kept over infants under two years of age attending the infant health centres and particularly over these found to be underweight, in a marginal state of nutrition, or showing more specific signs of protein-calorie malnutrition. Such deficiency states are usually associated with or precipitated by attacks of gastro-enteritis and other common childhood infections and are expected to be more prevalent among displaced refugees who are subject to special social, economic and environmental stresses.

48. A daily issue of a mixture of liquid whole and skim milk is available for infants aged six to twelve months, and for those under six months who cannot be breast-fed. An issue of liquid skim milk is made available on twenty-six days per month to children aged one to six years, to expectant and nursing mothers from the beginning of the fifth month of pregnancy until the end of the twelfth month after delivery, and to sick refugees upon medical recommendation. During the scholastic year, there is an issue of milk in the Agency's elementary schools on twenty-days per month. A monthly issue

of 500 grammes of corn flour/soya/milk mixture (CSM) is made available to all children in the age group of six to ten years. The Agency's milk and CSM distribution programmes are made possible through the special annual contribution of skim milk powder and CSM from the Government of the United States of America. During the period under review, the Agency received donations of 1,169 metric tons of skim milk powder and 739 metric tons of CSM.

49. Nutritionally balanced hot meals are provided at Agency supplementary feeding centres six days per week, on an "open" basis to all children up to the age of six years, on medical selection to children between six and fifteen years, and to a small number of sick adults. Over and above the varied standard menus, a special bland high-protein menu is provided for infants and young children suffering from gastro-enteritis and malnutrition. Vitamin A and D capsules are issued to children one to six years of age attending supplementary feeding centres and to elementary school children at the time of school milk distribution. On medical certification, extra dry rations are issued to expectant and nursing mothers from the beginning of the fifth month of pregnancy to the end of the twelfth month after delivery. On medical certification also, tuberculous outpatients receive a monthly supplement equivalent to the UNRWA monthly basic rations.

50. In addition to the foregoing supplementary feeding issues, the emergency feeding programme introduced after the June 1967 hostilities was maintained, with minor changes, throughout the period of this report. While those benefiting under this special programme were mainly the newly displaced refugees, whether living in or out of the emergency camps in east Jordan and in Syria, assistance was also provided to some other categories on the West Bank and in Gaza. In broad outline, the emergency feeding programme consisted of: (a) extension of the daily hot meal and milk distribution to include all displaced refugee children up to the age of fifteen years; (b)

distribution of a monthly protein supplement consisting of one twelve-ounce tin of meat and 500 grammes of CSM (i) to all displaced refugees in Syria, (ii) to those living in emergency camps and to displaced pregnant women, nursing mothers and tuberculous outpatients living outside the emergency camps in east Jordan, (iii) to all pregnant, nursing mothers and tuberculous outpatients in Gaza and West Bank; (c) an extra supplement, including flour, rice and fats, to all displaced refugees living in the tented camps and hardship cases living outside those camps in Syria, which was, however, discontinued with effect from 1 August in order to bring the emergency supplementary rations in Syria in line with those issued to the displaced refugees in east Jordan. Daily hot meals were provided by UNRWA on behalf of the Jordanian Government (on a reimbursable basis) for about 8,000 displaced persons not registered with UNRWA, but living in the emergency camps in east Jordan. The whole/skim milk mixture was made available for the age group of four to six months among the displaced registered refugee population in east Jordan and in Syria.

51. Some contributions were received from various sources, in cash and in kind, including milk and other food items, in support of the supplementary feeding programme.

52. Tables 5 and 6 of annex I below give, in summary, the numbers of various categories of refugees and displaced persons benefiting from the milk and supplementary feeding programmes.

Camps, shelter and construction

53. The Agency continued to provide assistance in sixty-three camps—the fifty-three¹ camps established before 1967 and the ten emergency camps (six in east Jordan, four in Syria) set up in 1967 and 1968 for shelter-needy refugees and other persons displaced as a consequence of the 1967

hostilities. Total camp population increased over the year from some 590,000 to 616,000, of whom 497,000 resided in the established camps and 119,000 in the emergency camps (see tables 7 and 8 of annex I).

54. In the six emergency camps in east Jordan, the total population increased during the year from 91,000 to 103,000, of whom some 61 per cent were UNRWA-registered refugees displaced from the West Bank and Gaza and the remainder other displaced persons from the West Bank, Gaza and the East Ghor (east Jordan River valley). As of June 1970, the Agency had completed most of the major construction programme begun in the autumn of 1968 for both shelter and central services buildings.

55. During the year, UNRWA built 6,084 pre-fabricated family shelters in three of these camps—3,900 units financed by the Federal Republic of Germany, 890 from UNRWA funds released from the Agricultural Credit Corporation of Jordan (under the agreement reached when the Corporation succeeded the Development Bank of Jordan, Ltd., liquidated in 1967), 700 by the Standing Conference of British Organizations for Aid to Refugees, 385 by the Italian Government, 200 by OXFAM (in addition to their contribution to the Standing Conference) and nine by the Catholic Women's League of the United Kingdom. In addition, the Lutheran World Federation financed a self-help shelter construction scheme for some 500 displaced refugee families in Sukhne village, near Zerka. As the year ended, a further increment of about 950 Agency shelters was under construction in one of the camps. When those shelters are added to the 6,000 family units built by UNRWA in four camps and the 2,400 built by voluntary organizations in two camps in 1968-1969, a total of about 16,500 family shelter units will have been built in the emergency camps and one village in east Jordan in less than two years. Finally, the Agency has requested a contributing Government to finance an additional 1,000 shelters to care for the increasing population of these camps.

56. The emergency camps in east Jordan

¹ The camp in Nuweimeh, north of Jericho, has contained no refugees since 1967 and is on a stand-by basis.

have been improved during the year by the erection of additional pre-fabricated or temporary buildings to serve as schools, clinics, dining halls, kitchens etc., as well as by the construction of additional access roads, pathways, storm-water drains and septic tank latrines. A further contribution of pre-fabricated buildings from Diakonische Werke (the Federal Republic of Germany) has been used mainly to provide additional schoolrooms in two camps, while the Pontifical Mission for Palestine has financed and constructed schools in three camps over a period of two years. Thus, it has been possible virtually to eliminate tents as schoolrooms in the emergency camps of east Jordan, though "double-shifting" is still necessary.

57. In the four emergency camps in Syria, the registered refugee population increased during the year from 9,041 to 9,671, and the total camp population to 15,491. All residents continued to live in tents because of the lack of funds to finance the construction of residential shelters. As a result of UNRWA appeals, a special contribution has been received from the World Anglican Community, through the Anglican Archbishop of Jerusalem and the Bishop in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, which will cover shelter construction in one camp, and appeals have been made to voluntary organizations for similar contributions to cover the other camps. Standard school buildings were being constructed in two of the camps and construction will begin in a third camp as soon as a site is made available.

58. Elsewhere, no refugees are accommodated in tents. In the camps in Lebanon, no shelters were built during the year, but construction of new schools was begun in several locations. In the West Bank camps, construction was limited to some improvement in central facilities. In several Gaza camps, the Agency had to replace or build shelters demolished because of the construction, for security reasons, of wide roads by the Israeli authorities, with funds provided or expected to be provided by the occupation authorities.

Special hardship assistance

Clothing

59. The voluntary agencies continued, through their contributors abroad, to make generous donations of used clothing to UNRWA. During the year about 1,200 tons of used clothing were received by UNRWA and distributed to registered refugees in need in east Jordan and on the West Bank, in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. The Agency itself spent over \$30,000 on inland transportation costs and on ocean freight for some of the clothing received from abroad.

60. The following agencies generously maintained and indeed increased their regular contributions to meet the needs of the many thousands of registered refugees and other displaced persons, and other special donations were received from various organizations in the United States of America, Canada and Europe, including the following:

- American Friends Service Committee
- Canadian Lutheran World Relief
- Canadian Red Cross Society
- Caritas-Verband (Federal Republic of Germany)
- Catholic Relief Services (United States of America)
- Church of Scotland
- Church World Service (United States of America)
- Lutheran World Relief, Inc.
- Mennonite Central Committee (United States of America)
- OXFAM (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
- Unitarian Service Committee of Canada
- United Church of Canada
- Women's Royal Voluntary Service
(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Casework programme

61. Special assistance continued to be given to the most needy, amongst whom are the chronically ill, widows with minor children and the aged. They were assisted with either small sums in cash or issues of

clothing, blankets and kerosene. A few cases were helped through special donations to purchase the tools necessary to practice their trade and attain some measure of self-support. Because of budgetary limitations, only a fraction of the real need could be met. Through the casework programme, 132 orphans and thirty-five aged persons were placed in various institutions. Welfare employees continued their work of counselling, helping families solve their problems and trying to mitigate the strenuous conditions presently obtaining.

B. Health services

62. Under the technical supervision of staff lent by the World Health Organization, the Agency has maintained its health programme for the Palestine Arab refugee population. Technical guidance was available from the World Health Organization (WHO) in accordance with the Agreement under which WHO provides advisory and consultative services in health matters to UNRWA. It is to be noted that the World Health Assembly, under resolution WHA22.43 adopted on 24 July 1969 at its twenty-second session, requested the Director-General to take all effective measures in his power to safeguard health conditions among refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East and to report thereon to the twenty-third session. This report was presented, the Agency providing the Director-General of WHO with such information in respect of the displaced UNRWA-registered refugee population (and other displaced persons to whom UNRWA provides assistance) as was required for the purpose of enabling him to complete the report. Subsequently, at its twenty-third session, the World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA23.52 dated 21 May 1970 [see below, Document].

63. The Agency's health programme comprises both curative and preventive elements, the former including services for outpatients attending Agency health centres, referrals for laboratory investigation, specialist consultations and admission to hospital; the

latter includes maternal and child health services, health education and the control of communicable diseases, with special emphasis on prophylactic immunization of the susceptible against specific diseases and on environmental sanitation services. The programme of supplementary feeding and milk distribution has been developed to provide nutritional support for the specially vulnerable groups. In general, the Agency's health programme, though operated within a very limited financial framework has, over the years, effectively safeguarded the health of the refugee community. The individual services are designed to keep in line as closely as possible with the services provided by the Governments of the host countries for comparable sections of the local population in their countries. Close co-operation between UNRWA's Health Department and the Ministries of Health of the Governments of the host countries has continued and has been particularly fruitful in such fields as the control of communicable diseases and mass immunization campaigns.

64. As in previous years, the Governments concerned, universities, charitable organizations, business firms and individuals have given much assistance in such forms as provision of personnel, specialized technical advice and guidance, free hospital, X-ray and laboratory facilities, services in maternal and child health centres, medical supplies, vaccines, layettes and supplementary food items, as well as help in mass vaccination campaigns. Funds were obtained for the training of refugee students, particularly in basic nursing and midwifery. Donations were received covering the annual operating costs of individual units, such as health centres and rehydration/nutrition centres, and part of the operating costs of the emergency supplementary feeding programme. Donations were also received to meet the cost of construction and equipment of a number of new health units and of improvement of accommodation in existing units.

65. A number of improvements have been achieved in the health programme and services during the period of review :

continued gradual extension in all Fields, except Gaza, of the preventive health services to include the regular health supervision of children in the third year of life working towards the eventual aim of covering the whole pre-school age group; strengthening of the basic immunization programme, particularly the extent to which primary protection against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus and poliomyelitis was completed and BCG vaccination was extended among infants and school children; extension to all Fields of protection through vaccination of young children against measles; institution of a special study on the incidence of goitre among school girls in Damascus; establishment of two additional clinical laboratories attached to health centres in east Jordan; strengthening of dental services through the provision of new equipment at Zerka, Baqa'a and Irbed health centres; improvement in facilities in the supplementary feeding dining halls; establishment of the cafeteria system in a number of the Agency's residential training centres. Under the environmental sanitation programme, it was possible to effect a partial replacement of the pit privy latrines by septic-tank latrines in the emergency camps in Syria and east Jordan. The replacement by pre-fabricated shelters of the tents in the emergency camps in the latter Field can be regarded also as a substantial contribution towards the protection of the health of the population groups affected.

66. Through special donations received, an active programme of construction and amelioration of accommodation for health services was maintained. Thus it was possible to make substantial improvements for both patients and staff at Bureij Tuberculosis Hospital, Gaza. In east Jordan, a new health centre is now in use at Marka Camp and another is under construction at Zerka. Plans are well under way for the construction of an infant health centre at Amman New Camp, an infant health centre and a rehydration/nutrition centre at Jebel Hussein Camp, and a health centre at Irbed, all in east Jordan, as well as a health centre at Amari Camp in West Bank. Residential accommodation is

almost completed for health staff living in the east Jordan emergency camps and on call after normal clinic working hours. Dining halls are also being built in these same locations which, when ready, will permit the serving of the daily hot meal under supervision. Work has begun on the construction of a new supplementary feeding centre at Dera'a Camp in Syria.

Curative and preventive medical services

Clinics, hospitals and laboratories

67. Curative and preventive medical services continued to be provided directly by UNRWA at eighty-nine points, at a further fifteen points by Agency-subsidized voluntary societies and at eight points by Governments. The curative services comprise medical consultations, injections, dressings, eye treatments, laboratory examinations, dispensing of medicines and dental services, and referrals to specialists, hospitals and medical rehabilitation centres. During the period of review, the family file system, already in operation for some years in the Gaza Strip, was extended to all health centres in the remaining Fields, thus enabling the treating medical officer to evaluate the health state of the family as a whole as well as that of the individual member. A register of congenital malformations and chronic diseases, covering eighty different conditions, has been created in each health centre for the purpose not only of maintaining a case-sheet for each patient, but also of establishing as accurately as possible statistical records of the prevalence among the refugee population of the separate conditions under review. Four additional diabetic clinics have been established, three in east Jordan and one at Yarmouk in Syria, making a total of nine such special clinics in all Fields. A heavy work-load has been borne by the health centre staff particularly in the Gaza Field where a number of posts remained unfilled because of recruitment difficulties, though the position has now improved considerably. It is considered that the increasing demand for medical services is a reflection, at least in part, of increased strain on the refugee

population resulting from the unstable conditions in the Middle East. Statistical information in respect of outpatient curative services is shown in table 9 of annex I below.

68. During the period of review, the average daily number of hospital beds made available to refugee patients through arrangements made by UNRWA in the five Fields was 1,706. This total includes beds in Agency hospitals, in those subsidized by the Agency, in government and private institutions, as well as beds provided free of charge by Governments and voluntary societies. The average daily bed occupancy was 1,329. Other hospital admissions have also taken place, arranged directly by the patients themselves with government and private hospitals; their number is not known.

69. The Agency maintained its cottage hospital (thirty-six beds) at Qalqilya in the West Bank, nine camp maternity wards (sixty-nine beds), located mostly in the Gaza Strip, and a fifteen-bed paediatric ward in UNRWA-Swedish Health Centre at Gaza. (Part of the annual operating costs of this centre is being met by the Swedish Save the Children Federation.) In addition, UNRWA and the public health authorities in Gaza operated jointly the 210-bed tuberculosis hospital at Bureij. Through a donation from the Finnish Refugee Council, extensive improvements of both patient and staff accommodation, as well as of certain other facilities in this hospital have been made.

70. About four fifths of the hospital beds available are set aside for the treatment of patients suffering from acute conditions of a medical, surgical or gynaecological nature, the remaining one fifth being occupied by those suffering from chronic disabilities, principally tuberculosis and mental diseases. Statistical details in respect of the number of beds available are shown in table 10 of annex I, which also provides similar information in respect of the twenty rehydration/nutrition centres.

71. The Agency maintains a central laboratory in the Gaza Strip. It also operates ten clinical laboratories attached to its larger health

centres (east Jordan, 4; Lebanon, 3; Gaza, 2 and Syria, 1). Of the ten clinical laboratories mentioned above, two were established during the period of review at the Zerka and Jerash health centres in east Jordan. All other laboratory services, whether of a clinical or public health nature, were obtained from governmental, university or private laboratories, usually on a subsidy or on a fee-for-service basis, but in certain instances free of charge.

Control of communicable diseases

72. Through the Agency health centres, the routine data on communicable diseases are collected and the measures for their prevention and control are undertaken and maintained. The governmental and local health authorities collaborate closely with the Agency in various aspects of the control programmes involved by providing certain facilities, vaccines and services. Surveillance of communicable diseases was maintained through weekly reporting by health centres of the incidence of selected diseases and by the investigation of any untoward disease occurrence or any special epidemiological problems. In table 11 of annex I may be found the case incidence of these reportable diseases for the period under review. None of the quarantinable diseases made their appearance among the refugees, nor did epidemic typhus or relapsing fever. Most of the other reportable diseases showed either a downward trend or remained near their level of the previous year. Whooping cough, on the other hand, occurred with greatly increased frequency from May through August 1969 in the Zerka area (east Jordan) and in the outlying communities in the West Bank. With intensification or extension of the immunization programme in these areas, the incidence dropped off to low levels by December. Influenza, which had shown the first epidemic waves in certain areas of Syria and in Gaza early in 1969, developed as a wide-scale epidemic in all Fields towards the end of the year. Following epidemic peaks reached in east Jordan in November 1969 and in all other

Fields in January 1970, the incidence fell off gradually in the ensuing two to three months. Although the epidemic was moderately severe, the excess mortality from it was little, if any, due in part at least to the immunization of vulnerable groups with donated vaccine early in 1969.

73. The total number of new cases of tuberculosis reported by Fields other than east Jordan, which provided statistics for the first nine months only, was almost the same as that reported in the preceding period. In following up the findings of surveys in 1968 and from a further survey in Baqa'a camp early in 1970, it was concluded that tuberculosis is not at present more prevalent among the emergency camp populations than among the general refugee population in east Jordan. The incidence rate in 1969 for this Field (about 19.5 per 100,000) was below the general average of 24 per 100,000 for the refugee population of all Fields. The incidence of other communicable diseases among the newly displaced registered refugees reflected fairly closely the levels found in the refugee population in general.

74. Aside from the general measures of environmental sanitation, the usual control measures of early case detection and treatment, isolation to a limited extent and mass prophylaxis on occasion were employed. For specific long-term prevention, the same range of immunizing agents were employed starting in early infancy, namely, BCG, DPT, poliovirus, TAB and smallpox vaccines. For infants, pre-school and school children, the extent of full primary and reinforcing immunization was substantially increased. BCG vaccination was greatly extended among infants and school children. The use of more efficient agents, such as the lyophilized forms of smallpox and TAB vaccines, was steadily expanded. Thanks to the donation of attenuated vaccines from various sources, there was substantial progress towards the goal of establishing measles immunization as a routine protective procedure in infancy. Since this programme, in view of the Agency's financial situation, has not been included under the regular budget,

its continuation is entirely dependent upon further donations of vaccine. Early in 1970, the use of individual immunization record cards was introduced in all Field as an aid in maintaining up-to-date immunity status.

Maternal and child health

75. The Agency continued to provide comprehensive maternal care and health supervision of infants through some eighty maternity and seventy-nine infant clinics, of which one of the former and two of the latter are operated in Jerusalem by voluntary societies subsidized by the Agency. In east Jordan, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Commonwealth Save the Children Fund and the Lutheran World Federation each continued to provide a medical and nursing team to render maternal and child health services in three of the emergency camps. In Amman, the Ministry of Health's several maternal and child health centres made their services available to the large, scattered refugee population there, and in Amman and Damascus, the Lutheran World Federation had clinics providing maternal and child health services to refugee communities. In Gaza, the Swedish Save the Children Federation undertook to meet the operating costs of the maternal and child health and related training services at the UNRWA/Swedish Health Centre. The Belgian Government provided a paediatrician for the **infant** and child health services at the UNRWA-Belgian Health Centre in Jabalia.

76. The maternal services comprised antenatal, delivery and post-partum care. In the reporting period, 72.4 per cent of the 27,421 deliveries took place in the homes with attendance by local midwives under Agency nursing supervision and the remaining 27.6 per cent, about equally divided, in maternity centres and hospitals. There were nine maternal deaths, giving a mortality rate of 0.32 per 1,000. The issue of extra dry rations and skim milk to pregnant and nursing women provided valuable support to maternal nutrition. Surveys conducted during the period in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan indicate that nutritional anaemia

in pregnancy is a problem of considerable importance, at least in these three Fields. Infant health care comprised regular medical and nursing observation of the growth, development, nutritional state and general health; comprehensive immunization; treatment as necessary; and education of the mother in child care.

77. The nutritional state of the group as a whole was maintained under surveillance by ascertaining monthly for the under-one-year group and bi-monthly for the one-to-two-year group the percentages of underweight infants. Comparing the rates for the calendar years 1968 and 1969, there was a modest improvement in all Fields except for Lebanon, where a small but significant increase in the underweight rate occurred, especially in the one-to-two-year group. In the emergency camp population of east Jordan, the rates of underweight infants in Baqa'a, Jerash and Husson were on the whole above the average for the Field both for the under one-year group or the one-to-two-year group, though some of the pre-1967 camps in Amman had rates of a similar order. Only Jerash camp stood out as having consistently the highest rate for the Field. In Syria, on the other hand, the rates of underweight in the emergency camps were not unfavourable in comparison with the Field average. Further information on the nutritional state of infants and other vulnerable groups in the Jordan emergency camps, based upon a survey early in 1970, is to be found in the sub-section on nutrition later in this chapter. The infant health services continued to find valuable support in the Agency's supplementary feeding programme (see paras. 45 to 52 above), both in helping to maintain normal nutrition and to restore the nutrition of undernourished children either through the open cooked-meal and milk feeding or the special post-diarrhoea menu. For the more serious cases of gastro-enteritis and malnutrition, the rehydration/nutrition centres served a valuable purpose. During the period of review, admissions to the twenty centres (with 216 cots) numbered 2,103 as compared with 1,956 in 1968-1969.

78. As an aid in assessment of the problems of infant health, studies on infant mortality were developed on a more systematic basis in four Fields in 1969. Comparing the data collected in recent years, including 1969, the trend of infant mortality appears to be favourable in Lebanon and Syria, where the rates were 36.2, and 40.3 per 1,000, respectively, in 1969. The Gaza rate of 86.7 in 1969 was substantially reduced from the last previously reported rate of 127.0 in 1964. In West Bank, on the other hand, the trend in the past three years has been definitely unfavourable, the rates being 76.8, 93.5 and 106.3 in the years 1967-1969, inclusive. The proportional mortality in 1969 of the five leading causes of deaths of infants and young children dying in hospital in east Jordan, West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon were found to be as follows: diarrhoeal disease, 24.7 per cent; respiratory infections, 24.1 per cent; nutritional deficiency, 15.4 per cent; prematurity, 9.2 per cent; measles, 6.2 per cent. Nutritional deficiency was associated with about one third of the deaths ascribed to diarrhoeal disease.

79. There has been considerable progress during the reporting period in the development of regular health care for the two- to three-year age group. This has been achieved in all Fields, except in Gaza, where shortage of staff precluded any such development. There, attention is directed mainly to the underweight and problem cases in this age group. After the pilot project stage, which began early in 1969 at selected health centres, the service has been gradually extended to other centres from the latter part of that year. The average number of children of this age under regular care had increased from 1,093 in 1968 to 4,863 in 1969. Desirable as it might be, an expansion of the same service to children in the upper pre-school ages, that is, three to six years, would require certain additional facilities and staff, which could be realized only through specific additional contributions. Both the Health and the Education Departments have had useful exchanges of view with voluntary organizations, such as the American Friends

Services Committee and the World Organization for Early Childhood Education (OMEP), which have shown an interest in promoting the general welfare of pre-school children among the refugees.

80. The school health services were provided to children at 480 schools of the Agency in the five Fields. The service comprises the comprehensive medical examination of school entrants and the follow-up care required; the examination and care of other school children as and when required; referral of undernourished children for supplementary feeding; reinforcing immunization; school environmental sanitation; and systematic health education. The service is provided by the camp health units, supplemented by special school health teams. Such a team could still not be fully reconstituted in Gaza owing to the continuing shortage of medical officers. With the improved organization of the service in other Fields, more attention has been devoted to the study of special problems of school children. For example, a study of 255 school entrants in two camps of the West Bank revealed the presence of intestinal parasites in 97.5 per cent and blood hemoglobin levels below 70 per cent (Sahli method of estimation) in 48.2 per cent. In the Damascus area, grossly visible goitre was observed in 19.8 per cent of 2,887 school girls aged twelve to fifteen years. In the West Bank, a survey revealed dental caries in approximately 30 per cent of school children of both sexes and all ages (six to sixteen). Within its available means, the Health Department is directing special attention towards the amelioration of these and other common problems brought to light by routine examinations and special studies.

81. Statistical information is presented in table 12 of annex I on some of the salient operational features of maternal and infant care and the school health services.

Health education

82. The health education programme continued to place its main emphasis on educating mothers in maternal and child

clinics, children in schools, special groups in social welfare centres, and the general camp communities, on the basic elements of health, the prevention of disease and on individual and community responsibility in protection of health. It is carried out in each Field by teams of Health Education Workers in close co-operation with health centre staff, school teachers and school health committees, social welfare staff, and leaders in the community. The theme selected for the focus of the programme in 1969-1970 was "UNRWA's health services; what they offer and how they can best be utilized in promoting individual and community health". Under this theme, highlighted by the Health Calendar, monthly subjects were developed in weekly health drives in the camps, in classroom sessions, and by group education in health centres and social welfare centres. Besides the Health Calendar, other visual aids, such as monthly leaflets, posters and flannelgraphs, were produced by the Audio-Visual Division at headquarters and distributed widely in all the Fields.

83. World Health Day was again observed in all Fields. On this occasion, a poster and an informational document were produced on the theme "Early detection of cancer saves lives", for wide distribution in all Fields, and the health education programme centred on this topic during the whole month of June.

84. In addition to the general programme mentioned above, each Field undertakes special programmes to meet its own particular needs. Health exhibitions were organized in several Fields on subjects of special interest in the Agency's health programme, as well as campaigns associated with camp sanitation, fly control, immunization, tuberculosis control, mass treatment programmes, etc. Emphasis continued to be placed on group teaching and demonstration in maternal and child health clinics and on the production of suitable visual aids. The health education course on motherhood and child care continued successfully in the third preparatory classes of girls' schools in Gaza.

Nursing services

85. At the end of the period of report, UNRWA was employing 155 graduate nurses and midwives, 285 auxiliary nurses and 55 traditional midwives (*dayahs*). The nursing staff make a most important contribution to the preventive and curative health programmes, having considerable responsibility for the following activities: maternal and child health clinics, layette distribution (including the provision of extra layettes to babies born in the emergency camps and of woollen blankets for the same category born during the winter period), home visiting, supervision of infant feeding, certification of expectant and nursing mothers for supplementary ration distribution purposes, school health, health education, individual and mass immunization, tuberculosis and venereal diseases control, care of the sick in clinics, hospitals, rehydration/nutrition centres, and midwifery services in the home, in camp maternity centres and in one hospital. They also provide nursing services after normal clinic working hours in the Gaza Field and in the emergency camps in east Jordan. Because of the shortages of graduate nurses in Gaza, it was necessary to recruit abroad a number of nurses. In east Jordan, the services of two graduate nurses have been provided to the Agency by the French Government through the French Red Cross. Due credit must also be given to the nursing staff of the various hospitals and clinics subsidized by the Agency for the part they play in the medical care programme for refugees.

Nutrition

86. General surveillance of the health and nutrition of the refugees is maintained through the Agency's preventive and curative services. Of particular importance in this respect are the regular periodic returns on the number and proportion of underweight infants under two years of age, as well as the quarterly reports of the school health officers.

87. A nutrition survey was carried out on a representative sample of some 3,700 displaced refugees (infants, pre-school and school

children, expectant and nursing mothers) living in Baqa'a and Jerash emergency camps in east Jordan. The survey comprised anthropometric measurements, clinical examination, haemoglobin determination and a dietary investigation. In general, the survey showed that infants up to two years of age grow less well than expected by the norms of Boston standards, but that they were, however, growing better than the non-refugee children examined in Jordan in 1962 by the Inter-departmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defence (ICNND). Typical advanced cases of kwashiorkor or marasmus were not observed, but mild protein-calorie malnutrition exists to a considerable extent in the pre-school age group. Riboflavin and vitamin C deficiencies exist in a small proportion of school children and pregnant/lactating mothers. Anaemia was present in substantial proportions of all groups studied but more among the pre-school children of both camps.

88. The aim of the supplementary feeding and milk distribution programme is to protect the most vulnerable groups of the population (infants, pre-school and school children, pregnant and nursing women and selected medical cases). Details of this programme, which is administered and operated by the Agency's Health Department, are given in paragraphs 45 to 52 above. Included is a description both of the normal programme in operation in all five Fields and of the emergency feeding programme, which provides additional assistance to the newly displaced refugees in east Jordan and Syria as well as to certain hardship cases elsewhere.

Environmental sanitation

89. The environmental sanitation programme, which involves the provision of potable water supplies, sanitary disposal of liquid and solid wastes, surface water drainage and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease, was in general maintained satisfactorily in all camps. While tented shelters are still maintained in the emergency camps in Syria, replacement of tents by prefabricated shelters in the emergency camps of east

Jordan and partial replacement of pit privies by the water-seal septic-tank type of latrines have improved the living and sanitary conditions considerably. Improvements in refuse collection are proceeding through the replacement of the metal-wheeled barrows by rubber-tyred hand-carts and the introduction of tractor-trailers. At Homs Camp, the Syrian local authorities have provided community water supply and sewerage systems thereby enhancing greatly the standard of sanitation in the camp. On the other hand, as a result of political tension and problems connected with the maintenance of public order, public sanitation and other facilities in certain established camps were encroached upon particularly through the unauthorized extension of shelters. Responsibility by the vector control aspect of the malaria control programme in Gaza outside of camps was assumed by the local public health authorities on 1 April. The camp sanitation labour force, other than in the emergency camps, was maintained at a ratio of 1.7 labourers per 1,000 camp population. In the emergency camps, as improvements took place (see above), the ratio was reduced in two stages from 2.5 to 2.0 labourers per 1,000 camp population.

Medical education and training

90. In the field of health sciences 442 refugee students are holders of university scholarships (see para. 132 below). Of these, 351 are studying medicine, twenty-three dentistry, sixty-four pharmaceutical chemistry, and four veterinary medicine. There are, in addition, seventy-seven students receiving training in basic nursing, eleven in midwifery, forty-one are in training as assistant pharmacists, thirty-seven as laboratory technicians, five as physiotherapists, nine as public health inspectors. One staff member, a dental surgeon, was granted six months study leave in order to pursue abroad a course of training in periodontology. One medical officer on study leave abroad completed a post-graduate course in cardiology during the period of report. An active programme of in-service training of staff, including doctors, nurses and environmental sanitation

personnel, was continued. During the period of review, 150 students have either completed successfully their course of education or are expected to pass their final qualifying examination: fifty-two in medicine, four in dentistry, eighteen in pharmaceutical chemistry, twelve in basic nursing, eight in maternal and child health auxiliary nursing, twenty-two as assistant pharmacists, sixteen as laboratory technicians, six as X-ray technicians, four as physiotherapists and eight as public health inspectors.

C. Education and training services

91. Total enrolments in 1969-1970 amounted to 219,378 in agency schools at the elementary and preparatory level of general education, 3,656 in Agency vocational and pre-service teacher-training centres, and 1,465 in the Institute's programme of in-service teacher training for agency staff members. In addition, there were an estimated 64,359 refugee children in government or private primary and secondary schools, many of them assisted by agency grants-in-aid. The university scholarship programme in 1969-1970 covered a total of 1,101 awards in Middle East universities, and 115 graduates of the Vocational Training Centres were abroad on training-in-industry schemes, for the most part in the Federal Republic of Germany. Details of enrolments, by educational level, type of training, and country are given in appendices to this report.

92. While these figures do reflect steady progress in the expansion of the education programme, to keep pace with the growth in the population of school age, so that it now involves over half of the Agency's total staff and costs 45 per cent of the Agency's budget, 1969-1970 has not been an easy year, as it has been marred throughout by strikes by teachers or by students, protests and demonstrations, curfews, shooting incidents and damage to agency school buildings and equipment. While these troubles were seldom simultaneously agency-wide, they reflected adversely on the programme and the educational advancement of the students

concerned, especially in Gaza, as well as in east Jordan and Lebanon, where conditions were particularly unsettled during the year.

93. Towards the end of the year under review, from 25 to 28 June 1970, the fourth meeting of the present series between representatives of UNESCO, UNRWA and the Governments of the Arab host countries took place in Beirut, and the recommendations resulting from this latest meeting are now under consideration by UNESCO and UNRWA. Some of these recommendations raise serious problems for the Agency, both from a financial point of view and on grounds of principle. For instance, the Governments of the Arab host countries recommended that UNRWA/UNESCO schools must be considered as "private schools and therefore subject to the laws, regulations and by-laws applicable to private schools". The implications for the UNRWA/UNESCO school system of this recommendation will be explored with the Governments in consultation with the Director-General of UNESCO. As a result of a project for co-operation with the International Labour Office in vocational training, the Governments of the Arab host countries also expressed their apprehension lest consultation and association with other international organizations should affect UNRWA's basic responsibility for services to Palestine refugees.

94. The Agency also took part in the Regional Workshop on Teacher Training, held in Beirut from 7 to 12 July 1969, and in the third Regional Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning in the Arab World, held in Marrakesh, Morocco, from 12 to 21 January 1970. Both of these meetings were organized by UNESCO. At Marrakesh, the Director-General of UNESCO made a stirring appeal for assistance to the UNRWA/UNESCO joint education and training programme.

95. Funds provided by NEED (United States private sources), the Swedish Save the Children Federation, the Government of Denmark, and Austcare (Australia), in the period following the hostilities of June 1967

have enabled the Agency, despite its operational deficits, to carry on with its capital expansion programme in the field of education, particularly in the provision of new schools, additional classrooms to existing schools, and science laboratories in the general education sector, and in expanding facilities in the vocational and teacher-training sector. In the former sector, 1969-1970 was not as productive as had been expected mainly because of the considerable delays experienced in obtaining suitable sites for schools in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan. Nevertheless, a total of 320 schoolrooms and eleven science laboratories have been completed in east Jordan and twenty-one science laboratories on the West Bank, while a total of 191 schoolrooms and seven science laboratories are presently under construction in east Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Various circumstances have called for a slight modification of the original school programme, and there is now a balance of 295 schoolrooms and seven science laboratories to be completed; these are either in the design stage or held up pending the acquisition of building sites.

96. Better progress was made in the training sector, particularly in the construction of a \$1,250,000 project financed by NEED in the Amman area of Jordan. This is a combined teacher and vocational-training centre for 300 young men and 400 young women. It will replace two temporary centres in the Amman area set up by the Agency in the autumn of 1967, when admission of refugee students from Lebanon, Syria and the east Bank of Jordan into the Agency's training centres on the occupied West Bank was no longer possible, and represents a permanent addition to the educational opportunities open to young refugees since admissions to the West Bank centres have been maintained at the pre-1967 level. It has been planned to open the new centre by the beginning of the 1970-1971 school year, and up to mid-1970 it looked as if this target date would be achieved. Unfortunately, the crisis which affected east Jordan, and in particular Amman, in June, resulted both in structural damage to some of

the buildings already completed, and to work stoppages by the contractor's staff. Present indications are that the centre will not be ready for occupation before February or March 1971. Work also began on the expansion of Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre, in the Amman area, with funds provided by the Federal Republic of Germany. Work continued on the expansion of the Ramallah Women's Training Centre in Ramallah, near Jerusalem. This project was financed by NEED. The expansion of Gaza Vocational Training Centre, providing for an increase in intake from 368 to 556 trainees, was completed this year. Alterations were made this year also to transform the two adjacent centres operated by the Agency at Sibliin, in the Lebanon, into a combined training centre under a single administration. In March 1970, the United States Government made a special additional donation of \$1,000,000 to the Agency towards the expansion of its training programme, and it has been agreed that this contribution will be used to cover the operating costs of the new Amman Training Centre, the operating costs of the expansion of Gaza VTC, and the initial capital and operating costs of an additional 144 training places on a residential basis at Kalandia Vocational Training Centre on the West Bank.

97. In last year's report, reference was made to the troubled relations between the Agency and its teaching staff over the latter's resistance to the new service and salary conditions which the Agency had introduced in July 1968 and which were later withdrawn in consequence of strike action.¹ This action did not satisfy the teachers completely and 1969-1970 has been disturbed by further strikes, the most serious of which was a five-week stoppage in September-November 1969 in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan. These strikes also affected the Agency's training centres in these countries. Negotiations continued between the Agency and the different groups of teachers, and agreement was reached with the teachers by the end of 1969 on the main points at issue.

¹ *Official Records of the Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), paras. 97-101.*

General education

98. Despite this somewhat sombre picture, the UNRWA/UNESCO school system continued to function and even to expand. During the year under review, it operated 480 elementary and preparatory schools for a total of 219,378 refugee children. In addition, 45,755 registered refugee children were enrolled in government and private schools in these two cycles, which cover the first nine years of general education (for details see tables 13 to 16 of annex I). In 1969-1970, the Agency employed 6,268 teachers and head teachers in its own school system, in addition to a supervisory staff of 61 elementary and subject supervisors divided between the five Field Offices, each of which has its own educational administrative staff headed by a Field Education Officer. Co-ordination and technical control over these five largely autonomous field education systems is achieved through the UNRWA/UNESCO Department of Education at Agency headquarters.

99. Attendance of refugee students at government and private schools in the upper secondary cycle totalled 18,604 in 1969-1970. The Agency made some financial contributions towards the education of these students, but the major part of the burden is borne by the Governments concerned.

100. The textbook problem continued to bedevil the UNRWA/UNESCO school system and to call for considerable attention from the Director-General and the secretariat of UNESCO. The Director-General visited the Middle East in August 1969, and had discussions with the Israeli authorities and, in Amman, with representatives of the Governments of the Arab host countries. These raised fresh hopes that a solution would soon be found to the problem. Further discussions and consultations continued throughout 1969-1970 with some progress. Meanwhile the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in Gaza and the West Bank continued to be deprived of the major part of the text-books prescribed for use.

101. In October 1969, the UNESCO

Executive Board, in the course of its eighty-third session, once more discussed the text-book issue, and adopted resolution 4.2.3. In this resolution, approved by a vote of 27 to 1, with 4 abstentions, the Executive Board urgently called on the Government of Israel to remove immediately any obstacles in the import and use of the text-books approved by the Director-General in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories, asked UNRWA not to use in its schools in east Jordan the three text-books found unacceptable by the Director-General (which UNRWA has not yet been able to achieve), commended the Director-General for the measures he had already taken and asked him to report progress on the implementation of the present resolution. The Director-General subsequently had consultations with the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic and Israel, and was able to report to the next session of the Board that, in January 1970, Jordan had agreed to accept the proposed changes in certain of its text-books and would embody these changes in the prescribed text-books for 1970-1971. The United Arab Republic gave similar assurances in June. In the Lebanon, where school texts are not published or prescribed by the Government, the commercial publishers of two of the seven queried texts announced in March their intention to modify and reprint these two books. There was no change in the attitude of Syria, which had previously rejected the setting up of the Commission of Outside Experts as being an encroachment on its national sovereignty.

102. Shortly after his visit to Israel, the Director-General wrote to the Permanent Delegate to UNESCO, reiterating his request to the Government of Israel to permit, as a matter of urgency, the importation into the West Bank and Gaza of the eighty-four books approved by him for use in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in these areas. He sent a similar request in October 1969 concerning an additional thirty-four books, and a third request in March 1970 concerning eight other books. In February, the Perma-

nent Delegate advised the Director-General that his Government would permit the import of specific text-books from Jordan as soon as all text-books in UNRWA/UNESCO schools in that country had been replaced or amended in full accord with the recommendations of the Commission and the Director-General's rulings.

103. Towards the end of the school year, the Government of Israel allowed the Agency to import into its West Bank schools a number of English language school texts, and copies of the Koran, but permission to import the school texts published in Jordan was not forthcoming.

104. This was the situation when the UNESCO Executive Board met again in June 1970 to hear the Director-General's report on this item. This report drew attention to the seriousness of the situation in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the occupied territories resulting from the shortages of text-books and of teaching notes. In Gaza, the 60,000 students enrolled in the Agency's schools needed 500,000 school texts; they had in 1969-1970 only 90,000 teaching notes and obsolete text-books, the latter for the most part falling to pieces. The situation was less unsatisfactory in the West Bank, where the 28,000 students had 143,000 copies available out of a total of 220,000, but in certain subjects of the curriculum virtually no texts or teaching notes were available.

105. In the debate which followed, the Board, by a vote of 25 to 2, with 5 abstentions, approved a resolution which deplored with grave concern the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with paragraph 7 of the previous resolution¹ and physically admit into the occupied territories all the text-books approved by the Director-General; called for early admission of these books by the Government of Israel; invited all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the relevant resolutions of the Executive Board, and asked the Director-General, in the event that the Government of Israel failed to permit the

¹ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), annex II.

importation of these books, to report urgently to the Board, to enable it to reconsider the matter and formulate its recommendations to the sixteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference [See below, Document 344].

106. During the same session, the Executive Board authorized the Director-General to take appropriate steps to launch an international appeal describing the conditions of the Palestine refugees and urging participation in the provision of assistance to ensure the continuation and improvement of the education services provided for them.

107. The organization by UNESCO in August 1969, with the active collaboration of the United Arab Republic and Israeli authorities, of secondary school certificate examinations for some 7,000 students of both sexes in the Gaza Strip, was a remarkable example of international co-operation in very unfavourable circumstances. This operation, which was supervised in Gaza by local government and Agency staff working under the control of a team of international experts from UNESCO and UNRWA, resulted in 5,109 students passing the United Arab Republic certificate examination, and in 1,031 subsequently crossing the Canal zone in five convoys, conducted by the International Red Cross, to take up university scholarships offered by the United Arab Republic Ministry of Higher Education. This constructive action has brought fresh hope to thousands of young Gaza residents, most of them registered refugees. The Israeli Defence Department has given an undertaking to permit these students to return to Gaza during the long vacation and at the end of their university education.

Lebanon

108. The UNRWA/UNESCO schools in the Lebanon began the new school year on 1 September 1969 with a deficit to make up, as the disturbed conditions of the previous year had prevented the 1968/1969 syllabus from being fully covered. No sooner had the year started, however, than the camp schools

in the north had to close for security reasons. A sit-in strike affecting the whole area began on 4 October and lasted until 3 November, when a settlement between the Agency and its teaching staff in Jordan helped to bring the Lebanon teachers' strike to an end. This did not restore peace to the school system, as sporadic strike action by pupils followed in November and December for a variety of reasons, mainly affecting schools in south Lebanon. The early part of 1970 was relatively tranquil, but fresh disturbances, not the consequence of Agency action, occurred in March and the latter half of April. These stoppages, and the generally unsettled conditions prevailing in the schools even when they were supposed to be normally operating, have had a serious effect on both the quantity and the quality of the work done.

109. As a result of representations from the teaching staff in Lebanon, the Agency agreed early in 1969 to consider the teaching of Palestine history and geography in UNRWA/UNESCO schools in Lebanon. A recommendation to the same effect was subsequently made at the 1969 meeting of representatives of the Governments of the host countries, UNESCO and UNRWA on education, and with the agreement of the Director-General of UNESCO and the approval of the Lebanese Ministry of Education, the subject was introduced as from January 1970. New material has been provided by the Department of Education, with the technical assistance of the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education.

Syria

110. Agency schools in Syria were equally affected by the teacher's strike in October over conditions of service, but have since had a better work record, despite difficulties caused by shortages of school texts. Construction of additional classrooms, for which funds have been contributed, has been delayed for lack of suitable sites. 312 elementary and 51 preparatory class sections were on double shift during the 1969-1970 school year, the majority in the Yarmouk quarter, Damascus.

East Jordan

111. The teachers' strike also affected the east Bank area of Jordan, until 18 October, after which a plan was put into effect to make up for the time lost. Considerable efforts were made by the teachers and pupils to achieve the desired target, but later in the school year teaching was disrupted on a number of occasions by incidents affecting public security. Moreover, some of the Agency's schools in Irbed in north Jordan were in an area subject to shelling, and this had an adverse effect on attendances. The prescribed curriculum was covered by the end of the school year, however, and final examinations were completed on schedule.

West Bank

112. Apart from brief strikes in September and some curfews in October, the school year on the West Bank has been relatively good in so far as work and attendance are concerned. The schools suffered seriously from a shortage of text-books and of certain teaching notes, however, which had to be withdrawn and could not yet be replaced by the text-books approved for use by the Director-General of UNESCO. It is estimated that this has caused an effective loss of between a quarter and a third of the school year, despite the overtime worked by many schools.

Gaza

113. UNRWA/UNESCO schools in Gaza suffered even more seriously than those in the West Bank from an almost complete lack of text-books and teaching notes, and this has placed an extra, heavy burden on the teachers who have had to resort to large-scale dictation. Despite generally unsettled conditions in the Strip, the UNRWA/UNESCO school system continued to operate with acceptable results. There is no doubt that the successful holding of the secondary school certificate examinations in Gaza in 1969 contributed to this by boosting the morale of both teachers and students.

Youth activities programme

114. This programme, which is carried

out in partnership with the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations, is now generally accepted by the refugees as an important factor in camp life. It aims to train refugee youth to become responsible members of their communities and to channel their interests and energies into constructive activities. In addition to sports and recreational activities, emphasis is laid on community services and active participation in developing projects for the community. The programme has also developed a sense of individual responsibility in the participants and fostered the concept of working together for the good of the community.

115. Voluntary leaders are selected and trained to assume responsibility for the thirty-four youth activities centres which serve around 3,000 young men and to organize, through committees drawn from the centres, cultural, recreational, sports and community activities in the centres and the camps.

Pre-school children's activities

116. There is a growing awareness in the Middle East of the importance of pre-school education in the development of children, a matter which has been of concern to the Agency over the years. Unfortunately no funds can be made available from the Agency's budget for this programme, which must therefore be financed from special contributions.

117. Ideally a pre-school programme should cover all facets of a child's development—social, education and health—and the Agency, with the active assistance of voluntary agencies, is endeavouring to improve its present programme, which is limited both in scope and content. In the emergency camps in east Jordan, a number of voluntary agencies are administering and operating children's centres at their own expense and in co-operation with the Agency with a view to meeting the needs of the refugee children. On the West Bank, the Young Men's Christian Associations are operating pre-school centres in three camps. The Agency has also entered into an agreement with the Ame-

rican Friends Service Committee whereby they will finance, operate and improve the Agency's centres in Gaza. There are at present twenty-six centres operating in the area of UNRWA's operation, serving 3,486 children in the age group three to six years. In general, these children are given milk and a hot meal, but only a relatively small percentage at present are under regular medical supervision by the Agency's doctors.

Teacher Training

118. The Agency is active in the field of teacher training, both to provide for its own needs and to give selected young refugees of both sexes a professional training which would enable them to be gainfully employed outside the Agency's services. The programme falls into two distinct, but professionally related sectors, pre-service training of school leavers and the in-service training of Agency staff members, who now exceed 6,250 in the teaching service. The former category of training is undertaken in the UNRWA/UNESCO residential training centres and the latter by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education, operating on an Agency-wide basis from its Beirut headquarters.

Pre-service

119. The Agency's pre-service teacher-training programme is of a two-year duration at post-secondary school level. In the school year 1969-1970, the Agency operated five centres: two on the West Bank, two (temporary) in east Jordan and one in Lebanon.

120. A new training centre is being constructed on the outskirts of Amman (see paragraph 96 above). It will absorb the two temporary centres which have functioned since 1967 in Amman, and will have a total enrolment of 700 students; 300 men and 250 women following courses in teacher education and 150 women following courses in vocational training. The Centre will have a central administration, with shared library, stores, kitchen and laundry facilities, but with separate dining-rooms, reading rooms, classrooms and dormitory facilities.

121. At the beginning of the school year 1969-1970, the Technical and Teacher Training Institute in Siblin (Lebanon), which combined teacher training and technical education, was amalgamated with the Vocational Training Centre, also in Siblin, under the common name of the Siblin Training Centre. The capacity of the teacher-training section was reduced from 200 to 125 students.

122. In the period under review, these five pre-service teacher-training centres concentrated on two-year courses of training to prepare teachers principally for the six grades of the primary (elementary) education cycle. Some aspects of the curricula were, however, based on the assumption that the centre's graduates may be called upon to teach classes in the preparatory cycle.

123. The total number of refugee trainees enrolled in the UNRWA pre-service teacher-training centres in 1969-1970 was 1,153 compared with 1,162 in 1968-1969 and 1,219 in 1967-1968. This number is expected to reach 1,395 in 1970-1971, when the new Amman Centre begins to operate.

In-service

124. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education continued in 1969-1970 to provide in-service training for teachers employed in UNRWA/UNESCO schools, but shifted the emphasis from elementary to preparatory school teachers. By the end of the school year 1968-1969, the Institute had completed six of its basic two-year or three-year courses for the in-service training of elementary teachers. Out of a total initial intake of 2,797 elementary teachers enrolled between 1964 and 1967, 1,901 (about 68 per cent) have successfully completed all the requirements of their training programme, and have been recognized by the Agency as professionally certificated elementary school teachers. In addition, 653 elementary school teachers are still undergoing in-service training with the Institute, having begun their training in 1967, 1968 or 1969. Of these, 372 will

complete their training in August 1970, and 281 in August 1971. The total number of elementary school teachers who have so far been involved in this programme of on-the-job professional training is 3,450. This represents about 80 per cent of the total number of elementary school teachers in the school year 1969-1970. When the Institute started operation in October 1964, it was estimated that only about 10 per cent of the total of elementary teachers were professionally qualified. The first phase of the Institute's task, that is, the upgrading of elementary school teachers, has been running down over the past two years, and is expected to continue to run down during the next two school years, but not to be eliminated completely.

125. With the decrease of enrolment in the basic courses for training elementary teachers, the Institute has further expanded and diversified its programme for the in-service training of preparatory-level teachers, which started on an experimental basis in 1967-1968. By the end of the school year 1968-1969, 159 preparatory school teachers, out of an initial intake of 349 (about 45 per cent), have successfully completed all the requirements of their training courses and have been certificated as qualified Agency teachers for the preparatory level. In addition, 685 teachers are still undergoing training with the Institute in preparatory-level courses of different specializations: mathematics, science, Arabic, social studies, English and home economics. Of these, 297 will complete their training in August 1970 and 388 in

August 1971. The duration of the preparatory-level courses varies according to the teachers' academic background and the level of their teaching duties. The total number of preparatory school teachers who have so far been involved in the programme of on-the-job professional and academic training is 1,034, which represents about 54 per cent of the total preparatory-teacher population in the school year 1969-1970. The expansion of the programme for the training of preparatory-school teachers is expected to continue during the coming two school years.

126. In the school year 1969-1970, the Institute introduced, on a limited and experimental basis, a special course in school administration for fifty-two head teachers employed in UNRWA/UNESCO schools in east Jordan and Syria. It also organized an *ad hoc* course in the use of the global method for seventy-five teachers of Arabic to elementary school children in grade one in the Damascus area. Within the framework of its research activities, the Institute has produced new instructional material for use in schools. The Institute has thus embarked upon the third phase of its task, that is, the improvement of the quality of education in UNRWA/UNESCO schools through the training of key education personnel and through methods other than the qualification of unqualified and underqualified teachers.

127. Since 1965-1966, the total training strength of the Institute has been maintained at about 1,500 trainees per year, as can be seen from the following tables:

	'64-'65	'65-'66	'66-'67	'67-'68	'68-'69	'69-'70
Courses for training elementary teachers	862	1,506	1,552	1,398	927	653
Courses for training preparatory teachers	-	-	-	190	620	685
Special types of courses (the head teachers' course and the global method course)	-	-	-	-	-	127
	862	1,506	1,552	1,588	1,547	1,465

128. UNESCO has now provided the Institute with a closed circuit television unit and videotape recording facilities. During the first stage, experiments will be conducted on production techniques and procedures as well as field utilization and the training of personnel. For this purpose, a small experimental closed circuit television studio has been installed in the Institute. With the help of an additional contribution from the Swiss Government, it has been possible to establish five new posts at the Institute to enable it to develop further its methods, particularly in the use of programmed instruction, of closed circuit television and in documentation and research.

129. The Institute continued its plans for the further training of its professional staff at both the headquarters and field levels. The annual seminar for Field Representatives and Subject Supervisors was held at the UNESCO Palace, Beirut, from 7 to 11 February 1970. The programme concentrated on ways of improving the quality of seminar instruction and media, practice teaching, self-study practices and guidance to the trainees in their research studies.

University scholarships

130. UNRWA awarded a total of 1,101 scholarships to Palestine refugees for university-level study during the academic year 1969-1970. Of these, 943 were continuing scholarships and 158 were new. UNRWA scholarships funded from various sources are awarded only for one year at a time, but are renewable from year to year for the duration of the course of study undertaken by the individual student provided he satisfactorily passes the end-of-year examination held by his faculty.

131. In 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany generously agreed to assist Palestine refugee students whose university studies had been affected by the hostilities of 1967 by sponsoring a five-year programme through the provision of funds to the extent of \$850,000. Of this total, an amount of \$237,000 for 496 scholarships was allocated for the school year 1969-1970.

132. The distribution of university scholarships is shown in the following table:

UNIVERSITY SCHOLARSHIP HOLDERS BY COURSE OF STUDY AND COUNTRY OF STUDY
DURING THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1969-1970

<i>Course of Study</i>	<i>United Arab Republic</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Total</i>
Medicine	256	12	73	-	-	10	-	351
Pharmacy	33	3	23	-	-	5	-	64
Dentistry	6	-	11	-	-	6	-	23
Veterinary	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Engineering	133	25	48	-	-	38	4	248
Agriculture	16	2	5	-	-	1	-	24
Teacher training	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	33
Commerce and economics	11	7	5	33	-	-	-	56
Arts	55	21	41	22	18	-	-	157
Science ^a	30	33	24	31	14	9	-	141
TOTAL	577	103	230	86	32	69	4	1,101

^a Includes scholars who may later enter the medical faculty of their university.

133. Several Governments have also granted scholarships to Palestine refugee students. These include, in addition to the Governments of Arab host countries, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, the Sudan and Turkey.

Vocational and technical education

134. There are now six training centres established by the Agency for vocational and technical education, and operated on a residential basis for Palestine refugees. The apparent reduction from seven to six¹ is due to the amalgamation of the two previously independent training centres in Siblin (see paragraph 121 above) into one operational unit. In addition, a number of expansion schemes were implemented and an increase was in fact registered in 1969-1970 in the over-all training capacity of the programme, the number of places available being 2,656, compared with 2,408 for the previous year.

135. The capacity and location of each of the vocational and technical training centres are given below, and further details of the training places available by centre and by course of study are given in table 17 of annex I below.

contribution of the Government of the United States of America of \$1,000,000 (see paragraph 96 above).

137. Regrettably, many of the Agency's training centres have lost considerable training time during the past year. As already mentioned, the training centres located in Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan lost more than one month at the beginning of the school year owing to a sympathy strike staged by the instructional staff of the centres in support of the teachers in the general education sector. In addition, the centres in east Jordan and Lebanon, particularly the latter, have lost more time because of strikes staged mainly by students. The time lost by the Siblin Centre in Lebanon has reached such proportions that it is doubtful if the students will be able to complete their courses before the end of the school year. The amount of time lost in the centres on the West Bank and Gaza is less significant, but the situation in Gaza has deteriorated recently and could give cause for concern in the future.

138. The employment prospects of graduates from the Gaza Vocational Training Centre continue to be less than satisfactory,

<i>Centre</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Number of training places in vocational and technical education</i>
Kalandia Vocational Training Centre	West Bank	376
Wadi Seer Training Centre	East Jordan	452
Gaza Vocational Training Centre	Gaza	556
Damascus Vocational Training Centre	Syria	404
Siblin Training Centre (Vocational Training wing)	Lebanon	556
Ramallah Women's Training Centre	West Bank	312
	TOTAL	2,656

136. Plans are being formulated for a further expansion of the vocational training programme, made possible by the special

in spite of efforts by the Agency to alleviate the situation.

139. Arrangements were made in 1969-1970 for 115 graduates of Agency vocational training centres to be given the opportunity of gaining work experience in modern

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (7614), para. 126.*

industry in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Agency is indebted to the Government for making it possible for this important adjunct to the training programme to be continued. The number benefiting from this scheme in 1969-1970 could have been higher if forty-one graduates from Gaza Vocational Training Centre who were selected for this scheme had been able to obtain travel documents from the United Arab Republic and take part. Negotiations are taking place between the Agency and the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to continuing this scheme in 1970-1971 with another 150 graduates from UNRWA training centres and it is hoped that it will be possible for refugees from Gaza to take part in the coming year.

Adult training courses

140. Refugees who lack the academic qualifications necessary for admission to vocational training centres were enabled to acquire a skill through adult training courses and so improve their prospects of earning a living. During the year, forty-five young men attended one-year carpentry courses organized in three centres. Further, in thirty-three centres run by the Agency and six by voluntary agencies, 1,743 young women attended six-month sewing courses in which they also received instruction in cooking, home management and hygiene, as well as literacy. Moreover, 667 girls and young women attended thirteen centres, where they participated in a variety of women's activities. The training at these centres is designed to teach the young women to improve their standard of living by their own initiative, and includes literacy classes, remodelling of second-hand clothing, teaching of embroidery, knitting, first aid, child care and household skills. In addition, cooking courses were organized to teach these young women how to prepare simple meals based on UNRWA rations. The continuation of these activities is mainly dependent on receipt of special donations.

Training of the handicapped

141. Through its programme for the rehabilitation of the physically disabled, the Agency has, since 1958, endeavoured to meet the needs of blind, deaf and crippled refugees by providing them with education and training and thus helping them to move from a feeling of seclusion and loneliness towards social, educational and economic integration in the community.

142. During this year, 275 disabled boys and girls, including fifty accepted free of charge, were placed in various institutions in the Middle East. Among them were sixty-five blind children and adults receiving training from the Centre for the Blind in Gaza, which is financed by the Pontifical Mission and administered by the Agency and which provides elementary education from the first to the sixth grades for forty-four students and vocational training for a further twenty-one students. The Centre also operates a home unit section, which serves thirty-five adult refugees residing in Agency camps and provides them with work.

D. Common services and general administration

143. The numbers of staff on the Agency's manning-table at 30 June 1970 as compared with 30 June 1969 are given in table 23 of annex I.

144. During the period under review, the locally recruited staff manning-table was increased so as to allow for the annual increase in teachers' posts and to accommodate, upon reclassification as manning-table employees, a number of pre-existing and regularly employed casual distribution labourers in east Jordan.

145. The net increase in the international manning-table at 30 June 1970 was nine posts, all in the field of education, reimbursable or not. During the year, twenty vacancies were filled and ten occurred. Of the total of 133 international posts on the manning-table on 30 June 1970, thirty-three were paid for by other organizations (mainly UNESCO and WHO).

146. As indicated in the last annual report, the Agency's salary policy for locally recruited staff has been, within the limits set by the availability of funds, to use as a guide levels of remuneration of the Governments of host countries in each Field for comparable groups of employees. Basing itself on this policy, the Agency approved a 4 per cent cost-of living allowance for its employees stationed in the Lebanon with retroactive effect to 1 January 1969 and, in the light of two separate costs-of-living adjustments approved by the Jordanian Government, effected a number of salary and allowance revisions for its staff in Jordan (East Bank and West Bank) and in Gaza. These comprise a revision of the Manual Service salary scales and a 6 per cent cost-of-living allowance for area staff in Gaza effective 1 July 1969; a 4 per cent cost-of-living allowance for area staff on the West Bank effective 1 July 1969; revised Manual Worker salary scales in the East Bank and West Bank of Jordan and in Gaza effective 1 January 1970, and supplementary to the 1 April 1969 revisions already reported; and a 4 per cent cost-of-living allowance for area staff in Gaza effective 1 January 1970. There have similarly been revisions of the locally recruited staff dependency allowances and, effective 1 January 1970, incremental steps have been introduced into the Manual Worker salary scales throughout the Agency. With effect from 1 April 1970, additional cost-of-living allowances have been approved for area staff and Manual Workers serving in Jordan (East Bank). Effective 1 July 1970, the Agency's Manual Worker salary scales were increased in Lebanon and Syria so as to conform more closely to the minimum wage standards established by the Governments of the host countries.

E. Legal matters

The Agency's staff—detention

147. The Agency continues to be concerned about the detention of members of its staff. The following table gives the number of employees arrested and detained in Gaza

during the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970, and not charged with any criminal offence:

<i>Period of detention</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
Up to 3 days	7
4-7 days	6
1 week to 1 month	12
1 month to 3 months	19
3 months to 6 months	8
(including 2 banished staff members)	
More than 6 months	5
	<u>57</u>

Out of these fifty-seven cases, thirteen of the persons involved were still under detention on 30 June.

Comparable figures on the West Bank are as follows:

<i>Period of detention</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
Up to 3 days	2
4 to 7 days	1
1 week to 1 month	2
1 month to 3 months	-
3 months to 6 months	2
More than 6 months	7
	<u>14</u>

Out of these fourteen cases, seven staff members were still under detention on 30 June. During this same period, nine staff members (five in Gaza and four in the West Bank) have been brought to trial by military courts, of whom four (two in Gaza and two in the West Bank) had been arrested and detained prior to the reporting year.

148. Further matters affecting the Agency's activities in the occupied territories, are the deportation and the "banishment" or "rustication" of staff. In September and October 1969, two head teachers of Agency schools in the West Bank and a teacher in one of the schools were deported by the Israeli authorities to the East Bank. The Agency protested strongly to the authorities about these deportations, which are contrary not

only to the Fourth Geneva Convention,¹ but, as they affect the Agency's operations, also to the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 100 and 105). Having regard to the latter, the Agency enquired as to the reasons for the deportations, but was not informed of them in any precise terms. Regarding staff "banished", on 17 December 1969, two of the Agency's staff in Gaza (the General Education Officer, and a head teacher) were removed by the Israeli authorities to places in the desert of Sinai. The Agency made representations to the Israeli authorities, but has been unable to obtain adequate information as to the reason for this action. These two staff members were released and returned home on 12 June 1970.

149. One of the difficulties that has always confronted the Agency in this sphere is that of obtaining adequate information from the authorities as to the reasons for the detention or deportation of staff. In response to representations made to the Government of Israel, the Agency has been told that the authorities are willing to inform the Agency in general terms of the charges made against any employee detained or deported (or "rusticated"). As this does not satisfy the obligations under the Charter, further information has been sought about the reasons for the deportations mentioned above.

150. During the autumn of 1969, eight members of the staff in Jordan, East Bank, all of whom were teachers, were arrested and detained for varying periods up to a few weeks, and then released. The Agency was informed by the Jordanian Government that the arrests were made for reasons of security. Four additional members of the staff, also teachers, were arrested and subsequently brought to trial and sentenced to imprisonment by the Security Court.

151. In August 1969, a nurse employed by the Agency in one of its clinics in Gaza, Miss Fatma Abdul Fattah el Najouli, was arrested and charged on two counts in a military court. On the first count she was

charged with failing to report to the police her treatment of an injured person in the clinic whose "injury was believed to have resulted from explosive materials," contrary to the requirements of Order No. 122 issued in 1968 by the Israeli authorities. The second count charged her with "making contacts with the enemy". At her trial, Nurse Najouli was defended by the Agency's legal adviser in Gaza, who argued that the first charge arose out of matters connected with her official duties, and accordingly claimed privilege under section 18 (a) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946.² The military court decided against the claim of privilege, convicted Nurse Najouli on both charges, and sentenced her to imprisonment. The Agency does not accept that the decision of the military court was right in law on the question of privilege, and the matter has been taken up with the authorities of the Government of Israel. Shortly after her conviction, while discussions were in progress with United Nations Headquarters, Miss Najouli was pardoned and returned to work.

152. As reported in last year's report,³ locally recruited staff employed by the Agency within Syria, whether Syrian or Palestinian, are not accorded the full measure of privileges and immunities conferred on the Agency's officials by article V of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946. The Government of Syria still maintains its attitude on this question, although the Agency is glad to report that there have been no instances of arrest of staff members such as were reported last year.

153. On 21 May 1970, the Agency sent a note verbale to the Government of Jordan protesting against the forcible abduction, by persons unknown, from outside his home, of one of its senior officials in Amman, and of his child and sister-in-law. They were

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1 (1946-1947), No. 4, p. 15.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614)*, para. 144.

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973, p. 287.

forcibly detained for the whole of one night. The Agency requested that immediate steps should be taken to trace the offenders and deal with them according to law.

154. In the course of the disturbances in the second week of June 1970, a senior official of the Agency was forcibly detained in a hotel in Amman for three days by armed elements. A protest has been made to the Government.

The Agency's staff—movement and functioning

155. There have been continuing difficulties in connexion with the travel of Agency staff members. The Syrian Government takes the position that visas will not be granted on the United Nations laissez-passer held by Syrian or Palestinian staff. Exit permits have been refused by that Government to several staff members whose presence has been required at the Agency's headquarters at Beirut, including drivers. Representations on this matter, drawing attention to sections 24 and 25 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, were made to the Syrian Foreign Ministry by a note verbale dated 14 May 1970.

156. Difficulties in respect of the movement of locally recruited staff have also been experienced in the West Bank. Thus the Israeli authorities have refused permission on various occasions to three staff members in the West Bank to travel on duty to Amman and Beirut. Two of the Agency's headquarters staff members are not permitted by the Israeli authorities to enter the occupied territories. Mention should also be made of the refusal by the Israeli authorities to permit a staff member to travel to Chicago, Illinois, where she was to attend a conference on behalf of the Agency.

157. In last year's report, reference was made to the matter of the fees, by way of stamp duty or "popular action contribution",¹ collected by the Government of Syria on applications by the Agency for

travel permits for locally appointed officials. The Agency is happy to report that its officials have now been exempted from these fees when travelling on Agency business.

158. The Agency is glad to record that, as foreshadowed in last year's report,² a satisfactory agreement, incorporated in an aide-mémoire dated 10 September 1969, was concluded with the Government of Lebanon regarding certain staff matters. The agreement covers the procedure for the appointment of certain categories of the Agency's locally recruited staff; the possession of residence permits, and the procedure for application for entry and exit permits, when required.

159. The difficulty over obtaining visas for entry into Syria for the purpose of official visits by staff internationally recruited has been somewhat eased.³ But there have been two cases in which the Government has declined to allow the presence in the country of senior officials of the Agency for the purpose of employment there. The first case concerned the Agency's Deputy Field Director. On 26 August 1969, the Agency was notified that the Deputy Director had been "declared *persona non grata*" and that he should leave the country within three days. The Agency, in a note verbale to the Foreign Ministry dated 26 August, expressed its concern at this decision and brought to the notice of the Syrian Government that it did not have the right with respect to an official of the Agency to invoke the doctrine of *persona non grata* by which a State, without establishing an abuse of privilege or giving any reason, may unilaterally require that a diplomat accredited to it leave the country. The Syrian Government, however, adhered to its decision. The matter was taken up by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he drew attention to the procedure for consultation which had been agreed between the Secretary-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1967. He also

² *Ibid.*, para. 140.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 148.

¹ *Ibid.*, para. 148.

referred to Articles 100, 101 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, and asked the Syrian Government either to agree that the Deputy Field Director, who had departed on home leave, return to his duty station, or to supply full information as to the facts on which the Government had based its decision. The Secretary-General, having considered the information given to him in response to this request, replied that he was not satisfied that the officer in question had acted in any way contrary to his obligations as an international civil servant. In all the circumstances, however, the Secretary-General, taking into account the attitude of the authorities towards the official, recognized that he might not usefully continue his work in Syria, and he was therefore assigned to another duty station on his return from home leave. The Secretary-General stated, however, that in the future, he would be unwilling to consider the transfer of an Agency staff member except in accordance with the agreement of August 1967, on the basis of particularized and satisfactorily proved complaints. In the second case, the Government has refused, notwithstanding written representations to it, to agree to the transfer of an official to the Vocational Training Centre at Damascus, without giving any reason.

The Agency's courier

160. On 7 May 1970, the Agency's regular courier car, en route from Beirut to the West Bank and Gaza, was stopped by unknown armed men in civilian clothes on the borders of Beirut. The Agency's international driver was ejected and the car, including its one female passenger, an international employee on her way to take up Agency employment on the West Bank, was driven away. The Agency's five diplomatic pouches and all other baggage in the car were removed, and the female passenger was then told to drive the car back to the Agency's headquarters. A note verbale about the incident was sent to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry on 19 May 1970, but the pouches and other bags have not been recovered

nor have those responsible been brought to justice.

The Agency's premises and camps

161. On a number of occasions during the year under report, there have been intrusions into the Agency's Field Office in Amman. The first occurred on 14 September 1969, when three armed persons forcefully entered the building and distributed communications to staff members. The second occurred on 25 October, when a large crowd, mostly school children, surrounded the Office and pulled down the United Nations flag on the building. Representations were made to the Government on both these occasions and adequate protection of the Agency's premises was requested. On 7 April 1970, a mob of students attacked the Office, threw stones, smashed windows, forced their way into the buildings, seized official papers and documents and threw them into the street. Telephones and other equipment were damaged. Outside the office, the crowd set fire to a number of vehicles belonging to the Agency or its staff, damaging some of them seriously. The United Nations flag was torn down. By a note verbale dated 9 April 1970, the Agency protested strongly against this latest violation of its premises and again requested that prompt and effective measures should be taken to protect the Agency and its staff so that the Agency could carry out its functions. A note of protest was also sent to the Government on 5 May 1970 relating to forceful demonstrations and some damage affecting the Agency's office at Irbed, which occurred on 16 April 1970.

162. During the disturbances which took place in Jordan in the second week of June 1970, the Agency suffered incursions upon, and damage to, its premises and property. On 10 June 1970, several armed persons entered the Agency's field office building in Amman, caused damage to the building and also to some office files, pulled down the United Nations flag and placed a machine-gun on the roof for some time. They took away with them five telephone sets and an electric fan, which were subsequently re-

turned. Damage has also been caused in various camps and installations in Jordan during the period of the disturbances. In addition, a number of vehicles, belonging to the Agency as well as to some of its staff members, have been removed by unknown persons. Some of these vehicles have been subsequently retrieved. A protest has been made to the Government on these occurrences.

163. In July 1969, armed soldiers forcibly entered the Agency's Vocational Training Centre and Supply Compound at Damascus and caused damage to the dormitories and workshops. The incident was immediately reported by the Agency to the Syrian Government on 28 July 1969, and subsequently, on 3 September 1969, the Agency claimed from the Government the sum of £ S 2,767 representing the assessed damage caused to Agency property. The Government expressed its regret for the incident, but has not so far paid the sum claimed, despite a further request made to it on 31 January 1970.

164. On 2 December 1969, the Agency sent a note verbale to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry drawing attention to the state of affairs in the Agency's refugee camps. At the time of the disturbances that had recently taken place in the country, the Lebanese security forces had been withdrawn from the camps, and some buildings continued to be occupied by armed elements. These included youth centres, welfare and other centres, and a number of other buildings, in fourteen camps, with the result that the operation of certain of the Agency's services were affected. The note verbale requested that measures should be taken with the minimum delay to ensure the Agency's protection and the release of the buildings. This was followed up by various representations to the authorities, including the delivery of an aide-mémoire, dated 11 March 1970, again drawing attention to the situation and asking for the evacuation and return to the Agency of the buildings still occupied. A further note verbale was sent to the Government on 2 June 1970.

165. The demolition of shelters and other structures by the Israeli authorities, both in Gaza and the West Bank, has been of serious concern to the Agency. Shelters demolished include those put up by the Agency and others erected by the refugees at their own cost or with materials provided by the Agency. Even in these last cases, the demolition affects the Agency, since new housing must be found for the refugees and, in some cases, other relief.

166. In one category of cases, some of the occupants of individual shelters, having been arrested or detained, have had their shelters demolished by the Israeli authorities, often by explosives. The Israeli authorities have stated that, in such cases, the demolished shelters cannot be rebuilt without specific authority, and have further indicated that no reimbursement will be made therefor. Besides the demolition of refugee shelters, the Israeli authorities have demolished a Camp Leader's house, causing damage to the extent of £ I 17,000. These demolitions are, in the Agency's view, contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Protests at the demolitions have been lodged, and compensation claimed in appropriate cases. The demolitions also often cause damage to adjacent structures. In the West Bank, the Israeli authorities have accepted, in principle, that damage to adjacent structures will be compensated for, and have, in most cases, themselves arranged for the repairs to be carried out. In Gaza, the authorities have not met claims for such damage.

167. In a different category of cases, the Israeli authorities have taken the view that the roads leading through certain refugee camps in Gaza have to be widened and properly surfaced for security reasons, in order to facilitate the movement of their patrol vehicles. This has involved the demolition of shelters, sometimes without consultation with the Agency and even with very little advance notice, with the result that the refugee families affected did not have time to safeguard their belongings. As a result of a review of these problems with the Minister of Defence of Israel,

on 23 January 1970, at the Agency's urgent request, the authorities have agreed to try to provide due notice to the Agency when contemplating demolition measures in this class of cases, so that alternative accommodation for the refugees affected can be made available (and have in practice since done so). The competent Israeli authorities in Gaza have confirmed that reimbursement will be made in respect of the destruction of or damage to shelters, whether built by the Agency or not, and for any other damage caused to the Agency's buildings or facilities in this context.

168. In December 1969, armed soldiers and several police entered the compound of the Agency's Field Office headquarters in Gaza in Army and Police vehicles and the personnel entered the Agency's Office, began to interrogate one of the Agency's employees and, subsequently, took him away. In a note verbale dated 27 February 1970, the Agency protested to the Israeli authorities against this violation of the immunity of the Agency's premises, and recalled a working arrangement that, if the authorities deemed it to be absolutely necessary to question Agency staff for security reasons during office hours, it would be done in a mutually agreed manner which would not violate the Agency's premises. The Israeli Government, in its note verbale of 11 June 1970, stated that the measures taken were considered urgent and unavoidable and that the military authorities would maintain the arrangements under which they would refrain from entering the Agency's premises except in cases of vital security need. It is the Agency's view that under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, such entry could only be with the Agency's prior approval.

169. There have been several instances of intrusion by the Israeli authorities into the Agency's Vocational Training Centres, especially in Gaza, for interrogation of the students and staff.

170. The Agency has also taken up with the Israeli authorities the matter of the

use of schools and other Agency premises in the camps for the purpose of screening the inhabitants, and the Israeli authorities have undertaken to try to avoid this to the greatest extent possible.

The Agency's transport operations

171. The Agency has encountered difficulties regarding the implementation of existing arrangements with the Syrian Government for the transportation of supplies within Syria. By the Bernadotte Agreement of 28 August 1948 the authorities are bound to transport free of charge within Syria supplies intended for the Palestine refugees. Until 1960, transportation was directly undertaken by the Syrian authorities, and thereafter it was agreed that the Agency would arrange with the contractors to do the transport, the cost being reimbursed by the Syrian authorities. Despite repeated requests, the Agency has not received reimbursement for such transport cost incurred since 9 December 1968, and, as at 31 January 1970, an amount of approximately £ S 200,000 is outstanding. The authorities have also not communicated their approval for the renewal of the transport contract for 1970. Notes verbales were sent in regard to these matters on 20 March and 23 April 1970, but no reply has yet been received.

172. The Syrian authorities have also recently been insisting that a 40 per cent quota of the trucks carrying Agency supplies to Jordan from the Lebanon through Syria should be reserved for Syrian trucks. It appears that the basis for these requirements is the Arab Transit Agreement of 1959 to which the Agency is not a party. The Syrian authorities are also insisting that the Syrian trucks should be paid for at rates laid down by the Syrian Transport Syndicate, which are appreciably higher than corresponding rates for Jordanian and Lebanese trucks. The Agency, by a note verbale of 23 June 1970, pointed out that such restrictions were incompatible with the Agency's right to freedom of transport; and further that the inapplicability of the Arab Transit Agreement of 1959 to its operations had been

made clear as early as June 1960 (by aide-mémoire of 3 June 1960) without any disagreement. The Agency is willing to employ Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian trucks in any relative proportions acceptable to the Governments concerned, provided that such arrangements do not result in increased costs and administrative difficulties. It was stated in the *note verbale* that any extra cost resulting from the above-mentioned restrictions would be the subject of a claim against Syria.

Education and health subsidies

173. There has been an exchange of notes with the Israeli Government regarding the education and health subsidies. The Israeli Government has maintained that the education and health subsidies formerly paid to the Jordanian Government and the Gaza authorities by the Agency are payable to it in respect of the occupied territories. The Agency's position is that these subsidies are not payable to the Israeli Government. In any event, the Agency is compelled, on account of its critical financial position, to discontinue the subsidies altogether. The Jordanian Government, which was informed of this decision, has pressed for payment of the subsidies to it and, in reply, the Agency has reiterated its inability to do so.

The Agency's claims against Governments

Lebanon

174. The Commission of Experts on Taxation, set up by the Government to verify the Agency's claims in relation to taxes paid, has now recognized the validity of the Agency's claims amounting to approximately £1 594,000. The Commission will soon submit its report to the Ministry of Finance with a view to the payment of this sum to the Agency. A procedure has been set up by the Government, with the concurrence of the Agency, for the reimbursement to the Agency of landing charges paid on goods discharged in Lebanese ports,¹ and

¹ See *ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), annex II, para. 14; and *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), paras. 152 and 153, as to these various claims.

monthly reimbursements have already begun.

Syria

175. No progress has been made towards the settlement of the Agency's claim of £S 272,577. The claim has again been rejected by the Government by letter dated 17 September 1969, on basically the same grounds as before. The continuing claim for exemption from portage fees and taxes on electricity bills also remains.²

Jordan

176. No response has been received from the Government with regard to the proposal mentioned in last year's report³ for an overall settlement of certain claims of the Agency against the Government and of claims made, on the other hand, by the Government against the Agency. A settlement on the basis of this proposal would result in a payment being made by the Agency to the Government of \$3,371.70.

177. In response to the claim made by the Agency for reimbursement of the amount paid (JD 1,500) to one of the four contractors affected by the Government's order in 1967 to cease work under the "winterization" programme in the Jordan Valley,⁴ the Government replied, in November 1969, by denying liability. By letter of 17 March 1970, the Agency reiterated its claim for reimbursement on the ground, amongst others, that under the operation of the rules of State responsibility, Jordan was responsible for the loss incurred by the Agency as a result of the sudden order to cease the construction work, which had been undertaken with due permission. Furthermore, the Government had not, for nearly two years, controverted the Agency's position, taken as early as 20 December 1967, that the Government should bear any loss to the Agency from the implementation of the order to cease construction

² See *ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), annex II, paras. 16-18; and *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), paras. 154 and 155, as to these various claims.

³ See *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), para. 156.

⁴ See *ibid.*, para. 157.

work. The Agency also requested that corresponding reimbursements be made by the Government of any sums which the Agency may have to pay in order to settle claims raised by the three other contractors affected by the Government's order. A request has since been received from the Government for further information and clarification, which has been provided.

178. As reported last year,¹ the Agency has made a claim on the Government of Jordan in respect of certain damage suffered at its Field Office in Jerusalem during the hostilities of June 1967. A note verbale reminding the Government of this claim was sent on 14 March 1970. In a note verbale dated 30 March 1970, the Government has rejected this claim. The matter is being pursued.

179. A note verbale was sent to the Government on 17 January 1970, claiming compensation for damage caused to Agency installations and other property in certain camps in Jordan on 4 November 1968. The damage was done in the course of disturbances which led to an exchange of fire between the armed forces and other elements. Although the Minister of Development and Reconstruction and the Secretary of the Supreme Ministerial Committee offered compensation at that time in the amount estimated by the Agency, the Government has subsequently declined to pay compensation, as conveyed recently in its note of 30 March 1970. The Agency has already spent JD 520 on the repairs and JD 524 more will have to be spent for their completion.

The claim against Lebanon, Syria and Jordan jointly in respect of excess rail charges

180. This claim, of about \$1.5 million, is in respect of excess costs paid by the Agency for the transport of supplies from Beirut to Jordan by rail.² By notes verbales of 15

March 1967 to all the three Governments, the Agency had proposed a joint meeting, but, except for an expression of willingness to meet on the part of the Lebanese Government (conditional on the willingness of the other two Governments to meet), no reply was received to these notes. Letters dated 10 June 1969 were sent by the Commissioner-General to the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Jordan asking again for agreement to a meeting, or for any alternative proposals they might have for a settlement of the matter. A reply to this letter, dated 22 September 1969, was received from the Government of Syria drawing attention, *inter alia*, to the efforts made by the competent authorities to reduce the railway charges. There was no response to the request for a joint meeting. A reply was sent on 2 March 1970 by the Agency in which the request for a joint meeting of the three Governments and the Agency was reiterated. A reminder was also sent on 26 February 1970 to the Government of Jordan on the same subject.

United Arab Republic

181. A note verbale was addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic on 11 September 1969 giving the Agency's outstanding claims against the United Arab Republic, amounting altogether to \$80,637.67. Discussions have taken place with representatives of the Government on these claims, and it is hoped that some settlement will be arrived at in due course.

Israel

182. By notes verbales dated 31 December 1968 and 23 January 1969, the Agency claimed various sums, as reported last year,³ from the Government of Israel in respect of damage to and loss of Agency property during the hostilities of June 1967. In response to a further note verbale sent on 14 March 1970, the Government of Israel

¹ *Ibid.*, para. 159 (b).

² See *ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), annex II, paras. 22-24; and *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), para. 158.

³ See *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), para. 159(a).

advised the Agency that the claims were still under consideration.

183. The Israeli military authorities have on three occasions conducted military exercises in the empty Nuweimeh Camp, in the West Bank. While the claim raised by the Agency regarding damage caused for the first such occurrence was met by the authorities, no settlement has been made of the Agency's claim for compensation regarding damage caused in the other two instances. The authorities have been repeatedly requested to refrain from using empty UNRWA camps for military purposes. Another case relates to damage caused to the water pipeline between two of the Agency camps in the West Bank. The damage was apparently caused when a trench was being dug for the military authorities. Despite repeated reminders, the Agency has so far received only I£ 300, as against the total claim of I£ 1,350.

184. The Agency has submitted various small claims to the Israeli military authorities for loss or damage suffered in incidents occurring in the occupied territories during the year under report, many of which have been settled. There are, however, a number of larger claims for loss or damage occurring since the hostilities of June 1967, which owing to shortage of staff, it has not yet been possible to assess and formulate.

185. Under agreements made by the Agency with the Government of Jordan in 1953 and 1955, the Agency spent considerable sums on the development of an area of land at El Hubeileh in the West Bank, the land then being in the custody of the Jordanian custodian of enemy property. The Agency spent these sums in carrying out agricultural development with a view to settling Agency refugees on the land, and in erecting houses and school buildings, and executing other works. By November 1967, a considerable number of the refugee families, who had been on the land, had left for the East Bank, and the rest were paid compensation by the Israeli authorities. Almost all the buildings on the land were then demolished. The Agency, in a note

dated 23 July 1969, protested to the Government of Israel against the demolition of its installations and stated its intention to claim compensation therefor. The Government replied by a note verbale dated 30 September 1969. Further notes verbales were exchanged on 3 April and 16 April 1970. The position taken by the Government of Israel is that the activities of the Agency on the property in question were undertaken at its own risk, and that it regards the matter as one in which the former Israeli owners of the land have regained lawful possession of it. The Agency has found itself unable to accept this and will continue to pursue the question with the Government of Israel.

Claim in respect of the Agency's account with the Gaza Branch of the Bank of Alexandria

186. As indicated in previous reports,¹ the Agency has a claim in respect of the amount of £ E 40,401,854 held by the Gaza branch of the Bank of Alexandria, to the account of the Agency, at the time of the hostilities of June 1967. By a note verbale dated 11 March 1970, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel informed the Agency that, without entering into the merits of the Agency's legal submission, conveyed in a note verbale to the Ministry, dated 19 January 1970, it was ready, as an exceptional measure, and on certain undertakings, to arrange for the transfer to the Agency of approximately 9 per cent of the amount mentioned above. This percentage represents the proportion of the total deposits in the Gaza branch held in liquid form at the commencement of hostilities. The Agency has continued to pursue the matter also with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the United Arab Republic; and it is hoped that, with the good offices of that Ministry, the claim may be settled.

F. Financial operations

187. The financial accounts of UNRWA are published separately, together with

¹ See *ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/7213), annex II, para. 26; and *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), para. 162.

the related report of the Board of Auditors.¹ This section, therefore, presents in summary form the Agency's actual financial operations in 1969 and its estimated financial operations in 1970. (UNRWA's fiscal period is the calendar year, whereas the present report covers the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970.)²

188. The following summary table reflects the Agency's financial operations in 1969:

In millions of US dollars

<i>Income received in 1969:</i>	\$	\$	\$
Pledges by Governments			39.8
Other contributions			1.8
Other income			0.7
Total income			<u>42.3</u>
<i>Expenditure in 1969:</i>			
	<i>Recurrent operations</i>	<i>Non-recurrent operations</i>	<i>Total</i>
Relief services	19.7	1.4	21.1
Health services	5.5	0.2	5.7
Education services	<u>17.6</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>19.4</u>
Total expenditure	42.8	3.4	46.2
Excess of expenditure over income (deficit)			(3.9)
Add working capital at 1 January 1969			
(after adjustment of prior year's accounts)			14.4
Working capital at 31 December 1969			<u>10.5</u>

189. The foregoing summary distinguishes between expenditure on "recurrent operations" (salaries, supplies, rentals, subsidies and other costs incurred on a regularly recurring basis) and expenditure on "non-recurrent operations" (capital improvements such as shelters and schoolrooms, replacement

of worn-out equipment and other essentially non-repetitive costs). The significance of this distinction lies in the facts (a) that the cost of recurrent operations is a measure of the Agency's basic programme which it cannot easily reduce, and (b) that non-recurrent operations are largely financed by special contributions which cannot be used for recurrent operations.

190. Perhaps the most significant feature

of the foregoing summary is that the Agency again—for the sixth time in seven years—incurred a massive deficit on its programme, amounting to \$ 3.9 million (compared with \$ 2.9 million in 1968), which reduced working capital to only \$ 10.5 million. Although income in 1969 increased by \$ 1.2 million over income of 1968, expenditure increased by \$ 2.2 million, so that the deficit increased by \$ 1 million.

191. Unliquidated budget commitments carried forward from 1969 (or prior years) to 1970 totalled approximately \$ 3 million, compared with \$ 2.6 million of such commitments which had been carried forward

¹ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 7C (A/8007/Add.3).

² Figures for income, expenditure and working capital and detail of income from all sources since the establishment of UNRWA are shown in tables 19 and 20 of annex I. Table 21 lists contributions from non-governmental sources for the year 1969 and the first six months of 1970. Chapter II provides more detailed information with respect to the Agency's financial operations for 1969 and 1970 and the budget for 1971.

from 1968 to 1969. During 1969, savings on liquidation of budget commitments from prior years totalled some \$124,000 (the savings were credited to working capital).

192. At the end of 1969, unpaid pledges from Governments totalled \$10.6 million, compared with \$9.9 million unpaid at the end of 1969, reflecting a further slight slowdown in the timing of payment of contributions in 1969 by certain Governments. Inventories of supplies and advances to suppliers at \$6 million were materially lower than at the close of 1968 (\$7.7 million). Accounts receivable had also been materially reduced, from \$4.3 million at the close of 1968 to only \$1.5 million at the close of 1969. These two factors, which increased cash available, contributed significantly (\$4.5 million in all) to avoiding exhaustion of the Agency's cash, which nevertheless amounted

legal reasons, these funds cannot be regarded as part of the Agency's funds. Up to 30 June 1970, the Agency had received a total of \$6.6 million of NEED funds (including interest) and by that date had expended or committed \$5.5 million, largely for the provision of emergency shelter and sanitation for refugees and other displaced persons in east Jordan and Syria and for school and vocational training facilities in east Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon. The unexpended balance of funds available was largely earmarked for further expansion of educational facilities for the refugees.

194. The financial prospects for the Agency in 1970 regrettably indicate not only another deficit year (the seventh in eight years), but a year of even greater deficit than in 1969, as the following summary table clearly shows:

In millions of US dollars

<i>Estimated income in 1970:</i>	\$	\$	\$
Pledged by Governments			39.1
Other contributions			1.4
Other income			0.5
Total income			41.0
<i>Estimated expenditure in 1970:</i>			
	<i>Recurrent operations</i>	<i>Non-recurrent operations</i>	<i>Total</i>
Relief services	18.8	0.3	19.1
Health services	6.0	0.1	6.1
Education services	20.4	0.5	20.9
Total expenditure	45.2	0.9	46.1
Estimated expenditure over income (deficit)			(5.1)
Add working capital at 1 January 1970			10.5
Estimated working capital at 31 December 1970			5.4

to only \$5.5 million at year end, less than the cost of two months' recurrent operations.

193. The foregoing figures do not include those related to the receipt and expenditure of funds made available by NEED (Near East Emergency Donations, Inc.) mentioned elsewhere in this report. For technical and

195. In 1970, expenditure on recurrent operations is expected to increase by \$2.5 million (due largely to increased school population and to increased staff salaries to meet increases in the cost of living). Non-recurrent operations expenditure, however (which, as mentioned above, is very largely

financed by special contributions), is expected to decrease by \$2.5 million, so that total expenditure is expected to be \$0.02 million less than in 1969. On the other hand, income is expected to be \$1.3 million less than in 1969, so that the deficit is expected to increase to \$5.1 million (compared with \$3.9 million in 1969 and \$2.9 million in 1968).

196. A comparison of the summary tables for 1969 and 1970 reveals a significant change in the pattern of the Agency's expenditure on recurrent operations. Expenditure on education services recurrent operations is expected to increase by \$2.9 million and health services by \$0.5 million, while that on relief services is expected to decrease by \$0.9 million.¹ For the first time in the Agency's history, therefore, recurrent education services operations will exceed in financial scope recurrent relief services operations. Total expenditure on education services is also expected to be significantly larger than total expenditure on relief services, but this relationship will depend on the amount of special contributions received to finance capital improvements under either programme in 1970.

197. A deficit of \$5.1 million in 1970 will, as shown in the summary table, reduce working capital to approximately \$5.4 million, that is, less than the Agency requires even to finance its "pipeline" of supplies. Even this estimate is subject to a number of assumptions, however, the more important of which are (a) that unit costs (in particular staff costs) will not increase further, (b) that some \$13.1 million of expected pledges by Governments will be forthcoming, and (c) that contributions from non-governmental sources for recurrent operations will continue at the same high rate as in 1970. While the latter two of these seem reasonably safe assumptions, the first may well prove to be seriously wrong, particularly in respect of staff salaries affected by increases in the cost of living.

¹ Resulting mainly from the difference in the unit valuation per ton of flour and discontinuance of the distribution of soap with the monthly ration.

198. With an opening cash balance of only \$5.5 million and an expected deficit of \$5.1 million or more, the Agency will have been extremely fortunate in not finding itself faced with an insufficiency of cash to meet its payrolls, rentals, suppliers' bills, etc., at some point in 1970. At the close of 1970, the Agency's accounts payable, its obligations for separation costs of staff, etc., will be covered virtually only by unpaid pledges (not all of which will be payable in cash), accounts receivable and other non-cash assets. It is extremely likely that the Agency will be insolvent at the end of 1970, that is, that it would be unable to meet its current obligations in full if called upon to do so immediately. (It would also, of course, be unable to meet its total obligations, if called upon to do so at that time, until and unless it could collect all unpaid cash contributions and convert its non-cash assets, including unpaid pledges in kind, into cash.)

199. The problems posed by the expected deficit of \$5.1 million in 1970 are also discussed in the introduction to this report (see paragraphs 6 to 11 above). The ability of the Agency to continue its existing programme is at stake.

CHAPTER II

BUDGET FOR 1971 AND REVISED BUDGET FOR 1970

A. *Introduction*

200. This part of the report presents both the budget estimates for 1971 and the adjusted budget estimates for 1970. The original budget estimates for 1970 were presented to the General Assembly in the report for 1968-1969 and revised estimates were presented in document A/SPC/133 dated 17 November 1969. These estimates have now been further revised in the light of developments since that date, in particular adjustments which have had to be made in local staff salaries and cost of living allowances in the light of changes in the rates of remuneration paid by the Governments of the host countries for comparable employment.

201. The budget for 1971 is estimated at \$47,545,000, which compares with estimated expenditure of \$46,145,000 in 1970 and actual expenditure of \$46,161,000 in 1969. These totals include the non-recurrent costs of replacement of unserviceable equipment and of capital improvements, the latter being financed almost entirely by special contributions designated for those purposes. Non-recurrent expenditure budgeted at \$537,000 in 1971 compares with an estimated expenditure of \$861,000 in 1970 and actual expenditure of \$3,413,000 in 1969 (when large special contributions were received for capital improvements). Continuing annually recurrent costs, on the other hand, are estimated at \$47,008,000 for 1971, compared with \$45,284,000 estimated expenditure in 1970 and \$42,748,000 actual expenditure in 1969.

202. Recurrent costs have increased each year in the three years under review and may be expected to continue to increase at a similar rate in future years. Three factors in particular contribute to the steady increase in recurrent costs: first, the increase in local staff costs due to cost-of-living adjustments. The incidence of staff cost increases falls to some extent on all Agency activities, but rather more than 50 per cent in general education (where more than half of the staff of the Agency are employed and where approximately 80 per cent of the total of recurrent costs in Agency schools relates to teachers' emoluments); secondly, other educational increases due to continually larger numbers of pupils enrolling and the constant trend for students to remain longer in the educational cycles—for example, it is now normal for girls to remain in school nearly as long as boys, whereas even five years ago there was a significant preponderance of male pupils; thirdly, the increase in vocational and professional training costs due to the use of expanded capacity at residential centres for vocational and teacher training (an increase partly funded by special contributions received for this purpose).

203. Other factors contributing to annual increases in costs are increased costs of

supplies and services purchased by the Agency, in particular transport services, rentals and subsidies paid to private hospitals. In general terms, inflationary influences have been marked in the Agency's area of operations since the hostilities of June 1967, and although the effects of these influences have been most pronounced in the case of staff costs, they are also experienced by the Agency in respect of virtually everything it buys.

204. As a partial offset to these increases, some reductions have been achieved and are described under the programme headings in section B below, including the suspension of soap issues, except in the emergency camps; a partial reduction in the numbers of hot meal beneficiaries and the closure of supplementary feeding centres where the hot meal beneficiaries were less than an economical number; some reductions in medical and sanitation services; strictures in the consumption rates for many supplies; limitation of the quantities of used clothing (contributed by voluntary societies, but on which the Agency pays freight).

205. Costs of health services in 1970 will be higher than in 1969, particularly in recurrent costs, and are expected to increase again in 1971 despite lower provisions for non-recurrent items and no amelioration in standards of care. The increases arise from staff costs, as mentioned first in paragraph 202 above, from rising hospital-bed rates and unit prices for supplies and from the increasing numbers seeking health care, especially in the emergency camps. Again, the cost of environmental sanitation continues higher in the emergency camps than in the older-established camps.

206. In relief services, the reduction achieved in 1970, below the 1969 level, is maintained for 1971. Although prices of certain commodities have risen, that increase has been offset by substitution of available lower-cost components in the ration without reducing the over-all nutritional value. Provisions for non-recurrent items are also progressively lower, now at an irreducible

minimum. No estimates have been framed for shelter units or even for tent replacements in the emergency camps in Syria—it is hoped that such essential requirements can be funded from special contributions being solicited for this purpose.

207. Common costs (supply and transport and other internal services and general administration), which rose shortly after the events of mid-1967, have tended to stabilize. However, this has been partly achieved by progressive limitations on replacement of capital equipment (see particularly paragraph 237 below), a policy which sacrifices long-term economies for short-term budget savings. Particular efforts have been made over the years to reduce common costs (in particular other internal services and general administration), with considerable success up to June 1967. The present cost levels therefore reflect essentially the reduced

levels achieved by June 1967 increased only by the unavoidable effects of the hostilities of June 1967 (in particular the necessity to have two field offices in Jordan) and staff salary increases subsequently. Further reductions will be sought, but are not likely to be found.

B. Budget estimates

General

208. The following tables present in summary the budget estimates for 1971 together with comparative data of the adjusted budget for 1970 and actual expenditure in 1969, table A presenting the total estimates and tables B and C the estimates of recurrent and non-recurrent costs, respectively. The estimates for 1971 are briefly described in the paragraphs following the tables.

TABLE A
TOTAL COSTS
(In thousands of US dollars)

	<i>1971 budget estimates</i>	<i>1970 adjusted budget estimates</i>	<i>1969 actual expenditure</i>
<i>Part I. Relief services</i>			
Basic rations	12,487	12,461	13,546
Supplementary feeding	2,204	2,111	2,165
Shelter	261	348	1,390
Special hardship assistance	534	529	524
Share of common costs from part IV	3,539	3,585	3,509
Total, Part I	19,025	19,034	21,134
<i>Part II. Health services</i>			
Medical services	3,799	3,662	3,523
Environmental sanitation	1,522	1,369	1,101
Share of common costs from part IV	1,136	1,139	1,093
Total, Part II	6,457	6,170	5,717
<i>Part III. Education services</i>			
General education	15,335	14,452	12,589
Vocational and professional training	3,911	3,679	4,050
Share of common costs from part IV	2,817	2,810	2,671
Total, Part III	22,063	20,941	19,310
<i>Part IV. Common costs</i>			
Supply and transport services	3,429	3,539	3,587
Other internal services	2,617	2,556	2,321
General administration	1,446	1,439	1,365
Total, Part IV	7,492	7,534	7,273
Costs allocated to operations	(7,492)	(7,534)	(7,273)
Grand total	47,545	46,145	46,161

TABLE B
RECURRENT COSTS
(In thousands of US dollars)

	<i>1971 budget estimates</i>	<i>1970 adjusted budget estimates</i>	<i>1969 actual expenditure</i>
<i>Part I. Relief services</i>			
Basic rations	12,484	12,454	13,537
Supplementary feeding	2,186	2,089	2,081
Shelter	256	270	256
Special hardship assistance	534	529	497
Share of common costs from part IV	3,472	3,443	3,317
Total, Part I	18,932	18,785	19,688
<i>Part II. Health services</i>			
Medical services	3,759	3,620	3,397
Environmental sanitation	1,449	1,350	1,061
Share of common costs from part IV	1,121	1,105	1,049
Total, Part II	6,329	6,075	5,507
<i>Part III. Education services</i>			
General education	15,096	14,242	12,013
Vocational and professional training	3,866	3,446	2,962
Share of common costs from part IV	2,785	2,736	2,578
Total, Part III	21,747	20,424	17,553
<i>Part IV. Common costs</i>			
Supply and transport services	3,329	3,336	3,300
Other internal services	2,603	2,513	2,285
General administration	1,446	1,435	1,359
Total, Part IV	7,378	7,284	6,944
Costs allocated to operations	(7,378)	(7,284)	(6,944)
Grand total	47,008	45,284	42,748

TABLE C
 NON-RECURRENT COSTS
 (In thousands of US dollars)

	<i>1971 budget estimates</i>	<i>1970 adjusted budget estimates</i>	<i>1969 actual expenditure</i>
<i>Part I. Relief services</i>			
Basic rations	3	7	9
Supplementary feeding	18	22	84
Shelter	5	78	1,134
Special hardship assistance	-	-	27
Share of common costs from part IV	67	142	192
Total, Part I	93	249	1,446
<i>Part II. Health services</i>			
Medical services	40	42	126
Environmental sanitation	73	19	40
Share of common costs from part IV	15	34	44
Total, Part II	128	95	210
<i>Part III. Education services</i>			
General education	239	210	576
Vocational and professional training	45	233	1,088
Share of common costs from part IV	32	74	93
Total, Part III	316	517	1,757
<i>Part IV. Common costs</i>			
Supply and transport services	100	203	287
Other internal services	14	43	36
General administration	-	4	6
Total, Part IV	114	250	329
Costs allocated to operations	(114)	(250)	(329)
Grand total	537	861	3,413

RELIEF SERVICES

Basic rations

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	12,487,000	12,484,000	3,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	12,461,000	12,454,000	7,000
1969 actual expenditure	13,546,000	13,537,000	9,000

209. The components of the basic ration have been briefly described in paragraph 44 above and in table 4 of annex I below. The costs included under this heading cover both the purchase and the distribution of all basic food items and of soap issues (which for economy reasons are now limited to refugees in the emergency camps). The costs of transportation and warehousing within the UNRWA area, however, are reflected under "supply and transport services" (see paragraphs 236 and 237 below).

210. The present estimate provides for

cost of oil and sugar, so that the total budget estimate for recurrent costs in 1971 is only slightly larger than the revised estimate for 1970.

211. Many of the premises where ration distribution is made are old, unsuitable and in some cases dilapidated; nevertheless, no proposals are included for replacements during 1971 however desirable this may be, because of the continuing serious financial situation; for the same reason only a minimal reservation has been made for necessary replacements of essential equipment.

Supplementary feeding

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	2,204,000	2,186,000	18,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	2,111,000	2,089,000	22,000
1969 actual expenditure	2,165,000	2,081,000	84,000

ration issues to beneficiaries throughout 1971 of approximately the same nutritional value as in 1970 (although the composition of the ration may differ somewhat) and to approximately the same number of beneficiaries. The costs of flour and of rice (both expected to be received as contributions) are expected to be maintained at about the current level, but prices for cooking oil and sugar are expected to rise and insurance rates on shipments have increased. However, issues of pulses have been discontinued and replaced by flour (to utilize supplementary contributions of flour). The resulting savings are expected nearly to offset the increased

212. This programme is described in paragraphs 45 to 52 above and in tables 5 and 6 of annex I below. Again, similar to the basic ration activity (see paragraph 209 above), the costs of transportation and warehousing within the UNRWA area are charged to "supply and transport services".

213. The nutritional value of the supplementary hot meals which are served is intended to be maintained at the approved level despite the continual rise in prices of fresh food components and increased staff costs. However, to keep the over-all costs at the 1970 level, the authorized numbers of benefi-

ciaries has been reduced since April 1970 by 5,500 (about 10 per cent). Further, centres which serve less than 150 hot meal beneficiaries have been closed as uneconomic on a *per caput* cost basis. Other supplemental items of diet for other vulnerable groups of refugees are proposed for continuation; these include milk, cornflour/soya/milk mixture, tinned meat and vitamin capsules.

214. As to premises, the same remarks apply here as for basic commodities (see

that special contributions will be forthcoming for these purposes, both in 1971 and 1970, as in 1969.

217. Due to very generous special contributions received in 1969, essential shelter in the emergency camps in Jordan has been largely completed in prefabricated units which have replaced tents. For the tented camps in Syria it is hoped that sufficient special contributions will be received in 1970 to permit replacement by shelter units, but

Shelter

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	261,000	256,000	5,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	348,000	270,000	78,000
1969 actual expenditure	1,390,000	256,000	1,134,000

paragraph 211 above). The budget estimate provides only for essential replacements of equipment.

215. This programme is described in paragraphs 53 to 58 above and in table 7 of annex I below. The estimate includes the rental value of camp sites (most of which are made available as contributions by Governments) and the cost of administrative control of shelters. An exceedingly limited amount is included for structural maintenance of Agency-built shelters and for upkeep of roads and paths within camps.

216. For 1971, no provision has been included for construction of additional shelter in established camps, nor has any provision been included for extension of roads and paths within camps. It is hoped, however,

no provision has been included for either tent replacements or shelter units.

218. This heading covers the provision for additional relief assistance to refugee families who suffer from special hardship; this is limited to welfare casework, to the distribution of donated used clothing and donated layettes and blankets. The programme is described in paragraphs 59 to 61 above.

219. Although the real needs for assistance under this programme are substantially greater now than they were prior to the events in 1967, the Agency has been constrained to limit the scope and scale of this form of relief. Inevitable increases have had to be offset by strictures on the quantities of used clothing accepted (despite exemption from

Special hardship assistance

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	534,000	534,000	-
1970 adjusted budget estimate	529,000	529,000	-
1969 actual expenditure	524,000	497,000	27,000

freight charges in certain circumstances on shipments from the United States of America and Canada) and by limiting the average scale of family case-work relief to the same level as that of ten years ago.

223. The programmes under this heading are described in paragraph 89 above. Although progressive economies have derived from application of more proficient techniques and by the constant replacement

HEALTH SERVICES

Medical services

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	3,799,000	3,759,000	40,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	3,662,000	3,620,000	42,000
1969 actual expenditure	3,523,000	3,397,000	126,000

220. For preventive and curative medical services, the programmes are described in paragraphs 67 to 88 above and in tables 9 to 12 of annex I below.

221. No improvements of any kind are proposed in the present minimal standards of care nor is any provision included for either replacement or amelioration of the many unsuitable premises. Increases, however, are inevitable due to the constantly rising unit costs of supplies, the increasing numbers of patients who require treatment (due to the normal increase in population, the conditions in the emergency camps and the loss of income of other refugees), higher bed-rate charges for hospital services and increased staff costs.

222. Inevitably, a minimal provision has had to be made for essential replacement of aged and worn out ambulance vehicles and for replacement of clinic equipment.

(within available funds) of public latrines by private family facilities (the latter significantly reducing maintenance costs), these have been more than extinguished by other increases, including the higher ratio of sanitation labourers required in emergency camps, increased costs of supplies (especially of effective insecticides where resistance has been developed to former cheaper treatments) and wage increases to conform with increases in corresponding government scales of remuneration.

224. Fortunately, certain essential sanitation works in the emergency camps have been financed by funds provided outside the Agency's budget by NEED (Near East Emergency Donations Inc.). Nevertheless, in 1971, it will be necessary to effect essential replacements of two outworn vacuum tankers (for voiding septic tanks), of unserviceable wheel barrows and garbage

Environmental sanitation

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	1,522,000	1,449,000	73,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	1,369,000	1,350,000	19,000
1969 actual expenditure	1,101,000	1,061,000	40,000

carts, of corroded water-pipe lines and to repair installations for sewage and surface water drainage—hence the increased estimates for non-recurrent costs.

and projected for 1970/1971. Prior to 1967, the average annual increase in recurrent costs for general education was approximately \$0.5 million; it now exceeds \$1.0 million,

EDUCATION SERVICES

General education

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	15,335,000	15,096,000	239,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	14,452,000	14,242,000	210,000
1969 actual expenditure	12,589,000	12,013,000	576,000

225. For a description of the Agency's general education programme, see paragraphs 98, 99 and 108 to 113 above and tables 13 to 16 of annex I below. Several minor activities conducted outside the UNRWA/UNESCO schools are also included under this heading: youth activities (paragraphs 114 and 115), women's activities and pre-school play centres (paragraphs 116 and 117). Although the two latter activities are considered as normal Agency programmes, funding of their operations is limited to special contributions designated for these purposes.

226. Of all services provided for refugees, general education is possibly the one most highly valued; it is on education that refugee families pin their hopes for the future; this is more and more reflected in the tendency for both boys and girls to remain at school throughout both the elementary and the preparatory cycles and then to press for secondary school facilities. It is noteworthy that the current enrolments of refugee girls throughout both the elementary and preparatory cycles are now almost the same as for boys. Further, families which withheld their children from schools immediately following the hostilities of 1967, have now re-enrolled them. Again, the unusually high number of births in the early sixties has resulted in an exceptionally high intake of pupils in the first elementary classes in school years 1968/1969, 1969/1970

substantially due to the salaries for the additional teachers required and increases in salaries paid to correspond to those paid by local Governments.

227. It is important to note that approximately 80 per cent of general education costs in Agency schools is related to staff costs of teachers, and that nearly half the staff employed by the Agency are teachers. Hence the payment of comparable remuneration to that paid by the host Governments has a very significant reflection in the Agency's education budget.

228. Standards of equipment and for consumption of educational supplies are extremely closely controlled. In many localities, especially in large agglomerations of populations, school facilities are already 100 per cent double-shifted. Undeniably, this system is educationally most undesirable—an expedient of sheer necessity. Only a massive injection of funds for capital improvements could remedy this truly deplorable situation. The provisions for non-recurrent costs in 1971, however, are limited to essential replacements of equipment and for capital costs related to avoiding of triple shifts where further double-shifting is impossible.

229. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (see paragraphs 124 to 129 above) continues to give an effective and

efficient service of in-service training programmes to raise the academic and professional qualifications of teachers already in Agency service, to the desirable level. For 1971, it is hoped, again, that the operational costs (estimated at \$419,000) will be substantially, if not totally, covered by special contributions.

respective trades in industries abroad (mostly limited to defraying travel costs).

233. Even more than general, vocational and professional training is sought by refugee families. It is one of the few avenues by which Agency services can lead to be economically independent of direct relief and permanently

Vocational and professional training

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	3,911,000	3,866,000	45,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	3,679,000	3,446,000	233,000
1969 actual expenditure	4,050,000	2,962,000	1,088,000

230. Details of these programmes are given in paragraphs 134 to 139 above. They include teacher training and vocational and technical courses conduct in the Agency's residential centres, as well as similar training subsidized by the Agency in centres operated by Governments or other organizations.

231. Also included is the cost of scholarships awarded at universities in the Agency's area (described in paragraphs 130 to 133 above) for outstanding candidates who are selected on the dual basis of academic qualifications and economic need. During recent years, much of this part of the programme has been funded from special contributions. However, for 1970/1971, while scholarships will be continued for those students who have made satisfactory and acceptable progress, the grant of new scholarships has had to be drastically curtailed. 232. This heading also includes certain minor categories of training, such as adult craft training (largely funded by special contributions), the training of physically handicapped children and some additional assistance to graduates from Agency centres in obtaining on-the-job training in their

equipped for a successful future. For this reason, special contributions have been particularly numerous for the expansion of the Agency's training facilities. The consequence has been a marked increase in recurrent operating costs as shown in the budget estimates (although their increase has been partly financed by special contributions also).

234. Although unit costs for consumable supplies continue to rise and salaries for staff also (staff costs represent nearly 60 per cent of the total operational costs), the spread of the costs of common instruction and administration over a greatly increased number of trainees results in a significantly lower *per caput* cost of graduating a trainee.

235. No provision has been made for further expansion in 1971, but, if special contributions are received for this purpose, the budget will be adjusted accordingly. Provisions for one-time expenditure in 1971 are limited to a minimal amount for essential replacement of equipment and to a small reservation for in-service training of instructors.

COMMON COSTS

Supply and transport services

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	3,429,000	3,329,000	100,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	3,539,000	3,336,000	203,000
1969 actual expenditure	3,587,000	3,300,000	287,000

236. All costs are reflected here of procurement, control and warehousing of supplies and equipment, port costs and the operation and maintenance of freight and passenger transport within the UNRWA area of operations for all Agency activities. Although recurrent costs appear to have temporarily stabilized, it seems inevitable that future operational costs will increase; all economies which can be attained have already been implemented (inclusive of the plan, in passenger transport, of user-drivers in austerity vehicles to save driver costs), but they have been offset by higher staff costs, by

In 1970, somewhat more than \$200,000 will be expended on essential replacements (including the value of certain vehicles which have, fortunately, been received as contributions); double that amount could have been expended with advantage and with consequential long-term economies. However, for 1971 only \$100,000 is contemplated to cover replacement not only of uneconomic freight and transport vehicles, but also of workshop equipment now under even heavier usage than ever before; this is minimal and only postpones the day when drastic remedial measures will become unavoidable.

Other internal services

	<i>Total</i> \$	<i>Recurrent</i> \$	<i>Non-recurrent</i> \$
1971 budget estimate	2,617,000	2,603,000	14,000
1970 adjusted budget estimate	2,556,000	2,513,000	43,000
1969 actual expenditure	2,321,000	2,285,000	36,000

heavier costs for vehicle maintenance and by increased rates of port charges and hire of transport (although the latter, on the west Bank and in Gaza, is matched by an increased contribution).

237. The replacement of old vehicles continues to be a very serious problem. Many of the freight carriers in the fleet have already been ten years or more in service. Although it is uneconomic in the long run to continue them in use with high maintenance costs and high incidence of replacement parts, the limitation of funds for capital replacements has obliged the adoption of such a practice.

238. These services include the registration of refugees and determination of their eligibility for Agency services; personnel and administrative services; translation, legal, financial, audit, technical (engineering) data-processing services and the protection of Agency installations and other property.

239. Efforts have been sustained and intensive over many years to reduce these costs. Substantial economies have been attained, but the continuing effects of dislocations following the mid-1967 hostilities have largely offset those results. More recently, the cost of living adjustments for

local staff, to conform with government practice in the host countries, has further offset operational economies. Although effort will be pursued, even intensified, to reduce the incidence of expenditure (as far as can be effected without loss of efficiency or of adequate control of operations), no major reductions can be expected.

240. It will be noted, under the non-recurrent heading above, that provision for essential replacement of operating equipment has again been significantly reduced, possibly this time below the minimal requirement.

208 above reflect the allocation of common costs to the three main categories of Agency services—relief, health and education. Such an allocation is subject to the exercise of judgement, but the percentages applied have been evolved and retested periodically on the basis of a detailed study of all Agency operations in all offices and extraced as weighted averages. They are believed to be an accurate assessment.

C. Financing the budget—1970 and 1971

244. The problems facing the Agency in

General administration

	Total \$	Recurrent \$	Non-recurrent \$
1971 budget estimate	1,446,000	1,446,000	-
1970 adjusted budget estimate	1,439,000	1,435,000	4,000
1969 actual expenditure	1,365,000	1,359,000	6,000

241. All general administration requirements for the Agency's headquarters and for five Field Office headquarters are included

financing the currently adjusted budget for 1970 and the budget for 1971 are summarized below.

(In thousands of US dollars)

	1970	1971
Budget	46,145	47,545
Estimated funds available from:		
Non-government contributions	1,380	1,350
Miscellaneous income	550	550
	<u>1,930</u>	<u>1,900</u>
Balance to be covered by contributions from Governments	44,215	45,645
Estimated contributions by Governments	<u>39,103</u>	<u>?</u>
Estimated deficit	<u>(5,112)</u>	<u>(?)</u>

in these estimates, as well as for all subordinate area and camp formations, together with maintenance of liaison offices in New York, Geneva and Cairo, and for the public information service.

242. The observations in paragraph 239 above on other internal services are equally applicable under this heading and the same conclusion pertains.

Allocation of common costs

243. The summary table under paragraph

245. While a question mark has been shown above for estimated contributions by Governments in 1971, it is clear that, if they do not exceed those estimated for 1970 (excluding special contributions for capital improvements not repeated in the 1971 budget estimates), the deficit in 1971 will exceed \$6.5 million. The implications of the probable deficit in 1970 and of a possible further deficit in 1971 are examined in the introduction to this report.

ANNEX I. TABLES

STATISTICS CONCERNING REGISTERED POPULATION

TABLE I

TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION ACCORDING TO CATEGORY OF REGISTRATION 1950-1970 a

Year ended	"R" Category b			"S" Category c		"N" Category d		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Full ration recipients	Half-ration recipients	Babies and children registered for services	Total 1 - 2 - 3	Other members receiving no rations	Persons eligible to receive general education and medical services	Persons not eligible to receive rations or services with certain exceptions	Grand total 4 - 5 - 6 - 7
June 1950	f	f	f	960,021	-	-	-	960,021 g
June 1951	826,459	51,034	2,174	879,667	-	-	24,455	904,122 g
June 1952	805,593	58,733	18,347	882,673	-	-	32,738	915,411 g
June 1953	772,166	64,817	34,765	871,748	-	-	45,013	916,761
June 1954	820,486	17,340	49,232	887,058	-	-	54,793	941,851
June 1955	828,531	17,228	60,227	905,986	-	-	63,403	969,389
June 1956	830,266	16,987	75,026	922,279	-	-	74,059	996,338
June 1957	830,611	16,733	86,212	933,556	18,203	4,462	62,980	1,019,201
June 1958	836,781	16,577	110,600	963,958	19,776	5,901	63,713	1,053,348
June 1959	843,739	16,350	130,092	990,181	21,548	6,977	68,922	1,087,628
June 1960	849,634	16,202	150,170	1,016,006	22,639	8,792	73,452	1,120,889
June 1961	854,263	15,998	169,730	1,039,996	23,947	9,515	77,566	1,151,024
June 1962	862,083	15,805	176,772	1,054,660	20,004	9,027	91,069	1,174,760
June 1963	866,369	15,705	197,914	1,079,988	21,195	10,420	98,567	1,210,170
June 1964	863,284	15,617	226,494	1,105,395	23,369	13,168	104,653	1,246,585
June 1965	859,048	15,546	251,131	1,125,725	29,387	18,589	107,122	1,280,823
June 1966	845,730	15,392	284,025	1,145,147	39,485	24,367	108,750	1,317,749
June 1967	843,790	15,328	312,649	1,173,767	39,997	25,331	106,991	1,346,086
June 1968	824,366	14,704	316,166	1,155,236	60,219	26,900	121,939	1,364,294
June 1969	806,366	13,466	326,185	1,146,017	73,738	27,315	148,004	1,395,074
June 1970	804,576 h	13,602 h	342,009 i	1,160,187	77,735	27,238	160,059	1,425,219

a These statistics are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths, false registrations or undetected absences from the area of UNRWA operations.

b The "R" category of registration (columns 1 to 5) covers refugees with some or all members eligible for basic rations and entitled also to receive general education, medical services and other Agency assistance.

c The "S" category of registration (column 6) includes refugees whose income is above that of "R" category refugees, but below that of "N" category refugees, being eligible for general education, medical services and some other UNRWA assistance, but not for basic rations.

d "N" category (column 7) includes refugees whose income is such as to disqualify them for basic rations, general education and medical services, or who have received assistance to enable them to become self-supporting, women married to unregistered persons etc.

e Before 1954, half rations were issued to babies and bedouins as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan. Since then, babies have been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Bedouins are eligible to receive full rations. Half rations presently are issued only to frontier villagers on the West Bank. Three thousand and three ninety-five frontier villagers displaced to east Jordan after the hostilities of June 1967 are issued full rations on an emergency basis.

f Details not available.

g This grand total included refugees receiving relief in Israel who were UNRWA's responsibility through 30 June 1952.

h The actual number of rations issued for June 1970 was 836, 926, broken down as follows:

804,576 full ration recipients;

6,801 half rations to 13, 602 registered half ration recipients;

20,762 displaced registered refugees and children of displaced refugees who are receiving rations on an emergency and temporary basis;

therefore been changed;

1,353 displaced persons who are not registered with UNRWA who are receiving rations on an emergency and temporary basis;

3,254 temporary rations to registered refugees who have been declared eligible to receive rations.

936,926 total rations

i The total of 342,009 comprises:

(i) 17,992 infants under the age of one year who receive services but no rations;

(ii) 268,070 children (CRS) aged one year and over who are not receiving rations because of ration ceilings; and

(iii) 56,117 children (CRS) receiving rations on an emergency and temporary basis.

TABLE 2

RECAPITULATION OF CHANGES IN COMPOSITION AND/OR ENTITLEMENT OF FAMILIES REGISTERED FOR RATIONS ^a

Nature of changes	1 July '50 to 30 June '65	Year Ended					Total 1950-1970
		30 June '66	30 June '67	30 June '68	30 June '69	30 June '70	
	b			c	c	c	
<i>Increases</i>							
Births	516,970	43,945	40,506	26,803	38,659	35,500	702,383
New registration	45,777	283	74	75	1	1	46,211
Loss of self-support ^d	74,221	7,340	7,117	5,621	5,460	6,791	106,550
Returned from absence	14,811	1,168	1,679	3,872	17,757	7,990	47,277
Miscellaneous ^e	31,551	212	529	995	1,001	1,557	35,845
Total	683,330	52,948	49,905	37,366	62,878	51,839	938,266
<i>Decreases</i>							
Deaths	105,120	7,155	6,233	7,158	8,806	7,671	142,143
False registration and duplication	57,402	204	166	565	597	558	59,492
Self-support ^d	173,694	23,401	10,190	8,850	12,794	12,526	241,455
Absence	47,324	2,077	3,296	34,068	48,035	14,824	149,624
Miscellaneous ^e	134,360	770	1,669	4,686	2,211	2,107	145,803
Total	517,900	33,607	21,554	55,327	72,443	37,686	738,517
Population at 30 June	1,125,725	1,145,147	1,173,767	1,155,236	1,146,017	1,160,187	

^a This table recapitulates changes over twenty years affecting the total number of ration recipients, their babies and children registered for services (column 4 of table 1). Births, new registrations, deaths, false registrations and duplications result in additions to or deletions from the registration records. Self-support and absence reflect transfers to or from the lower categories of registration (shown in columns 5, 6 and 7 of table 1).

^b Transfers within or between areas, as well as issue of rations (when available) to children registered for services, are not shown in this table.

^c Includes changes effected during the 1950-1951 census operations.

^d Virtually no births, deaths or other changes have been documented in respect of registered displaced refugees in east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

^e Covers income, employment with the Agency, assistance towards self-support etc., or the cessation thereof.

^f Miscellaneous changes include up to June 1953, a number of additions to or deletions from the registration records, as well as certain changes in category of registration. The deletion of refugees in Israel from the Agency's records is also reported mainly under this heading (40,930 persons over the period July 1950-June 1953).

TABLE 3

RECAPITULATION OF CHANGES IN COMPOSITION OF TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION ^a

Nature of changes	1 July '50 to 30 June '65	Year Ended					Total 1950-1970
		30 June '66	30 June '67	30 June '68	30 June '69	30 June '70	
<i>Additions</i>				<i>c</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>c</i>	
Births	524,573	46,212	42,971	29,286	41,555	38,661	723,258
New registration	45,777	283	74	75	1	1	46,211
Miscellaneous ^b	6,453	68	92	458	392	1,681	9,144
Total	576,803	46,563	43,137	92,819	41,948	40,343	778,613
<i>Deletions</i>							
Deaths	108,300	7,866	6,963	7,853	9,866	9,220	150,070
False and duplicate registration	59,967	1,633	8,041	3,623	805	896	74,965
Miscellaneous ^b	89,165	-	-	-	-	-	89,165
Total	257,432	9,499	15,004	11,478	10,671	10,116	314,200
Total registered population at 30 June	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	
	1,280,823	1,317,749	1,346,086	1,364,294	1,395,074	1,425,219	

^a This table recapitulates changes affecting the total number of registered population (column 8 of table 1) over twenty years.

^b Transfers within or between areas are not shown herein.

In comparing the figures in this table with those in table 2, it should be borne in mind that deletions from the ration rolls do not necessarily entail deletions from the total registered population. Persons ceasing to draw rations because of absence or self-support continue to be registered within the total population. On the other hand, some deaths and false and duplicate registrations are reported among persons registered but not receiving rations, and this accounts for the minor differences under these headings in the two tables. In the earlier years of the Agency's history, the distinction between ration recipients and registered population was incompletely recorded.

^b Nature of changes reported under "miscellaneous" was not specified during the census operation. Figures reflect those amendments which resulted in addition or deletion in the total registered population, and removal of refugees in Israel from UNRWA registration records, and correction of deletions previously made by error which were included in the figures of new registration in the reports of previous years.

^c Virtually no births, deaths or other changes have been documented in respect of registered displaced refugees in east Jordan since the hostilities of June 1967.

RELIEF SERVICES

TABLE 4

BASIC RATIONS AND OTHER SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED BY UNRWA

1. *Basic dry rations*

A monthly ration for one person consisting of the commodities listed below was issued to refugees for the months of July-October 1969.

10,000 grams of flour
000 grams of pulses
600 grams of sugar
500 grams of rice
375 grams of oils and fats

Thereafter flour was substituted in part for the pulses and rice ration, in order to utilize donations of flour received as contributions to the Agency over and above normal programme requirements.

The ration continued to provide about 1,500 calories per day. In the winter, the flour issue was increased to bring the daily ration to about 1,600 calories.

2. *Other supplies distributed*

As for many years, one piece of soap (150 grams) per month was distributed to each ration beneficiary in the months from July 1969 to February 1970. However, beginning in March 1970, as an economy measure, the general issue of soap ceased, soap thereafter being restricted to ration beneficiaries in the emergency camps in east Jordan and Syria.

As in previous years, 1-1/2 litres of kerosene were allocated to ration beneficiaries and to babies and children registered for services, in camps in east Jordan, West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria during five winter months. In Gaza, 1 litre was allocated to these beneficiaries, whether or not they lived in camps, during five winter months.

TABLE 5

NORMAL SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAMME

Number of issuing centres and beneficiaries (1 July 1969-30 June 1970)

<i>A. Hot meal programme</i>				
Field	Number of feeding centres	Beneficiaries		
		Daily average for the period		
		0-2 years	2-15 years and special cases	0-15 years
East Jordan ^a	15	474	2,681	3,155
West Bank	30	507)	9,176)	
	5 ^b	159)	260)	10,102
Gaza	24	1,304	15,475	16,779
Lebanon	18	339	4,021	4,360
Syria	18	218	3,856	4,074
	110	3,001	35,469	38,470

<i>B. Milk programme</i>					
Field	Number of milk centres	Daily number of beneficiaries Average for the period			
		Milk centres	Schools	Orphanages, medical pre- scriptions	Total
East Jordan ^a	16	3,389	23,069	154	26,612
West Bank	30	3,540	12,291	125	15,956
Gaza	24	23,995	31,912	80	55,987
Lebanon	21	14,424	5,092	351	19,867
Syria	19	12,011	12,193	111	24,315
	110	57,359	84,557	821	142,737

<i>C. Extra dry ration programme</i>					
Field	Beneficiaries				
	Monthly average for the period				Total
	Pregnant women	Nursing mothers	TB out- patients	6-10 years CSM ^c	
East Jordan ^a	1,028	2,861	185	32,380	36,454
West Bank	1,121	4,770	409	23,642	29,942
Gaza	3,082	7,791	432	35,732	47,037
Lebanon	856	2,478	144	22,022	25,500
Syria	759	1,788	93	19,720	22,360
	6,846	19,688	1,263	133,496	161,293

^a Statistics for the first nine months only.^b Centres operated by voluntary societies.^c Mixture of corn flour, soya and milk.

TABLE 6

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAMME

	Number of beneficiaries (daily average)
<i>A. Hot meal programme</i>	
<i>Categories by Field</i>	
East Jordan ^a - displaced refugees 1-15 years	13,011
- non-refugee displaced persons 1-15 years	7,183
Syria - displaced refugees 1-15 years	5,318
	<hr/> 25,521
<i>B. Milk programme</i>	
<i>Categories by Field</i>	
East Jordan ^a - displaced refugees 1-15 years	3,120
- non-refugee displaced persons 1-15	1,685
Syria - displaced refugees 1-15 years	6,424
	<hr/> 11,229
<i>C. Other emergency supplements</i>	
<i>I. Protein supplement^b</i>	
(Consists of a twelve-ounce tin of meat and 500 grams CSM per month.)	
	Number of beneficiaries
<i>Field</i>	<i>(monthly average)</i>
East Jordan	33,840
West Bank	6,278
Gaza	11,304
Lebanon	-
Syria	16,611
	<hr/> 68,033
<i>II. "Non-protein supplement"^c</i>	
(Consists of 600 grams of flour, 500 grams rice and 500 grams fat per month.)	
<i>Field</i>	
East Jordan	-
West Bank	-
Gaza	-
Lebanon	-
Syria	15,685
	<hr/> 15,685

^a Statistics for the first nine months only.

^b Authorized for issue to all displaced refugees in Syria, to those living in emergency camps in east Jordan and to pregnant and nursing mothers and tuberculosis out-patients in West Bank and Gaza, and to those in this category living outside the emergency camps in east Jordan.

^c Authorized for issue to displaced refugees living in emergency camps in Syria and to identified hardship cases among the same category living outside these camps. This was done with a view to having the Agency's ration conform as closely as possible in food value to that issued by the Syrian Government to the Syrian displaced persons. Such issues were, however, discontinued as of 1 August 1969 in order to bring the programme in line with that in east Jordan.

TABLE 7

POPULATION OF ESTABLISHED CAMPS BY COUNTRY AS AT 30 JUNE 1970

Area	Number of camps	Number of persons officially registered in camps ^a	Number of persons actually living in camps ^c
East Jordan	4	72,595	106,417
West Bank	20	66,274	73,058
Gaza	8	192,590	198,919
Lebanon	15	83,487	90,949
Syria	6	25,313	27,630
Total	53	440,259	496,973

a This table does not include displaced persons and registered refugees in the emergency camps (see table 8 below).

b Persons officially registered in these camps are refugees eligible for UNRWA assistance who are shown in UNRWA records as living in camps, irrespective of their category of registration (R,S,N), although some may have moved to villages, towns or cities in other parts of the country and their removal has yet to be reported to the Agency. The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA, but benefit from sanitation services only.

c Persons actually living in these camps include 489,351 UNRWA-registered refugees and 7,622 who are neither registered with UNRWA nor eligible for UNRWA assistance. Also included are so-called refugee "squatters", who live in or on the fringes of the camps, although never officially admitted to or registered in the camps.

TABLE 8

POPULATION OF EMERGENCY CAMPS BY COUNTRY AS AT 30 JUNE 1970

Area	Number of camps	Number of persons actually living in camps ^a
East Jordan	6	103,678
Syria	4	15,491
Total	10	119,169

a Persons actually living in these camps comprise 78,024 UNRWA-registered refugees and 41,145 other persons, all of whom became displaced in 1967 and 1968.

N.B. Total population of persons living in established and emergency camps is 616,142.

HEALTH SERVICES

TABLE 9

OUT-PATIENT MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE

Number of patient-visits according to services rendered, UNRWA and UNRWA-subsidized clinics,
1 July 1969-30 June 1970.

Type of service	Number of visits (first and re-visits combined)					
	East ^a Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	All Fields
Medical consultation	386,465	267,393	513,441	414,396	423,809	2,005,504
Injection	315,529	193,067	536,484	249,564	225,047	1,519,691
Dressing and/or skin treatment	232,630	191,086	363,063	223,164	114,344	1,124,287
Eye treatment	178,172	162,097	380,366	110,916	40,464	872,015
Dental treatment	9,931	12,797	18,577	29,573	8,509	79,387
All types	1,122,727	826,440	1,811,931	1,027,613	812,173	5,600,884

a Statistics for the first nine months only.

TABLE 10
IN-PATIENT MEDICAL CARE

<i>A. Hospitals providing services to Palestine refugees, as at 30 June 1970</i>						
<i>Administering body</i>	<i>Number of institutions</i>					
Government and local authorities	35					
Voluntary societies or private	38					
UNRWA	3 ^a					
	76					
In addition, there are nine maternity centres: one in Syria, two in West Bank and six in Gaza.						

<i>B. Hospital beds by type of service and Field as at 30 June 1970</i>						
	Number of Beds Available					
<i>Type of services</i>	<i>East^b Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>All Fields</i>
General medical and surgical	218	227	348	161	79	1,033
Turberculosis	23	25	84	32	20	184
Maternity	25	33	87	8	7	160
Paediatrics	40	55	60	22	-	177
Mental	19	75	-	56	2	152
All services	325	415	579	279	108	1,706

<i>C. Rehydration/nutrition centres</i>						
	<i>East Jordan</i>	<i>West Bank</i>	<i>Gaza</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>All Fields</i>
Number of centres	7	1	6	3 ^c	3	20
Number of cots	57	10	98	30	21	216

^a These are: Kalkilya Hospital, West Bank; the paediatric ward in UNRWA/Swedish Health Centre, Gaza, and the Bureij Tuberculosis Hospital in Gaza, operated jointly with the Government Public Health Authority.

^b As at 31 March 1970.

^c One RNC (ten cots) temporarily closed.

TABLE 11
INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED AMONG PALESTINE REFUGEE POPULATION
(1 JULY 1969-30 JUNE 1970)

Reportable diseases	Number of cases					All Fields
	East ^a Jordan	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	
Cholera	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plague	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Smallpox	0	0	0	0	0	0
Typhus (louse-borne)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (louse borne)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ankylostomiasis	1	0	32	3	0	36
Bilharziasis	0	0	22	0	0	22
Brucellosis	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chicken-pox	541	677	863	1,260	771	4,112
Conjunctivitis	9,470	4,994	4,706	1,900	6,353	27,423
Diphtheria	1	0	0	0	1	2
Diarrhoeal diseases (0-3 years)	13,548	10,710	18,516	13,931	14,731	71,436
Dysentery	1,267	409	924	609	172	3,381
Enteric group fevers	0	0	15	4	123	142
Gonorrhoea	0	0	8	3	4	15
Infectious hepatitis	93	24	524	65	74	780
Influenza	7,310	715	6,394	2,874	8,254	25,547
Leishmaniasis cutaneous	0	2	0	0	2	4
Leprosy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malaria	0	0	4	1	0	5
Measles	1,848	528	469	494	733	4,072
Meningitis (cerebrospinal)	0	1	1	3	2	7
Mumps	541	964	2,807	790	886	5,988
Pertussis	218	74	35	53	15	395
Poliomyelitis	4	2	31	6	3	46
Rabies	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scarlet fever	0	0	0	0	0	0
Syphilis	0	0	12	13	13	38
Tetanus	0	0	1	2	1	4
Tetanus neonatorum	1	0	18	1	0	20
Trachoma	165	83	494	12	639	1,393
Tuberculosis (pulmonary)	55	20	95	93	10	273
Typhus (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0	0

^a Statistics for the first nine months only.

TABLE 12
MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH (1 JULY 1969-30 JUNE 1970)

	East Jordan ^a	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
<i>A. Ante-natal services</i>						
Number of ante-natal clinics	10	24	9	18	19	80
Pregnant women newly registered	5,199	3,948	9,681	3,558	2,961	25,347
Average monthly attendance	1,750	1,207	3,461	1,071	882	8,371
Serological tests	1,559	1,716	4,325	994	891	9,485
Tests positive	0	0	9	8	9	26
Home visits	1,539	23	75	615	693	2,945
<i>B. Infant health care</i>						
Number of infant health clinics	10	23	9	18	19	79
Infants 0-1 year registered, monthly average	6,096	3,568	9,383	4,308	2,735	26,090
Number attended, monthly average	4,541	3,051	8,469	3,310	2,157	21,519
Infants 1-2 years registered, bi-monthly average	5,765	3,905	8,325	4,174	3,034	24,393
Number attended, bi-monthly average	4,416	2,459	4,017	2,687	2,315	15,894
Infants 2-3 years registered, tri-monthly average	2,648	2,260	509	486	1,486	7,389
Number attended, tri-monthly average	1,134	1,639	402	316	892	4,383
Smallpox vaccinations	3,516	2,123	9,273	4,277	2,155	21,344
TAB immunizations (full)	2,775	3,079	98	2,446	2,446	11,576
DPT immunizations (full)	4,314	3,865	12,369	3,944	3,020	27,512
BCG vaccination	5,238	3,236	1,282	4,182	3,177	17,115
Polio vaccination	4,754	3,134	12,371	5,117	2,834	28,210
Home visits	8,537	11,313	9,169	13,288	12,252	54,559

^a Statistics for first nine months only.

TABLE 12 (continued)

	East Jordan ^a	West Bank	Gaza	Lebanon	Syria	Total
<i>C. School health services</i>						
Number of health teams	2	1	1 ^b	1	1	1
School entrants examined	9,388	2,498	8,130	3,759	6,329	30,104
Other pupils examined	2,209	11,282	297	1,241	13,570	28,599
Follow-up examinations	1,395	458	0	587	10,742	13,182
Teachers and attendants examined	772	345	0	0	967	2,084
School inspections	158	560	818	129	324	1,989
TAB boosters	12,494	8,526	34,733	32,386	18,915	107,054
Diphtheria or diphtheria/tetanus boosters	8,856	2,450	6,327	3,721	4,208	25,562
DPT immunizations (full)	0	312	0	0	0	312
Smallpox revaccinations	0	4,804	0	32,306	3,392	40,502
BCG vaccinations	0	2,693	2,514	6,079	15,721	27,007

a Statistics for first nine months only.

b School Medical Officer not available.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES

GENERAL EDUCATION

TABLE 13

UNRWA-UNESCO SCHOOLS

NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY AND PREPARATORY PUPILS, 1951-1970

Country	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 a
JORDAN																				
Elementary	16,345	15,882	30,118	39,188	42,144	43,649	42,431	41,600	39,519	38,223	38,309	41,000	45,531	50,220	55,713	60,802	65,849	45,593	53,357	60,334
Preparatory	-	-	87	790	1,612	2,862	4,274	5,357	6,714	6,898	7,437	8,384	8,492	8,868	9,623	11,113	12,838	9,043	10,939	13,830
Secondary	-	-	-	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	16,345	15,882	30,205	40,000	43,838	46,711	47,039	47,452	46,811	45,733	46,344	50,259	54,023	59,088	65,336	71,915	78,687	54,636b	64,296b	74,164b
WEST BANK																				
Elementary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,957	20,411	21,733
Preparatory	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,587	5,582	6,386
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,544	25,993	28,119
GAZA																				
Elementary	19,543	22,551	25,702	31,107	34,016	35,087	34,876	35,164	34,806	36,633	36,591	37,885	38,470	38,905	41,164	40,757	41,362	35,395	38,351	41,051
Preparatory	61	164	675	1,781	3,339	4,937	6,410	7,495	8,244	8,481	9,841	10,641	12,797	13,627	15,032	15,644	16,710	12,358	15,251	16,372
TOTAL	19,604	22,715	26,377	32,888	37,355	40,024	41,286	42,658	43,050	45,114	46,432	48,526	51,267	52,532	56,196	56,401	58,072	47,753	53,602	57,423
LEBANON																				
Elementary	4,564	6,291	9,332	11,695	12,567	12,983	13,155	13,936	14,881	15,422	16,292	17,124	17,411	18,041	19,836	19,547	20,744	21,312	22,426	23,791
Preparatory	-	-	86	384	620	948	1,003	996	1,325	1,668	2,159	2,676	2,680	3,491	3,710	3,648	3,451	5,168	6,046	6,267
TOTAL	4,564	6,291	9,418	12,079	13,187	13,931	14,158	14,932	16,206	17,090	18,451	19,800	20,091	21,532	23,546	23,195	24,195	26,480	28,472	30,058
SYRIA																				
Elementary	2,599	2,895	5,410	8,758	9,700	10,288	11,042	11,332	12,256	13,354	13,685	14,430	15,618	16,463	17,631	18,720	19,564	20,197	21,088	21,702
Preparatory	-	-	166	864	671	936	1,180	1,562	1,916	2,592	3,589	4,122	4,459	4,946	5,284	5,740	6,449	6,981	7,471	7,912
TOTAL	2,599	2,895	5,576	9,622	10,371	11,224	12,222	12,894	14,172	15,946	17,274	18,552	20,077	21,409	22,915	24,460	26,013	27,178	28,559	29,614
GRAND TOTAL																				
Elementary	43,051	47,619	70,562	90,748	98,427	102,007	101,504	102,031	101,462	103,632	104,877	110,439	117,030	123,629	134,344	139,826	147,519	141,454	155,533	168,611
Preparatory	61	164	1,014	3,819	6,242	9,683	12,867	15,410	18,199	19,639	23,026	25,823	28,428	30,932	33,649	36,145	39,448	38,137	45,289	50,767
Secondary	-	-	-	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	43,112	47,783	71,576	94,589	104,751	111,890	114,705	117,936	120,239	123,883	128,501	137,137	145,458	154,561	167,993	175,971	186,967	179,591	200,922	219,378

a Including a total of 8,618 non-eligible children attending UNRWA-UNESCO schools. Non-eligible may refer either to non-eligible refugee children or to non-refugees. In Jordan, non-refugee children in Agency schools are offset by reducing the subsidies payable to the Government in respect of refugee pupils attending government schools. The Government of Syria and the Authorities in Gaza partially offset the cost by providing teachers. In Lebanon, non-eligible refugees pay school fees.

b East Jordan only.

TABLE 14

NUMBER OF REFUGEE PUPILS ATTENDING GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS,
AS OF 31 MAY 1970

Country	Elementary			Preparatory			Secondary			All levels		
	Govern- ment schools	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Total
East Jordan	10,029	920 ^a	3,527	410 ^a	3,251	390 ^a	16,807	1,720 ^a	18,527			
West Bank	8,570 ^b	1,631	2,610 ^b	710 ^a	2,310 ^b	530 ^a	13,490	2,871	16,361			
Gaza	-	-	-	-	7,568	-	7,568	-	7,568			
Lebanon	943	5,229	237	2,078	163	1,475	1,343	8,782	10,125			
Syria	6,990	171	1,588	112	2,255	662	10,833	945	11,778			
Total	26,532	7,951	7,962	3,310	15,547	3,057	50,041	14,318	64,359			

^a Estimated (eligibility check not yet completed).

^b Estimated (this year the Occupying Authority did not provide the Agency with lists of refugee pupils attending government schools).

TABLE 15

UNRWA-UNESCO SCHOOLS SHOWING NUMBER OF PUPILS^a BY GRADES AS OF 31 MAY 1970*Elementary*

Country	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
East Jordan	7,026	6,786	6,117	5,541	5,007	4,408	4,771	4,152	4,485	3,717	4,751	3,573	32,157	27,177
West Bank	2,104	2,374	1,869	2,042	1,675	1,831	1,665	1,723	1,568	1,600	1,655	1,627	10,536	11,197
Gaza	4,763	4,172	4,417	3,934	3,114	2,797	3,225	2,717	3,016	2,676	3,309	2,911	21,844	19,207
Lebanon	2,517	2,235	2,379	2,179	2,457	2,158	2,024	1,810	1,537	1,345	1,768	1,382	12,682	11,109
Syria	2,210	2,068	2,176	1,962	1,980	1,632	1,878	1,489	1,721	1,325	1,860	1,401	11,825	9,877
TOTAL	18,620	17,635	16,958	15,658	14,233	12,826	13,563	11,891	12,327	10,663	13,343	10,894	89,044	79,567
GRAND TOTAL	36,255		32,616		27,059		25,454		22,990		24,234		168,611	

Preparatory

Country	I		II		III		IV		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
East Jordan	3,781	2,534	2,616	1,682	1,997	1,220	-	-	8,394	5,436
West Bank	1,526	1,206	1,167	886	863	738	-	-	3,556	2,830
Gaza	2,967	2,684	2,943	2,593	2,605	2,580	-	-	8,515	7,857
Lebanon	1,269	938	1,118	732	963	657	358	232	3,708	2,559
Syria	1,738	1,131	1,359	1,046	1,608	1,030	-	-	4,705	3,207
TOTAL	11,281	8,493	9,203	6,939	8,036	6,225	358	232	28,878	21,889
GRAND TOTAL	19,774		16,142		14,261		590		50,767	

^a See table 13, footnote b.

TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEE PUPILS RECEIVING EDUCATION (AS OF 31 MAY 1970)

COUNTRY	Number of UNRWA-UNESCO schools	Number of pupils in a elementary classes at UNRWA-UNESCO schools		Number of pupils in a preparatory classes at UNRWA-UNESCO schools		Number of refugee pupils in government and private schools		Total number of refugee pupils receiving education
		Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	
East Jordan	136	32,157	28,177	60,334	8,394	5,436	13,830	92,691
West Bank	87	10,536	11,197	21,733	3,556	2,830	6,386	44,480
Gaza	103	21,844	19,207	41,051	8,515	7,857	16,372	64,991
Lebanon	61	12,682	11,109	23,791	3,708	2,559	6,267	40,183
Syria	88	11,825	9,877	21,702	4,705	3,207	7,912	41,392
Total	480	89,044	79,567	168,611	28,878	21,889	50,767	283,737

a See table 13, foot-note b.

TABLE 17

UNRWA-UNESCO VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME, 1969-1970 SCHOOL YEAR
NUMBER OF TRAINING PLACES BY CENTRE, COURSE AND YEAR OF STUDY

Trade and professions	EAST JORDAN				WEST BANK				LEBANON				SYRIA				GAZA				TOTAL		GRAND TOTAL
	Wadi Seer Vocational Training Centre		Kalandia Vocational Training Centre		Ramallah Women's Training Centre		Siblin Training Centre		Damascus Vocational Training Centre		Gaza Vocational Training Centre												
	1st.	2nd.	1st.	2nd.	1st.	2nd.	1st.	2nd.	1st.	2nd.	1st.	2nd.	1st.	2nd.									
A. METAL TRADES																							
Fitter machinist	12	12	12	12	-	-	-	16	12	12	-	24	24	76	60	136							
Instrument mechanic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	16	16	-	-	-	32	16	48							
General mechanic	16	-	12	12	-	-	-	16	12	12	12	24	24	80	60	140							
Diesel plant site mechanic	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	16	16	16	16	64	64	128							
Auto mechanic	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	16	16	32	32	80	80	160							
Refrigeration and air-conditioning	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	32	32	64							
Panel beater and paint sprayer	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16							
Sheetmetal worker	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	-	-	-	-	32	32							
Blacksmith welder	12	12	12	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	32	32	56	68	124							
Welder	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	24	-	-	36	-	36							
Moulder	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	12	12							
B. ELECTRICAL TRADES																							
Electrician (industrial)	-	-	16	16	-	-	-	24	32	16	16	32	32	88	96	184							
Electrician (power)	-	-	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	32							
Radio TV mechanic	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	16	16	16	16	48	64	112							
Auto electrician	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	28	-	28							
C. BUILDING TRADES																							
Builder/shutterer	16	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	32	32	64	64	128							
Plasterer/tile setter	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	32							
Plumber	16	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	16	16	16	-	-	16	48	64							
Carpenter/wood machinist	16	16	16	-	-	-	-	16	16	16	16	32	32	96	80	176							
Plumber/sheetmetal worker	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16	16	16	32							

D. TECHNICIANS ^a													
Land surveyor	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	24	24
Quantity surveyor	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	24
Construction technician	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	24	24
Architectural draughtsman	16	-	24	-	-	24	-	-	24	-	24	64	88
Telecommunication technician	-	-	-	-	-	24	24	-	-	-	-	24	48
Vocational training instructor	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	24	24
Engineering draughtsman	24	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	48
Radio TV/electronics	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	16
E. COMMERCIAL ^a													
Business and office practice (men)	24	48	48	-	-	48	48	-	-	-	-	120	144
Secretaries (women)	-	-	-	52	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	104
F. PARA-MEDICAL													
Assistant pharmacist	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	20	-	-	20	40
Laboratory technician ^a	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	40	40
Public health inspector ^a	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	16
G. VOCATIONAL COURSES FOR GIRLS (other than commercial)													
Home and institutional management ^a	-	-	-	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	32
Infant leader ^a	-	-	-	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	32
Dressmaking	-	-	-	42	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	66
Clothing production	-	-	-	14	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	26
Hairdressing	-	-	-	16	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	32
TOTAL by year of study	228	224	196	180	176	136	300	256	208	196	272	284	1,380
GRAND TOTAL	452	376	312	556	404	556	556	556	1,276	2,656			

	Men	Girls	Grand total
Present total	2,344	312	2,656
Expansion in hand	356	180	536
Present total plus expansion	2,700	492	3,192

^a Indicates post secondary-level courses. All other courses are post preparatory.

OTHER ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

TABLE 18

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES HAVING OPERATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR DIRECT
ASSISTANCE TO UNRWA-REGISTERED REFUGEES 1969-1970

American Friends Service Committee

Baptist Mission (United States)

CARITAS

Catholic Relief Services

Commonwealth Save the Children Fund

Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

Lutheran World Federation

Mennonite Central Committee

Near East Council of Churches—World Council of Churches

Pontifical Mission for Palestine

Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA

World Alliance of YMCAs

Young Men's Christian Association

Young Women's Christian Association

TABLE 19

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENDITURE AND WORKING CAPITAL (1 MAY 1950-31 DECEMBER 1970 ^a)
(In US dollars)

	Income		Expenditure	Adjustments to working capital increases (decreases)	Balance of working capital (operating reserve)
	Pledges from Governments	Other income			
1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951	39,477,281	1,346,325	40,823,606	-	7,224,634
1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952	67,686,495	1,018,785	68,705,280	215,792	47,572,648
1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953	26,867,673	440,419	27,308,092	518,220	48,620,026
1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954	22,684,330	575,024	23,259,354	157,264	42,530,104
1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955	23,673,500	594,161	24,267,661	(114,217)	37,460,843
1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956	23,385,026	571,866	23,956,892	(164,814)	29,054,371
1 July 1956 to 31 December 1957	42,378,773	1,072,872	43,451,645	198,575	20,240,452
1 January to 31 December 1958	32,555,876	1,104,793	33,660,669	(36,519)	21,160,076
1 January to 31 December 1959	32,625,400	1,405,205	34,030,605	110,688	20,285,552
1 January to 31 December 1960	33,828,887	2,629,135	36,458,022	150,084	22,219,198
1 January to 31 December 1961	34,386,052	2,306,293	36,692,345	194,943	20,054,965
1 January to 31 December 1962	34,308,775	1,346,239	35,655,014	615,154	20,636,289
1 January to 31 December 1963	34,444,063	1,251,994	35,696,057	448,589	20,573,857
1 January to 31 December 1964	33,963,601	1,198,130	35,161,731	922,665	17,620,062
1 January to 31 December 1965	34,000,353	1,134,525	35,134,878	155,708	15,292,176
1 January to 31 December 1966	34,969,322	1,358,729	36,328,051	152,209	14,274,016
1 January to 31 December 1967	40,335,873	2,733,256	43,069,129	(115,529)	16,686,923
1 January to 31 December 1968	37,561,310	3,546,861	41,108,171	(156,048)	13,651,941
1 January to 31 December 1969	39,792,749	2,508,000	42,300,749	681,949	10,473,591
1 January to 31 December 1970 (estimated)	39,102,769	1,930,000	41,032,769	-	5,361,360
	708,028,103	30,072,612	738,100,720	1,847,893	

^a The figures in this table are based on the Agency's audited accounts through 1969, modified to reflect, for each period, the income and expenditure (including commitments) applicable to the budget for that period, regardless of when the income was actually received or the expenditure actually incurred. This basis of reporting was first adopted in the Commissioner-General's report for 1961-1962 and a few minor changes have since had to be made in the figures contained in that report (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/5214)*).

^b These adjustments represent principally the liquidation in subsequent years of liabilities and commitments at less than amounts originally charged to expenditure account. Also included are adjustments arising from revaluation of inventory, recovery of assets previously charged to expenditure, and price variations on supplies not chargeable to a particular budget heading. These adjustments are shown separately because of the difficulty in identifying the specific prior year to which the adjustments pertain. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1964 and 1 January to 31 December 1967 also include transfers of \$1,761,792 and \$460,854, respectively, to bring up the provisions for deferred staff costs to the level required by the Agency's revised social security arrangements. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1968 include a transfer to the Agency's reserve for unliquidated commitments of \$431,664 reflecting a commitment in 1968 for capital construction of a receipt of funds included in the income of the preceding financial year. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1969 include a transfer of accumulated net exchange differences on provident fund liabilities.

^c Includes \$2,646,909 deficit of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees paid by UNRWA.

TABLE 20

DETAILED STATEMENT OF INCOME TO UNRWA, 1 MAY 1950-31 DECEMBER 1970 ^a
(In US dollars)

Contributor	For the period							Total
	1 May 1950 to	Twelve months to						
	31 December 1965	31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968	31 December 1969	31 December 1970b		
I. PLEDGES BY GOVERNMENTS								
Abu Dhabi	-	-	20,927	40,000	10,000	10,000	80,927	
Argentina	-	-	-	2,000	-	-	2,000	
Australia	3,179,903	201,600	201,600	201,600	364,934	357,600	4,507,237	
Austria	31,950	10,000	29,350	10,000	15,000	20,000	116,300	
Bahrain	23,867	-	-	-	-	-	23,867	
Belgium	398,000	30,000	35,000	35,000	74,771	76,000	648,771	
Bolivia	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	
Brazil	25,000	-	-	-	-	-	25,000	
Burma	9,546	-	-	-	-	-	9,546	
Cambodia	7,141	-	-	-	-	-	7,141	
Canada	17,468,725	1,111,111	2,463,768	1,709,445	1,574,074	1,577,000	52,904,123	
Central African Republic	398	-	-	-	1,800	1,800	3,998	
Ceylon	5,400	1,000	3,000	800	800	800	11,800	
Chile	-	-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000	
China	3,279	10,000	20,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	123,279	
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	-	-	20,000	-	-	-	20,000	
Cuba	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	
Cyprus	1,682	280	560	240	480	240	3,482	
Denmark	786,363	209,348	496,986	691,333	572,882	623,000	3,379,912	
Dominican Republic	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	6,000	
El Salvador	500	-	-	-	-	-	500	
Ethiopia	35,500	-	-	-	-	-	35,500	
Federal Republic of Germany	3,135,221	500,000	752,800	2,149,263	3,073,055	2,297,000 g	11,907,339	
Finland	43,000	10,000	65,000	60,000	60,000	60,000	298,000	
France	12,221,920	229,778	1,258,137	1,128,457c	683,959	582,000	16,104,251	
Gambia	30	-	-	-	-	-	30	
Gaza authorities	876,871	167,437	155,547	107,152	93,414	95,000	1,495,421	
Ghana	21,000	3,000	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	39,000	
Greece	260,017	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	16,000	336,017	
Haiti	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	6,000	

Honduras	2,500	-	2,500	-	12,500	-	2,500	-	2,500	2,500
Holy See	20,965	2,500	28,500	12,500	12,500	-	2,500	-	2,500	79,465
Iceland	-	-	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000
India	332,534	13,333	13,333	13,333	13,333	-	13,333	-	13,333	399,199
Indonesia	240,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,268	-	5,268	245,268
Iran	55,153	-	12,695	7,120	6,000	16,000	96,968	-	96,968	502,000
Iraq	2,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	502,000	-	502,000	338,876
Ireland	108,876	25,000	65,000	40,000	50,000	50,000	3,076,190	-	3,076,190	2,100,915
Israel	256,547	-	683,911	591,629	943,103	238,619	480,000	-	480,000	10,620
Italy	821,326	160,000	240,100	160,870	238,619	3,250	350,000	-	350,000	772,500
Jamaica	560	560	3,000	-	3,250	3,250	163,000	-	163,000	2,346,129
Japan	162,500	30,000	140,000	40,000	50,000	50,000	220,000	-	220,000	2,142,860
Jordan	1,547,242	173,819	163,737	146,477	151,854	151,854	220,000	-	220,000	4,687
Kuwait	1,042,860	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000	51,839	-	51,839	880,750
Laos	4,687	-	-	-	-	-	3,000	-	3,000	43,500
Lebanon	646,205	37,231	51,839	43,253	51,222	51,222	100,000	-	100,000	564,000
Liberia	26,500	-	3,000	-	9,000 ^d	9,000 ^d	3,000	-	3,000	49,000
Libya	64,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	3,000	-	3,000	280
Luxembourg	34,000	- 3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	1,500	-	1,500	45,238
Malawi	140	140	-	-	-	-	5,000	-	5,000	135,691
Malaysia	27,738	1,500	11,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	204	-	204	7,253
Malta	-	-	5,000	20,000	-	-	204	-	204	40,000
Mexico	115,691	-	-	20,000	-	-	25,000	-	25,000	1,575,370
Monaco	6,257	204	204	204	204	204	110,193	-	110,193	2,581,600
Morocco	139,089	20,000	25,000	25,000	40,000	40,000	67,200	-	67,200	4,420
Netherlands	933,010	140,625	115,518	110,193	111,189	111,189	5,000	-	5,000	40,000
New Zealand	2,156,000	140,000	84,000	67,200	67,200	67,200	181,818	-	181,818	1,473,694
Niger	-	510	510	2,500	450	450	20,969	-	20,969	677,786
Nigeria	15,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	22,500	-	22,500	116,728
Norway	718,569	77,000	293,497	91,000	111,810	111,810	12,000	-	12,000	6,500
Pakistan	562,470	31,446	20,964	20,969	20,968	20,968	3,000	-	3,000	30,000
Philippines	13,750	1,250	1,250	1,250	3,750	3,750	3,000	-	3,000	39,200
Qatar	62,728	10,000	10,000	10,000	12,000	12,000	297,778	-	297,778	3,702,081
Republic of Korea	6,500	-	-	-	-	-	6,666	-	6,666	4,000
Republic of Viet-Nam	21,000	-	3,000	-	3,000	3,000	1,000	-	1,000	1,626,642
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	39,200	-	-	-	-	-	705,427	-	705,427	154,494
Saudi Arabia	1,916,191	594,778 ^e	297,778	297,778	297,778	297,778	2,193,081	-	2,193,081	13,283,532
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	529,770	-	529,770	3,136,993
Singapore	-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	4,000	-	4,000	4,000
Spain	50,000	-	166,481	-	704,734	704,734	1,626,642	-	1,626,642	154,494
Sudan	153,940	-	-	-	-	-	554	-	554	13,283,532
Sweden	2,118,650	2,354,641	2,200,773	2,222,969	2,194,018	2,194,018	869,056	-	869,056	3,136,993
Switzerland	988,986	297,791	254,630	196,760	196,760	196,760	529,770	-	529,770	3,136,993

TABLE 20 (continued)

Contributor	For the period						Total
	1 May 1950 to 31 December 1965	Twelve months to					
		31 December 1966	31 December 1967	31 December 1968	31 December 1969	31 December 1970b	
I. PLEDGES BY GOVERNMENTS (continued)							
Syria	1,344,221	91,480	93,726	88,770	88,642	90,000	1,796,839
Thailand	4,125	-	6,800	-	-	-	10,925
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	1,000	1,500	-	1,500	4,000
Tunisia	18,000	5,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	5,000	40,000
Turkey	67,759	8,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	15,000	120,759
United Arab Republic	5,097,319	255,960	120,452	1,845	400	-	5,475,976
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	90,524,004	5,000,000	5,000,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	4,500,000	114,024,004
United States of America	364,468,069	22,550,000	24,200,000	22,200,000	22,200,000	22,325,000h	477,943,069
Uruguay	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Yugoslavia	528,700	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	628,700
Sundry Governments through World Refugee Year Stamp Plan	238,211	-	-	-	-	-	238,211
TOTAL GOVERNMENT PLEDGES	516,266,085	34,969,322	40,335,873f	37,561,310f	39,792,749	39,102,769	708,028,108
II. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS							
UNESCO	2,276,415	332,215	343,221	349,376	356,506	380,000	4,037,733
WHO	598,056	51,402	60,878	65,185	83,508	80,000	939,029
Sundry donors	6,181,406	438,770	1,944,709	2,256,992	1,346,407	920,000	13,088,284
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS	9,055,877	822,387	2,348,808 f	2,671,553 f	1,786,421	1,380,000	18,065,046
III. MISCELLANEOUS INCOME AND EXCHANGE ADJUSTMENTS							
	8,939,889	536,342	384,448	875,308	721,579	550,000	12,007,566
TOTAL INCOME	534,261,851	36,328,051	43,069,129	41,108,171	42,300,749	41,032,769	738,100,720

a The figures in this table through 1969 are based upon the Agency's audited financial statements, modified to show for each year the government pledges applicable to that year, regardless of when payment was actually made.

b The figures for 1970 are estimated.

c Includes \$23,980 (FF 117,500) for 1969.

d Includes a late contribution of \$3,000 for 1968.

e Includes a late contribution of \$297,000 for 1964.

f Includes special contributions for the emergency situation arising from the hostilities of June 1967 as follows: from Governments \$5,841,465 (in 1967) and \$1,327,836 (in 1968) from others \$1,309,928 (in 1967) and \$1,454,136 (in 1968).

g The Federal Republic of Germany has made pledges for 1970 totalling \$3,278,688 mainly to cover costs of special projects. Of this amount, \$2,297,000 (as shown above) has been included in UNRWA's budget for 1970 pending agreement between the donor and UNRWA on the projects to be financed.

h The United States of America has made a special pledge of \$1,000,000 for projects expanding technical and vocational training. The figure of \$22,325,000 includes only \$125,000 of this pledge to meet the operating costs in the first semester of 1970/1971 of expansion already undertaken by UNRWA and accepted by the donor as meeting the purpose of the pledge.

TABLE 21
STATEMENT OF INCOME FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
1 JANUARY 1969 TO 30 JUNE 1970
(In US dollars)

Name of contributor	Year 1969	First six months of 1970
<i>Australia</i>		
Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE)	29,283	12,550
United Nations Association of Australia—Victorian Division	-	551
<i>Austria</i>		
Caritas	1,925	-
Robert Brunner and Franz Wieland	-	796
<i>Belgium</i>		
L'Association culturelle belge-libanaise	343	-
<i>Canada</i>		
Arab Refugee Emergency Appeal of Windsor	124	-
Baird, Dr. R. P.	462	475
Bartling, Miss Hedwig, D. H.	120	-
Canadian Council for International Co-operation	100	-
Canadian Red Cross Youth		
Ontario Division	925	-
Quebec Division	463	464
Canadian Save The Children Fund	4,664	-
Unitarian Service Committee	6,591	9,761
Sundry donors	96	19
<i>Denmark</i>		
Lutheran Aid Organization	-	2,842
Statens Seruminstitut	600	-
<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>		
Daimler-Benz, Stuttgart	-	1,093
Deutsche Bank, AG.	601	-
Diakonische Werk	63,903	18,500
Index-Werke KG, Esslingen	-	546
Katholische Hauptschule	-	137
Kraukenhagen, Gerndt	75	-
MISEREOR	10,004	-
Near East Representatives of German Banks	546	466
Refugee Campaign 1966-1967, Bavaria	500	-
Spehl, Helmut	149	-
Sundry donors	34	11
<i>Finland</i>		
Finnish Refugee Council	10,000	-
Sipila, Mrs. Helvi	1,050	-

TABLE 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1969	First six months of 1970
<i>France</i>		
Bouges, Miss Bernadette	108	-
El-Mallawany, I.	46	-
French Red Cross	856	19,719
<i>Gaza</i>		
Abu Abdallah Family	63	31
Abu Ayyad Family	23	12
Abu Ayyad and Awada Families	45	22
Abu Khusa Family	20	10
Abu Middain Family	1,241	620
Abu Omar Family and Khalil Khalil	23	12
Abu Salim Family	304	152
Abu Salah Nasr	17	9
Abu Sha'b Family	274	137
Abu Uriban Family	58	29
Abu Uriban and Abu Middain Families	30	15
Awada Family	973	486
Awada and Abu Middain Families	200	100
Daghma Family	69	34
El Mussaddar Family	174	87
Gaza Municipality	34	17
Mussadar and Qur'an Families	232	116
Saleh Ali Barbakh	29	14
Tarazi Family	71	36
Waqf Department	4,093	2,046
<i>Iceland</i>		
Women's Club of Neschurch (Reykjavik)	100	-
<i>Iran</i>		
Sundry donors	12	-
<i>Ireland</i>		
Sundry donors	24	-
<i>Japan</i>		
Petroleum Association of Japan	-	278
Toyota Company	-	1,800
Sundry donors	34	-
<i>Jordan</i>		
Municipal Council—Qalqilia	616	308
Anonymous	120	-
Sundry donors	179	153

TABLE 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1969	First six months of 1970
<i>Lebanon</i>		
American Mission	978	489
Ardill, R. H.	50	-
Bassoul, Heneiné and Co.	-	200
Cassis, Gabriel J.	-	154
Greek Orthodox Community	615	308
Heirs of Saadeddine Shatila	1,230	615
Hortaman, John F.	50	-
Middle East Education Consultant	20	-
Mneimneh and Bohsaly	1,384	692
Rowland, Victor	70	-
Syrian Lebanese Mission	1,845	923
Taylor, Vernon	-	200
The Church Council of the Evangelische Gemeinde	421	-
Anonymous	1,016	256
Sundry donors	8	40
<i>Luxembourg</i>		
Association pour l'Aide aux Réfugiés Palestiniens	-	500
Biermann, P.	498	500
<i>Malaysia</i>		
Masged Negara	412	-
<i>Monaco</i>		
Les Guides de Monaco	-	500
<i>Netherlands</i>		
Leepel, Mrs. M. J. B.	279	-
Stichting Clubbingen—Zwalle	-	54
Van der Valk, P. C.	300	-
Sundry donors	29	-
<i>New Zealand</i>		
Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO)	18,425	2,233
United Nations Association of New Zealand— South Canterbury Branch	400	-
<i>Norway</i>		
Norwegian Aid Society for Refugees and International Development	-	1,100
Norwegian Refugee Council	16,621	6,599
Save the Children Fund	700	1,416
<i>Portugal</i>		
Gulbenkian Foundation	20,000	10,000

TABLE 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1969	First six months of 1970
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>		
Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO)	104,000	-
<i>Sweden</i>		
Swedish Committee for Palestine Refugees	106	98
Swedish Organization for Individual Relief	-	1,374
Swedish Save the Children Federation	481,164	51,886
Sundry donors	53	-
<i>Switzerland</i>		
Association de Cooperative Franco-Algerienne du Faucigny	-	45
Association Suisse-Arabe	-	432
Caritas	19,676	-
Evangelisch-Refermierten Kirchen des Kantons—Schaffhausen	1,551	-
Hoffman La Roche	1,125	-
Krbec, Miss Eva Marie	185	93
Swiss Pastors	259	116
Van Berchem, Mrs. M. Gauthier	549	-
Sundry donors	2	-
<i>Syria</i>		
Syrian local authorities	3,038	992
<i>United Arab Republic</i>		
Butros, Dr. Nushi Abdel Hadi	46	-
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i>		
Aitken, Mr. and Mrs. M. M. W.	619	-
Ardrossan Churches' Group—Scotland	335	250
Catholic Women's League	2,400	-
Collegiate School for Girls—Blackpool	-	499
Hite, Mrs. P. A.	48	-
Imperial Chemical Industries (Ltd.)	80	-
Iraq Petroleum Company	13,386	12,913
OXFAM	228,590	51,326
Rogers, Miss M.	984	-
Standing Conference of British Organizations for Aid to Refugees, including:		
Catholic Women's League	142,134	
Friends Service Council		
Help the Aged		
OXFAM		
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		
War on Want		

TABLE 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1969	First six months of 1970
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Continued)</i>		
Aitken, Mrs. E.	-	552
The Refugee Circle	-	984
The Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh and Associated Hospitals, Scotland	100	-
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—Peterborough Branch	24	-
Sundry donors	90	69
<i>United States of America</i>		
American Friends Committee	2,263	1,683
American Joint Distribution Committee	214	1,920
American Middle East Rehabilitation (AMER)	29,536	3,990
American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA)	40,000	-
American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA)		
Contribution of Mr. and Mrs. Howard Page	1,000	1,500
Contribution of Mr. G. Piercy	500	500
Contribution of Mr. Harold Fisher	1,000	-
Balfour Declaration of the Western Hemisphere	64	-
Baligh, Mustafa H.	-	200
Canate, Ruth	-	50
First Congregation Church of San Francisco	500	-
Gardner, Mrs. Cary B.	100	-
Glover, Dr. M. and Dr. F. Jackson	-	85
Hess, Mrs. Gertrude C.	100	-
Henderson, Mrs. Douglas C.	462	-
Hurlimann-Mader, Mrs. Marianne	1,000	-
Islamic Centre of New York	-	127
Johns, Leroy K.	-	50
Munroe, Miss Gretel S.	-	100
NAJDA, American Women for the Middle East	1,000	550
National Cash Register Company	6,000	-
Pal-Aid	448	-
Press, Mr. and Mrs. Robert	150	-
Righter, Thomas	190	-
Scarsdale—Hardsdale Chapter of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. Inc.	125	-
Schwitters, A. M.	100	50
Union Theological Seminary	800	-
U.S. Omen	250	-
United States People's Fund for the United Nations, Inc.	2,093	60
Anonymous	1,250	-
Sundry donors	220	214

TABLE 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1969	First six months of 1970
<i>International organizations</i>		
Caritas (through Jordan office)	5,080	-
Church World Services Inc.	-	54
Federation of Business and Professional Women:		
International Federation	2,024	-
Australia	504	-
Canada	3,588	2,788
Denmark	24	-
Japan	131	-
New Zealand	499	550
Norway	492	-
Sweden	319	-
Switzerland	500	-
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1,571	499
United States of America	500	-
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	1,500	-
Lutheran World Federation	5,874	1,398
The Pontifical Mission for Palestine	-	352
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	356,506	195,157
Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA	4,525	5,769
World Council of Churches/Near East Christian Committee	92	40,000
World Health Organization (WHO)	83,508	43,032
Zonta International	20,801	17,000
Anonymous	462	-
Sundry donors	35	-
	1,786,421	540,540

TABLE 22
DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO REFUGEES^{a b}
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 1970
(in US dollars)

Governments	Education services	Social welfare services	Medical services	Housing	Security services	Miscellaneous services	Administrative costs	Totals
Israel	1,497,714	705,714	1,304,286	-		292,857	433,143	4,233,714
Jordan	1,325,038	289,800	285,648		1,260,000		402,027	3,562,513
Lebanon	43,077	9,231	13,846	2,307,692	133,846	13,846	107,692	2,629,230
Syria	957,523	197,674	79,070	1,144,379	34,884	123,256	284,884	2,821,670
United Arab Republic	6,527,400	552,000	57,500	-	-	126,500	883,200	8,146,600

^a In addition to the foregoing contributions direct to the refugees, all Governments listed also made contributions to UNRWA for the latter's budget. These contributions are reported in the Agency's own accounts and are set out in tables 19 and 20.

^b All data shown are provided by the Governments concerned, and are expressed in United States Dollars computed by applying the Agency's accounting rates of exchange, which are based on official or free market rates as appropriate.

UNRWA MANNING-TABLE POSTS

TABLE 23

UNRWA MANNING-TABLE POSTS AT 30 JUNE 1969
AND AT 30 JUNE 1970

	Local posts ^a	International Posts				GRAND TOTAL
		UNRWA posts	Posts occupied or to be occupied by loaned staff, mainly from other United Nations organizations		Total	
			Reimburs-able	Non-reimburs-able		
30 June 1969	13,088	93	3	28	124	13,212
30 June 1970	13,750	97	3	33	133	13,883

a Virtually all local posts are occupied by Palestine refugees.

PART II

Documents Submitted to the General Assembly by Special Committees

317

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories¹

October 5, 1970

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¹ U.N. doc. A/8089, pp. 1-59. The annexes to the report, pp. 61-125, are not reprinted here.

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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly, for their information, the attached report which was submitted to him by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in accordance with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968.

Letter of Transmittal

5 October 1970

His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York, N.Y.

Sir,

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories has the honour to present herewith its report in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII).

The Special Committee has conducted its investigations in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV). A major obstacle that faced the Special Committee at the very outset was the refusal of the Government of Israel to co-operate with it. The Committee was therefore not in a position to visit the occupied territories for more thorough verification of the allegations made before it. However, the Committee feels that it has achieved its purpose of ascertaining whether or not the policies and practices referred to in resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV) are in existence in the occupied territories and the degree to which such policies and practices may be said to exist.

Within the time at its disposal the Special Committee has not been able to undertake as detailed an analysis as it would have desired of the mass of documentary material which had been presented to it in support of

the allegations that the Government of Israel has engaged in policies and practices in violation of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. The paramount need, in the Special Committee's opinion, was to secure immediate alleviation of the conditions prevailing in the occupied territories and this could be achieved only if the primary evidence available was evaluated and the Special Committee's findings on it presented with the least possible delay. The Special Committee has therefore thought fit in this, the first stage of its work, to concentrate its attention on the evidence that had an immediate bearing on the types of violation of human rights specified in the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and to report its findings on that evidence. The documentary material which has been submitted to the Special Committee tends to support this evidence. The need for a further and more thorough study of this material which the Special Committee intends undertaking because of its relevance to the entire question of the protection of human rights in the occupied territories does not therefore diminish the value of the evidence that has already been considered and on which the Special Committee has based its present findings.

The Committee held hearings in London, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Geneva and New York and recorded the evidence of persons who claimed to have first-hand experience of breaches of human rights. It has also examined statements made by members of the Israeli Government and other political leaders, relevant to the allegations with which the Special Committee is concerned. The Committee has thereby created a basis upon which a responsible opinion can be given.

The evidence given before the Special Committee has revealed the grim situation of the refugees living inside the occupied territories. The Special Committee visited some of the refugee camps outside the occupied territories and was deeply moved by the unhappy plight of their occupants. Not all the efforts of the relief organizations that minister to the needs of the refugees can

restore to them the conditions of social stability and economic security from which they have been dislodged by war. Apart from the recommendations contained in section IV of this report, the Special Committee is of the opinion that there is an urgent need for the improvement of the lot of these refugees and displaced persons. The Committee wishes to commend the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the other organizations, whose devotion to the cause of humanity is universally recognized, for what they are doing. It feels, however, that the activities of these organizations, in particular UNRWA, might be amplified and intensified in scope and content to ensure for the refugees a greater measure of the essential amenities of life. To that end, so far as UNRWA is concerned, it should be provided with the necessary financial and material resources.

The Special Committee would like to observe that the cause of humanity could be even better served if, in situations such as this, organizations, whose personnel has direct experience and knowledge of events constituting relevant and valuable evidence, could see their way to modifying their present policies and make such information available, without condition, to investigating bodies.

The Special Committee has made certain recommendations in its report which it hopes would help to facilitate the termination and prevention of such policies and practices that constitute a violation of human rights.

The aim of the Special Committee's recommendations is to provide a machinery whereby the facts could be established by an independent body in order to remove the doubts that have surrounded these allegations which, if true, are of a very serious nature and, if untrue, are equally serious since they serve no purpose except to prolong and even aggravate a poignant situation.

Resolution 2443 (XXIII) requests the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General "as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter". The Special Committee, in its recommendations, proposes that it continue its work until such time as an

arrangement is made that would be acceptable to all parties concerned. The Special Committee states in its report that "for this purpose the Committee would require certain facilities to enable it to keep abreast of developments in the occupied territories which have a bearing on the protection of the human rights of the population of those territories, to receive allegations and evidence of violations of those rights, to conduct studies of relevant developments as they occur, and, if necessary, to return to the Middle East for further work in execution of its mandate". Judging by its experience so far, the Special Committee would consider it necessary to have sufficient professional and other staff assigned to assist it for as long as its mandate remains in force, and to have adequate financial provision made at this stage for the contingency of a further visit by the Committee to the Middle East in 1971 of somewhat the same scope and duration as in 1970.

The Special Committee trusts that this report will be made available to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and would be glad if this letter could be circulated as part of the report.

The Special Committee takes this opportunity of expressing to you and to the staff of the United Nations who have been associated with it its sincere thanks for the help and co-operation which it has received.

(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE

Chairman

Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories

*Report of the Special Committee to investigate
Israeli practices affecting the human rights of
the population of the occupied territories*

I. MANDATE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. *Terms of reference of the Special Committee*

1. The General Assembly, in resolution 2443 (XXIII) entitled "Respect for and

implementation of human rights in occupied territories", adopted at its 1748th plenary meeting on 19 December 1968, decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States. The General Assembly requested its President to appoint the members of the Special Committee, requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work, and requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter. The Secretary-General was requested to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task. The full text of resolution 2443 (XXIII) is reproduced in annex I to the present report.

2. The General Assembly in resolution 2546 (XXIV), bearing the same title, adopted at its 1829th plenary meeting on 11 December 1969, reaffirmed its resolutions relating to the violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel; expressed its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of human rights in those territories; and condemned such policies and practices as collective and area punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel. The General Assembly urgently called upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from its reported repressive practices and policies towards the civilian population in the occupied territories and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations. The General Assembly requested the Special Committee to take cognizance of the provisions of resolution 2546 (XXIV). The full text of the resolution is reproduced in annex II to the present report.

B. Developments prior to the establishment of the Special Committee

3. The President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly died without completing the appointment of the members of the Special Committee as provided in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII). On 23 May 1969 the Secretary-General drew this fact to the attention of Member States in a *note verbale* which was circulated to the General Assembly on 28 May 1969 (A/7495). In the *note verbale*, the Secretary-General recalled that:

... it had not yet been possible to complete the appointment of the Special Committee provided for in General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. The President's death has thus left unresolved the question of the appointment of the Committee, and the rules of procedure of the General Assembly do not contain any provision covering the present situation.

In the circumstances there would appear to be only two practicable alternatives to comply with the resolution:

1. To convene a special session of the General Assembly to provide another method for constituting the Special Committee;

2. (a) To find a procedure which, through its acceptance by Member States, would permit the designation of one of the Vice-Presidents to undertake the appointment of the Special Committee;

(b) Alternatively, and in line with the spirit of rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to ascertain from the Government of Guatemala, if possible, who would be the Chairman of that country's delegation for the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and request him to undertake the appointment of the Special Committee.

The first alternative, that of a special session of the General Assembly, would involve considerable time, effort and expense. However, if this alternative is favoured, the special session might be brief and be attended only by members of permanent missions if its business were limited either to the designation of a Vice-President or the proposed Chairman of the delegation of Guatemala to perform the residual function of the

President of the twenty-third session, or to transfer that function to the President of the special session.

The second alternative would appear to be more convenient. If this alternative is acceptable, it has been suggested that the membership might first be consulted as to which of the sub-alternatives, namely, the designation of the leader of the delegation of Guatemala or one of the Vice-Presidents, to exercise the residual function of the President of the twenty-third session, is generally acceptable.

In the circumstances explained above, the Secretary-General would like to inquire whether His Excellency's Government accepts one or the other of the above alternatives, and if so which alternative is favoured.

In view of the time that has already elapsed, the Secretary-General would be grateful for a very early reply, by letter or by telegram, not later than 10 June 1969.

4. In a communication dated 19 June 1969 (S/7495/Add.1, para. 3) the Government of Israel, with regard to the proposals contained in the Secretary-General's *note verbale* of 23 May 1969, stated that:

...the initiative taken by the Secretary-General in his communication of 23 May 1969 was unwarranted. There is nothing in the Charter or in United Nations practice which required him to take such action. With all respect to the Secretary-General the suggestions made by him constituted dubious means to a dubious end. There was nothing urgent about the matter, it did not concern international peace and security, and it would amply have met the needs of the situation for the Secretary-General to have drawn the attention of the next regular session of the General Assembly to this matter, in his annual report.

With regard to the course of action now proposed by the Secretary-General in his communication of 18 June 1969, the Permanent Representative of Israel had the honour to state as follows.

No Member State elected as a Vice-President at the twenty-third session has any legal standing to assume functions exercised by the President. Firstly, under rule 31 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the Vice-Presidents ceased to hold office on 21 December 1968. Secondly, the President himself ceased to hold office under the same rule and at the same date, and could

continue to perform any function thereafter only in his personal capacity and not as President.

The former Vice-Presidents as a group have no legal authority or standing to confer such a function on one of their number. Firstly, as already stated, they all ceased to hold office on 21 December 1968. Secondly, even during the session at which they are elected, the Vice-Presidents do not under the rules of procedure of existing practice constitute a collective body that can exercise any collective functions or take any collective decisions.

The Secretary-General and the Secretariat have no recognized authority to convene meetings of former Vice-Presidents as a group or to act in accordance with their decisions or recommendations.

The opinions or preferences expressed by a number of Member States in response to the Secretary-General's note cannot confer upon the Secretary-General, upon the former Vice-Presidents collectively, or upon one of their number individually powers and functions which they do not legally and constitutionally possess.

In the view of the Israel Government, therefore, the whole process whereby the function originally entrusted to the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-third session would now be 'delegated' to a former Vice-President is without a legal basis at any of its stages. No former Vice-President that accepts such a function will have any *locus standi* to discharge it, and any action taken in pursuance of such an alleged mandate will be *ultra vires*.

5. The procedure suggested in alternative 2 (a) of the Secretary-General's *note verbale* of 23 May 1969 was approved by more than an absolute majority of the Member States. A meeting of the Vice-Presidents of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly was accordingly held on 23 January 1969. At that meeting it was agreed that H.E. Dr. Luis Alvarado, Chairman of the delegation of Peru to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, should undertake the appointment of the members of the Special Committee (A/7495/Add.2).

C. Establishment of the Special Committee

6. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on

the Special Committee (A/7495/Add.3):

Ceylon
Somalia
Yugoslavia

7. On 3 October 1969, the Government of Ceylon informed the Secretary-General that it had nominated Mr. H.S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative of Ceylon to the United Nations, to represent Ceylon on the Special Committee. On 14 October 1969 the Secretary-General was informed that Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, was to represent Somalia on the Special Committee. On 27 October 1969 the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the Yugoslav Government had appointed Dr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and member of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to represent Yugoslavia on the Special Committee.

D. Organization of the work of the Special Committee

8. The Special Committee held a series of informal meetings at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York in November and December 1969, at which it was decided to collect all evidence concerning the policies and practices of the Israeli Government affecting the human rights of the population in the occupied areas. The Special Committee agreed that it should carry out its investigation in the occupied territories and seek the co-operation of the Government of Israel to that end.

9. On 12 November 1969, the Secretary-General, at the request of the Special Committee, informed the Government of Israel by *note verbale* of the composition of the Special Committee. The Secretary-General requested the co-operation of the Government of Israel in the fulfilment of the Committee's mandate in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), and in

particular, to receive the Committee and to facilitate its work.

10. On 2 January 1970, the Special Committee itself addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic to the United Nations, informing them of the constitution of the Committee, drawing their attention to its mandate, and requesting their co-operation.

11. The Permanent Representative of Israel replied, by *note verbale* dated 6 January 1970, as follows:

The Permanent Representative of Israel presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and on instructions of his Government has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note SO 234 (16-2) of 12 November 1969, concerning the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. The Secretary-General's note transmits to the Government of Israel a request from the Special Committee for co-operation in the performance of its task.

The history of this matter has from the beginning been tainted with political bias and procedural irregularity.

The original General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, from which the Special Committee purports to derive its authority, was denounced and rejected at that time by the Israel delegation as being discriminatory and unbalanced. It attempted blatantly to prejudice the very allegations the Special Committee was supposed to investigate; and it evaded altogether the genuine humanitarian plight of the Jewish communities in certain Arab countries in the Middle East region, whose human rights were being viciously trampled upon. Their situation should be the subject of United Nations concern rather than the situation in Israel-held areas which are open to the observation of tens of thousands of foreign visitors.

It is not surprising that although this professed to be a humanitarian resolution, the great majority of United Nations Member States refused to vote for it, and it received the support only of a minority, nearly all Arab or pro-Arab States. As it was,

there were procedural manipulations in the Committee stage, and confusion in the voting in the plenary. It was clear that the resolution lacked all moral validity, was a purely propaganda exercise, and did not represent the views of the responsible and impartial majority of the Members of the United Nations.

It is recalled that by that resolution, the President of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the late Dr. Emilio Arenales, was requested to appoint three States as members of the Special Committee. In the four months that elapsed prior to his untimely death, Dr. Arenales was unable to complete that task. He had approached a large number of States that had abstained in the voting on the original resolution, and could, therefore, be regarded as impartial. However, they had generally refused to serve on a United Nations Committee that was to be set up under such controversial and dubious circumstances.

In a communication to the Israel Ambassador to Guatemala on 6 March 1969, Dr. Arenales himself expressed the opinion that the establishment at that juncture of the Special Committee would add 'further causes of friction to the already tense situation in the Middle East'.

After the death of the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General initiated steps to have the Special Committee appointed by other means. These steps were wholly without precedent, and in the opinion of the Israel Government, without any legal basis whatsoever. Following an unwarranted process, a meeting was called of representatives of countries that had served as Vice-Presidents at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, but whose term of office as such had expired at the end of the session. These representatives thereupon selected one of their own number, a representative of Peru, to appoint the members of the Special Committee—the task that had been entrusted by the General Assembly to its President. The appointment of the Special Committee in this manner was *ultra vires* and illegal.

In its notes of 28 May and 18 June 1969, the Government of Israel stated in unequivocal terms its own views on this series of irregular procedures.

Unable to find nominees for a committee with any pretensions to impartiality or balance, the

representative of Peru proceeded to appoint a committee whose composition automatically guaranteed its anti-Israel bias. One of its three members, Somalia, functions at the United Nations and elsewhere as if it were wholly within the Arab camp; it has refused to recognize the State of Israel or have relations with it. Another of the three members of the Special Committee, Yugoslavia, broke off diplomatic relations with Israel at the time of the hostilities of June 1967, and has since openly identified itself with the political positions of the Arab States. The third member, Ceylon, maintains limited diplomatic relations with Israel, but for reasons of its own has generally voted in favour of Arab resolutions at the United Nations – as it did on the aforementioned General Assembly resolutions of 19 December 1968.

If the United Nations desires to investigate the alleged 'practices' of a Member State, such a function can properly be exercised only under conditions that ensure complete objectivity, and the maintenance of quasi-judicial standards. United Nations fact-finding that does not satisfy such standards is a worthless exercise, that simply converts the Organization itself into a vehicle for propaganda and political warfare. It is regrettable that in the case of the Special Committee, as in the parallel case of the so-called Special Working Group of Experts set up by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the elementary safeguards that should be expected in such matters are lacking. The results of such inquiries are not worthy of credence by fair-minded men.

For the reasons which have previously been stated, and are reaffirmed in this note, the Government of Israel is not prepared to extend co-operation or facilities to the Special Committee.

12. The Permanent Representative of Jordan replied by letter dated 7 January 1970, as follows:

Excellency.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. SO 234 (16-2) dated 2 January 1970, concerning the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Arab Territories, and to inform Your

Excellency that its contents have been brought to the attention of the appropriate Jordanian authorities.

The Jordan Government welcomes the appointment of the members of the Special Committee and is ready to extend its full co-operation to the Committee.

13. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon replied by letter dated 8 January 1970, as follows:

Sir,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter Ref. SO 234 (16-2) dated 2 January 1970 concerning the Special Committee's investigation of the Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

I would like to assure you that the Government of Lebanon will extend its fullest co-operation to this Special Committee.

14. The Permanent Representative of Syria replied by letter dated 10 January 1970, as follows:

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your letter No. SO 234 (16-2) dated 2 January 1970, concerning resolution 2443 (XXIII), entitled "Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories", adopted by the General Assembly at its 1748th meeting on 19 December 1968, and resolution 2546 (XXIV), bearing the same title, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1829th meeting on 11 December 1969, copies of which you enclosed.

I wish, furthermore, to thank Your Excellency for informing me that the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, in implementation of resolution 2443 (XXIII), has been established as of 12 September 1969, with Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia as members, and that the Government of Israel has been requested to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work; that the General Assembly further expressed its grave concern at the continuing reports of violation of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel in resolution 2546 (XXIV), condemning such policies and practices as collective and area

punishment, the destruction of homes and the deportation of the inhabitants of the Israeli occupied territories.

The contents of your letter have been communicated to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, who, I am confident, will give the Special Committee all necessary co-operation and facilities for its work in implementation of the two General Assembly resolutions mentioned above.

As to the requested information, relating to the practices referred to in the aforementioned resolutions, the names and addresses of persons and organizations residing within the jurisdiction of the Syrian Arab Republic, I shall be glad to communicate with you immediately upon receipt of such information.¹

15. The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations replied by letter dated 12 January 1970, as follows:

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 2 January 1970 concerning the future work of the Special Committee, established under General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Israeli Occupied Territories.

The letter has been forwarded to the competent authorities in the United Arab Republic which, I am sure, would accord the utmost attention to the requests therein, in order to facilitate the task of the Committee.

Upon instructions of my Government, I would like to convey to you, and through you, to the distinguished members of the Committee, that the Government of the United Arab Republic is ready to extend its full co-operation to the Committee in order to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate and the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII).

16. The Special Committee also addressed letters to the League of Arab States, informing it of the constitution of the Committee and requesting its co-operation in the execution of its mandate. The Permanent Ob-

¹ The representative of Syria transmitted a list of organizations and names of individuals prepared to testify before the Special Committee by letter dated 3 March 1970. [This and subsequent notes are part of the report—ed.]

server of the League of Arab States replied by letter dated 9 February 1970, as follows:

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 29 January 1970, concerning the modalities of co-operation between the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and the League of Arab States.

Your letter has been forwarded to the League of Arab States. I am sure that the League will give it all due consideration and attention, specially with regard to the proposed modalities of co-operation.

It gives me, however, great pleasure to inform you that the League welcomes both the establishment of the Special Committee and its intended visit to the Middle East during the month of April 1970.

17. The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed another letter to the Special Committee on 27 March 1970, as follows:

Upon instructions of my Government, I would like to convey to you, and through you, to the distinguished members of the Committee, that the Government of the United Arab Republic would communicate to the Committee upon its arrival in Cairo all available information as indicated in your above-mentioned letter.

18. The Special Committee considered these replies and decided to visit the territories of those States that had indicated their willingness to co-operate with it in order to record such evidence as was available in those territories. The Special Committee also decided to hold hearings in Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Cairo. The Special Committee also decided to visit London in order to hear other witnesses, among them persons who, according to information appearing in relevant documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly,¹ appeared to have first-hand knowledge of matters relev-

ant to its mandate. It further decided to visit Geneva to hear certain witnesses and to consult with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

19. In order to ensure that the appointment of the Special Committee, and its terms of reference, received the widest publicity in the areas concerned, it was decided to have paid notices inserted in the press in the countries in its itinerary and in Israel. The notice prepared by the Special Committee, and published in various language versions, read as follows:

Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices in Occupied Territories to Hear
Witnesses in Middle East

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, established by the United Nations General Assembly, has decided to hold hearings in _____ from _____ to _____ April at the _____ Hotel. The Special Committee is composed of representatives of Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia. Any person who has knowledge of practices affecting the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by Israel, who is prepared to testify before the Special Committee, either in open or private session, is requested to apply immediately to the Secretary of the Committee, giving name, address and brief summary of information he is prepared to present.

20. The Special Committee decided that persons from Israel or Israeli-held territory desiring to give evidence should be heard in Geneva or New York.

E. Rules of Procedure

21. The Special Committee discussed its rules of procedure at meetings held in New York and in London prior to the start of its hearings. The Committee was guided by the model rules of procedure for United Nations bodies dealing with violations of human rights (E/CN.44/1021) prepared by the Secretary-General and presented to the Commission on Human Rights at its

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1969*, documents S/9501, S/9506, S/9507, S/9511 and S/9575.

twenty-sixth session. The rules of procedure adopted by the Special Committee are reproduced in annex III to the present report.

F. *Conduct of the investigation*

22. The Committee conducted its investigation in the period from 25 March 1970 to 15 June 1970, during which it held a total of forty-six meetings for the purpose of hearing witnesses and several other meetings for planning and organizing its work. The Special Committee met at United Nations Headquarters in New York during the period 23 to 29 March; in London from 31 March to 5 April; Beirut from 6 to 8 April; Damascus from 9 to 13 April; Amman from 13 to 21 April; Cairo from 21 to 29 April; and Geneva from 30 April to 2 May 1970. A total of 146 persons was heard, as follows: London, thirteen, including five in closed or partly-closed session; Beirut, eleven, including three in closed or partly-closed meetings; Damascus, thirty-three, including one in closed meeting; Amman, thirty-five, including four in closed or partly-closed meetings; Cairo, fifty, including four in partly-closed meetings; Geneva, three, including one in a partly-closed meeting; New York, one. The Special Committee visited refugees in Djeramanah Tents, Damascus, on 12 April, and at the Jerash refugee camp in Jordan on 18 April 1970. The Special Committee held meetings at Headquarters from 10 to 15 June and at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 13 to 24 July and 31 August to 5 September 1970. A list of persons appearing before the Special Committee in open meeting is given in annex IV to the present report.

23. The Special Committee also received a considerable number of written communications from persons appearing before it as well as from other persons.

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. *Relevant international instruments and resolutions*

24. In resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546

(XXIV), the General Assembly referred to the following international instruments and resolutions:

- (a) The Charter of the United Nations;
- (b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (c) The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
- (d) Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968;
- (e) General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968;
- (f) Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968;
- (g) Commission on Human Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968, and 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969, and the telegram dispatched to the Government of Israel on 8 March 1968;
- (h) The relevant resolutions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization.

25. Security Council resolution 237 (1967), which was endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 2252 (ES-V), applies to the plight to civilians from the areas affected by the hostilities of June 1967 in the Middle East, and to the situation which arose after those hostilities. The Security Council called upon the Government of Israel, *inter alia*, "to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

26. In both resolutions, the preamble refers to "the urgent need to spare the civilian populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings" and "the urgent need to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and prisoners of war as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East". The purpose of these resolutions was therefore to protect the civilian population by calling upon the Government of Israel to ensure their safety,

welfare and security and to facilitate the return of those who had fled. In addition, both resolutions recommended to the Governments concerned "the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatments of prisoners of war and civilian persons contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949." The Security Council, in resolution 237 (1967), requested the Secretary-General to follow "the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council".

27. The Security Council, in resolution 259 (1968), expressed concern for "the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel", deplored the "delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving a Special Representative of the Secretary-General", and requested the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the occupied territories and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967).

28. In resolution 2341 B (XXII), the General Assembly expressed its concern about the "continued human suffering as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East". In resolution 2452 A (XXIII), the Assembly called upon the Government of Israel "to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

29. The Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 6 (XXIV) on 27 February 1968 and resolution 6 (XXV) on 4 March 1969. The Economic and Social Council endorsed resolution 6 (XXIV) in resolution 1336 (XLIV), adopted on 31 May 1968. The preambles of both Commission resolutions referred specifically to "the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizing the right of everyone to return to his country". Both resolutions affirmed "the inalienable right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities to return," and called upon the

Government of Israel "to immediately implement the United Nations resolutions to this effect". In resolution 6 (XXV) the Commission established a Special Working Group of Experts to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War on 12 August 1949 in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East. The Special Working Group of Experts presented its report (E/CN.4/1016 and Add.1-5) to the Commission at its twenty-sixth session. After considering the report, the Commission adopted resolution 10 (XXVI), in which the Commission *inter alia* requested the Secretary-General to bring the report of the Special Working Group to the attention of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The Economic and Social Council, in resolution 1504 (XLVIII), took note of the report of the Special Working Group.

30. It is apparent that a common purpose of the resolutions referred to in paragraphs 25 to 29 *supra* is primarily to secure the return of those inhabitants who had fled the occupied areas to their homes, to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and to alleviate their sufferings.

31. The Special Committee notes that in the time that elapsed between 14 June 1967, when the first resolution on this question was adopted by the Security Council, and 19 December 1968, when the General Assembly adopted resolution 2443 (XXIII), establishing the Special Committee, the concern of the United Nations organs for the safety, welfare and security of the population of the occupied areas was accentuated by the increasing frequency of the allegations of violations of human rights in the occupied areas and by Israel's refusal to fulfil its obligations under the Charter and the Geneva Conventions.

32. The international instruments and resolutions mentioned in paragraphs 25 to 29 constitute the context in which the Special Committee has carried out its mandate.

B. *Scope of the investigation*

33. The mandate of the Special Committee, as set out in resolution 2443 (XXIII), is to "investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories". The proper interpretation of this mandate requires the Special Committee to determine:

(a) Which are the territories that should be considered as "occupied territories";

(b) Who is covered by the term "population" of the occupied territories;

(c) What are the "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories;

(d) What are the "policies" and "practices" referred to in resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV).

34. With regard to the first question, both resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV) refer to the situation that developed subsequent to the hostilities of June 1967. The areas under Israeli occupation are: the Golan Heights, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.

35. As regards the second question, as to who are the persons covered by resolution 2443 (XXIII) and therefore the subject of the investigation of the Special Committee, the first and most obvious category of persons is the civilian population residing in the areas occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. The second category consists of those persons normally resident in the areas that are now under occupation but who have left those areas because of the hostilities. However, the Special Committee notes that resolution 2443 (XXIII) referred to the "population", without any qualification as to any segment of the inhabitants in the occupied territories.

36. The "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories, in the view of the Special Committee, consist of two elements, namely those rights which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable human rights" in its resolution 237 (1967); and secondly, those rights which

find their basis in the protection afforded by international law in particular circumstances such as occupation and, in the case of prisoners of war, capture. To the first set of rights pertain those enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in particular the principles set out in article 13 regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country. According to article 2 of the Declaration, everyone is entitled to all these rights and freedoms without distinction of any kind; furthermore, "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether this territory be... independent... or under any other limitation of sovereignty". The Special Committee considers that these rights are of universal application to the persons covered by its investigation, subject of course to the provisions of article 29, paragraph 2, of the Declaration.¹

37. Moreover, civilians are entitled to the protection envisaged in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (Fourth Convention) in accordance with the provisions of that Convention, and prisoners of war are entitled to the protection afforded by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (Third Convention). The Special Committee notes that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions were ratified by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on 29 May 1951, by Israel on 6 July 1951, by the United Arab Republic on 10 November 1952 and by the Syrian Arab Republic on 2 November 1953.

38. Apart from the Third and Fourth Conventions which are unquestionably applicable to the situation in the Middle East and binding upon Israel as the occupying

¹ Article 29, paragraph 2: "In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society".

Power, the Special Committee also has taken note of the standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which though not yet in force, asserts the inalienability of certain rights even "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed."

39. The Special Committee's investigation, according to resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV), concerns "policies" and "practices" affecting human rights. Whereas resolution 2443 (XXIII) referred only to "acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population", resolution 2546 (XXIV) referred to "reports of collective punishments, mass imprisonment, indiscriminate destruction of homes and other acts of oppression against the civilian population" and to "deportation of the inhabitants". The Special Committee interprets the term "policies" to mean any course of action consciously adopted and pursued by the Government of Israel as part of its declared or undeclared intent. "Practices", for the purposes of the investigation of the Special Committee, are, in the context of resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV), those actions which, irrespective of whether or not they are in implementation of a policy, reflect a pattern of behaviour on the part of the Israeli authorities towards the Arab population of the occupied areas.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

Introduction

40. In this section of its report the Special Committee analyses the evidence that has been presented to it. In doing so it has been guided by the purposes of the Security Council resolutions adopted from time to time after the June 1967 war, particularly Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, which expresses concern for, and seeks to ensure, the right of persons who had left their homes owing to the hostilities to return to their homes, and the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

41. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949¹ may be considered as the expression of the international community's sense of revulsion at the treatment accorded to Jews who came under the Nazi régime during time of war and occupation and who were subjected to indignities, abuses and deprivations in gross denial of human rights.

42. Since the adoption of that Convention the irony of history has made the June 1967 war between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries, and the aftermath of that war, the first occasion on which the value of the Convention itself and the genuineness of individual nations' adherence to it could be put to the test. The Special Committee's attention was drawn to this aspect of the matter by the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross appearing before it (A/AC.145/RT.36).² The International Committee was the organ that found itself with the responsibility for ensuring the observance of the relevant Geneva Conventions. It was placed in the predicament of having to fulfil its traditional role as the accepted and neutral instrument for the observance of the international humanitarian rules of war and occupation while avoiding involvement in acrimonious controversy through the disclosure of instances of violation of these rules which had come to its knowledge solely by virtue of its privileged status.

43. In defining the precise aim and purpose of this investigation, the Special Committee decided, at the outset, that it must not interpret its mandate as enjoining it to conduct an investigation for the purpose of conviction and punishment of abuse. The Special Committee prefers to regard its mandate as requiring it to investigate a situation, to ascertain the facts, to determine whether there have been contraventions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, if it finds that there have been instances of contravention and violation of these rules of interna-

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Services*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

² The symbol A/AC.145/RT.____ refers to verbatim records of testimony heard by the Special Committee.

tional law, designed and accepted in the interests of humanity, to express its opinion as to the means and measures by which the international community can instil in all nations a scrupulous respect for, and extract from them adherence to, these rules of humanitarian conduct even under the brutalizing influence of armed conflict.

44. The Special Committee has no power to make an effective response to the numerous appeals made to it for help in securing the return of displaced persons to their homes in the occupied territories, the reunion of families or the release of relatives said to be held in detention without trial or intimation of charges, or the alleviation of the alleged sufferings and privations of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

45. The evidence presented to the Special Committee consists of oral statements made under a solemn declaration, documentary evidence in the form of newspaper articles by journalists, published statements of responsible representatives of the occupying Power, published reports, including reports of surveys such as those conducted by the Institute of Palestine Studies and the American University of Beirut, and of investigations such as those undertaken by Amnesty International, the National Council of Churches of Christ, USA, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers; and graphic evidence in the form of films on the human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

46. The Special Committee was not allowed by the Government of Israel to visit the occupied territories, but despite this, sufficient evidence has been forthcoming from outside those territories to justify certain clear findings and conclusions. There were witnesses, some from within Israel itself, who spoke in general terms in warm approbation of the conduct of the Israeli forces and of the occupation régime (A/AC.145/RT.6, 37, 38). For the most part they maintained that they had seen no evidence of any violation of human rights or of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

47. There were other witnesses from Israel who corroborated the general evidence of systematic violations of human rights (A/AC.145/RT.3, 40, 41). The Special Committee would refer in particular to the evidence given by a representative of the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights on behalf of that organization, Mr. Joseph Abileah, an executive member of the League who was authorized by the League's executive to testify before the Special Committee (A/AC.145/RT.40,41). He presented on behalf of the League a memorandum dated 8 June 1970, which forms part of the records of the Special Committee (L2, appearing as annex VI to this report). In this memorandum the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights refers to alleged instances of breaches of human rights, such as collective punishments, blowing up of houses, administrative detention, expulsions and torture, killing during curfew, and supports these allegations with statistics and names of persons affected. Mr. Abileah supplemented the memorandum with oral evidence.

48. In an effort to eliminate any possibility of political prejudice or any other form of bias on the part of Mr. Abileah and the organization he represents, namely the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, against the Government of Israel, the members of the Special Committee subjected Mr. Abileah to a thorough and exhaustive cross-examination. Mr. Abileah withstood this cross-examination without faltering and left no doubt in the minds of the members of the Special Committee as to his credibility.

49. The Special Committee wished to hear the evidence of the Israeli lawyer, Mrs. Felicia Langer, who was mentioned by several witnesses and has been referred to in the memorandum of the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights (see annex VI to this report). Mrs. Langer and her law associates seem to have been prominent in representing the interests of persons detained by the Israeli authorities and to have been in contact with several persons who complained of ill-treatment while in custody. Mrs. Langer had addressed an open letter to the

Minister of Police entitled "*Where is the truth, Mr. Minister?*" citing certain cases of alleged torture. According to the memorandum of the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, this letter was published in the *Zo' Haderekh* of 6 May 1970. The same letter appeared in the Israeli newspaper *Al-Ittihad* (No. 100 of 28 April 1970). The Special Committee also received from a witness in closed session translations of several letters concerning cases of alleged ill-treatment of some of Mrs. Langer's clients (see annex VII to this report). The Special Committee attempted without success to secure Mrs. Langer's attendance before it. In excusing herself, Mrs. Langer stated in a telegram to the Special Committee dated 30 July 1970:

Sorry unable to come because of my obligations towards clients and unfavourable circumstances in which testimony will endanger the continuation of my work. I confirm as facts verified by me all parts of the memorandum Human Rights League sent to you concerning my cases and my experience. Felicia Langer

50. It is a self-evident proposition that the suppression or withholding of evidence regarding an offence is inexcusable and could be tantamount to abetment of the offence itself. There are, however, certain extenuating circumstances which might be invoked to exempt organizations from this general proposition. They concern the International Committee of the Red Cross and the personnel employed in United Nations establishments like schools and camps of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Both these organizations were in a position to confirm or rebut direct evidence alleging violations of human rights in the occupied territories but their policies compel them to recognize discretion as the better part of humanity.

51. The International Committee of the Red Cross would risk forfeiting the prerogative it now enjoys, of access to embattled or occupied zones, to prisoners of war and to persons detained under military occupation régimes if it revealed information which has

come into its possession in the course of its discharge of its humanitarian mandate and which has been made available to it in confidence.

52. The International Committee of the Red Cross seems to have found it impossible to function both as an intermediary protecting the interests of the captive and as an investigator exercising surveillance over the conduct of the captor. The reluctance of the International Committee to involve itself in the function of surveillance over the conduct of the occupying Power is understandable, as is also its chagrin at the leakage of the contents of reports which it hoped would remain secret. The Special Committee considers it proper to absolve the International Committee of the Red Cross from responsibility for these leakages. The Special Committee is entitled, however, to make use of any evidence that has come its way, irrespective of the procedure through which such material has received publicity.

53. United Nations personnel find themselves in the same dilemma as the International Committee of the Red Cross in that they are faced with the conflict between the discharge of their primary and legitimate functions and the general duty which devolves on any responsible organization directly or indirectly concerned with the rules of international law and conduct, to co-operate in securing adherence to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions. The failure of UNRWA to disclose information regarding conditions prevailing in the occupied territories, and especially regarding the unpleasant experiences of UNRWA personnel and establishments at the hands of the occupation authorities, might appear to be a dereliction of a humanitarian duty. If, however, the policies of UNRWA preclude the organization from furnishing any evidence that it has in its possession, the Special Committee must either accept the situation, regrettable though it be, or seek some change of policy.

54. The Special Committee has made specific mention of UNRWA because there

was evidence of undue and unwarranted interference with UNRWA establishments and personnel, particularly in the Gaza Strip. Reference has been made to UNRWA protests against the destruction of refugee huts, and to the sacking, looting and seizure of UNRWA property.

55. From the great mass of evidence that has been received, the Special Committee would like to extract those parts that merit special attention. In making this selection the Committee has taken into account the purpose of its investigation, which is not to establish judicial proof that in turn would lead to the conviction and the punishment of an offence, but to draw attention to a state of affairs of which there is *prima facie* evidence warranting, if the need should arise, further investigation. For example, where the names of persons who are said to have been killed in the course of demolition and destruction of homes, or who are alleged to have been summarily shot by the occupation forces, have been given by witnesses, such evidence has more than ordinary value. Into this category would also fall statements made by more than one witness independently of one another and thereby providing some element of corroboration of forms of ill-treatment, further corroborated by physical evidence. Throughout the investigation the Special Committee endeavoured to pay special attention to the demeanour of witnesses as a measure of their credibility and to sift actual experience from invention.

56. The Special Committee realizes that the consternation, confusion and chaos that followed in the wake of hostilities and that prevailed in the first weeks or months of the cease-fire and the occupation largely account for the lack of coherence in the evidence of some witnesses, and also the notable absence of any attempt at an orderly and systematic accumulation of facts by any responsible authority. It is precisely under such conditions that the passions and animosities aroused by actual armed conflict could undermine the discipline of troops and impair the effectiveness of command, thereby resulting in individual excesses. This is not to

condone such excesses or to absolve those in authority from their duty of adopting every precaution to prevent the abuse of power and the transgression of human rights.

A. *The validity of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945*

57. The Special Committee has taken note of the law by virtue of which Israel, as occupying Power, is carrying on the government in the occupied territories. Many measures and, in particular, the demolition of houses, deportation of individuals and imposition of curfews, were alleged by witnesses to have been taken by the Government of Israel under the authority of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. The Government of Jordan has questioned the validity of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, and has submitted that as far as the West Bank was concerned such measures are illegal since:

(a) They did not form part of Jordanian law in 1967, having been abolished by the Jordanian Government when it brought into effect on 16 May 1948 the Jordanian Defence Regulations of 1935;

(b) Israel, as a occupying Power, does not have the right to promulgate such law; and

(c) In fact, Israel has not promulgated these regulations (see the reply of the Government of Jordan in annex V to this report).

58. The Special Committee has examined these regulations and is of the opinion that the question of their validity should be examined before the question of their applicability could be discussed. The purpose of these regulations in 1945 was to maintain order in a situation of emergency declared to be existing in Palestine, at that time a territory under British mandate. The situation existing in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities in June 1967 is one of occupation of territories falling within the jurisdiction of three foreign States. This type of situation is governed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Israel is a party and which are applicable in the occupied areas.

59. The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the role of the occupying Power are unequivocal and should regulate the way in which that Power exercises authority in the occupied territories. The proper law to be applied in the West Bank by Israel should, therefore, be the Jordanian law existing at the time of occupation and the only changes permissible under the Fourth Geneva Convention are changes in such provisions of the penal law as constitute a threat to the security of Israel or an obstacle to the application of the Convention. Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention further provides:

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations are not, and cannot be, considered as enacted in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Convention since, irrespective of whether they are part of Jordanian law or not, they contain provisions which are contrary to several principles of human rights, which, the Special Committee considers, have been universally accepted and recognized in international law and the constitutions of most States. These principles are enshrined in legal provisions that are inalienable and any law or regulation purporting to deprive the individual of the protection of such rights is of itself invalid. Inasmuch as the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945:

- (a) Allow arbitrary, prolonged detention of individuals without charge or trial;
- (b) Deny persons, including those under detention, access to their lawful courts by substituting other quasi-judicial or administrative bodies that do not offer the procedural safeguards en-

visaged in the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

- (c) Do not allow for proper and adequate legal aid of persons under detention;
- (d) Allow for arbitrary deportation of individuals;
- (e) Allow for destruction of property as a disciplinary measure irrespective of whether the owner of such property is known to be the offender or not;

these regulations may, to this extent, be considered invalid and any act perpetrated under any such invalid provisions is *ultra vires*.

60. Furthermore, the Special Committee is of the opinion that any law, even though based on security considerations, is invalid if such law violates the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. This applies to any provision, whether it exists in the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, or in the Security Instructions promulgated by the Israel Defence Forces in any occupied area, or in any other form of legislation or administrative decree concerning the occupied territories.

B. Analysis of evidence relevant to the right of everyone to return to his country

61. The Special Committee received considerable evidence alleging infringements of the right of persons living in the areas under occupation to remain living there and of the right of those who fled those areas to return to their homes.

62. A number of witnesses testified that they had been forcibly deported from their homes; this applies, in particular, to those witnesses normally resident in the Golan Heights.¹ The same type of allegation was made in connexion with the Gaza Strip where, apart from evidence of forcible deportation, it was also alleged that the Israeli authorities were intent on transferring

¹ A/AC.145/RT.12, pp. 18-20, 87, 101, 118-120; A/AC.145/RT.13, pp. 53, 54; A/AC.145/RT.14, p. 42; A/AC.145/RT.16, pp. 61, 72-73.

a considerable number of the inhabitants of Gaza to the West Bank.

63. The Special Committee received evidence of indirect methods, employed by Israeli authorities, designed to discourage the local inhabitants from remaining in the occupied areas and to induce them to leave. Allegations of harassment were made to the Special Committee by a considerable number of witnesses whose testimony ranges from allegations of unnecessarily repressive security measures to indiscriminate collective punishment inflicted by way of reprisal.

64. A number of publications presented to the Special Committee concerned this question: an interview with Mr. Weizman, Minister of Transport of the Government of Israel, reported in *Haolam Hazeh* (A/AC.145/RT.22, Nabulsi, doc. J52), quotes the Minister as saying that the West Bank has been and will remain a part of Israel and that the inhabitants of the area would be expelled from the West Bank, the Moslems being sent to the East Bank and the Druzes to the Golan Heights.

65. The evidence of mass deportation, and of the creation of conditions which leave no option to the individuals except to leave the territory, is further supplemented by evidence tending to show that the inhabitants of the occupied areas are being deprived of leadership by the deportation or detention of a considerable number of those persons looked upon by the inhabitants as their leaders.¹

66. The Special Committee has received evidence which indicates that the occupation has created adverse economic conditions which, together with other circumstances, force the inhabitants of the occupied territories to leave (A/AC.145/RT.10, Mr. Sayegh). On the other hand, an Israeli witness main-

tained that the economic conditions in the occupied territories had actually improved rather than deteriorated since the occupation (A/AC.145/RT.37).

67. The allegations of mass deportation, deportation of leaders, creation of adverse economic conditions and excessively harsh collective punishments—such as protracted curfews, demolition of houses, indiscriminate and frequent arrests and prolonged administrative detention of an ever-increasing number of persons—taken as a whole and in the absence of any reasonable justification for such measures, lead the Special Committee to believe that the occupying Power is pursuing a conscious and deliberate policy calculated to depopulate the occupied territories of their Arab inhabitants. In addition, the Special Committee has also received evidence of the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, particularly in occupied Jerusalem, Golan Heights, and in certain areas of the West Bank.

68. The Government of Syria has represented to the Special Committee that Israel intends to annex the Syrian territory that it occupied during the hostilities of June 1967 (see reply of the Government of Syria in annex V to this report). The Syrian Government stated that the legal and judicial system in the occupied Syrian territory has been replaced by the Israeli legal and judicial system. The Syrian Government also drew the attention of the Special Committee to the following dispatch of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency dated 31 May 1970 concerning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian territory:

Jerusalem, 31 May (JTA)—A \$ 48 million five-year plan to expand Israeli settlements in the occupied Golan Heights was approved by the Ministry of Agriculture's Planning Committee today. The project calls for the addition of six new settlements to the eleven already established in the region. Each settlement will have 1,000 head of cattle and about 8,000 acres of pasture land for grazing. Golan settlements already produce potatoes, citrus fruits, plums, olives and walnuts.

¹ A/AC.145/RT.17, p. 6 concerning the deportation of Senator A. Atalla; A/AC.145/RT.18, p. 18 concerning the deportation of Mr. Nadim Zarou, Mayor of Ramallah; A/AC.145/RT.19, p. 92 concerning the deportation of Mr. Negib El-Ahmed, Member of the Jordanian Parliament, and Dr. Saleh Anabtawi, pediatrician; A/AC.145/RT.20 on Mr. Rühi Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem.

69. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in the first part of a report on its activities in the Middle East during the period June 1967 to June 1970 (published in the *International Review of the Red Cross*, August 1970, No. 113), states with regard to the exodus from the Golan Heights, that the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation in Israel tried on several occasions to stop the various pressures that were forcing those people who were still in the area to leave for unoccupied Syria. The report states that the official Israeli position was confirmed by a letter of 7 May 1968, in which it was stated that the occupation forces were not doing anything to make the local inhabitants leave or to make them stay. The Government of Israel is also reported as stating that the departure of the inhabitants was a voluntary one and not a forced deportation. The same report states that the local population of the occupied Syrian territory was estimated at 110,000 persons before the hostilities. Immediately after the hostilities, the population numbered about 8,000 persons, of whom 1,000 lived in Quneitra. At the beginning of 1968, the report states, there were 6,848 Druzes, 388 Muslim Arabs, seventeen Christian Arabs and five Tcherkesses. The report states that on 31 May 1970, there were eleven Arabs left in Quneitra.

70. The Special Committee takes note of the attempts that have been made since 1967, on behalf of the refugees, to facilitate their return to the areas under occupation that they had fled. As is shown, *inter alia*, by the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross, efforts at repatriation have been unsuccessful. In the view of the Special Committee this report confirms the view that the Government of Israel was to blame for hindering efforts at repatriation of civilians and reuniting families. The failure of these efforts, together with the other evidence referred to earlier, and the absence of any pronouncement or effective action to the contrary by the Israeli authorities, convince the Special Committee that the Government of Israel is in effect pursuing a

policy whereby the rights of persons in the occupied territories to remain there and of those who have fled to return, is being denied.

C. Analysis of evidence relevant to the question of the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the occupied areas

I. ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING PERSONS AND PROPERTY

(a) *Collective and area punishment*

71. The Special Committee understands the term "collective and area punishment" as any punishment indiscriminately imposed on a number of persons without regard to their responsibility for the act for which the punishment is imposed. It believes that responsibility for an act is a prerequisite to the punishment of that act.

72. The Special Committee received considerable evidence, ranging from eyewitness accounts to newspaper reports, on the alleged policy of collective and area punishment. To these must be added official pronouncements by members of the Government of Israel which affirm the existence of such a policy. This evidence shows that there is a policy of collective and area punishment being imposed indiscriminately on the civilian inhabitants in the occupied territories. It also shows that such punishment is, in most cases, inflicted by way of reprisal for acts of sabotage of which the resistance movement is suspected.

73. The evidence received by the Special Committee reveals that collective and area punishment takes the form of destruction of houses, curfews and mass arrests. A common feature of these forms of collective punishment appears to be the lack of proportion between the act committed and the punishment imposed. Mr. Michael Adams (A/AC.145/RT.1) in his evidence, *inter alia*, on the curfew that was imposed in Gaza in January 1968, when a 250-gram TNT grenade was thrown, stated that during the curfew the United Nations Relief Organization in the area was not allowed to provide normal services over a period of several days and that the

population had to go without food and sometimes without water for periods for the best part of twenty-four hours at a time. Similar evidence of collective punishment was received by the Special Committee with regard to incidents that occurred in Beit Sahhaur (A/AC.145/RT.3, Miss Birkett). The Committee also heard evidence concerning collective punishment imposed in several localities in the occupied territories, among them Gaza and Halhul. It is an established fact that Halhul was the scene of extensive destruction, that the destruction was inflicted as a collective punishment by way of reprisal, and that the Israeli authorities were responsible for the destruction that took place.

74. In addition to this evidence describing incidents of collective punishment, the Special Committee takes note of certain pronouncements of Israeli leaders. These pronouncements show that the collective punishments that have been imposed in the occupied territories are not merely isolated incidents in answer to manifestations of resistance to occupation, but rather part of a deliberate policy adopted by the Government of Israel. These acts of collective punishment in themselves are a violation of article 33 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, which states: "...Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation, or of terrorism are prohibited". The commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention published by the International Committee of the Red Cross states that the prohibition on collective penalties refers to "penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity, for acts that these persons have not committed" (p. 225). In the cases brought to the Special Committee's attention regarding such incidents as those for example, in Halhul, Beit Sahhaur, and Gaza, there is no evidence to show that any effort was made to establish the responsibility of the victims of collective punishment and that in all cases the punishment imposed, whether it was destruction of homes or a twenty-two hour curfew, or

indiscriminate arrest or detention for prolonged periods, was utterly draconian and defied the most elementary principles of humanity. Furthermore, the Special Committee has come to the conclusion that these collective punishments were imposed by way of reprisal, which is in itself contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention (article 33).

(b) *Deportation and expulsion*

75. The Special Committee has heard considerable evidence of deportations, ranging from the ejection of whole village populations in the Golan Heights to the expulsion of individuals for alleged acts which the occupying Power considered to be contrary to its interests or its convenience. In the Golan Heights, at various periods immediately after the cease-fire, the Israeli authorities ejected a number of persons forcibly from the villages. The Special Committee has received evidence in particular with regard to the villages of Deir El Bteha (A/AC.145/RT.12, Maatouk, p. 18), Mas-sakieh (A/AC.145/RT.12, Dawwas, p. 87), Mashtah (A/AC.145/RT.12, Ersan, pp. 118-120), Hafar (A/AC.145/RT.12, Nassif, p. 101), Zaaoura (A/AC.145/RT.13, Khatib, pp. 53-57) and Quneitra (A/AC.145/RT.14, Kader, p. 42 and others). A substantial number of the inhabitants of the Golan Heights, particularly those from Quneitra (which is the largest town in the area), had fled before the Israeli troops entered the area, and of those who remained behind, the majority were forced to leave. The Special Committee notes that since that time there has been no genuine effort to bring back the inhabitants who had thus fled or had been forcibly ejected; on the contrary, there have been several confirmed reports that the Government of Israel has established Israeli settlements in those areas, the apparent purpose of which is to preclude the return of the inhabitants to these areas. Such mass deportation of the inhabitants of an area, and their replacement by persons of the occupying Power's choice in new and permanent settlements, constitute a violation of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

76. The question may arise whether "the security of the population or military reasons" justify the Government of Israel in depopulating the Golan Heights. The civilians who inhabited the area before 1967 and who are now displaced have a right to return to their homes and should be allowed to do so. The Special Committee must stress that even strategic and defence considerations offer no pretext for the denial of this right.

77. The Special Committee also received evidence concerning the deportation of individuals from the occupied territories, in particular persons who may be considered as being leaders of the community or who are recognized as such by the civilian population. The Special Committee would refer particularly to the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Ruhi Khatib, and the Mayor of Ramallah, Mr. Nadim Zarou, who were deported on the ground of being security risks. The Special Committee has little reason to doubt that the Government of Israel hoped to enervate the community by depriving it of intelligent and active leadership, and thereby to reduce the community to a state of passive subservience to the occupying Power.

(c) *Ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees*

78. The Special Committee heard several witnesses who alleged that they had been subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment whilst under detention. It was particularly impressed by the testimony of a number of such witnesses, among them Mr. Sadaddin Kamal (A/AC.145/RT.11), Mr. Ahmed Khalifa (A/AC.145/RT.9), Mr. Youssef Salahat (A/AC.145/RT.21), and Mr. Ismael Abu Mayaleh and his wife, Mrs. Abila Tahha (A/AC.145/RT.22). These cases have been specially cited not because they exceed others in credibility but because they represent what the Special Committee feels is a cross-section of practices which are alleged to prevail in Israeli prisons and detention camps. The Committee notes also that a number of witnesses, in independent testimony in different countries, have corroborated one another's evidence with regard to

methods of ill-treatment practised in certain prisons as distinct from certain other prisons. This is particularly true of Sarafand camp, sections of the Muscovite prison in Jerusalem and the Gaza prison.

79. Mr. Sadaddin Kamal (A/AC.145/RT.11) thirty-one years old, messenger and janitor at the Ministry of Public Works, a native of Beit Gian, who was working in Quneitra at the time of the June 1967 hostilities, appeared before the Special Committee and alleged that he had been blinded as a result of torture inflicted on him by his Israeli captors. He described how blood was drawn from his arm in such copious quantities that he was reduced to unconsciousness; how he was beaten on the head and had his head subjected to violent pressure by being forced into a narrow opening, apparently a window in a room. He alleged that his head was kept locked in that position and that he had to submit to this treatment daily at about midday for about half an hour at a time, more or less, during a period of forty-two days. His finger-nails were pulled with pincers and his eyelids and eyelashes puckered. This happened to him in the Mount Carmel zone in Palestine. As a result of this treatment he lost his eyesight. Witness Mohamed Kheir Fayez Eid (A/AC.145/RT.11), Inspector of the Public Works Department of Quneitra, testified that he knew witness Sadaddin Kamal. He stated that he had recruited him into the service of the Quneitra municipality, that a month later Sadaddin Kamal was transferred to the Public Works Department as an usher or janitor and that his eyesight was normal. Doctor Ahmed Aziz (A/AC.145/RT.13), in corroboration of Sadaddin Kamal's evidence, said that he had him admitted to the Mushtahid Hospital in Damascus. Questioned by the Special Committee about the reason for the treatment he had received, Sadaddin Kamal said that it was by way of punishment for his refusal to perform forced labour. It is unlikely that this was the real reason, but the motive is irrelevant if the fact is established. The Special Committee is convinced of Mr. Kamal's credibility and has no doubt that he

was blinded as a result of the ill-treatment to which he was subjected in the course of his detention.

80. Mr. Ahmed Khalifa's evidence (A/AC.145/RT.9) was particularly impressive because, when he testified before the Special Committee, he did not give the impression that he was moved by rancour towards his former captors. Despite his experiences he seemed to have retained his objectivity and sense of proportion. This was manifest in his description of his own ill-treatment and that of his fellow prisoners. Mr. Khalifa was released in February 1970 after being in prison for two years and one month. He was kept in the Muscovite Prison in Jerusalem, in Ramleh Prison and Sarafand detention camp. His evidence, therefore, covers a rather long period and a number of prisons. He describes his being suspended by the wrists for prolonged periods in the Muscovite Prison, having dogs set on him in Sarafand and being severely beaten in all the prisons where he was detained. Mr. Khalifa also testified to what he had himself witnessed in these prisons. He makes reference to a number of cases, in particular, those of Mr. Abu El-Ajrami, Mr. Abdul Latif Dhaidt, Mr. Kassem Tamimi and Mr. Abu Rumeile.

81. The evidence of Mr. Nadim Zarou (A/AC.145/RT.17, 18 and 20), who was the Mayor of Ramallah at the time of the occupation, deserves special attention. He presented a written statement that appears in the record as document J-10, and supported it with oral testimony. He is a responsible citizen and attempted to intervene with the occupying forces to prevent the population of his village from being harassed and oppressed. He maintained that persecution and torture were deliberately employed by the occupying forces as political weapons to intimidate the population and to compel them to leave their country. He referred to this as a deliberate policy of the Israeli authorities executed by Col. David Brinn, Military Governor of Ramallah, with the endorsement of Gen. Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister of Israel. These statements, even if they come from responsible persons, must

be subjected to the same careful scrutiny and the same norms of credibility as statements of any other witness. In the Special Committee's opinion, Nadim Zarou's evidence satisfied these tests and deserves credence.

82. Mr. Zarou referred to Muhammad Mustapha Ghanam, a labourer in the Amary Camp of UNRWA at Jalaza, who was summoned by Capt. Ilan and was given five days in which to decide whether he would collaborate with the occupation forces as an informer. He refused to do so and was tortured. An official of UNRWA, Mr. Castles, described by Mr. Zarou as the Director of UNRWA, intervened at Mr. Zarou's instance and secured Muhammad Ghanam's release. Mr. Zarou stated that Mr. Castles gave Mr. Ghanam two months' leave with pay, after which he returned to work. He is said to have borne marks of beatings and dog bites, the result of a form of ill-treatment mentioned by many witnesses and said to have been practised by the occupying forces. Under this treatment dogs were let loose on prisoners who were bound and scarcely able to move. Mr. Zarou maintained that Mr. Castles had presented a report on this incident to the Director-General of UNRWA, Mr. Michelmores, for transmission to the United Nations in New York. The value of this statement is that it specifically mentions officials of UNRWA whose evidence has not been forthcoming for reasons of policy. The Special Committee feels that it is entitled to know whether or not such a report exists. Much more is at stake than Mr. Zarou's credibility as a witness, high enough, though, that stake is [*sic*].

83. Mr. Zarou mentioned the trial of a lawyer, Beshir El Khairi of Ramallah, which took place four months after his arrest. During this trial, Beshir El Khairi is said to have stood up and shown the marks of the ill-treatment he had received during interrogation, and as a result of which he had lost the hearing of his right ear and also his virility. Medical reports of Jewish doctors who examined him in prison are said to have testified to his condition. Representatives

of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the Israeli Press had attended his trial. Beshir El Khairi's lawyers, Antol Jasser and Aziz Shehadeh, were said to have been asked by the Military Governor to persuade Beshir El Khairi to withdraw his allegations of torture, in support of which he had cited certain witnesses, on the promise of withdrawal of the charges against him. Mr. Zarou stated that Beshir El Khairi had rejected this offer. At the time of the investigation of the Special Committee, he was said to be still in Ramallah Prison.

84. Mr. Zarou was arrested on 1 October 1969, detained in prison for six days, and then expelled from the area. He stated in his evidence that he was in constant touch with Peter Sutherland of the United States Consulate in Jerusalem who, along with him, toured a few villages in the district of Ramallah, such as Deir Es-Sudan, Ajjoul, Karawa, Aboud and Deir Abou Misha'al. Mr. Zarou stated that one Easter Sunday Peter Sutherland visited several persons who had been tortured and as a result were suffering from paralysis, mutilated fingernails and loss of hearing. Mr. Zarou had been shown a copy of Peter Sutherland's report, containing the names of these persons and the details of their torture. He naturally was not aware of the fate of that report, but it is worth recording that such a report is said to have been made.

85. The cruel treatment of Mr. Abu Mayaleh and his wife, Mrs. Abla Tahha (A/AC.145/RT.22), at the hands of the Israeli authorities has been established beyond any doubt and is now a matter of public record.

86. The case of Mr. Abu Rumeile also deserves attention. He did not appear before the Special Committee as he is allegedly confined in a mental hospital in Israel or in Israeli-occupied territory. However, the Special Committee received enough corroborative evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Rumeile became insane as a result of the ill-treatment he received at the hands of his Israeli captors. His case

was mentioned to the Special Committee by Mr. Khalifa (A/AC.145/RT.9), by a witness appearing in closed meeting (A/AC.145/RT.25) and in written communications forwarded to the Special Committee from within Israel by persons who have been closely involved with his case (see annex VII and its appendix).

87. Mr. Negib Mustapha el-Ahmed (A/AC.145/RT.19,) fifty-year-old Palestinian of Jenin, formerly a Deputy in the Jordanian Parliament, stated that he had been held in prison for one year and fourteen days accused of passing military information to the Iraqi Ambassador and to Mr. Yassir Arafat, the leader of Al-Fatah. For twenty-seven days he was beaten every day. Those responsible for this treatment were all officers, a Major Yakoubi, a Major Baruch and a Major Manachem, as also Lieutenant Chaim, who seemed to have specialized in ill-treatment by boxing and kicking. The witness made special mention of the fact that he was not ill treated or tortured by any soldiers. Such ill-treatment as he received took place before he was brought to trial and extended over a period of two months. He was visited in prison by Mr. Conveir, a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, on 5 November 1968. Israeli intelligence officers were present throughout the interview and he had been warned of reprisals if he complained of having been subjected to any ill-treatment.

88. Mr. Ahmed stated that the International Committee's representative, Mr. Conveir, as well as his successor, visited him in prison. He could not, however, speak with them except in the presence of an Israeli officer.

89. Mr. Ahmed specifically referred to the case of Anwar Kamal Mustapha Khamis and sixty-three others who were arrested on 21 March 1968, on a charge of belonging to the *fedayeen*, and brought to Jenin Prison. They were subjected to torture and went on a hunger strike which lasted for five days. A Jewish doctor was brought in to feed them by force. The Israeli captors picked out

fifteen of them, including Mustapha Khamis, and beat them with sticks. A policeman named Haim—a prison guard apparently—beat Khamis with a stick on his belly and head, causing profuse bleeding. Khamis died four hours later. An Arab doctor, who was a Government Medical Officer named Hafiz Saddar, was asked to issue a certificate that death was due to illness. He refused to do so. The body was then transferred to Ramleh Prison and ultimately sent to Jordan through the International Committee's representative, Mr. Conveir. Mr. Ahmed and others brought the facts of this case and of many others to Mr. Conveir's notice.

90. Mr. Ahmed also mentioned the case of Moayyad Osman Bashsh of Nablus, twenty-two years old, who was arrested in mid-1967 after the cease-fire. He was taken to Sarafand Prison and tortured. The torture took the form of his being hanged by his feet from a wall, burnt with cigarette butts and given enemas of red pepper. He was hanged for sixteen hours at a stretch and beaten with rubber whips that had been reinforced with metal wire. As a result of this treatment his left hand became paralysed and later his entire side up to his shoulder. He was taken before a military court and acquitted but he is still in gaol. Mr. Ahmed stated that the International Committee's representative, Mr. Conveir, had intervened but without avail. Osman Bahsh was brought to Nablus Infirmary. An international group headed by a tall Englishman visited him in gaol. Mr. Ahmed spoke with the Englishman. Presumably this was a group from Amnesty International, but that fact cannot be verified without reference to the organization.

91. Mr. Ahmed also mentioned the case of six Egyptian soldiers who had been lost in the Sinai Desert after the cease-fire. He met them in Nablus Prison where they were brought after being tortured in Sarafand Prison. The International Committee's representative, Mr. Conveir, and others met them. They had been captured on or about 1 January 1968. Mr. Ahmed repeats the story that they had been made to commit acts of homosexuality on one another. One

of them, Muhamed Jad El Sayid, had his shoulder-blade broken by torture. One had tried to immolate himself by pouring kerosene on his body and setting fire to himself. Ahmed met them in Nablus Infirmary in January 1969.

92. The lurid story of being compelled to commit acts of homosexuality was repeated by four of these Egyptian soldiers, who were traced and who gave evidence before the Special Committee in Cairo (A/AC.145/RT.32 and RT.33/Add.1).

93. Mr. Ragheb Abdul Nasi Ahmed Abu Ras (A/AC.145/RT.20), twenty-five years old, of Bireh, was arrested on 11 October 1967, suspected of being a *fedayeen*, and then again arrested on 12 July 1968. The circumstances of his arrest on 11 October 1967, as described by him, were that an Israeli detail under Major Yakub Sapir entered his house, searched it and removed him under custody to the Ramallah Military Governor's office, where there were several intelligence officers, among them Major Ramy. Mr. Abu Ras stated that he was hanged by one of his arms from the ceiling of his cell with his feet dangling in the air just above floor level. He was beaten by Colonel Abu Zlika and was subjected to electric shock treatment. He stated that at Ramleh Prison he saw others who had been severely tortured, namely, Taysir Quba'a, As'ad El As'ad, Ishak El Maraghi and Dr. Abdel Aziz Shahir. Dr. Shahir was beaten so badly that he was given up for dead. Abu Ras with two others, Hisham Sa'udi and Mahmud Jabir, was asked to carry him out and wash him for burial.

94. Mr. Abu Ras stated that he was beaten daily for about twenty days. The persons responsible were mentioned by him as Major Elia, Major Koulsky and Major Zaki. He was taken to Sarafand Prison. He also described in detail the forms of torture he received: garbage was thrown at him; he was prevented from sleeping by being hanged by a chain round the waist; he was compelled to eat large quantities of heavily salted fish and then refused water for forty-eight hours,

after which he was forced to drink water from his own urine pail; his finger-nails were extracted by forcing his fingers through door hinges and closing the door slowly until blood spurted from his nails; he was stripped, his body sprinkled with water and he was then beaten. Another form of torture was to put a serpent on his body in a manner which he considered too obscene to describe. He was bound firmly to a chair and his head secured in a manner which prevented him from moving it. A can with a hole bored in its bottom was placed above his head and water poured into it so that it would drip on to his head steadily; every drop, he stated, being like the blow of a hammer. He maintained that all this ill-treatment was applied in an effort to get him to incriminate Professor Yakub Obedi.

95. Mr. Abu Ras stated that he was seen by a member of the Israeli Knesset, Mr. Emil Habibi, who was accompanied by lawyers Aly Rafi and Felicia Langer. They saw the torture marks on his body. Witness Abu Ras stated that Mr. Emil Habibi had raised his case in the Israeli Knesset and that the proceedings of the Knesset were published in *Al Ittihad* in one of its December 1968 issues. He also stated that Amnesty International had his medical reports and X-rays which were taken at the laboratory of Dr. Hassan Abdul. He was treated by Dr. Walid Bakir of Amman immediately after his arrival in Amman.

96. Mr. Youssef Muhammad Salahat (A/AC.145/RT.21), eighteen years old, student of the village of Far'ac in Talouza District, appeared before the Special Committee on the second day after his release from prison in Israeli occupied territory. His physical condition, attributed to the ill-treatment he received in prison, and his frank demeanour, left no doubt in the Special Committee's mind as to his veracity. He said that he was in Karamah in March 1968 when Israeli forces attacked it. The population was ordered to assemble in the local school ground where there were persons in disguise, who, the witness said, were collaborators and did not wish their identity to be known and who

were asked to point out the persons who, apparently, were suspected of being involved in the resistance. Some 250 persons were subjected to ill-treatment at Basra Camp (electric-chair and water-hose treatment). At Sarafand Prison they were chained to the wall by their hands and kept hanging in that position with their feet dangling above the floor. Witness Salahat mentioned the case of a greengrocer, Najah Muhammad Issa Khattab, who was buried alive right up to the neck and had salt stuffed into his mouth. Witness Salahat saw this treatment himself. He said that it was meted out to Khattab for about half an hour at a time. The case was taken up by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Najah Muhammad Issa Khattab was sent to Cairo and admitted to hospital. According to witness Salahat's reckoning, the incident had taken place about October 1969. This evidence is corroborated later on.

97. Witness Salahat stated that he had been released in April 1970, just before he gave evidence. He was released and sent to Jordan through the International Committee of the Red Cross. His physical condition was very poor and he could scarcely stand erect. At one stage, while giving evidence, he appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Witness Salahat said that he was allowed to see representatives of the International Committee at his request, though not always. He also said quite frankly that he was allowed to see them alone. He could not recall the days of their visits but indicated that they fell within the period of his imprisonment, that is between March 1968 and April 1970. He was allowed to see them in Jenin but not in Sarafand Prison or other places of torture which were out of bounds to the International Committee's representatives.

98. Mr. Suleiman Muhammad Sheikh-Eid (A/AC.145/RT.24), a thirty-seven-year-old tailor of Beersheba, stated that on 16 July 1970, six Israeli soldiers entered his house and accused him of being a terrorist. One soldiers, on the order of his officer, struck him with a meat axe on his head. He said that he lost his eye on the spot.

The fingers of his right and left hands were crushed. He was sent to Shefa Hospital in Gaza and spent five months there. It is an Arab hospital and Arab doctors attended on him. They were Dr. Ahmed, Dr. Jihad and Dr. Rahman. On his discharge from the hospital, he was sent to prison where he was kept three months before being expelled to Amman. He was not able to get a medical report from the hospital. At the time of the incident, he was in what he and other witnesses called "X camp" in the Gaza Strip, an UNRWA establishment. There were UNRWA officials around at that time. Later on he discovered that about 600 houses (or huts) in the camp had been destroyed on the very day on which he had been assaulted by the Israeli soldier with the meat axe. He cited as UNRWA employees who were aware of the situation there, an UNRWA camp supply officer named Yussef Faragh, a Christian, and an UNRWA inspector of schools and sanitation, Audi Abu Adra, who was a Mukhtar.

99. The Special Committee observed that witness Sheikh-Eid had a vertical scar about an inch and a half long over his right eye, on his forehead, that his right eyeball was missing, and that the fingers of his right and left hands had been crushed. It was a case of horrible injury. The evidence is circumstantial and the allegations can be substantiated only by reference to hospital records and other witnesses.

100. Najeb Mohammed Issa El-Khattab (A/AC.145/RT.23), who was mentioned by witness Yussef Hafez Muhammad Salahat, stated in evidence that he was a greengrocer of Borj in Ramallah District. He was arrested at Karameh on 21 March 1968, taken to Sarafand, given serial number 372 and interrogated by an officer named Abu Moussa, whose name was mentioned by other witnesses as well. He was beaten, bound by his hands to the bars of a window with his feet dangling in the air above floor level, blindfolded and had dogs unleashed on him. He was buried in a grave right up to his neck. He stated further that when he was in Jenin Prison officials of the International

Committee of the Red Cross visited him. Prisoners who complained to the International Committee were Ahmed Rashid, Muhammad Abd Rahim, Jabr Shelbayeh, Abdel Majid Awad. They were taken to Ramleh.

101. Mr. Othman Abdul Hadj Al Aaraj (A/AC.145/RT.23) was living in the UNRWA camp at Shaffat at the time of the June 1967 hostilities. He presented a written statement which forms part of our record (J-55). On his release from prison, he was seen by Dr. Subhi Gosh at the UNRWA Shaffat Camp clinic. His case was taken up in the Israeli Knesset by Mr. Emil Twefik Habibi and formed the subject of an article in the January 1969 publication of *Al Jihar*, described as a communist journal. He had been arrested on 1 May 1968. Lawyer Felicia Langer was retained by his family to institute proceedings for his release. On 17 September 1968, he was put on trial. Two medical reports on him, one from Dr. Subhi Gosh and the other from Dr. Jabr Al Aaraj of the French hospital in Jerusalem, were handed to lawyer Felicia Langer. Witness Al Aaraj confirmed the evidence regarding the imprisonment of Abla Taha and two other women, Sarah Judah and Luftia el Hawari, in a cell with a group of Israeli prostitutes.

102. Mr. Munir Abdullah Ghanam (A/AC.145/RT.23) was living in Nablus during the hostilities, was arrested on 20 October 1969 along with two others, Jihar and Ahmed, in a region called Shashaha south of Damiya Bridge. While he was in Ramleh Prison hospital he met Mahmoud El Halhuli of Halhul, who had lost one eye in action after June 1969 and stated that his other eye had been gouged out by his Israeli captors. Also in what he called the "X cell" in Ramleh, witness Ghanam had met Abd el-illah Khaled Munir el Nabulsi and was with him for about a month. Witness Ghanam said that el Nabulsi suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the barbarous treatment he had received, and that Dr. Cohen, Israeli military physician in Ramleh, decided to transfer him to a ward

for mental patients within the prison.

103. Dr. Kamal Gobriel (A/AC.145/RT.26), who at the time he gave evidence was attached to the Dar es Salaam Hospital in Cairo, stated that he was on the staff of El Arish Hospital, about 160 miles from Qantara, during and after the 1967 hostilities. Many cases of torture were sent to El Arish Hospital but they were not allowed to keep any records. Names of patients were registered in the hospital but the register is in Israeli hands. Dr. Gobriel stated that he had informed the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Hunch, of the cases of torture that had come to his attention.

104. Mr. Mohammad Abdel Kadir Derbas (A/AC.145/RT.26) was a medical attendant at Dar El Shefah Hospital in Gaza when he was arrested on the second day after the hostilities and taken to Atlit Prison, where he spent four months. He described how Dr. Mordechai performed an operation to castrate him. When he recovered from the efforts of the anaesthetic, his attention was drawn to the organs that had been removed from him in the course of the operation and which were displayed in front of his bed. This case is mentioned because witness Derbas was examined at the instance of the Special Working Group of Experts when they visited Cairo.

105. The allegation of serious ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees is also supported by the report of the investigation carried out by Amnesty International. The investigation was conducted inside the occupied territories and corroborates in detail the accounts of ill-treatment described by witnesses appearing before the Special Committee. On this subject, a member of the Executive Committee of Amnesty International, Mr. Arne Haaland, stated in an interview reported in the Norwegian newspaper *Arbeiderbladet* on 4 April 1970:

We never claimed that the allegations about torture had been proved... but we have in our possession very extensive material to support the assumption that torture does in fact occur.

...

We have rarely—if ever—had such reliable material on which to base the establishment of the fact in relation to torture taking place—or not taking place—in a particular country.

106. The Arab Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies presented a publication entitled "Violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949" to the twenty-fourth International Conference of the Red Cross held at Istanbul, Turkey, in September 1969. This publication quotes reports of torture made by the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning, in particular, Hebron, Jenin, and Tulkarm Prisons. In the report concerning the Hebron Prison, dated 31 October 1968, the delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross is quoted as stating: "It came to light during our interviews with the prisoners that the treatment they received during interrogation was brutal." A number of prisoners who showed scars of brutal treatment were named by the delegates.

107. Another report concerning Nablus Prison, dated 26 February 1968, states:

A number of detainees have undergone torture during interrogation by the military police. According to the evidence, the torture took the following forms:

1. Suspension of the detainee by the hands and the simultaneous traction of his other members for hours at a time until he loses consciousness.
2. Burns with cigarette stubs.
3. Blows by rods on the genitals.
4. Tying up and blindfolding for days (in one case for seven days).
5. Bites by dogs.
6. Electric shock at the temples, the mouth, the chest and testicles.

108. None of the reports quoted in this publication have been refuted and this, together with the evidence before the Special Committee, leads it to believe that there is, in several prisons, especially in Sarafand Camp, a regular practice of ill-treating inmates. Such ill-treatment is prohibited by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 5, which states:

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."

Articles 31 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention expressly prohibit torture and ill-treatment.

109. The Special Committee received considerable evidence concerning persons in administrative detention. These persons are often detained without intimation of charges for indefinite and prolonged periods. A witness from Israel (A/AC.145/RT.40 and 41) quoted what he described as official Israeli statistics according to which, at the end of May 1970, over 1,200 persons were being detained under administrative orders.

110. The Special Committee does not contest the right of the occupying Power, as provided for in the Fourth Geneva Convention, to safeguard its security and, if necessary, to restrict the freedom of certain individuals who pose a threat to its security. However, the evidence before the Special Committee shows that this power is being abused in that it is exercised far too freely and that administrative detainees and ordinary prisoners are treated alike. Indeed, in the Special Committee's view, ordinary prisoners are, in theory at least, in a better position than administrative detainees, since they have the right to trial and would therefore be informed of the charges against them and benefit from whatever protection legal procedure might afford. The Security Instructions promulgated by the Israel Defence Forces in the occupied territories provide for the establishment of an "Advisory Committee" with the following functions:

...to examine any appeal against an order made under this article and to submit its recommendations to the military commander concerning such appeal. If a person is detained under this article, the committee shall make a judgement on his detention at least once in six months, whether or not the detained person appeals to it.

In the Special Committee's opinion, this "Advisory Committee" does not afford the same protection as the ordinary courts,

as the person concerned is at no point made aware of the charges against him. To speak of an "appeal" in such circumstances is therefore a self-evident contradiction.

111. The Special Committee is of the view, on the basis of the evidence before it, that the present procedures leading to administrative detention are unsatisfactory and in practice merely permit arbitrary arrest of persons and their detention for indefinite, prolonged periods.

(d) *Ill-treatment of civilians*

112. Several persons who were forcibly ejected from the villages in the Golan Heights testified as to their ill-treatment at the hands of the Israeli forces when they were being evicted from their homes and villages. In a number of cases it was stated that groups of individuals were picked out and summarily killed (A/AC.145/RT.12, 13, 14 and 15). Even allowing for the fact that this eviction took place immediately after the cease-fire and that it was carried out by troops still under the influence of military victory, such treatment of civilians, who were clearly not members of enemy forces, is inexcusable. The Special Committee is not in a position to verify these allegations of ill-treatment of civilians; however, the consistency of the accounts given by several witnesses leads the Committee to the conclusion that there were indeed a number of instances where civilians were treated with unnecessary severity.

113. Mr. Hussein Muhammad Maatouk (A/AC.145/RT.12) of Talaner District stated that after the fighting ceased there was confusion and panic; Israeli forces entered his village with bulldozers and demolished and destroyed everything, including cattle sheds and livestock. The village contained about 16,000 inhabitants. The witness gave three instances of indiscriminate destruction of lives or murder. The first instance was the case of four old women, some of them relatives of his, who perished when their homes were dynamited by Israeli forces. They were all in their eighties. The names of the victims

as given by the witness were: Nimri Maatouk, Saada Sleiman, Lazha Khefes and Hamdi Hussein. In regard to the second instance, Mr. Maatouk mentioned that Israeli forces lined up about fifteen young men at about seven o'clock in the morning of the day of their entry into the village after the cease-fire had come into operation, and shot them in full view of the assembled villagers. This happened three days after the promulgation of the cease-fire. Mr. Maatouk gave the names of some of the victims as: Shehade el-Abi, Abdel Hamid el-Awad, Muhammed el Mahmud, Ali Barakat and his brother Hael Barakat; Hamdi Sharki, Nasr el-Hamud, Ahmed el Faur, Fadil Ibrahim, Sleiman Fandi of the Iban tribe, Yasim Muhammad of the Habur tribe and Muhammad el Attiya of the Kedaria tribe.

114. The third instance occurred when the villagers were being driven out of the occupied area at machine-gun point and were about one and a half kilometres from the border. At this point, according to Mr. Maatouk, about seven or eight persons of the group "broke ranks" and rushed to a water-point, and were shot by the Israeli troops. The names of the victims were: Hassan el-Khatib, Awad el Saleh, Muhammad Hussein Ali, Nayif el Meanel Muhammad Mahmoud, Khalid el-Dib, Muhammad Hussein Mustapha, Musa Ahmen Radwan, of the Iban tribe. Mr. Maatouk, questioned by the members of the Special Committee, stated that on reaching the cease-fire line they were not met by any persons in authority nor did they have any contact with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

115. Mr. Mahmoud Nasr Fares (A/AC.145/RT.12) of the village of Almine stated that about twenty days after the fighting ceased, Israeli forces entered his village and destroyed the houses and crops. When villagers refused to abandon their cattle and property, four young men were selected and summarily shot. Among them was his brother Ali Nasr Fares. The other victims were Mahmoud Djasem Ahmed Hassan el Ali and Issa Mahmoud Khalil.

116. Mr. Ahmed Dawas (A/AC.145/RT.12), Mukhtar of the village of Massakieh near Bteiha, a village separated from Israeli territory by a river, spoke of the entry of Israeli forces into the village after the cease-fire, the stripping of their houses of all their furniture and contents, general looting, intimidation of the population and demolition of houses (in all 120 to 150), sometimes with the occupants in them. He named five such cases of very elderly persons, namely Matar Mahfouz, Shahada Omar, Salal el Brahim, Durfa Mahmoud and her invalid sister Nokha Mahmoud. Mr. Dawas stated that the villagers were driven out to Houran.

117. Miss Eisha Awad Hegazi (A/AC.145/RT.26), twenty years old, housewife living in El Arish at the time of the 1967 hostilities, stated that about two weeks after the war, a group of Israeli soldiers entered her house and started firing at random. They shot and killed her father, a man called Araby and Araby's daughter. She herself received gun-shot injuries in the arm and knee. After some delay, she was able to go to El Arish Hospital, where she was treated by Dr. Kamal Malik Gobriel (A/AC.145/RT.26), who has already been mentioned. At El Arish Hospital her arm was amputated. She was transferred from there, through the International Committee of the Red Cross, to Helwan Hospital in Cairo. Dr. Gobriel corroborated Miss Hegazi's version and stated that the amputation was performed by Dr. Helmy Sadek.

118. Miss Kamilia Kamel Suleima El-Zerbawi (A/AC.145/RT.27), a sixteen-year-old student who was living in El Arish and left the area on 15 November 1967, stated that an Israeli detachment entered her house a few days after the hostilities and started firing at random. Her father, two cousins and her aunt's husband were killed. She sustained bullet wounds in her head, hands and feet. This incident occurred at about nine o'clock in the morning. Her two cousins who were killed were Namdour Mahmoud El-Zerbawi and twenty-year-old Numir. The persons injured were she herself, her father, her younger sister and one female

cousin. Witness Kamilia El-Zerbawi stated that she was taken to El Arish Hospital the next day and the bullet was removed by Dr. Dafrawi. She remained in El Arish Hospital for fifteen days and was then transferred to Dar El Shefah Hospital in Gaza, where another operation was performed. The Special Committee noticed that she had a two-inch scar of an injury on the right side of the head above the ear, and also that her left hand and left leg were paralysed.

119. Dr. Mahmoud Suleiman Elbaik (A/AC.145/RT.27), forty years old, Director of the School Medical Association in El Arish at the time of the June 1967 hostilities, stated that he ran his own private clinic and was a medical officer attached to El Arish Hospital. Witness Kamilia Kamel Sulcima El-Zerbawi was brought to the hospital with a fracture of the skull on the right side and was suffering from hemiplegia of the left limb, lower and upper, a paralytic condition forty-eight hours old and critical. Dr. Elbaik said that the surgeon, Dr. Dafrawi, examined Kamilia and operated on her for the fracture of the skull. The left hemiplegia was due to a depressed fracture on the right side of the skull.

120. Mr. Abdel Rahim Ali Damarani (A/AC.145/RT.29), Headmaster of Mustapha Kamal School in El Arish, a primary school of about 600 pupils between the age of six and twelve years, stated that Israeli soldiers entered his house and fired at the occupants with machine-guns. Two of his children, sixteen-year-old Abdel Alvin Abdel Rahim and eleven-year-old Mahmoud Abdel Rahim, fell dead. His seventeen-year-old daughter, Soad Abdel Rahim, was also injured while his six-year-old son Mustapha was shot in the leg. This incident occurred at about 9 a.m. between 15 and 16 June 1967. He took the injured to El Arish Hospital and saw Dr. Gobriel and Dr. Onsi. An operation was performed on his daughter Soad for the amputation of her left arm at the shoulder by Dr. Sadek. The daughter Soad appeared before the Special Committee. Her left arm had been amputated at the shoulder. The son, Mustapha, was brought to the Special

Committee and showed the mark of a bullet wound on the right leg. Dr. Gobriel corroborated the statement regarding the injury and stated that Dr. Sadek performed the amputation on Soad's arm.

121. Another case of ill-treatment of civilians to which the Committee would draw attention is that of Mr. Mansi Salama El Far, who was alleged to have been beaten, stoned and shot by Israeli soldiers in El Arish in September 1967. Mr. El Far is said to have subsequently died of his wounds. His colleague, Mr. Nagli Hussein Gilbanah, was similarly ill-treated (A/AC.145/RT.30). This account was corroborated by several eye-witnesses including the father of Mr. El Far, who witnessed the incident (A/AC.145/RT.28), the mother, who was in the vicinity (A/AC.145/RT.30), and his cousin, who claims to have heard an account of the incident from two or three other persons who were eye-witnesses (A/AC.145/RT.34) and who testified before the Special Committee, including Dr. Mahmoud Soliman El Baik (A/AC.145/RT.27) of El Arish Hospital who treated the two young men. The Special Committee has no reason to reject these allegations.

122. The Special Committee would draw attention to part III, sections I and II, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which lays down the norms for protection of civilians.

(c) Destruction and demolition of houses and buildings, confiscation and expropriation of property

123. The Special Committee heard several allegations of destruction of houses and buildings, expropriation and confiscation of property. These measures were alleged to be part of a deliberate policy of the Israeli authorities designed to demoralize the inhabitants of the occupied territories to the point of abandoning their homes. This aspect of the allegations has been dealt with in part C of this chapter.

124. The Committee received evidence concerning destruction of houses that took place in Jerusalem in order to clear certain

areas. This was preceded by confiscation or expropriation of the land on which the houses were constructed. The destruction that went on in Jerusalem is now a matter of public record and the evidence brought before the Special Committee confirms the fact that this has taken place, that those responsible for this destruction are the Israeli authorities, and that the victims are the civilian Arab population of Jerusalem.

125. The Special Committee also heard repeated allegations concerning the systematic destruction of certain villages in the Golan Heights area. In this region the pattern that was followed usually started with concentrating the civilian population in a particular spot, herding them out of the village and destroying the village soon after, usually within sight of its inhabitants (A/AC.145/RT.12, Mr. Maatouk, village of Deir El Btcha; Mr. Dawwas, village of Massakieh; Mr. Nassif, village of Hafar; A/AC.145/RT.16, Mr. Ibrahim, villages of Derbahiya and Saiyada). The destruction of these villages took place after the ceasefire and the Special Committee is of the opinion that the evidence tends to show that the eviction and demolition of this area were part of a policy designed to clear this part of the Golan Heights permanently of its civilian inhabitants.

126. The Special Committee recalls the mass destruction of the three villages in the Latrun area—Yalu, Emwas and Beit Nuba—which were completely razed to the ground and whose inhabitants were dispersed. The Government of Israel is said to have offered alternative accommodation to the inhabitants of these villages in another area, but the Special Committee has not been able to verify these reports. The Special Committee acknowledges that these reports, if correct, show that the Israeli authorities are aware of the problem created by this destruction. It strongly urges that these villages be rebuilt and that the inhabitants be allowed to return to their homes.

127. In the report of the Deputation to the Middle East of the National Council of

Churches of Christ, United States of America (19-31 July 1968), it is stated on the subject of Yalu, Emwas and Beit Nuba:

...that there is no plan to rebuild the three villages or to return the inhabitants to their lands. No other example of so drastic an effort to change geography and political history was observed.

128. It appears to the Special Committee that in many instances destruction was unwarranted, as evidenced in the case of the village of Suris, which was completely wiped out at the opening of the hostilities of 1967. Suris had been the site of an ambush in which Israelis had been killed nineteen years earlier. Such acts of deferred vengeance cannot but produce unnecessary suffering and can only widen the gap between occupier and occupied.

129. Destruction of property is prohibited by article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Certain derogation clauses in other articles (*inter alia*, 5 and 53) make some exceptions to this prohibition. These exceptions are based on considerations of military necessity. The Special Committee is of the opinion that there is no question that with regard to the destruction of these three villages, refuge cannot be taken behind these exceptions.

130. The commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention states the following with regard to article 54:

The occupying forces may... undertake the total or partial destruction of certain private or public property in the occupied territory when imperative military requirements so demand.

Furthermore, it will be for the occupying Power to judge the importance of such military requirements. It is therefore to be feared that bad faith in the application of the reservation may render the proposed safeguard valueless; for unscrupulous recourse to the clause concerning military necessity would allow the occupying Power to circumvent the prohibition set forth in the Convention.¹

¹ *Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), p. 302.

131. The Special Committee considers that in the case of the three villages of Yalu, Beit Nuba and Emwas, Israel had "unscrupulous recourse" to military necessity in carrying out this wanton destruction.

(f) *Looting and pillage*

132. In his report to the Secretary-General, Mr. Nils Gussing, Special Representative appointed by the Secretary-General in implementation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, referring to the Golan Heights immediately after the hostilities of June 1967, stated that looting had taken place in some areas and, in particular, in Kuneitra.¹ Mr. Gussing stated in paragraph 33 of his report that:

...on the strength of reports received from different sources, the Special Representative felt reasonably sure that the responsibility for this extensive looting of the town of Kuneitra lay to a great extent with the Israel forces, and he expressed this view to the Israel officials accompanying him during his tour of the city.

133. The evidence heard by the Special Committee indicated that the villages of Talhamer, Almine, Derbahiya and Saiyada were the scene of widespread looting by Israeli forces (A/AC.145/RT.12, Mrs. Saleh, Mr. Fares, Mr. Dawwas; A/AC.145/RT.14, Mr. Zindaki, Mr. Kader; A/AC.145/RT.15, Mr. Awad; A/AC.145/RT.16, Mr Ibrahim and Mr. Abu Lail). In addition to these cases, the Special Committee received evidence of similar incidents, most of which took place immediately after the cessation of hostilities and in connexion with the entry of troops into an area.

134. Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits pillage and in this sense it may be said that there have been a number of violations of this provision of the Convention. The evidence before the Special Committee, however, does not justify the conclusion that it was the practice of the

occupying Power to loot and pillage the occupied territories.

2. ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING INSTITUTIONS

(a) *Policies and practices constituting interference with economic and social life and repugnant to religious susceptibility*

135. Mr. Youssef Sayegh (A/AC.145/RT.10) testified before the Special Committee that the occupation was having a serious effect on the economic life of the territories. He alleged that such acts as collective punishment and destruction of homes were having an adverse effect on the economic life of the occupied territories.

136. It was alleged before the Special Committee that the occupation authorities had imposed the same taxes in the occupied territories as in Israel itself and that since the standard of living in the occupied territories was lower than in Israel, the inhabitants of these territories were unduly burdened. It was testified before the Special Committee that hotels in towns like Ramallah, which were flourishing before the occupation, were after the occupation no longer able to pay their own way (A/AC.145/RT.18, Zarou). In Gaza, the interference of the occupation authorities had virtually ruined the citrus fruit business (see reply of the United Arab Republic Government concerning Gaza in annex V to this report).

137. One witness, Mr. Gideon Weigert (A/AC.145/RT.37), testified that the economic situation in the occupied area had improved since the occupation and that the Israeli authorities had done much to better the conditions that existed in the occupied area before 1967.

138. The Special Committee is not in a position to determine the exact extent to which the occupation has affected the economic situation in the occupied territories as it had no opportunity of visiting the area. The evidence before the Special Committee, however, shows that the occupation had a disruptive effect on the economy of the occupied territories.

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967, document S/8158, paras. 31-34.*

139. The Special Committee heard evidence concerning alleged interference with religious matters as well as allegations of practices offensive to the religious susceptibilities of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Sheikh Abdul Hamid Es-Sayeh, Mufti of Jerusalem (A/AC.145/RT.17), informed the Special Committee that the occupation authorities had interfered in Moslem religious matters. Bishop Simaan, Roman Catholic Auxiliary Bishop and Vicar General for the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the East Bank, testified to instances of desecration of holy places including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. He also mentioned a case of looting of sacred figures and produced photographs to illustrate the acts of desecration and vandalism.

140. The evidence mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, together with the other allegations on the same subject made before the Special Committee, shows that there exists a distinct lack of respect for the religious susceptibilities of the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

141. The Special Committee also heard evidence concerning interference by the Israeli authorities in education matters. It has not been able to determine the exact nature of this interference, but it is aware that changes in curricula of the schools in the occupied areas were imposed. The Special Committee heard allegations of undue pressure being brought to bear on teachers. It notes that among those persons deported for alleged security reasons there are a number of teachers. The Special Committee is unable to state whether this interference with the curricula and the teachers in the occupied territories assumed alarming proportions, but it feels that proper steps should be taken without delay to regulate the education in the schools in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (article 50).

(b) *Interference with the judicial system, including legal aid*

142. The Special Committee has examined

the proclamations and orders promulgated by the occupation authorities in the occupied territories and finds that the Israeli authorities have seriously hampered the functioning of the court system by transferring the Court of Appeal in Jerusalem to Ramallah. This transfer provoked a reaction on the part of the judiciary that brought activities of the Court of Appeal to a standstill.

143. The Special Committee is concerned at the lack of legal assistance for persons who are in detention. It appears to the Committee that the only legal assistance that is available to persons accused of offences against security is rendered by one office, which has three or four lawyers working in it.

144. The Special Committee commends the work carried out by the members of this office. It could not help but note that the number of cases where legal assistance was needed far exceeded the resources of counsel available for this purpose.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

145. The Special Committee, having examined the evidence presented to it, has arrived at the conclusion, expressed in the preceding chapter, that the Government of Israel is pursuing in the occupied territories policies and practices which are in violation of the human rights of the population of those territories.

146. The Special Committee considers that in this case the fundamental violation of human rights lies in the very fact of occupation. The Committee therefore finds it almost impossible to separate the specific policies and practices applied to particular individuals, groups or areas from the broad context of the occupation itself. The ideal manner in which violations of human rights could cease would clearly be by the termination of the occupation itself. It must be recognized, however, that while the occupation lasts, the occupying Power has both a legal and a moral obligation to implement the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions—an obligation which it voluntarily assumed and

which it cannot avoid merely by declaring that the question is an "open" one.

147. The Special Committee has examined the existing arrangements for the enforcement of those Conventions and has come to the conclusion that they are totally inadequate. Under these arrangements, allegations that the provisions of the Conventions have been violated cannot be completely or exhaustively investigated, and it is possible for valuable evidence to be overlooked or even withheld. Such an investigation can be effective only if the Government concerned extends its full co-operation.

148. A primary difficulty affecting the implementation of the Geneva Conventions in this case is the absence of an effective Protecting Power. The Conventions assign certain functions to the Protecting Power, some of which have been assumed in the present case by the International Committee of the Red Cross. But the Red Cross can hardly be expected to be as effective in this role as a true Protecting Power.

149. The International Committee of the Red Cross, despite its laudable efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, has not been authorized, staffed or equipped to deal adequately with allegations of violations of the Geneva Conventions, and is precluded by its own policies from publicizing the facts in such cases or from criticizing, even by implication, the Governments concerned. This is particularly true with regard to allegations of maltreatment of prisoners held under security regulations in Israel and in the occupied territories, to whom Red Cross officials have been denied access. Wide publicity to the results of investigations by an independent and impartial authority might at least ensure that the power of public opinion could provide some slight deterrent to persistent and continuing breaches of the Geneva Conventions.

150. For these reasons, the Special Committee has decided to propose an arrangement whereby the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions will be enforced and commends this arrangement to the States concerned in

the Middle East conflict for their acceptance.

151. The success of such an arrangement must depend on the willing admission by the States concerned of the principle of supervision by an independent authority and on their readiness to grant such an authority freedom of operation in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions. The first requirement is to have the Governments concerned carry out their obligations existing under the Geneva Conventions. Secondly, it is necessary that the Governments be prepared to respect the recommendations resulting from any investigation carried out in this context.

152. In the meantime, in order to spare the civilian population and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East further suffering, the weight of international public opinion should be brought to bear on the Government of Israel to apply forthwith the principles declared in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and in conformity with the resolution to withdraw Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories and to bring the occupation to an end.

153. The Government of Israel should be called upon to desist from practices and policies in violation of human rights, to prevent acts of violence and hostility directed against the population of the occupied territories and to observe without reservation the norms of humanitarian conduct recognized, established and ordained by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and which have received fresh endorsement in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which is not yet in force.

154. The Government of Israel should further be requested by the General Assembly:

(a) To permit, unconditionally, all persons who fled the occupied territories, or who were deported or expelled therefrom, to return to their homes;

(b) To cease immediately, and to prevent, all policies and practices of collective punish-

ment, such as the destruction of property, imposition of excessively harsh curfews and mass arrests;

(c) To make full compensation for property destroyed, and to effect restitution of property confiscated, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention;

(d) To cease immediately, and to prevent, the torture and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons imprisoned or detained under the laws and regulations relating to the occupation, and to apply to all such categories of persons the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and of the United Nations Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;

(e) To bring to an end the indefinite and prolonged detention without trial of all persons, including those detained under security regulations and those under administrative detention, by releasing them or affording them a fair trial in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions;

(f) To reform the procedures and conditions of administrative detention in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions;

(g) To refrain from attempts at compelling the inhabitants of the occupied territories to collaborate with the occupation authorities;

(h) To discontinue the policy of establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and to withdraw all Israeli settlers from settlements already established;

(i) To eliminate, and refrain from the creation of, social and economic conditions which result in the departure of the inhabitants of the occupied territories from their established homes and communities;

(j) To refrain from harassment and arbitrary deportation of leaders and intellectuals from among the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

(k) To rescind Israeli legislation in force in the occupied territories and which is repugnant to the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions;

(l) To repeal all measures taken to alter the status of occupied Jerusalem and to restore it to the status subsisting before the outbreak of hostilities;

(m) To restore the judicial system in the occupied territories to the status which it enjoyed before the occupation and in particular to return the Court of Appeal of Jerusalem to its seat in Jerusalem;

(n) To investigate all the allegations brought to the notice of the Committee concerning ill-treatment of civilians and detainees, particularly those persons detained under security regulations, access to whom is denied to Red Cross officials, and those purportedly held under administrative detention, and to take appropriate remedial measures.

155. Without prejudice to the recommendations made above, and having regard to the existing political attitudes of the parties to the conflict vis-à-vis one another, the Special Committee, having in mind the urgent need for providing a workable mechanism to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, proposes as a temporary practical measure that the General Assembly recommend to the States whose territory is occupied by Israel that they appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. In the special circumstances prevailing in the occupied territories where there is a large population which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising its right of self-determination, it is necessary to make suitable arrangements for the proper representation of their interests. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly take this fact into account in implementing this recommendation. In the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, which require that any such arrangement be acceptable to all parties concerned, the Special Committee would recommend that a

neutral State or organization, nominated by Israel, be associated in this arrangement. The Special Committee further proposes that the General Assembly call upon Israel to accept such an arrangement and to provide all the facilities necessary for its effective functioning consistent with the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The State or States or international organization duly nominated under this arrangement might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of those Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

(c) To report to the States concerned, and

to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on its work.

156. The Special Committee feels that until such an arrangement is made, it should continue its work. For this purpose the Committee would require certain facilities to enable it to keep abreast of developments in the occupied territories which have a bearing on the protection of the human rights of the population of those territories, to receive allegations and evidence of violations of those rights, to conduct studies of relevant developments as they occur, and, if necessary, to return to the Middle East for further work in execution of its mandate.

V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

157. Approved and signed by the Special Committee in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure as follows:

(Signed) H. S. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon)
Chairman

(Signed) A. A. FARAH (Somalia)

(Signed) B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

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Report of the Special Working Group Established by the Commission on Human Rights to Investigate Allegations Concerning Israel's Violation of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War¹

January 20, 1970

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¹ U.N. docs. E/CN.4/1016, E/CN.4/1016/Add.1, and E/CN.4/1016/Add.2. Table of contents supplied by editor.

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INTRODUCTION

A. *Establishment and terms of reference of the Special Working Group*

1. At its 973rd meeting, on 27 February 1968, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 6 (XXIV), which reads as follows:

The Commission on Human Rights,

Recalling provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 regarding the protection of civilian persons in time of war,

Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country,

Recalling resolution 237 (1967), adopted by the Security Council on 14 June 1967, in which the Council considered that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war and called upon the Government of Israel, *inter alia*, to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities,

Recalling also resolution 2252 (ES-V) of the General Assembly, which welcomed with great satisfaction Security Council resolution 237 (1967), of 14 June 1967, and called for humanitarian assistance,

1. Notes with appreciation the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 regarding human rights in the territories occupied as result of the hostilities in the Middle East;

2. Affirms the right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return and that the Government concerned should take the necessary measures in order to facilitate the return of those inhabitants to their own country without delay;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Commission informed upon developments with respect to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

2. At its twenty-fifth session the Commission on Human Rights had before it a report (E/CN.4/999) submitted by the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 3 of

resolution 6 (XXIV). At its 1014th meeting, on 4 March 1969, the Commission adopted resolution 6 (XXV), which reads as follows:

The Commission on Human Rights,

Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizing the right of everyone to return to his country,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, resolution 6 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights and Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968 and General Assembly resolution 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 which called upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,

Further recalling the telegram dispatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 March 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by Israel, and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Bearing in mind that Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968, and resolution 6 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights have called for the application of Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in the territories occupied by Israel,

Noting that the Security Council has once again expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel and deplored the delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967),

Noting also resolution I on respect for, and implementation of, human rights in occupied territories, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968 (A/CONF. 32/41) and General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,

Deeply concerned about the reported continuation of human rights violations as well as violations

of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in the territories occupied by Israel,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General (E/CN.4/999),

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities to return, and calls upon the Government of Israel to immediately implement the United Nations resolutions to this effect;

2. *Deplores* Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, particularly the acts of destroying homes of Arab civilian population, deportation of inhabitants and the resorting to violence against inhabitants expressing their resentment to occupation and *calls upon* the Government of Israel to put an immediate end to such acts;

3. *Expresses its deep concern* on Israel's refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and *calls once again upon* the Government of Israel fully to respect and apply that Convention;

4. *Decides* to establish a special Working Group of Experts composed of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts established under Commission resolutions 2 (XXIII) and 2 (XXIV) with the following mandate:

(a) To investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East;

(b) To receive communications, to hear witnesses and to use such modalities of procedure as it may deem necessary;

(c) To report, with its conclusions and recommendations, to the Commission's twenty-sixth session;

5. *Decides* to include the question of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of priority on the agenda of the Commission's twenty-sixth session.

B. Organization of work

3. On 9 April 1969 the Acting Chairman of the Special Working Group of Experts

established by the Commission in resolution 6 (XXV) addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic to the United Nations, drawing their attention to the mandate which the Commission on Human Rights had entrusted to the Special Working Group and informing them of the Working Group's intention to conduct its investigations during July and August 1969, subject to the concurrence of the Economic and Social Council and the other competent organs of the United Nations. The letter further stated:

At the request of the Working Group I have the honour to express the hope that Your Excellency's Government would extend its co-operation to the Group. In particular, the Working Group would be grateful if Your Excellency's Government could communicate to me... by 27 June 1969, if possible, any information relating to matters within the mandate of the Group as set out above, including the names and addresses of persons or organizations residing within the jurisdiction of Your Excellency's Government who might be prepared to furnish such information, either orally or in writing, to the Working Group. The names of such persons or organizations would be kept confidential by the Working Group upon request.

4. Similar letters were addressed to the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations and to the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

5. The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic replied by a note dated 8 May 1969 which read in part as follows:

The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic wishes to convey to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group that the Government of the United Arab Republic is ready to extend its full co-operation to the expert group in order to ensure the fulfilment of its mandate and the prompt implementation of resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights.

6. The Permanent Representative of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan replied by a letter dated 9 May 1969 which read in part as follows:

I have the honour...to convey to the Working Group...that the Jordan Government is ready to extend to the Working Group its full co-operation to ensure the prompt fulfilment of the Mandate entrusted to it under resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights.

7. The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic replied by a letter dated 22 May 1969 which read in part as follows:

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would be more than happy to extend to the Special Working Group established under paragraph 4 of resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights...its full co-operation for the successful fulfilment of its humanitarian mission in accordance with the terms of the aforementioned resolution.

8. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon replied by a letter dated 25 June 1969 which read in part as follows:

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government welcomes the visit of the Special Working Group of Experts to Lebanon and is prepared to do whatever possible to facilitate its mission. Furthermore, the Government and many directly interested organizations and individuals will be willing to supply the Committee with all the documents and evidence which prove the Israeli violation of human rights in the occupied territories.

9. The Permanent Representative of Israel replied by a note dated 25 June 1969 which read in part as follows:

At the time of the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Israel fully explained why the Government of Israel rejected that unbalanced and prejudicial resolution.

It attempted to prejudice the very conclusions which the so-called Special Working Group of Experts was to reach.

It failed to have any regard for the vicious trampling on the human rights of the Jewish

Communities in certain Arab countries in the Middle East region.

It was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights by a vote of 13 in favour and one against, with 16 abstentions and two members absent. All the 13 votes in favour were cast by Member States with a record of anti-Israel votes, and nearly all of them are Arab or pro-Arab States that do not maintain any normal relations with Israel and are consistently hostile to it.

It is clear that a resolution adopted in these circumstances is a purely propaganda exercise lacking any moral validity; and that it does not represent the views of the responsible and impartial majority of the Commission's members.

It is noted that the Special Working Group of Experts had not been completely or properly constituted when some of its members decided to dispatch the letter of 9 April 1969 to the Government of Israel, which is attached to the Secretary-General's note. It is further noted that the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights setting up the Special Working Group was not subsequently approved as required by various resolutions of the Economic and Social Council, including more particularly resolutions 9 (I) of 21 June 1946 and 1367 (XLV) of 2 August 1968.

In the light of the foregoing, the Government of Israel wishes to inform the Secretary-General that it is unable to consider resolution 6 (XXV) as constituting a basis for co-operation on its part.

10. The Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States replied by letter dated 21 May 1969 which read in part as follows:

I am pleased to inform you that the League of Arab States welcomes the decision of the said resolution entrusting the *Ad Hoc* Group of Experts established under resolutions 2 (XXIII) and 2 (XXIV) of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 April 1949, in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East.

The League of Arab States also welcomes the visit of the group to conduct its investigations and will co-operate to the fullest extent.

I wish also to inform you that your letter was presented to the Permanent Arab Regional

Commission of Human Rights, which expressed its readiness to meet with the *Ad Hoc* Group and render all facilities.

The League of Arab States is in the process of preparing the requested information relating to matters within the mandate of the group. I shall, in due time, inform you about this matter in full detail.

11. In a further letter, dated 19 June 1969, the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States stated:

With reference to your letter dated 9 April 1969, concerning resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights, entitled 'Question of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East' and my reply of 21 May 1969, I wish to bring to your attention and also to the attention of the distinguished members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, the various complaints submitted by Arab Member States concerning Israel's violations of human rights in the occupied territories since its aggression of June 1967. These complaints had been distributed to the Member States of the United Nations as official records of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

I think that these complaints are most helpful to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group in carrying out its mandate entrusted to it by resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights.

12. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA replied to the letter of the Acting Chairman of the Special Working Group by a letter dated 16 June 1969, which read in part as follows:

I have given careful consideration to the request made in your letter, in the light of the mandate of UNRWA as determined by the General Assembly. Although I understand and sympathize with your needs and purposes, I feel obliged to advise you that I have serious doubts as to whether the requests contained in your letter fall within the terms of that mandate, or are consistent with the activities as conducted at present by UNRWA, or indeed, whether UNRWA at present would be able to do what you wish done.

You may be sure that it is with genuine regret that I feel unable, for the reasons stated above, to respond favourably to your requests. Permit

me to suggest that if you and the Special Working Group of Experts should wish to pursue this matter further, you might seek the opinion and guidance of the Secretary-General.

13. The Special Working Group considered these communications, and the organization of its work at a series of eight meetings held in New York during July 1969. It decided to visit Geneva in order to consult with the International Committee of the Red Cross on the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949. It further decided to visit those States which had indicated their willingness to co-operate with it for the purpose of hearing witnesses and gathering evidence in accordance with its terms of reference. For this purpose, it established the following itinerary: Beirut (10-12 August); Damascus (13-15 August); Amman (15-18 August); Cairo (19-23 August).

C. Documentation

14. The Special Working Group had before it the documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly containing information relevant to its mandate, as well as an annotated list of such documents prepared by the Secretariat. The Special Working Group also took note of the relevant documents of the Commission on Human Rights and those of the International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran, from 22 April to 13 May 1968. In addition, it had before it the texts of several proclamations and orders promulgated by the Israeli occupation authorities in the occupied areas (see annexes). The Special Working Group has not been able to obtain the complete collection of these proclamations and orders but it has been able to take into account some of these proclamations and orders that are particularly relevant to its mandate. The Group also had before it the annual reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross for 1967 and 1968, the *Topical Red Cross News*, a series of bulletins published periodically, and the *International Review of the Red Cross*, a monthly publication; these are

both publications of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Special Working Group also benefited from the International Committee of the Red Cross reports on visits to certain prisons by delegates of that Committee. These reports were communicated to the Special Working Group by the President of the Jordan National Red Crescent Society and they refer to the prisons of Nablus, Jenin, Jericho, Hebron, Tulkarm and Ramallah in the West Bank. The Secretary-General of the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Republic also presented the Special Working Group with a report of Dr. Marc Schmid of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the medical and health aspects of the situation in the occupied Gaza and Sinai regions; the report is based on a visit to the areas concerned by Dr. Schmid from 19 November to 12 December 1968. The Special Working Group also received a documentary film entitled "Inside the Occupied Land" submitted as evidence by the League of Arab States.

D. Procedure

15. In accordance with operative paragraph 4 of resolution 6 (XXV), the Special Working Group of Experts established by the Commission on Human Rights is composed of the members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts which had been established under Commission resolutions 2 (XXIII) and 2 (XXIV). The Working Group accordingly is composed of Mr. Ibrahim Boye, *Procureur général*, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations (Senegal); Mr. Felix Ermacora, Professor of Public Law, University of Vienna (Austria); Mr. Branimir Jankovic, Professor of International Law, University of Belgrade (Yugoslavia); Mr. Nagenora N. Jha, First Secretary at the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations (India); Mr. Luis Marchand Stens, Professor of International Law, Minister at the Embassy of Peru to the United States (Peru); and Mr. Waldo Emerson Waldron-

Ramsey, barrister-at-law and economist, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations. Mr. Boye acted as Chairman of the Special Working Group and Mr. Jankovic as Vice-Chairman. Some of the members of the Special Working Group were unable to attend certain meetings, and therefore the composition of the Working Group varied (see annexes).

16. Mr. Edward Lawson, Deputy Director of the Division of Human Rights, represented the Secretary-General at the meetings which the Special Working Group held in New York. Mr. Maxime Tardu (Division of Human Rights) was Secretary to the Group during its meetings in New York. Mr. Ilhan Lutem (Division of Human Rights) was Principal Secretary during the Group's meetings in Geneva and in the Middle East. Mr. John Pace (Division of Human Rights) was Assistant Secretary to the Group in New York, Geneva and in the Middle East.

17. The Special Working Group followed the following procedure when hearing witnesses. The Chairman first read out the mandate of the Group. Each witness was then asked by the Chairman to give his or her name, age and occupation and was offered the choice of taking an oath or making a declaration. The alternatives offered were as follows:

I swear that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
and

I solemnly declare on my honour and conscience that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

The Chairman then asked whether the witness wished to make any statement. After the statement, or in the absence of a statement, the members of the Special Working Group put questions to the witness.

E. Conduct of the mission

18. The Special Working Group held eleven meetings in New York, one in Geneva, three in Beirut, three in Damascus, six in

Amman and five in Cairo. On 13 August, in Syria, the Group visited the Djerammadah Tents and the Doumar Temporary Houses, which house refugees. In Jordan, on 15 August, the members of the Working Group visited the refugee camp at Baqaa.

19. The Special Working Group heard a total of 103 persons. Of these, three were heard in New York, fourteen in Beirut, twenty in Damascus, twenty-six in Amman and thirty-nine in Cairo. Of the witnesses, five testified in closed meeting at their own request. In connexion with the testimony of one witness in Cairo, on 21 August 1969, the Working Group arranged for a medical examination of the witness conducted by a doctor appointed for the purpose. The Group also consulted with a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mr. Claude Pilloud. A list of the witnesses heard by the Group in open meeting and a list of communications appear in the annexes to this report.

CHAPTER I

SCOPE OF THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS IN THE LIGHT OF RESOLUTION 6 (XXV) OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR

20. The Special Working Group of Experts has conducted its investigation on the basis of resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights and the debates which led to the adoption of that resolution.

21. The Group noted that in the course of those debates, the representative of Israel stated:¹

...that allegation [of the alleged failure by Israel to apply the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949] could only be based on a fundamental misconception. Under article 9

of that Convention, it was to be applied 'with the co-operation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers', which would have to be appointed by agreement between Israel and the Arab States in question. But the Arab States had obstinately refused to agree with Israel in that matter, because by so doing they would be recognizing the State of Israel, something they were not willing to do. The position was that a humanitarian organization, the International Red Cross, had intervened, but its activities were limited by the fact that it could not undertake the functions of a Protecting Power in accordance with article 11 of the Convention.² That view had been confirmed by Mr. Pictet, the Chairman of the International Red Cross Society, in a commentary on the Convention. Within those limits, Israel had co-operated fully with the Red Cross and continued to do so.

It also noted that the position of the Government of Israel was said by the International Committee of the Red Cross to be as follows:

Application of the fourth Geneva Convention—Following on persistent ICRC representations to the Israeli authorities stating that the fourth Convention is applicable throughout all the occupied territories, the Government of Israel has declared that it wished 'to leave open for the time being' the question of the application of the fourth Geneva Convention, preferring to act on an *ad hoc* basis by granting practical facilities to the ICRC delegates.³

22. The note verbale of the Government of Israel dated 25 June 1969 stated:

At the time of the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Israel fully explained why

² Article 11, para. 2, of the Convention provides: "When persons protected by the present Convention do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization provided for, in the first paragraph above, the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an organization, to undertake the functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the Parties to a conflict."

³ *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 95 (February 1969), p. 88; communicated by Mr. Pilloud, a Director of the International Committee of the Red Cross, at the twelfth meeting of the Group, Geneva, 8 August 1969.

¹ E/CN.4/SR.1012, 28 February 1969. [This and subsequent notes are part of the report—ed.]

the Government of Israel rejected that unbalanced and prejudicial resolution.

It attempted to prejudge the very conclusions which the so-called Special Working Group of Experts was to reach.

It failed to have any regard for the vicious trampling on the human rights of the Jewish communities in certain Arab countries in the Middle East region.

It was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights by a vote of 13 in favour and one against, with 16 abstentions and two members absent. All the 13 votes in favour were cast by Member States with a record of anti-Israel votes, and nearly all of them are Arab or pro-Arab States that do not maintain any normal relations with Israel and are consistently hostile to it.

It is clear that a resolution adopted in these circumstances is a purely propaganda exercise lacking any moral validity; and that it does not represent the views of the responsible and impartial majority of the Commission's members.

It is noted that the Special Working Group of Experts had not been completely or properly constituted when some of its members decided to dispatch the letter of 9 April 1969 to the Government of Israel, which is attached to the Secretary-General's note. It is further noted that the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights setting up the Special Working Group was not subsequently approved as required by various resolutions of the Economic and Social Council, including more particularly resolutions 9 (I) of 21 June 1946 and 1367 (XLV) of 2 August 1968.

In the light of the foregoing, the Government of Israel wishes to inform the Secretary-General that it is unable to consider resolution 6 (XXV) as constituting a basis for co-operation on its part.

The argument advanced by the Government of Israel in the Commission on Human Rights and implied in the reply to the Group quoted above, that a similar investigation into alleged violations of human rights of the Jewish communities in Arab countries ought to be conducted by the Special Working Group, cannot be entertained by this Group, irrespective of whether such a parallel investigation would be justified in fact. The principal reasons against this Israeli argument are as follows: (a) that such an

investigation would not fall under any of the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention, and (b) even if there did exist reciprocal agreement between the parties to the Convention, this investigation could not be carried out by the Special Working Group in view of the precise terms of the mandate set out in resolution 6 (XXV).

23. During the debate in the Commission, most representatives stressed that, in their opinion, the Government of Israel was bound by the Convention and should apply it in the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.¹ It was noted, in particular, that the Government of Israel had ratified the Convention without reservation on 6 July 1951. The Convention had been also ratified without reservation by Jordan, on 29 May 1951, Syria, on 2 November 1953, and the United Arab Republic, on 10 November 1952. It was further mentioned that the conditions under which the Convention was applicable were set forth as follows in article 2 of the Convention:

(a) all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the State of war is not recognized by one of them; and

(b) all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

The occurrence of an armed conflict in 1967 between Israel, on the one hand, and Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, on the other, as well as the subsequent occupation of certain territories by Israel are known historical facts. The question whether these occupied areas are territories "of a High Contracting Party" within the meaning of article 2 of the Convention must be answered by taking into account the status of the territories in question at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967. On 4 June 1967 the lines of demarcation between territories under Israeli authori-

¹ See, for instance, E/CN.4/SR.1010, pp. 4-5; E/CN.4/SR.1011, pp. 5 and 9; E/CN.4/SR.1013, pp. 7 and 9; E/CN.4/SR.1014, p. 6.

ty and territories under the authority of Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic were defined partly by the international border of the former Mandate of Palestine, partly by the cease-fire line laid down in the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements of 1949. There appears to be no question that the territories of Syria and the United Arab Republic now under occupation, outside the international borders of the former Mandate of Palestine, are "territories of a High Contracting Party" in the sense of article 2 of the Convention. Those territories within the borders of the former Mandate of Palestine that are now under occupation, namely the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are also to be considered as "territories of a High Contracting Party" in accordance with article 2 of the Convention. The borders of these territories were recognized in the Arab-Israeli Agreements of 1949. Since then, Israel, the Kingdom of Jordan and the United Arab Republic have exercised governmental powers in these territories. In addition, at the time of ratification of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, none of the parties concerned made any reservations regarding these territorial limits, thereby tacitly recognizing them. The Special Working Group is of the opinion, therefore, that the areas of the West Bank and Gaza occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 are, as far as the Group's mandate is concerned, "territories of a High Contracting Party".

24. In resolution 6 (XXV), the Commission on Human Rights "expresses its deep concern on Israel's refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and calls once again upon the Government of Israel to fully respect and apply that Convention", and it requests the Group to investigate "allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle

East". The Group has conducted its investigation, basing itself on the affirmation, clearly expressed in resolution 6 (XXV), that Israel should apply the Convention in the territories occupied as a result of such hostilities.

25. In the present chapter; the Group merely wishes (a) to determine the scope of its investigation and (b) to stress certain basic provisions of the Convention. Articles of the Convention which set forth specific rights of protected persons will be quoted or summarized in chapter III as appropriate.

A. Scope of the investigation

1. Limitations as regards the rights which should be considered in the investigation

26. The civilian population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East enjoys the human rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights. The applicability of these norms in the area of conflict in the Middle East is affirmed by the Security Council in resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, which states that "essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war". Security Council resolution 237 (1967) was welcomed with great satisfaction by the General Assembly in resolution 2252 (ES-V). The Commission on Human Rights in resolution 6 (XXV) recalled both these resolutions in its preambular paragraphs.

27. The civilian population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East is also protected by the laws of armed conflict in general, i.e., the norms laid down in customary international law or in international conventions ratified by the parties to the conflict.

28. Sub-paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 6 (XXV) of the Commission on Human Rights limits the scope of the present investigation to "allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of

War of August 1949". Thus, the investigation is concerned with allegations of violations of human rights in general and of those deriving from the laws of armed conflicts only to the extent that such rights are covered by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

29. The main rights of the civilian population mentioned in the Convention are the following:

- (a) Establishment of hospitals and safety zones and localities to protect wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven (article 14);
- (b) Civilian hospitals may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict (article 18);
- (c) The hospital staff shall be respected and protected (article 20);
- (d) Land and sea transport of wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases shall be respected and protected (article 21);
- (e) Free passage of all consignment of medical supplies, food and clothing shall be allowed (article 23);
- (f) Measures relating to child welfare shall be undertaken (article 24);
- (g) Family news of strictly personal nature should be allowed to be sent and to be received (article 25);
- (h) Inquiries made by members of families dispersed owing to the war, with the object of renewing contact with one another and of meeting if possible should be facilitated (article 26);
- (i) Article 27 contains a general provision about human treatment against all acts of violence, insults and public curiosity; women shall be especially protected;
- (j) No physical or moral coercion in general and to obtain information shall be allowed (article 31);
- (k) The prohibition of corporal punishment, torture etc. is required (article 32);
- (l) The individual responsibility should be respected, no collective penalties, pillages and reprisals are allowed (article 33);
- (m) The taking of hostages is prohibited (article 34);
- (n) The right to leave the territory must be guaranteed, departures should be carried out in a humanitarian manner (articles 35 and 36);
- (o) The right to fair employment shall be granted (article 39);
- (p) Compulsion to work is only permitted in a reciprocal way (article 40);
- (q) Prohibition of individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations in every direction (article 49);
- (r) Care and education of children (article 50);
- (s) Any destruction of real or personal property is prohibited (article 53);
- (t) Food and medical supplies should be ensured (article 53);
- (u) Hygiene and public health should be ensured (article 56);
- (v) Spiritual assistance shall be permitted (article 58);
- (w) Penal law and penal system of the occupied territories should be upheld (article 64);
- (x) In any case a fair trial must be guaranteed (article 71);
- (y) Persons who are sentenced to death should have the right of petition for pardon (article 75);
- (z) Treatment of detainees in the lines of "the standard minimum rules" (article 76);

(aa) Regulations about the treatment of internees in case of articles 41, 42, 43, 68 and 78 (article 79 ss.), following the "principles of the standard minimum rules" (separate internment, hygiene accommodations, religious services, canteens, air-raid shelters, food, clothing, medical attention, recreation, working conditions, labour detachment, personal property, discipline regulations, petition system, transfers).

30. The Special Working Group deems it necessary to point out that there exists a close connexion between the norms contained in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and other legal norms which are part of the law of armed conflicts. This connexion is affirmed in article 154 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which reads:

In the relations between the Powers who are bound by the Hague Conventions relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of 29 July 1899, or that of 18 October 1907, and who are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention shall be supplementary to Sections II and III of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of The Hague.¹

31. Security Council resolution 237 (1967) refers to both the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The scope of the present investigation is limited to allegations concerning Israel's violations of the latter Convention.

32. The allegations which prompted the adoption of resolutions 6 (XXIV) and 6

(XXV) on the Commission of Human Rights are found in letters from the Governments of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic contained in documents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. Some of these letters refer to alleged breaches of specific articles of the Convention, whereas others allege situations that fall within the purview of the Convention without referring to any specific article. Examples of the first kind of letters appear in documents S/8064 and S/8596. These letters refer to alleged breaches of the following articles of the Convention: article 3 (cruel treatment etc.); articles 3 and 16 (disregard of protection of civilian residents); article 15 (food and supply not ensured); article 18 (attacking civilian hospitals); article 49 (forcible transfer); article 54 (alteration of status of public officials); articles 106, 108 (family relations).

Examples of the second category of letters are to be found in the following documents:

(a) Referring to ill-treatment of civilians:

- (i) S/8115, S/8750 from Jordan;
- (ii) S/7991, S/8037, S/8077 from Syria;
- (iii) S/7988, S/7933, S/8344, S/8373, S/8991 from the United Arab Republic;

(b) Referring to torture and murder:

- (i) S/8817, S/8820, S/8929, S/8961 from Jordan;
- (ii) S/8873, S/8892 from Syria;
- (iii) S/8344, S/8373 from the United Arab Republic;

(c) Referring to looting:

- (i) S/8032 from Jordan;

(d) Referring to deportation:

- (i) S/8032, S/8290, S/8311, S/8445, S/8932, S/8691, S/8698, S/8722 from Jordan;
- (ii) S/8125, S/8550, S/8643 from Syria;
- (iii) S/8007, S/8017 from the United Arab Republic;
- (iv) S/8127 from the Arab Group of States;

¹ The provisions of the Hague Conventions are binding on the parties to the conflict in the Middle East, inasmuch as these are part of customary international law. See *Judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals*, Cmd. 6964, p. 65: "by 1939 these rules laid down in the [Hague] Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."

(e) Referring to demolition of houses and destruction:

(i) S/8004, S/8117, S/8642, S/8789, S/8890, S/9212 from Jordan;

(ii) S/8178, S/8857, S/8893, S/8904, S/9042, S/9131, S/9139, S/9150, S/9164, S/9199 from Syria;

(f) Referring to violation of the right to fair trial:

S/8923, S/8930, S/8995, S/9102, S/9162, from Jordan.

33. Most of the allegations contained in these letters do not mention the names or identity of the persons and places they refer to. However, of the letters that mention such names, those contained in the following documents may be mentioned by way of example:

S/8117—razing the villages Zeita, Beit Nuba, Yalu Imwas in Jordan;

S/8817—murder of Judge Shawqi A. El-Farra, of Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip; deportation of Miss Zleikha Shehabi, Dr. Daoud El-Husseini, Mr. Kamal Dajani of Jerusalem, Mr. Yasser Amre of Hebron, Jordan;

S/8820—torture and intimidation of Mrs. Abla Tahha, Miss Sarah Judah from Jerusalem, Miss Lutfia Ibrahim, West Bank; expulsion of head of families in Jabalia (five names are mentioned);

S/8857—destruction of the Syrian villages, Souraman, Ahmedyie on 18 September 1968 and 10 October 1968;

S/8932—names of persons who were expelled without charge or trial on 25 October 1968 and on 30 October 1968;

S/8932—alleged arrest of Mrs. Zaigah Al Khatib and Mr. Maleha' Al-Husseini, Mr. Nazeeh Kurah, Jordan;

S/8961—As'ad Abdul Rahman, statement on his imprisonment in Israeli-occupied territory and the treat-

ment of Arabs in prisons under the occupation, Jordan;

S/9102—mass arrests in Jerusalem, Nablus, Al-Khalil, Gaza, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Beir Zeit;

S/9150—demolition of houses in Abizetun, Tell Essqui, Errazaniye, Khan El-Joukhadar, on 6 April 1969, 7 April 1969 and 8 April 1969;

S/9162—arrest of the Reverend Elia Khoury, Mr. Nabih Muammer, and their expulsion to the East Bank, Jordan;

S/9197—arrest of Atta-Maraghi of Silwan Village near Jerusalem, Jordan;

S/9199—demolition of houses in Aache and other nearby places on 27 April 1969, 1 May 1969 and 5 May 1969;

S/9225—arbitrary imprisonment of Randa Nabulsi, Hiba Nabulsi and Saada Nabulsi, demolition of their houses on 8 April 1969, Jordan.

34. The Government of Israel has replied to some of the allegations contained in these letters. In particular, the following documents containing replies may be mentioned:

S/8123 (referring to S/8115)—referring to ill-treatment of civilians;

S/8863 (referring to S/8851)—referring to destruction of villages (Souraman and Ahmediye);

S/8965 (referring to S/8961)—referring to torture;

S/9158 (referring to S/9150)—referring to demolition of houses;

S/9174 (referring to S/9162)—referring to arbitrary arrest of civilians;

S/9208 (referring to S/9197)—referring to violation of human rights of civilians;

S/9230 (referring to S/9225)—referring to arbitrary imprisonment of civilians and demolition of houses.

35. The letters referred to in paragraphs 32, 33 and 34 concern allegations most of which have been brought as evidence before

the Group. The letters containing allegations and replies are analysed in chapter III of this report.

2. *Limitation of the investigation in time*

36. Sub-paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 6 (XXV) refers to "the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East" without indicating expressly any limitation in time. The Group noted, however, that the preamble of the resolution refers only to resolutions adopted after the 1967 conflict and referring to that conflict. On the basis of this consideration and in the light of the debates at the Commission on Human Rights, the Group feels that its mandate should be interpreted as referring only to the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East which took place in 1967.

37. The concept of occupation in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is the same as that mentioned in the Hague Regulations of 1907. The question of when an occupation of a territory begins is dealt with in article 42 of the Hague Regulations as follows:

A territory is considered as occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

38. Both the existence of a formal declaration of occupation and/or of a cease-fire are therefore irrelevant to the question of when a territory is occupied in the sense of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, since this is, in accordance with the Hague Regulations, a question of fact. Hence, an event falls within the purview of the present investigation if (a) it concerns any of the benefits afforded by the fourth Geneva Convention, inasmuch as this protects civilians in occupied territories, (b) it took place after the opening of hostilities in the Middle East on 5 June 1967 and (c) the geographical

location where the event took place was under the *de facto* authority of the Israel Defence Forces.

3. *Geographical scope of the investigation*

39. The Special Working Group considers that sub-paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 6 (XXV) refers only to the territories which came under *de facto* control of the State of Israel subsequent to the opening of hostilities on 5 June 1967. The limits of these territories are, on one side, the lines which on 4 June 1967 separated territories under Israeli control from territories under the control of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic and, on the other side, the cease-fire lines established between Israel on the one hand and Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic on the other, in accordance with Security Council resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967.¹

40. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territories to the territory of the occupying Power, regardless of the reasons for such transfers or deportation. Thus, persons domiciled or residing in the territories occupied by Israel after 5 June 1967 who have been forcibly transferred or deported to the territory which was under Israeli control prior to that date would be covered by the present investigation.

4. *Protected persons*

41. Article 4 of the Convention defines the term "protected persons" as follows:

Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner

¹ The acceptance of the cease-fire call of the Security Council in resolution 233 (1967) was communicated as follows:

(a) Jordan, by cables dated 7 and 8 June 1967 (S/7943 and Corr.1, S/7946, S/7947);
 (b) Israel, by letter dated 7 June 1967 (S/7945);
 (c) United Arab Republic, by letter dated 8 June 1967 (S/7953);
 (d) Syria by cable dated 9 June 1967 (S/7958).

whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.

The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in article 13.

Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, or by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present Convention.

42. The persons covered by the present investigation are therefore those who found themselves in the territories occupied by Israel after 5 June 1967 (as mentioned under sub-section 3 above), provided they are not nationals of Israel, nationals of States not bound by the Convention or nationals of neutral or co-belligerent States which have normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

43. As was noted earlier, persons who have been forcibly transferred or deported from the occupied territories to Israel after 5 June 1967 are also covered by the investigation, in accordance with article 49 of the Convention.

B. Some basic provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in Time of War

1. The inalienability of the rights of civilian persons under the Convention

44. The rights provided for in the Conven-

tion may not be derogated from, except in view of military necessity or for reasons of security, in accordance with detailed provisions of the Convention. These provisions are, in particular: article 5; article 16 (obligations of States Parties as regards wounded and sick persons); article 53 (prohibition of the destruction of property); article 55 (verification by the Protecting Power of the amount of food and medical supplies in occupied territories); article 57 (requisition of civilian hospitals); article 63 (relief work of National Red Cross Societies and other relief organizations); article 64 (penal legislation); article 108 (relief shipments to civilian internees); article 111 (special means of transmitting mail and relief shipments to civilian internees); article 142 (facilities to be granted to relief societies); and article 143 (visits of protected persons by representatives of the Protecting Power and of the International Committee of the Red Cross).

45. Article 8 of the Convention provides:

Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing article, if such there be.

The special agreements mentioned in article 7 may regulate in detail various matters, but they may in no way adversely affect the situation of protected persons or restrict their rights (article 7, paragraph 1).

46. In accordance with article 47 of the Convention,

Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, not by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, not by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.

2. *Guarantees for the implementation of the Convention*

47. Article 30 of the Convention provides:

Protected persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization, that might assist them.

These several organizations shall be guaranteed all facilities for that purpose by the authorities, within the bounds set by military or security considerations.

Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers shall facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons by the representatives of other organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.

3. *Responsibility for the treatment of protected persons and penal sanctions*

48. The question of responsibility for the treatment of protected persons is regulated, *inter alia*, in article 29 of the Convention. This article reads:

The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred.

49. Article 146 states that the High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing any of the "grave breaches" of the Convention defined in article 147. Article 147 reads as follows:

Grave breaches to which the preceding article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deporta-

tion or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

In accordance with article 148, "no High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding article".

4. *Rights of the occupying Power*

50. The Geneva Convention provides minimum standards for the protection of protected persons in the case of conflict or occupation. In article 1 of the Convention "the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Conventions in all circumstances". The provisions set forth in the Convention may therefore in principle not be derogated from. However, concessions to requirements of State security and military necessity are made in several of the provisions of the Convention. In particular, the following provisions may be mentioned: articles 5, 19, 23, 27, 41, 49, 51, 53, 64, 68 and 78.

51. These articles concern the following subject-matter:

(a) General provision governing derogations (article 5);

(b) Discontinuance of the protection of hospitals (article 19);

(c) Free passage can be restricted (article 23);

(d) In respect of the general rule about the treatment there is the exception that "the parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security..." (article 27);

(e) A partial or total evacuation of a given area is allowed (article 49). In this and other contexts assigned residence and internment are allowed (article 41);

(f) A certain degree of compelled labour is permitted (article 51);

(g) The destruction of property is allowed where "such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations" (article 53);

(h) Special penal provisions may be promulgated by an occupying Power (article 68);

(i) Under article 78, internment and assigned residence are permitted as security measures.

52. The extent to which considerations of military necessity may justify derogations from the rights of the civilian population in time of peace is exhaustively regulated in the Convention, and considerations for military necessity and State security may not justify any further derogations from any provision of the Convention. Therefore the derogation clauses should be interpreted restrictively, as is shown in particular by the third paragraph of article 5 of the Convention. Article 5 reads as follows:

Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict the latter is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.

Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.

In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.

53. Articles 146 and 147 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as sanctioning further restrictions of the Convention; they indicate, on the contrary, that persons responsible for any of the grave breaches of the Convention should be subject to effective penal sanctions. Article 147 provides that acts which are "justified by military necessity" do not constitute "grave breaches" of the Convention. However, this provision cannot be interpreted as allowing for derogations additional to those mentioned in paragraphs 50 and 51 above.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF SOME RELEVANT PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDERS OF THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES IN THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. This analysis is based on the texts available to the Special Working Group. In spite of the efforts of the Group and of the Secretariat to secure a complete collection, the texts available are not complete but they provide a sufficient basis for a pertinent analysis.

2. Immediately upon occupation, government in the areas concerned was vested in the Israeli Military Command. The Israeli authorities have, with the exception of occupied Jerusalem, divided the areas under occupation into four regions for the purpose of administration. These regions are (a) the West Bank of the Jordan (referred to by Israeli Military Government as "Judea and Samaria"), (b) the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, (c) the Golan Heights and (d) southern Sinai. Each of these regions is under the control of a military governor.

3. The government of these regions is carried out by means of proclamations and orders which are in principle allegedly published in Hebrew and Arabic and the publication of which is a prior condition to their coming into force. It also appears that each proclamation and order is subsequently

published in the official gazette of the Israel Defence Force Command of the region, which is entitled *Compilation of Proclamations and Orders*.

A. General survey

4. In order better to understand the importance and the effectiveness of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) in the occupied territories, it is necessary to analyse some relevant proclamations and orders of the Israel Defence Forces in the occupied territories. There exists a close relation between the Convention and the said proclamation and orders. For instance, article 64 of the Convention recognizes that the penal law of the occupied territories shall remain in force, and article 117 of the Convention recognizes that the laws in force in the territory will continue to apply to internees who commit offences during internment; article 54 of the Convention guarantees, *inter alia*, the existence of judicial institutions of the occupied areas during the period of occupation.

5. Proclamation No. 2 of the Israel Defence Force for the Golan Heights concerning law and administration states in section 2 that the law in force in the region on 10 June 1967 will remain in force, in so far as it does not conflict with "this proclamation or any other proclamation or order issued by the Israel Defence Force and with the modifications resulting from the establishment of government by the Israel Defence Force in the region". Similar proclamations concerning the West Bank region and the Gaza Strip contain the same provisions.

6. Section 2 of Proclamation No. 2 thus recognizes the spirit of article 64 of the Convention and of article 117 of the Convention in principle, but the same section 2 of the Proclamation makes reference to abrogations and modifications resulting from the establishment of military government by the occupying Power.

7. There appears to be no question that,

in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and with the proclamations promulgated in the occupied areas immediately after occupation, the national penal law in the various areas under occupation is that which was in force prior to occupation.

8. The Special Working Group considers that arguments which imply that "occupied territories" are not "occupied" in the sense of article 64 of the Convention are to be regarded as private opinions and have no bearing on the judicial situation as it exists in the occupied areas of the Middle East and, indeed, as affirmed in the relevant proclamations concerning those areas.

B. The system of the Israel Defence Forces regulations

9. The proclamations and orders of the Israel Defence Force in the occupied territories reflect two systems of law of the occupying Power:

(a) the Jerusalem area under occupation, where Israeli law has for all intents and purposes replaced the existing legal system of the region;

(b) the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Sinai-Gaza regions, where Israeli law has replaced important elements of the legal system of the region, in particular in so far as the maintenance of regular government, security and public order is concerned.

1. The Jerusalem area under occupation

10. That the Jerusalem area is an area under occupation in the sense of the Fourth Geneva Convention has been affirmed in several resolutions adopted by United Nations organs, in particular, Security Council resolution 237 (1967).

11. In virtue of an amendment to the Law and Administration Ordinance 5708 (1948), the Israeli authorities declared an area which includes the occupied area of Jerusalem as one in which the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State apply.

The law in force up to the occupation was therefore completely substituted by the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel.

12. The report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) relating to Jerusalem (S/8146) contains the necessary information for understanding the factual situation regarding this part of the occupied territories.

13. The occupied area of Jerusalem is governed by Law and Administration Order No. 1 (1967) and the orders subsequent to it. These orders, including the Land Order (Expropriation for Public Purposes) 1943, of 8 January 1968 (*Official Gazette* No. 1425) and the Law of Dispossession (Dispossession for Public Purposes) 1943, of 14 April 1968 (*Official Gazette* No. 1443), are connected with article 53 of the Geneva Convention. According to the commentary on the Convention¹ article 53 permits requisition of private property "only under certain circumstances". The Land Order in question does not mention any "certain circumstances"—it simply refers to "public purposes". In the opinion of the Special Working Group this reference to "public purposes" is not sufficient to render this expropriation immune to the prohibition implied in article 53. The Land Order mentioned above announced that the land described in a schedule to it is absolutely required by the Minister of Finance for public purposes. The order provides for compensation.

14. Since the landowners protested against the expropriation order on general grounds and did not claim compensation, the expropriation took place by virtue of the last sentence in paragraph 3 of the order, which states: "The Minister of Finance hereby orders any person in possession of the said land to deliver possession thereof forthwith". The deprivation of property has thus become a confiscation forbidden by classic international law.

15. Since it appears that in virtue of the Law and Administration Order No. 1 (1967) the area of occupied Jerusalem is governed by Israeli law, which has abrogated the former law of the territory, the Special Working Group is of the opinion that this Israeli law should be considered, in the light of the Geneva Convention, as the law by which the occupying Power governs the occupied part of Jerusalem. In this respect, the Group considers that there is no difference between the Israeli laws applying to Jerusalem and the proclamations and orders applying in the other occupied territories.

2. *The Golan Heights, the West Bank and Sinai*

16. The Israel Defence Forces govern the occupied area, with the exception of the Jerusalem area under occupation, by means of proclamations and orders. In conducting its analysis of the law of the occupying Power, the Special Working Group limits itself to analysing only the legal system in the occupied areas, with the exception of occupied Jerusalem, which is dealt with under subsection 1 above.

17. A comparison of the Israeli regulations with the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, as amended until 2 March 1947,² enacted during the period of the British Palestine Mandate shows that the latter has been replaced by Israeli proclamations and orders as they concern the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

18. Since the system of the Israel Defence Force regulations concerning the different occupied territories—other than the region of Jerusalem—appears to be approximately the same in each region, for the purposes of this report it is sufficient to analyse only one group of regulations more carefully, that is the system in the Golan Heights; this does not restrict the Special Working Group from considering, if necessary, the legal situation in other parts of the occupied territories.

19. There appear to be three main procla-

¹ *Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), p. 301.

² *Government of Palestine. Ordinances, regulations, rules, orders and notices* (Jerusalem, Government Printing Press, 1947).

mations for each region. Proclamation No. 1 concerning the assumption of government by the Israel Defence Forces (10 June 1967), Proclamation No. 2 concerning law and administration (18 June 1967), Proclamation No. 3 relating to the entry into force of the Order concerning security instructions (18 June 1967).

20. The proclamations are carried out by a series of orders. The main orders for the Golan Heights appear to be the following:

- (a) Order concerning security instructions (18 June 1967) as amended;
- (b) Order No. 2 concerning prohibition of looting (18 June 1967);
- (c) Order No. 5 concerning establishment of military court (21 June 1967);
- (d) Order No. 8 concerning jurisdiction in criminal offences (30 June 1967);
- (e) Order No. 1 concerning closed areas (18 June 1967);
- (f) Order No. 12 concerning establishment of advisory committees (4 July 1967);
- (g) Order No. 13 concerning land transactions (11 July 1967);
- (h) Order No. 20 concerning abandoned property (20 July 1967).

21. Amongst the orders of the Israel Defence Forces promulgated for the West Bank region the following are of particular interest:

- (a) Order No. 58 concerning abandoned (private) property (15 November 1967);
- (b) Order No. 143 concerning defence in military court (8 October 1967);
- (c) Order No. 157 concerning prolongation of detention warrant (1 November 1967);
- (d) Order No. 163 concerning reporting of wounded persons (5 November 1967);
- (e) Order No. 164 concerning local courts (3 November 1967).

22. Amongst the orders of the Israel Defence Forces promulgated for the Gaza

Strip region the following are also of particular interest:

- (a) Order No. 257 concerning extension of detention ordinance (8 January 1969);
- (b) Order No. 263 concerning prosecutions (16 February 1969);
- (c) Order No. 266 concerning identification of goods (18 February 1969);
- (d) Instruction concerning designation of places of detention and imprisonment (5 February 1968).

23. The Special Working Group notes that the Order concerning security instructions for the West Bank region, which is presumably similar to the Order for the Golan Heights, has been amended several times. Among these modifications there is—at least valid in the West Bank—the abrogation of article 35, which recognized the Convention as an auxiliary source of law (Amendment No. 9, Order No. 144).

C. Proclamations Nos. 1-3 (Golan Heights)

24. Proclamation No. 1 concerns the situation immediately after the occupation of the area and governs the curfew and its consequences; Proclamation No. 2 concerns the assumption of authority: all governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative authority is vested in the military commander of the Israel Defence Forces in the region. The conclusion can be drawn that the commander of the region is primarily the responsible organ of the Israel Defence Forces in the respective regions.

25. Proclamation No. 2 may be considered by the Israeli authorities as a legal basis for the repeal or suspension of penal law of the occupied territories as recognized by article 64 of the Convention.

26. Proclamation No. 2 further contains provisions concerning Syrian State property: all movable and immovable property of this kind is handed over to the military commander of the region and is under his control.

27. Proclamation No. 3 contains the Security Instructions, which concern the same subject-matter as the Convention. These instructions are analysed in section D below.

D. *The Security Instructions*

1. *General*

28. The Security Instructions—amended several times—which are similar to the Defence Emergency Regulations (1945) of the Government of Palestine, contain five parts as follows:

- (a) General provisions (sections 1-4);
- (b) Provisions about courts and jurisdictions (sections 5-43);
- (c) Offences (sections 44-59);
- (d) Provisions concerning detention, search, seizure and confiscations (sections 60-64);
- (e) Provisions concerning restriction order, surveillance, order and administrative detention (sections 65-70) and miscellaneous provisions.

29. The provisions of the above-mentioned Security Instructions are in particular related to articles 64 to 75 of the Convention, which concern common penal law offences. Article 5 of the Convention permits derogations for security reasons. The Security Instructions could therefore be considered as derogations validly based on the Convention.

30. The Security Instructions do not contain any provision concerning the matters dealt with in other chapters or articles of the Convention. It follows, therefore, at least as concerns the Golan Heights—that, in respect of those matters, the Convention has not been derogated from by Israeli law. On the contrary, section 35 of the Security Instructions contains a reference to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is made source of law, since it states that in case of conflict between the Security Instructions and the Convention, “the provisions of the Convention shall prevail”. But Order No. 144 containing Amendment No. 9 (22

October 1967), referring to the Security Instructions of the West Bank, has replaced the reference to the Convention by a provision about the period of detention. The legal material available does not allow a firm conclusion that this amendment has also been made in respect of the Security Instructions of the other occupied territories.

31. Order No. 2 concerning prohibition of looting, which corresponds to article 33 of the Convention, reads as follows: “Any person who loots, or breaks into a house, or other place, for the purpose of looting, or who knowingly aids and abets looting, shall be liable to a penalty of imprisonment for life”.

2. *Courts and jurisdiction*

32. Section 5 *et seq.* of the Security Instructions established a separate penal law for offences defined in the Security Instructions and the subsequent orders. Military courts are established which are to follow a particular procedure as regards evidence, witnesses, preparation of records, summoning of witnesses, arrest for failure to appear. The instructions also contain provisions concerning the finality of decisions and the presentation of the defence.

33. The conviction and sentence of a person by a military court shall be valid only in so far as they are confirmed by the regional commander (section 38); he also has the power to review the sentence.

34. Concerning the procedure to be followed by the military courts reference is made to section 35 of the regulations and to paragraph 29 of this report.

3. *Offences*

35. Section 44 *et seq.* enumerate a list of offences: use of firearms, explosives carrying of firearms, explosive substances, offences against maintenance of public order, disguising, giving refuge, false witness, aiding and abetting, attempt to commit offences, interference in Israel Defence Force affairs, information of military significance, hind-

rance of soldiers in the performance of their duties, possession of military equipment, threats, failure to give information, giving of false information.

4. *Detention, search, seizure and confiscation*

36. Section 60 *et seq.* contain provisions about arrest and detention, seizure and confiscation. This refers to offences created in the Security Instructions on the basis of considerations of security. They would not refer to offences under the common penal law.

37. The confiscation clause is wide: goods, articles, documents or objects with respect to which an offence against the security regulations has been committed shall be confiscated in favour of the Israel Defence Force. The release of such goods can be ordered.

38. Section 62 permits the search of any place and person.

39. Section 66 *et seq.* give the basis for making further restrictions in individual cases and for putting a person under special surveillance.

40. Section 67 authorizes the putting of persons under administrative detention. An advisory committee is in this case competent to make a judgement on detention of this kind "at least once in six months whether or not the detained persons appeal to it".

5. *Other restrictions*

41. Section 68 contains provisions prohibiting the use of roads, concerning the control of vehicles and of the movement of persons, and declaring an area a closed area.

E. *Israeli legislation in the occupied territories in relation to the Fourth Geneva Convention*

1. *Physical safeguard of the civilian population*

42. Article 33 of the Convention establishes individual responsibility. It states: "No

protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed...". Section 72 of the Security Instructions, however, makes a person responsible if he is a leader of a convicted organization, regardless of his individual responsibility. It states: "If an organization is convicted of an offence against this order, any person who at the time of the offence was a leader or official of the organization shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence, unless he has proved that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he took all reasonable steps to prevent its commission."

43. The order concerning prohibition of looting (Order No. 2, Golan Heights) relates to article 33, paragraph 2, of the Convention.

44. Article 68 of the Convention does not prohibit death sentences absolutely. By Order No. 268 (West Bank), No 328 (Gaza and northern Sinai) and No. 146 (Golan Heights), the death penalty is abolished.

2. *Penal legislation and procedure (articles 64 to 75 of the Convention)*

45. The various security orders do not concern the common penal law. They may be considered, in a sense, martial law, within the Convention (see article 5 of the Convention); nevertheless, section 35 of the Security Instructions makes reference to the Geneva Convention.

46. The different orders and regulations of the Israel Defence Forces which create offences and provide for their adjudication and punishment introduce in fact a new penal system. This, however, may be interpreted as consistent with article 64, paragraph 2, of the Convention, which reads as follows:

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property

of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

47. Article 64 of the Convention also states that the tribunals of the occupied territories shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the penal law of the territory. In contradiction to this provision and not covered by the derogation appearing in article 64, paragraph 2, of the Convention is Order No. 8 concerning jurisdiction in criminal offences (repeated in similar orders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip). Under this order military courts shall be competent to judge any offence against a law of the region which was in force immediately prior to the entry of the Israel Defence Forces into the region. The Group has no proof which would enable it to state that the military courts have taken a political attitude.

48. In so far as the military courts replace the ordinary courts in penal matters, a separate legal aid and defence system is established. This, as such, is not contrary to the Convention. (For the West Bank, see Order No. 143 in relation to article 72 of the Convention; for the Gaza Strip see Order No. 262.)

3. *Respect for the property of civilians (articles 3 and 53 of the Convention)*

49. Reference is made once more to the order concerning the prohibition of looting.

50. In the context of the provision of the Convention which prohibits the destruction of property, one may mention the orders concerning abandoned (private) property, which establish a system with the aim of restoring eventually the abandoned property to the original owner in law, or possessor in fact.

51. On the other hand, the Security Instructions provide for the confiscation of goods, articles etc., in favour of the Israel Defence Forces in case of suspicion of offence against the order (under Proclamation No. 3, sections 61 and 69 of the Security Instructions).

52. The expropriation system in the Jerusalem area introduced by an order of 8 January 1968, in accordance with sections 5 and 7 of the Land Order (Expropriation for Public Purpose) 1943, is described in paragraphs 10-15 above.

4. *Guarantees of the institutions and government of occupied territories (articles 47 and 54 of the Convention)*

53. A wide interpretation of the spirit of article 54 which, according to the commentary on the Convention¹ refers not only to judges and public officials but to "the whole administrative and judicial machinery", may lead to the conclusion that article 54 guarantees all the institutions and government of occupied territories. The Israeli authorities, pursuant to Proclamation No. 2 and other orders, replaced the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts by that of military courts. The Israeli authorities also enacted the Law and Administration Order No. 1 (1967) concerning the area of Eretz-Israel (concerning Jerusalem) whereby the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel apply. The Israeli authorities have taken measures pursuant to that order. The Special Working Group concludes that article 47 is violated if the changes in the institutions or government introduced by the occupying Power in fact and in law lead to a deprivation of the benefits which the Convention affords to protected persons.

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY THE SPECIAL WORKING GROUP²

54. The evidence before the Special Working Group consisted of the following:

¹ *Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), pp. 306-307.

² This chapter merely summarizes here evidence received by the Working Group. The conclusions which the Working Group has reached on the basis of this evidence are found in chapter IV of this report.

(a) Personal testimony of individuals alleging violations of the Convention;

(b) Oral statements concerning alleged violations of the Convention;

(c) United Nations documents containing information relevant to the mandate of the Special Working Group;

(d) Written communications received by the Group alleging violations of the Convention;

(e) Communications relating to the situation in the Middle East in general;

(f) Reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which have a bearing on the mandate of the Special Working Group.

55. The Special Working Group heard witnesses who testified as to their personal experience concerning alleged violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The list of names of persons appearing before the Special Working Group appears as an annex to this report.

56. The Special Working Group also heard statements and received communications relating to alleged violation. In particular, it heard a statement by Dr. Burhan Hammad, representing the League of Arab States, dealing with the question of applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and setting out the various types of violations allegedly committed by Israel in the territories occupied by it as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. It also heard the testimony of Mr. George Dib (RT.5),¹ who presented to the Group a detailed memorandum on the treatment of Arab civilians in the occupied territories on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut. The memorandum contains data collected by research teams of the Institute, relating to allegations of wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, destruction of houses and other property, expropriation of property and pillage, and eviction of Arabs and settlement of Jews. Mr. Dib informed the Group that this

information had been corroborated:

(a) By interviewing the persons directly concerned and finding corroboration of the same fact by a number of persons separately interviewed;

(b) By looking for and inspecting traces of alleged maltreatment on the bodies of persons who testify to having been maltreated;

(c) By verifying the accuracy of the evidence by reference to other sources, such as newspaper reports and parliamentary reports.

57. At its twenty-eighth meeting in Cairo, the Group heard a statement by Professor Izzedin Foda of the University of Cairo (RT.20). In his statement and an accompanying memorandum, Professor Foda submitted instances of alleged Israeli breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention with regard to: (a) expulsion of individuals, (b) destruction of homes, (c) illegal detention, torture and illegal trial, (d) murder and terrorism, (e) hospitals and health services, (f) changes in school schedules, closing of schools and profanation of holy places, and (g) undermining the economy of the occupied territories and looting. Professor Foda based the proof of his allegations on excerpts from reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, information gathered by the International Committee of the Red Cross, reports in Israeli and world press, and information collected by the Government of the United Arab Republic as a State involved in the question and harbouring refugees from the occupied territories, in particular from the Gaza Strip and from Sinai. At its twenty-first meeting held in Amman, Jordan, the Working Group heard the statement by Major Derek Cooper concerning the treatment of individuals and the question of the status of the occupied territories under the Israeli occupation régime (RT.13). In this context, Major Cooper stated:

I should like to stress that there is no doubt whatever in my mind that there has always been a carefully organized pressure by the Israelis to oblige the indigenous population of Palestine to

¹ Reference is to documents series E/CN.4/AC.26/RT. (English text), which for purposes of brevity is cited as RT.

leave the country by every means at their disposal, which has included intimidation, endless house-to-house searches, day and night, under any pretext whatever, the billeting of troops, monetary and psychological pressures, lack of jobs, bribes, bad treatment, and the blowing up of property. In other words, if you do not co-operate, you can leave. That was virtually admitted to me in a conversation with Mr. Michael Comay in Jerusalem...

58. A number of allegations concerning ill-treatment of civilians and destruction and looting of civilian property were made in letters from the representative of Syria on 15 June 1967 (S/7991), 6 July 1967 (S/8037) and 19 July 1967 (S/8077). These letters were referred to by the representative of Israel in letters dated 23 June 1967 (S/8012), 4 July 1967 (S/8030), 7 July 1967 (S/8042) and 2 August 1967 (S/8105). These were denied by the representative of Israel.

59. In a letter dated 17 July 1967 (S/8064), the representative of the United Arab Republic communicated the text of a note sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic to the International Committee of the Red Cross dated 7 July 1967. This note contains a list of examples of acts in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular, articles 3, 16, 18, 49, 53, 54, 55, 89, 91, 92, 106 and 108. The representative of Israel, by letter dated 19 July 1967 (S/8082), categorically denied these allegations and made references to measures taken by Israel to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population.

60. The Special Working Group also took into account the information contained in United Nations documents; the attention of the Special Working Group to these documents was drawn by the League of Arab States by letter dated 19 June 1969. Where the information contained in these documents relates to the same subject matter as that of oral testimonies these documents are referred to in the analysis of the evidence which follows.

61. The Special Working Group also received a number of written communications

concerning alleged violations of the Convention. A number of these communications were received by the Working Group during its field trip in the Middle East; shortage of time unfortunately prevented the Working Group from hearing the individuals in person. The other communications were addressed to the Working Group by cable or mail. These are listed in the annexes to this report.

62. The Special Working Group also received a number of communications concerning the situation in the Middle East in general. The list of these communications is reproduced in the annexes.

63. The following is the order adopted in analysing the allegations received by the Working Group:

(a) Allegations regarding the physical safeguard of the civilian population, including children and treatment of detainees. These allegations concern articles 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 49, 50, 55, 56 and 76 of the Convention;

(b) Allegations regarding violation of articles 64-75 relating to penal legislation and penal procedure;

(c) Allegations regarding respect for property of protected persons, covered by articles 33 and 53;

(d) Allegations regarding the eviction and deportation of protected persons and the prohibition of transfer of population of the occupying Power to the occupied territories (article 49);

(e) Allegations regarding the non-observance of article 54, which sets forth the guarantees of the institutions and government of occupied territories;

(f) Allegations regarding the non-observance of article 30 concerning the implementation of the Convention.

A. Allegations regarding the physical safeguard of the civilian population including children and treatment of detainees

1. Killing, torture and ill-treatment of individuals other than detainees

(a) Murder of individuals

64. Mr. Abu Mohammed Kubsi ((RT.8) stated that on 11 June 1967, Israeli troops had invaded his house, stood his son and a friend of his up against the garden wall and shot them both. The son was killed and his friend was wounded. The following day, the Israeli troops again visited the house. They placed the wounded man on the same bed as a second son of the witness who was bedridden with tuberculosis and shot both dead in the bed (pages 36-40).

65. According to Mr. Mohammed Abdl Meguid (RT.9) on 15 June 1967, Israeli troops occupying the village of Ein Zewair, near Quneitra, had shot an old woman and they had thrown her body into a well. The witness also stated that on 18 June 1967, the Israelis had shot and wounded the village mukhtar (page 81).

66. Mr. Tayyim El-Ghuzzi (RT.9) stated that Israeli troops shot and killed one man and one woman during their forced eviction from their village of Bteiha on or just before 12 June 1967 (pages 91-95).

67. Dr. Mohammed El-Bek (RT.21) testified that when the Israeli troops entered the El-Arish area, he and his wife were made to stand against the wall with their hands in the air, together with some other civilians. Some of these were then shot down in his presence and the Israelis refused to allow the victims to be taken to hospital. He and his wife, who was near to giving birth, were left without food and water for two days. The witness also stated that he had seen Israeli troops bring two Arab students before his house, kill one and shoot the other in the head. He also stated that doctors had also been beaten up and terrorized.

68. Mr. Gutyam Nasser Selmi (RT.20)

stated that his brother was shot and killed by the Israeli troops in his house before the witness; this took place twenty-three days after the first Israeli attack in Bir el-Abd.

69. Mrs. Maha El-Zirbawi (RT.20) testified that Israeli troops in El-Arish had driven her and her family from their apartment and had shot and killed her father and her two brothers. The Red Cross had eventually arranged for her and her brother to reach Cairo.

70. According to Kamel El-Harouni (RT.20), his brother was shot in the leg and soon after shot and killed by Israeli troops who were searching for the witness on 28 September 1967. In an earlier attempt to contact him, Israeli troops arrested the witness's wife and mother-in-law and informed them that they (the Israelis) would kill the witness's children if he did not show up at Israeli headquarters on the following day.

71. Mr. Yehia Abou Shahla (RT.18) said that two persons, Kadi el Kadi and Shawky el Farra, had been killed by Israeli troops without legal proceedings in the first half of July 1967. The witness further testified that one of his neighbours, Mr. Khadry el Dayer, Secretary of the Palestine School, had been murdered by the Israelis in his bedroom together with his son for no reason at all. The witness drew the attention of the Special Working Group to the execution a few months earlier of Dr. Heidar Abu Shafi, head of the Islamic Tribunal in Gaza and a Gaza lawyer Mr. Fayzy el Husaini. The witness could not see any reason for these executions except that the two executed persons had submitted a protest to the Military Governor about the looting by Israeli troops and the taxes levied on the population. The witness further testified that he had seen dead bodies lying in the streets one week after the occupation. The Israelis had refused to give up the bodies to relatives; they had loaded them into lorries and thrown them into ditches.

72. Miss Aisha Vati Ghazy (RT.18), eighteen years old, testified that two weeks after the commencement of the June 1967

war, the Israelis shot down her father before her eyes as they entered the house. She tried to prevent them and cried bitterly, but the Israeli soldiers fired at her and wounded her severely in the arm and knee. Her uncle and cousin had also been badly beaten. She herself had remained in the house one week in order to care for her wounded uncle. People working in the street had eventually entered and found that there were dead persons within and had taken her to the hospital. It had been necessary to amputate her right arm, and she had received an artificial arm which she showed to the Group. Four or five months after the war, the Israelis had beaten the aunt of the witness and shot down her cousin.

73. Mrs. Fatma Mahmoud Abdallah (RT.18) stated that when the Israeli troops entered her village, they broke down the door of her house and fired at her husband and children. Her husband had been killed, and one of her five children had been injured in the head.

74. Mr. Salmud Mahmoud El Yemen (RT.18) testified that one man he knew, Sid Ahmed Soliman Atallah, had been killed by the Israelis because he had defended his wife and children in Bir el-Abd.

75. Miss Camilia Kamal Soliman El Zirbawi (RT.17) testified that her uncle and two cousins had been killed and her father wounded in the same episode as that when she was shot in the head.

76. Mr. Salem Gowaa Ghorab (RT.17), chief of the Dawaghere tribe of the Bir el-Abd region of Mousfig, testified that one or two months after the occupation of the village, a boat with six persons on board which had been bringing drinking water from the Bardaweel Lake to his village had been destroyed by the Israelis and the occupants killed. Two fishermen on the Bardaweel Lake had also been killed by machine-gun fire from helicopters.

77. Mrs. Narges El Sayed Ibrahim (RT.17) stated that she had been asleep in a room with her husband and children when the

Israelis had broken down the doors and burst into their house. They had made her children and herself lie on the floor, while they slit her husband's throat with a bayonet. The blood stains could still be seen on the stone floor. The Israelis had threatened to cut the throat of the seven-year-old son of the witness if she refused to do what they said. The boy had been very roughly treated by the Israelis and his arm was still badly dislocated and deformed.

78. Mohammed El Attar (RT.19) testified that one night he was escorting a pregnant woman for medical treatment. He was a policeman. They were accosted by an Israeli patrol who shot and killed the eight-month pregnant woman.

79. Other instances of murder were alleged in communications to the Secretary-General. In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 8 August 1967 (S/8115), it was stated:

On the morning of 26 July 1967, the Israel armed forces arrested eight Jordanian citizens near Auja village. After being searched and their possessions confiscated, they were forcibly taken to the Hayek Bridge on the Jordan River, where they were brutally beaten with rifle butts and machine-guns.

According to Ali Hassan Ali Suleiman, an eye-witness and the only survivor, the victims were told to swim to the east bank. They were later thrown in the river and seven of them were shot in cold blood.

Ali Hassan Ali Suleiman, who escaped death by diving under the water and hiding behind a bush, is now undergoing medical treatment at Salt Hospital.

This letter was answered by the Permanent Representative of Israel in a letter of 16 August 1967 (S/8123) which contains the following statement:

Towards the end of July, several instances occurred of armed infiltrators attempting to cross into Israel-controlled territory. After they had opened fire, they were driven back. No unnecessary force was employed on any of these occasions.

(b) *Torture and ill-treatment of individuals, other than detainees*

80. Mr. Mohammed Kader Derbas (RT.19) testified that he had been castrated in Gaza. The operation took place when the witness was hospitalized for treatment. The witness was examined by a physician duly appointed by the Working Group, who reported that Derbas had been castrated and that otherwise he was in good health (see report of Dr. Choukri in RT.20). The Working Group also took note of a report by two doctors presented by Professor Foda in an annex to his written memorandum (RT.20).

81. The witness also stated that several other men had been castrated who were unwilling to testify before the Working Group.

82. Miss Camilia Kamal Soliman El Zirbawi (RT.17), fifteen years old, testified before the Group that on 7 June 1967, she had been shot in the head by an Israeli soldier. The episode had occurred in one of the bedrooms of her home in El-Arish. The Israeli soldiers who had fired the shots had been at the door of the room. They had fired at random into the room. The witness had been hit in the right temple, and was still slightly paralysed on her left side. The shooting had occurred when her house at El-Arish had been surrounded by tanks and a number of Israeli soldiers had rushed in. They had struck the children with rifle butts and her younger brother had been knocked unconscious. When her mother had attempted to stop them she had been thrown to the ground. The witness had rushed to help her mother and had been shot in the head. The witness stated that there were no members of the resistance in the house, nor had any of her relatives participated in the resistance.

83. Mrs. Dawlat El Sayed Allam (RT.18) testified that the Israelis had come to her house during lunch. Her sixty-five-year-old husband, and her eight children had been present. They had been lined up and asked for their identity cards. Her husband had

said he was a Sheikh and knew nothing about any soldiers. The Israelis had then beaten him savagely. She had been tied up and the Israeli soldiers had attempted to rape her. Her fifteen-year old son had seized a knife and attacked the soldiers, who had killed him. They had then raped her. The witness had been raped a second time by Israeli soldiers when she had tried to get to Egypt. The witness stated that she had not been the only woman treated in that way in the village, and some who had resisted rape had been killed.

84. Sheikh El-Hersh (RT.19) stated that as he and his family were moving towards Egypt after being forced from their home (Bir el-Abd), one of his daughters had died of thirst since they had no food or water.

85. Mr. Nasser Salem Salama (RT.19) testified that when the Israelis asked the villagers of Bir el-Abd who their chief was and when he had come forward, they tied him up, robbed him of everything and struck him with a rifle butt in the left cheek. His house was burned down.

86. Witness E (RT.19) also stated that she had been sexually molested by the Governor of Nablus Prison when she went to him to obtain permission to visit her husband. The same witness also stated that, according to her information, four other girls had been taken into a nearby room by Israeli officers who raped them.

2. *Ill-treatment of civilians in groups, including mass killing*

(a) *Mass murder*

87. Mr. Emil Anton El-Ghoury (RT.6) testified that there was indiscriminate and mass shooting of civilians by Israeli troops in Jerusalem streets after the cease-fire (pages 29-30). He submitted a list of the names of 180 persons who had been killed in this manner. In his testimony, Archbishop Diodoros (RT.12) speaks of the presence of several corpses in the streets of Jerusalem during the period immediately after the cease-fire (page 26).

88. Mr. Mahmoud Saleb Sejf (RT.6) stated that in Jericho, immediately after the Israeli troops had moved in, any person who attempted to flee the city was shot and that he himself had seen thirty-four corpses (pages 61).

89. Witness C (RT.13) refers to the fact that in one village nine youngsters had been shot to death in front of their families (page 26-30).

90. Mr. Salen Nazani (RT.15) from the Noseirat tribe and the village bearing the same name, stated that four men had been summoned by the Israeli army and summarily shot as they approached the place to which they had been summoned. This took place on 29 November 1967. The following day, the whole population of the village was ordered out (page 26).

91. Sheikh Abu Rashed (RT.16) testified that the Muktar (Al-Rawachdi tribe) and his family, Abu Seheiban, were murdered by the Israelis and buried in a mass grave; they were refugees who lived in the Rafah camp in Gaza.

92. Abdel Rahman Nasr (RT.16) an eleven-year old boy, stated that he had seen several adults being herded by the Israelis to rubbish heaps outside the refugee camp (Rafah), shot down and their bodies covered over with the use of bulldozers.

93. Sheikh Salem Aly el Hirsh (RT.17), chief of the tribe in the Rabaa District from region Bir el-Abd, testified that when the Israelis had entered the village, they had forced the villagers to lie on the ground, had begun to shoot at them and had killed two men of the tribe named Soliman Aly Nasser and Nasser Awda Nasser.

94. According to Mr. Kassem Daoud (RT.8), seven young men of those who had been taken as hostages were summarily shot dead by the Israelis on 15 June 1967. The witness further stated that when the village population was marched out, they were covered by machine-guns mounted on jeeps; the Israelis shot at anyone who strayed or who looked back (pages 71, 81-85).

95. Mrs. Nimet Mahmoud Saleh (RT.9) stated that three days after the Israelis occupied her village (Tel Awra), they had forcibly evicted the villagers and after five days of walking, through the demilitarized zone to the combat lines, the Israelis had picked sixteen young men and had shot them in cold blood. Her husband was among these (page 46).

96. Mr. Hussein Khaled Naajel (RT.9) who testified in Damascus, stated that three days after occupation, Israeli troops had evicted the village population and in doing so they had picked sixteen young men and shot them. He stated that his wife had tried to prevent the murder of her four sons and she too had been shot dead (page 61).

97. Mr. Tayyim El-Ghuzzi (RT.9) stated that on 13 June 1967, as the villagers of Bteiha were being marched to the cease-fire line by the Israelis, they had singled out six men and shot them in cold blood (pages 91-95).

98. Mr. Mohammed El-Attar (RT.19) said that in early July 1967, in the Gaza Strip, Israeli troops had picked three men from a number that they had assembled and had shot them dead. One was a teacher, one was a shoe-shine boy and one was a labourer. As the Israelis dispersed the men they shot over their heads, killing another two.

99. Mr. Souhair Moussa Ibrahim (RT.19) stated that twenty-five days after the Israeli attack, Israeli soldiers had suddenly surrounded his tribe and killed thirty-seven civilians.

100. Mr. Ibrahim Abu Seheiban (RT.14) witnessed the killing of a number of persons in Awadhira Camp 11 June 1967. He stated that thirteen corpses had been counted in the ruins of a secondary school that had been demolished, including that of his father and his two brothers, who had previously been taken away from his home by Israeli soldiers (pages 71-75).

101. In a letter dated 8 April 1969 (S/9141), the representative of Syria states that

Israeli soldiers captured six Syrian shepherds in Brika and murdered them in cold blood.

(b) *Mass torture and ill-treatment*

102. Mohammed Kassen Daoud (RT.8) stated that several persons were taken to the house of a wealthy farmer and they were put in several rooms facing the wall with their hands raised above their heads. They were kept like this for three days. They were then taken out and told to dig trenches; they were made to stand in these trenches each day for three days. On the fourth day they were made to stand holding heavy stones above their heads. They were then told to leave the village or be shot and buried in the trenches that they had dug (pages 62-71).

103. Rev. Elia Khouri (RT.12) stated that in Ramallah, over a period of time up to March 1969, he witnessed Israeli soldiers mercilessly beating up men, women and children at random outside their homes (pages 32-35).

104. According to Miss Camilia Kamal Soliman El Zerbawi (RT.17) fifteen years old, in El-Arish, the Israeli troops entered the houses in the middle of the night and treated the women and children very brutally. It was also their habit to go round the streets carrying empty beer bottles and, when they met civilians, to break them over their heads. One of her brothers, aged eighteen, had suffered a broken leg from Israeli beatings. Subsequent to this, he had been arrested and held in prison for two months.

105. Sheikh Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT.17), who is chief of the El Rawayeh tribe from Beir el Abed in the Bteiha Zone in the Sinai region, testified that the Israelis had passed through his village at the commencement of hostilities. Two weeks later they had returned and forced the inhabitants to leave their houses. On this occasion, some members of his tribe had been killed by machine-gun fire.

106. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 19 August 1968, the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/8750) stated that

certain acts of lawlessness had taken place in Jerusalem against Arab inhabitants. The letter further states:

Yesterday, 18 August, hundreds of Israeli youths poured into Arab Jerusalem and attacked Arab residents, stoned Arab taxis and buses, smashed windows, thus injuring scores of innocent civilians, some of whom were seriously wounded. The mobs roamed through the streets for over an hour bringing havoc and fear. Again, as in the June war, looting took place and Arab stores were attacked and property destroyed. The Israeli police, whose headquarters are very close to the scene, apparently was not instructed to intervene until the Israelis mobs had completed their job.

107. This letter is referred to in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel of 21 August 1968 (S/8756) which states:

The letter purports to give an account of an incident that occurred in Jerusalem on 18 August. It deliberately omits, however, the essential facts. It does not mention that the incident began with three premeditated and planned terror attacks carried out by terror organizations operating from Jordan. It fails to mention that ten persons were injured, two of them seriously, by explosions of timing devices placed at the Bikur Holim Hospital, the central bus station and a gasoline station. The letter omits also the fact that the Jerusalem authorities condemned the outburst of a number of Jewish youths incensed by these terror attacks against innocent civilians; that a number of the young men implicated were arrested and immediate steps taken to end the turbulence and prevent its recurrence; and that Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence defined it as hooliganism which plays into the hands of the El-Fatah.

On the other hand, the Jordanian Government has failed to dissociate itself from acts of violence and murder directed against civilians. On the contrary, it supports them and even actively participates in them. Indeed, the Jordanian Government has repeatedly avowed its adherence to terror warfare, which constitutes a grave violation of the cease-fire. This warfare is pursued from Jordanian territory by inhuman and cowardly attempts at random killing and maiming of innocent civilians, Jews and Arabs, men, women

and children, without the pretence of any military objective. Among the methods frequently employed in these attacks are the placing of explosives in theatres, bus stations and crowded streets, the dispersing of button-shaped mines in school yards, the throwing of grenades into stores and the sabotage of agricultural installations and vehicles.

The citizens of Jerusalem, Jews and Arabs alike, have repudiated the incident of 18 August, and the city continues on its course of normal life and development marked by coexistence of the two peoples which are weary of conflict and shrink from the warfare of terror, murder and hate inspired by the Arab Governments.

108. References to ill-treatment of groups is also made in a number of letters from the Governments of the interested States. In a letter dated 15 June 1967 (S/7988), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic stated:

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following:

(1) The Israeli authorities, after their occupation of Rafah and El Arish, launched brutal and inhuman attacks by shelling and thereby severely damaging the hospitals in both cities, which were crowded with wounded military personnel and civilians as well as of their medical staff.

(2) The Israeli authorities have been shooting at the civilian population of the Gaza Strip and Sinai indiscriminately and for no apparent reasons.

(3) The Israeli authorities, not satisfied with destroying the civilian installations, hit at ambulances and looted stored children's food.

(4) Hundreds of wounded have been left to die helplessly from thirst in the scorching heat of the desert. The Israel authorities refused adamantly to transport them to the eastern side of the Canal. They have been left to their fate and, in order to live, they have to walk under these conditions, no less than 180 kms.

This inhumane conduct has been practised ever since the outbreak of hostilities and is continuing notwithstanding the cease-fire call. Not only have the Israeli authorities constantly and consistently refused to extend any help to those unfortunate people but have also continuously

obstructed any attempt by the International Red Cross to extend its assistance.

109. The Permanent Representative of Israel in a letter dated 20 June 1967 (S/8003) referred to the allegations made in document S/7988 and stated:

The allegation that the civilian population was attacked is untrue. No civilians were attacked by the Israeli forces, except when they took an active part in the armed hostilities, or gave cover to armed forces. As is known, there were irregular Arab forces operating in the area.

Military personnel and civilians in the areas controlled by the Israeli forces, who were wounded during the hostilities, are given the same treatment in the same hospitals as Israeli casualties.

110. In his letter dated 26 September 1969 (S/9456), the representative of Jordan referred to the ill-treatment of the population of the village of Al-Khalil. This allegation referred to the closure of the central market by the military authorities, where food, clothes and other materials are transacted; reported spoiling of foods by Israeli soldiers by mixing rice with sugar and pouring petrol over flour; arresting inhabitants and leaving them naked in the sun, and cutting off Al-Khalil from the rest of the area so that no supplies, including medical materials could be carried to the city. The same letter refers to alleged similar treatment meted out by the Israelis in Beit Sahour. The allegation refers to the twenty-two-hour curfew imposed on 29 August 1969 and still in force on 26 September 1969, and the representative of the International Red Cross being forbidden to enter the town, as well as the representative of the Holy See.

111. The representative of Israel, in his letter dated 7 October 1969 (S/9466), referred to the allegations contained in document S/9456 and stated:

After a series of terror and sabotage acts in the area of Hebron and Beit Sahur, causing the death of several civilians and disrupting public order, the authorities were compelled to take appropriate preventive and police measures to ensure the safety of the population for which they are res-

possible. These measures concerned in particular restrictions on traffic to Jordan and their purpose having been attained they have already been terminated.

112. In his letter of 25 November 1969 (S/9511), the representative of Jordan also drew attention to the ill-treatment of civilians in Gaza in a newspaper report attached to his letter. The report, entitled "Eye-witness in Gaza", had been published in the British newspaper *Sunday Times* on 23 November 1969. The report refers, *inter alia*, to the hunger prevailing in the Gaza area among civilians, and curfews imposed arbitrarily as a reprisal. The report quotes an Israeli soldier, and with regard to curfews imposed as a reprisal, it states, *inter alia*:

In the tougher cases, the same curfew rules applied, but only the women were kept indoors. The men were driven into the desert in trucks and sometimes beaten up on the way. When they arrived at an isolated spot, they were divided according to age into two groups. They were then forced to squat on their haunches in the sun under guard for several hours — he says for as long as eight hours at a time.

There were also harsher measures, which the witness says were common knowledge among soldiers serving on the Strip this summer, but which he never witnessed himself. He says that during a coffee party in his tent (the army is dry), half a dozen soldiers told him the best way to combat terrorism was to bind suspects tightly with electric wire on arms and legs, and leave them in the sun.

These were not young soldiers telling tall stories, he says, but mature reservists chatting unemotionally, without even much interest (which was the single thing that made the deepest impression on him). He also says they reported beating Arab men on the shins with the butts of automatic weapons, sometimes until their legs were broken.

How accurate are these accounts? And do the events they describe result from official policy? The first question is desperately hard to answer. Many Arabs around Gaza have told me similar stories in the last weeks, but even President Nasser could not call them good witnesses. They were vague on details. They were carried away by

their own rhetoric (even filtered through an interpreter) and evidently biased.

On the other hand, an Arab professional man—he is under such pressure that I cannot even say which profession—gave a similar account. And this was also largely confirmed in the course of a series of extremely guarded conversations with international workers in the area, most of whom are concerned, above all, to avoid offending the occupying authorities.

Moreover, they are frankly terrified that any statement of theirs will be used to prevent them from continuing all kinds of essential services.

All of these witnesses, some of whom have spoken at first hand, and others only through hearsay, must be treated with some reserve. But the Israeli soldier, I believe, is in a different category.

He is not only a Jew; he is a devoted one. He has served in the Israeli army during two wars. He is a highly educated man, and indeed one of some distinction in his profession. He knows people, Israelis like himself, who have told me very similar stories. Finally, this witness, who, it should be said, is unlike the majority of dissident sources in Tel Aviv in that he is anti-communist, has gone so far as to swear a detailed statement which is in the possession of the *Sunday Times*.

(c) *Use of napalm against civilians*

113. Mr. Sami Oueida (RT.6) testified before the Group that he and his family had been attacked by three aeroplanes as they fled Jericho on 9 June 1967. He stated that they were alone and clearly distinguishable as civilians; that his daughter was killed in this attack and that he and some members of his family were severely burnt by the incendiary bombs that the aeroplane had repeatedly dropped around them (pages 51-55).

114. The Working Group at its twenty-third meeting saw Souhair Maraqa, a six-year old girl, who showed burns over most of her body. Her father, Mohammed Maraqa, who escorted her, testified before the Group, that she had suffered on 7 June 1967 near Jericho, napalm burns over most of her body (RT.15).

115. Dr. Kamal Malek Ghobriel (RT.17)

who had been working at the Public Health Hospital at El-Arish from the beginning of hostilities until September 1968, had witnessed six cases of napalm burns, some of which had been transferred to Cairo for skin grafts.

116. According to Mr. Abdulghani Sheik (RT.8), he and his fellow villagers of Keshneya had suffered napalm (and bomb) attacks after the cease-fire on 10 June 1967 (pages 7-10).

117. Sister Marie Therese Lacaze (RT.15) stated that in Jerusalem, she had seen children who had been burnt by napalm. Her testimony referred to the period from 14 June to 1 July 1967 (page 12).

118. Reverend Paul Gauthier (RT.15) testified that on 7 June 1967, he had seen twelve persons who had been burnt by napalm. These persons were hospitalized in the Indian Hospice in Jerusalem (page 19).

119. Dr. El Bek (RT.21) stated that some doctors and patients were killed when the Israelis threw incendiary bombs on the hospital at El-Arish.

120. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, in a telegram to the Secretary-General on 15 June 1967 (S/7993), stated that Israel used napalm bombs and heavy artillery and tanks against hospitals, youth camps and schools. The contents of this letter were denied by the Permanent Representative of Israel in a letter dated 20 June 1967 (S/8003).

(d) *Medical supplies, health and hygiene*

121. Dr. Kamal Malek Ghobriel (RT.17) who had been working at the Public Health Hospital at El-Arish from the beginning of hostilities until September 1968, states that the health situation in the town had deteriorated rapidly, mainly due to the lack of medical supplies and trained personnel, but also in part, due to serious economic deterioration. The food situation had been most unsatisfactory throughout the period. The hospital had been forced to obtain food

from the civilian population, since its request for supplies from the Israel authorities had been held in suspense for months. Finally a concessionnaire from Gaza had supplied food by arrangement with the hospital authorities. The situation regarding medical supplies had been similar. One lorry-load of antibiotics, which had arrived in August 1968, contained medicines which had been out of date since February 1968. The witness had regularly reported such cases to the Red Cross representative in Gaza who had himself been an eyewitness to some of them. The hospital had been without an operating theatre for the months of June and July 1968. In August 1968, a hospital from Tel Aviv had taken over control of the El-Arish Hospital and had promised that doctors and nurses would be sent. In fact, four very recently qualified Israeli doctors had been supplied, but no specialists, who were urgently needed. The main need had been for surgeons, but the Israelis had sent none. The witness had drawn the attention of the Military Commander of El-Arish to the acute danger of a tuberculosis epidemic in the area, mainly due to lack of food. Other diseases that had become prevalent, such as hypertension and diabetes, had been due to the nervous depression caused by Israeli terrorism and to lack of medicine.

122. Dr. Mahmoud El-Bek (RT.21) testified that the public water supply in El-Arish was cut off by the Israelis and as a result, many children had died because of epidemics.

123. Mrs. Nancy Abi-Haidar (RT.7) stated that after the cessation of hostilities, relief agencies had not been allowed extra supplies to deal with the situation. She stated that a Red Cross team had been shot at whilst trying to bring in extra supplies across the Jordan.

124. Witness B (RT.7) stated that in a village outside Jerusalem, a serious health hazard was caused when a large rubbish dump was created near the village; she said that this rubbish dump had been put up by the Israelis despite the fact that there were incinerators

in good working order which were not being used. The witness was referring to the period of the second week of August 1967.

(e) *Labour*

125. Mrs. Hamdi Ali El-Khalili (RT.21) stated that in El-Arish, many people had been forced to carry out unpaid labour for the occupying authorities.

(f) *Text of articles of the Convention relative to the evidence analysed in foregoing subsections 1 and 2:*

ARTICLE 27

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.

Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.

However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.

ARTICLE 31

No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.

ARTICLE 32

The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies

not only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.

ARTICLE 33

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Pillage is prohibited.

Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.

ARTICLE 36

Departures permitted under the foregoing article shall be carried out in satisfactory conditions as regards safety, hygiene, sanitation and food. All costs in connexion therewith, from the point of exit in the territory of the Detaining Power, shall be borne by the country of destination, or, in the case of accommodation in a neutral country, by the Power whose nationals are benefited. The practical details of such movements may, if necessary, be settled by special agreements between the Powers concerned.

The foregoing shall not prejudice such special agreements as may be concluded between Parties to the conflict concerning the exchange and repatriation of their nationals in enemy hands.

ARTICLE 55

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary food-stuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

The Occupying Power may not requisition food-stuffs, articles or medical supplies available in the occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces and administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods.

The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to verify the state of the food and medical supplies in occupied territories, except where temporary restrictions are made necessary by imperative military requirements.

ARTICLE 56

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the co-operation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

If new hospitals are set up in occupied territory and if the competent organs of the occupied State are not operating there, the occupying authorities shall, if necessary, grant them the recognition provided for in article 18. In similar circumstances, the occupying authorities shall also grant recognition to hospital personnel and transport vehicles under the provisions of articles 20 and 21.

In adopting measures of health and hygiene and in their implementation, the Occupying Power shall take into consideration the moral and ethical susceptibilities of the population of the territory.

3. *Torture and ill-treatment of detainees*

126. Mr. As'ad Abdul Rahman (RT.6 passim) stated that he had been beaten and terrorized several times in the Muscovite Prison, Sarafand Prison, Ramleh and Ramallah Prison during his interrogation.

The same witness also testified that physical and psychological torture was practised on other prisoners, in particular in Sarafand Prison, and he submitted a list of kinds of torture that he knew was practised.

127. The statement of Mr. Rahman was communicated to the Secretary-General in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan of 7 January 1969 (S/8961). In a letter of 13 January 1969 (S/8965) the Permanent Representative of Israel referred

to the statement of Mr. Rahman and stated the following:

... This is undoubtedly the most scurrilous document ever to be circulated in the United Nations. It is atrocity mongering of the cheapest and most vulgar kind and unworthy of the attention of any State Member of the United Nations....

128. Rev. Elia Khouri (RT.12) stated that he saw and heard evidence of beating and abuse of young detainees in Ramallah Prison during his own detention in March-April 1969. He also stated that he had been shown a young detainee who had suffered a beating and he was threatened with receiving the same treatment (pp. 41-54).

129. Witness C saw evidence of beating of twenty-five girls in March 1969 in Nablus Prison and in the Muscovite Prison in Jerusalem. She also stated that she had heard cries from the room next to hers in the Muscovite Prison where she had seen persons being taken in and being brought out showing signs of having been beaten.

130. Mrs. Abla Tahha (RT.14) testified as to her own experiences of torture mostly during interrogation; she was pregnant at the time, and her torture was spread over a period of seven months (July 1968-February 1969). She stated that she had suffered torture in the Muscovite Prison in Jerusalem, Haifa Prison and Ramleh Prison. She had also been in Abu Kebir Prison in Tel Aviv and Nablus Prison. Mrs. Tahha told the Group that she had been severely beaten on various areas of her body, especially her abdomen; she was also burnt with cigarette butts all over her body and on these occasions she was stripped naked by Israeli prostitutes with whom she was sharing a cell. She also stated that acts of lesbianism were committed by Israeli women on Arab women prisoners; an attempt was made to have her participate in these acts of lesbianism (pp. 11-15, 26). The witness also stated that she had seen her friend Lutfia El-Hawari being tortured. She said that Miss El-Hawari had had her teeth knocked out during her torture. She also said that in Nablus Prison there was a Beth-

lehem woman with six children, the youngest of whom was one and a half years old (p. 36).

131. Mr. Ismael Abu Mayalan (RT.16) stated that he was the husband of Abla Tahha. He was tortured during detention and his wife had also been tortured. His brother had also been tortured and as a result, he remained in a poor physical condition (p. 32).

132. The alleged torture of Abla Tahha and Lutfia El-Hawari is referred to in an interview given by Dr. Felicia Langer, their attorney, and reported in the publication *Palestina och Israel* by Staffan Beckman (Stockholm 1968, Rabén and Sjögren, pp. 104-108). (See annexes.)

133. Mr. Yahya Hassan El-Qatrash (RT. 15) testified as to his torture during interrogation. He described his tortures in the Saba Prison and the Atlit Prison which took place during his six months in prison following upon the cease-fire. The witness showed the Group the scars which remained on his head and chest as a result of his torture. The witness alleged that his chest was scarred with several bayonet-inflicted gashes and his right forehead and upper jaw had been smashed as a result of being hit with a rifle butt (pp. 28-30).

134. Major Derek Cooper (RT.13) testified that he had gathered evidence from several individuals who had been tortured during their detention by the Israelis, in particular in Jericho Prison. Major Cooper submitted names of such individuals and data regarding their treatment (pp. 82-86).

135. Sheikh Abu Rashed (RT.16) stated that during the ten-month period that he spent in prison (five months in Gaza Prison and five months in Ashkelon Prison), he was beaten regularly. The witness was released and deported in August 1969; he stated that as he had been held as an administrative detainee, he was never brought to trial. He also stated that during his imprisonment he had witnessed a Masri Azam who had become insane after being tortured. Another

prisoner, Hassan Abu Teraya, was sharing the cell with Azam and he too had been tortured. The witness also said that he heard cries every night from the torture room nearby (Gaza Prison) and that he had heard that Abu Shaluf, another prisoner, had died because of torture (pp. 7-15).

136. Mr. Hamdi Ali El-Khalili (RT.21), a lawyer, stated that he was detained from 7 February to 24 March 1968 in Gaza Central Prison. He stated that he was beaten and otherwise ill-treated. He had also seen other prisoners being taken in for interrogation and carried out afterwards. The witness also stated that he was never charged with an offence and when released he had checked this with the Public Prosecutor who informed him that no charges had been filed against him (the witness).

137. Mr. Abdallah Gibril Abid (RT.21) stated that he was beaten during his detention in Gaza Central Prison in 1968. He was also kept in a cell without a bed or covering for six weeks. He had reported his ill-treatment at the hands of the Israelis to a representative of the Red Cross who visited Gaza Prison.

138. Mr. Ismail Ahmed Zikri (RT.20) testified that he was constantly ill-treated, beaten and tortured for prolonged periods in Gaza Central Prison. He was always denied medical attention and when he requested to see a Red Cross representative he was told there was none. He was released from prison after fifty-three days.

139. Mr. Mohammed Rabi^c El-Sherif (RT.19) stated that he was beaten while under arrest. He also stated that his eighteen-year old son had been tortured extensively. They both lived in El-Arish.

140. Mr. Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT. 19) testified that he was tortured day and night. He was from Bir El-Abd in the Sinai region.

141. Witness E (RT.19) stated that when she had visited her husband in Nablus Prison in August 1967, she repeatedly saw marks of torture on him.

142. Mr. Ahmed El-Matari (RT.19) testified that he was tortured and beaten repeatedly by Israeli troops during periods under arrest in El-Arish.

143. Dr. Kamal Malek-Ghobriel (RT.17) who had been working at the Public Health Hospital at El-Arish from the beginning of hostilities until September 1968, had witnessed evidence of ill-treatment including torture on patients brought to the hospital from Israeli police posts and the Israeli Army. The witness mentions as examples of ill-treatment and torture: blows from rifle butts on tender parts of the body; burns on the feet of patients with hot wires or iron; blows on the head of patients which had produced concussion and deafness. The witness had personally witnessed one case of a patient subjected to electric shock treatment by the Israeli authorities. The witness also stated that these patients whose feet burned with hot wires or iron were brought from Israeli police stations in handcuffs and after treatment, had been taken back to the police stations. The witness states that, at an average, there had been ten cases of torture per day submitted by Israeli police posts and two cases per day submitted by the Israeli Army in the period he had done service at the El-Arish hospital after the Israeli occupation. Those cases that had been submitted by an Israeli police post or by the Israeli Army were so registered in the reception room book. He had on several occasions shown the book to the representative of the Red Cross, translating the Arabic entries for him. From August 1968 onwards, the entries were in Hebrew and it had then become impossible for the witness to give indications such as those he had previously inserted.

144. Miss Camilia Kamal Soliman El Zerbawi (RT.17), fifteen years old, testified that one of her brothers, aged eighteen, had been held for two months in prison. The treatment there had been very bad and the prisoners had been forced to sleep on the ground and had been kept short of food and water.

145. Miss Feihag Abdilh Edi (RT.18), eighteen years old, testified that on 14 March 1969, she and her mother had been arrested and accused of belonging to the resistance. She had been beaten and insulted, as a result of which she had limped for three weeks afterwards. To put psychological pressure on her, the witness had been beaten in front of her mother. The person who had tortured the witness had stated that he took great pleasure in doing so. Concerning the methods of torture in the Nablus Prison where she had been detained, the witness stated that these were both physical and psychological. The torturers attacked the sensitive parts of the body, particularly the sexual regions. The witness testified that the following torture had been inflicted on girls she had known in the Nablus Prison: (1) Nimet Ayoub Kamal had been struck with a steel bar, and her hand paralysed, and one of the torturers had tried to urinate on her; (2) Sinal Hambaly had been struck with the same steel bar and she had had a nervous breakdown subsequent to torture. One of the torturers had tried to rape her. She had also been drawn by her hair which was long; (3) Randa El Nabouky had been struck by a torturer on the eyes and ears, and the torturer had attempted to rape her; (4) Siham El Wazany had been beaten and drawn by her hair and one of the torturers had attempted to rape her. The witness further testified that she had learnt through her parents about cases of electric torture and mentioned the names of Rasmeya Aode and Aicha Aode. The witness also knew that Mariam Shakshib had suffered considerable torture. The witness added that there were internee camps where nothing could be proved, but where she knew that young girls were held, and she mentioned the names of Sawsan Saleh, Yahouda Ersh and Rada Abdel Hady. The witness stated that the cases of torture she had personally witnessed had taken place in the Nablus Prison, but that the torturers had been brought from the Muscovite Prison in Jerusalem. The girls arrested and held in the Muscovite Prison had, according to her information, suffered far worse tortures than those who had been held in the Nablus

Prison. As examples of what she called psychological torture, the witness mentioned that prisoners would be left without food, they would be forced to witness the torture of others and they were placed in a room next to the torture chamber.

146. In a closed meeting, the Special Working Group also heard evidence of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Gaza Prison and in the Rafah police station. The information that the Group has is to the effect that during 1968 it was ascertained that certain individuals in detention showed obvious signs of having been tortured, severely beaten and burnt with cigarettes in the face. Some of these individuals are: Mohammed Hassan Lydda, eighteen years of age, Meshmat Mohammed Yassini, Salah Mohammed Keslatat, twenty-four, Khanis Rabi^c Abu Nubeira, twenty-five, Youssef Ayed Abu Jadallah, Ibrahim Hassan Abu Deraya'a, Ahmed Aly Abu Mugsina, Sawalim Abu Shaluf. In all cases of torture and maltreatment reported, the author was always a policeman rather than a prison warden; prisoners were only allowed thirty minutes of walking per week in a small courtyard. Gaza Prison was also reported as being overcrowded (360 persons capacity, but actually housing 507 inmates), and severely lacking in hygiene facilities.

147. Dr. Ahmed Abu Qoura (RT.16) presented the Group with reports of representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross on visits to various prisons. With regard to the Hebron Prison, visited on 31 October and 13 November 1968, a report states:

Conditions during interrogations:

On the other hand, it appeared from private conversations held with prisoners that suspects were brutally treated during the investigation. The names of some prisoners who bore tangible marks of such maltreatment were taken down by the delegates.

Duration of the police investigation:

The delegates noted that the duration of solitary confinement was prolonged; this deprived

prisoners of all contact with the outside world and also of any possibility of being interviewed by the representatives of the ICRC.

Another report, on a visit to Tulkarm Prison conducted on 16 October 1968, states:

Maltreatment

A rather serious complaint was lodged by the prisoners Kamal Khmaish and Abdul Salam Khmaish. After being arrested together the previous month, they had apparently been beaten with clubs (traces were still visible on the nape of Kamal Khmaish's neck) and electric contacts had apparently been placed inside their ears during their interrogation at the Tulkarm police station.

The prisoners stated that Sgt. Major Cohen had been present during these tortures during which they had allegedly been given electric shocks until they lost consciousness and bled through the mouth and nose.

148. The articles of the Fourth Convention relevant to the evidence analysed in subsection 3, are also the following:

ARTICLE 31

No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.

ARTICLE 76

Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein. They shall, if possible, be separated from other detainees and shall enjoy conditions of food and hygiene which will be sufficient to keep them in good health, and which will be at least equal to those obtaining in persons in the occupied country.

They shall receive the medical attention required by their state of health.

They shall also have the right to receive any spiritual assistance which they may require.

Women shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under the direct supervision of women.

Proper regard shall be paid to the special treatment due to minors.

Protected persons who are detained shall have the right to be visited by delegations of the Protecting Power and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in accordance with the provisions of Article 143.

Such persons shall have the right to receive at least one relief parcel monthly.

4. *Ill-treatment of children*

149. Witness A (RT.7) stated that in Ramallah in 1968 some children of a Protestant mission school had staged a sit down strike in the local mosque. He had seen all the children of the school marched out into the square where they had been made to sit in the sun for a whole day without food or water until 4.00 p.m. when the Military Governor arrived to give them a lecture in Hebrew, a language which they do not understand.

150. Rev. Elia Khouri (RT.12) testified that in Ramallah during the period September-December 1968, he had seen Israeli soldiers flogging twelve-thirteen year-old girls mercilessly with sticks and rifles in the streets. He also stated that when primary and secondary school girls had demonstrated they had been beaten up by Israeli soldiers (page 36).

151. Abdel Rahman Nasr (RT.16), twelve years of age, said in a written statement received by the Group (page 2), that he had been beaten by an Israeli officer with a wooden ruler every day for six days.

152. Ismail Gamal El-Zirbawi (RT.20), fifteen years old, testified that he had been arrested twice by Israeli troops in El-Arish. He was tortured as a result of which his left leg had been broken.

153. Miss Camilia Kamal Soliman El Zerbawi (RT.17), fifteen years old, testified before the Group that on 7 June 1967, in El-Arish, her house had been surrounded by tanks and a number of Israeli soldiers had rushed in. They had struck the children with rifle butts, and her younger brother had been knocked unconscious. The witness also stated that in El-Arish, the Israeli troops

entered the houses in the middle of the night and treated the women and children very badly.

154. Mrs. Narges El Sayed Ibrahim (RT.17) testified that when the Israelis had broken down the doors and burst into their house, the Israelis had threatened to cut the throat of the seven-year old son of the witness if she refused to do what they said. The boy had been very roughly treated by the Israelis and his arm was still badly dislocated and deformed.

155. Mrs. Watfa Hassan Amar (RT.17) testified that when the Israeli army had occupied her village, soldiers had entered her house and she had been forced to leave with her ten-year old daughter. The soldiers had fired their rifles and her daughter had died in her arms. The witness stated that her daughter had died suddenly of fright, caused by the firing.

156. Moussa Ali Kuneibi (RT.21) stated that he had seen Israeli soldiers attacking students, injuring some ten of them.

157. Dr. A. Abu Qoura (RT.16) presented to the Group a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on a visit to Nablus Prison which took place on 17 and 19 September 1968. The report states, *inter alia*:

The number [of prisoners] also included a girl of twelve years of age (a case of ordinary law... released on 26 September), and two boys of fifteen years of age, one sentenced to one year and the other awaiting trial, both for security reasons.

158. The text of article 50 of the Fourth Convention, besides the articles quoted with reference to subsections 1 and 2, is relevant to the evidence analysed in this section:

ARTICLE 50

The Occupying Power shall, with the co-operation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.

The Occupying Power shall take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the registration of their parentage. It may not,

in any case, change their personal status, nor enlist them in formations or organizations subordinate to it.

Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative or friend....

5. *Taking of hostages*

159. Mr. Mohammed Kassem Daoud (RT.8) testified that when the villagers of Bteiha were ordered to leave, several young men were taken as hostages by the Israelis (page 71).

160. Mr. Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim (RT. 15) stated that when the population of Emmaus was being marched out towards Ramallah by the Israelis, thirty-seven young men were taken as hostages or prisoners (page 3).

161. Mr. Muneef Ramadam (RT.9) stated that when the Israeli troops entered his village, Zaaour, they took seven young men as hostages. They had later been returned alive and well (pages 11-15).

162. Mr. Hamdi Ali El-Khalili (RT.21) testified that in El-Arish, the Israeli troops took hostages when they could not find the persons whom they were searching for.

163. Article 34 of the Fourth Convention provides:

“The taking of hostages is prohibited.”

B. Allegations regarding violations of articles 64-75 relating to penal legislation and penal procedure

164. Mr. Yehia Abou Shehla (RT.18) who had been Deputy Judge in the Gaza Strip until his departure for Cairo on 26 July 1967 testified that in the first week of July 1967 an Israeli officer named Abraham had appeared in uniform in the court room

accompanied by an Israeli soldier holding a loaded sub machine gun. The officer had announced that he had instructions from the Military Governor to alter the Court procedure of the Gaza Strip. The witness had told the Israeli officer that he was not prepared to collaborate with him, but the officer had said that in that case the new procedure would be approved in his absence. The witness had told the Israeli officer that his orders were illegal, since the Gaza Strip was governed by a Constitution and Laws of its own which had been observed by the Egyptians for twenty years.¹ The Israeli officer had then pounded his fist on the table, and told him to be quiet. The officer had added that he had drawn the attention of the Israeli officer to the Geneva Convention. The latter had replied that Moshe Dayan had decided to annex the Gaza Strip to Israel; it was now an integral part of that country and therefore the Geneva Conventions did not apply. The witness further testified that three weeks later Israeli troops had searched his house and caused fear and terror among the women and children. They had also searched the houses of friends and colleagues, one of whom had been beaten and kept in jail for two days without cause. Another friend had informed the witness that the Israeli officer Abraham was preparing to take revenge on him for not returning to his post. In fear of his life, therefore, the witness had secretly left Gaza without taking any of his possessions with him. His fears had proved justified since one of his friends, Judge Shawky el Farra had been killed by the Israelis shortly afterwards. The witness was of the opinion that these measures were not motivated by reasons of security, but rather by a policy of Zionist expansion.

Right of defence

165. In her testimony, Abla Tahha (RT. 14) stated that the Israeli authorities refused to let her see her lawyer and when they eventually did so, they harassed her lawyer

¹ Concerning the legal situation in the occupied territories, see chapter II.

(Dr. Felicia Langer) (p. 16-20, 41). Dr. Felicia Langer, in an interview reported by Steffan Beckman in "Palestina och Israel", refers, *inter alia*, to her defence of Mrs. Tahha and the conditions under which she conducted it.

166. Mr. Beckman also makes several references to Dr. Langer's fear of reprisal or intimidation for her activities as defence counsel for several Arabs accused of guerrilla activities.

167. In his statement As'ad Abdul Rahman (RT.6) stated that his lawyers "were under great duress" whilst defending him. (p. 13).

168. The Permanent Representative of Jordan in a letter dated 12 December 1968 (S/8930) transmitted a resolution adopted by the Arab Regional Conference on Human Rights which alleged that Mrs. Rouhi El-Khatib, Mrs. Tewfik Al-Husseini and Mrs. Najla Al-Naboulsi were sentenced without trial to three months imprisonment and that they were denied the right to defend themselves.

169. Mohammed Rabih El Sherif (RT.19) testified that his son (18 years) was tried by a military court. He had been defended by an Israeli army lawyer who had done little or nothing to defend his son. The judge at his son's trial spoke Hebrew which the witness did not understand.

170. Sheikh Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT.17) who is chief of the El Rawayeh Tribe from Bir el-Abd in the Kherba zone in the Sinai region said that two members of his tribe, Mr. Mausor Eid Mausour and Mr. Rabih Rasuidou Soliman had been imprisoned by the Israeli forces when these reentered his village two weeks after the commencement of hostilities. These two men had not been soldiers and had been arrested while in their homes. To the best of the knowledge of the witness these prisoners were still in prison.

171. According to Mr. Yehia Abou Shahla (RT.18), who had been Deputy Judge in the Gaza Strip until his departure for Cairo on

26 July 1967, in the first week of July 1967 an Israeli military vehicle had appeared at his house with an Israeli officer named Abraham and an Israeli soldier named Hor Khassiso. The officer had forced the witness against his will to bear witness against some of his friends.

172. The relevant articles of the Fourth Convention are the following:

ARTICLE 64

The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

ARTICLE 65

The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.

ARTICLE 66

In case of a breach of the penal provisions promulgated by it by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64, the Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in the occupied country.

ARTICLE 67

The courts shall apply only those provisions of law which were applicable prior to the offence, and which are in accordance with general principles of law, in particular the principle that the penalty shall be proportionate to the offence. They shall take into consideration the fact that the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power.

ARTICLE 68

Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the Occupying Power, but which does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to internment or simple imprisonment, provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed. Furthermore, internment or imprisonment, shall, for such offences, be the only measure adopted for depriving protected persons of liberty. The courts provided for under Article 66 of the present Convention may at their discretion convert a sentence of imprisonment to one of internment for the same period.

The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in accordance with Articles 64 and 65 may impose the death penalty on a protected person only in cases where the person is guilty of espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional offences which have caused the death of one or more persons, provided that such offences were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began.

The death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person unless the attention of the court has been particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance.

In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.

ARTICLE 69

In all cases the duration of the period during

which a protected person accused of an offence is under arrest awaiting trial or punishment shall be deducted from any period of imprisonment awarded.

ARTICLE 70

Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war.

Nationals of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought refuge in the territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, according to the law of the occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.

ARTICLE 71

No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial.

Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying Power shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they understand of the particulars of the charges preferred against them, and shall be brought to trial as rapidly as possible. The Protecting Power shall be informed of all proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons in respect of charges involving the death penalty or imprisonment for two years or more; it shall be enabled, at any time, to obtain information regarding the state of such proceedings. Furthermore, the Protecting Power shall be entitled, on request, to be furnished with all particulars of these and of any other proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons.

The notification to the Protecting Power, as provided for in the second paragraph above, shall be sent immediately, and shall in any case reach the Protecting Power three weeks before the date of the first hearing. Unless, at the opening of the trial, evidence is submitted that the provisions of this Article are fully complied with, the

trial shall not proceed. The notification shall include the following particulars:

- (a) description of the accused;
- (b) place of residence or detention;
- (c) specification of the charge or charges (with mention of the penal provisions under which it is brought);
- (d) designation of the court which will hear the case;
- (e) place and date of the first hearing.

ARTICLE 72

Accused persons shall have the right to present evidence necessary to their defence and may, in particular, call witnesses. They shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate or counsel of their own choice, who shall be able to visit them freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing the defence.

Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting Power may provide him with an advocate or counsel. When an accused person has to meet a serious charge and the Protecting Power is not functioning, the Occupying Power, subject to the consent of the accused, shall provide an advocate or counsel.

Accused persons shall, unless they freely waive such assistance, be aided by an interpreter, both during preliminary investigation and during the hearing in court. They shall have at any time the right to object to the interpreter and to ask for his replacement.

ARTICLE 73

A convicted person shall have the right of appeal provided for by the laws applied by the court. He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time-limit within which he may do so.

The penal procedure provided in the present Section shall apply, as far as it is applicable, to appeals. Where the laws applied by the Court make no provision for appeals, the convicted person shall have the right to petition against the finding and sentence to the competent authority of the Occupying Power.

ARTICLE 74

Representatives of the Protecting Power shall have the right to attend the trial of any protected

person, unless the hearing has, as an exceptional measure, to be held *in camera* in the interests of the security of the Occupying Power, which shall then notify the Protecting Power. A notification in respect of the date and place of trial shall be sent to the Protecting Power.

Any judgement involving a sentence of death, or imprisonment for two years or more, shall be communicated, with the relevant grounds, as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power. The notification shall contain a reference to the notification made under Article 71 and, in the case of sentences of imprisonment, the name of the place where the sentence is to be served. A record of judgements other than those referred to above shall be kept by the court and shall be open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power. Any period allowed for appeal in the case of sentences involving the death penalty, or imprisonment of two years or more, shall not run until notification of judgement has been received by the Protecting Power.

ARTICLE 75

In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of petition for pardon or reprieve.

No death sentence shall be carried out before the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date of receipt by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgement confirming such death sentence, or of an order denying pardon or reprieve.

The six months period of suspension of the death sentence herein prescribed may be reduced in individual cases in circumstances of grave emergency involving an organized threat to the security of the Occupying Power or its forces, provided always that the Protecting Power is notified of such reduction and is given reasonable time and opportunity to make representations to the competent occupying authorities in respect of such death sentences.

C. *Allegations regarding the respect for property of protected persons*

1. *Mass destruction*

173. Several witnesses testified as to the destruction of the villages of Yalu, Beit Nuba and Emmaus, in the Latrun area.

(a) *Yalu, Beit Nuba, Emmaus*

174. Witness A (RT.13) stated that he had seen in mid-October 1967, Israelis carrying away the ruins of the villages in trucks. On 25 December 1967 he had seen the Israelis destroying the remaining houses in Emmaus as well as the mosque. He saw the Israelis levelling the ruins and planting trees in their place. He also stated that the village of Emmaus had not been touched during or by the hostilities. He stated that the destruction of the three villages took place in stages. Finally the grounds had been planted and sold off by the Israelis. The villages had previously been removed.

The witness also stated that an Israeli friend of his from a neighbouring kibbutz had informed him that the destruction had taken place on higher orders.

175. Mr. Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim, (RT. 14) mukhtar of Emmaus, testified that the population of his village had been forced to leave and to walk to Ramallah. Twenty-seven persons were taken as hostages during this time. He stated that their houses were all completely destroyed; the Israelis had offered to purchase their land from them but the villagers had refused. The population was eventually loaded on lorries by the Israelis, carried for some distance and deposited on a road and told to head for the Jordan river.

176. Reverend Paul Gauthier (RT.15) made reference to the testimony of the mukhtar of Emmaus (Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim—RT. 14) and stated that the same applied to the villages of Yalu and Beit Nuba. He also stated that he witnessed bulldozers destroying these villages: eight were used in Emmaus, two in Yalu and two in Beit Nuba. The witness said that he saw tractors from the kibbutz nearby tilling the land owned by the inhabitants of these three villages. The witness further testified that an Israeli officer had asked a monk from a neighbouring monastery to point out to him the buildings in the villages that had a historical value, in order to spare such buildings from the general destruction.

177. The destruction at Yalu, Beit Nuba and another village is described in a newspaper article annexed to a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan dated 18 June 1968 (S/8642) and in a letter to the Secretary-General from the inhabitants of the villages of Emmaus, Yalu and Beit Nuba sent from Ramallah on 5 July 1968. This letter is reproduced as an annex to a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/8789) dated 29 August 1968.

178. The representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Nils-Goran Gussing also referred to the destruction of Emmaus, Yalu and Nuba (S/8158) in his report issued on 2 October 1967 wherein it is stated *inter alia*:

60. The Israel Minister of Defence, in his meeting with the Special Representative, stated that he had ordered the destruction of these damaged villages for strategic and security reasons since they dominated an important strategic area.

(b) *Qalqilyah*

179. Witnesses also made statements concerning mass destruction in Qalqilyah.

Witness B (RT.7) testified that she had seen the large number of houses that had been destroyed. As proof of the fact that such destruction had been carried out deliberately and not during military action, the witness mentioned that next to the destroyed buildings young trees had been left untouched.

180. Witness C (RT.13) stated that she had seen houses being destroyed by Israelis in Qalqilyah after the cease-fire.

181. Sister Marie Therese Lacaze (RT.14) stated that she had seen the ruins of the houses in Qalqilyah. She stated that 3/4 of Qalqilyah had been systematically destroyed by the Israelis who used tanks and dynamite for this purpose. Sister Marie Therese was in Qalqilyah at some time during the period 14 June 1967-1 July 1967. The witness also stated that she had seen people living in the ruins of their homes.

182. The destruction that took place in Qalqilyah was mentioned in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan

(S/8004) dated 21 June 1967, which states:

As of 7 June 1967, the Israeli authorities occupied the town of Qalqilyah evacuated its inhabitants by force and moved them to Nablus Mosque and to the olive groves surrounding that town. Having thus removed them, they commenced to demolish all the houses in the town, which demolition was still in progress as of 20 June.

It is obvious that this is part of a well-calculated plan, which involved several other front-line villages, and which aims at obliterating the demographic structure of the area.

183. The reply of the Permanent Representative of Israel is contained in a letter dated 23 June 1967 (S/8013) which states:

The village of Qalqiyah was one of the concentration points of this general attack. Large number of troops and artillery were deployed in and around the village. Commencing on 5 June, heavy and continuous fire was opened from Qalqiyah and its environs on Israeli villages, and Tel Aviv itself was shelled from Qalqiyah.

As part of this aggression, the inhabitants of Qalqiyah voluntarily evacuated the village before it was occupied by Israel forces—doubtless out of a sense of guilt for the prolonged shelling in which they had assisted.

The village itself ceased to be a civilian and became a military outpost for the Jordanian units, which carried on the war from it. In the course of the battle of 6 June between units of the Jordanian and Israeli army, a large number of houses in which Jordanian soldiers had established themselves were damaged. Since the end of the battle, no further buildings have been destroyed.

I wish to point out that near Qalqilyah is the town of Tulkarm. There was no fighting in that town and it is undamaged. Its population remains there and life continued normally.

184. The mayor of Qalqilyah is reported in document S/8158 (report by Mr. N. Gussing to the Secretary-General dated 2 October 1967) as stating that some fifteen to twenty houses had been destroyed or damaged during actual fighting. It goes on "54... Three weeks after they left their city, the population was allowed to go back to Qalqil-

yah. Upon their return they found that out of a total of some 2,000 dwellings approximately 850 had been demolished. The mayor repeatedly stated that he did not know the reasons for this large-scale destruction. 55. The Israeli military Governor stated that the destruction had been caused partly by tanks and partly by dynamite.... Houses from which sniping took place were dynamited. Others were destroyed for 'safety' reasons, those houses, for instance, on the point of collapsing and possibly containing unexploded ammunition, or for sanitary reasons, that is, because of the presence of dead bodies."

(c) *Other cases of mass destruction*

185. Mr. Ibrahim Abu Scheiban (RT.14) stated that he had seen approximately twenty-four buildings each containing four apartments, destroyed by Israeli troops. These buildings were located near camp X.

186. Mr. Saleh Nazhani (RT.15) stated that although no sabotage or hostile acts had taken place from the village (Nosariat), 700 houses had been destroyed completely by the Israelis after the whole population had been forcefully deported to Jordan. This took place on 3 December 1967 (p. 27).

187. Sheikh Abu Rashed (RT.16) stated that the tents in the Jabaliah refugee camps were attacked by the Israelis during the hostilities; many homes had been demolished (pp. 9-10).

188. Dr. Mohamoud El-Bek (RT.21) stated that twenty houses and most of the mosques in El-Arish were destroyed.

189. Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT.19) stated that the Israelis dynamited seventeen houses in Bir-el-Abd.

190. In a letter dated 31 January 1968 (S/8373) the representative of the United Arab Republic reported that on 24 November 1967 144 houses in a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip were bulldozed in a single night. In the same letter, it is reported that on 29 November 1967, several buildings in Deir el Balah, an Arab town in the occupied Gaza

Strip, were destroyed in reprisal for the alleged murder of an Israeli volunteer.

191. In a letter dated 3 October 1967 (S/8178) the Permanent Representative of Syria stated that from the second half of August 1967 Israeli forces were destroying houses and the water reservoir of the village of Kafr El-Mâ in the occupied part of Syria. In the same letter it is stated that on 7 September 1967, Israeli forces commenced the destruction of the Syrian village of El-Hurriah.

192. The representative of Syria, in a letter dated 15 October 1968 (S/8557) stated that Israel had completely destroyed the village of Somamain and the village of Ahmediye in occupied Syrian territory. The representative of Israel in a letter dated 21 October 1968 (S/8863) stated that the Syrian representative had exaggerated what was the demolition of some abandoned and damaged houses, which constituted a risk because they were in danger of collapse.

In two subsequent letters dated 7 November 1968 (S/8893) and 21 November 1968 (S/8904), the representative of Syria stated that the villages were indeed inhabited and that the destruction was designed to drive out the Arabs and establish Israeli settlements.

193. In a letter of 4 March 1969 (S/9042) the representative of Syria stated that Israel had burnt the village of Khisfine in the occupied Syrian territory. This incident was reiterated in a letter of 4 April 1969 (S/9131) which alleges demolition of houses in occupied Syrian territory and in the village of Aboukhsit. The representative of Israel referred to the letter contained in document S/9131 in a letter of 15 April 1969 (S/9158) where it is stated that the question of the veracity of the allegations is not discussed.

194. In annex I to his letter dated 30 September 1969 (S/9459) the representative of Syria makes a summary list of Syrian villages allegedly demolished or burned down by Israeli occupying authorities, as follows:

<i>Name of village</i>	<i>Date of destruction</i>	<i>Location co-ordinates</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Al-Adnanieh (Suraman)	18 Sept.-18 Nov. 1968	2783-2286	Continued despite Syrian protests to UNTSO
Al-Hamidieh	10-30 Oct. 1968	285-229	
Khesfin	26 Feb. 1969	2506-2265	Burned down by Israeli authorities
Group of dwellings	26 March 1969	2814-2290	
Abou Kheit	31 March 1969	2484-2273	
Kuneitra suburbs	31 March 1969	2813-2279	
Khan El-Joukhadar	8 April 1969	2593-2297	
Al-Razzanieh	7 April 1969	2540-2290	
Tel Al-Saqi	7 April 1969	2527-2281	
Abi Zeitoun	6 April 1969	2486-2256	
Maqam Abi Daher	7 April 1969	2564-2292	
Cluster of dwellings	27 April 1969	2855-2261	
Al-Asha	27, 28 April 1969	2643-2320	Continued despite Syrian protests to UNTSO
Al-Batmich	20 June 1969	2615-2328	
Al-Rafid (5 houses)	23 June 1969	2625-2347	
Ein Al-Hamra	7 July 1969	2884-2255	
Cluster of houses	13 July 1969	2518-2292	
Cluster of houses	13 July 1969	2520-2290	

195. The representative of Jordan stated in a letter dated 10 August 1967 (S/8117) that the border villages of Beit Awwa and Beit Marsam were completely destroyed by the Israelis several days after the hostilities had ceased. The representative of Israel in a letter of 16 August 1967 (S/8123) referred to the destruction of these two villages and stated that these were scenes of heavy fighting during the hostilities and that extremely heavy damage was caused in them.

2. *Destruction of houses and certain buildings¹*

196. The Group received testimony regarding the destruction of houses in the occupied area of Jerusalem.

197. Mr. Moussa Abusond (RT.6) testified that the fourteen houses in Jerusalem that the Israelis had expropriated from his family had all been demolished. He also stated that he had seen houses that were destroyed in Jerusalem which houses had been vacated so summarily that the occupants were not given time to carry out their furniture. These houses were adjacent to the Western Wall (pp. 62-66).

198. Mr. Ibrahim Al-Abid (RT.5) quoted the Israeli newspaper *Zo Haderekh* of 22 March 1969 which contained a description of the destruction of a house in Jerusalem during early March 1969 (pp. 56-61).

199. Bishop Simaan (RT.12) stated that the Syrian Catholic Church had been destroyed and the Church of St. Anna had been damaged after the cessation of hostilities. Both churches are situated in Jerusalem (p. 11).

200. Destruction of houses is also referred to in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 21 March 1969 (S/9102). This letter mentions the destruction of six houses in Jerusalem, four houses in Gaza, four houses in Ramallah, three in Al-Khalil, two in Nablus and one house in Bir Zeit. In a letter on 6 November 1968

(S/8990), the Permanent Representative of Jordan communicated that several buildings in Jerusalem had been demolished.

201. In letters dated 8 April 1969 (S/9139) and 11 April 1969 (S/9150) the Permanent Representative of Syria stated that Israel had destroyed houses in Quneitra, Abizeium, Tel-Esseqi, Razzaniya and Khan El-Joukhadar. The Permanent Representative of Israel referred to these allegations in a letter dated 15 April 1969 (S/9158) which states:

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letters addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Syria on 4 (S/9131), 8 (S/9139, S/9141) and 11 April 1969 (S/9150), and without discussing the question of the veracity of allegations contained in them, to state:

Syria has no right or grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line, particularly when these measures are essential in face of repeated Syrian attempts to violate the cease-fire by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs.

In his letters, the Permanent Representative of Syria tries to divert attention from his Government's persistent policy of aggression, which is expressed in its rejection of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, its opposition to any peace-making effort, and the waging of terror warfare against Israel in flagrant violation of the cease-fire.

202. The representative of Syria, in a letter of 9 May 1969 (S/9199) makes reference to the destruction of houses in the Syrian village of Aache.

203. Sheikh Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT.17), chief of the El Rawayeh Tribe from Bir El-Abd in the Kherba Zone in the Sinai Region, testified that when the Israeli forces re-entered his village two weeks after the commencement of hostilities the Israeli forces had forced the inhabitants to leave their houses which they had then burned down.

204. Mr. Salem Gomaa Ghorab (RT.17), chief of the Dawaghara Tribe of the Bir el-Abd Region of Mousfiq, testified that one or

¹ For further information regarding destruction of houses in Jerusalem, see annexes.

two months after the occupation of the village the Israelis had demolished the school, which was named after himself, with a bulldozer. Subsequently his own house had been demolished. Asked if he could give any reason why his house had been demolished, the witness testified that the Israelis had asked him if he loved President Nasser to which the witness had replied in the affirmative. The Israelis had also tried to persuade him to procure men to work for them, but he had not done so. The witness further testified that others houses in the village belonging to Mr. Hag Selim Selmy Gadoose, Sweilim Ayesh, and Hamdan Salem had been destroyed as well as the Mosque of the Zone of Mousfiq.

205. According to Sheikh Salem Aly el Hersh (RT.17), chief of a tribe in the Rabaa District from Region Bir el-Abd, three houses in his village, including his own, had been burned down, and that two rest-houses in the village had been demolished.

206. Mrs. Watfa Hassan Amar (RT.17) testified that the Israeli army had burned down her house in Roumana Village after entering the house and forced her to leave it.

207. Mr. Yehia Abou Shehla (RT.18) testified that he had seen the Israelis demolishing houses in Gaza including that of Mr. Habib Birady and that of the Abu Ramadan family.

208. Miss Aisha Vati Ghazy (RT.18) eighteen years old testified that the house of her family had been dynamited by the Israelis.

209. Mr. Rateb Saleh El Bek (RT.18) testified that the Israelis had dynamited his house in the village Ezba Asakha.

210. Mr. Abdel Aziz Soliman Marzouk (RT.18) testified that the Israelis had burned twenty houses in the village El Mohamed some twenty kilometres from Bir El Abd some forty days after the war.

3. *Expropriation*¹

211. Mr. Moussa Abussoud (RT.6) stated that he and his family owned fourteen houses in occupied Jerusalem. The fourteen houses had been expropriated by the Israeli authorities. He also stated that he had been offered compensation but that this had been refused (p. 62).

212. Mr. Ruhi Khatib (RT. 12), the expelled Mayor of Jerusalem, stated that the Israeli Government had expropriated several *dunums* of land in and around occupied Jerusalem. He also stated that several homes belonging to Arabs that had been expropriated were demolished (p. 66).

213. The expropriation of 838 acres of land adjacent to the old city on 11 January 1968 is also mentioned in a letter dated 23 January 1968 from the representative of Lebanon (S/8354).

214. The question of the expropriation of land in occupied Jerusalem has also figured extensively in letters to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Representatives of interested Governments. References to the expropriations in Jerusalem are contained in the letters reproduced as Security Council documents as follows: S/8427 and Add.1, S/8433, S/8439 and Add.1, S/8552, S/8507, S/8546, S/8634, S/8661, S/8666, S/8667.

215. Mr. Hamdi El-Khalili (RT.21) stated that in El-Arish the Israelis had forced the farmers who had been forced to leave their lands to sign documents renouncing their property. Thus the Israelis seized farms, including a number of co-operative farms.

4. *Looting and pillage*²

216. The representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Nils-Goran Gussing, in his report issued on 2 October 1967 (S/8158), stated:

Israel spokesmen informed the Special Repre-

¹ Concerning the legal situation in the occupied territories, see chapter II.

² *Ibid.*

sentative on several occasions that the Israel authorities had taken measures to prevent looting and to stop it when it occurred, including the court martialling of army personnel caught in the act of looting.

217. Mr. Emil El-Ghouri (RT.6) stated that his own house in Jerusalem in which he was living at the time was ransacked during the period 9-21 June 1967 (p. 28-30).

218. Mr. Mohmoud Saleh Sejf (RT.6) stated that his shop in Jericho as well as others he had witnessed, were looted after the hostilities of June 1967 had ended. He had also seen Israeli troops dismantling and removing machinery from the factories and workshops in Jericho (pp. 58-61).

219. Mrs. Nancy Abi-Haidar (RT.7) stated that in Jerusalem, she had seen looting still going on by Israelis up to six weeks after the cessation of the hostilities in June 1967. She also stated that United Nations and UNRWA personnel had informed her that United Nations and UNRWA property had been extensively looted. She said that looting had continued during late hours when curfew was in effect. Mrs. Abi-Haidar mentioned that in one instance she had seen an electronic goods store being looted under supervision of Israeli officers.

220. Bishop Simaan (RT.12) testified that certain Catholic churches in the West Bank had been looted (pp. 7-10).

221. Bishop Diodoros (RT.12) stated that the St. Elias Church on Bethlehem Road had been looted. He also stated that on 8 June 1967 in Jerusalem he had seen Israeli troops stealing cars and that his own had been looted (pp. 22-26).

222. Rev. Paul Gauthier (RT.15) stated that tractors belonging to the inhabitants of Yalu, Emmaus and Beit Nuba were taken away from them by the Israelis. He believed that they had been given to neighbouring kibbutz (p. 21).

223. The witness also stated that he had seen looting going on in Jerusalem on 7, 8, and 9 June 1967 by Israeli men and women.

In a particular case of looting mentioned by the witness, a Rabbi of the IDF intervened to end the looting when so approached by the witness (pp. 21-22).

224. Rev. Gauthier also testified that he had come across a Red Crescent van which had been stolen by a young Israeli. The witness had found this out whilst talking to the young man (p. 21).

225. Mr. Saleh Nazhani (RT.15) testified that the Israelis had taken away thirty-four tractors and 4,000 *dunums* of land belonging to the villagers of Noseirat whom they had forcefully deported to Jordan. He also stated that as the villagers were being loaded on trucks to be deported, the Israelis robbed them of all previous items that they were carrying (p. 26).

226. Mr. Abdulghani Shik (RT.8) stated that on 11 June 1967, when the Israeli troops entered his village they looted all the houses therein. The village is that of Keshneya (pp. 11-15).

227. According to Mr. Muhammed Kubsi (RT.8), his house was looted by Israeli troops on 12 June 1967 (pp. 37-40).

228. Mr. Mohammed El-Arour (RT.8) stated that when all the villagers of Razzanija had been told to quit their homes they were told to leave their homes unlocked. All the houses were subsequently pillaged by the Israeli troops (p. 46).

229. Mr. Mohammed Mohieddine Sleek (RT.8) stated that soon after Israeli troops entered Quneitra, the villagers were stripped of all their precious belongings on their way to assembling in accordance with instructions issued by the Israelis (pp. 96-100).

230. Mr. Ibrahim Ghawdjel (RT.8) stated that the homes of all the people in the Quneitra region, who had been kept assembled for a fortnight in a particular part of the town, were pillaged (p. 51).

231. Mrs. Nimet Mahmoud Saleh (RT.9) testified that she and the other women from their village had been separated from the

menfolk and they were systematically robbed of their money and their jewellery by the Israelis (p. 46).

232. Mr. Hussein Khaled Naajel (RT.9) stated that the women of the village had been grouped off from the men and they were systematically robbed of their money and their jewellery (p. 61).

233. Mr. Mohmoud Khairallah (RT.9) from Quneitra stated that the day after they entered the town the Israelis looted UNRWA storehouses. He also stated that the houses of most inhabitants were looted by the Israelis, who assigned the people to different houses (pp. 67-70).

234. Mr. Mohammed Abdel Meguid (RT.9) testified that on 13 June 1967 the Israeli troops looted the whole village of Ein Ziwan. He also stated that the village, which is situated between the two roads leading to Quneitra, was subjected to looting every day by patrols. The villagers were finally forced to leave for Syria on 23 June 1967 (pp. 77-81).

235. Mr. Tayyim El-Ghuzzi (RT.9) stated that as the population of the village of Bteiha was being forced to unoccupied Syria on 13 June 1967 he saw Israeli troops systematically robbing the villagers of all their possessions (p. 96).

236. Dr. Mahmoud El-Bek (RT.21) stated that in the hospital where he was (El-Arish area) the Israelis had removed the dispensary and that the Red Crescent hospital had been converted into a police station and torture chamber. He also testified that all but two of the ambulances in the zone had been carried off to Israel.

237. Sheikh Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT.17), chief of the El Rawayeh Tribe from Bir el Abd in the Kherba Zone in the Sinai Region, testified that the Israeli forces re-entered his village two weeks after the commencement of hostilities. The witness had owned two shops stocked with food, all of which had been confiscated by the Israelis. Later the tribe of the witness had been forced to leave the village and to proceed towards

Egypt. They had been pursued by Israeli helicopters whose crews had caught up with them, landed and forced them to surrender all their valuables.

238. Mr. Salem Gomaa Ghorab (RT.17), chief of the Dawaghara Tribe of the Bir el-Abd Region of Mousfig, testified that one or two months after the occupation of his village the Israelis had pillaged the school canteen, stolen all the food with which it was stocked and destroyed it. Subsequently, they had carried out all the firewood in his house, which had then been destroyed.

239. Sheikh Salem Aly el Hersh (RT.17), chief of tribe in the Rabaa District from region Bir el-Abd, testified that when the Israeli soldiers entered the village they had forced the villagers to leave their houses wearing only the clothes they had on at the time. They had taken all their valuables and jewellery.

240. According to Mr. Yehia Abou Shahla (RT.18), who had been Deputy Judge in the Gaza Strip, there had been more looting in the occupied territories than he could recount. He himself had seen troops breaking into shops and looting them.

241. Mr. Ratib Saleh El Bek (RT.18) who was a railway employee from Kantara East testified that the Israelis had looted his furniture and cattle before dynamiting his house.

242. Mr. Mahmoud Abdel Moneim Aghour (RT.18) testified that the Israelis had imposed a curfew on the city of El Arish, had broken open the doors of the depots and pillaged houses. They had taken everything of value from the houses.

243. Mr. Sahmoud Mahmoud El Yemen (RT.18) testified that on the second day of the war when the Israelis had entered the village of Bir El-Abd, they had looted the houses.

244. Mr. Moussa Ali Kuneibi (RT.21) said that during the ten days that he and his family had been held by the Israelis, he had witnessed Israeli troops looting houses and

shops, including Rafah secondary school and the hospital and clinic. The witness also stated that he had seen Israeli forces loading their plunder into military vehicles.

245. Mr. Saad Mohammed Ibrahim (RT.21) stated that as soon as they entered Rafah, the Israeli troops plundered the shops in the main street. Israeli soldiers gave small items to Arab children and photographed them with the shops in the background. He also saw cases of looting by Israelis in Gaza.

246. Mr. Abdallah Gibril Abid (RT.21) stated that his house was looted by the Israelis, in Gaza on 7 February 1968.

247. Mrs. Maha El-Zirbawi (RT.20) testified that Israeli troops had entered her family's apartment in El-Arish and they had robbed it of everything of value.

248. Mr. Ismail Ahmed Zikri (RT.20) was arrested on 13 July 1967. When he was released from prison after fifty-three days he found that his house had been completely looted.

249. Mr. Kamel El-Hourani (RT.20) testified that on 16 June 1967, his house which they were searching for him was looted by Israeli troops.

250. Mr. Mohammed El-Attar (RT.19) stated that in the Gaza Strip he saw Israeli troops looting freely whenever they searched houses and Bedouin tents on the pretext of searching for arms or soldiers.

251. Witness E (RT.19) stated that her house was looted by Israelis on 8 June 1967.

252. Acts of looting were also mentioned in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 5 July 1967 (S/8033). This letter refers to acts of looting of banks and stores by Israelis in Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, Jenin, Ramallah and Bith. These allegations were replied to by the Permanent Representative of Israel on 12 July 1967 (S/8055/Rev.1). The letter states:

The allegations contained in that letter are unfounded.

The banks on the west bank of the Jordan had in fact averaged a 10 per cent liquidity, and had they been permitted to open for normal banking business, they would have automatically become bankrupt. It has been established that the two main reasons for this low level of liquidity were:

- (a) An extremely high ratio of loans to deposits;
- (b) Substantial transference of deposits to the bank's head offices in Amman.

Immediate resumption of normal banking activities is conditional upon the authorization by the Jordanian Government of the transfer of deposits back to branches on the west bank. Alternatively, resumption of Jordanian banking activities will depend on the rate of maturity and collection of outstanding loans.

Far from affecting any withdrawals from the west bank, the Government of Israel has authorized the opening of branches of Israel banks in eight townships on the west bank, with a view to encouraging a flow of capital designed to stimulate economic activity.

Most commercial shops are open. They have ample stocks. A number of owners who closed their shops and crossed to the east of the Jordan had previously transferred their stocks to others.

It is evident from the facts stated above that there are no grounds to the Jordanian letter.

5. *Destruction of property as a reprisal*

253. Article 33 prohibits, among other things, reprisals against protected persons and their property.

254. In the analysis of allegations concerning the physical safeguard of protected persons and those concerning the property of protected persons, reference is made to allegations of mistreatment of person and property by way of reprisal. The attention of the Special Working Group was drawn to a report appearing in *The New York Times* on 11 November 1969 (A/C.3/619). This report states *inter alia*:

Israeli authorities recently began demolishing homes of Arabs who had been unco-operative in investigations of terrorism or who had declined to come forward with information. Previously demolition was limited to the homes of those actively engaged in terrorism.

255. The following are some witnesses who have testified that they or their property suffered in acts of Israelis specifically designated as reprisals.

256. Abdallah Gibril Abid (RT.21) stated that his house and those of eighteen other detainees from Gaza were demolished by the Israelis. He stated that he had not been charged nor sentenced; he had been detained for refusing to go back to teaching. He left the Gaza Strip for Cairo on 16 September 1968.

257. Mohammed Rabi^c el-Sherif (RT.19) testified that his house was demolished while he was in prison in El-Arish. His family had been dispersed and he had been rendered destitute.

258. Witness E (RT.19) stated that her house was dynamited by Israeli troops because she had not divulged her husband's whereabouts to them.

259. Mohammed El-Attar (RT.19) testified that in Khan Younis houses were blown up which belonged to persons who denied knowledge of the "fedayeen".

260. The Special Working Group also took note of documents S/9501, S/9506, S/9507 and S/9511 in so far as they relate to reprisals.

261. The representative of Jordan drew attention to a report appearing in the British newspaper *The Times* on 28 October 1969, by means of a letter dated 10 November 1969. The letter and the report entitled "Grim Reports of Repression in Israel-occupied Lands" by E.C. Hodgkin, appear as document S/9501. The report refers *inter alia* to the destruction of the village of Halhul, north of Hebron, by Israeli forces in reprisal for harbouring a guerrilla fighter. Documents S/9506 and S/9507 containing letters from the representatives of Israel and Jordan, respectively, make reference to the subsequent correspondence appearing also in *The Times* refuting and endorsing the report of Mr. Hodgkin.

262. In his letter dated 25 November

1969, the representative of Jordan refers to an article appearing in the British newspaper *Sunday Times* on 23 November 1969 entitled "Eye-witness in Gaza". According to an editor's note preceding it, the article is based on a "long and detailed statement which he (an Israeli citizen) gave us (*Sunday Times*) and to which he swore on oath". This report speaks, *inter alia*, of reprisals in Gaza against villages and civilians (see paragraphs 253-256 above).

6. *Relevant articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention*

263. These articles are as follows:

ARTICLE 33

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Pillage is prohibited.

Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.

ARTICLE 53

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

D. Eviction and deportation of protected persons and the prohibition of transfer of population of the occupying Power to the occupied territories

264. Sheikh Abdul Hamid Sayeh (RT.11) testified that he was expelled from Jerusalem on 23 September 1967. He was told that he was being expelled for reasons of security. He stated that he believed that he was expelled because he had refused to collaborate with the Israeli authorities. Sheikh Sayeh is the [Chief of the religious courts] of Jerusalem (pp. 61-66).

265. Bishop Simaan (RT.12) referred to statements which had been made to Monsi-

gnor Rodain, head of *Caritas Internationalis* (an emissary of the Holy See), at the Allenby Bridge by refugees. These refugees had told Mgr. Rodain *inter alia* that they had been made to sign papers stating that they agreed to leave the West Bank and that if they returned they could be sent to gaol for fifteen years (pp. 3-5).

266. Witness C (RT.13) stated that she had been deported. The witness had participated in a sit-down strike at the Holy Sepulchre.

267. Major Derek Cooper (RT.13) testified that he was convinced that the Israelis intended to move in instead of the Arabs as the latter were made to leave and not allowed to return (pp. 76-80).

268. Dr. Salah Anabtawi (RT.14) stated that he had been deported against his will by the Israeli authorities for no apparent reason. He came from Nablus and he was deported on 23 October 1968. Dr. Anabtawi is a paediatrician by profession. He stated that professionals and leaders were being deported in order to deprive the Arab people of their leadership and thus erode their morale and eventually force them to leave the occupied zones.

269. The expulsion of Dr. Anabtawi, among others, is referred to in a letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan of 13 December 1968 (S/8932). This letter concerns the question of deportation of leading figures of the occupied areas, in this case the West Bank. This question is also referred to in letters of the Permanent Representative of Jordan of 4 August 1967 (S/8110) referring to Mr. Anwar El-Khatib, Governor of Jerusalem, Dr. Daoud Husseini, former Member of Parliament, Abd El-Muhsen Abu Mizer, a lawyer, Dr. Subhi Ghousheh and Amir Ghousheh, two brothers and prominent citizens, of 22 December 1967 (S/8311) referring to Ibrahim Bakir and Kamal Nasser, two leaders, of 7 March 1968 (S/8445) referring to Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, and of 13 December 1968 (S/8932) referring to Dr. Anabtawi, Mr. Mosa Jayousi, lawyer, R.

Shahin and A. O. Hijjawi from Nablus, Dr. Moussa Abu Ghoush, Dr. Wahkeh and Y. Ebeidi from Ramallah, Mohammed Tawfiq Haj Hassan, Deputy Major, Messrs. A.S. Rabbaa^c and F.S. Neraⁱ, from Jenin, Mohammed F. Taher from Ja'Bed, R.A. Hamid from Tulkarm and Mohammed Khaled Abdo from Jericho. The contents of document S/8311 were referred to in a letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel of 2 January 1968 (S/8322). In this letter it is stated:

The action concerning Ibrahim Bakir and Kamal Nasser was taken by Israeli authorities in pursuance of their duty to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the population of the area concerned.

270. The contents of document S/8445 were referred to in a letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel of 11 March 1968 (S/8452). In this letter it is stated:

The concern of the Government of Jordan that the activities of Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, a Jordanian national, in Jerusalem have been stopped is understandable. Mr El-Khatib, an appointee of the Jordanian Government, had been an agent for that Government in promoting tensions and public unrest behind the cease-fire lines between Jordan and Israel.

After the hostilities had ended he did not cease his attempts at incitement. He maintained contact with the Jordanian Government and acted as intermediary for the transmission of directives and instructions from Amman and for the illegal transfer and distribution of funds for the purpose of promoting breaches of public order. Realizing that he failed to enjoy public support, he increasingly tried to revert to illicit pressure and threats against local inhabitants.

Owing to these activities and the threats to public order and security which they posed, he was ordered in accordance with the Defence Emergency Regulations of 1945 to leave and cross the cease-fire line to Jordan.

271. More allegations of harassment of leading figures in the occupied areas were made in the letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan dated 9 December 1968 (S/8923) which refers to: (a) the

arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of Mrs. Zaidah El-Khatib (wife of Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib) in Ramleh prison, (b) the imprisonment of Mrs. Maleha Al-Husseini, a prominent leader of women's organizations in Jerusalem, and (c) Mr. Nazeeh Kurah, a teacher who was sentenced to three years imprisonment for allegedly opposing Israeli changes in the school curriculum.

272. Mr. Taysir Nabulsi (RT.14), an advocate, stated that he had been deported on 6 January 1969. In his expulsion order, he stated, it was alleged that he was responsible for a school strike and a student demonstration in Nablus. He was arrested, kept three hours in goal without being questioned and then deported.

273. Mr. Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim (RT. 14) stated that he and the whole population of Emmaus, the village where he was Muktar, had been forcibly evicted from their homes and sent away from their village by the Israelis.

274. Sister Marie Therese Lacaze (RT.14) stated that the civilians in the village of Qalqilyah had been put on buses and taken away.¹ Some others had to walk to Nablus

(27 miles away) in order to obtain food. The witness also stated that she had seen the expulsion of 400 Arab families from near the Wailing Wall.

275. Referring to De'ish Refugee Camp, Sister Marie Therese added that the Israeli troops had ordered the refugees "to go to Hussein".

276. Loudhailers were used in Bethlehem to encourage the civilians to flee to Jericho "if [they] wished to save [their] lives". The use of loudhailers to encourage civilians to leave their homes is referred to also by other witnesses, among them Sami Ouieda (RT.6) and Badih El-Abouie (RT.6). It is also referred to in letters of the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/7975) and of the Permanent Representative of Tunisia (S/7974), both of 12 June 1967.

277. Saleh Nazhani (RT.15) testified that the population of his whole village (Nosierat) was forcibly taken away on trucks to the Allenby Bridge. This took place on 3 December 1967. Earlier on 30 November 1967, the Israelis had ordered the population out but they had refused.

278. The matter of the expulsion of the Nosierat tribe was brought to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly by the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 8 December 1967 (S/8290). The Permanent Representative of Israel referred to this matter in a letter dated 12 December 1967 (S/8295). In this letter it is stated:

The allegation that members of the Nuwaseirat tribe have been forced to cross to the east bank of the Jordan is false. The facts are as follows.

"The village itself ceased to be a civilian and became a military outpost for the Jordanian units, which carried on the war from it. In the course of the battle of 6 June between units of the Jordanian and Israeli army, a large number of houses in which Jordanian soldiers had established themselves were damaged. Since the end of the battle, no further buildings have been destroyed. "I wish to point out that near Qalqilyah is the town of Tulkarm. There was no fighting in that town and it is undamaged. Its population remains there and life continues normally."

¹ The expulsion of the civilians from Qalqilyah is also mentioned in the letter from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/8004) of 21 June 1967:

"No fewer than 12,000 people of the above-mentioned town are now living in the open air and in olive groves without food, shelter or clothes.

"The inhabitants of Qalqilyah beseeched in the military governor of Nablus and requested permission to return to their town to secure some of their belongings. Their request was not granted.

"Only yesterday five bus loads of the inhabitants of this town were driven into the east bank of the Jordan, thus adding to the 150,000 refugees who have already been forced to leave the occupied territory."

This letter is referred to in another one from the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/8013) of 23 June 1967 which states:

"The village of Qalqilyah was one of the concentration points of this general attack. Large numbers of troops and artillery were deployed in and around the village. Commencing on 5 June, heavy and continuous fire was opened from Qalqilyah and its environs on Israeli villages, and Tel Aviv itself was shelled from Qalqilyah. "As part of this aggression, the inhabitants of Qalqilyah voluntarily evacuated the village before it was occupied by Israel forces—doubtless out of a sense of guilt for the prolonged shelling in which they had assisted.

This is a small tribe of bedouin nomads that has no fixed habitation but lives in tent encampments and normally moves between the western and eastern sides of the Jordan River in the Jericho area. In this locality there have been frequent illegal infiltrations across the river and terrorist activities by persons penetrating from Jordanian territory on the east bank.

For security reasons it became necessary to proclaim the area a restricted area. In their desire to alleviate unnecessary suffering, the Israel authorities approached the chief of the tribe and proposed an agreed relocation elsewhere. A new site for the encampment was agreed upon while maintaining access to the former grazing grounds. At the same time approximately 150 members of the tribe voluntarily chose to cross to the east bank and written declarations of this willingness were signed by these persons at the Allenby Bridge. Those bedouin who crossed to the east bank were accepted without any reservations by the Jordanian authorities, who awaited them a few yards away. The crossing was openly and freely conducted and there was no coercion whatsoever.

279. Sheikh Abu Rashed (RT.16) stated that he was the leader of 2,000 Rawachdi tribesmen. He was deported after ten months in prison. He was arrested on 15 October 1968 for having urged the Mukhtars to complain to the ICRC and to UNRWA. The witness said that he was, during this period, under preventive arrest and therefore was not brought to trial.

280. Mr. Abdulgnani Shik (RT.8) testified that on 12 June 1967 the Israeli troops ordered all the villagers out of Keshneya within fifteen minutes (pp 21-25).

281. Mr. Mohammed Gowaa El-Aroux (RT.8) stated that the inhabitants of the village of Razzaniya were ordered out of their homes, the Israelis fired some shots in the air, took away twelve youths—released two months later—and they were not allowed to return to their village.

282. According to Mr. Mohammed Kassem Daoud (RT.8), the whole population of his village in occupied Syria was deported by the Israelis on 15 June 1969 (p. 71).

283. Mr. Mohammed Moheiddine Sleek (RT.8) said that in Quneitra, conditions were rendered such by the Israelis that the civilians had no choice but to leave for Syria (p. 101).

284. Mr. Ibrahim Ghawdjel (RT.8) testified that he had been forcibly deported from his village in the Quneitra region. This took place in 1968. The witness also stated that most villagers had been forced to leave by 1968 and that only one or two persons had remained in the village (p. 56).

285. Mr. Muneef Ramadan (RT.9) said that six days after occupation the Israelis ordered all the inhabitants of his village Zaaour to leave for another village within one hour. They were told to cross into unoccupied Syria and when he as Mukhtar protested they were forced to do so (pp. 16-20).

286. Mrs. Nimet Mahmoud Saleh (RT.9) stated that the inhabitants of her village, Tel Awra in the Bteika Zone, were forcibly evicted from the village and taken to the combat line after a five-day march (p. 46).

287. Mr. Hussein Khaled Naajil (RT.9) testified that three days after occupation the villagers were forcibly evicted. The date was 15 June 1967 (p. 61).

288. Mr. Mahmoud Khairallah (RT.9) a baker from Quneitra, stated that after their occupation, the Israelis rendered the food situation serious and therefore most people who had remained there were forced to leave the town and go to unoccupied Syria; the Israelis provided transportation for them and for their property (p. 71).

289. Mr. Mohammed Abdel Meguid (RT.9) from Ein Ziwan near Quneitra, testified that on 23 June 1967, after ten days of occupation, the inhabitants of the village were forced to leave for Syria (p. 81).

290. According to Mr. Tayyim El Ghuzzi (RT.9), the population of Kherba was repeatedly told by the Israelis to leave this village and go to unoccupied Syria. The village population was eventually forced to

the cease-fire line on 13 June 1967. The witness also stated that he would not return to his village unless it was under the auspices of the United Nations; he would not return under an Israeli régime (p. 96).

291. Mr. Hamdi El-Khalily (RT.21), a lawyer from El-Arish, stated that in the Gaza Central Prison, the Israelis bargained with the detainees daily during interrogation to leave the area. The Israelis promised freedom to the detainees and permission to take all their belongings, including their money, to the East Bank. He also stated that he felt that, in many cases, imprisonment was designed to produce an atmosphere of terror and cause people to leave.

292. Sheikh Mohammed Hemeid (RT.20) testified that his tribe had been attacked by Israeli troops and they were forced to leave their village in the Zodbba zone near Bir el-Abd; they were threatened with death unless they left. The witness had fled for Port Said.

293. Mr. Ismail Ahmed Zikri (RT.20) stated that on 9 February 1969 he was told by an Israeli officer to leave El-Arish immediately for the East Bank.

294. According to Witness E (RT.19), she had been asked to leave for the East Bank from Gaza since she was considered a security threat. She had been a headmistress in Gaza and her husband was imprisoned for allegedly belonging to the fedayeen.

295. Sheikh El-Hersh (RT.19) testified that the Israelis had ordered him to proceed to Egypt. He and his family were pursued by helicopter and shot at as they fled (Bir el-Abd).

296. Souhir Moussa Ibrahim (RT.19) stated that the Israelis had ordered the people of Bir el-Abd to go to Egypt.

297. Nasser Salem Salama (RT.19), village Chief of Bir el-Abd, said that the whole population of his village was forcibly deported to Egypt by the Israelis.

298. Sheikh Salim Aly el Hersh (RT.17),

chief of tribe in the Rabaa District from Bir el-Abd region, testified that when the Israeli troops had entered the village they forced all the inhabitants to leave their houses. After they had evacuated their houses they were accused of hiding weapons which had been left there by the Egyptian army and therefore they were driven out of the village. The Israelis had pursued them with helicopters as far as the mountains, where they had landed and again ordered them to produce the arms which they had concealed. He had then requested permission to return home, but the Israelis had said that anyone who tried to return would be shot. The villagers had suffered greatly from hunger and thirst while proceeding on foot towards the lakes. The witness himself had remained in the rear and had continued to request permission to return to his shop, but the Israelis had replied that he had to go to President Nasser. The witness testified that between 180 and 200 families had been expelled, and that not more than forty or sixty persons still remained in the village. The witness also stated that during its retreat the Egyptian army had passed through his village, but he was prepared to swear by God and his honour that no arms had been left there.

299. Mrs. Watfa Hassan Amar (RT.17) testified that the Israeli army had burned down her house in Roumana Village and driven them away, firing on them constantly. The survivors had walked all the way to Port Said.

300. Miss Aisha Vali Ghazy (RT.18), eighteen years old, testified that the surviving members of her family had been driven away by the Israelis.

301. Mrs. Fatma Mahmoud Abdallah (RT.18) testified that the surviving members of her family had been expelled to Port Said.

302. Sheikh Soliman Moussa Ibrahim (RT.17), chief of the El Rawayeh Tribe from Beir el Abd in the Bteiha Zone in the Sinai Region, testified that the Israeli forces re-entered his village two weeks after the commencement of hostilities. After the

killing of some members of his tribe by machine-gun fire the Israelis had forced the surviving inhabitants to leave the village and had ordered them to proceed to Egypt. They had been pursued by Israeli helicopters whose crews had caught up with them, landed and forced them to surrender all their valuables. They had then continued in the direction of the plains, through the marshes, until they had reached the Port Said Region.

303. Salem Gowaa Ghorab (RT.17), chief of the Dawaghera Tribe of the Bir el Abd Region of Mousfig testified that after the killing of some men of his tribe, the imprisonment of others and the destruction and looting of houses of his village the rest of his tribe had fled. After walking for four consecutive nights, the survivors had crossed the lake and reached Port Said. The wife of the witness had suffered a nervous breakdown and had died after her arrival in Egypt.

304. Mrs. Narges El Sayed Ibrahim (RT.17) testified that after the killing of her husband and mistreatment of her seven year old son by the Israelis the witness, her son and her three daughters had been forced to leave the house and had not been allowed to take any of their clothes and possessions with them. They had then crossed the Canal to West Qantara where her son's injuries had been attended by the Egyptians.

305. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic in a telegram dated 21 June 1967 (S/8007) stated that Israel was expelling several hundred of Palestinians through El-Kantara. This was reiterated in a telegram dated 25 June 1967 (S/8017) where it was reported that more mass expulsions of Palestinians had taken place bringing the total to 2,402 persons expelled within five days.

306. The Permanent Representative of Israel referred to these allegations in a letter dated 27 June 1967 (S/8019) wherein it is stated:

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter from the Minister

for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic of 21 June 1967 [S/8007] alleging expulsion of civilians through the cease-fire line at El Kantara.

The representative of the United Arab Republic repeated those allegations at the 1533rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly of 23 June 1967, and at the 1534th meeting, of the same date, I made the following reply:

Prisoners of war are held in a camp at the outskirts of El Kantara. As part of Israel's policy to return the prisoners of war to Egypt, arrangements have been made with the Egyptian authorities on the opposite bank of the Canal for them to ferry groups of released prisoners from the Israel line to the west bank of the Canal.

These prisoners of war are freely accepted by the competent Egyptian authorities and transferred by them to Egyptian territory. No complaints have been received on the spot that persons other than prisoners of war have been sent to Egypt through El Kantara.

If there were Palestinians among the prisoners of war they apparently belonged to the military units of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army, which was controlled by the Egyptian army and participated in the hostilities against Israel.

Be that as it may, the transfer of prisoners of war at El Kantara is being carried out with the free co-operation of the Egyptian authorities. The representatives of the International Red Cross have publicly expressed their satisfaction and appreciation at the manner in which Egyptian prisoners of war have been cared for and repatriated by Israel.

As in the case of earlier communications from the representatives of the United Arab Republic (S/7988 and S/7993), the statements contained in the letter of 21 June 1967 are inconsistent with the facts. That letter must therefore be considered as one further attempt to mislead its readers.

307. In a letter dated 10 August 1967 (S/8117) the representative of Jordan states that on 26 July 1967, eighty-five inhabitants of the West Bank were expelled as were another seventy-five on 27 July 1967.

308. The representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter dated 31 January 1968 (S/8373) mentioned that as of 7 Novem-

ber 1967, 100 to 300 persons a day, mostly from the Gaza Strip, still crossed to east Jordan. The letter adds that these persons stated that they were coerced by the Israelis into leaving their homes. Intimidation, shooting, terror, demolition of houses at random and house-to-house searches were among the methods used by the Israelis to drive the Arabs out. Further reports of intimidation of Arabs were made in newspaper articles appearing in *The Guardian* of 26 January 1968 by Michael Adams and in *The Observer* of 28 January 1968 by Irene Beeson. These reports were communicated to the Secretary-General as annexes to a letter from the representative of the United Arab Republic dated 2 February 1968 (S/8380).

309. The representative of the United Arab Republic made reference to forced deportation of Arabs from Gaza in a letter dated 16 May 1968 (S/8588). By February 1968, it is stated, approximately 85,000 Arabs were forced to leave the Gaza Strip for the East Bank of the Jordan. It is also stated that Arabs were being forced to leave the Gaza Strip at rates varying between 3,000 to 4,000 per week. These allegations were denied in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel dated 26 May 1968 (S/8596).

310. The representative of Jordan, in letters of 25 July 1968 (S/8691), 29 July 1968 (S/8698) and 5 August 1968 (S/8722) reported that the Israeli authorities intended to deport 50,000 Palestinians from Al Jabaliah refugee camp in Gaza. The representative of Israel denied this claim in letters dated 30 July 1968 (S/8700) and 31 July 1968 (S/8701).

311. In a letter dated 26 June 1969 (S/9284) the representative of Jordan mentioned the expulsion of nine Jordanian citizens to the East Bank of Jordan.

312. In his testimony Mr. Ruhi Khatib (RT.12) stated that Israel was building a number of housing projects in occupied Jerusalem and around it, to house 40,000 Jewish immigrants to live in place of Arabs, both inside and outside the city walls (p. 76).

313. Mr. Hamid El-Khalili (RT.21) said that Israeli families were being installed in the Nahal Sina Zone of Sinai.

314. Allegations of transfer of Israelis to the occupied areas are also contained in letters of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on 3 July 1968 (S/8666, S/8667), regarding the settlement of Israeli Jews in occupied Jerusalem. The same allegation was made in a letter of 3 June 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan (S/8609) with regard to transfer of Israeli Jews to Al-Khalil (Hebron). The contents of this letter are referred to in a letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel on 7 June 1968 (S/8626) where it is stated:

This letter magnifies and distorts the matter in question.

A small group of pious Jews and their families have on their own spontaneous initiative taken up residence in Hebron, a town with venerable Jewish historical and religious associations.

There is no good reason why their neighbours should not live on peaceful and amicable terms with them and so help to heal the tragic memories of the massacre of Hebron Jews in 1929.

315. In a letter dated 3 October 1967 (S/8178) the representative of Syria states that the destruction of the villages of Kafr El-Mâ and El-Hurriah is part of plans to move new settlers and colonies to that area. For this purpose, the letter refers to a report in *The New York Times* of 25 September 1967 which mentions plans by Israel to settle territories seized during the June 1967 hostilities.

316. In another letter dated 18 April 1968 (S/8559) the representative of Syria mentions the fact that Israeli "Nahal" colonies were being established in the occupied areas.

317. The representative of Israel, in a letter dated 24 April 1968 (S/8558) stated that the allegations contained in document S/8550 were unfounded. Referring to the "Nahal" settlements, the representative of Israel stated that this was a corps,

a military unit of the Israel Defence Forces, employed in assisting to ensure the security of the area and in maintaining the cease-fire. The true nature of the "Nahal" settlements is again discussed in a letter of the representative of Syria dated 18 June 1968 (S/8643) and the reply to it by the representative of Israel dated 27 June 1968 (S/8654).

318. The representative of Syria, in a letter of 17 April 1969 (S/9164) refers to the destruction of houses in Quneitra, Abizetun, Tel-Esseqi, Razzaniya and Khan El-Joukhadar mentioned in documents S/9139 and S/9150 and alleges that this destruction, together with other evidence such as newspaper reports including reports of pronoun-

Syria dated 30 September 1969 (S/9459) refers to the continued demolition of Arab buildings and villages in occupied Syrian territory and the eviction of Israeli settlements for the purpose of colonizing the occupied areas. The letter also refers to some passages from an article appearing in the *Christian Science Monitor* on 23 September 1969 by Trudy Rubin, entitled "Israeli Border Life—Golan Cliffs Along Syrian Border Key to Territorial Desires". The article also refers to the settlement of the occupied Syrian territory by Israel. An annex to the letter shows a list of ten Israeli settlements allegedly built on sites of partially or totally demolished Syrian villages and in other locations in occupied Syria, as follows:

<i>Name of settlement</i>	<i>Former name</i>	<i>Date of establishment</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Shenir	Banias	14 August 1967	
Golan	Kuneitra	5 November 1967	
Geishur	Tel el-Faras	10 March 1968	
El-ʿAl	El-ʿAl	5 May 1968	Most buildings of Arab El-ʿAl were demolished
Ezz Ed-Dine	Mazraʿet Ezz Ed-Dine	7 July 1968	Total destruction
Fiq	Fiq	8 August 1968	Most buildings demolished
Yoab	Kafar Hareb	November 1968	Most buildings demolished
Gibin	Jibin	28 December 1968	Total destruction
Ein Zivan	Ein Ziwan	29 December 1968	Total destruction
Shalom Jabata	Az-Zeit	5 May 1969	Total destruction

cements by Israeli Ministers quoted in document S/9164, demonstrate the intention of Israel to settle areas occupied by it as a result of the hostilities of June 1967.

319. The question of transfer of population of the occupying Power to the occupied territory was raised also in letters of the representative of Jordan dated 26 June 1969 (S/9284) referring to legislation by Israel (Administrative Regulation Law, 1968) aimed at changing the status of Jerusalem, and 2 July 1969 (S/9303), drawing attention to photographs allegedly showing constructions of Israeli settlements in occupied Jerusalem, on confiscated Arab land.

320. The letter of the representative of

321. Article 49 of the Convention, relevant to the evidence analysed in section D, reads as follows:

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their

homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.

The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place.

The Occupying Power shall not detain persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

E. Allegations regarding the guarantee of the institutions and Government of occupied territories (article 54)

322. Sheikh Abdul Hamid Sayeh (RT.11) testified that, as chief of the religious courts, he had been ordered by the Israeli authorities that the religious courts in occupied Jerusalem were not to apply Muslim religious law any longer but to apply instead Israeli law (pp. 72-75).

323. Mr. Saad Mohammed Ibrahim (RT. 21) stated that his colleagues in the Police Force in Gaza who had refused to co-operate with the Israelis had been sentenced to periods of from five to eleven years imprisonment.

324. Mr. Abdalla Gibril Abid (RT.21) said that he was a teacher and he had refused to go back to teach in Gaza when the Israelis had decided to reopen the schools. He was therefore imprisoned for three days and beaten constantly.

325. Mr. Kamel El-Harouni (RT.20) who was Director of the Secretariat in the Education Offices in Gaza (El-Arish) testified that he was offered good conditions if he co-operated with the Israelis in calling teachers to a meeting. He had not co-

operated and subsequently he was searched for by the Israeli troops on 28 September 1967. He therefore left El-Arish 12 October 1967 until when he was still in hiding.

326. Article 54 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, relevant to the evidence analysed in section E, reads as follows:

The Occupying Power may not alter the status of public officials or judges in the occupied territories, or in any way apply sanctions to or take any measures of coercion or discrimination against them, should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience.

This prohibition does not prejudice the application of the second paragraph of Article 51.¹ It does not affect the right of the Occupying Power to remove public officials from their posts.

F. Allegations regarding the non-observance of implementation of the Convention (article 30)

327. Mr. Mohammed Kassim Daoud (RT. 8) stated that there was no international relief agency who could safeguard the rights of civilians. The only appeal available was with the Military Commander. The witness stated that there was no point in complaining to the very person who was persecuting the civilians (pp. 82-85).

¹ The commentary to the Fourth Convention (Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958), p. 307, states:

The reference to Article 51 relates not only to the list of different types of work, but also to the conditions and safeguards contained in that Article, in particular the prohibition on the use of compulsion to make protected persons take part in military operations. This is particularly important in the case of police officers, who cannot under any circumstances be required to participate in measures aimed at opposing legitimate belligerent acts, whether committed by armed forces hostile to the Occupying Power, by corps of volunteers or by organized resistance movements. On the other hand, it would certainly appear that the Occupying Power is entitled to require the local police to take part in tracing and punishing hostile acts committed under circumstances other than those laid down in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. Such acts may in fact be regarded as offences under common law, whatever ideas may have inspired their authors, and the occupation authorities, being responsible for maintaining law and order, are within their rights in claiming the co-operation of the police.

328. Witness E (RT. 19) testified that she was specifically forbidden to report to the Red Cross representatives on her husband's torture in Nablus Prison at the hands of the Israelis. The witness stated that she was threatened with being killed together with her children if she complained to the Red Cross.

329. Miss Aisha Vati Ghazy (RT. 18) testified that she had not been allowed to see the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross since the signs of beating were still apparent on her. Subsequently, however, she had managed to see him.

330. The relevant article of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides:

ARTICLE 30

Protected persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist them.

These several organizations shall be granted all facilities for that purpose by the authorities, within the bounds set by military or security considerations.

Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by Article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers shall facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons by the representatives of other organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

1. Although the Special Working Group of Experts was not in a position to verify juridically the allegations which were received, the Group draws, from the evidence received by it, the conclusions set forth hereafter:

(a) The Special Working Group of Experts has applied the relevant provisions of the Convention in the light of its mandate as contained in resolution 6 (XXV). In addition, the Group is of the opinion that from a juridical point of view there appears to be no question as to the applicability of the Convention to all the occupied areas, including occupied Jerusalem.

(b) The Special Working Group has gathered evidence which is based on a variety of sources. The Group was unable to conduct its investigation in the occupied territories because of the refusal of Israel to recognize the Group and to co-operate with it. Also the Group did not receive directly in the course of its work any communications from the Government of Israel concerning allegations which the Group was mandated to investigate. The evidence received by the Group was one-sided. Nevertheless, the Group was able to make an evaluation of such evidence.

(c) The largest number of allegations concerning violations of the Geneva Convention relate mostly to the period immediately following the hostilities of June 1967. The Working Group does not have sufficient oral evidence to enable it to state with absolute certainty whether these alleged violations have continued with the same intensity since that period.

(d) (i) On the basis of certain evidence before it, the Special Working Group is of the opinion that there are violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In particular, this appears to be the case in so far as the occupying Power is interested in ensuring the collaboration of the civilian population even against its will. It appears that when the occupying Power considers that a person endangers the security of the State, according to certain witnesses, it seems that means of coercion are always applied to extract information and confessions contrary to the relevant provisions of the Convention. The following locations, *inter alia*, have been mentioned as places where torture is alleged to have taken place: Nablus Prison, the

Muscovite Prison in Jerusalem and the Gaza Prison.

(ii) In the circumstances in which the Group carried out its investigation, it was not in a position to verify these allegations juridically.

(c) Certain witnesses claimed that during the hostilities and immediately thereafter, in the Golan Heights and the West Bank areas, the Israeli forces had occasionally ill-treated and killed civilians without provocation.

(f) It appears to the Special Working Group that the vast majority of detainees are held in detention in virtue of administrative orders. It also appears that persons under administrative detention are deprived of any guarantee concerning the length of detention and fair trial.

(g) Certain witnesses stated that in some cases accused persons had not been informed in writing of the charges against them, that they had not been provided with counsel of their choice and that even when the latter condition had been fulfilled, counsel was prevented by the Israeli authorities from discharging their duties satisfactorily. However, the Group was not in a position to verify the truth of these allegations.

(h) The Group has heard several allegations concerning destruction of property, including destruction of houses and villages. The Group is of the opinion that total destruction of the villages of Yalu, Emwas, Beit Nuba, and the partial destruction of Qalquilyah, after the cease-fire in violation of the Convention are proven. The Group was not in a position to state whether the destruction of these villages was absolutely justified by military operations, in accordance with article 53 of the Convention.

(i) According to certain testimony, there was destruction of moveable and immoveable property; according to this same testimony, that destruction was not absolutely necessary because of military operations as provided for in article 53 of the Convention.

(j) Certain witnesses stated that looting took place. However, the occupying Power established a system to protect abandoned property. The Group is not in a position to evaluate the effectiveness of that system.

(k) It appears that in the occupied part of Jerusalem the civilian population, consistent with its policy of non-co-operation, adopted a political attitude towards the system of expropriation established by the occupying Power and refused to accept the compensation which, according to some witnesses, had been offered by the occupation authorities.

(l) Parts of the rural population have been transferred from their homes. Intellectuals (judges, barristers, advocates, doctors, teachers, religious leaders) are expelled or transferred by individual orders unless they collaborate with the occupying Power or because they take an attitude of passive resistance.

(m) The occupying Power has assumed full governmental powers in the occupied territories. In occupied Jerusalem, it has abrogated the former law completely; in the other occupied areas, in addition to the penal law system in force before occupation, a special penal law system of the Israel Defence Forces is established. Criminal courts have been replaced by military courts (see chapter II).

(n) There is no evidence to indicate that the occupation authorities are implementing Part IV of the Convention. On the contrary, article 35 of the Security Instructions which contained a specific reference to the application of the Geneva Convention is—at least in respect of the West Bank—abrogated. Furthermore—as reported by the International Committee of the Red Cross—Israeli authorities expressed the view that the question of the applicability of the Geneva Convention should be left open. In the testimonies and communications received, no case is reported of Israeli officials being held responsible for alleged violations of the Convention.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. Whereas the Government of Israel has stated that the applicability of the Convention should be left open, the Group wishes that the occupying Power would now commence to apply the Convention. Attempts at compelling, as distinct from exhorting, the inhabitants of the occupied territories to collaborate with the Israeli authorities, should cease immediately.

3. The provisions for implementation of the Geneva Convention should be carried out.

4. All reported instances of torture, looting and pillage should be immediately investigated by the occupying authorities, and those found responsible suitably punished.

5. Matters concerning the detention of civilians, in particular administrative detention, require special attention, as well as the extent to which the treatment of such detainees conforms to the provisions of the Convention, in particular section IV of Part III of the Convention.

6. Deported or transferred persons should be permitted to return to their former residence without any formalities the fulfilment of which would render return impossible in fact. The repatriation should be supervised by United Nations organs.

7. Persons detained on grounds of security, in accordance with article 5 of the Convention, should be brought to trial at an early date in accordance with articles 71, 72 and 73 of the Convention.

8. The Israeli authorities should investigate, wherever possible, allegations reported by the Working Group, in particular, the allegations of torture concerning Mrs. Abla Tahha, Miss Lutfia El-Hawari, Mr. Yahha El Qatrash and Mr. Mohammed Derbas.

9. The occupying Power should refrain from demolishing houses for reasons which are not provided for in the Geneva Convention. The occupying Power should investigate all cases of demolished houses mentioned in this report and should grant adequate compensation in all cases of demolition in violation of the Convention.

10. Property confiscated or otherwise taken away from its owner by the occupation authorities in a manner inconsistent with the Convention should be restored in accordance with the Convention.

CHAPTER VI

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

The present report was approved and signed by the members of the Special Working Group of Experts, as follows:

Mr. Ibrahima Boye, Chairman-Rapporteur
 Mr. Branimir Jankovic, Vice-Chairman
 Mr. Felix Ermacora
 Mr. N.N. Jha
 Mr. Luis Marchand-Stens¹
 Mr. Waldo Emerson Waldron-Ramsey

¹ Mr. L. Marchand-Stens was absent, owing to reasons of health.

PART III

Documents Submitted to the Security Council

Letters submitted to the Security Council by the representatives of the Arab states and Israel are summarized in the Annual Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1969–15 June 1970 (see above, Document 314) and are not reproduced here. For statements submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, see below, Documents 321, 324 and 329.

PART IV

Statements and Reports by the Secretary-General

For the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1969–15 June 1970, see above, Document 313.

For other statements and reports by the Secretary-General, see next page.

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News Conference Statements by the Secretary-General on the Role of the Big Four and Ambassador Jarring in Solving the Middle East Crisis¹

New York, February 17, 1970

Q. Do you see progress in the Big Four talks, Mr. Secretary-General, towards agreement on the guide-lines for Ambassador Jarring, and are there any circumstances in which, even without such guide-lines, you would ask Ambassador Jarring to resume his contacts with the Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East?

The Secretary-General: My assessment of the progress or lack of progress of the Big Four talks in New York can be summarized in a few words. I have studied the three proposals very carefully—the United States proposal, the Soviet proposal and the French proposal—and it seems to me that a common denominator can be found in these three proposals on one or two basic issues of the problem. Since my return from Africa, I have been in constant contact with the Permanent Representatives of the Big Four. I have discussed with them the possibility of formulating something on these common denominators. Of course, it will be very difficult, at least for some time, to agree on all the basic issues of the problem as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), but in my view there are certain basic issues on which the Big Four can come to an agreement leading to a formulation of the guide-lines to enable Ambassador Jarring to reactivate his mission. Of course, as I have said on a previous occasion, the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission will depend primarily on the agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council on certain guide-lines—but not exclusively. That is one reason why I look forward to my discussion with Ambassador Jarring tomorrow, with a view to ascertaining whether the time has come for him to give some thought to the reactivation of his functions.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, is the search for peace in the Middle East affected in any way by offers of offensive weapons to the opposing sides by both the United States and the Soviet Union?

The Secretary-General: I believe that I expressed my views on this subject through a United Nations spokesman some time ago. Just to refresh your memory, perhaps I should elaborate on this a little bit.

I am in principle in favour of arms limitation—particularly limitation of highly sophisticated arms—when a situation such as that in the Middle East develops. But it would be misleading to leave the matter there. No restriction of this kind is ever self-executing. The measure of the justification for arms limitation and its utility is its effectiveness, its impartial application. This comes down to a question of the willingness and readiness of all States concerned to observe the limitation strictly. Otherwise, the results of the declared limitation or embargo could defeat its own ends and could even give a military advantage to one side or the other.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, in December, in answer to a question about whether the Big Four were considering an embargo on arms and whether they were considering a guarantee to all parties on the boundaries on which the parties might agree, you told us that you would transmit these views to the Big Four. Would you kindly tell us what specific reaction you might have had from the Big Four on these two suggestions, and also on the proposals that have been made that the Big Four adopt a move for restoration of the cease-fire in the Middle East?

The Secretary-General: This has been the prime preoccupation of the Big Four at the last several meetings. They have kindly briefed me on the results of their deliberations. As you all know, whenever the Big Four met, the Permanent Representative who happened to preside over that particular meeting came to report to me about the results of the deliberations.

As regards the cease-fire, one of the Big Four has presented certain ideas to the rest and I understand that that matter, among

¹ Excerpted from U Thant's news conference as published in *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, March 1970, pp. 27-31.

others, will come up for discussion at the next meeting, scheduled for the 19th of this month. The cease-fire, of course, has been a matter which has occupied the attention of the Big Four in the last several meetings and I have been giving a lot of thought to that. As you all know, the Middle East situation is again heating up most dangerously. It becomes apparent that only some very strong measures can avert a new catastrophe. At the moment, at any rate, one must still look principally to the four-Power talks for the necessary effort. As I said some time ago in special reports to the Security Council—you will recall that I have submitted at least four reports to the Security Council on this subject—the Middle East cease-fire demanded by the Council at the time of the June 1967 war has broken down and is now totally ineffective, especially in the Suez sector. Breaches of the cease-fire committed by both sides have been daily occurrences for a long time and recently have increased in number and in intensity.

For almost a year now I have been making daily reports to the Council on breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. Indeed, as regards the Suez sector, both sides in the conflict now frequently make public announcements of breaches committed by themselves on their own military initiative. This is an unprecedented situation in United Nations peace-keeping experience. It is really alarming. It is my duty as Secretary-General, of course, to do all that I can to have the cease-fire observed. I have been doing all that I can towards that end, but admittedly with little success in recent months.

I also have a deepening concern for the safety of the United Nations military observers in the Suez sector, who recently have been exposed to fire from both sides with disturbing frequency, particularly as regards small-arms fire from the West Bank of the Canal. The inescapable conclusion from this only United Nations attempt to maintain a cease-fire over an extended period, concurrently with military occupation by one of the conflicting parties, is that it has become increasingly unsuccessful.

As you know, I asked General Bull, who is here with us this morning, to come here urgently. My request was sent to him on 11 February and we have been conferring on what, more, if anything, can be done at this time of a helpful nature by UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine) as well as by the United Nations Headquarters. I had very fruitful meetings with General Bull on Sunday and again yesterday. I hope to wind up the discussions with the General today. Of course, I am sure you will understand that at least for the moment it will not be in the public interest to divulge any details of those discussions and consultations.

Q. Do you have any time-table in mind for when the Big Four must act, or when the point of no-return will have been reached in this situation? Are you thinking of any deadline for action either by you or by the Big Four in the next few weeks or the next few months?

The Secretary-General: You know that I have no time-table or deadline in mind, but as I stated a moment ago, I still believe that a political solution is possible. I still believe that the Big Four can come up with a formulation of guide-lines on certain basic issues, not necessarily a comprehensive agreement on all issues provided for in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. I have been exchanging views with the Permanent Representatives of the Big Four, as I have said, since my return from Africa.

I believe that a kind of formulation by the Big Four on the basic issues—at least one or two basic issues—of the problem is still possible. I believe that they are striving towards that end. So I must say that I am not pessimistic about the outcome of the deliberations of the Big Four. I do not think it would be realistic to set a time-table or a deadline.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, yesterday United Nations spokesmen announced that you would review with Ambassador Jarring tomorrow in Geneva the roles of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. We know the role of Ambassador Jarring and the Security Council resolution, but did you have in mind in addition the role of the Secretary-General and his powers under Article 99?

The Secretary-General: I am looking forward to discussing with Ambassador Jarring tomorrow in Geneva many aspects of the problem of the Middle East, particularly in the context of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). I have some ideas to present to him and I am sure that he must have some ideas to present to me. Of course, his reactivation, as I said earlier, does not necessarily depend on the agreed formulation of guide-lines by the Big Four, but primarily, of course, he cannot function in the way in which he had been functioning for one year, and I do not believe that he would wish to repeat the futile exercise which he had been carrying out during the last year or so.

Regarding the invocation of Article 99, it would be interesting to recall that, in the history of the United Nations during the last 24 years, the Secretary-General only once invoked Article 99. That was in the case of the Congo. At that time Mr. Hammarskjöld had the full support of all African States, and also the full support of all the permanent members of the Security Council. So, when he invoked Article 99 to call a meeting of the Security Council he was on very firm ground. Nobody objected to that. That explains why Article 99 was invoked only once in the history of the United Nations in the past 24 years.

In the present situation—as of course you all know—if I were to invoke Article 99 and call a meeting of the Security Council, we have to think in terms of the results. Not one member of the Security Council has indicated to me that the Security Council should meet

now and discuss the situation, because every member of the Security Council realizes that at this time at any rate, a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Middle Eastern problem would not be productive. So, since not one single member of the Security Council has hinted to me, or even whispered to me, that the Security Council should meet, I do not think it would be appropriate on my part to invoke Article 99 at this stage.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, a moment ago you said that only very strong measures can prevent a catastrophe in the Middle East. Would you be kind enough to enumerate some of the prime measures that you have in mind?

The Secretary-General: As I said, the measures are the legitimate concern of the Security Council and, for that matter, the permanent members of the Security Council.

Q. Can you indicate what measures you are thinking of?

The Secretary-General: Not publicly.

Q. Sir, you have said twice today that it is possible for the Big Four to have some common denominator of guide-lines on one or two basic issues. Could you tell us what are, in your view, those basic issues in the Security Council resolution on which they could now formulate guidelines?

The Secretary-General: I have mentioned those basic issues to the Big Four, and since those discussions and consultations are of a privileged character, I do not think I can divulge them publicly now.

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Report by the Secretary-General on Protection of Women and Children in Emergency or Wartime, Fighting for Peace, National Liberation and Independence¹

March 24, 1970

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¹ U.N. doc. E/CN.6/536. Table of contents supplied by editor. The annex to the report, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2444 (XXIII), 2535 (XXIV) and 2546 (XXIV), is not reprinted here. See *International Documents on Palestine 1968*, Document 256, p. 195 and *International Documents on Palestine 1969*, Documents 350 and 351, pp. 559-561.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Commission on the Status of Women, at its twenty-second session, adopted resolution 4 (XXII) entitled: "Protection of women and children in emergency or wartime, fighting for peace, national liberation and independence". In operative paragraph 1 of this resolution the Commission takes note of resolutions I and XXIII adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights and of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2444 (XXIII) concerning respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories and human rights in armed conflicts. In operative paragraph 5 the Commission requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Commission at its twenty-third session a report "based in particular on information in United Nations official documents and in the reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Children's Fund, on the conditions of women and children in the territories mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of this resolution". The present report has been prepared in pursuance of this request.

2. The report is divided into two main chapters. Chapter I relates to conditions of women and children in the territories mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of Commission resolution 4 (XXII). In Section A of this chapter, reference is made to relevant information contained in United Nations official documents, while Section B contains information furnished by the United Nations Children's Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In Chapter II a brief summary is given of certain steps taken by the United Nations with respect to the question of the protection of human rights in armed conflicts subsequent to the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968.

I. CONDITIONS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN TERRITORIES MENTIONED IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 4 (XXII) OF THE COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

A. Relevant information contained in official

United Nations documents

3. A number of United Nations documents refer to conditions in the territories mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of Commission resolution 4 (XXII). Many of these documents relate to the conditions of the civilian population in general, and, in various instances, contains information relating specifically to women and children. They include communications of Member States and other documents submitted to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights and also resolutions adopted by these bodies. Communications containing information relating specifically to women and children have been received for example from the following Member States: Iraq,¹ Israel,² Jordan,³ Syria,⁴ and the United Arab Republic.⁵

4. Among the resolutions adopted, mention may be made of those entitled: "Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories" which have been adopted by the General Assembly. These include resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 cited in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 4 (XXII) of the Commission on the Status of Women and resolution 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969. Mention may also be made of General Assembly resolution 2444 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, entitled "Respect for human rights in armed conflicts" and of General Assembly resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 entitled "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East". The texts of these resolutions are reproduced in an annex to this report.

5. In addition to the above-mentioned documents it may be noted that the Commis-

¹ S/9011. [This and subsequent notes are part of the report.]

² S/8003, S/8012, S/8042, S/8756, S/8994, S/9208, S/9217, S/9228, S/9230 and Corr. 1, S/9478, S/9575.

³ S/7975, S/8290, S/8750, S/8817, S/8820, S/8929, S/8930, S/9102, S/9212, S/9225, S/9501, S/9507, S/9511.

⁴ S/7991, S/8037, S/8887.

⁵ S/7993, S/7988, S/8330, S/8991, S/9197, S/9474.

sion on Human Rights at its twenty-fifth session in February-March 1969 established, by resolution 6 (XXV),¹ a Special Working Group of Experts with the following mandate:

(a) To investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East;

(b) To receive communications, to hear witnesses and to use such modalities of procedure as it may deem necessary;

(c) To report, with its conclusions and recommendations, to the Commission's twenty-sixth session.

6. In the course of its work the Special Working Group of Experts took into account all relevant documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council, including those referred to in paragraph 3 above. It also examined the texts of several proclamations and orders promulgated by the Israeli occupation authorities in the occupied areas, reports and publications of the International Committee of the Red Cross, including reports on visits to certain prisons communicated by the Jordan National Red Crescent Society, and a report by a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross presented to the Group by the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Republic. The Group also gathered evidence by visiting two refugee locations and by hearing 103 witnesses.

7. The above documentation is referred to and analyzed in the report of the Special Working Group of Experts (E/CN.4/1016 and Add. 1-5) which has been submitted to the Commission on Human Rights at its current twenty-sixth session.

8. The position of the Government of Israel with respect to the Group was that "it was unable to consider resolution 6 (XXV)

of the Commission on Human Rights as constituting a basis for co-operation on its part with the Group" (E/CN.4/1016, paragraph 9).

9. The attention of the Commission on the Status of Women may be drawn *inter alia* to Chapter III of the report of the Group (E/CN.4/1016/Add.1) which contains an analysis of all the evidence received by it. This consists of:

(a) Personal testimony of individuals alleging violations of the Convention;

(b) Oral statements concerning alleged violations of the Convention;

(c) United Nations documents containing information relevant to the mandate of the Special Working Group;

(d) Written communications received by the Group alleging violations of the Convention;

(e) Communications relating to the situation in the Middle East in general;

(f) Reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which have a bearing on the mandate of the Special Working Group.²

10. The following sections of the analysis may be of relevance to the conditions of women and children: allegations regarding the physical safeguard of the civilian population, including children, and the treatment of detainees (E/CN.4/1016/Add.1, paragraphs 64 to 162); allegations regarding respect for property of protected persons (E/CN.4/1016/Add.1, paragraphs 173 to 262); and allegations regarding the eviction and deportation of protected persons and the prohibition of transfer of population of the occupying power to the occupied territories (E/CN.6/1016/Add.1, paragraphs 264 to 320).

11. An examination of all the relevant documentation, including the evidence before the Special Working Group of Experts and the analysis contained in Chapter III of its report would seem to indicate that the study of the conditions of women and children

¹ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-sixth session, E/4621, Chapter XVIII.

² See E/CN.4/1016/Add.1, paras. 54-62.

might properly be considered in the context of the treatment of the civilian population as a whole, as any attempt to single out situations involving the treatment of women and children only may not give a complete picture of their condition. Instead of attempting to describe the cases where particular mention is made of women and children, it seems preferable to bring to the attention of the Commission on the Status of Women the relevant sections of Chapter III of the report of the Special Working Group of Experts mentioned in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, and to make the report as a whole available to the Commission.

12. The attention of the Commission on the Status of Women may also be drawn to a letter dated 27 January 1970 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. The letter was distributed to the General Assembly and to the Security Council in documents A/7994 and S/9618. It is brought to the attention of the Commission at the request of the Permanent Representative of Jordan. The attention of the Commission is also drawn to the reply to this letter by the Permanent Representative of Israel. The reply is contained in a letter dated 29 January 1970 and addressed to the Secretary-General. It was distributed to the General Assembly and to the Security Council in documents A/7945 and S/9623. This letter is also brought to the attention of the Commission on the Status of Women at the request of the Permanent Representative of Israel.

13. The Commission may also be informed that the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 (See Annex) decided to establish a Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, composed of three Member States. This Committee, composed of Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia will visit the Middle East in April 1970, and will report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter.

B. Information furnished by the United Nations Children's Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross

14. In a letter dated 6 March 1970, the Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF forwarded the following information:

UNICEF extended emergency relief assistance to mothers and children who were displaced just after the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967 in the Middle East. In June 1967 and again in December 1967, the UNICEF Executive Board approved a total of \$1,008,000 to be given in the form of medical supplies, equipment, transport, food and blankets to mothers and children in the territories concerned. Some of the funds allocated by UNICEF were subsequently used for the restoration of health, education and community services.

During the early months of the emergency UNICEF remained in close liaison with UNRWA, the World Food Programme, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, CARE and other agencies to assure the rational use of these resources and to avoid duplication since all were rendering assistance in the area.

In Jordan arrangements were made for the local procurement of classroom furniture destined for primary schools in which the displaced children were admitted. UNICEF funds were also earmarked to cover the salaries of four medical officers appointed by the Ministry of Health to supervise the activities of eight new maternal and child health centres set up by the Government in areas where there was a large concentration of displaced persons.

In Syria, UNICEF supplied drugs, disinfectants and vaccines which were distributed by the Ministry of Health for use in the main camps for displaced persons. Other assistance included distribution of blankets; procurement of classroom furnishings and education material and teaching aids for forty primary schools; a selection of health equipment for the examination and treatment of children in the forty schools mentioned; and vehicles and some equipment in support of activities for children, young girls and mothers at ten community development units.

UNICEF assistance for mothers and children on the west bank of the Jordan River consisted

of blankets, rice, sugar, oil and soap; in Gaza and North Sinai UNICEF provided flour, oil and skim milk. In March 1968 the Government of Israel agreed to continue the feeding programme for mothers and children (instituted in Judah, Samaria and Gaza) with the aim to make it an integral part of the general social welfare programme to be implemented in these areas with the help of CARE.

The regular programme of long-term assistance by UNICEF are continuing in the countries of the region.

15. In a letter dated 11 March 1970, the International Committee of the Red Cross forwarded the following information:

"It was with great interest that the ICRC took note of resolution 4 (XXII) on the Protection of women and children in emergency or war time, fighting for peace, national liberation and independence which was adopted by the Commission on the Status of Women on 3 February 1969. The Commission which, in paragraphs 2 and 4 of its text, refers to the activities of the International Committee on behalf of women and children in territories ravaged by war, expresses concerns which are shared by the International Red Cross and, in so doing, encourages the latter's activities.

In the various assistance operations that it has had to carry out, the Red Cross has indeed always shown a special interest in the protection of women and children suffering as a result of hostilities or natural disasters. In this connexion, it is necessary to distinguish between the various types of assistance undertaken by the ICRC which enable it to furnish women and children with the right kind of help in the particular circumstances.

During the visits which the ICRC makes to prisoners of war with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the Third Geneva Convention and improving, as far as possible, the conditions under which they are held, the Committee, in recent years, has only very rarely had occasion to concern itself with women and children. The position is very different in the case of political prisoners, who include many women and adolescents to whom the representatives of the ICRC devote their

full attention; thus they have been able to visit women's prisons and to talk with some of the women prisoners, *inter alia*, in Greece, South Viet-Nam, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. They have also concerned themselves with young people detained in internment camps for juvenile delinquents. Lastly, free transport has been organized, particularly in Greece and the Middle East, for needy families who were unable to travel to visit a relative held in custody.

However, it is primarily in its activities on behalf of civilian populations that the ICRC can improve the living conditions of women and children. Refugee camps, camps for displaced persons and persons interned by belligerents, and populations living in occupied territories are largely made up of women, children and old people. They will receive assistance in the form of food and clothing and can obtain medical aid. During the civil war in Nigeria, in 1968, the ICRC helped to ensure the subsistence of some 850,000 women and children in parts of the secessionist province of Biafra; this number increased considerably early in 1969. When a measles epidemic occurred in this province in December 1968, a vaccination campaign was undertaken; as at 30 June 1969, the number of persons vaccinated, most of whom were children, was more than 750,000 against measles and nearly 2 million against smallpox.

The ICRC has also taken part in a great many programmes of milk distribution to under-nourished children in various parts of the world.

But the International Red Cross does not confine its activities on behalf of women and children to the distribution of foodstuffs and medical aid. In so far as possible, it endeavours to repatriate persons who have been displaced as a result of wars or are living in occupied territories. This activity has expanded considerably in the Middle East in particular where representatives of the ICRC have repatriated a number of Palestinian children who were displaced in Transjordan, and have also repatriated to the UAR Arab women and children who were in Gaza.

Similarly, in Latin America, Honduran women and children who had been displaced in El Salvador were repatriated.

Lastly, among all ICRC's world-wide activities, mention must be made of those designed to promote the reunification of families whose members have been scattered as a result of war and the efforts of the Central Tracing Agency which, in time of conflict, endeavours to re-establish contacts between persons who have been separated.

The foregoing is a brief description of only some examples of the ICRC's general activities. Through them however it is possible to see the very great importance which the ICRC attaches to the protection of women and children in times of emergency or war. Such protection is in fact one of its major concerns.

In operative paragraph 2 of its resolution 4 (XXII) the Commission on the Status of Women expressed the hope that women in increasing numbers will be consulted or sent on missions by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

It is pointed out, in this connexion, that the International Committee employs a considerable number of skilled female personnel in responsible posts, whenever circumstances permit. Women doctors and nurses, in the field of medical care, dieticians, in the field of nutrition, and social welfare workers have held a variety of posts with ICRC missions throughout the world. Highly qualified women in the Central Tracing Agency and on the administrative staff also take part in the activities of the ICRC.

While the International Committee is of necessity obliged to exercise discretion in recruiting women to perform tasks presenting special difficulties of a psychological or other nature—participation in relief activities in areas where military operations are taking place, visits to prisoners of war, to male political prisoners—it is nevertheless ready to avail itself increasingly of the highly valued collaboration of women.

We very much regret that we were unable, because of other urgent tasks, to send you earlier this brief account of the activities of the ICRC in this field."

II. STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICTS

16. At its twenty-third session in 1968 the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 2444 (XXIII) on respect for human rights in armed conflicts. In the preambular part of the resolution the General Assembly recognized "the necessity of applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts", took note of resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts¹ which has been adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights, and affirmed that the provisions of that resolution needed to be "implemented effectively as soon as possible".

17. The General Assembly further affirmed the following principles for observance by all governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts: (a) that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; (b) that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; and (c) that distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.

18. The Secretary-General was invited to study, in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other appropriate international organizations: "(a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and rules in armed conflicts; (b) The need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible revision of existing Conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare". The Secretary-General was further

¹ *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights*, United Nations publication, Sales No. E/68.XIV.2, chapter III.

requested to take all other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions of that resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session on the steps he had taken.

19. The report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to the above resolution (A/7720) includes a brief survey of the origin and nature of the United Nations concern in the question of human rights in armed conflicts, a short historical review of relevant international instruments, and observations on some of their provisions in their relation to the human rights activities of the United Nations. This part of the report is followed by a survey of some of the more specific issues pertaining to the better application of existing humanitarian conventions and rules in armed conflicts and to the question of the need for additional humanitarian conventions or other instruments.

20. Of special interest to the Commission on the Status of Women would be the section of the report which is devoted to the protection of civilians,¹ and prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare.²

21. Distinctions are drawn in the report between various phases of military conflict. One phase would be that during which hostilities occur and military operations are carried out. Another phase would be that in which combat and armed encounters or attacks have essentially ceased, at least for a time, and enemy armed forces remain in military control or occupation of territories in which civilians live or work.

22. In respect of the latter phase the Secretary-General concludes that the relevant provisions of Geneva Convention IV might be considered as adequate and as requiring little or no information.

23. With respect to armed conflicts involving the actual conduct of hostilities and

military operations, the report suggests that one method of increasing the protection to civilians might be to gather and place under shelter as large a part of the civilian population as possible, especially women, children, the elderly, the sick and those who do not participate in the armed conflict, nor contribute in any way to the pursuit of military operations. This might be achieved by adopting and developing, on a larger scale than provided at present, a system of safety zones which would offer special protection and even immunity from attack. Convention IV provides in article 15, for the establishment, in the regions where fighting is taking place, of neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war wounded and sick combatants or noncombatants and civilian persons who take no part in hostilities and perform no work of a military character. The Convention contemplates in this case the conclusion of written agreements. A common purpose served by these arrangements is to establish conditions tending to maximize the protection afforded various categories of persons, especially civilians, participating in the war effort against whom attacks are prohibited by existing rules.

24. The Secretary-General suggests that the question of zones of refuge or sanctuaries for civilians not participating in armed conflicts might deserve special study, with a view to envisaging the possible conclusion of an appropriate new international instrument. Conditions and requirements which will appear to be necessary in order that a system of safety zones be accepted are also discussed in the report.

25. At its twenty-fourth session the General Assembly adopted resolution 2597 (XXIV) in which the Secretary-General is requested to continue the study initiated by resolution 2444 (XXIII), and to give special attention to the need for protection of the rights of civilians and combatants in conflicts which arise from the struggles of peoples under colonial and foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and to the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and rules to such conflicts. The

¹ A/7720, paras. 133-135.

² *Ibid.*, paras. 183-201.

Secretary-General is invited to present a further report on this subject to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session (1970). Also comments by the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council on the report submitted by the Secretary-General (A/7720) have been requested, to be submitted to the same session of the General Assembly.

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Note by the Secretary-General to the Security Council Informing the Council of His Letter to the States whose Nationals are Serving as United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal Sector¹

June 8, 1970

This is to inform the members of the Security Council of a letter which I have addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the States whose nationals are serving as United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector. This letter was dated 5 June 1970 and was delivered to the respective Missions on that date. It is self-explanatory.

The text of the letter, which was in identical terms to each of the Governments concerned, is as follows:

It is because officers of the armed forces of your country are serving as United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) in the Suez Canal Sector in the Middle East that I address this letter to you. Permit me to say of the outset that the Government and people of [name of country] may take much pride in the dedicated and courageous service to the cause of peace rendered by the Observers of your nation along with those of other nations. They are making a unique and most distinguished chapter in United Nations peace-keeping history.

As you know, the Suez Canal Sector Observa-

tion Operations was instituted in response to a Security Council action, and, in the absence of any contrary action by the Council, is being maintained to the extent possible.

The physical safety of the personnel serving in United Nations peace-keeping operations is always a foremost consideration in my thinking, and this is more than ever the case under the hazardous conditions now prevailing in the Suez Canal Sector. In this regard, I would call especially to your attention the statement in my report to the Security Council of 27 May 1970 (S/7930/Add. 734, para. 2) as follows:

'2. The Secretary-General has agreed to the actions proposed by the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO. As stated above in the report from the Acting Chief of Staff and as has been indicated on previous occasions, representations and protests concerning firings on or close to United Nations personnel, installations and equipment have been of no avail in reducing the number of such incidents. On the contrary, there has been recently an increase in such firings from the UAR side. The Secretary-General recognizes the difficulties involved in limiting and controlling firing in what amounts to a war situation due to the breakdown of the cease-fire as previously reported to the Council, but he cannot fail to register his deep concern at the constant and increasing danger to which United Nations personnel are exposed in the Suez Canal Sector and his distress over the fact that, far from a reduction in that danger, the risks being experienced by them are now even greater than at any previous time.'

The main significance of this statement is in its public recognition of the fact that, because of conditions beyond my control, I am no longer able to guarantee, to any reasonable degree, the physical safety of the men engaged in the observation operation in the Suez Canal Sector. This, of course, has been abundantly evident from the daily reports on military activity in that Sector which I have been submitting to the Security Council in recent months. You may be assured that the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO and I will continue to take every possible precaution for the safety of the UNMOS, such as the closing of Observation Posts (OPs) when they become

¹ U.N. doc. E/CN.6/536 (S/9875).

too exposed. I am painfully aware, however, in the present situation where near misses are an almost every day occurrence at United Nations Observation Posts on the Canal, it is something of a miracle that casualties among the Suez Observers have not been much higher.

I feel obliged to write to you frankly on this matter, so that your Government may be in no doubt as to the situation in which its officers are serving the United Nations with such courage and distinction.

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News Conference Statements by the Secretary-General on Efforts Towards Peace in the Middle East¹

New York, June 11, 1970

The Secretary-General: As to the Middle East, the situation steadily deteriorates with an increase in daily incidents of violence and fighting, and dimming prospects for a restoration of peace. The will for an end to fighting, which led to the discussions and compromises that made possible the Armistice Agreements 21 years ago, is tragically lacking today. Progress towards peace in situations of this kind can be made only when there is a give-and-take attitude on the part of the parties involved with regard to their own positions. There is not likely to be a breakthrough to a fruitful peace effort in the Middle East until that stage is reached; and, in all frankness, I see no sign at the moment of reaching it. It would appear, as a matter of fact, that in recent months the positions of the parties may have hardened.

Looking at the Middle East conflict realistically today, it is obvious that its international aspects and concerns are greater than ever before. The firmer alignments of the two super-States on opposite sides have become a vital factor. The political and other

repercussions from the conflict extend far beyond the area. International efforts to resolve the conflict have been the greatest ever—the Security Council and General Assembly actions, Ambassador Jarring's determined efforts, the four-Power talks and the bilateral talks—but all have been unavailing thus far.

During the three years following the 1967 war there has been no evidence that the issues of the Middle East conflict can be settled by the parties through their own efforts. Therefore, international assistance should be increased and intensified.

On the international side, the four Powers will have to do much more than they have been able to do thus far in support of and in carrying out resolution 242 (1967) of November 1967, and in helping Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's efforts. There would seem to be no other road to a just and peaceful long-term settlement. Both sides have indicated their acceptance of resolution 242 (1967), but this has little meaning in the absence of a clear and unequivocal indication from both sides of a readiness to carry out the provisions of the resolution in full.

That indication has not been forthcoming thus far from one of the parties.

As I read the resolution, its stated principles and objectives are not to be the subject of negotiation, but the means of attaining them are negotiable.

In my thinking, the essential condition for the restoration of peace in the Middle East has now come to be an international consensus on the vital issues which, to be effective, requires agreement amongst the four Powers, which, in turn, could be possible only if agreement could be reached between the two biggest Powers.

To this end, if any real progress is to be made, the four Powers themselves also will have to adopt a give-and-take attitude and seek and accept compromises on their positions. It is evident that in the four and two-Power talks this process has not gone far enough thus far to produce significant agreement.

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) sets forth the vital issues requiring solution,

¹ Excerpted from U Thant's news conference as published in *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, July 1970, pp. 110-111, 114-117.

and defines applicable principles and steps to be taken in resolving them. They are difficult and complex, but they are not beyond the pale of agreement.

I cannot believe, for example, that the two most basic of those issues are irreconcilable—the inherent right of a State to be free of military occupation of its territory, on the one hand, and the entirely legitimate demands for the right of a State to exist behind secure boundaries, on the other.

It merits repetition and emphasis that the provision of arms to the fighting parties in the Middle East, and particularly the provision of arms which are clearly and primarily for use in offensive actions, can serve only to intensify the war and impede progress towards peace.

Q. News dispatches in the last few days have reported heavy fighting in and around refugee camps between commando groups and the Jordanian Army, indicating that the commandos maintain headquarters in some of those UNRWA camps in Jordan. Do you have any reports on that situation from Mr. Michelmore? What is UNRWA's position in those camps in Jordan where the commandos seem to operate openly? Are there any further reports about the camps in Lebanon recently occupied by the commandos?

Also, is it true that UNRWA camps in Jordan have come under fire from Jordanian troops? What is the general situation in Jordan now, and what steps is the United Nations taking to deal with it?

The Secretary-General: As far as the current developments in Jordan—particularly in the city of Amman—are concerned, as you all know the United Nations has had no presence in the form of observers, since the stationing of observers between Jordan and Israel was rejected. But, of course, we do have an UNRWA branch in Amman, and a liaison officer in Amman for the Chief of staff of UNTSO. I have been in touch with both of them.

I must say that I am very much concerned about the developments there, and before I receive a considered assessment and reports

from my people in the area, I do not wish to comment on the situation at this moment.

Q. Since the Arabs will not observe the cease-fire as long as Israel occupies their land, and Israel will not withdraw unless the cease-fire is observed, how can the United Nations, or anyone, resolve this dilemma?

The Secretary-General: Regarding the question of a cease-fire, you all know the positions of the parties concerned; you all know the reasons given by both sides in explanation of their attitudes.

It is worth recalling that a cease-fire was ordered by the Security Council, and that my primary function is to send observers to the affected areas, particularly, as you know, to the Suez Canal sector; and their function is to observe and report—to observe whether there are any breaches of the cease-fire and to report to me, through the Chief of staff; and I, in turn, have to report to the Security Council, which I have been doing almost every day.

So beyond that, I do not wish to comment. It is primarily the responsibility of the Security Council to give consideration to this aspect; but you all are aware of one fact: that there is a growing body of opinion in this house, to my knowledge, that the question of a cease-fire cannot be considered separately from the consideration of the over-all question of peace and stability in the area. That is the general feeling of many representatives with whom I have discussed this question.

Q. You have said that resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission depended primarily, but not exclusively, on the Big Four talks. Do you believe that re-launching Ambassador Jarring on his mission—or renewed efforts to reactivate his mission—might soon follow or result from your talk with him in Moscow?

The Secretary-General: My assessment of the situation in the Middle East, particularly with respect to the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission, I believe is well known. As you all know, the four permanent members of the Security Council have been meeting here almost regularly for some time; they have been in constant touch with me.

It seems to me that the picture is now clearer than before. As I have said on previous occasions, there is still a possibility for a political solution. There are two very good bases on which to start: the first basis is Security Council resolution 242 (1967), as I indicated in my opening remarks. The second basis is the statement issued by the four Foreign Ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council on the night of 20 September 1969, immediately after my dinner on the thirty-eighth floor. I believed at that time—and I still believe—that those two documents can serve as a sensible, suitable basis for launching the next efforts.

You will recall that the four Foreign Ministers, in their statement on 20 September last year, made a categorical commitment along the following lines: They reaffirmed that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be supported and carried out. That is the language used by the four Foreign Ministers of the permanent members.

In my view, the next logical step is for the four permanent members of the Security Council to ask the parties concerned to accept that resolution and carry it out.

I am afraid they have not done that.

Of course, as I said earlier, I have been in contact with the four permanent members; I have presented these ideas to all of them. Personally speaking, I believe the next step is for the four permanent members of the Security Council to draw the logical conclusion from that statement and ask the parties involved not only to accept resolution 242 (1967) but to carry it out—to implement, it, in other words.

Then, in my view, whatever else they want to put in their statement they should put in, and then submit that statement to the Security Council for distribution as an official document of the Council. So it would be official as the expression of the combined will of the four permanent members of the Security Council. At such time I might take it that that was the consensus of the Security Council. Then I could request Ambassador Jarring, my Special Representative, to reactivate the mission and go into the area to

discuss the methods and modalities of carrying out that resolution, including the setting of a time-table. That would be a very good basis for the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission. For the moment, I do not see any other alternative.

Q. I have two other questions about Ambassador Jarring. You may want to say something about these questions or you may consider, Mr. Secretary-General, that you have answered them. One question asks whether, in the light of your remarks on the Middle East, you think that there is any use asking Mr. Jarring to resume his mission now, as you are reported to be considering doing.

The second question is: in the light of the difficulties the Big Four had in formulating guidelines for Mr. Jarring to take to the parties, would you now favour a decision by Ambassador Jarring himself to draw up on his own authority a proposed basis for negotiations?

The Secretary-General: I believe I have dealt with those two questions in my previous statement.

Q. You spoke in your statement of the increasing involvement of the two big Powers in the Middle East. However, the United States has not positioned troops or advisers in Israel, but the USSR has done just this in Egypt. Do you have a comment on this apparent one-sided acceleration?

The Secretary-General: When I spoke in my introductory statement regarding the increasing involvement of the two super-States, I was not thinking in terms of the concrete help and assistance given to the parties involved. I was not thinking of the degree or the equality or the balance of the kind of aid rendered. But I am sure you will agree with me that both super-States are still involved in the conflict in the Middle East, and there are indications of greater involvement in the future. That is why I have to sound this note of warning.

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News Conference Statements by the Secretary-General on the Big Four Talks, on the Soviet Military Role in the Middle East and on the Role of U.N. Forces¹

New York, July 7, 1970

Q. In your speech yesterday to the Economic and Social Council you admitted the failure to pacify the Middle East and South-East Asia. Does that mean that you have given up the hope and the optimism that you had two weeks ago when you came back from Moscow?

The Secretary-General: No, I have not given up hope, as far as the Middle East situation is concerned. As most of you are no doubt aware, during my stay in Moscow last month the Soviet leaders briefed me very fully about their latest proposals on the Middle East—that is, the proposals which the Soviet Government submitted to the Big Four meeting in New York on the 24th of last month, after I had returned from Moscow.

During my stay in Moscow, the United States Government also briefed me fully about their latest proposals on the Middle East. As a matter of fact, I received the briefing about the Soviet proposals on 18 June and the briefing about the United States proposals on 20 June.

I had occasion to have a discussion with Ambassador Jarring in Moscow; as you know, Ambassador Jarring is the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East.

As soon as I returned to New York, I got in touch with the Permanent Representatives of the Big Four. They met on 24 June, and again on 1 July.

Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union, who happened to preside over the Big Four meeting on 1 July, reported to me on the results of the deliberations. He did that the next morning; that is, on Thursday morning. Hence, I could leave New York only on Thursday evening, 2 July.

If I am to assess the latest proposals, I must say that the Soviet proposals have some interesting and concrete elements as regards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I am still hopeful that a peaceful solution, a political solution, is possible as regards the Middle East situation.

Q. Do you think that the Soviet plan is more interesting and concrete than the United States plan?

The Secretary-General: I do not want to venture any opinion by way of comparing the two proposals. But, as I said a moment ago, so far as the question of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is concerned, the new Soviet proposals have certain new and concrete elements.

Q. Were you informed in Moscow about the installation of the Soviet missiles in Egypt and what was your reaction? Also, what is your reaction to the direct involvement of Soviet military forces in the Middle East war?

The Secretary-General: During my recent visit to Moscow, the question of Soviet missiles, reported to have been installed on United Arab Republic territory, was not brought up. Of course, I have not been officially informed of these missiles; I have learned of them only from newspaper reports.

Q. Would you be kind enough to comment on this matter?

The Secretary-General: I have made observations on the question of arms shipments to the Middle East on many previous occasions. I have made a distinction between offensive weapons and defensive weapons. I think that to be fair we have to make a distinction between those two types of weapons. My views on this matter are well known.

Q. Is it envisaged that a United Nations force should ultimately be sent to the Middle East and, if so, would there be Soviet participation this time and would there be any provision to present the precipitate withdrawal of the force, as happened in 1967?

The Secretary-General: I regret to note that there still seems to be misunderstanding or

¹ Excerpted from U Thant's news conference as published in *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, August-September 1970, pp. 93-97, 99-100.

misconception regarding the withdrawal of UNEF in 1967. My reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly are on record. Not one single Member questioned the correctness of my decision to withdraw UNEF. Of course, there have been from time to time comments in newspapers and on radio and television.

Just to set the record straight, I want to take this opportunity of explaining certain aspects of the withdrawal of UNEF. As soon as I got the request from the United Arab Republic Government to withdraw UNEF I discussed it with the Advisory Committee on UNEF. I then reported to the General Assembly, on the same day. I reported to the Security Council within 24 hours. Not one single Member suggested to me that I should not comply with the request. As a matter of fact, when the request reached me the United Arab Republic forces were already on the lines in front of UNEF, so I had no alternative but to give instructions to withdraw. That was agreed upon by the Force Commander, of course, General Rikhye. The withdrawal was not effected in a few days; it took five weeks. During that period of five weeks, 14 soldiers of peace, serving with UNEF, were killed.

Those are some of the aspects of the problem which are not properly understood.

As far as the future involvement of the United Nations in the Middle East is concerned, I feel very strongly that the United Nations has a responsibility to maintain law and order and peace and security in the area. I understand that the permanent members of the Security Council have been giving a great deal of consideration to the stationing of a United Nations force in the area. Of course, the proper and effective functioning of a United Nations force in the area requires Security Council action—not General Assembly action, as was the case with UNEF. The Security Council must take the necessary steps, in my view, to station a United Nations military presence in the area, to maintain peace and security. As I have said on many occasions in the past, United Nations involvement in the search for peace is essential, and the United Nations should continue to be

interested in the maintenance of peace and justice in the area. Security Council action—not General Assembly action—is essential.

Q. What are your views on the presence of Soviet pilots in the Middle East and particularly on what is coming from the White House, that the United States may feel obliged to send United States military personnel into the Middle East if the pilots are not removed, and the comparison being made with the missile confrontation over Cuba?

The Secretary-General: ... no organ of the United Nations has any official information regarding the presence or the nature of the functions of the Soviet pilots alleged to have been involved in the United Arab Republic. Of course, from time to time I have read Press accounts of their presence and according to unofficial information they were involved in training programmes only and not in operations. Of course it is difficult to comment on these aspects of the problem without any concrete evidence to base any comments upon.

Q. Is there any possibility of Dr. Jarring's mission being reactivated during the course of this month? Secondly, with regard to the United Nations Observers, in view of the escalation of hostilities along the Suez Canal, apart from their providing a symbolic United Nations presence, do they have any other function, and is it your intention to leave them in that rather exposed position?

The Secretary-General: Regarding the question of the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission, since my arrival in Geneva I have been in contact with him and, in the present context, both Ambassador Jarring and I agree that, at least for the moment, there is no basis for the reactivation of his mission. Of course, as I explained earlier, the Big Four have been meeting and I understand they are meeting again on 15 July. By that time, if there is a real basis for the reactivation of Ambassador Jarring's mission, I am sure he will be very glad to go to the area or to stay at the Headquarters of the United Nations to resume his activities.

Regarding the functions of the United Nations Observers in the Suez Canal sector, it is worth recalling that they are stationed there on the basis of a Security Council resolution. That relevant resolution of the Security Council defined their functions and, therefore, it is not within the competence of the Secretary-General to revise their functions or review their functions. They are performing their functions in the context of the relevant resolution of the Security Council.

Q. But did that resolution not refer to a truce, to truce observers?

The Secretary-General: No, the resolution referred to the presence or the stationing of United Nations Observers in the Suez Canal sector.

Q. You said that you were not going to compare the Soviet and American proposals, but you said that the Soviet proposal was very interesting for lasting peace. By implication, one would say that the American proposal is not.

The Secretary-General: No; I am just pin-pointing one aspect of the problem. You will recall that the big Powers seemed to agree that there remain three basic issues in the Middle East: withdrawal, peace and boundaries. As far as the question of peace is concerned, in my view the Soviet proposal has concrete elements. I am not saying that the United States proposal has no concrete elements, but the United States proposal deals with other aspects of the problem. The United States position on peace is also well known. The United States is very desirous of the restoration of peace in the area, as is well known. But what I am saying is that the new Soviet proposal contains some new elements regarding the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area. I am just stressing the fact that the Soviet Union—for the first time, to my knowledge—has come out with concrete and positive elements regarding this particular aspect of the problem, that is, the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area.

Q. Could you identify these concrete elements that you find interesting in the new Soviet proposal?

The Secretary-General: I do not think I am in a position to disclose the substance of the proposals; but they are, of course, in the possession of all the big Powers.

Q. I have two questions. First, I want to ask your opinion of the use in the United Arab Republic of the SAM missiles, apparently with some Russian supervision. Do you regard this as justified as a means of self-defence and do you or do you not consider it to be an obstacle to the acceptance of a Soviet peace plan? Secondly, at what stage do you think the United Nations should send a military force to the United Arab Republic to separate the combatants? Do you think that should be done only after the acceptance of a broader plan from the Soviet Union or the United States, or do you think it should be done now?

The Secretary General: Regarding the reported presence of SAMs on United Arab Republic territory, I have never said that is a good thing and I have never specified any category of arms as being involved in the area. What I have been saying is that, from the United Nations point of view, a distinction should be made between two types of weapons, weapons which are of a purely offensive character and weapons which are of a purely defensive character. That is my only point of view.

Regarding the second question, on the stationing of United Nations forces in some areas of the Middle East, that is possible and desirable only with the endorsement of the Security Council. I feel very strongly that the Security Council has the responsibility of restoring peace in the area, of restoring justice in the area, and, in this context, the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to contribute to the successful outcome of the Security Council deliberations.

When I say that the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility, I am conscious of their special status under the Charter. So I have been advocating the closer collaboration of the permanent members of the Security Council in seeking a just and peaceful solution to the problem.

You will recall that I was the first to endorse the French proposal more than two years ago to the effect that the four permanent members of the Security Council must be actively involved in the search for a solution. I see no other alternative.

I do not think that a solution is possible outside the framework of the United Nations. A solution is possible and desirable only within the framework of the United Nations. If the four permanent members agree on the basic issues of the Middle East problem, that will facilitate the task of the Security Council in adopting worthwhile, concrete and realistic resolutions. By that time, in my view, the United Nations should station a peace-keeping force which could not be withdrawn immediately—unlike the case of 1967. On that point, I wish to call your attention to the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. You will recall that the United Nations Force in Cyprus was stationed there as a result of a Security Council resolution. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the Government of Cyprus were to ask me today to withdraw the United Nations Force from Cyprus, I would have to reply to the Government of Cyprus by saying: I am sorry; that is beyond my competence. It is for the Security Council to meet and to debate and to discuss and decide. That is a different basis altogether from the basis of the stationing of UNEF in the Middle East. I want to make very clear the difference between Security Council action and General Assembly action, particularly in the context of UNEF.

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Statement by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanese Territory¹

September 7, 1970

At the 1551st meeting of the Security Council on Saturday afternoon 5 September

1970 (S/PV.1551, pp. 11-15), I made an oral statement to the Council setting forth such information concerning the item before the Council as was then available to me. Subsequently, it has been reported to me by cable from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) that Lebanese authorities have informed UNTSO officially through the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC), that the Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanese territory as of 0700 hours GMT on 6 September 1970. In the absence of United Nations Observers in that area, there could be no direct observation by them of the circumstances of this withdrawal. I have no further information on this matter.

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News Conference Statements by the Secretary-General on the Jarring Mission, on the Middle East Cease-Fire Situation, and on Incidents Involving Civil Air Transport²

New York, September 10, 1970

The Secretary-General: You will understand readily that my overriding concern is to further the cause of peace in the Middle East. I am not willing at this critical juncture to take any risk of saying anything which could be construed as obstructing peace.

The current peace effort in the Middle East, begun only so recently with hope and expectation because there was no other hopeful sign, has now had a severe setback even before it had really got underway. Of this there can be no doubt. But I am not yet prepared to say that it is beyond salvage. This is a time to exert every possible constructive effort—and this we are doing, I assure you.

Ambassador Jarring continues to be here

¹ U.N. doc. S/9929.

² Excerpted from U Thant's news conference as published in *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, October 1970, pp. 30-32, 37-38.

and fully available to all the parties. Indeed, he has been carrying on his effort throughout the crisis of the stand-still arrangements, with regard to which he has no relationship and no responsibility. In fact, as you know, Ambassador Jarring was even able to carry on talks with the parties while the cease-fire in the Suez sector was completely broken down—for many months, indeed for a couple of years. Today I am very happy to be able to say that the cease-fire in the Suez sector is being observed scrupulously. There is no fighting.

The matter of the stand-still arrangements involves, of course, not Ambassador Jarring nor the United Nations, but the United States and the two parties concerned. It bears emphasis that this is an area in which the United Nations has no responsibility because none has been given to it.

My immediate concentration will be on getting the Jarring effort back on the tracks. It is good that, despite the setback, Ambassador Jarring, with his typical resilience and fortitude, is neither hopeless nor despondent. He is persevering in his task in the conviction, which I fully share, that this is the one chance for a breakthrough to peace in the Middle East.

That I deeply deplore hijackings is well known, and my attitude towards them has been often stated, most recently at the beginning of this week, on 8 September. Let me repeat what I said then: "However understandable and even justifiable some of the grievances of the perpetrators may be, their acts are savage and inhuman." I am glad that the Security Council, only yesterday, took the first step, which I hope will generate further international action to put a stop to this return to the law of the jungle.

I am horrified by the sudden increase in the number of incidents involving innocent international air travellers.

Let me cite an earlier case. On 17 August 1970, I made an oral appeal to the Government of Israel through the Mission of Israel to the United Nations for the release of the two Algerian citizens detained in Israel on 14 August 1970 as they were in transit through Lydda airport on a BOAC aircraft. Having had no reply from the Government

of Israel, I reiterated my appeal on 26 August 1970 by a note handed to the Chargé d'affaires of the Israel Mission. In the note, I made reference to the wide concern which exists in the international community regarding the need to ensure freedom of air travel. I also recalled that the Government of Israel has in the past publicly expressed its strong belief in the unimpaired movement of persons and goods by air. Mention was also made in my note of the representations which the African Group had made to me conveying the grave preoccupation of the African States at the continued detention of the two Algerian citizens in Israel, and requesting me to take all appropriate measures to secure their release.

On the occasion of handing the note to the Israel Chargé d'affaires, I expressed to him that it was my intention to send a high level representative to Israel for the purpose of discussing with the appropriate Israeli authorities the question of the detention of the two Algerian citizens. I regret to have to state that as of this moment, I have received no reply to my appeal nor any reaction to the sending of a high level representative to Israel.

In regard to this matter, I have been in touch with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and with the International Federation of Airline Pilots Association (IFALPA). These organizations have also been active on this question. I shall continue to exercise my good offices for the purpose of obtaining the release of the two detained Algerian citizens.

May I now have your questions other than those relating to the situation in the Middle East, as I have just requested.

Q. Mr. Secretary-General, on the eve of the twenty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly, I am sure you know that the charge is constantly being made that the United Nations has failed, that conflicts continue to erupt in various parts of the world. On the eve of the commemorative session I wonder, inasmuch as you have been here some 15 or

16 years, with some 10 years as Secretary-General, if you would give us your personal opinion about the United Nations and what its future is in the next five to 10 years, whether it can really become an instrument for peace in the world.

The Secretary-General: . . . I am cautiously optimistic [regarding the Middle East situation]—for two main reasons, among others. First of all, there is an overwhelming body of opinion in the United Nations that the United Nations has a special responsibility to contribute towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The vast majority of the Membership subscribes to that view. Secondly, the permanent members of the Security Council in the course of their periodic meetings in the last two years have developed a kind of consensus, a common approach to the problem. In other words, the area of agreement regarding the final solution of the Middle East situation among the permanent members is much wider than the area of disagreement. This is a very heartening sign, not only from the point of view of the United Nations but also from the point of view of the international community. To my knowledge, in the history of the United Nations over the past 25 years there has been not one instance where all permanent members of the Security Council have had such a wide agreement on a major issue as they have now on the Middle East problem. . . .

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Joint Appeal by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly for Assistance to Jordan¹

September 24, 1970

The President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have been profoundly distressed at the bloodshed and suffering that have afflicted Jordan in the present tragic situation. They are

aware of the many efforts being made to restore peace, and naturally hope that they will be successful.

They feel that the United Nations and its family of agencies and non-governmental organizations will wish to offer immediately all possible assistance that may be needed to prevent further loss of lives and to alleviate the afflictions and the anguish that have become the sudden lot of so many thousands of human beings.

They join in appealing to all Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, to non-governmental organizations, as well as to private individuals, to provide the needed humanitarian aid.

The United Nations and the specialized agencies have always been ready to come to the assistance of those stricken by harsh events, and will, beyond doubt, add another chapter to this generous record.

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Special Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General on Operations of the Agency in Jordan²

October 2, 1970

Letter of Transmittal by the Secretary-General

1. The Secretary-General has received from the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) a special report on UNRWA operations in Jordan, dated 30 September 1970.³ This special report is transmitted herewith to the members of the General Assembly for their most serious attention.

² U.N. doc. A/8084.

³ The annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the period 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970 [see above, Document 316], is now being processed and will be circulated shortly. [This note is part of the Special Report.]

¹ U.N. doc. A/8077.

2. As indicated in the special report, UNRWA urgently requires additional funds to enable it to restore its services and to meet the emergency needs of the Palestine refugees in Jordan. In particular, the Commissioner-General has mentioned that there is an immediate need for thousands of tents and that, for the purchase of tents and the replacement of shelter in the camps in Amman alone, the cost might be in the order of two million dollars.

3. The Secretary-General fully endorses the appeal of the Commissioner-General. It will be recalled that, on 24 September 1970, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General made a joint appeal (A/8077) in which they expressed their profound distress at the bloodshed and suffering resulting from the recent fighting in Jordan and urged all Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations as well as private individuals, to provide the needed humanitarian aid. The Secretary-General earnestly hopes that Governments as well as non-governmental organizations and private individuals will make a special effort to respond to these appeals in order that the Palestine refugees and victims of the recent fighting in Jordan may receive the humanitarian assistance they so desperately need in the present tragic circumstances.

Special report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on operations of the Agency in Jordan

1. Every effort is now being made, and with the greatest urgency, to restore UNRWA services to the Palestine refugees in Jordan. Along with all other civilian functions in Amman and in most other populated areas in the country, the Agency's activities were brought to a virtual standstill by the fighting which erupted on 17 September 1970. Agency officials and staff in Jordan were completely unable to communicate with each other, or indeed with anyone else, for ten days. Telephone service had ceased and movement on the streets had been

prevented by fighting and later by curfews.

2. On 27 September the Commissioner-General, the Director of UNRWA Health Services, the Acting Director of UNRWA Affairs in Jordan and the UNRWA Chief of Supply and Transport for Jordan were able to meet with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health, who is also Minister for Reconstruction and Development, and to start arranging the reactivation of the Agency's services. Key Palestinian staff, reached by calls over the national radio, walked to a meeting at which actions were initiated to get operations started again. In the following days, staff were able to reach some "camps" and UNRWA installations and to appraise the effects of the fighting and the measures required to restore services. Communication is still difficult, public services, such as electrical power, are not operating and some areas can still not be reached.

3. Damage in Amman and other areas was widespread and severe in some districts. The Palestine refugees were especially affected, and the two large camps in Amman, where some 70,000 refugees lived, suffered heavily. In Jebel Hussein Camp, damage was described as serious, but not to the extent of complete devastation: the dead and wounded had been removed; much shelter was damaged; schools and other central buildings were badly damaged; the food distribution centre was intact, but disinfection was necessary; water was again being supplied. The situation in Amman New Camp was found to be far worse: damage was very severe and the outskirts of the camp were almost destroyed; 25 per cent of the buildings were estimated to be beyond repair, another 25 per cent extensively damaged and the remainder damaged in varying degrees; equipment and supplies were gone; the normal water supply had not been restored and water was being brought by UNRWA tankers.

4. Information so far available on other camps and installations outside Amman indicates less severe damage. No reports on damage are yet available from Irbid and some other locations. Upper floors of the

UNRWA Field Office were damaged, but the extent has not yet been assessed. The main UNRWA warehouse and its contents are largely intact, but some UNRWA vehicles and equipment and supplies have been lost. No deaths of Agency staff have been reported as yet, but only a small fraction of the staff has been reached so far.

5. Efforts are now being concentrated on the resumption of health and sanitation services, where these had been suspended, and distribution of food rations. The lack of telephones and the continuation of curfews make communication extremely difficult, but all staff members are doing their best to overcome the difficulties. The Agency has been doing all it can to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross and others in bringing emergency assistance from sources outside Jordan and to help these groups to co-ordinate their activities with each other. Meetings in Beirut of representatives of interested agencies were called by UNRWA on 25 and 28 September, and other meetings and co-ordinating services will be arranged.

6. The Agency has most of the food and medical supplies immediately required, although these will need to be replaced later. It will also be necessary to replace the trucks and other vehicles damaged or lost and to repair the buildings and replace the equipment lost or destroyed. Some time will be required to assess these needs precisely, but it seems likely that the repair of schools, health centres, other installations and offices, and the replacement of lost and damaged automotive and other equipment and supplies may well run into several hundred thousands of dollars—perhaps as much as a million dollars. An even more pressing need is sure to be shelter for those whose homes were destroyed. There will be an immediate need for thousands of tents. For the purchase of tents and the replacement of shelter in the camps in Amman—not including other camps or other housing needs—the cost might be in the order of two million dollars.

7. The Commissioner-General urgently

appeals to Governments, organizations, and individuals for funds to enable the Agency to restore its services and to meet the emergency needs of the Palestine refugees in Jordan east of the Jordan River. The situation in Jordan emphasizes the importance of maintaining UNRWA's programmes, which, as the Secretary-General has recently warned Governments, are threatened with collapse in 1971 unless an additional \$6 million in annual income can be found (see A/8040, annex).

8. The Commissioner-General believes it pertinent to call attention to the fact that in the Jericho area there are thousands of empty shelters, together with schools, health centres, food distribution centres and other installations, which are unused. If Palestine refugees who moved to the East Bank in 1967 could return to their homes, as called for by the General Assembly and Security Council in numerous resolutions, the situation on the East Bank would be greatly eased and the humanitarian distress dramatically reduced.

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Additional Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General on Operations of the Agency in Jordan¹

November 6, 1970

Note by the Secretary-General

Since the publication, on 2 October 1970, of the special report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on operations of the Agency in Jordan (A/8084), the Secretary-General has received from the Commissioner-General a further report on the subject. This report is transmitted herewith to the Members of the General Assembly.

¹ U.N. doc. A/8084/Add.1.

Additional report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on operations of the Agency in Jordan

1. The Commissioner-General reports with regret that eleven local staff members of UNRWA were killed in the fighting which took place in east Jordan in the last half of September. The total number of deaths among the refugees registered with UNRWA is not known, but it is now believed to be lower than estimates reported in the press at the time of the hostilities. The lower casualty rate was due in part to the fact that many refugee families left the congested camp areas in Amman before or in the early stages of the fighting.

2. Emergency arrangements for medical care for the wounded and the provision of food-stuffs and water to those in urgent need, which had begun in September, were continued in October while normal facilities were being restored. The International Committee of the Red Cross had a leading role in these arrangements and many Governments and non-governmental organizations participated generously. UNICEF was an early and effective contributor. The Agency gave supply and transport assistance to these efforts and UNRWA and its staff, working also as individual volunteers, helped organize food convoys from the West Bank. In addition, UNRWA sent ambulances, water tankers, trucks and other vehicles into Jordan east of the Jordan River from other areas.

3. The restoration of regular UNRWA services in Jordan east of the Jordan River, which had begun at the time of the Commissioner-General's earlier report of 30 September 1970, made rapid progress in the early days of October. Health and sanitation services were already functioning, water was being distributed to the most needy areas, and regular food distribution was resumed from 1 October onwards. Over 5,000 tons of food-stuffs were distributed during October; full distribution was made to all authorized recipients for that month, as well as for a large part of the backlog for the last half of Sep-

tember. By 13 October, all UNRWA relief and health services, including supplementary feeding and milk distribution were operating fully.

4. Schools operated by UNRWA and UNESCO will be reopened at the same time as government schools, hopefully by mid-November. Schoolbuildings, especially in the Amman area, were badly damaged. Until repairs can be carried out, many classrooms will be unusable. Some 30,000 schoolchildren will be affected. The only way in which classes can be arranged for many of them will be in large (marquee) tents. An appeal for such tents has been launched, and there are hopes that at least a good part of the number required will be forthcoming.

5. The cost of repairing UNRWA schools, training centres, clinics and other installations (but excluding shelter) will be about \$200,000, and the cost of replacing furniture, equipment, supplies and vehicles will require a further \$200,000. If it should be necessary to purchase large marquee tents for classrooms, this could amount to as much as \$300,000 more. As mentioned above, it is hoped that this need will be met, at least to a large extent, by contributions of tents. Other costs may have to be met, possibly including compensation if the injury or death of any staff member is found to be attributable to UNRWA service.

6. The Commissioner-General's earlier report estimated that the cost of repairing and reconstructing refugee shelters and of providing family tents in the meantime "might be in the order of \$2 million". Since then, the refugees themselves have been very active in clearing away the debris and repairing their damaged shelters. They are being assisted by a self-help project operated by one of the non-governmental organizations. Some family-sized tents have been donated by other organizations and further contributions are expected.

7. It is hoped that the efforts of the refugees themselves and the assistance being provided by other organizations will go far to meet the

need for shelters. So far UNRWA has not committed any funds for this purpose, and would be unable to do so from its existing resources.

8. Even though some of the requirements foreseen in the Commissioner-General's previous report are now being met in other ways—by the refugees themselves or by other organizations—the financial impact on UNRWA of the events in Jordan will still be very considerable, and additional contributions for this purpose are required.

9. The Agency is already facing a deficit of \$ 5 million during 1970, and faces an estimated shortfall of some \$ 6.5 million in 1971. Therefore, unless adequate additional funds are made available now, UNRWA will be unable to maintain its programme during 1971 at the present level. As the Secretary-General has warned Member States (A/8040), reductions in UNRWA's programme would inevitably, in the disturbed conditions of the area, have a profoundly unsettling effect.

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Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East¹

January 4, 1971

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¹ U.N. doc. S/10070. Table of contents supplied by editor.

INTRODUCTION

1. On 22 November 1967, the Security Council adopted resolution 242 (1967), which reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

2. On 23 November 1967 I reported to the Council (S/8259) that I had invited Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden to accept the designation as the Special Representative mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Council's above-mentioned resolution. Ambassador Jarring accepted this designation and arrived at United Nations Headquarters on 26 November, where he entered into consultation with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Syria, the other State concerned, did not at that stage or later accept the Security Council resolution). After those consultations with the parties, Ambassador Jarring established the headquarters of the United Nations Middle East Mission in Cyprus.

3. In reports dated 22 December 1967, 17 January 1968, 29 March 1968, 29 July 1968 and 3 December 1968 (S/8309 and Add.1 to 4, respectively), I reported to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring. On 7 August 1970, I was able to inform the Security Council (S/9902) that Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic had agreed to take part in discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them. Unfortunately and for well known reasons those discussions were interrupted immediately after they began. The Members of the Security Council will have been able to observe that in the last few days it has become possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions. I hope that these resumed discussions will be fruitful. However, it seems appropriate at this time to provide the Security Council with a somewhat fuller account of the activities of the Special Representative than heretofore.

I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DURING THE PERIOD 9 DECEMBER 1967 TO 26 NOVEMBER 1968

4. When the Special Representative first met with the parties in December 1967, he found that the Israeli Government was of the firm view that a settlement of the Middle East question could be reached only through direct negotiations between the parties culminating in a peace treaty and that there could be no question of withdrawal of their forces prior to such a settlement. On 27 December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, communicated to the Special Representative a proposal that Israel and the United Arab Republic representatives should, as a first step, discuss an agenda for peace. The Israeli proposals for such an agenda were:

1. *Political and juridical problems* : The replacement of cease-fire arrangements by peace treaties ending the state of belligerency, ending all hostile acts and threats and embodying a permanent undertaking of mutual non-aggression.

2. *Territorial and security problems* : The determination of agreed territorial boundaries and security arrangements. Agreement on this measure would determine the deployment of armed forces after the cease-fire.

3. *Navigation problems* : Practical methods should be discussed for ensuring free navigation for all states including Israel in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba when the cease-fire is replaced by peace. In the light of tragic experience, it is evident that international declarations cannot by themselves solve this problem. Concrete measures and guarantees are required.

4. *Economic problems* : Proposals for terminating boycott practices and instituting normal economic relations.

5. The United Arab Republic and Jordan, for their part, insisted that there could be no question of discussions between the parties until the Israeli forces had been withdrawn to the positions occupied by them prior to 5 June 1967. Reacting specifically to the Israeli proposals for discussing an agenda for peace,

the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, stated that the withdrawal of Israel's forces to the positions held prior to June 1967 was a basic and preliminary step to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

6. An Israeli proposal for discussions on an agenda for peace with Jordan was submitted to the Special Representative on 7 January 1968. It followed the same general lines as the proposal for the United Arab Republic but contained more detailed suggestions for economic co-operation, as well as the following new topics:

Humanitarian problems : In the proposed negotiation, high priority should be given to a solution of the refugee problem with international and regional co-operation.

Religious and historical sites : Access to sites of special religious significance should be discussed. The Government of Israel clarified its views on this subject in several verbal and written communications to the United Nations.

It was also stated:

In the meantime, it is urgent that breaches of the cease-fire and activity by El Fatah and other such organizations should be suppressed and every effort made on both sides to avoid exchanges of fire.

7. The proposals, when communicated to the Jordanian authorities by the Special Representative, were objected to in the same way as the proposals to the United Arab Republic had been.

8. Faced with these conflicting positions, the Special Representative sought to obtain from the parties an assurance that they would implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in the hope that such a declaration would be regarded as a basis for subsequent discussions between the parties. The Special Representative received from Foreign Minister Eban a number of formulations of Israel's position on the Security Council resolution, of which the last, dated 19 February 1968, read as follows:

1. The Government of Israel, out of respect for the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and responding affirmatively thereto, assures you of its full co-operation in your efforts with the States concerned to promote agreement and to achieve an accepted settlement for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, in accordance with your mandate under the resolution.

2. Israel's position has throughout been that the best way to achieve the objective of the Security Council resolution is through direct negotiations. However, as a further indication of Israel's co-operation, we are willing that this be done in a meeting convened by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

3. On 12 February 1968, I informed you of Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's call in its resolution of 22 November 1967 for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace. The United Arab Republic is also aware of Israel's willingness as explained on 1 February to negotiate on all matters included in the Security Council's resolution. We accept the sponsor's view that the principles recommended for inclusion in the peace settlement are integrally linked and interdependent.

4. We have noted the United Arab Republic's willingness to 'implement' the Security Council's resolution and fulfil its obligations thereunder. It is a matter of concern that the United Arab Republic statements, unlike those of Israel, do not specifically use the precise terms of the resolution in such crucial matters as 'agreement' and the 'establishment of a just and lasting peace', and that the United Arab Republic has not yet agreed to a process of negotiation without which, of course, a declaration of willingness to fulfil the resolution is of no substantive effect. The resolution is a framework for *agreement*. It cannot be fulfilled without a direct exchange of views and proposals leading to bilateral contractual commitments. The United Arab Republic position is, therefore, still deficient in important respects. We are, however, conscious of the importance of the fact that the United Arab Republic and Israel have both responded affirmatively to the call for co-operating with you in the mission laid upon you by the Security Council. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to ignore that there have been sharp differences of interpretation of what

the resolution entails. To subscribe to similar declarations does not of itself solve practical issues at stake.

5. It is accordingly urgent to move forward to a more substantive stage and to embark on a meaningful negotiation for achieving the just and lasting peace called for by the Security Council.

In discussions with the Special Representative, Foreign Minister Eban stated that Israel would not object to an indirect approach to negotiations provided that it was designed to lead to a later stage of direct negotiations and agreement.

9. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister gave repeated assurances that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the Security Council resolution as a whole and to fulfil its obligations under it, but stated that it would not accept direct negotiations. The United Arab Republic accepted indirect negotiations; however, the first step must be an Israeli declaration "in clear language" that it would implement the Security Council resolution.

10. The Jordanian authorities expressed a similar point of view to the Special Representative.

11. The Special Representative then proceeded to United Nations Headquarters for consultations with the Secretary-General. Returning to the area at the beginning of March, he informally presented to the parties, to ascertain their reactions, a draft letter from himself to the Secretary-General, which would be worded as follows:

The Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic [Jordan] have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and intend to devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement.

In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the two Governments to meet with me, for conferences within the framework of the Security Council resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation.

12. When Ambassador Jarring presented this text to the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister on 7 March 1968, the latter stated that recent statements by Israeli leaders showed that they were following an expansionist line. It was no longer sufficient to have Israel give an assurance of intent to implement the resolution; the Arabs had to be satisfied that the Israelis were going to "implement it for action". If the Israelis withdrew completely from the occupied territories, peace could be arrived at by the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution under the Council's guidance.

13. In a meeting on 10 March, the Special Representative informed the Israeli Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic attitude. He then informally showed his draft letter to the Foreign Minister, who expressed the personal view that it would be fully acceptable to the Israeli authorities if it was also accepted by the other side and led to contacts between them. Subsequently the Special Representative was informed of Israel's official acceptance, without conditions, of the text.

14. In a meeting on 14 March, the Jordanian authorities stated that they were ready to accept the proposed meeting in principle provided that the text was modified to read that the parties had "declared their readiness to implement the resolution".

15. During the following weeks, Ambassador Jarring paid repeated visits to the countries concerned in an endeavour to obtain from the Israelis a more precise formulation of their acceptance of the resolution and from the two Arab States acceptance of the idea of meetings between the parties under his auspices.

16. At a meeting in Amman on 16 April 1968, the Jordanian authorities stated that they were prepared to accept the text of the Special Representative's draft letter provided that the third paragraph was amended to read as follows:

In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlements, I will meet with representatives of Israel and Jordan for conferences within the framework of the Security Council resolution, in New York. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably hereto.

The acceptance was based on the assumption that the United Arab Republic would accept an identical text.

17. The Israeli authorities found difficulties in the Jordanian amended text. They had accepted meetings at Nicosia, on the understanding that the Special Representative's invitation would lead to joint meetings. The new text appeared to give the impression that only meetings between the parties and the Special Representative were intended. The change of venue, while not objectionable in principle, tended to create the impression that only discussions with the permanent missions in the scope of normal United Nations activities would take place; a change from Nicosia to a European city would be acceptable.

18. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister at first continued to insist on a prior declaration by Israel of its intention to implement the Security Council resolution. Finally, however, on 9 May, on the eve of the Special Representative's departure from the area (see following paragraph), he replied to the Special Representative's proposed invitation in the form amended by Jordan in the following written statement:

With reference to your indication to me today of your desire to meet with a representative of the United Arab Republic in New York, I wish to reaffirm the readiness of our Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York to meet with you to continue the contacts which you have been conducting with the parties concerned

in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for the implementation of that resolution.

I have referred in the course of our previous meetings to the importance of the setting of a timetable for the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council, and offered you several alternatives towards that end, one of which, that you present a timetable prepared by yourself for the implementation of the resolution. These suggestions emanate from the United Arab Republic's indication to you of its acceptance and readiness to implement the above-mentioned resolution.

I wish to express anew our willingness to co-operate with you in your capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of your tasks as defined in the Council's resolution of the 22nd of November 1967.

The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister repeated that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the resolution as a whole and as a "package deal". It insisted however, that Israel should do likewise, including complete withdrawal.

19. Ambassador Jarring was faced with a position where there was now agreement, though clearly with considerable differences of interpretation, on the first two paragraphs of his proposed invitation, but where there was disagreement on the third paragraph containing the actual invitation. Further journeying backwards and forwards between the various countries was unlikely to be productive. In consultations with me, he considered issuing a formal invitation along the lines of his proposal, but with the venue at New York, but it was felt that a forced acceptance obtained by such an invitation would not be helpful. Instead it was decided that the talks in New York should begin without a formal invitation by the Special Representative or a letter from the Special Representative to the Secretary-General but on the basis of a short statement to the press in which it would be announced that the Special Representative was arriving in New York for consultations in continuation of his mission.

20. During his stay in the area, the Special Representative visited Beirut on three occasions. The Lebanese Government expressed its full support for a solution according to Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Lebanon, however, had no territory under occupation and therefore did not have the same detailed involvement in the settlement as the United Arab Republic and Jordan. The Special Representative did not visit Syria, whose Government, as noted above, had not accepted the Security Council resolution.

21. Ambassador Jarring left the area on 10 May 1968 and arrived at Headquarters on 15 May 1968.

22. In the five weeks following his arrival at New York, Ambassador Jarring pursued actively his contacts with the permanent representatives of the parties at both a formal and informal level. Unfortunately these contacts did not serve in any way to break the dead-lock between the parties concerning the interpretation of the Security Council resolution and the manner in which it should be implemented. In that regard, the Permanent Representative of Israel had stated in the Security Council on 1 May 1968:

In declarations and statements made publicly and to Mr. Jarring, my Government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and durable peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all the matters included in that resolution."

This statement was not regarded as acceptable by the Arab representatives.

23. Returning to New York on 22 July after a short stay in Europe during which he had met in various capitals the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan, Ambassador Jarring decided, with my approval, to return to the Middle East and resume his direct contacts with the parties. This second round of discussions, which began on 16 August 1968, took the form of an exchange of questions

and of comments between the parties through the Special Representative. Some progress in the clarification of the respective positions of the parties had been made when the opening of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly caused the venue of the discussions to be transferred to New York, where they could be carried out with greater convenience. With the arrival of the foreign ministers of the parties for the session toward the end of September, Ambassador Jarring began a series of frequent meetings with them individually, which were at first mainly of an informal nature but which, following the delivery by the foreign ministers of their speeches in the general debate, assumed a more formal character and concluded with written communications from the Foreign Ministers of Israel and of the United Arab Republic restating the positions of their respective Governments. Those written statements were in amplification of the positions of the parties as publicly stated in the General Assembly and made clear the essential differences between them. On the one hand, Israel regarded the Security Council resolution as a statement of principles in the light of which the parties should negotiate peace and, on the other hand, the United Arab Republic considered that the resolution provided a plan for settlement of the Middle East dispute to be implemented by the parties according to modalities to be established by the Special Representative. It was also abundantly clear that there was a crucial difference of opinion over the meaning to be attached to the withdrawal provisions of the Security Council resolution, which according to the Arab States applied to all territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and according to Israel applied only to the extent required when agreement had been reached between the parties on secure and recognized borders between them.

24. Discouraging though the prospects seemed, Ambassador Jarring decided to carry out another brief round of discussions in the Middle East. As he explained in a letter to me, dated 26 November 1968, he had in mind inviting the parties to a new round of

discussions in the middle of January 1969 in order to give them time for reflection and for careful consideration of their respective positions.¹

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM 27 NOVEMBER 1968 TO JUNE 1970

25. Ambassador Jarring departed from Headquarters on 27 November 1968 and met with representatives of Israel in Nicosia on 2 and 3 December, of the United Arab Republic in Cairo on 4 December and of Jordan in Amman on 7 December. Unfortunately these meetings did not reveal a change of position in the attitude of the parties that would have made it expedient for Ambassador Jarring to convene a meeting of the parties in the middle of January 1969, as envisaged in his letter of 26 November 1968.

26. After resuming for a time his duties as Ambassador of Sweden to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Jarring returned to Headquarters on 29 January 1969. He there undertook a series of personal contacts with the Permanent Representatives of the parties and the representatives of other Member States.

27. At that stage, Ambassador Jarring concluded, with my concurrence, that the best contribution which he could make to breaking the existing deadlock was to make a further tour of the Middle East in which he would submit formally to the parties a series of questions designed to elicit their attitude towards Security Council resolution 242 (1967). He accordingly left New York on 21 February 1969 for the Middle East. At meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic on 5 March, of Jordan on 8 March, of Israel on 9 March and of Lebanon on 14 March, he submitted the questions which he had previously prepared. The replies of the parties were received by Ambassador Jarring as follows:

¹ For the texts of the letter from Ambassador Jarring and the reply by the Secretary-General, see S/8309/Add.4. [This and the subsequent note are part of the report.]

Israel: handed to Ambassador Jarring in Jerusalem by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2 April 1969.

Jordan: received by Ambassador Jarring in Nicosia on 24 March 1969.

Lebanon: received by Ambassador Jarring in Moscow on 21 April 1969.

United Arab Republic: handed to Ambassador Jarring in Cairo by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic on 27 March 1969. The questions and replies are reproduced in annex I.

28. It had been the hope of Ambassador Jarring, in submitting his questions, that the replies might show certain encouraging features which might make it possible to invite the parties for a series of meetings between them and him at some mutually convenient place. Unfortunately, the replies were in general a repetition of attitudes already expressed to Ambassador Jarring on numerous occasions from the beginning of his mission. They showed continued serious divergencies between the Arab States and Israel both as regards the interpretation to be given to the Security Council resolution and as to the procedures for putting its provisions into effect.

29. Ambassador Jarring was regretfully forced to conclude, with my agreement, that the conditions for convening a useful series of meetings at that time did not exist and that there was no further move which he could usefully make at that stage. He therefore returned on 5 April 1969 to Moscow, where he resumed his duties as Ambassador of Sweden to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

30. Ambassador Jarring continued to keep in close touch with me and with representatives of the parties and of other interested States.

31. Ambassador Jarring returned to Headquarters from 12 September to 8 October 1969 and from 10 to 26 March 1970, but found no new elements which would permit him to organize active discussions with the

parties. On each occasion he returned to his post in Moscow.

32. On 3 April 1969, the Permanent Representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America began a series of meetings on the Middle East question, which have continued at various intervals up to the present time. After each such meeting, the Chairman reported to me on the substance of the discussions and I kept Ambassador Jarring informed.

III. THE ATTEMPT TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S AUSPICES (JUNE 1970-4 JANUARY 1971)

33. In June 1970, the Government of the United States of America proposed to the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic that they should each advise Ambassador Jarring as follows:

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under his auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as he may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with resolution 242;

(c) that, to facilitate his task of promoting agreement as set forth in resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective 1 July at least until 1 October, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

34. Having been informed by the United States Government that the States concerned had accepted its peace initiative, I invited Ambassador Jarring to return immediately to Headquarters, where he arrived on 2 August. I informed the Security Council in a note dated 7 August (S/9902) that Ambassador Jarring had received confirmation from the Permanent Representatives of those States of their acceptance and that he had addressed to me a letter as described above. I was informed by the United States representative that his Government had received the acceptance of the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel to a standstill cease-fire for a period of ninety days from 2200 GMT on the same day. Ambassador Jarring and I had previously been informed by Secretary of State Rogers that his Government would take responsibility for organizing the standstill cease-fire.

35. Ambassador Jarring at once entered into contact with the parties and, after considering their views on the time and place of the discussions, on 21 August 1970 addressed to them invitations to take part in discussions opening at New York on 25 August 1970. He met on the appointed day with representatives of each of the parties. However Ambassador Tekoah, who had been designated by Israel as its representative for the initial phase of the talks, then stated that he had been instructed by his Government to return to Israel for consultations. On his return on 8 September, he communicated to Ambassador Jarring the following decision of his Government:

Israel's acceptance of the United States peace initiative according to its decision of 4 August 1970, and the appointment of a representative to the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring are still in effect.

The Government of Egypt has gravely violated the ceasefire-standstill agreement, and this violation is continuing without letup.

The strictest observance of the ceasefire-standstill agreement is one of the central elements of the American peace initiative and of the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. Therefore, so long as the ceasefire-standstill agreement is not

observed in its entirety, and the original situation restored, Israel will not be able to participate in these talks.

Ambassador Tekoah, who is returning to his post as head of the permanent delegation of Israel at the United Nations, has been authorized to bring this decision of the Government of Israel to the attention of Ambassador Jarring.

The Special Representative thus found himself precluded for the time being from holding formal meetings with the Israeli representatives, and his talks with the representatives of the Arab States, though they continued, could not be productive because of the lack of contact with the Israeli representative. After a brief visit to Moscow from 6 to 14 October to attend to his affairs as Ambassador of Sweden there, the Special Representative returned to New York and had a wide range of contacts with representatives of the parties and of other Member States during the commemorative session of the General Assembly and the debate on the Middle East, which followed that session.

36. Immediately following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), Ambassador Jarring entered into contact with the representatives of the parties in order to invite them to re-enter into talks under his auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic informed him that their Governments continued to be willing to do so; the representative of Israel stated that the matter was under consideration in the Israeli Cabinet.

37. On 19 November and pending a decision by the Israeli Cabinet, Ambassador Jarring returned to Moscow. On the eve of his departure, he addressed a letter to the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he formally invited the Israeli Government to resume its participation in the discussions, as well as letters to the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic, in which he took note of the position of their Governments. These letters, together with replies from the Permanent Represen-

tative of the United Arab Republic and the Israeli Foreign Minister, are reproduced in annex II.

38. On 30 December, Ambassador Jarring received in Moscow a message from the Foreign Minister of Israel in which the latter informed him of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the talks. The message is also reproduced in annex II.

ANNEX II

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE DISCUSSION

A. Letter dated 18 November 1970 addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 7 August 1970 addressed to the Secretary-General, referred to in document S/9902, in which I informed him of the agreement of your Government and of the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic to the holding of discussions under my auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between the parties.

As you will recall, I issued on 21 August 1970 an invitation to the parties to take part in discussions opening at New York on 25 August 1970. Ambassador Tekoah, who was Israeli representative for the initial stage of the discussions, met with me twice on the opening date, but was recalled to Israel for consultations. On his return on 8 September he communicated to me the decision of your Government, for reasons which were explained to me and have been publicly announced by your Government, to suspend its participation in the talks.

I am definitely of the view that the time has come for me once again to invite your Government to participate in discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

When I met you last on 5 November 1970, to consider the question of Israel's return to

the discussions, I noted your concern about the influence of the debate of the General Assembly on the Middle East question and of its resolution 2628 (XXV). I wish to assure you in this connexion that I am proceeding on the basis that there is no change in my mandate, which I continue to regard as having been defined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

You will understand, I know, my desire to make a positive report to the Secretary-General about the progress of our discussions. I am accordingly inviting your Government to reconsider its position on the question and to resume its participation in the discussions. In this connexion, I wish to state that I have already been informed by the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic of their continued willingness to participate.

I take this opportunity to inform you that, pending a reply from your Government to this appeal, I am returning to my post in Moscow. I hope that your Government will find it possible in the near future to respond favourably to this invitation, in which case I shall be available to return to New York at twenty-four hours' notice.

(Signed) Gunnar JARRING

B. Letter dated 18 November 1970 addressed to the Permanent Representative of Jordan¹

I have the honour to inform you that I have today addressed a letter to the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs in which I once again appealed to his Government to resume participation in discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

In that connexion, I keep in mind the willingness of the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic, as expressed to me by yourself and your colleague from the United Arab Republic, to continue to participate in such discussions.

I take this opportunity to inform you that, pending the receipt of a reply from Israel,

¹ An identical letter *mutatis mutandis* was sent to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic.

it is my intention to return to my post in Moscow. I wish to emphasize, however, that I am ready to return here at twenty-four hours' notice on receipt of the Israeli reply.

(Signed) Gunnar JARRING

C. Letter dated 18 November 1970 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic

With reference to your letter of today in which you inform me of your imminent return to your post in Moscow, I note with appreciation your reference to the readiness of the United Arab Republic to co-operate fully with you.

I wish to emphasize that, conscious of its obligations under the Charter and in abiding by the Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the United Arab Republic has for the last three years consistently co-operated with you, in the sincere hope you will successfully achieve the targets entrusted, by the Secretary-General, to you in accordance with the aforementioned resolution.

Since my Government designated me last August to enter into discussions with you, I have during several meetings restated my Government's belief in a lasting peace based on the faithful implementation of the aforementioned Security Council resolution in all its parts and consequently the restoration of all Arab lands occupied by Israel since June 5, 1967, as well as ending the injustices inflicted so far on the Arab people of Palestine.

I am sure that Your Excellency's report to the Secretary-General on your mission which would be transmitted by him to the Security Council before 5 January 1971, will be of great benefit to the members of the Security Council and would assist them in taking whatever steps they may deem necessary in carrying out the responsibility entrusted to them by the Charter.

(Signed) Mohamed H. EL-ZAYYAT

D. Letter dated 1 December 1970 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

I have received your letter of 18 November 1970 in which you invite the Government of Israel to participate in discussions under your auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). I note your assurance in reply to my comments on General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) that you are proceeding on the basis that there is no change in your mandate, which you continue to regard as having been defined in Security Council resolution 242.

On 6 August 1970 Ambassador Tekoah conveyed to you Israel's position on the United States peace initiative. This communication remains valid as the expression of Israel's policy. Concerning the discussions which we have agreed to hold under your auspices, I also draw attention to the Israel Government's decision of 6 September 1970 which was conveyed to you by Ambassador Tekoah.

On 22 November 1970 the Government of Israel adopted and published the following decision:

The Government will act in accordance with the policy expressed in the Prime Minister's statement to the Knesset on 16 November 1970, for the creation of conditions which will justify implementation of the Government's resolution of 4 August 1970 which was approved by the Knesset—concerning the holding of talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring including consolidation and extension of the cease-fire agreement with the aim of progressing from a cease-fire to a complete end to the war and to lasting peace.

We are now holding discussions on the creation of conditions which would justify a decision by the Government of Israel to hold talks with the United Arab Republic under your auspices, in accordance with our decision of 4 August 1970 conveyed to you by Ambassador Tekoah on 6 August. I shall keep you in touch with developments on this matter as they arise.

We have publicly announced that we are ready for discussions with Jordan whose Government has informed you on its continued willingness to participate in such talks.

We are also willing to hold discussions on the establishment of permanent peace with Lebanon which has announced its adherence to Security Council resolution 242.

(Signed) Abba EBAN

E. Message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

Further to my letter of 1 December 1970 I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Israel decided on 28 December 1970 as follows:

The present political and military conditions enable and justify the termination of the suspension of Israel participation in the talks

under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The Government decided to authorize the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform those concerned of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the Jarring talks in accordance with the basic principles of the Government policy and on the basis of its decisions of 31 July and 4 August 1970 as approved by the Knesset concerning Israel's affirmative reply to the peace initiative.

In view of this decision I would like to meet you in Jerusalem at your earliest convenience and my intention is to survey the situation, to acquaint you with the basic views of my Government and to discuss steps necessary to ensure the fulfilment of your mission for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace.

Abba EBAN

PART V

Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations and Related Organizations

I. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

330

General Assembly Resolution 2628 (XXV) Calling for a Three-Month Extension of the Cease-Fire and for Talks Under the Auspices of the Secretary-General's Special Representative with a View to Implementing Security Council Resolution 242¹

November 4, 1970

The General Assembly,

Seriously concerned that the continuation of the present grave and deteriorating situation in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

¹ U.N. doc. A/Res/2628 (XXV). Adopted at the 1896th plenary meeting:

In favor: 57. Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (People's Rep.), Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: 16. Australia, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, El Salvador, Iceland, Israel, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, U.S.A.

Abstaining: 39. Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Venezuela

Absent: 7. Albania, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Maldives, Malta, Portugal, Rwanda

Algeria, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria and Yemen announced that they were not participating in the vote.

Reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized,

Deploring the continued occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

Seriously concerned that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which was unanimously adopted and which provides for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, has not yet been implemented,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

1. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored;

2. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles:

(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

3. *Recognizes* that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

4. *Urges* the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which provides for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, in all its parts;

5. *Calls upon* the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts;

6. *Recommends* to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they may enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

8. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the implementation of its resolution.

331

General Assembly Resolution 2645 (XXV) Condemning Interference with Civil Air Travel¹

November 25, 1970

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that international civil aviation is a vital link in the promotion and preservation of friendly relations among States and that its safe and orderly functioning is in the interest of all peoples,

Gravely concerned over acts of aerial hijacking or other wrongful interference with civil air travel,

Recognizing that such acts jeopardize the lives and safety of the passengers and crew and constitute a violation of their human rights,

Aware that international civil aviation can only function properly in conditions guaranteeing the safety of its operations and the due exercise of the freedom of air travel,

Endorsing the solemn declaration² of the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization held at Montreal from 16 to 30 June 1970,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 2551 (XXIV) of 12 December 1969, and Security Council resolution 286 (1970) of 9 September 1970 adopted by consensus at the 1552nd meeting of the Council,

1. *Condemns*, without exception whatsoever, all acts of aerial hijacking or other interference with civil air travel, whether originally national or international, through the threat or use of force, and all acts of violence which may be directed against passengers, crew and aircraft engaged in, and air navigation facilities and aeronautical communications used by, civil air transport;

2. *Calls upon* States to take all appropriate measures to deter, prevent or suppress such acts within their jurisdiction, at every stage of the execution of those acts, and to provide for the prosecution and punishment of persons who perpetrate such acts, in a manner commensurate with the gravity of those crimes, or, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of States under existing international instruments relating to the matter, for the extradition of such persons for the purpose of their prosecution and punishment;

3. *Declares* that the exploitation of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the purpose of taking hostages is to be condemned;

4. *Declares further* that the unlawful detention of passengers and crew in transit or

¹U.N. doc A/Res/2645 (XXV). Adopted at the 1914th plenary meeting by a vote of 105 to none, with 8 abstentions.

²International Civil Aviation Organization, *Resolutions adopted by the Assembly. Seventeenth Session (Extraordinary)* (Montreal, 1970), resolution A17-1. [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

otherwise engaged in civil air travel is to be condemned as another form of wrongful interference with free and uninterrupted air travel;

5. *Urges* States to the territory of which a hijacked aircraft is diverted to provide for the care and safety of its passengers and to enable them to continue their journey as soon as practicable and to return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession;

6. *Invites* States to ratify or accede to the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts committed on Board Aircraft signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963,¹ in conformity with the Convention;

7. *Requests* concerted action on the part of States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, towards suppressing all acts which jeopardize the safe and orderly development of international civil air transport;

8. *Calls upon* States to take joint and separate action, in accordance with the Charter, in co-operation with the United Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization to ensure that passengers, crew and aircraft engaged in civil aviation are not used as a means of extorting advantage of any kind;

9. *Urges* full support for the current efforts of the International Civil Aviation Organization towards the development and co-ordination, in accordance with its competence, of effective measures in respect of interference with civil air travel;

10. *Calls upon* States to make every possible effort to achieve a successful result at the diplomatic conference to convene at The Hague in December 1970 for the purpose of the adoption of a convention on the unlawful seizure of aircraft, so that an effective convention may be brought into force at an early date.

The General Assembly, without a vote, took note of the following statement contained in the report of the Sixth Committee:

"It was agreed in the Committee that the adoption of the draft resolution cannot prejudice any international legal rights or duties of States under instruments relating to the status of refugees and stateless persons."

332

General Assembly Resolution 2649 (XXV) Condemning Denial of Self-Determination, Especially to the Peoples of Southern Africa and Palestine²

November 30, 1970

The General Assembly,

Emphasizing the importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights,

Concerned that many peoples are still denied the right to self-determination and are still subject to colonial and alien domination,

Regretting that the obligations undertaken by States under the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions adopted by United Nations bodies have not proved sufficient to attain respect for the right of peoples to self-determination in all cases,

Recalling its resolution 2588 B (XXIV) of 15 December 1969 and resolution VIII adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,³

Considering that it is necessary to continue the study of ways and means of ensuring international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination,

² U.N. doc. A/Res/2649. Adopted at the 1915th plenary meeting:

In favor: 71

Against: 12

Abstained: 28

Paragraph 5, in which Palestine is mentioned, was adopted by a separate vote:

In favor: 48

Against: 27

Abstained: 35

³ *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2), p. 9. [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 704 (1969), No. 10106.

Noting the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,¹ which elaborated the principle of self-determination of peoples,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970 on the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

1. *Affirms* the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination recognized as being entitled to the right of self-determination to restore to themselves that right by any means at their disposal;

2. *Recognizes* the right of peoples under colonial and alien domination in the legitimate exercise of their right to self-determination to seek and receive all kinds of moral and material assistance, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments that deny the right to self-determination of peoples under colonial and alien domination to recognize and observe that right in accordance with the relevant international instruments and the principles and spirit of the Charter;

4. *Considers* that the acquisition and retention of territory in contravention of the right of the people of that territory to self-determination is inadmissible and a gross violation of the Charter;

5. *Condemns* those Governments that deny the right to self-determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine;

6. *Requests* the Commission on Human Rights to study, at its twenty-seventh session, the implementation of the United Nations

resolutions relating to the right of peoples under colonial and alien domination to self-determination, and to submit its conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, as soon as possible.

333

General Assembly Resolution 2653 D (XXV) Accepting the Accounts of UNRWA²

December 4, 1970

The General Assembly

1. *Accepts* the accounts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for the year ended 31 December 1969 and the certificates of the Board of Auditors;³

2. *Takes note* of the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as set forth in its report.⁴

334

General Assembly Resolution 2656 (XXV) Establishing a Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA⁵

December 7, 1970

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970,⁶

² U.N. doc. A/Res/2653 (XXV) D. Adopted without objection at the 1917th plenary meeting.

³ U.N. doc. A/8007/Add. 3. [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

⁴ U.N. doc. A/8150, paras. 16-20.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/Res/2656 (XXV). Adopted without vote at the 1918th plenary meeting.

⁶ U.N. doc. A/8013. [This note is part of the resolution.]

¹ Resolution 2625 (XXV).

Noting with grave concern the acute financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and its serious implications for the future work of the Agency,

Bearing in mind the appeal made by the Secretary-General on 2 December 1970 at the 740th meeting of the Special Political Committee as well as the appeal made by the Chairman of that Committee on 25 November 1970 at the 733rd meeting of the Committee, and taking into account the suggestions made in the course of the debate concerning possible means of securing additional income,

1. *Decides* to establish a Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, consisting of nine Member States, to study all aspects of the financing of the Agency;

2. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to designate the Member States which will compose the Working Group;

3. *Requests* the Working Group, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to present an interim report to the General Assembly, not later than 14 December 1970, containing its recommendations on possible measures to be taken to prevent a reduction of the Agency's services in 1971;

4. *Also requests* the Working Group, in the interval between the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly, to assist, as appropriate, the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in reaching solutions to the problems posed by the Agency's financial crisis;

5. *Further requests* the Working Group, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Re-

fugees in the Near East and the specialized agencies, to present a comprehensive report on all aspects of the financing of the Agency to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session.

* * *

At the 1926th plenary meeting, on 11 December 1970, the President of the General Assembly announced that, in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the above resolution, he had designated the nine members of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

The Working Group is composed of the following Member States: France, Ghana, Japan, Lebanon, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

335

General Assembly Resolution 2672 (XXV) Recognizing that the People of Palestine are Entitled to Self-Determination and Calling Once More on Israel to Take Immediate Steps for the Return of the Displaced Persons¹

December 8, 1970

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949,

¹ U.N. Doc. A/Res/2672 (XXV). Adopted at the 1921st plenary meeting:

Resolution A: 111 to 2, with 1 abstention

Resolution B: 114 to 1, with 2 abstentions

Resolution C:

In favor: 47. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, Chile, Congo (People's Rep.), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965,

Against: 22. Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, U.S.A., Uruguay.

Abstaining: 50. Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Dahomey, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

Absent: 9. Cambodia, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Maldives, Malta, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago.

Resolution D:

In favor: 93. Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (People's Rep.), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, U.S.A., Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: 5. Costa Rica, Guatemala, Israel, Nicaragua, Panama

Abstaining: 17. Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, Congo (Dem. Rep.), El Salvador, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nepal, Peru, Portugal, Togo, Uruguay

Absent: 12. Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Maldives, Malta, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago

2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2535 A (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970,¹

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;

5. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013).* [This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

6. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and, therefore, urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, and 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970,¹

Bearing in mind also the letter dated 13 August 1970 from the Secretary-General addressed to States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies,²

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), and 2535 C (XXIV);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

C

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine,

Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations and more recently reaffirmed in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,³

1. *Recognizes* that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

¹ *Ibid.*

² A/8040.

³ General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

2. *Declares* that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities, and 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969,

Gravely concerned with the plight of the displaced persons,

Convinced that the plight of the displaced persons could best be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,

Emphasizing the imperative of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced persons,

1. *Considers* that the plight of the displaced persons continues since they have not been able to return to their homes and camps;

2. *Calls once more upon* the Government of Israel to take immediately and without any further delay effective steps for the return of the displaced persons:

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

336

General Assembly Resolution 2674 (XXV), Affirming That Participants in Resistance Movements Should be Treated as Prisoners of War¹

December 9, 1970

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2444 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2597 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 and noting resolution XXIII adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,²

Referring to resolution XIII and to the other pertinent resolutions on human rights in armed conflicts adopted by the twenty-first International Conference of the Red Cross held at Istanbul in 1969,³

Expressing its deep concern in connexion with the fact that wars unleashed in violation of the Charter of the United Nations in several parts of the world lead to incalculable disasters and suffering among civilians,

Having considered with appreciation the Secretary-General's report on respect for human rights in armed conflicts,⁴

1. *Solemnly reaffirms* that, in order effectively to guarantee human rights, all States should devote their efforts to averting the unleashing of aggressive wars and armed conflicts that violate the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,⁵

2. *Condemns* the actions of countries which, in flagrant violation of the Charter, continue to conduct aggressive wars and defy the

¹ U.N. doc. A/Res. 2674. Adopted at the 1922nd plenary meeting.

² *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2), p.18. [This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

³ See A/7720, annex I, section D.

⁴ A/8052.

⁵ Resolution 2625 (XXV).

generally accepted principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹ and the Geneva Conventions of 1949;²

3. *Considers* that the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should be strictly observed by all States and that States violating these international instruments should be condemned and held responsible to the world community;

4. *Affirms* that the participants in resistance movements and the freedom fighters in southern Africa and territories under colonial and alien domination and foreign occupation, struggling for their liberation and self-determination, should be treated, in case of their arrest, as prisoners of war in accordance with the principles of the Hague Convention of 1907³ and the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

5. *Considers* that air bombardments of civilian populations and the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials and devices, as well as bacteriological (biological) weapons, constitute a flagrant violation of the Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

6. *Recognizes* the necessity of developing additional international instruments providing for the protection of civilian populations and freedom fighters against colonial and foreign domination as well as against racist régimes.

337

General Assembly Resolution 2727 (XXV) Calling on Israel to Implement the Recommendations of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the

¹ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973.

³ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

Population of the Occupied Territories and Asking the Committee to Continue its Work⁴

December 15, 1970

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,⁵

Recalling Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969 and 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970,

Further recalling Commission on Human

⁴ U.N. doc. A/Res/2727 (XXV). Adopted at the 1931st plenary meeting:

In favor: 52. Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, South Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: 20. Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Israel, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, U.S.A., Uruguay

Abstaining: 43. Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Denmark, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Venezuela

Absent: Albania, Botswana, Cambodia, Chile, Congo (People's Rep.), Gabon, Gambia, Iceland, Maldives, Malta, South Africa, Swaziland

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973. [This and subsequent notes are part of the resolution.]

Rights resolutions 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968,¹ 6 (XXV) of 4 March 1969² and 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970,³ the telegram of 8 March 1968 to the Israeli authorities,⁴ the relevant resolutions of the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in 1968,⁵ Commission on the Status of Women resolution 7 (XXIII) of 9 April 1970⁶ and the relevant resolutions of the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,⁷

Noting with regret that the provisions of these resolutions have not been implemented by the Israeli authorities,

Gravely concerned for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel,

1. *Expresses its sincere appreciation* to the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories and to its members for their efforts in performing the task assigned to them;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to immediately implement the recommendations of the Special Committee embodied in its report,⁸ and to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

of 12 August 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions adopted by the various international organizations;

3. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, to continue its work and to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

4. *Urges* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work;

5. *Requests* the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the continued performance of its tasks;

7. *Decides* to inscribe on the provisional agenda of its twenty-sixth session an item entitled "Report (or Reports) of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

338

General Assembly Resolution 2728 (XXV) Approving the Report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and Requesting It To Continue its Work⁹

December 15, 1970

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,¹⁰

¹ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475), chapter XVIII.

² Ibid., Forty-sixth Session, document E/4621, chapter XVIII.

³ Ibid., Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 5 (E/4816), chapter XXIII.

⁴ Ibid., Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475), para. 400.

⁵ See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2), chapter III.

⁶ Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 6 (E/4831), chapter XII.

⁷ A/3089.

⁸ Ibid, paras. 145-156.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/Res/2728. Adopted unanimously at the plenary meeting.

¹⁰ A/8264.

Recalling its grave concern about the acute financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and its serious implications for the future work of the Agency,

Bearing in mind the need to take all possible measures to prevent the reduction of the services being provided to the Palestine refugees by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the urgency to undertake such action,

1. *Approves* the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

2. *Endorses* the recommendations contained in paragraph 10 of the Working Group's report and urges the full co-operation of all concerned for their implementation;

3. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its work in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 and the present resolution;

4. *Renews its appeal* to all Governments to join in a collective effort to solve the financial crisis of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

2. SECURITY COUNCIL

339

Security Council Resolution 279 Demanding Immediate Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanese Territory¹

May 12, 1970

The Security Council

Demands the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory.

¹ U.N. doc. S/Res/279. Adopted unanimously at the 1537th meeting.

340

Security Council Resolution 280 Condemning the Large-Scale and Premeditated Military Attack by Israel Against Lebanon²

May 19, 1970

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1537,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon³ and the Permanent Representative of Israel,⁴

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from violations of resolutions of the Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968 and 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969,

Convinced that the Israeli military attack against Lebanon was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned in nature,

Recalling its resolution 279 (1970) of 12 May 1970 demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory,

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to abide by resolutions 262 (1968) and 270 (1969);

2. *Condemns* Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Declares* that such armed attacks can no longer be tolerated and repeats its solemn warning to Israel that if they were to be repeated the Security Council would, in accordance with resolution 262 (1968) and the present resolution, consider taking ade-

² U.N. doc. S/Res/280. Adopted at the 1542nd meeting by a vote of 11 to none, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, U.S.A.).

³ U.N. doc. S/9794. [This and the subsequent note are part of the resolution.]

⁴ U.N. doc. S/9795.

quate and effective steps or measures in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter to implement its resolutions;

4. *Deplores* the loss of life and damage to property inflicted as a result of violations of resolutions of the Security Council.

341

Security Council Resolution 285 Demanding Complete and Immediate Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanese Territory¹

September 5, 1970

The Security Council

Demands the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory.

342

Security Council Resolution 286 Appealing to States to Take Steps To Prevent Hijacking²

September 9, 1970

The Security Council,

Gravely concerned at the threat to innocent civilian lives from the hijacking of aircraft and any other interference in international travel,

1. *Appeals* to all parties concerned for the immediate release of all passengers and crews without exception held as a result of hijackings and other interference in international travel;

2. *Calls on* States to take all possible legal steps to prevent further hijackings or any other interference with international civil air travel.

¹ U.N. doc. S/Res/285. Adopted at the 1551st meeting by a vote of 14 to none, with 1 abstention (U.S.A.).

² U.N. doc. S/Res/286. Adopted without vote at the 1552nd meeting.

3. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

343

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 10 (XXVI) Condemning Israel's Continued Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories³

March 23, 1970

The Commission on Human Rights,

Mindful of the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizing the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of peoples to justice, freedom and peace,

Recalling resolution I of the International Conference on Human Rights of May 1968 in which the Conference requested the Commission on Human Rights to keep the question of respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories under constant review,

Recalling also Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) and 259 (1968) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), in which the Council and the Assembly called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities, and General Assembly resolutions 2535 B (XXIV), which reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, and 2546 (XXIV), in which the Assembly expressed its grave concern at the continuing violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel and called upon Israel to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Con-

³ U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L.1082. Adopted at the 1082nd meeting:

In favor: 12. India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia

Against: -

Abstained: 16. Austria, Chile, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Jamaica, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, United Kingdom, U.S.A., Uruguay, Venezuela

vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

Recalling further its resolution 6 (XXV) by which it decided to establish a special working group of experts to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of that Convention,

Bearing in mind that the said Convention is binding upon Israel,

Recalling its resolution 5 B (XXVI) in which it considered violations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as war crimes and an affront to humanity in addition to being crimes,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating conditions of human rights in the militarily occupied territories in the Middle East,

Gravely disturbed about recent reports of the planned mass deportation of the Palestinian refugees (numbered 300,000) from the occupied Gaza Strip by the Israeli occupying authorities,

Having received and studied the report of the Special Working Group established under resolution 6 (XXV) to investigate allegations concerning Israel's violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the territories militarily occupied by Israel,

1. *Notes with dismay* the refusal of Israel to co-operate with the above-mentioned Working Group established by the Commission on Human Rights;

2. *Endorses* the conclusions of the Working Group concerning:

(a) The applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to all the occupied areas including occupied Jerusalem;

(b) The existence of violations of that Convention in the Israeli occupied territories;

3. *Condemns* Israel's refusal to apply that Convention and its violation of the provisions

of that Convention, in particular the following violations:

(a) The total or partial destruction of villages and cities in the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements in the militarily occupied Arab territories;

(c) The unlawful deportation and expulsion of civilian population;

(d) The coercive acts to compel the civilian population under its military occupation to collaborate with the occupying Power against their will;

(e) The abrogation of the national laws in occupied territories contrary to the Convention and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

(f) All policies and measures of collective punishment;

4. *Deplores* all policies and actions aiming at the deportation of the Palestinian refugees from the occupied Gaza Strip;

5. *Expresses its grave concern over:*

(a) The use of means of coercion to extract information and confession in violation of the relevant provisions of the Convention;

(b) The ill-treatment and killing of civilians without provocation;

(c) The detention of people by virtue of administrative orders for periods that are automatically renewed *ad infinitum*;

(d) The deprivation of those detainees of any guarantee concerning the length of detention and fair trial;

(e) The deprivation of the accused persons of having counsel of their choice, and the prevention of the counsel, in the cases where a counsel was chosen, from discharging their duties satisfactorily;

(f) The destruction and usurpation of movable and immovable property;

6. *Calls upon* Israel once more to observe

strictly that Convention in the occupied territories;

7. *Further calls upon* Israel immediately:

(a) To rescind all measures and to desist forthwith from taking any action prejudicial to the national laws, systems and practices in the occupied territories;

(b) To refrain from establishing settlements in the occupied territories;

(c) To cease immediately from compelling the inhabitants of the occupied territories to collaborate with the Israeli occupying authorities;

(d) To ensure the immediate return of deported and transferred persons to their homes without any formalities the fulfilment of which would render their return impossible;

(e) To refrain from demolishing houses in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Convention;

(f) To restore the property confiscated or otherwise taken from its owners in contravention of the provisions of the Convention;

8. *Also calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from deporting the Palestinian civilians from the Gaza Strip;

9. *Commends* the Special Working Group for its work and decides that the Working Group should continue to investigate and report the Israeli violations of that Convention which occur in the militarily occupied Arab territories since the outbreak of hostilities and to examine in particular:

(a) The evidence concerning the cases of torture taking place in the Israeli prisons against prisoners in the occupied territories;

(b) Other cases of violation of the Convention in the occupied territories which it has not yet investigated, including those that took place during the period investigated by the Group;

(c) The establishment of settlements in the occupied territories in contravention of the provisions of the Convention;

10. *Calls upon* Israel to receive the Special Working Group, to co-operate with and to facilitate its task in carrying out its mandate as specified in the preceding paragraph;

11. *Decides* to continue to include the question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of priority on the agenda of the Commission's twenty-seventh session;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give the widest publicity to the entire report and to report at the twenty-seventh session on the publicity given to it;

13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to bring the report of the Special Working Group, together with this resolution, to the attention of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

4. UNESCO

344

UNESCO Executive Board Decision 84 EX/4.2.1 Deploing Israel's Failure to Admit Textbooks approved by UNESCO¹

July 15, 1970

I

The Executive Board,

1. *Having examined* the Director-General's report (84 EX/5 and Add.) on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),

2. *Recalling* its previous decisions on this question and in particular decision 4.2.3 adopted at its eighty-third session,

3. *Having heard* the debate,

4. *Considering* the increasing shortage of textbooks in UNRWA/UNESCO schools for

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013), pp. 104-105. Adopted at the Eighty-fourth session.*

the refugee children from Palestine, especially in the occupied territories, and the serious damage this shortage inflicts on the credibility of their education,

5. *Realizing* that these innocent school-children are the direct victims and sufferers if this shortage continues,

6. *Commends* the Director-General on his continuous and dedicated efforts to implement its previous decisions in letter and spirit;

7. *Deplores*, with grave concern, the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with paragraph 7 of 83 EX/Decisions, 4.2.3 and physically admit all the textbooks approved by the Director-General of UNESCO into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools;

8. *Reiterates* its earnest call upon the Government of Israel to authorize, within the shortest possible time, the admittance of all textbooks approved by the Director-General into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the schools therein;

9. *Invites* all the parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Director-General in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Executive Board in order to ensure that the approved textbooks reach the hands of schoolchildren in the most convenient time;

10. *Asks* the Director-General, in the event of the Government of Israel failing to permit the importation into the occupied territories of these textbooks, to report urgently to the Board, in order to reconsider the matter and formulate its recommendations to the General Conference at its sixteenth session on the problem of textbooks in the occupied territories and the whole educational situation in UNRWA/UNESCO schools.

II

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalls* the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1969, which directed attention to the financial difficulties which UNRWA faces;

2. *Considers* that the great shortage in the resources of UNRWA will have a serious impact on the education of the children of Palestinian refugees;

3. *Supports* the recommendation of the Third Regional Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers responsible for Economic Planning in the Arab States convened by UNESCO in Morocco from 12 to 20 January 1970, to launch an international appeal describing the conditions of the Palestinian refugees and urging participation in the provision of assistance to ensure the improvement and continuation of educational services for those refugees;

4. *Authorizes* the Director-General to take the appropriate steps to launch this appeal for voluntary contributions to UNRWA;

5. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at a future session on the implementation of this resolution.

345

UNESCO Executive Board Decision 83 EX/4.3.1 Expressing Deep Concern at Israel's Violations of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Properties in the Event of Armed Conflict¹

1970

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth session and decision 4.4.2 adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd session,

3. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1969 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions 2253 and 2254

¹ UNESCO document 83 EX/12. Adopted at the Eighty-third session.

of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively, concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

4. *Noting* the report of the Director General (83 EX/12) and the observations submitted by the Commissioners-General in their recent reports (Annexes I, II and III to document 83 EX/12),

5. *Expresses* its deep concern at the violations by Israel of the Hague Convention, of resolutions 3.342 and 3.343 of the fifteenth session of the General Conference and of decision 82 EX/Decisions 4.4.2 of the Executive Board and at the disregard of the Recommendation on Archaeological Excavations which emerge from the reports of the Commissioners-General;

6. *Invites* Israel;

(a) To preserve scrupulously all the sites, buildings and other cultural properties, especially in the old city of Jerusalem;

(b) to desist from any archaeological excavations, the transfer of such properties and any change of their features or their cultural and historical character; and

(c) to adhere scrupulously to the provisions of the above-mentioned Convention, Recommendation, resolutions and decision;

7. *Invites* the Director-General, in agreement with the legally sovereign State concerned and in conformity with the United Nations resolutions mentioned in paragraph 3 of this resolution:

(a) To assist the parties concerned, both public and private, by technical advice relating either to questions of general import or to particular, specific problems and to supplement such advice by technical assistance designed to facilitate its application;

(b) to seek the means of ensuring the rigorous and effective application of the said Convention, Recommendation, resolutions and decision;

(c) to provide world public opinion with objective information on these matters with

a view to enlightening its judgement and also to promote, in connexion with the preservation of Jerusalem, a vast movement of understanding and mutual respect between the cultures whose historical roots are there;

8. *Requests* the Director-General to consult the Governments Parties to The Hague Convention on the advisability of calling, as soon as possible, a meeting of the High Contracting Parties with a view to studying means whereby the scope of the said Convention can be made clear and its efficacy enhanced and to report to the Board at its next session on the application of this decision.

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UNESCO Executive Board Decision 83 EX/4.3.1.1 Condemning the Burning of the Aqsa Mosque¹ 1970

The Executive Board,

1. *Profoundly distressed* by the extensive damage which an act of arson caused, on 21 August 1969, to the Sacred Mosque of Aqsa, in Jerusalem, under Israel military occupation,

2. *Aware* of the loss which the cultural heritage of mankind has thereby sustained,

3. *Having heard* the statements made to the Board, which bear witness to the universal indignation aroused by this sacrilegious act,

4. *Condemns* the criminal burning of the Aqsa Mosque as well as all those who are responsible for it.

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UNESCO Executive Board Decision 85 EX/4.1.2 Calling on Israel to Admit

¹ UNESCO document 83 EX/34 and Add. Adopted at the Eighty-third session.

UNRWA/UNESCO Textbooks Immediately After Their Approval by UNESCO¹

November 1970

I

The Executive Board,

1. *Having examined* the Director-General's Report (85 EX/4) on co-operation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and *having heard* his oral report on this subject,

2. *Recalling* its previous decisions on this question and in particular decisions 6.8, 4.2.5, 4.2.3 and 4.2.1 adopted at its 77th, 82nd, 83rd and 84th sessions respectively,

3. *Having heard* the debate,

4. *Commends* the Director-General on his dedicated, tireless and persistent efforts to implement its previous decisions in letter and spirit;

5. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the remarkable measure of success already achieved by UNESCO in this important endeavour;

6. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to authorize the admittance of all textbooks immediately after they have been approved by the Director-General into the occupied territories for distribution and use in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools therein;

7. *Asks* the Director-General, in the event of the Government of Israel failing to permit the importation of these textbooks into the occupied territories, to report urgently to the Executive Board;

8. *Also asks* the Director-General to report at a future session of the Executive Board on the situation in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools, wherever they are.

The Executive Board

1. *Recalling* its previous decision 4.2.1 adopted at its 84th session on the launching

of an international appeal for voluntary contributions for UNRWA,

2. *Reaffirming* its belief of the urgent need for such an appeal,

3. *Asks* the Director-General to launch the appeal as soon as he deems the circumstances favourable;

4. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board at the Spring session of 1971 on the implementation of this resolution.

5. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

348

World Health Organization Resolution WHA23.52 Calling for the Immediate Return of the Refugees and for Israel To Abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention²

May 21, 1970

The Twenty-third World Health Assembly,

Mindful of the principle that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security;

Having considered the Director-General's report of 1 May 1970, and the annual report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA);

Recalling its resolutions WHA21.38 and WHA22.43 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

Noting with grave concern that the refusal to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, as well as the refusal to apply United Nations resolutions regarding the refugees and displaced persons continue to cause immense sufferings to the life and health of the inhabitants of the

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413), pp. 101-102. Adopted at the Eighty-fifth session.*

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8013), pp. 101-102. Adopted at the fifteenth plenary meeting.*

occupied territories as well as the refugees and the displaced persons in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions WHA21.38 and WHA22.43 on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons;

2. *Deems it necessary*, for the protection of the life and physical and mental health of the refugees and displaced persons, that they be immediately afforded their right to return to their homes, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

3. *Calls upon* Israel, for the safeguarding of the life and the physical and mental health of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, to abide by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;

4. *Expresses* its appreciation to the Director-General of the WHO, the Director of Health of UNRWA and to the specialized and other organizations that provide assistance to the refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East; and

5. *Requests* the Director-General of the WHO

(a) to issue a world-wide appeal to Governments and humanitarian organizations, to make available to the International Committee of the Red Cross, material and human aid to the inhabitants of the occupied territories;

(b) to take all other effective measures in his power to safeguard health conditions amongst refugees, displaced persons and the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East;

(c) to report to the Twenty-fourth World Health Assembly on the implementation of this resolution.

6. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

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Declaration by the International Civil Aviation Organization on Acts of Violence Against Civil Air Transport¹

Montreal, late June 1970

Whereas international civil air transport helps to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the peoples of the world and promotes commerce between nations:

Whereas acts of violence directed against international civil air transport and airports and other facilities used by such transport jeopardize the safety thereof, seriously affect the operation of international air services and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of international civil air transport;

Whereas Contracting States, noting the increasing number of acts of violence against international air transport, are gravely concerned with the safety and security of such air transport;

The Assembly

Condemns all acts of violence which may be directed against aircraft, aircraft crews and passengers engaged in international civil air transport;

Condemns all acts of violence which may be directed against civil aviation personnel, civil airports and other facilities used by international civil air transport;

Urgently Calls Upon States not to have recourse, under any circumstances, to acts of violence directed against international civil air transport and airports and other facilities serving such transport;

Urgently Calls Upon States, pending the

¹ *External Affairs* (Canada), XXII, 9 (September 1970), pp. 306-307. This declaration was agreed on by an Extraordinary Assembly of the I.C.A.O. which met from June 16-30, 1970.

coming into force of appropriate international conventions, to take effective measures to deter and prevent such acts and to ensure, in accordance with their national laws, the prosecution of those who commit such acts.

Adopts The Following Declaration:

The Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization

Meeting in Extraordinary Session to deal with the alarming increase in acts of unlawful seizure and of violence against international civil air transport aircraft, civil airport installations and related facilities;

Mindful of the principles enunciated in the Convention on International Civil Aviation;

Recognizing the urgent need to use all of the Organization's resources to prevent and deter such acts;

Solemnly

1. *Deplores* acts which undermine the confidence placed in air transport by the peoples of the world.

2. *Expresses* regret for the loss of life and injury and damage to important economic resources caused by such acts.

3. *Condemns* all acts of violence which may be directed against aircraft, crews and passengers engaged in, and against civil aviation personnel, civil airports and other facilities used by, international civil air transport.

4. *Recognizes* the urgent need for a consensus among States in order to secure widespread international co-operation in the interests of the safety of international civil air transport.

5. *Requests* concerted action on the part of States towards suppressing all acts which jeopardize the safe and orderly development of international civil air transport.

6. *Requests* application, as soon as possible, of the decisions and recommendations of this Assembly so as to prevent and deter such acts.

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Resolution To Combat Hijacking Adopted by International Civil Aviation Organization¹

Montreal, October 1, 1970

The Council,

Finding that a heightened threat to the safety and security of international civil air transport exists as a result of acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft involving the detention of passengers, crew and aircraft contrary to the principles of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes, and the destruction of such aircraft;

Recognizing that Contracting States to the Convention on International Civil Aviation have obligated themselves to ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world;

Calls upon Contracting States, in order to ensure the safety and security of international civil air transport, upon request of a Contracting State to consult together immediately with a view to deciding what joint action should be undertaken, in accordance with international law, without excluding measures such as the suspension of international civil air transport services to and from any State which after the unlawful seizure of an aircraft, detains passengers, crew or aircraft contrary to the principles of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes, or any State which, contrary to the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, fails to extradite or prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure for international blackmail purposes;

Directs the Legal Committee to consider during its Eighteenth Session, if necessary by extension of the session, an international convention or other international instruments:

(i) to give effect to the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph;

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIII, 1634 (October 19, 1970), p. 453.

(ii) to provide for joint action by States to take such measures as may be appropriate in other cases of unlawful seizure; and

(iii) to provide for amendment of bilateral air transport agreements of contracting parties to remove all doubt concerning the authority to join in taking such action against any State.

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International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft¹

The Hague, December 16, 1970

Preamble

The States Parties to this Convention:

Considering that unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of control of aircraft in flight jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation;

Considering that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern;

Considering that, for the purpose of deterring such acts, there is an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for punishment of offenders;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:

(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or

(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as "the offence").

Article 2

Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe penalties.

Article 3

1. For the purposes of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board.

2. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.

3. This Convention shall apply only if the place of take-off or the place of actual landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is committed is situated outside the territory of the State of registration of that aircraft; it shall be immaterial whether the aircraft is engaged in an international or domestic flight.

4. In the cases mentioned in Article 5, this Convention shall not apply if the place of take-off and the place of actual landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is committed are situated within the territory of the same State where that State is one of those referred to in that Article.

5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, Articles 6, 7, 8 and 10 shall apply whatever the place of take-off or the place of actual landing of the aircraft, if the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State other than the State of registration of that aircraft.

Article 4

1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of violence against passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in con-

¹ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, February 20-27, 1971, pp. 24456-24457. Prepared by the International Conference of Air Law, held at The Hague, December 1-16, 1970, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

nexion with the offence, in the following cases:

(a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that State;

(b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board;

(c) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that State.

2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

Article 5

The Contracting States which establish joint air transport operating organizations, or international operating agencies which operate aircraft which are subject to joint or international registration shall, by appropriate means, designate for each aircraft the State among them which shall exercise the jurisdiction and have the attributes of the State of registration for the purpose of this Convention and shall give notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation Organization, which shall communicate the notice to all States Parties to this Convention.

Article 6

1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present, shall take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any

criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.

2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.

3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national.

4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft, the State mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 (c), the State of nationality of the detained person and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

Article 7

The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.

Article 8

1. The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option con-

sider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offence as an extraditable offence between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

4. The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.

Article 9

1. When any of the acts mentioned in Article 1 (a) has occurred or is about to occur, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.

2. In the cases contemplated by the preceding paragraph, any Contracting State in which the aircraft or its passengers or crew are present shall facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable, and shall without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.

Article 10

1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offence and other acts mentioned in Article 4. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases.

2. The provision of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not affect obligations under any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual assistance in criminal matters.

Article 11

Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its national law report to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization as promptly as possible any relevant information in its possession concerning:

- (a) the circumstances of the offence;
- (b) the action taken pursuant to Article 9;
- (c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged offender, and in particular the results of any extradition proceedings or other legal proceedings.

Article 12

1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.

2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention, or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The other Contracting States shall not be bound by the preceding paragraph with respect to any Contracting State having made such a reservation.

3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the Depositary Governments.

Article 13

1. This Convention shall be open for signature at The Hague on December 16, 1970, by States participating in the International Conference on Air Law held at The Hague from December 1-16, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Hague Conference).

After December 31, 1970, the Convention shall be open to all States for signature in Moscow, London and Washington. Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Convention shall enter into force 30 days following the date of the deposit of instruments of ratification by 10 States signatory to this Convention which participated in the Hague Conference.

4. For other States, this Convention shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with para-

graph 3 of this Article, or 30 days following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession, whichever is later.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Convention, and other notices.

6. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and pursuant to Article 83 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944).

Article 14

1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Depositary Governments.

2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the date on which notification is received by the Depositary Governments.

Arab World

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Libyan Newspaper Interview with Secretary-General Habbash of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the Unity of the Commando Organizations¹

early January, 1970

Q. In your view, what are the reasons for the differences among the commando organizations?

A. Before discussing the differences, we must put on record that the keynote of the situation lies in the points of agreement between the organizations, and that any differences must be seen in the context of all the commando organizations meeting on a historical common ground. These organizations are in agreement on the objective, which is the liberation of Palestine, and they are in agreement on the method, which is the popular war of liberation. Once we have all got this firmly fixed in our minds, we can discuss the differences and the reasons for them.

Certainly what lies behind the differences between the commando organizations is a disparity of points of view on the nature of the battle and the strategy required to fight it. For example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that the enemy we are confronting in this battle is not the State of Israel alone. It believes that a scientific definition of the enemy, based on 52 years of struggle by the Palestinian people, must include Israel, the Zionist movement, world imperialism and Arab reaction.

This definition is not a mere fabrication out of nothing; it is the bitter struggle of our people since the Balfour Declaration that has taught them that their struggle to liberate Palestine will always be confronted by this hostile alliance, so that they must prepare for the battle on this basis.

This scientific political definition forms the basis of one of the Front's lines of strategic military action—the right of the Palestinian

resistance to strike at the interests of the Zionist movement anywhere in the world, and also our right to strike at the interests of imperialism which brought Israel into existence, and still provides it with all kinds of support.

In the light of this principle it is possible to explain and understand some of the blows delivered by the Front, such as the destruction of the American plane at Damascus Airport, the blowing up of the Tapline pipeline in the area occupied by Israel, the burning of Marks and Spencer stores in London, and so on. . . .

Q. How can these differences be ended?

A. Firstly: There can be no doubt that the progress of the battle and the incidents that take place in it will provide us with the right answers to some of the points on which there is no agreement at present. The important thing is that the commando organizations should be capable of reconsidering their attitudes in the light of the clear answers provided by the battle. Events themselves will play a major role in unifying views on issues it has so far proved difficult to agree on through mere discussion.

Secondly: Scientific comradely discussion can also bring about a *rapprochement* of points of view and make us more capable of understanding each other.

Thirdly: The important thing is that we should learn to cooperate in spite of our differences, for as long as there are essential points of agreement we should be able to find a formula for cooperation on a basis of these points, even if points of view continue to differ.

This is the natural and scientific solution of this problem at the present stage. It is the solution adopted by many revolutionary experiences in the world. The establishment of a broad national front which rallies all the commando organizations around an agreed national program is the solution to the problem of national unity at the present time.

Cooperation in the form of a front will ensure agreement on basic common issues. It will also allow each organization to implement its own view of the battle in the case of

¹ Interview originally published in *al-Thawra* (Libya), 1970; this text is a translation of the Arabic text published in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), January 17, 1970.

points on which there is no agreement at present. In this way differences of points of view will, in the long run, work in the interests of the battle rather than working against it.

We cannot end these differences by removing them by force; this would be a mistake, and would open the door to internal conflicts. Nor can we sidetrack differences which exist objectively by emotional appeals.

The scientific solution is the broad national front which, based on a general national program, will draw up programs for cooperation in the various fields. It will also leave each organization free to engage in independent activities in conformity with its convictions, which can neither be suppressed by force nor sidetracked by emotional appeals. This is how the Front understands the problem of the differences among the commando organizations, and the manner in which these differences should be coped with.

There remains one final point—the fact that some of the commando organizations have not yet really succeeded in justifying their existence as separate entities. They have not offered any new ideas or any new and distinctive strategy for the battle and they have not suggested a new method of fighting. Thus, the only way they can cope with the problem is by relying on the time factor and on the facts being made known to the masses.

Q. Where do you think the battle should be fought? In the occupied territories, or anywhere in the world?

A. The real field of the battle is, by the nature of things, in the occupied territory; there can be no disputing this. Striking at the enemy's elements of support and his interests outside Palestine must be complementary to the basic line of action, so the Front believes, not an alternative to it. The greater part of the Front's activities, effectiveness and military efforts are, by the nature of things, located in Palestine—in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the area occupied since 1948.

To sum up: the Front, in the light of its definition and conception of the enemy, believes that it is necessary and profitable to

go after the enemy everywhere; from its appraisal of the effects of this line of action, the Front believes that it is advantageous to the cause and to the battle. It has inflicted material and moral injury on the enemy and presented our case at world level.

Q. Do you not think that the commandos' disagreements on methods of action diminish the importance of such action in the eyes of the world?

A. Naturally world public opinion is of interest to us, but it can never be the ultimate criterion in our judgement of affairs. After 52 years of struggle against Zionism and colonialism, we have come to know our enemy and the ways of confronting him better than world opinion does. We must confront the enemy and plan for the battle in the light of our own understanding of our problem. In the long run, world public opinion will be with us to the extent that we prove that we deserve to live and are worthy of our right to our homeland and our freedom. The life of humiliation and misery that the Palestinian people have been living for twenty years in the camps of despair is bound to leave its mark on our way of thinking and the way we cope with things. What is required is not that we should understand the circumstances of the world but that, first and foremost, the world should understand our circumstances.

Q. What is the attitude of commando action to the Four Power peace talks?

A. We ourselves shall decide our battle in the territory of our homeland, and we ourselves shall decide our own destiny. The basis of action at this stage lies in acknowledgement of the situation embodied in the existence of Israel, and the Palestinian revolution is based on the rejection of this situation. There can be no coexistence between the Palestinian revolution and any political action based on recognition of Israel's right to exist.

Q. In your view, what are the aims of commando action?

A. That it should escalate into an Arab

popular war of liberation that will put an end to the existence of Israel.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Majdani of Lebanon to the Lebanese Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, January 6, 1970

Members of Parliament,

It gives me great pleasure to meet you today so that I may acquaint you with the most important foreign problems we are attending to, and benefit from your views on them.

It seems clear to me that the point we must start from if we are to understand the present situation is that Israel has refused to submit to the resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967, which refusal has frustrated all efforts that have been made so far. It has become clear that Israel will not agree to a reasonable settlement, but is intent on vast expansion at the expense of the neighboring Arab countries, disregarding the views and resolutions of the United Nations and relying exclusively on force, violence and coercion.

Faced with this situation, the Joint Defense Council met in Cairo in the first half of November. At this meeting the countries concerned came to the conclusion that attempts to arrive at a peaceful solution had reached an impasse because of Israel's obduracy. They proposed that the Arabs should strengthen their defensive capacity to defend their rights and recover those usurped by Israel. The Commander-in-Chief of the Western and Eastern Fronts submitted a report containing proposals as regards the support required by the countries on the line of confrontation, and on a possible basis for the distribution of burdens among the

majority of the Arab countries.

The Palestine Liberation Organization stated what it required to strengthen its organization and consolidate their activities, and the Secretariat-General submitted to the Defense Council a study of the conditions under which Arab residents in the occupied territories are living and the material support they need.

The Defense Council studied all these problems and, in view of their extreme importance, it was agreed to leave it to the Kings and Presidents to take decisions on them. It was also proposed that the Summit Conference should meet in Rabat on January 20.

Naturally Lebanon welcomed this proposal, attended the Conference and took part in its activities, because it believes in Arab cooperation and the necessity of establishing such cooperation on clear and solid foundations. The Lebanese delegation to Rabat was headed by the President of the Republic and included the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defense and the Interior.

The delegation made a stop at Paris, where the President and the Prime Minister met the President of the French Republic. This visit provided an opportunity to strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries at the highest level and to discuss affairs that are of concern to both of them in the present international situation.

The members of the Lebanese delegation were able to present their point of view on the present conflict in the Middle East. They commended France's friendly attitude to Lebanon and to the Arab countries in general. They also pointed out that the aggravation of the situation was due to Israel's obstinacy and obduracy, and emphasized that it was a mistake to believe that the military situation which had resulted from the June War had opened the way to solutions which the Arabs regarded as involving surrender, for they would never surrender, whatever it cost them to hold out and whatever sacrifices were involved. It was thus clear that it was the duty of the Great Powers to face up to their responsibilities fully in this grave state of affairs, since, if the situation

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in Lebanon, Ministry of Information, *National News Agency Bulletin* (Arabic edition), No. 2568 (January 6, 1970).

in the Middle East exploded, it was liable to have profound and extensive repercussions from whose consequences no country could escape.

The French President's attitude was extremely understanding and friendly. He reaffirmed what his Foreign Minister had said to the President of Lebanon when he called on him as soon as he arrived in Paris. The Lebanese government is absolutely convinced that the French government will not relinquish the attitude it adopted immediately after the June War and reaffirmed even more strongly after the Israeli aggression against Beirut Airport. The Lebanese government is sure that the French government will never be remiss in supporting the legitimate rights of the Arabs; that as it has done in the past, it today supports the independence, sovereignty and security of Lebanon, and that it is seriously seeking just solutions that will cover all aspects of the conflict, including the rights of the Palestinian people.

The French President agreed that the President of Lebanon should undertake the task of informing the Arab Kings and Presidents of their talks.

The visit to Paris provided Lebanon with a new opportunity to undertake a conspicuous role in the field of information, which role His Excellency the President performed personally in a series of interviews and statements which were disseminated by world television and radio stations; press agencies and the international press. These talks were faithfully recorded, published and broadcast, and made an effective contribution to the presentation and clarification of the Arab point of view to world public opinion. One Paris newspaper, however, did not record His Excellency the President's speech, but reproduced a free version of it, including a number of alterations, which it published in a series of morning instalments.

Here I should like to announce that the statement submitted by the Commander-in-Chief stated that the countries on the line of confrontation are those that have established special defensive relations with each

other, either because Israel has occupied parts of their territory, or because they had actually taken part in the military operations in June 1967. These countries are: the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. The Commander-in-Chief proposed that the other countries, which are regarded as the supporting countries, Lebanon being one of them, should support the defensive efforts that are being made by the countries on the line of confrontation. Lebanon agreed to perform what was asked of it within the framework of joint Arab efforts; it is determined and able to carry out what it has undertaken, from the conviction that the reinforcement of its defensive capacity is to its own advantage and that of all the Arab countries.

It is my duty to announce that, in adopting this attitude, Lebanon was not gambling or taking foolhardy risks. In all its statements Lebanon has taken account not only of its duty and its sincere wish to share in joint Arab efforts, but also of its real potential and of its present political, military and economic situation, and of the responsibility which falls to the state for coping with this situation, both on the southern frontiers and in all other parts of the country. It was obvious both to the members of the Lebanese delegation and to all the officials in the other Arab delegations, that collaboration within a framework of mutual respect is not only possible and profitable, but essential, however different the regimes of the countries concerned and however various their methods and concepts of government. Indeed, this variety is a source of strength, rather than a factor for weakness and division. It was also clear that among the elements that must be taken into account in distributing the roles and responsibilities among those who are associated in the enterprise is the disparity between the potentials of the Arab countries; each of them is to offer of its best as generously as it can afford; in this way the resources and potentials of all can be integrated.

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Statement of Policy on Commando Activity by the National Command of the Ba'ath Party (Excerpt)¹

Damascus, January 8, 1970

Commando activity has imposed itself as a revolutionary reality not only on the advocates of defeatism and surrender who have long doubted it and fought against it, but also throughout the Arab world and at world level. Commando activity has become one of the strongest hopes of the Arab peoples and they cannot accept that there should be bargaining over it.

Struggling masses of our people:

The complex circumstances which surround the Arab battle and the nature of the imperialist and Zionist plans directed against the existence of the Arabs and aimed at undermining the Arab liberation movement leave only one avenue of confrontation.

The Party conferences, drawing their inspiration from the will of the Arab masses and the requirements of the revolution, have adopted a strategy for the future based upon confrontation, endurance, continued battle, the pursuit of a policy based on principles and the choice of means that are appropriate to the ends and will ensure their achievement. The basic pivot of this confrontation is armed struggle to liberate the usurped land, to press forward on the road to liberation and to employ all other economic, political and information means to serve that end.

In the light of this, the Party has laid down the general principles for a long and continuous battle, starting from the principle of self-reliance which derives from confidence in the abilities of the Arab masses who possess the unlimited resources, firm faith and unwavering resolution that will enable them to play an effective and decisive role in our battle of destiny.

The principle of self-reliance in confronting the colonialist challenges and frustrating

all hostile designs was the basis adopted by the Party in order to assemble all resources, to enable every citizen to play his role in the battle, to mobilize everything for the battle, to construct the economic base and to continue with production projects of all kinds.

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Lebanese Foreign Ministry Memorandum on Israeli Attacks on Lebanon Delivered to the Ambassadors of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States²

Beirut, January 10, 1970

For some days there have been repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon, sometimes even several times a day. These attacks have been preceded, accompanied and followed by threats, uttered over the radio and television and in the press, by Israeli officials who now no longer conceal their aggressive intentions not only against the security of Lebanon, but also against its territorial integrity.

It is incontestable that the escalation of violence that we are now witnessing has two aspects. Firstly, it is directed against the civilian population. Secondly, its perpetrators are no longer troubling to follow their usual custom of making the futile excuse that it is in reply to the Palestinian resistance, realizing that this excuse cannot throw any responsibility on Lebanon, inasmuch as Israel alone must bear all the consequences. This is because the presence and activities of Palestinians in Lebanese territory are the result of Israel's aggressive policy which has led to the eviction of the Palestinians and which refuses to submit to the Security Council resolutions.

Acts of violence against both civilian and military targets without discrimination are always barbarous wherever they take place; how much more so when they are directed exclusively against civilians, and in particular when, in concentrating such acts against

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), January 9, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 11, 1970.

civilians, the aggressor uses his regular forces to kidnap some of them.

This conduct is reminiscent of the most iniquitous stage of the so-called policy of hostages for which the Nazi machinery of repression was so strongly criticized in the last war. It also recalls what is known as tribal responsibility—the policy that used to be employed in the earliest times and which it had been thought that an ancient civilization stretching back many centuries had put an end to. Such conduct must be condemned in the name of all agreements and all legal systems, whether of human or divine origin.

The details of Israeli aggressions have been minutely reported to the Security Council every time as they occurred, and in reporting them today to the representatives of the four Great Powers which have special responsibilities at the Security Council, and in submitting this complaint to your governments, Lebanon is basing its case not only on its legitimate rights and interests, but also on the fundamental requirements of civilized human life.

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Statement by the Palestine Commando Organizations on Attempts by Lebanon To Violate the Cairo Agreement¹

Amman, January 10, 1970

To the Lebanese and Palestinian Masses: Attempts have recently been made by the Lebanese authorities to violate the Cairo Agreement which, in the view of the resistance movement, constitutes the minimum

requirement for the solution of the crisis between commando action and the Lebanese government.

During the past week the Lebanese government has taken a series of measures to impede the commando action organizations' freedom of movement, and has attempted, by these measures, to destroy the unity of the resistance movement. It has tried to achieve this by allowing freedom of movement to some of the organizations and denying it to others. It has also taken measures to limit freedom of military action. In addition, the authorities are trying to restrict training in the Palestinian refugee camps; this is incompatible with the right of the Palestinian people to mobilize all their forces for the liberation of their land, as guaranteed by the Cairo Agreement.

All sections of the resistance movement see these measures as heralding a renewal of the crisis that was brought to an end by the Cairo Agreement, and just as they are scrupulously abiding by everything in that agreement, call on Lebanon to abide by the obligations it entered into under that agreement.

In bringing this situation to the attention of the Palestinian and Lebanese masses, all sections of the resistance movement reject these measures and call on all nationalist and progressive forces in Lebanon to maintain their solidarity with the Palestinian resistance movement. They also call on all the resistance organizations to form a compact front to protect the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to continue fighting to liberate their homeland.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), January 11, 1970.

This statement was signed by the following organizations: The Palestinian Liberation Movement, al-Sa'iqa, the Popular Forces for Liberation, the Popular Front, the Arab Palestine Organization, the Liberation Front, the Action Movement for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Struggle Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Popular Front and the General Command of Ahmad Za'rur's Organization.

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Lebanese Newspaper Interview with Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on the Palestine Revolution in the Aftermath of the Arab Summit Conference at Rabat (Excerpts)¹

January 14, 1970

The Conference was deliberately sabotaged. I smelled a whiff of peaceful solutions, or rather surrender solutions, which was released to sabotage the Conference. But you may be confident that the revolution, which has awakened a people of refugees and transformed them into a people of fighters, has also awakened the Arab conscience and Arab dignity. Our nation is a proud, noble and sensitive nation which will never allow its conscience, once aroused, to be quelled. We have obtained full copies of every peace project, of every solution that has been submitted to the Arab countries, and in every solution there is a central paragraph that demands the destruction of the Palestinian revolution.

We shall triumph over international conspiracies. I have always said that 1969 was the year of Arab conspiracies against the revolution, and we have triumphed over all of them. And now I say that 1970 is the year of international conspiracies against the revolution, and I reaffirm that we shall triumph over them too.

You have heard George Brown's optimistic statements about the peaceful solution. When I was in Baghdad Brown came there in an attempt to meet me, and I left immediately for Kuwait.

This month the revolution is five years old, from the date when its first shot was fired. At the start attempts were made to cast doubts on the efficacy of this revolution, sometimes with bad, sometimes with good

intentions. In spite of this it continued to progress, and made its great leap forward after the Battle of Karameh. If we want the truth without exaggeration, if we want a true appraisal, we can say that the revolution stands today at the beginning of a road on which it constitutes a danger to Israel. So far it has not constituted such a danger, but it is beginning to constitute a danger to the Zionist entity.

As I have already said, the revolution has been subjected to campaigns of scepticism, and the slogan of "the democratic State" which it has proposed has been the object of a concentrated campaign, even by some of our Arab brethren. This slogan, which has been adopted by Fateh, follows the original slogan which calls for the liberation of the land and the elimination of the Zionist entity, and then the establishment of a democratic Arab state on the debris of that criminal expansionist entity, so that Christian and Muslim Palestinians may be able to live with Jews with the same rights and obligations.

We have refused all invitations to compromise. For had we wanted any other way than that of liberation, we should have accepted the proposals that have been made to the Palestinian people in their dozens for the establishment of a Palestinian state and entity side by side with the Zionist state and entity. But we have rejected such proposals and this rejection has resulted in many deaths every day—only yesterday five of our men fell.

We also reject Ahmad al-Shuqairi's words about throwing the Jews into the sea; the idea is not acceptable to the world, nor is it to us. But we shall absolutely never accept the theft of our homeland, our land and our homes and the eviction of our families.

We shall never liquidate any commando organization by force, as happened in the case of the Algerian revolution. In Algeria seven organizations were liquidated by force, and the first Evian talks failed because the

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), January 20, 1970. The interview was granted to *al-Anwar* during Arafat's visit to the Arabian Gulf.

Algerian National Liberation Front insisted that it was the sole representative of the Algerian people, whereas France wanted to include Musalli al-Hajj's movement and others in the negotiations.

There were 33 organizations in the Palestinian revolution; 23 organizations have been liquidated either by dissolving themselves or amalgamating themselves with other organizations or because they lost the initiative, and the remainder are still in the field.

We have no intention of engaging in armed liquidation for a number of considerations. Firstly because, fundamentally, we do not believe in this method. Secondly, these organizations and their conflicts are part and parcel of the conflict within the Arab nation—and what are we if not part of that nation? Thirdly because some of these organizations are attached to Arab countries, so that an armed dispute with them would mean an armed dispute with those countries.

In the Vietnamese revolution the National Liberation Front includes 21 organizations, of which the Vietcong are the backbone. In the same way Fateh is the backbone of the Palestinian revolution.

The strength of Fateh derives from the fact that it absolutely refuses to be classified as either leftist or rightist, Eastern or Western, and that it also refuses to be linked to any Arab country. Fateh received offers from many Arab countries, which tried to tempt it with money and arms, when it was still in urgent need of everything, but it rejected all these offers. The Arab countries are today grouped in six axes; why should we attach ourselves to one of these axes, when to do so would offend the others?

Q. What was the object of your visit to Kuwait and the Gulf area?

A. After the Fifth Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, I visited all the countries of the Arab Maghreb. Then I visited Cairo, Baghdad and Kuwait. Today I am in the Gulf, and tomorrow I shall be in Saudi Arabia, and in other countries, in conformity

with the recommendation of the Summit Conference that bilateral contacts should be made with each country in the hope that they might allocate funds for the Palestine Liberation Organization.

I want to make clear what really happened at Rabat. Funds, to a total of £35 million, were allocated for arms contracts which the United Arab Republic was to carry out immediately.

At the last session of the Conference the atmosphere of the Conference provoked me into speaking frankly. I said that the revolution was proceeding and would not stop. It had started without the benefit of any conference or recommendations, and would continue its historical advance without the benefit of conferences or recommendations. I spoke of the sacrifices made by the commandos, of the way the Palestinians are holding out in Gaza and the West Bank, of the terrorism and the blowing up of houses.

When I had finished my speech, President Gamal Abdel Nasser came up to me and said: "Abu Ammar, I renounce the sums allocated for the United Arab Republic in favor of the Palestinian people, to support their endurance, and in favor of the Palestinian revolution." I hastened to reply: "Brother Abdel Nasser, I refuse to take anything from the Egyptian people or from the Egyptian soldier who is daily fighting such noble battles on the Canal Front and being subjected to such vicious attacks."

I did not for any specific sum from any Arab country I visited, but I gave a detailed statistical exposé of the sacrifices and requirements of the Palestinian people and revolution, leaving it to the Arab countries to decide the extent of their participation. As regards the sum of four million Libyan pounds, this matter was discussed before the Summit Conference, and Libya decided to pay it to us at the beginning of April of this year, and also expressed its readiness to provide as much aid as it possibly could.

We are not confronting Israel alone; along with Israel we are confronting all the forces of colonialism and imperialism. Here I want to give you an illustration of the importance of the psychological and information warfare

at which Israel is so good and which it is waging against us and the Arab nation, a war which it is essential that we should confront with faith and confidence.

In 1968 Fateh was confronted with an extremely serious problem. For three months the commando bases and groups refused to lay mines in the occupied territories. This came after a campaign by certain Arab newspapers belittling the importance of this method of action, which affected the morale of our combatants.

When I went to the U.S.S.R. with President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Abd al-Mun'im Riyadh, the late Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army, the latter said to me: "You must lay mines—you must lay mines—nothing does so much to affect the morale of an enemy army, to confuse him and impede his movements as the mine. It is one of the most important and dangerous weapons that can be used; it confuses the enemy, wears him out and inflicts on him losses thousands of times more costly than the price of the mine." Ten mines costing a hundred dinars mean that 75 per cent of the enemy's military and engineer patrols have to spend long hours searching for them, and eventually if only one of these mines is effective, it inflicts on them between 15 and 25,000 dinars' worth of damage.

I have absolutely no doubt that whoever raised this matter in the Arab press was a hireling of colonialism and Zionism. The combatants said, "We want confrontation, we want to fight, we do not want to lay mines and then withdraw—even though in laying mines our losses are only 5 per cent."

Q. What about the Israeli soldier captured by Fateh in the Mutla settlement?

A. This is only the start. The Zionist authorities must negotiate with the Palestinian Red Crescent through the International Red Cross, not through their official bodies. We shall not hand him over in any other way.

Two weeks ago Moshe Dayan said in the village of Halhul in the Hebron District: "It's us or Fateh." We say that Fateh will rule over the ruins of the criminal Zionist entity

and the houses they have blown up. In Gaza the commandos rule by night and the Israelis by day; this is something Israel knows very well.

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Statement Issued by the Palestine National Liberation Movement Fateh Condemning a Bomb Attack on a Jewish School in Lebanon¹

Beirut, January 19, 1970

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement Fateh censures the criminal act of aggression to which the Jewish school in Beirut was subjected, and condemns it in the name of the armed Palestinian revolution which was launched to combat racialism and to establish a democratic state in Palestinian territory in which Muslims, Christians and Jews can live on a basis of equality without discrimination.

Today the Palestinian revolution urges the Palestinian and Arab masses to practice greater caution and vigilance so as to frustrate all colonialist-Zionist conspiracies aimed at terrorizing Arab citizens of the Jewish faith into emigrating to Palestine, where, whether they like it or not, they will become soldiers in the enemy's army and provide support for his racialist and aggressive state.

We are sincerely determined to stand by these citizens and to offer them our protection, and we condemn all attempts to terrorize them, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere.

The Palestinian revolution will continue to work for the liberation of Palestine and for the destruction of racialist Zionism, which is the enemy of both mankind and religion.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), January 20, 1970. (At dawn on January 18, 1970, a bomb was thrown at a school belonging to the Jewish community in Beirut.)

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Television Speech by King Hasan of Morocco on Support to the Palestine Liberation Organization (Excerpts)¹

Rabat, January 22, 1970

I want to speak to you, my beloved people, on the subject of our solidarity with our Palestinian brethren. I have heard from an official of the Liberation Front, and it has also been mentioned in a discussion in the press, that I have promised that Morocco will contribute a certain sum of money to assist the Palestinians.

You may well ask why it is only this year that Morocco has thought of assisting Palestine in this manner.

The reasons are obvious and logical. The first is that until last year we had not felt that what is called the Palestine Liberation Organization was sufficiently serious.

Secondly: We had never felt that this organization was determined not to be the object of a deal, the object of bargaining by any Arab country or regime.

Thirdly: We came to understand that this organization had set itself new targets, had found a new, logical and realistic way out which could both attract the interest of official circles, and secure their acceptance—although it only represents a population of a million and a half—could secure their acceptance of that undertaking, the undertaking to coexist without distinction and in a democratic manner with all the inhabitants of usurped Palestine, whatever their race or religion—to live with them on a basis of democracy and equality.

It was then that it became clear to us that this was the only way of solving the Middle East crisis.

It is impossible that any Arab country, whether or not it is on the line of confrontation, should recognize the present frontiers of

a Zionist state, a state that practices racial discrimination, without betraying the Palestinian cause in so doing.

Secondly, no great power, neither Russia, nor America nor France nor Britain has ever helped any Arab country to take all the Israelis and throw them into the sea.

Thirdly, every one used to think that there was an imbalance between one hundred million Arabs who wanted to take vengeance on two and a half million poor Jews and devour them.

But now the problem has changed; it has become the problem of a million and a half Palestinians who came from there, who were born there, who want to return to their homeland although there are two and a half million non-Muslims in it.

Despite this disproportion they agree, as I have told you, to that undertaking to ensure free, democratic and peaceful coexistence, just as the different groups and communities live together in Lebanon, for example. There are indeed some who say that this is a dream. I myself, indeed, do not expect the leaders of the organization to adopt this solution wholeheartedly overnight, nor do I expect the Israeli authorities to agree to this trend. It is as if we had told the Residents-General in Morocco and Tunis, or those feudal capitalists that there used to be in Algeria, to sign a document proclaiming the independence of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

But I am convinced that the rising generations of Israelis themselves, and those who were born in that country, and speak Arabic as well as I do, and live an Arab life just as we do, will realize, and become mature enough to be convinced that this is the solution that is appropriate to their past, their future and their present.

And the Great Powers will also reach the same inevitable conclusion.

The solution does not depend on Cairo, or Jordan or Syria, the capitals of the countries which were the victims of the aggression, but on the Palestinians, whether they be Muslims or Jews.

When I say "Palestinians," I do not exclude either the Palestinian Jews or the Palestinian Muslims.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anba'* (Rabat), January 23, 1970.

Therefore in view of this action, in view of this window which, God willing, will become a door, and later several doors, which will light the way for us and give us broader horizons; in view of the seriousness of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in view of its determination that it should remain independent of all Arab trends, whether party or governmental, in view of its courage and readiness both to fight and to contribute to a just and reasonable peaceful solution, Morocco will play its part, and I call on you to play your part, in assisting our Palestinian brethren.

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Statement by the Palestinian Delegation to the International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East Conflict (Excerpts)¹

Cairo, February 2, 1970

II

Mr. President, we maintain that it is necessary to return to the heart of the matter, to comprehend its profound historical significance, if we want to achieve a real understanding of the Palestine problem. Only thus is it possible to appreciate the full weight of the injustice that has been done to the Palestinian cause.

Without reviewing historical developments, we can affirm that we are dealing with a stubborn, long-term operation which has been carried out with the full support of the colonialist countries like Britain, the United States and West Germany, and certain other Western countries, and has led to the following four consequences:

a. Palestine has been subjected to colonialism of a peculiar kind, involving the settle-

ment of the country by Zionist settlers on the pretext that it belongs to them.

b. The Palestinian Arabs have been uprooted from their homeland, which has been evacuated to clear the way for Zionist settlement.

c. The country has been evacuated and a Jewish state has been established in it.

d. There is constant, relentless, dynamic expansion into the neighboring Arab countries.

The consequence of this operation has been the tragedy of the Palestine problem as we see it today. This problem has four main aspects:

a. The whole of Palestine has been occupied, as have extensive areas of the territories of neighboring Arab countries.

b. Half the Palestinians have been evicted and their property has been seized.

c. The other half, who are still in Palestinian territory, are under occupation.

d. The Palestinian Arabs are prevented from exercising their right to self-determination and sovereignty.

III

This is the true character of the Palestine problem, and these are the basic facts that must engross our attention, for to allow ourselves to be distracted by side or marginal issues is incompatible with serious discussion of the character of the Palestine problem and will prevent us from seeking a sound solution that is acceptable to the Palestinians.

The reason for our laying such emphasis on the necessity to concentrate on the essential aspects of the Palestine problem becomes clear when we examine certain side issues and show why they cannot satisfy our legitimate demands. Four such side issues are worthy of careful study.

a. *The return of the displaced persons to occupied Palestine.* Return of this kind will not satisfy us, as being no more than an expression of indulgence or a humane attitude. The

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), February 12, 1970.

return we insist on is the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland with full sovereignty—the return of the Palestinians as a right and as a sovereign people.

b. *Israel's acceptance of the United Nations resolutions.* This too would not provide a satisfactory solution, even if the acceptance was genuine, because these resolutions are concerned with partial and marginal issues and are based on the existence of Israel, which is precisely what we reject.

c. *Better treatment of the Palestinians who are suffering under Israeli occupation.* This we demand, but we do not regard it as sufficient in itself. Even if Israel did agree to treat the Arabs under occupation in accordance with international principles and conventions, our rejection of the very existence of Israel would remain.

d. *Withdrawal from the occupied territories.* This is a matter that requires some study. Naturally we should welcome withdrawal, but not within the framework of the price imposed by the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. This resolution is unacceptable to the Palestinians; we reject it and reject the claim that it constitutes a solution of the Palestine problem, for the following reasons:

1. The resolution is only concerned with the occupation that took place, in 1967, of 22 per cent of the territory of Palestine, and ignores the occupation that took place, in 1948, of the rest of Palestine—78 per cent of its area.

2. The Security Council resolution touches only half of the Palestinians—those upon whom the burden of occupation fell in 1967; it does not restore to the other half the right of self-determination in the full meaning of the term.

3. The resolution does not recognize the Palestinian people as an independent people, or their right to self-determination; it does legitimize the existence of Israel.

IV

This analysis leads naturally and logically to a number of conclusions which, put briefly and simply, are the following: the occupation of Palestine—the whole of Palestine—must be ended, as must Israeli sovereignty over Palestine. If not, the Palestinian people will continue to be deprived of their basic human, political and national rights and to be prevented from exercising their right to establish their own state. This means that the Palestinians will continue their struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

As regards the Arab world as a whole, continued Israeli sovereignty means continued disturbances in the Arab area and continued danger of Israeli expansion and of the attrition of the area's development resources. Continued Israeli sovereignty also means that the Arab world from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the Gulf will fall within the Israeli sphere of influence, or rather will be part of the Israeli empire. This danger is a threat not only to the Arabs, but probably to certain other Middle East countries as well. And this danger will not be our lot only, but that of our sons and grandsons, as long as we do not repel it and put a definite stop to it.

V

Your Excellency, we have tried to define the Palestine problem and its consequences. Briefly, our demand is that, after liberation, Palestine should be established as a democratic state in which Muslims, Christians and Jews live as citizens in dignity and on a basis of personal equality. We also hope that on some subsequent occasion we may be granted the opportunity for further clarification of our views of the future—that is to say, our idea of the Palestine of tomorrow, which is today fighting for its liberation. Meanwhile, on the present occasion we should like to place on record and affirm the basic attitude of Palestinians in the following manner:

- a. We do not accept any tutelage over us or any decision taken on our behalf. Although we appreciate the help of our friends abroad and the support of our Arab

brethren, we emphasize that no party has the right to take decisions that concern us or to declare that the Palestine problem has been settled without our consent.

b. We refuse to relinquish any of our fundamental national rights.

c. We insist on concentrating on the essential aspects of the Palestine problem.

d. We refuse to allow the history of the Palestine problem to be fragmented by concentration at the outset on the elimination of the consequences of the 1967 aggression to the exclusion of the consequences of the 1948 aggression. For Israeli aggression is one and continuous, and the occupation must be terminated as a whole.

e. We insist that justice based on our rights must be a fundamental and essential element in the peace advocated by the lovers of peace.

f. We insist that no abridged or partial solutions can be acceptable to the Palestinian people.

g. We recognize that the struggle ahead of us will be long in view of the nature and scope of the problem that confronts us, and in view of the strength of the Israeli enemy and of the imperialist forces assisting it and of the way they hold on to their gains.

h. We declare that we shall fight as long as necessary for the liberation of Palestine; and that this is why the resistance movement and armed struggle have emerged to embody our demands.

i. We draw attention to the resurgence of the Palestinian people and to the profound significance of the Palestinian revolution for the Palestinian people and for the whole world.

j. We declare that the Palestinian National Liberation Movement is part of the world movement for liberation from discrimination, colonialism and imperialism and that we welcome the help of all forces in the world whose aim is to defeat colonialism and that assist national liberation movements.

Your Excellency the President, Ladies and Gentlemen, there is one last idea that we should like to offer as a subject for serious reflection: We as Palestinians have no need to justify ourselves, for would you have behaved differently if you had been in our position? We call on you all to understand the reasons for our insisting on our national right to our homeland for, to put it simply, we as a people refuse to die, and we shall fight with perseverance so that we may live with honor.

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Statement by an Official Spokesman of Fateh on Soviet Policy Towards the Palestine Question (Excerpt)¹

Beirut, February 8, 1970

[Concerning a visit to Moscow in early February by a delegation representing the Palestinian revolution, an official spokesman of Fateh stated that] Abu Ammar said that "there has been talk of visiting the U.S.S.R. for four months, but our preoccupation with revolutionary activities of the very greatest importance delayed us for the period. The opportunity to go was welcome."

[The Fateh spokesman went on to say:] This is not the first time that we have visited the U.S.S.R. We regard the Soviet Union as a friendly people who stand by the Arab people in this battle, and we have great hopes that the Soviet Union understands that the Palestine issue is a question of life and death for us. We hope that our brothers in the Soviet Union understand what our strategy is, and our position, as set out above. We think of nothing else, and we call on the Soviet Union and the people of the Soviet Union to adopt the attitude dictated by a profound view of all revolutions, and in particular of our revolution, which is the direct image of the revolution for liberation throughout the world.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hayat* (Beirut), February 9, 1970.

362

Communiqué Issued by the Second Conference of the Heads of State of the Arab Front-line States¹

Cairo, February 9, 1970

Meeting in this grave situation which is characterized by escalating Israeli military aggression, the countries on the line of confrontation which are directly responsible for the defense of the Arab nation against Israeli aggression, reaffirm their determination to liberate usurped Arab territory and their absolute faith in the inevitability of victory.

The countries on the line of confrontation are certain that the Arab nation, which has endured in the face of such great challenges throughout history, is capable of repelling aggression and recovering Arab rights from the usurpers. Hence our determination to continue the struggle against the enemy and to refuse to submit to his will is founded on a solid basis in which there are all the constituents of victory.

This meeting has been held at a time when the United States is once more adopting a hostile attitude to the Arab nation and disclosing its real links with Zionism and Israel's expansionist schemes.

Israel would never have persisted in its aggression, or scorned all human values and principles, challenged world public opinion and violated the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations, if it had not always been able to count on the United States to support it and supply it with arms and planes, allow its citizens to serve in the Israeli armed forces, and give it political support in the international field.

This aid and support is being provided at a time when Israel has usurped the whole of Palestine, driven out its people and occupied territory of three Arab countries that are members of the United Nations, with the object of expansion and continued aggression.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 10, 1970. The Front-line States are Syria, Jordan, Iraq and the United Arab Republic. The conference was held on the 7th, 8th and 9th of February.

The Arab nation refuses to see its wealth and its resources exploited and diverted to provide aid and arms to Israel, and the continuation of such exploitation can only be regarded as an act of colonialism which the Arab nation must make every effort to stop.

By behaving in this way and by its constant support, the United States is endangering peace and security in the Middle East and the peace of the world, for which it bears a grave responsibility to international society and to the whole of humanity.

At this dangerous stage through which the Arab nation is passing, it is the duty of all the Arab countries and of the Arab people, with all their institutions and organizations, to recruit their forces and mobilize their capacities in the face of these challenges in the battle of destiny.

In this struggle the Arab nation does not stand alone against this aggression; it is supported by all peoples who love freedom, progress and peace, and the countries on the line of confrontation call on these peoples and their governments to stand firmly in a common front to repel aggression and to consolidate the foundations of right, justice and peace.

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Decree Instituting Special Internal Security Regulations Issued by the Council of Ministers of Jordan²

Amman, February 10, 1970

The Arab nation is today passing through a stage of extreme gravity in its confrontation of escalating Israeli aggression. In this situation Jordan is called on to play a leading role, which it is performing intrepidly and honorably as it advances with confident steps and unshakeable determination along the course it is following with the other Arab

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 11, 1970.

countries which are fighting side by side in the battle of struggle and liberation.

This situation, with all that it implies in the way of readiness and preparation, and all that it requires in the way of organization and planning, has induced the Council of Ministers to issue the following decision, which is addressed to every citizen individually, to the people as a whole and to every free and noble Arab residing in the territory of this struggling country. The Council of Ministers calls on the state bodies and the authorities concerned to implement it, each in accordance with the duties and responsibilities entrusted to it.

The Council of Ministers believes that the Jordanian armed forces, which are daily providing the most splendid examples of intrepidity and sacrifice, deserve to be provided with a suitable climate which will strengthen their capacity and consolidate their power by rallying all forces around them and organizing citizens within a single comprehensive framework to stand behind them in the battle of destiny.

The Council of Ministers believes that the field of struggle cannot be secure and sound unless it is protected by a united and organized society, which is ruled by law, directed by order and in which all have confidence in the state and the citizen confidence in his fellow-citizen.

In its determination to meet the responsibilities of government to the full in this critical situation, to fulfil the task of governing that has been entrusted to it, to maintain and enforce the principles of the constitution, to act in accordance with the provisions of the law and in the service of the people, to maintain their cohesion and unity of ranks, to protect the honor of the struggle and to ensure that its objectives are achieved, the Council of Ministers issues the following decision as being an absolute necessity for any people who are determined to recover their usurped rights and to regain their occupied homeland.

1. All forces in the state, governmental, popular and individual, are called on to perform their role in accordance with the

provisions of the law and the instructions of the authorities concerned.

Whoever fails to serve the homeland and to play his part in performing the task required by the public interest to the best of his ability shall be liable to punishment in accordance with the law.

2. The liberty of the citizen is safeguarded by the constitution and, by virtue of Article 7 of the constitution, that liberty can only be interfered with, restricted or infringed in accordance with the law and the regulations, and by the appropriate legal authorities empowered to do so by the law and the regulations.

3. It is absolutely forbidden in any way whatsoever to obstruct, impede or prevent members of the Public Security or any public servant in any official establishment in the performance of his legitimate duties, and offenders shall be liable to the penalties stipulated by Article 186 of Penal Law No. 16 of 1960.

4. Every citizen shall carry his identity card at all times and show it to members of the Public Security when required to do so, in accordance with the provisions of the Identity Cards Regulation No. 110 of 1965.

5. It is forbidden to let off firearms in towns and villages and especially within the confines of the Capital and of the municipalities, either for purposes of testing or in celebration of festive occasions of any kind, and offenders shall be liable to proceedings by court-martial.

6. It is forbidden to carry arms when circulating within the boundaries of the capital, or in public vehicles, buses, taxis and *service taxis*, or to take them into mosques, public places, cafés, cinemas or crowded localities, only members of the popular resistance organizations being excepted from this rule, and offenders will be liable to the penalties provided for by the Firearms Law No. 38 of 1954.

7. Inasmuch as the storing of firearms and ammunition within the confines of the capital

and the municipalities and in populated localities exposes citizens to grave dangers, however exceptional or unusual the circumstances, it is forbidden to store explosives or to keep any quantities of them within the confines of the Capital or in populated localities. Notice of two weeks as from the issue of this decision is given to report on and remove any such materials as may be stored and to inform the General Command of the Jordanian Arab Army so that they may be placed at the disposal of the armed forces which will prepare special places for them and ensure that they shall be put to use in such manner as may be decided. Offenders will be liable to the penalties stipulated by Article 3 of the Explosives Law No. 13 of 1953.

8. Every car or vehicle circulating in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall carry the official number allotted to it by the Traffic Department, and every driver of a car or vehicle shall carry the appropriate papers as provided for by Articles 105, 106 and 126 of Road Traffic Law No. 49 of 1958.

Two weeks' notice as from the issue of this Decision is allowed for compliance with these provisions, after which any vehicle which has not been registered and does not carry a number officially licensed by the appropriate authority shall be confiscated, and when confiscated it shall be used for the purposes of the popular resistance and the person responsible for it shall be prosecuted.

9. All illegal demonstrations, gatherings, assemblies and political meetings are absolutely forbidden. Political discussions may only be held with prior permission from the Ministry of the Interior and its departments in accordance with Article 8 of Public Meetings Law No. 60 of 1953 and the regulations and laws in force.

10. All pamphlets, newspapers, magazines and printed matter published in contravention of the rules in force are forbidden and offenders will be tried by the State Security Courts; all their assets will be confiscated and they will be punished in accordance with the Printed Matter Law No. 16 of 1955.

11. Party activities are forbidden by law and it is forbidden to engage in them in any form whatsoever; offenders will be prosecuted in accordance with the regulations in force and sentenced in accordance with the Political Parties Law No. 15 of 1955.

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Statement Issued by the Unified Command of Commando and Mass Organizations in Jordan in Response to the Internal Security Regulations Issued by the Council of Ministers of Jordan¹

Amman, February 11, 1970

Arab masses,
Arab people of Jordan,
Soldiers and Officers of the Jordanian Army:

All the Palestinian commando organizations and all representatives of political parties, trade and labor unions, lawyers' and doctors' associations, womens' organizations and a number of leaders of public opinion, met in the evening of Wednesday, February 11, 1970, in the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization and studied the grave situation that has arisen in the country as a result of the decision issued by the Jordanian Council of Ministers on Tuesday, February 10, 1970. They decided to form a unified command for commando and mass action in Jordan, and issued the following statement:

It is clear that the decisions issued by the Council of Ministers have come at a time when the imperialist countries, headed by America, and in collusion with the Zionist enemy, are stepping up their efforts to impose surrender on the Arab nation. The real significance of these decisions is that their aim is to liquidate Palestinian commando action and the national liberation movement in Jordan. They are an extension of the authorities' permanent attitude of hostility

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya*, No. 24 (March 24, 1970).

to commando action and the people in Jordan. It is now all too clear that the enforcement of these decisions has led to the shedding of the blood of citizens, both commandos and soldiers; up to the time of the drafting of this statement eight commandos and a number of soldiers of the Jordanian army have lost their lives. The question that imposes itself is: In whose interest is the blood of citizens being shed? In whose interest are the authorities obliging the army to fire on the commandos, instead of all firing, whether by commandos or soldiers, being at the Zionist colonialist enemy who is in occupation of large areas of the Arab homeland and who is daily continuing his acts of aggression against all the Arab countries surrounding Palestine?

Jordanian masses,
Members of the Jordanian Army,

All the commando organizations, in full solidarity with all nationalist, trades union and professional forces, call on you to unite to frustrate the conspiracy against Palestinian commando action, the nationalist movement and the Jordanian people. We call on soldiers and officers to regard the commandos and the people exactly as they would their brothers, and to refuse to obey orders to fire on the commandos and the people. Let the slogan of all of us be 'Further reinforcement of the sacred unity of the people of Jordan—closer brotherly links between the Jordanian army and the commandos. More determination to fight the Zionist enemy and to liberate the territory of the homeland.' While condemning the conspiracy against commando action, the popular masses of Jordan demand the establishment of a nationalist government that enjoys the confidence of the people, is capable of putting the country on a real war footing and cooperating sincerely with commando action, and that will mobilize all the resources of the people for the war effort, ensure that the Army is provided with sufficient effective and trustworthy arms, and protect public funds from embezzlement and waste and employ them in making the war effort effective and in building up the national economy.

The Palestinian revolution, which is in complete solidarity with the Jordanian masses, which is an expression of the aspirations of the Arab nation, and the vanguard of the clash with the Zionist colonialist enemy, is the advance guard of the overall Arab revolt to repel the Zionist imperialist invasion from the Arab homeland and to consolidate the gains of the Arab nation in the fields of national liberation and social progress. The Palestinian revolution, which is closely united with the nationalist movement in Jordan, calls on the Arab masses, with all their progressive and nationalist forces, to raise their voices to condemn the conspiracy against commando action and against the Arab nation and the whole of our national movement.

All the commando organizations, which have achieved complete unity, are today united with the masses of the people of Jordan and declare their resolution to maintain and reinforce their unity and to continue the armed struggle against the Zionist colonialist enemy.

1) The Palestinian National Liberation Movement Fateh; 2) The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; 3) The Vanguard of the Popular War of Liberation al-Sa'iqa; 4) The Popular Liberation Forces of the Palestine Liberation Army; 5) The Democratic Popular Front; 6) The Popular Front, General Command; 7) The Arab Liberation Front; 8) The Arab Palestine Organization; 9) The Committee for Action to Liberate Palestine; 10) The Front for Palestinian Popular Struggle; 11) The Jordanian Communist Party; 12) The General Federation of Palestinian Women; 13) The General Federation of Jordanian Palestinian Women; 14) The Arab Women's League; 15) The General Federation of Labor Unions in Jordan; 16) The General Federation of Palestine Workers; 17) The Lawyers' Association; 18) The Doctors' Association; 19) The Engineers' Association; 20) The Pharmacists' Association; 21) The Agricultural Engineers' Association; 22) The Dentists' Association; 23) The Federation of Jordanian Teachers; 24) All the Jordanian Students' Unions; 25) The Save Jerusalem Committee; 26) Sulaiman al-Nabulsi; 27)

Shaikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sayeh; 28) Ibrahim Bakr; 29) Ruhi al-Khatib; 30) Akef al-Fayez; 31) Dr. Daud al-Husaini; 32) Dr. Qasem al-Rimawi; 33) Kamal al-Dajani, Lawyer; 34) Ishaq al-Duzdar; 35) The Rev. Iliya Khuri; 36) Dr. Nabih Mu'ammar.

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Speech by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to Muslim Pilgrims on the Palestine Question (Excerpts)¹

Mecca, February 12, 1970

Brothers, we have tried at the United Nations and we have tried with the Great Powers which today are making a show of coping with the Middle East problem but, most regrettably, as the proverb says, if you try too often unsuccessfully, you wish you had never tried at all.

We tried our best with the United Nations and the Great Powers in the past, but the powers that created Israel in 1947 and paid no attention to those sons of the homeland whom Israel expelled, usurping their lands and their homes and violating their dignity, are today claiming that they are seeking solutions that will satisfy both parties. Why, for Heaven's sake, why did they not follow this principle when they decided to create Israel and rejected all attempts by the Arabs at that time to avert that disaster? At that time they attached no importance to the second party to the problem, and went ahead, despite all the efforts that were made and all the advice that was offered them at the time, and today they are making it a condition for any solution that it should be approved by all parties. Who are these parties? There is one party which is aggressive, tyrannous, oppressive and arrogant, and another that is wronged and the victim of aggression, having

been expelled from its country and its homeland; who expects these parties to speak their minds or offer their opinions? I am sure that there is no need for me to describe to you, brothers, what has happened this year, but I remember that last year I said that the Israeli aggression of about three years ago was not the first case of aggression, but rather the expansion of a previous aggression. Indeed, the area has been experiencing aggression for more than twenty years, during which Israeli licentiousness and tyranny have been constantly increasing, until they have reached the stage where they have burnt the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and disdained all human and moral principles to the extent that they have made the holy Mosque the scene of whoring and the vilest acts of immorality, in their ever-increasing determination to outrage and insult Islam and the Muslims.

Brothers, sometimes, unfortunately, we are mistaken, as when we expect that those who have treated us unjustly will change their minds and deal justly with us. . . .

Brothers, there is a principle that cannot be ignored by any legal system or moral code in the world—the principle that all people should be entitled to keep their homeland and decide their own destiny. But in the Arab world we have a people who have been expelled, humiliated and persecuted, who are looking right and left for help. They hope that their brethren will help them; all they ask is that they may be allowed the right to return to their homeland, and the right to self-determination. Does this right constitute an injustice to anyone, or an aggression against anyone? But unfortunately all the conflicting powers today, the great powers in the world, ignore these principles and are trying to find solutions which will enable the brutal enemy to achieve his aims; none of them pays any attention to this people's right to recover its homeland and to self-determination. . . . This evicted and humiliated people have reached the point where they are trying to find a just solution; our

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Riyadh* (Riyadh), February 20, 1970.

Palestinian brethren have declared that they accept the principle of co-existence in Palestine between Christians, Muslims and Jews, but unfortunately the unjust powers in the world, both in the West and the East, ignore these concessions which none of us ever expected to hear of Palestinians making. But the suffering, trials and humiliation that have befallen them have induced them to accept what they would not accept before. But in spite of this no one has paid any attention to them, no one has looked into their complaints, so that there was nothing left for this people but to resort first to their Lord, and then to their brothers in the Islamic world, to ask for their help and to arouse their zeal and ardor to save them. But they can only be saved through belief in Almighty God, through devotion to this task, unanimity and an effort to ensure that justice is done to our afflicted and persecuted brothers. We do not say that we must neglect other people; what we say is that these people should mind their own business and leave the Arab countries to the Arabs. As for those original citizens of the country who want to coexist with the Arabs in it, our Palestinian brothers have said that they have no objection to allowing such persons to coexist with them.

Today, brothers, the enemy is repeating his aggressions against the Arab countries which are, of course, your countries too. Not content with occupying Arab territories and shedding blood, every day, every time the sun rises, the enemy repeats his aggressions and attacks peaceable civilians and others inside their homelands—not only on the firing line. Today Israeli planes have raided civilian factories in Abu Za'bal in Egypt, and bombed them with napalm and incendiary bombs, killing more than fifty and wounding more than sixty. What is there in Abu Za'bal? Only civilians. But this is proof of the pride and arrogance of these people, and their attempts to weaken and destroy the influence of our brethren in the countries that are Israel's neighbors. But this aim will not be achieved; whatever they do, whatever they try to do, it will not turn aside the Arabs and their brethren the Muslims from striving to recover their rights and to save their humil-

iated dignity and to deliver their territories from brutal occupation. I therefore call on my Muslim brethren once again to hasten to the support of a right which is theirs, of a justice that is theirs. For from today onwards there can be no hope that either the United Nations or any great powers will submit to right or justice; they will only wrangle over us and procrastinate. So there is nothing left for us but to start solving our problems ourselves and recovering our rights by ourselves. But before that we must establish faith and devotion in our hearts, if we want to achieve our aims.

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Joint Statement Issued by the Unified Command of the Palestinian Organizations and the Government of Jordan on the Regulation of Relations Between Them¹

Amman, February 22, 1970

On February 22 a meeting was held between representatives of the Jordanian government and representatives of the Unified Command of the commando organizations. This meeting was characterized by an atmosphere of full mutual understanding and of determination to reinforce national unity and to increase the public effort to prepare and mobilize the people so that they may stand alongside the gallant Jordanian armed forces and the struggling forces of the commando organizations who are stationed together in the same trenches, united in heroic determination to confront aggression on behalf of struggle and liberation.

The meeting discussed everything that can ensure this cohesion and eliminate all that is liable to impede this unified advance and come into conflict with the national interest and the requirements of public safety. The

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 23, 1970.

discussions ended in agreement and in all calling for action in accordance with the spirit of this statement, as being the basis of relations between the Jordanian government and the commando organizations.

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Press Conference Statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on Operations in Europe and Relations with Progressive Forces (Excerpts)¹

Amman, February 24, 1970

Q. Has the resistance been transformed into a revolutionary movement dedicated to the total defeat of the present political establishment in Jordan?

A. In the first place, such a question is out of place as far as the Palestinian revolution is concerned. The Palestinian revolution has repeatedly declared that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country.

Q. Europe is upset by some of the actions taken by commandos there. What is your attitude to the Munich attack?

A. We have said that the Palestine Liberation Organization does not engage in such actions, and an important point is that the Palestinian revolution is against attacks on civilians, wherever they may be.

Q. Has the Unified Command condemned the attacks on planes?

A. The Unified Command has issued a communiqué condemning such operations. We have absolutely no connection with the incidents that have occurred recently. If acts of sabotage are carried out by certain groups

which are outside the Arab framework, neither the Palestinian revolution nor any Arab source or quarter can be held responsible for them.

The Unified Command is now making a radical study of this subject and it has declared its attitude.

Q. Could you tell us about the results of the visit of the Palestine Liberation Organization's delegation to the Soviet Union? Is it to be expected that the Soviet Union will officially recognize the commando organizations, and how much aid is the Soviet Union providing to commando action?

A. At the beginning of the interview I spoke about our visit to the Soviet Union, and I was expecting these questions.

Firstly: In anything we do or achieve, it can be assumed that we observe the precept that secrecy is what helps you most to achieve your ends.

Secondly: What I can say, and it throws light on all these questions, is that I visited Moscow and the temperature was 20 below zero, and the whole place was covered with snow, but I found the snow of Moscow warm. I can tell you one thing—the visit was successful and the snow was warm.

Q. How prepared are the commandos for peace talks with Israel, and what conditions do they make for starting peace talks? Abba Eban has said that he is prepared to receive such a delegation.

A. Peace? What peace? The peace of the defeated, the peace of the aggressor? The peace of the usurper of territory? The Palestinian revolution determined its course when it fired its first shot on January 1, 1965; we said that we should continue our revolution until victory was won. We see our problem on this basis, we see our armed struggle within this framework only. When they attacked us at Karameh they had prepared a show—any of us left alive they were going to drive on foot from Jericho to Jerusalem, as in the days of David and Goliath. This is why we say that anyone who is waiting for a delegation will have to wait a long time.

¹Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), February 25, 1970.

Q. Recently contacts have been made with the Eastern countries and the leftist movements. Does this represent a new line of policy for your movement?

A. The Palestinian revolution is achieving victories and successes every day, and has succeeded in finding itself friends and supporters in every part of the world. Every day these relations established by the Palestinian revolution are becoming deeper. There has been more than one meeting between the Palestinian revolution and several liberation movements in different parts of the world—in Africa, Latin America and Asia. It is only natural that revolutions for liberation should come together on common lines of action. In the same way our relations with the leftist and socialist organizations have taken shape as a result of meetings and talks on more than one occasion.

Q. President Nasser has declared that in certain circumstances he would agree to sign a peace agreement with Israel. This, however, would lead to the recognition of Israel. What would be the attitude of the Unified Command if this were to happen?

A. I should like to remind the questioner of President Nasser's speech to the representatives of the Palestinian people in the Palestinian National Assembly. In that speech he said that the Palestinian resistance and the Palestinian revolution were entitled to continue until they achieve their objectives of liberating their country and returning to their lands.

Q. In spite of what you have said about not being responsible for the plane incidents, certain commercial companies that have dealings with Israel have started to forbid the shipping of consignments to Israel. In view of this, will you keep up the pressure until these incidents stop altogether?

A. Firstly, you seem to be very insistent in asking this question, in asking the Palestinian revolution about these incidents. We have stated our view quite frankly, and I can only hope you will be equally insistent in the case of the crimes committed by the Zionist enemy against Arab civilians, whether in the

occupied territories, on in Abu Za'bal, Irbid, al-Salt, Kerak or South Lebanon, then I shall feel the same as you.

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Statement by the Higher Political Committee for Palestine Affairs in Lebanon on Talks Being Held with the Lebanese Authorities on Implementation of the Cairo Agreement¹

Beirut, February 25, 1970

In the morning of Tuesday, February 24, 1970 the representatives of the Lebanese government, headed by the Minister of the Interior, and the representatives of the commando organizations held their regular meeting to continue dialogue and discussion with a view to implementing the Cairo Agreement and reaching agreement on the formulae necessary for this, and also to deal with other problems, both such as were pending and such as might have newly arisen in connection both with the situation of Palestinians resident in Lebanon and the requirements of the armed Palestinian revolution.

The meeting was characterized by a friendly atmosphere and by the appreciation by both sides of the necessity to cooperate, continue the dialogue and settle problems in that friendly spirit which will safeguard both the interests of the Palestinian revolution and those of Lebanon.

This meeting led to agreement in principle on the necessity to work towards the setting up of competent committees in the Palestinian displaced persons camps whose task it will be to provide the necessary services to improve health and social conditions and living accommodation, which committees shall constitute a central advisory body to function side by side with the Directorate General for Palestinian Affairs.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 26, 1970.

The two sides discussed the question of how both the Armed Struggle Command and the Lebanese gendarmerie are to perform their duties inside the Palestinian camps, and it was agreed that the Armed Struggle Command should deal with all problems and offenses connected with the safety and security of the revolution, and that the gendarmerie, which is to establish stations outside the camps, should, in cooperation with the Armed Struggle Command, deal with criminal and civil offenses which do not affect the safety and security of the revolution.

It was also agreed that elements from the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command should participate in regulating the passage of commandos and their vehicles at Lebanese frontier posts.

The delegation representing the commando organizations reaffirmed that it would abide by the prohibition against letting off firearms in the camps or allowing armed men out into the public streets. The necessary measures were also taken to meet the requirements of all forms of training.

The two sides discussed the necessity of regulating the collection of contributions to commando action. In anticipation of the drafting of a project to unify the system of collection and to define what methods should be employed in the collection of funds and from what sources they should be collected, the Lebanese side was informed of the decision taken by the Higher Political Committee in the evening of February 23, 1970 to forbid the collection of contributions in improper manners liable to injure commando action, such as armed men standing in the roads, stopping cars or entering houses and public places armed and in uniform, and also to forbid the collection of contributions in collecting boxes, or by any other means except against officially stamped receipts.

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Memorandum from the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce to the Director of the Income Tax Department of Israel Protesting the Department's Treatment of Arab Merchants in Jerusalem¹

Jerusalem, March 7, 1970

We are daily receiving complaints from a number of Arab merchants in the city about the high tax assessments imposed on them and the various harsh methods employed in collecting taxes from merchants. A number of merchants have complained that the tax collectors have entered their premises and laid hands on such money as was in their tills or in their possession and considered it as payment on account of the taxes due from them. A large number of others have complained that the collectors and responsible officials in the Tax Department have confiscated their stocks and even essential pieces of equipment in their shops, and removed them to the Department.

We have already explained to you on more than one occasion the economic stagnation that confronts Arab merchants in the city, which means that, for a variety of reasons, the income of Arab residents in Jerusalem is limited, so that their purchasing power has diminished and, as you have observed, commercial activity in the Arab markets is paralyzed. Many merchants have been obliged to abandon their original trades and engage in others in an attempt to make a living for their families, while others have been obliged to fall two years in arrears with the rent of their shops and stores.

We therefore request that you will put a stop to these harsh measures that are being enforced by officials and collectors of the Income Tax Department against Arab merchants in the city.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Quds* (Jerusalem), March 8, 1970. The Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce is an Arab organization located in East Jerusalem.

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Resolutions of the Tenth National Conference of the Ba'ath Party (Excerpts)¹

Baghdad, March 10, 1970

II. Requirements

The Present Stage: The Conference defined the present stage as being the stage of confrontation of the challenge and of preparation for the coming battle against Zionist-imperialist aggression. It also regarded this stage as one of advance to a new level of thought, action, planning and implementation characterized by revolutionary maturity and total fusion of the national liberation struggle with the social class struggle. It affirmed that if the minimum requirements of the Arab struggle with the alliance of Zionism, imperialism and reaction are to be met, it is an objective necessity, at this stage of the disaster, that regional divisions should be rejected and that the principle of unity in a strategic sense should be accepted. It also affirmed that this stage is the most revolutionary in contemporary Arab life, so that it is the stage of strategic ideological action and of revolutionary instruments capable of eliminating the consequences of defeat, of theoretical planning and of practical preparation for the battle in such a manner as to ensure victory in it.

Having analyzed the contemporary Arab struggle, the Conference also affirmed that the national liberation aspect and the social and class aspect are both aspects of a single fact, which is the objective of the Arab revolution. The Conference came to the conclusion that an analysis of the class aspect of the development of Arab revolutionary activity before the disaster of 1967 confirms the political analysis and the analysis of the intellectual and ideological trends of that stage: that June 5 proclaimed the end of the stage of leadership by the petty bourgeoisie and the beginning of the stage of leadership by the revolu-

tionary masses. That is to say, the stage of the organized, planned strategic amalgamation of these masses, which believe in revolutionary Arab ideology, with the vanguard revolutionary forces which, harmoniously constituted as they are, are capable, through a national front involving the whole of the Arab homeland, of playing the role of leaders of the Arab struggle.

The Conference also stated that the present Arab political regimes cannot obtain the confidence of the Arab masses unless they rise to the new level demanded by the present revolutionary stage and rid themselves of the negative features of the previous stage. The most prominent of these features were the following: they accepted fragmentation, they were dominated by a regionalist mentality and bureaucratic methods, they combated revolutionary party activities and provided purely formal support to the armed struggle without allowing it the opportunity to develop into a real popular war of liberation. In addition, these regimes gave no more than verbal support to the working class without ensuring the conditions that would enable its struggle to develop and take a serious part in the leadership; also, they tried to conceal their half-hearted attitudes through the token rejection of international solutions involving surrender.

The Conference also affirmed that the principal objects of Arab struggle are to ensure that Arab national mentality and principles should prevail over the principle of regionalism and that the strategy of unity should be achieved. In addition there must be party activity ready to accept the formulae and activities required by a front, the effective release of the energies of the toiling masses, support for commando action and armed struggle and rejection of solutions designed to liquidate the Palestine problem. The Conference also affirmed that, to ensure the objective conditions necessary for the confrontation of the imperialist-Zionist challenge, it is essential to realize a progressive national front embracing the whole Arab nation. This is because the Arab revolutionary forces will remain incapable of leading the masses and preparing them for the battle if they continue

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahwar* (Beirut), April 17, 1970.

in their present fragmented state and if they fail to reconcile the subjective with the objective within the framework of the present stage.

III. At Party Level

The Conference decided the following:

1. To develop the Party's class structure and capacity for struggle so that it may respond to the demands of the present stage, and so that commando action and armed struggle may become the axis round which the life of its members revolves.

V. At Political Level

1. Rapid and serious efforts must be made to change the character of the Arab situation so as to achieve the objective conditions essential for the confrontation of the Zionist-imperialist alliance. This can only be done by making unremitting efforts to achieve unity with a genuinely progressive content, undertaking a total reappraisal of the structure of the Arab situation, creating an intellectual and psychological disposition to gear the whole of Arab life indissolubly to the requirements of long confrontation, and converting the economy, policy, education and daily life into instruments that assist in directing the Arab struggle towards the battle.

2. Every emphasis must be laid on the necessity to adopt the strategy of the popular war of liberation, as decided on by the Ninth National Conference, and to regard all that this involves in the way of creating a policy of confrontation, an economy of confrontation and a school of confrontation, as the natural prelude to the achievement of a total, radical and profound revolution in contemporary Arab life, which revolution will put an end to fragmentation, backwardness and class exploitation.

3. Objective circumstances must be created which will enable the Arab revolutionary forces to get together under the aegis of

programs of comprehensive revolutionary action. These will assist in releasing the effective energies of the Arab masses and give them control of the battle, through the establishment of a progressive national front comprising the whole Arab homeland.

4. The Arab masses must be regarded as both the instrument and the objective of the revolution, and as being the class chiefly interested in liberation. Therefore attention must be focused on the masses and on mobilizing them to engage in the battle, especially now that formulae imposed from above have proved inadequate and failed to constitute even the basic minimum of confrontation and joint Arab action.

VI. The Palestine Problem and Commando Action

1. The Palestinian revolution must be regarded as the main center of gravity for the Arab revolution, and for the elimination of all deviationist tendencies based on regionalist conceptions or opportunist attitudes aimed at splitting the dialectical unity of both the Arab revolution and the Palestinian revolution.

2. Every effort must be made to implement the strategy of the popular war of liberation and armed struggle by supporting Palestinian commando action and popular resistance in the occupied territory and ensuring that all its political, material and moral requirements are met.

3. Relations between the Party and the commando organizations must be strengthened through the Unified Palestinian Command and on a basis of the realization that the Arab revolutionary forces are brothers in struggle.

4. Support must be given to all efforts to realize the slogan of the unity of commando action led by revolutionary thinking.

5. All calls to surrender must be rejected and all attempts to strangle and contain the Palestinian revolution, and to liquidate the Palestine problem, must be resisted.

6. Every effort must be made to disseminate awareness of the nature of the battle in Palestine, to disclose the organic link between colonialism and Zionism, and to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the Palestinian revolution and all progressive liberation movements in the world.

VII. The Iraqi Region

The Conference laid down the following guidelines for the government of the Iraqi Region, with the object of realizing the new pattern that is required after June 5th. This pattern means that the Iraqi Region must be transformed into an Arab revolutionary force and that its resources must be placed at the disposal of national strategy.

1. Regional problems must be solved in the light of the strategy of resistance to the Zionist-colonialist-reactionary alliance. The Conference affirmed that one of the first things the Party must do is to announce a democratic solution of the Kurdish problem on the basis of autonomy within the framework of Iraqi unity, which will secure the most favorable conditions for cooperation and solidarity between the Arab and Kurdish peoples. This will disengage the Party's armed forces and free its economic and human resources for the confrontation of the Zionist peril and the frustration of the imperialist-reactionary conspiracy in the area.

2. There must be profound revolutionary achievements which will lead to radical changes in production relations and provide the conditions necessary for entering on the stage of socialist transformation.

3. The Palestinian revolution must be regarded as the center of gravity for the policy of the Iraqi region and the strategy of unity and popular and regular armed struggle must be introduced (both as a concept and an actual fact) into every house, factory, school and barracks. The life of the individual, the family, the village and the town must be made to crystallize around the requirements of confrontation.

4. The struggle for unity must be regarded

as the road to liberation, and the struggle for Palestine as the right road to that unity which will rectify all vestiges of previous experience, inasmuch as the roads of unity and liberation are inseparable.

5. The progressive national front must be realized at both regional and national levels.

6. There must be a revolution in the information, cultural and social fields that will rid Arab life of all vestiges of fragmentation and partisanship incompatible with national and human ties and all concepts and traditions which impair the capacity for the scientific and revolutionary confrontation of the enemy.

VIII. At International Level

At international level the role of the Party consists of courageously, decisively and intelligently resisting international efforts to liquidate the Palestine problem in the name of a solution for the crisis that resulted from the June War in such a manner as to ensure the realization of the political objectives of this stage. These are:

1. To frustrate projects which are designed to endanger the future of the cause through some kind of international bargaining at the expense of the interests and destiny of the Arab nation.

2. To ensure that we are open to the socialist camp and establish the closest relations with the countries of the socialist bloc.

3. To bring public opinion to understand the truth about the revolutionary Arab position as constituting the defense of the existence and destiny of the Arabs and a struggle against a grave peril that threatens the destiny of humanity.

4. To draw attention to the schemes of the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary conspiracy, to the real scope of the conspiracy against the Arab homeland and to the nature of the strategic alliance between the United States of America and Israel.

5. To make every effort to gain for the Arab revolution true friends who will comprehend its objectives and appreciate the importance of the role it is playing in the field of world revolution.

6. To make the influence of the resistance in Palestinian territory more profound and to expand the framework of international support and aid for it at both popular and official levels.

7. To make every effort to diminish the field of Israeli propaganda and of the Zionist conspiracy against world public opinion.

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Statement Issued by the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine on the Idea of a Democratic Non-Sectarian State in Palestine (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, March 12, 1970

Certain Palestinian and Arab circles have been calling for acceptance of the idea of a "Palestinian Democratic State including Jews, Christians and Muslims." Others have been talking of a "secular state and peaceful coexistence." Still others have been calling for cooperation and brotherhood between Arab and Jewish leftist progressive groups which, they believe, would lead to Zionism being combated and eventually eliminated. This call has been voiced by those in official positions and others, both Palestinian and Arab; it has been taken up by the press and the news agencies, in statements, articles and lectures, and it has been associated with the proposal for a peaceful solution and the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

Many Palestinians and Arabs have been surprised that these proposals for a Palestinian State and for peaceful coexistence should

be made by Palestinians and other Arab personalities at a time when the revived Palestinian resistance movement is still in its first stages, and when the Zionist enemy is still in occupation of the whole of Palestine and parts of Syrian and Egyptian territory, and declaring on every occasion his determination to hold on to the city of Jerusalem and keep it as the capital of the State of Israel.

It is widely known that the national principles upon which the Palestinian cause is founded, and which have been acknowledged by the Palestinian conferences, may be summed up as rejection of the British Mandate and of Jewish immigration, Zionist policy and the Jewish National Home which were its consequences, and affirmation of the independence of Palestine within the framework of Arab unity. On behalf of these principles, which are included in the Palestinian National Charter, the Palestinian people fought violent battles for thirty full years (from 1918 to 1948), in which Palestinians gave their lives, their money and their possessions in sacrifice for their homeland, sustaining losses of tens of thousands of killed and wounded, never acknowledging that either the foreign occupiers or the Jewish intruders had any right to the Palestinian homeland. The Palestinians also rejected all the bogus solutions and misleading offers with which British and Zionist policy tried to tempt them—such as advisory councils, bogus legislative councils, an Arab Agency, various proposals to divide Palestine into Arab and Jewish areas, and the proposal of the British Royal Commission to partition Palestine (the proposal of Lord Peel in 1937). They stood firm in the field of battle for thirty full years, in spite of their limited numbers and resources, until the tripartite conspiracy for partition of 1947, to which Great Britain, the United States of America, and World Zionism were parties, and the first Palestinian disaster took place in 1948 with the establishment of the Zionist gangster state in part of the beloved Palestinian homeland, and the eviction of a million Palestinians to the neighboring Arab countries.

It is extremely regrettable that the Arab

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Filastin*, no. 109 (April 1970).

world did not pay sufficient attention to the lessons and warnings provided by this grievous calamity. Had they done so they might have studied the real causes and factors of the calamity, and made themselves strong enough to rescue the usurped Palestinian homeland and to protect the neighboring Arab countries from the enemy's schemes and expansionist ambitions. Jewish leaders have openly declared these ambitions; they have been published in their press and their books and have been disseminated to the four corners of the earth in their broadcasts. Far from remaining a closely guarded secret in the breasts of the leaders of Zion, these schemes have been published in every country of the world. But the Arabs, as certain Zionist leaders have said, do not read, or if they do read, pay no attention and do not learn their lesson. Fancies have distracted many of them from facts; they have gone back to the old Time of Ignorance, and been diverted into irrelevant wars in which they kill each other. Destroying themselves with their own hands, they have given their Zionist enemies twenty years in which to consolidate the foundations of their state and to provide themselves with arms and all the most modern scientific and technical war equipment. In this they have been supported by the colonialist countries, headed by the United States of America and Britain, until their state has become immensely strong and feared, and its population has risen to nearly three million, the majority of whom are trained in the arts of modern warfare.

Returning to the question of the democratic Palestinian state and peaceful coexistence, we are confronted with a number of facts which make these proposals as impossible to accept as they are to implement.

1. The whole idea of Zionism is based on the principle that Palestine must be as Jewish as England is English and as America is American, and that Arabs have no place in it. This has been declared by Weizmann and other Zionist leaders.

2. The Jewish Agency, which represented the Jews of Palestine under the Mandate, refused to accept the 1939 British White Paper in which the British government acknowledged the principle of an independent Palestinian state within ten years, because the Jews wanted to continue their immigration in order to swamp the Arabs and force them to leave Palestine (and this is what actually happened later—in two stages, the first in 1948 and the second in 1967.)

3. There are now nearly three million Jews in occupied Palestine, whereas when the British occupied the country they were a small minority of not more than 4.5 per cent. Thus they now exceed in numbers all the Palestinians in occupied Palestine and in the Arab countries and elsewhere, quite apart from the Jewish immigrants who are flooding into Palestine every year. The Palestinians have become a minority which is growing smaller every year as a result of Jewish immigration, and in such a Palestinian state they would constitute the weakest and poorest section of the population, as a result of the successive disasters that have befallen them, even if all the Palestinians could return to their country.

4. The Jews have their own way of life and their own religious and racialist doctrines which make it extremely difficult for them to coexist (even as a minority) with other nations and peoples. How, then, could a Palestinian Arab minority coexist with a Jewish majority with such a way of life and such doctrines? The Jews in Germany before the Second World War were a small minority, but the Germans could not coexist with them because they betrayed Germany in two World Wars, and because, by their usual ways and means, they sucked dry the sources of Germany's wealth. And although there are only six million Jews in the United States of America out of a total population of 215 million, their financial and political influence is such that they have almost total control of American policy. The same applies to France, Britain and other countries where the Jews have extensive influence—countries

with great achievements in the fields of civilization, art and industry. If Jewish influence is so great in these countries, where they constitute a small minority, how would the Palestinians fare with them in the Jewish state where they are a majority which is constantly being increased by immigration?

5. The Jews in occupied Palestine do not want peaceful coexistence with the Arabs; on the contrary, they are determined to root out the Palestinian Arabs at the first possible opportunity, by forcing some of them to emigrate, and by employing brutal and ingenious measures, including such as are injurious to health, that will lead to the annihilation of those who do not emigrate.

In addition to the above, the idea of a Palestinian state under present circumstances involves many dangers, some of which must be mentioned here.

1. It was the Jewish intelligence services that first called for the formation of a Palestinian state, after the occupation of the West Bank, and won over certain persons lacking in strength of mind and patriotism to the idea. These protégés of the Jews have now started to issue declarations and statements calling on the Palestinians to accept the idea and to fall into the trap of this Jewish-colonialist conspiracy, emphasizing the alleged advantages of the project, whereas in fact their real intention is to deceive the Palestinians, to extract from them an abdication of their rights in their homeland, to trap them and to destroy their unity and everything that links them to their brethren in the neighboring Arab countries.

2. In advocating the creation of a Palestinian state, colonialist and Zionist quarters are paving the way for the establishment of this alleged state in Transjordan and for the annexation to it of parts of the West Bank occupied in 1967. This means that a Palestinian state would be established in territory that is not Palestinian and that Israel would acquire further territories in

the West Bank to increase its area and guarantee it secure frontiers. This is impermissible, and it is unthinkable that the Palestinians should accept it. On the contrary, it is the duty of every Palestinian to fight for the liberation of the whole of Palestine, including the part usurped in 1948, upon which the oppressive state of "Israel" now stands.

3. This call weakens the burning zeal of Palestinians to liberate Palestine, and weakens the enthusiasm of the Arab and Islamic countries for the Palestinian struggle movement.

4. It is causing splits among the Palestinians themselves and between them and certain Arab countries.

5. The Palestinian commando movement was established on the understanding that Palestine should be liberated and that its original Arab character and all that is most sacred to it should be preserved.

6. The Islamic holy places in Palestine are held in trust by the Palestinians for Muslims all over the world, and any carelessness or negligence as regards them is an unforgivable betrayal of that trust.

Therefore the Arab Higher Committee feels itself obliged to warn against the call for a democratic Palestinian state (including Jews, Christians and Muslims) in the form in which it has been published. As has already been stated, there are at present nearly three million Jews in Palestine who are supported by international Zionist and Jewish organizations and by American and foreign capital. The danger involved in this call is only equalled by its fantastic character and the impossibility of implementing it. The Palestinians will never so far relinquish their noble national principles and their lofty ideals as to agree to become a small minority in a bottomless sea of Jewish elements in the name of a peaceful coexistence and a democratic state! What sort of coexistence would this be, what sort of democracy would this be, that wiped out our existence, made away with our independence and turned our Arab home-

land into a Jewish homeland and the Aqsa Mosque, to which the Muslims first turned in prayer, into a Jewish Temple?

The Arab Higher Committee also warns certain Palestinian organizations against the dangers of inviting individual foreign Jews to their bases and letting them take part in training and life in these bases on the ground that they are anti-Zionist and share the organizations' progressive and leftist views, lest they should prove to be enemy agents spying on our countries.

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Statement Issued by Fateh Reporting on a Meeting Between International Air Travel Association Director-General Hammersköld and P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat, Concerning the Security of Civil Air Transport¹

mid-March, 1970

Mr. Knut Hammersköld, the Director General of the International Air Travel Association, met with Mr. Yasser Arafat, the President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and official spokesman for the Palestinian National Liberation Organization Fateh, for an hour, in the course of which Abu Ammar assured him that the Revolution was not responsible for the two incidents involving Swiss and Austrian planes and that it always makes a point of not jeopardizing the safety of civilians.

He explained that the responsibility for endangering the lives of civilians fell on those who make civilian transport planes military targets by loading them with military equipment when they are on ordinary flights, and that IATA should make all possible efforts to persuade the Israeli authorities to put a stop to the use of civilian

planes for military purposes, which makes them military targets, thereby endangering the lives of civilians.

Mr. Arafat emphasized that no party had the right to anticipate the results of the inquiry, which was not yet completed, into the explosion of the Swiss plane, for the purpose of accusing another party or misleading world public opinion with untrue information which had not even been raised in the course of the inquiry.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit to Libya of Premier Haitham of South Yemen (Excerpts)²

Tripoli, March 23, 1970

In response to an invitation from the government of the Libyan Arab Republic, an official delegation from the People's Republic of South Yemen, headed by Muhammad Ali Haitham, Member of the Presidential Council and Prime Minister of the People's Republic of South Yemen, visited the Libyan Arab Republic from 10 Muharram 1390 (March 18, 1970) to 15 Muharram 1390 (March 23, 1970).

The two delegations agreed on the necessity to confront the constant Israeli aggressive provocations directed against the Arab countries and the campaigns of terrorism and persecution directed against the Arab population and their eviction from their homes by force, and affirmed that Israel is a racist, colonialist and aggressive entity which is the spearhead for imperialism in the Arab homeland and threatens international security and peace.... They also affirmed the necessity of liquidating the existence of Zionism and imperialism in the Arab homeland.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), March 15, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Tripoli), March 25, 1970.

The two delegations also pointed out that the effective military and political support provided to Israel by the United States and its allies is an aggressive act calculated to strengthen Israel as a military base for imperialism in the Middle East and to enable it to escalate its aggression against the Arab people.

The two sides affirmed their determination to aid and support the armed Palestinian revolution which is emerging today as an unconquerable force to affirm the rights of the Palestinian people and the fact that they will be recovered.

The two sides also affirmed that it is essential that the forces of the Arab revolution should be amalgamated in a unified progressive front to oppose the allied forces of Zionism, imperialism and reaction.

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Press Conference Report on U.A.R. President Nasser's Remarks to a Closed Session of the U.A.R. National Assembly on the Position of the Great Powers and Israel (Excerpt)¹

Cairo, March 25, 1970

The President reviewed the international aspects of our problem and the attitudes the different countries have adopted to it since 1967. He traced all the various stages in the efforts that have been made at the United Nations and elsewhere to find a solution for the problem, including the bi-partite talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the Four Power talks in which they were joined by Britain and France. The President also analyzed all the proposals made by the Great Powers to resolve the crisis, including the Rogers Plan.

In this connection the President made the following points:

1. When the United Nations opposed the Israeli aggression when it took place in 1967, the draft resolution proposed by certain friendly countries stipulated a cease-fire and withdrawal to the positions held by the forces in the morning of June 5. But the United States absolutely opposed the proposal for withdrawal, and only supported the idea of a cease-fire.

This was followed by a number of proposals, including the so-called American-Russian proposal, which provided for withdrawal and the termination of the state of belligerency. We declared that we accepted this proposal, but America then withdrew its support for the proposal, saying that its time was passed.

Britain then submitted its proposal which was adopted by the Security Council in November 1967, and although it was weaker than the American-Russian proposal, we accepted it. It stipulated that there should be no occupation of territory and that the [occupying] forces should be withdrawn, and provided for peace arrangements, in addition to raising the subject of the refugees and passage through international waterways. The resolution also stipulated that a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations should contact the parties concerned to ensure the implementation of the resolution. Jarring performed this task for eighteen months, and we gave unambiguous answers to all the questions he put to us, from our desire to cooperate with him in the performance of his task, but Israel always refused to answer his questions because it had adopted the theory that it would only express its opinion of the subject at the conference table, and when Jarring despaired of Israeli cooperation he returned to his job as ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

2. It has been clear from the start that America cannot give us a peaceful solution, because a peaceful solution means full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the solution of the refugee problem and the rights of the people of

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 26, 1970. (The National Assembly closed session at which President Nasser spoke was held on March 24, 1970. The report was delivered by the National Assembly President Shuqair).

Palestine, and this would mean that we should win a political victory that would affect the whole area.

It was also clear that there was some kind of collusion between America and Israel in this connection, as the Israeli Foreign Minister later said, in an interview with an American paper, that when he had been in America before the aggression the Americans had promised him that if he succeeded in occupying Arab territories, America guaranteed that a resolution on a cease-fire only would be adopted, not on withdrawal.

3. After this there were various American proposals, all of which were obviously intended to solve only the Egyptian-Israeli problem, without solving the Jordanian-Israeli or Syrian-Israeli problems, or to separate and divide up the solutions, so that there should be one solution for Egypt and a separate one for Jordan.

We rejected the principle of separate solutions, because the object of the operation was to remove Egypt from the affair, as being the political and military center of gravity, so that Israeli and American pressures might achieve Israel's objective of annexing further Arab territories. We announced that we could not accept that the Arab problem should be split up into several separate problems, and that when we talked of withdrawal we meant that withdrawal had to be from all Arab territories.

As regards the territories that Israel sought to annex, His Excellency declared that the Israeli leaders had no unified plan as to what should be annexed; some called for the annexation of Jerusalem, others for the annexation of the West Bank and Hebron; some called for the annexation of the [occupied] territories along with their Arab inhabitants, and others again called for the annexation of territory without its people.

Ezer Weizman also declares that Arab territory is not occupied territory but Israeli territory, and that the only map that could be recognized was that of Herzl, which shows Israel as stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.

4. In the light of this analysis, the President

then went on to review the Rogers Plan, both in the form in which it was submitted to Egypt and that in which it was submitted to Jordan. He showed that this plan, although it provided for withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel and to Egypt's international frontiers at the time of the Mandate in Palestine, left all details to be decided by negotiations between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel, as far as Jordan was concerned. This meant that we were subject to Israel's right of objection or veto. Moreover, the plan talked of the unification of Jerusalem, without stating clearly what its political status would be after unification, and we all know that Israel has announced that it has decided to annex old Jerusalem, where the Aqsa Mosque is situated, and that this decision is irreversible.

5. The President then reviewed the French proposal, showing how it was based on the necessity for withdrawal and the impossibility of direct negotiations.

6. His Excellency then said that at the Four Power talks now in progress three proposals are under discussion—the American, the Soviet and the French. He added that Britain supports the American proposal absolutely, and that the Four Power talks have not resulted in agreement between the four countries, because, while the U.S.S.R. supports the Arab position, which is a just one, the United States fully supports the Israeli point of view.

7. The President also mentioned the cease-fire that America is now advocating, pointing out that since the 1967 aggression Israel has never imposed a cease-fire; it attacked Suez and Ismailia before we had rebuilt our forces; and that a cease-fire now means nothing but giving Israel the time to consolidate its occupation of Arab territories and to avoid the adverse effects of the war of attrition on her. He also pointed out that, from our point of view, the cease-fire is linked with the implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution for withdrawal from the occupied territories.

8. The President also mentioned the financial aid, totalling \$100 million, that America recently announced it would give Israel. This, he said, was of the nature of military aid, because it would compensate Israel for the effects on its economy of the war of attrition.

Similarly, when America calls for the limitation of the delivery of arms to the Middle East at a time when Israel is saying that it is now greatly superior to the Arabs as regards arms and the strength of its air force, America is aiding and abetting Israeli aggression.

9. The President also drew attention to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, showing that the failure to solve this problem was a basic cause for the continuation of the Israel problem, and that there could be no solution for the problem unless the Palestinians were allowed their rights.

10. The President defined what is meant by a peaceful solution. A peaceful solution, he said, did not mean a solution involving surrender, but complete evacuation of all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, the solution of the refugee problem and the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on the refugees. He added that we want a peaceful solution if it achieves this for us, but if it does not, our only course is to recover our just rights by force.

He showed how Israel's attitude and United States support for continued Israel aggression was an obstacle to any peaceful solution, and added that in this respect the situation could be summed up by saying that there was no hope for agreement on a political solution until we became so strong that our enemies realized that we could use force to obtain our rights if we could obtain them through a peaceful solution.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser was asked a number of questions by members [of the National Assembly] on the attitude of the U.S.S.R. The President reviewed this attitude in detail and made the following important points:

1. We are in agreement with the U.S.S.R. that efforts must be made to find a political solution for the crisis if there is any way of reaching such a solution, because no one in the world wants war for war's sake. Nor is the world ready to accept the logic of war except in defense of a legitimate right, and unless it is the only way, the only remaining way, of defending such a legitimate right.

2. The U.S.S.R. coordinates all its political moves with us and we are in full agreement on the conditions for any political solution. We are in full agreement with the U.S.S.R. on two points:

— The Arabs can accept only complete withdrawal from all the occupied territories and will not renounce an inch of territory.

— The Arabs will never accept direct negotiations with Israel.

3. The U.S.S.R. abides by all its undertakings as regards what we have agreed on in the military, political and economic fields, and without its support for us, our position could have become extremely difficult and no Arab citizen who takes a fair view of things can fail to have profound esteem for the U.S.S.R. and all it has done for us, especially in the military field, which we all know is the field in which we must achieve our objectives if we are unable to achieve them in other fields. For the object of our struggle at present, at both political and military levels, is to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, and as regards this objective, on which we are all agreed, the U.S.S.R. has left absolutely nothing undone.

In fact the U.S.S.R. is the one great power which is able to help us to achieve our objective and the only great power that has agreed to do so. But for that the enemy and his friends could have imposed on us whatever conditions they liked.

4. The United States and its friends have been conducting a campaign against our relations with the U.S.S.R. In their attempts to fabricate dissension they went so far as to present us with a proposal which they know we could not accept and then to give us the

impression that the U.S.S.R. had also approved the proposal, and that it is a joint proposal by the two great powers. However, the truth was disclosed when we asked the U.S.S.R. about it, and it was confirmed that the proposal that had been submitted to us was an American one and that, far from regarding it as an expression of its views, the U.S.S.R. saw it as being completely biased in favor of Israel.

American propaganda is being intensified; it is trying to give the impression that the U.S.S.R. wants to prolong the crisis in its own interests. In fact this is the direct opposite of the truth, for the U.S.S.R. is sincerely making every effort to end the crisis by any means that will ensure a just and equitable solution.

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Press Conference Statements on the Middle East Crisis by President al-Bakr of Iraq¹

Baghdad, March 28, 1970

Q. [The Cairo daily *al-Jumhuriya*] *In his surprise press conference at the end of last week, President Nixon of the United States stated that America would adopt a certain attitude if the balance of power in the Middle East changed in disfavor of Israel. What does Your Excellency think of this attitude?*

A. My answer to this question is to ask the questioner if the United States has not already adopted the attitude he refers to? Does he believe that it has spared any efforts, and that it is only trying to maintain the balance of power between Israel and the other countries? How does he explain the constant lavish consignments of Phantom planes and other offensive weapons with

which the United States has been supplying Israel for so long?

Q. [The Jordanian daily *al-Difa'*] *The Lebanese reactionary forces are trying to contain and impede commando action in Lebanon. What is Iraq's attitude to this, in particular since the renewal of clashes in Beirut during the last few days?*

A. We have repeatedly affirmed that commando action is one of the major guarantees of the liberation of Palestine and all the other usurped Arab territories. We have stressed that it is our duty, and the duty of the liberated Arab countries to protect and support commando action. We therefore condemn any attempt to contain commando action or to impede it in the performance of its fundamental task. And we warn all revolutionary forces of the dangers which surround commando action as a result of the plans of imperialism and reaction to give it the *coup de grâce*. This attitude of ours is based on our adherence to the regional and national resolutions of the Party, which stress the necessity of adopting a strategy of armed struggle in fighting the battle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Q. [The Cairo weekly *Rose el-Youssef*] *Your Excellency's absence from the Arab Summit Conferences and the restricted Summit Conferences has given rise to questions as to the extent of Iraq's role on the Eastern Front. Could you explain this?*

Q. [The Jordanian weekly *Akhbar al-Usbu'*] *Observers have remarked on your failure to attend the Summit Conferences and also on Iraq's failure to attend the Islamic Conference recently held in Saudi Arabia. Were there any reasons that led the 17 July Revolution to take this course?*

A. Iraq took part in the Fifth Arab Summit Conference and the Conferences of the Countries on the Line of Confrontation with Israel. The seriousness of Iraq's participation in conferences has nothing to do with whether or not I am at the head of the Iraqi

¹ Excerpted and translated from the text of the news conference in *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), March 29, 1970.

delegation. Iraq submitted to the Rabat Conference a positive integrated proposal for the confrontation of the dangers and challenges of world imperialism to our nation, and the role our country has played at all the conferences it has attended has been effective and fruitful. As regards the Islamic Conference, we did not believe it would be of any avail to the Arab nation or the cause of Palestine, and the results of the conference proved that our estimate of it was correct.

Q. [The Jordanian weekly *Akhbar al-Ushbu'*] *Does Your Excellency discern any glimmer of hope in the Four Power talks to solve the Middle East crisis? And is it in the interests of the Arab nation and of Arab dignity that this crisis should be solved peacefully?*

A. Some of the Four Powers really and seriously want to establish peace in the Middle East area. But there are other countries, headed by the United States, which are directly responsible for the existence of Israel and for supporting it by their conspiracies and actions and for the persecution of the Arab people in Palestine and their eviction from their land.

But at the same time we believe that any solution that does not take into account the views of the Palestinian people and their organized Palestinian forces, and recognize the right of the Arabs to Palestine and all other occupied Arab territories, and their full sovereignty, can never lead to satisfactory results.

Q. [The Lebanese weekly *al-Liwa*] *Indications have begun to appear of attempts to impose solutions involving surrender and the liquidation of the Palestine problem, along with strategic moves on the part of reaction. These moves sometimes consist of attacks on commando action, they are sometimes made on the pretext of territorial security, and sometimes again take the form of conspiracies against the Iraqi army and the front in its rear, through unceasing Iranian maneuvers. What is the Iraqi attitude to this conspiracy and these solutions?*

A. We have constantly affirmed our condemnation of all attempts to contain commando action and destroy it or to infringe the sovereignty of Iraq and of the Arab world as a whole. We have always condemned and opposed solutions involving surrender and the liquidation of the Palestine problem, and we have constantly sought to recover the rights of the people of Palestine.

Q. [The Jordanian weekly *Akhbar al-Ushbu'*] *What is Your Excellency's appraisal of the Arab attitude in general to the imperialist-Zionist challenge to the Arab nation and to the flagrant American challenge to the Arab homeland through continued American support for Zionism and Israel?*

A. The present attitude of both the Arab countries and the Arab commando organizations to Zionism and America is a legitimate attitude for the confrontation of their colonialist crimes and ambitions. But at the same time we advocate a stronger line as regards Israel and American interests, to ensure that our people recover their national rights, by the imposition of serious obligations on the Arab countries to support commando action and to combat American interests. All these efforts must be made and all these measures taken within the framework of faith in Arab unity and of practical attempts to achieve it.

Q. [The Lebanese weekly *al-Ahad*] *Some of the major Arab newspapers have been calling for the restoration of Arab relations with West Germany and the other aggressor countries, on the principle that it is better to make friends than to make enemies, and in the hope of changing West German policy. What does Your Excellency think of this call?*

A. I should like to make it clear that the Arab nation is not hostile to the peoples of these countries, but to the policies of their governments which have been so persistent in their hostility to Arab national interests; they have aligned themselves with the Israeli occupation authorities in their aggression against the people of Palestine and the Arab

peoples, interfered in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and conspired to destroy the Arab revolution. In spite of the evil attitudes adopted by certain countries in the era of their colonialist domination of certain Arab countries, our people have succeeded in leaving the hated past behind, ridding themselves of its negative aspects and establishing relations with these countries on an objective basis. During the great Algerian revolution, our people were openly hostile to France but their present attitude is based on feelings of affection and appreciation, in view of the objective course followed by French policy since Algerian independence. And just as in the past it was the attitude of certain countries to the Algerian revolution that determined Arab policy *vis-à-vis* those countries, now it is their attitude to the rights of the people of Palestine that determines our policy *vis-à-vis* the countries of the world.

We doubt if the restoration of relations with the countries involved in the aggression will gain us friendship, because these countries betrayed us when we had relations with them at the highest levels. Nor do we believe that the restoration of relations would change their biased attitude to Israeli aggression against the Arab nation. Their attitude to our problems will only be changed when they change their views, make a proper estimate of their interests and the interests of their peoples, and free themselves from imperialist influence and colonialist interests. The justifications for severing relations with the countries involved in the aggression are still valid, and as far as we are concerned, there can be no restoration of relations with these countries until they change their policy of alignment with our enemies.

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U.A.R. Radio Interview with Lebanese Interior Minister Junblat on Violent Incidents Involving Palestine Commandos in Lebanon¹

Beirut, March 28, 1970

Q. Mr. Minister, to start with we should like you, as the man who is at present responsible for the situation in Lebanon, to reassure our listeners and to tell them of the background of the situation and the circumstances attendant on it as far as the recent incidents are concerned. Are things now quiet, or is there still a possibility of further incidents?

A. Those who play fast and loose with the security of Lebanon, or try to do so, are alien agencies and what may be called internal centers of power, which the whole of the Lebanese people want to be rid of. These agencies, these centers of power, have been trying, through certain parties and organizations or sections of them—it may well be without these parties wishing it—to escalate the situation in a manner that is becoming more and more dangerous every day. But the people, whom we have always made a point of keeping informed about everything, telling them the truth about everything—so that they might be aware of the criminal attempts that are being made to stir up confessional strife in this country—have, through their awareness, made it certain for a month and more that the conspiracies would be frustrated. The result is that the conspiracies have been confined within certain limits. Of course we must still take into account the danger that these agencies and centers of power, and certain sections of Lebanese organizations, may once more try to incite the Lebanese against each other to create manufactured incidents, to spread rumors liable to alarm public opinion, and so on.

In fact it is clear that certain foreign intelligence agencies are directing the plan—you know how persistent these agencies are,

¹ Broadcast on Radio Cairo on March 28, 1970; this text is a translation of the Arabic text published in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), March 31, 1970.

especially in a country where there is such extensive democratic freedom, freedom of opinion and freedom of movement. But we hope these agencies will have learned a lesson from what has happened and is still happening, and will cease their attempts to meddle with the Lebanese regime.

The battle is certainly a difficult one, as recent events have shown how close are the links of sections of certain Lebanese party organizations with the framework I have in mind. So we must all of us be on our guard, and our Palestinian brethren must be on their guard, for the battle is not yet over!

Of course I have a feeling of confidence because we have surmounted some extremely dangerous stages. You saw, of course, how they manufactured the Kahhaleh incident, and we now know who it was that manufactured it. You also saw, when that incident failed to arouse confessional strife, how they tried again and manufactured the Dekwaneh incident, attacking our Palestinian brethren, who were forced to fight back. But so patient, long-suffering and chivalrous were our Palestinian brethren, that they avoided killing dozens—hundreds—of those who were attacking them. And when we intervened with our Palestinian brethren, after the other party had called for help, and they had started to encircle them from every side, the Palestinians returned to their bases in an orderly manner.

After that they manufactured the Haret Hreik incident and the city of Beirut became the scene of these incidents, and when the nervous tension rose and they entered the city in accordance with a plan that was certainly pre-arranged and contrived, the Friday incident occurred. They hoped that dozens, hundreds even, would be killed, but the security forces resisted them with outstanding courage and discretion and nipped the conspiracy in the bud, so that the incident only lasted an hour.

Q. Your Excellency, could you give us further details on some of the points you have made? You said that there are indications that the conspiracy was the work of certain foreign intelligence agencies. Without anticipating the inquiry or disclosing

secrets, do you really have evidence that this was the case?

A. I cannot anticipate the inquiry by making a statement, and there are secrets that I cannot disclose. But I am certain that there was foreign planning, especially as those who undertook to execute the plan are known to be associated with this foreigner.

Q. The second point is your clear reference to our Palestinian brethren. You said that they exercised self-control, and did not fight back when they were attacked, whereas the rumors that were spread to arouse feelings said the opposite. Could our listeners hear the view of the official who knows the facts?

A. If you will allow me to say so frankly, the Palestinians behaved like angels, such was their incredible love and forbearance. No one ever—or only very rarely—saw the like of the way the leaders of the commando organizations went to the village of Kahhaleh, where the bodies of the Palestinian martyrs had been thrown in the streets. We passed with them among these bodies, and as we passed they went to shake hands with those who were responsible for the crime.

Q. Your Excellency, you said that the security forces are in command and that the situation is under control. But how can the situation be under control when there are so many arms in the streets and when conditions and circumstances are such as to provide concealed elements with the opportunity to play fast and loose? Do you think that there are other radical measures that should be taken to settle the situation once and for all?

A. We cannot foresee what the situation will be tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, because, unfortunately, we cannot say exactly what the internal intelligence services may do, for they are not properly organized, and there is no effective control over them. In a country where there are more than six hundred thousand foreign residents it is, by the nature of things, impossible for the security machinery attached to the Ministry of the Interior to become acquainted with all the conspiracies that may be concocted. Someone may be killed or assassinated here,

someone else may be assassinated there, an incident may occur or be manufactured in some part or other of the town, merely for the sake of provocation. The fact is that the security forces at the disposal of the state are not as adequate as could be wished. But, as I said, we depend on the awareness of the Lebanese people, and on the fact that they know who are those who hatch conspiracies against them. And we depend on the Lebanese army when we call on it in time of need—that army which I regard as completely independent of the intelligence services, with whose irregular conduct 95 per cent of the population of Lebanon is dissatisfied. We also depend on the repeated failure of attempts to arouse civil strife in the country. We pray that God will grant peace to this country, because it is quite clear that confessional fanaticism has grown weaker in the country and that what is now important are the horizontal divisions based on the economic and social conflict. This annoys traditional Lebanese reaction, which is closely connected with the intelligence services and domestic monopoly capitalism. This confrontation should make our brethren in the United Arab Republic realize what is the incentive behind these attempts to arouse confessional strife with the object of destroying the social movement, social awareness and the new Lebanon which is now being born before our eyes.

Q. All Arabs are now looking at Lebanon with the greatest concern. Last autumn we witnessed the same situation; the Arabs were profoundly concerned for Lebanon, until the Cairo Agreement came and gave Lebanon stability. Your Excellency has been allotted the task of enforcing most of the provisions of the agreement; do you believe that if it was scrupulously enforced, and if the forces that have tampered with it were removed, the Agreement would give Lebanon stability and security and ensure that commando action obtained its rights?

A. Yes, most certainly. This is proved by the three and a half months of complete quiet and stability enjoyed by Lebanon before that regrettable incident near the frontier which led to the killing of one of our Lebanese

brethren associated with commando action. I fully believe that it is possible to reconcile the interests of Lebanon in ensuring stability and security with the right of the Palestinian commandos to use Lebanon as a base for their dedicated activities.

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Statement Issued by the Higher Political Committee for Palestinian Affairs in Lebanon on Violent Incidents Involving Palestine Commandos in Lebanon¹

Beirut, March 28, 1970

The ugly crime took place while the delegation attending the funeral of the martyr was on its way and again while it was on its way back, and resulted in the commandos suffering so many casualties that, but for their awareness and self control, a bloody and destructive battle would have ensued in the village and, indeed, throughout the whole of Lebanon. But once again the conspirators failed, for the people of Kahhaleh at once declared that they were innocent of what had happened and apologized for the base and treacherous shedding of blood. Their approaches were magnanimously and generously received by us, their apologies were accepted and we lost no time in exchanging visits with them in the village. The conspirators in high places realized that all their weapons and stratagems were exhausted without their having succeeded in inflaming confessional strife and setting the country ablaze.

Only hours after the end of the Haret Hreik clashes, the conspirators in high places tried to play their last card by sending armed vehicles to fire in the air, in order to spread terror in the western district in the hope of arousing the classical discord between the western and eastern districts. The resistance movement had to take immediate action, and it informed the Ministry of the Interior

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), March 29, 1970.

that it had no connection with anything that happened outside the camps, and that there were no armed commandos in either the western or eastern districts. The resistance movement also sent its delegates to the leaders of all the quarters in the western district to explain to them the scheme to stir up confessional strife and to warn them of the consequences should they be taken in by it. Their attention was also drawn to the fact that certain spurious persons were carrying arms for the sole purpose of serving the conspiracy and the elements in high places that were involved in it. The resistance movement wishes once again to reaffirm that it has absolutely no connection with any armed man in the western district or elsewhere and that it is anxious that its relations with the Lebanese should be purely political, so as to avoid all ambiguity and exploitation.

From the above it is possible to sum up everything that has happened or may happen in the future as follows:

Firstly: Everything that happened was the result of a carefully laid plan, and was by no means spontaneous. Both those who made the plan and those who put it into effect are enemies of the revolution; some of them are in high places and others not, and we shall call things by their proper names after the exhaustive inquiry, which we insist should be held, is completed.

Secondly: The object of the conspiracy is to destroy commando activity through a clash between it and irregular forces in collusion with certain elements in high places which are involved in the conspiracy. It is also intended to exploit all that is happening for local purposes to which we have no intention of being a party.

Thirdly: The conspiracy has not ended yet, and we call upon public opinion to remain on the alert and ask all to practice self-control so as to frustrate the conspirators and to preserve the unity of the country and the sovereignty of the homeland. This will enable the revolution to continue in the performance of its one essential task—the liberation of Palestine.

Fourthly: The Palestinian resistance movement is too strong to be destroyed by any force, and those who are resisting Israel, and colonialism and imperialism that support it, will not be shaken by a gang of smugglers or a troop of conspirators and mercenaries.

Fifthly: The resistance movement declares that it is as deeply concerned for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon as it is anxious that the resistance itself should continue to exist and perform its sacred duty in the struggle.

Sixthly: Despite all its bitter experiences, the Palestinian resistance movement declares its confidence in the Lebanese army as a national institution with the status of all other Arab military institutions; however, it expresses its reservations as regards certain specific elements in this institution.

Despite the disclosure of the evil and infernal scheme, hatched by colonialism and its lackey Israel, for the liquidation of commando action in Lebanon, and despite the showing up of all the subservient elements and collusive quarters which were the instruments of this scheme, the Palestinian resistance movement firmly believes in the right of the Lebanese and Palestinian masses to be fully informed of the facts of the situation and the secrets of the conspiracy. This is why it is today outlining to the masses the main lines of the conspiracy, so as to put them on their guard against such further stages as may be resorted to by those agents of the enemy who concocted and carried out the conspiracy. For this criminal enemy has brought Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution to the edge of an abyss into which we might all have fallen, but for the awareness of the Lebanese and Palestinian people who rejected confessional strife and scorned those who tried to arouse it, but for the splendid revolutionary discipline of the resistance movement, and but for the responsible attitude of the Minister of the Interior.

In fact this infernal plan was no secret to the resistance movement, so that it did not come as a surprise. On the contrary the resistance movement warned the Lebanese authorities of the plan before it was carried

out and drew their attention to the dangerous consequences it was likely to give rise to—examples of which we have seen in such a terrible form in the last few days.

The resistance movement has redoubled its capacity and closed its ranks, and recently it has become ready to enter on a stage of a new kind in its struggle against Israel. Colonialism and Israel, frightened by this, decided, in cooperation with the United States, to put into action an evil and malicious plan, in which they employed local instruments to plunge the Arab area in irrelevant disputes. Their object was to exhaust the forces of the resistance and to prepare for the landing of foreign colonialist forces to protect Israel, and to strike at the progressive Arab forces and force them to accept solutions involving surrender and liquidation.

Colonialism and its lackeys turned to Lebanon in a cheap and despicable attempt to exploit social and confessional sensitivities in the country. They lay in wait for a favorable opportunity to light the flames of civil strife by taking advantage of local conflicts and the violent struggles attendant on the presidential election. It is well known that, since the very first days of commando action in Lebanon, the enemies of the revolution in Lebanon have been trying to involve it in Lebanese politics and vice versa, in order to confuse Lebanese public opinion and to divert the revolution from its basic aims, which it will never relinquish.

Just as the revolution expected, and warned in advance, the conspirators succeeded in going ahead with their plan and preparing to implement it, until things came to a head and we found ourselves in the present situation.

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Newspaper Interview Statements by President Helou of Lebanon on Lebanon's Role in the Middle East Crisis¹

Beirut, early April, 1970

Q. What does your Excellency think of the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East?

A. The possibilities are growing weaker every day, because time is working against them. This is because the social and religious character which is so prominent a feature of Zionist aggression, and particularly of the occupation of Jerusalem, makes it impossible for either party freely and finally to relinquish what for it is both a piece of land and a share in paradise.

In these circumstances I think that the only possibilities are inevitably military ones, as long as there is no implementation, through the agency of the Security Council, and particularly of the four, or the two great powers, of the Security Council resolution, which stipulates not only withdrawal from the occupied territories but also a just solution for the problem of the Palestinian people.

Q. What do you think is Lebanon's role in the search for such a solution?

A. It is not Lebanon's role to seek for a solution by itself. Lebanon has declared, in particular at the Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum, its solidarity with the Arab countries whose territories were occupied. It has also declared that it will support any solution that satisfies those countries.

In fact Lebanon has never broken the armistice agreement it concluded with Israel more than twenty years ago.

However, Lebanon believes it to be its right, indeed its duty, to explain in simple

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut) April 3, 1970. President Helou granted this interview to the Director of ABC and the correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*.

enough language for all the countries of the world to understand, the religious, political and human reasons why certain attempts that are being made are reaching an impasse. In doing this it is also explaining and gaining sympathy for the idea that there is only one possible solution—a solution based on justice.

Q. In the light of present difficulties, do you think that the Cairo Agreement will always be valid as a permanent basis for relations between the Lebanese State and the Palestinians in Lebanon? And what is your view of the present situation?

A. We are continuing to abide by both the letter and the spirit of the Cairo Agreement. The implementation of this agreement is, naturally, an extremely delicate matter. The good intentions and brotherly sentiments of both the Lebanese authorities and of those responsible for the Palestinian organizations cannot alone obviate or surmount the difficulties that are bound to arise from an agreement between a state and a movement with revolutionary features.

But in my opinion the only possible course for both parties is for them always to refer to the agreement concluded between them. Here in Lebanon we have a deep-rooted tradition of wisdom which enables us to confront the situation.

Q. Are you happy about the attitude of the Great Powers to the threats to Lebanon's territory and existence?

A. I certainly appreciate the Great Powers' concern and sympathy for us, but this is not enough.

A more positive attitude would be to find a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole, and until that is achieved there must be condemnation of every Israeli threat to Lebanon, which cannot rightly be regarded as in any way responsible for the existence of three hundred thousand refugees in its territory, or for the despair which is driving increasing numbers of these refugees to become fighters.

Lebanon is less responsible than the international community as a whole, and in particular is less responsible than Israel, for the consequences of the Palestinian tragedy.

The strong and effective condemnation we desire consists in depriving Israel of the aid that enables it to defy international justice and to endanger Lebanon.

I hope with all my heart that the great American democracy will succeed, through a policy of greater understanding of the Arab point of view in general, and the Lebanese point of view in particular, in making it possible for us to maintain our friendship for it.

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Memorandum Submitted by the PEN Club in Lebanon to the 36th Congress of the International PEN Club on the Situation of Arab Writers and Men of Letters in Israel and the Occupied Territories (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, April 28, 1970

The PEN Club in Lebanon,

Faithful to the long-established traditions of the International PEN Club, and on the strength of Articles 1 and 4 of the Charter of the International PEN Club, which call for the combating of any kind of restriction or denial of freedom of expression and advocate the establishment of a free press and free criticism of governments, administrations and institutions,

And on the strength of Articles 13, 17, 18 and 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which establish the right of every individual to return to his home and not to be deprived of his nationality, and grant the right of asylum for the persecuted and safeguard freedom of opinion and expression etc:

Calls on the 36th Congress of the International PEN Club to consider the following evidence and statements, and to adopt the attached draft resolution.

All Kinds of Persecution

During the last few years major Palestinian writers in Israel and occupied Palestine have

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Raya* (Beirut), April 29, 1970.

been subjected to all kinds of persecution, including surveillance, restriction of movement, enforced residence, exile and expulsion.

— The cultural magazine *al-Ard* has been suppressed; all efforts to start publishing it again have failed and those responsible for it have been subjected to all kinds of penalties, including imprisonment for ten years.

— No Palestinian cultural magazine may appear if it is both cultural and political.

— The following writers and poets have been arrested: Mahmud Darwish, Ali Ashur, Samih al-Qasim, Salem Jubran, Taufiq Ziyada, Mansur Kardush, Ali Rafi'i, Sabri Jiryis, Habib Qahwaji, M. Dassuqi, M. Asmar, Hanna Abu Hanna, Taufiq al-Zayyat, Ahmad Khalifa and J. Tu'ma, and some of them are still in prison.

— Some of these writers and poets, including Mansur Kardush, Ali al-Rafi'i, Sabri Jiryis and Habib Qahwaji, the founders of the *al-Ard* magazine, were placed in enforced residence after their release from prison, and obliged to report to the Public Security every morning and evening.

— The writer Habib Qahwaji was recently banished to Cyprus, having been escorted to the frontier under police guard.

— The poet Kamal Naser has also been banished from Bir Zait to Jordan, having been escorted to the frontier under police guard.

— The writer As'ad Abd al-Rahman was banished to Jordan, after spending eight months in prison where he was shamefully humiliated and maltreated. He was escorted to the frontier by a police guard, without being allowed to see his family.

— The poet Samih al-Qasim of Rama in Galilee was arrested in April 1969 after the publication of his book "Waiting for the Thunderbird."

— The Israeli authorities in the Histadrut admit that 53 per cent of Palestinian teachers in the schools, to which they were appointed by the Israeli authorities, are not qualified.

— In the field of university education in Israel, we find only a limited number of Palestinian teachers out of the 10,500 teach-

ing in the universities, while there are tens of thousands of Palestinian graduates who have been evicted from their homeland.

— In one of its reports Histadrut itself criticizes the shortage of school books available to Palestinian pupils in schools and the deficiencies of those that are available. The writer Sabri Jiryis shows how Israel deliberately pursues a policy of depriving the Palestinians of knowledge in order to keep them at a low educational level.

— The newspaper *Haaretz* published the following statement by the Israeli Adviser on Arab Affairs:

If there were no Palestinian pupils the situation would be better and more permanent. If the Arabs had remained hewers of wood it might have been easier for us to control them. But there are things that cannot be controlled; this is inevitable. All that can be done is to write suggestions and to give information on how to cope with the problems.

— Passages of classical Arabic of the highest literary value have been deleted from school books, while passages of inferior value have been retained, in conformity with the policy of impoverishing education and lowering its standards.

Beating and Breaking the Legs of Girls

In February and March 1969 the Israeli army beat up and broke the legs of dozens of Palestinian girls aged from twelve to sixteen with rifle butts and sticks, because they demonstrated in Gaza, Ramallah, Jerusalem and elsewhere in protest against the blowing up of houses and the acts of violence perpetrated by the occupation authorities.

— Persons suspected of belonging to the Palestinian resistance, including journalists, writers, men of letters and others, are subjected indiscriminately to all kinds of beating and torture.

— There is no recognition of the existence of Palestinian writers either as individuals, as writers or as organized bodies, and the attitude Israeli writers adopt to them is just

as hostile as the attitude the Soviet authorities are accused of adopting to the Jewish cultural minorities remaining in the U.S.S.R. At none of their meetings have they referred to the fate of Palestinian letters or to the maltreatment and degradation to which Palestinian writers are subjected. At the meeting of Israeli writers held in Jerusalem on April 9, 1968 it was disturbing that those who attended avoided raising the question of the situation of Palestinian writers in Israel.

Defense of Human Rights

The International PEN Club's links with UNESCO and the principles constantly affirmed in its official reports for the defense of human rights, which have always received the support of Lebanon in the debates of the organization's General Congress, the stern tradition of the International PEN Club, the resolutions of its recent congresses and earlier appeals by its presidents and secretaries, make it the duty of all thinkers and writers who attend the congresses of the International PEN Club to view with the greatest concern any abuse or infringement of the rights, dignity and freedom of writers, whatever country or human group they belong to, and to condemn such conduct.

For all of which reasons

The Lebanese PEN Club proposes that the 36th Congress of the International PEN Club should adopt the following draft resolution:

"The International PEN Club, meeting in its 36th Congress, calls on the Israeli authorities:

— To take immediate action to relieve Palestinian writers of all restrictions and pressures and to allow them freedom of assembly and expression.

— To license them to publish literary, cultural and political magazines, and to grant them freedom to publish their works.

— To raise the standard of Palestinian studies by choosing qualified teachers and providing proper school books.

— To allow qualified Palestinian teachers higher education without discrimination.

— To refrain from all acts of violence against Palestinian pupils whatever the reasons for their demonstrating."

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Statement by Foreign Minister Majdani of Lebanon to the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs on U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sisco's Visit to Lebanon (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, April 30, 1970

As regards the discussions that took place, as you know, he came here immediately after visiting President Abdel Nasser, and he said that he had informed President Abdel Nasser that he would tell Golda Meir everything President Abdel Nasser said to him, and that he would tell President Abdel Nasser everything he said to Golda Meir.

He said that he had brought no new proposals, but that the American State Department is aware that America's foreign policy as regards the Arabs must be revised, and that on three occasions he had made practical attempts to break the stranglehold established by the Administration of the former President Johnson on the relations between the United States and the Arabs.

The first attempt was to restore relations with the United Arab Republic, the second was contained in the Rogers proposals, and the third was President Nixon's latest speech which contained the United States' refusal to sell more planes to Israel. But, he said, the United States State Department had met with no response from the Arabs, for if they had responded the American government would certainly have continued to pursue its policy of improving relations with the Arabs. America was now confronted with a public

¹ Excerpted and translated from the text in *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut), April 30, 1970.

opinion at home which was to a great extent opposed to any rapprochement. But in spite of all this, and in spite of anti-American demonstrations, the United States would continue to pursue its policy of trying to find a peaceful solution that would satisfy both parties. America, so Sisco said, will continue its efforts to restore diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic and certain other Arab countries, because it believes that direct dialogue is more useful and more likely to convince both parties than dialogue through an intermediary. He said that President Abdel Nasser had informed him that he would make the necessary efforts to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Mr. Sisco then touched on the question of Secretary Rogers' proposals and whether discussion of them between the Arabs and Israel should be direct or indirect. He said that the Rhodes formula had given rise to confusion, as some people had thought that the talks were indirect, others that they were direct, and if Israel had not raised this point, Jarring might have started contacts between the two parties.

He added that he had read of objections to and criticisms of the Rogers proposals from the Arab side, in spite of the fact that in the American State Department they think that they meet 95 per cent of Arab demands, while the remaining five per cent is not in Israel's interest, and has indeed been left for settlement by negotiations. But the Arabs have criticized them and regarded them as being against their interests.

Our answer to this talk was quite unambiguous. President Charles Helou told Mr. Sisco that it was impossible, for example, that Israel should ever relinquish Jerusalem, as no Israeli could agree to this for religious reasons. He added that the efforts being made by the United States were sure to fail, and would not result in a peaceful settlement, especially as Israel rejects any proposal that is made to it, and that the Arabs are ready for a peaceful solution but not for solutions involving surrender, and time was on the Arabs' side. He said that it was American policy that was increasing the hatred

and dislike of America; the Arabs were not aligned with another quarter, but in view of the aid provided by the U.S.S.R., it was inevitable that they should cooperate with it.

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Appeal by the Popular Resistance Front in the West Bank and the United National Front in the Gaza Strip for Solidarity with Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons (Excerpt)¹

end of April, 1970

Stand by the hunger-strikers in Israeli prisons!

Sons and daughters of our people! You who are holding out in the territory of the homeland!

In the morning of Tuesday, April 28, 1970, thousands of your brethren and sons who are prisoners and detainees started an open hunger strike... in support of their demands for the following:

1. The release of all political internees detained under the Emergency Regulations passed by British colonialism, as the Zionists have no evidence on which to take these internees to any court, however fictitious.

2. To stop the barbarous torture by Zionist executioners of detainees and prisoners, which is more brutal even than the crimes of the Nazis and has led to the death of some of the cream of our people, including Qasem Abu Akr of Jerusalem, Qasem Abu Khadra of Acre, Muhammad Hasan Ismail of Nuba in the Hebron District, and many others, not to mention the dozens of fighters who have been paralyzed or sustained permanent disabilities as a consequence of brutal torture.

3. To ensure that prisoners are humanely treated, that they are provided with medical care, that their families and relations are allowed to visit them, that food-stuffs, newspapers and books are regularly delivered to

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nida* (Beirut), April 29, 1970.

them, and that forced labor in the new Nazi camps is stopped.

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Labor Day Speech by U.A.R. President Nasser Reviewing Developments in the Middle East Conflict, Appealing to U.S. President Nixon To Work Towards Peace, and Announcing a New Initiative Aimed at Achieving a Unified Arab Position (Excerpts)¹

Shubra al-Khaima, U.A.R., May 1, 1970

Brothers and fellow citizens:

I wanted to spend Labor Day with you here at Shubra al-Khaima, in this great industrial area of which Abu Za'bal is a part, an organic extension.

I wanted to be here because nothing explains the truth of what we represent, what we are defending, what we are fighting for so well as the sublime ideal which inspires us here, an ideal whose truth and veracity we instinctively realize in this center of struggle in the eternal land of Egypt.

Here, brothers—what happened in Abu Za'bal is an embodiment of the struggle between us and the enemy, of the facts of the struggle, the significance of the struggle, the goals of the struggle. Near us here, in Abu Za'bal, is the National Company for Metal Industries in Abu Za'bal. This factory cost about five million pounds, which were paid by the Egyptian people who have spent their whole life building for peace, civilization and freedom. Two thousand workers work in this factory; their annual wages were about one million pounds; they look after or support two thousand good struggling families. It is a very successful factory, working three shifts throughout the twenty-four hours of the day. It produces 75 thousand tons of steel for reinforcing concrete used in building. Thus

the factory may be said to have been a living symbol of our aspirations to build and construct.

This is the factory we built and worked in, and directed its output to the service of construction.

Now, brothers, let us go on to what happened to that factory in the morning of February 12. Suddenly, Phantom planes sent by the United States of America to Israel in 1969, infiltrated at low level and started attacking this factory with rockets, napalm bombs and time bombs.

Only a few minutes later, brothers, one of the main sections of this factory was a picture of death and destruction. Losses were estimated at LE350,000; 88 workers were killed and 150 wounded. The machinery in that part of the factory was smashed to pieces by the explosions. The wounds of the victims were burn wounds, caused by the napalm which the United States had supplied to Israel. The time bombs were buried in the ground, and these bombs too had been supplied to Israel by the United States of America; their sole object was that they should be another trap of death and destruction for the first aid and rescue squads when they arrived on the scene.

Brothers, this is the enemy we are fighting, the enemy whom it is inevitable and absolutely unavoidable that we should fight. . . .

...Israel talks about peace, and deceives the whole world, deceives world public opinion. For Israel knows that behind it are those who support it, support it in its aggressive intentions, support it in its expansion. The United States is behind it, but Israel deceives public opinion even in America. For 18 months Jarring has been going round all the Arab countries, putting questions to us on all the points in the Security Council resolution. We have answered all Jarring's questions on the Security Council resolution—we have said that we accept the Security Council resolution, that we agree to the implementation of all the peace arrangements contained in the Security Council resolution

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 2, 1970.

but that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied territories, as the Security Council resolution stipulates—and that Israel must implement the United Nations resolutions on the rights of the Palestinian people—as the Security Council stipulates. What was Israel's attitude to Jarring? Israel did not give an honest answer to Jarring's questions. Jarring puts questions to them, and they reply with a treatise in which there is not a single word that has any connection with the question. Israel refused to use the word "withdrawal," refused to refer to it under any circumstances whatsoever. But Israel said that it was ready to discuss the redeployment of its forces. Of course, if this proves anything it proves that Israel does not want withdrawal, it wants expansion.

There is also another point that shows Israel's intentions and condemns Israel and shows it up. After June 8 there were proposals by France on the basis of four-power talks between the great powers to discuss the Middle East problem. We agreed to these talks—when France contacted us we agreed to the idea. But Israel rejected the idea, and said that it would only accept a solution from the inside. What did this mean? Israel means that it wants to impose the *fait accompli*, to impose its domination, it wants to impose surrender on the Arabs, it wants the Arabs to accept its occupation and its annexation of Arab territories. After that there were two-power talks on the Middle East problem between America and the U.S.S.R. We declared that we agreed to these negotiations, but Israel refused, and launched a major campaign against the negotiations in every part of the Western world.

From all this we can say that we have really proved effectively that we want peace—but at the same time our nation has proved that it rejects surrender, and to reject surrender is a great responsibility. . . .

And now, brothers, they are accusing us in the United States of America and in Israel of violating the cease-fire. . . . We all know that the cease-fire resolution was adopted

by the Security Council in June 1967, on June 9, 1967. The normal situation, as proposed by the Afro-Asian countries and the U.S.S.R., the normal situation would have been for the cease-fire to have been accompanied by a clause stipulating the withdrawal of forces to the positions they were in before the fighting. But America insisted on refusing at the Security Council, on refusing that the resolution should include anything about withdrawal. So the resolution was adopted in an incomplete form. Then in November 1967 the Security Council adopted the resolution I am talking about now, which stipulated withdrawal from the occupied territories. It stipulated what I have been talking about. Now they are calling on us to observe a cease-fire. And they are accusing us of violating the cease-fire—Israel, the Israeli enemy and America, the United States of America. They pretend to forget, or they actually do forget the withdrawal resolution adopted in November 1967 and only remember the cease-fire resolution adopted in June 1967.

How can there be a cease-fire when territories belonging to our homeland and to the homeland of the Arab nation are groaning under an occupation that commits collective crimes openly and on the widest scale? Brothers:

It is clear that America, the United States of America, has harmed the Arab nation by giving Israel its military, political and economic support, so that the occupation may continue—the occupation of Arab territories which has now lasted nearly three years.

Since the occupation America gave Israel 150 Phantoms and Skyhawks; every year it has given them 350 million dollars in aid. How can there be a cease-fire when Arab territories have been under Israeli occupation for getting on for three years? How can there be a cease-fire? When the character of the occupied territory has been changed—occupied Arab territory—the character of the territory of Jerusalem, of Hebron, of Gaza?

It would not have been possible without United States support for Israel; if America had not supplied Israel with planes, tanks, guns, armored cars and modern electronic

devices. It would not have been possible to continue to suppress the struggling Arab forces in the occupied territories—this would not have been possible for Israel without American economic aid, the 350 million dollars a year it collects from bonds and receives as “contributions” in addition to American aid—it may well be more than 350 million dollars a year.

Israel would not have been able to go on for three years killing and destroying houses—occupying territories—imprisoning 15 thousand Arabs in occupied Palestine.... How can there be a cease-fire, when there is collective punishment? We all know, and Dayan himself has admitted that they impose collective punishment, collective destruction of houses—with their inhabitants being driven out of them—neighborhood punishment—if the neighbors don't give the commandos and the revolutionaries away, they punish them and destroy their houses. What do they destroy them with? Not to put too fine a point on it they destroy them with American half-tracks, with American guns—they attack the resistance with American manufactured planes.

How can there be a cease-fire when there is torture? The evidence of the international commission of enquiry that was in Cairo three days ago—the evidence that was submitted to it proves to the whole world that Israel is torturing the Palestinian Arab people more than Hitler tortured the Jews in Germany in the Second World War—the United Nations commission, I mean.

Brothers:

How can there be a cease-fire when Israel declares, when Israel's leaders declare that Israel has no official frontiers, and that its frontiers will be constructed with the passage of time. Israel's peace map—and what it shows. The map that Herzl spoke of has been mentioned by an Israeli minister, who said as far as he was concerned Israel was the Israel decided on by Herzl dozens of years ago: from the Nile to the Euphrates—from the Damietta branch—passing through Sharqiya and other areas to the West of the Canal until it reaches Iraq, passing through Syria,

Lebanon and Jordan, and passing through the northern part of Saudi Arabia. Where do Israel's frontiers start and where do they end? They say that Israel has no frontiers. How can they achieve this object? By what means? By what methods? The only way they can achieve it is by anaesthetizing people—the cease-fire—then imposing the *fait accompli*—then killing and destruction—then by obtaining arms from the United States—then by further expansion. They have talked about greater Israel; they have talked about a great many things.

How can we continue to observe the cease-fire?

The cease-fire means surrendering to time—the time factor creates a new *fait accompli*, that is hostile to all our aspirations for our territory, for peace, construction and freedom.

And how about the enemy? Did he observe the cease-fire after June 1967 when we were unable to respond to his strikes? We all know what happened in 1967. We know what happened to the population of Suez, to the people of Ismailia—the factories in Suez, the oil refineries, the fertilizer factories—the factories in Ismailia, the people living there. Israel certainly did not observe the cease-fire; it wanted to use the half-million people who lived in Suez and Ismailia and the area between the two towns as hostages, to make us surrender by injuring them. But the inhabitants of Suez and Ismailia and the Egyptian people as a whole succeeded in holding out, in enduring on the Canal, and when we decided not to give Israel this weapon—the weapon of injuring our civilian population—we decided to evacuate half a million people from the area, leaving the area empty except for the armed forces.

What was the reason for this? The reason was that Israel had not observed the cease-fire. And when we started to hit back with bullet for bullet, bomb for bomb, blow for blow—then the enemy started to talk about the cease-fire. When our action against the enemy started to increase, his friends rushed to provide him with planes so that he might be able to hold on to the occupied territories, so that he might be able to impose his will

on the Arab nation. In 1969 Israel started receiving Phantoms and Skyhawks, and America started talking about maintaining the balance. What does America mean by the balance of power in the Middle East? This balance, in the view of America and the American leaders, means a sweeping superiority for Israel. About forty days ago the American President talked about Israel's request for an arms deal—150 Phantoms and Skyhawks; he said that Israel had great superiority over the Arabs, and did not need any more planes for the moment, but that if the present balance was upset they would give Israel what it was asking for, they would not allow Israeli superiority to be affected. Later he said that America had decided, for the time being, to give Israel one hundred million dollars as economic aid.

So the balance of power in the view of the United States means maintaining Israel's sweeping superiority; so the balance of power means enabling Israel to continue to occupy Arab territories. In the view of American policy it means enabling Israel to keep the Arab people in the West Bank, in Gaza, on Golan and in Sinai under the yoke of Israeli colonialism, under the yoke of Israeli racialism.

The balance of power in the view of American policy means that Israel should continue to detain 15 thousand Palestinian Arabs, that Israel should kill Palestinians day and night, on the pretext that they are resisting the Palestinian resistance, or resisting terrorism.

The balance of power in American policy, the policy of the United States of America, means impeding any Egyptian offensive capacity to recover the Egyptian territory occupied by Israel in 1967—an attack not for aggressive purposes but for liberation, not to destroy but to purge.

The balance of power in the view of the United States of America means that Israel should continue to strike us in depth, to strike at our factories, at our schools, at our civilian population, at our economic installations.

Israel got the Phantoms and the Skyhawks in 1969, and it is still receiving four Phantoms

every month. The air potential that America gave Israel in 1969 made it possible for the Israeli enemy to penetrate in depth and strike at distant targets and force us to disperse our forces. They have attacked civilians and killed workers. They have attacked schools and killed the children. In all this they have used the American Phantoms they received in 1969. Israeli leaders have stated and threatened that they will strike everywhere in Egypt to subject Egypt to their will and make it accept their terms. Indeed, one of them actually said in so many words that they would destroy the whole of Egypt, that they would not leave a single building standing. Of course when he said this he knew that behind him was the United States which would give him Phantom bomber planes, would give him technicians, maintenance workers holding both American and Israeli nationality. He knew that America would also give him long-term loans so that he would not have to pay a penny to get these arms. Of course when they saw this, they said and declared—they said and declared in '67, '68 and '69—that if Egypt did not accept their terms they would destroy it, they would destroy it and not leave any economic installation standing, they would attack and destroy them, because they depended on their air power. All this of course was to frighten and terrify us and subject us to their will and make us accept their terms.

I knew, brothers, that you would accept the greatest sacrifices, but there is not one of us—not one of you who will agree to subjection and surrender.

On February 2 America presented us—the American envoy who is now in Cairo—presented us with the following official communiqué:

He said that Israel was now making raids deep into Egypt and that America was concerned by these raids, and regretted the victims that were falling as a result of the Israeli raids in depth. He therefore advised us to announce immediately that we accepted a cease-fire, and that if we did not accept, the Israeli raids deep into the country would continue on a greater scale and would increase, the Israeli raids would increase.

They thought this would frighten us and make us hesitate and accept, submit or surrender.

We said, brothers, that we would accept a cease-fire if Israel would announce, within the framework of the Security Council resolution, a date for the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories. Not only from Sinai, but from Sinai, Gaza, Golan and the West Bank, and from Jerusalem. This was the only way we could accept a cease-fire.

Brothers:

We have passed through critical times, very hard times, and there have been sacrifices everywhere—people have been killed, innocent children have been killed. You all know how the people here in Egypt have stood up to the critical days we have passed through. I have met many foreigners and they have all been surprised—they had all expected the Egyptian people to collapse after these raids, after these Israeli raids. I have met many senior foreign journalists, American journalists, and they asked me—they said they had come to see the Egyptian collapse as a result of Israeli attacks on the heights overlooking Cairo, on Helwan, Maadi, Abu Za'bal, Khankah, Dahshur and Tell el-Kebir. But what did they find? They found the people more obstinate and more determined, and they asked me why this was so. I said to them: "You don't know these people; they have behind them 7,000 years of civilization, they have the experience of their ancestors, and they know how to hold out."

Brothers:

In 1956 I said that Egypt had always been the grave of its invaders, because of the way its people hold out, because of their strength.

Brothers:

Then, after that, after those critical times, those hard times, after the sacrifices we had made, after so many had been killed, we reorganized ourselves and revised our plans and found that, in the meantime, the enemy had recovered the initiative in the air and become cocksure. The Israeli leaders were

strutting about like peacocks and boasting that they could strike at any part of Egypt, that they could strike at the Egyptians until they submitted. They were extremely conceited, saying, "We shall attack the Egyptians, and Egypt will have to surrender and bow to our will." When the enemy recovered the initiative in the air—of course, he had really been preparing for this operation for ten years. Our mistake was that we had not made a correct appraisal of the situation in the past and not made preparations as the enemy had. But the thing was that we really wanted peace, while the enemy wanted to expand.

Brothers:

Just now, in the last fifteen days, there has been a change. As we all know, our forces have been recovering the initiative: they have been recovering the initiative with courageous military operations in the air and on land.

Brothers:

Both on and in the air our forces have carried out courageous operations; in the past they have also carried out courageous operations at sea. But what is new today is that we can say that we have started to wrest back the initiative. These last few days, brothers, these last few days we have been hearing the great fuss Israel and those who are behind it have been making—the great fuss in colonialist circles, the great act Israel has been putting on: supplements to Israeli newspapers, stories told by Israel and a great deal of fuss in America, West Germany, Britain and all the colonialist countries.

This is the situation we are faced with at present, the fuss the enemy is making. The day before yesterday the enemy launched a political propaganda operation against the U.S.S.R. and the United Arab Republic, against Egypt, on the pretext that the U.S.S.R. is helping Egypt and constantly increasing its aid to us.

The day before yesterday Israel directed a grave accusation against the U.S.S.R., and once Israel started making accusations the colonialist press started repeating them too.

The grave accusation that Israel made against the U.S.S.R. was this: that Russia is helping Egypt and the people of Egypt, who are being subjected to aggression by American Phantom planes, and whose cities, factories and schools have been subjected to aggression and whose workers and children have been killed. Russia is helping Egypt to prevent Israel carrying out raids with American Phantom planes on cities, factories, schools and economic targets. This is the accusation that Israel made the day before yesterday. This is the accusation that has been repeated by the American press—the *New York Times* has been lamenting, the American press has been lamenting, and the West German press has been lamenting the fact that Israel cannot come and attack Cairo. They are saying that the U.S.S.R. is committing a great crime by helping us to defend our skies, our own air-space, from raids by American Phantom planes.

All this is intended for propaganda, to mislead and deceive world public opinion.

Israel says that Russia is helping Egypt to attack Israel. What sort of aggression against Israel is it if Egyptian planes fly on raids over Sinai as far as Rafah and el-Arish? Are Rafah and el-Arish part of Israel? Can this really be called aggression? Of course not. Of course we are exercising our right to liberate our territory; we are performing our duty to liberate our territory. Israel has attacked us, attacked Abu Za'bal, attacked the school at Bahr al-Baqar, attacked civilian centers in Khankah and elsewhere, but so far we have not attacked inside Israel.

In spite of this, Israel and those who are behind Israel are saying that Russia is helping us to attack it. So far we have not attacked a single Israeli city; we have not attacked Israeli military camps inside Israel.

I once told you that when they attack civilians we shall attack civilians, and I hold by this, I have not gone back on my word.

But when we start we must be sure of one thing—we must not act emotionally, we must ensure continuity.

Brothers:

Now that this period is over the initiative

has returned to our hands. Israel is creating this terrible fuss and accusing the U.S.S.R. Soviet aid to us is no secret, and it is nothing new. All the aid we receive from the U.S.S.R. is in agreement with the principles we have always believed in; it is the aid of a friend for a friend, the aid of right for right, the aid of all who believe in political and social progress, it is aid on behalf of the struggle for political and social progress.

Brothers:

I am happy to say that the Egyptian people are profoundly grateful for all the Soviet aid they have received—and it has all been aid provided without any terms or conditions—aid on behalf of principles and freedom. We cannot imagine what would have been our situation if we had not received Soviet aid, in view of what the United States has given Israel in the way of instruments of war, killing and destruction.

The United States supplied Israel before June 5; we were surprised when the aggression took place in spite of United States undertakings, and when it took place the United States was silent, and Israel was able to destroy all our armed forces, while the greater part of its own armed forces remained unharmed—we began to build up our armed forces, for we had a very small force indeed left on June 9.

Talking of the U.S.S.R., I can now say that I have received 12 letters from Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny in which they undertook to support the Arab people and undertook to rearm the armed forces to the level they were before, without asking anything in return; they only asked us to hold out at this time of trial so that we might rebuild our armed forces.

Without this, without the Russian arms we received after the defeat of June 5, Moshe Dayan could have been sitting here in Cairo, Golda Meir could have been sitting here in Cairo. I know that the Egyptian people would have fought, if only with their staves, and I said so in July 1967. But the Palestinian people in Gaza are also fighting and resisting and dying; Moshe Dayan goes there in the day—the Israelis are in control during the

day. But I have read a pro-Israeli American journalist who said that the Palestinians are in control at night in the Gaza area and threaten the Israelis. Of course it is a battle, but it is a battle of an unarmed, struggling people who believes in its right to freedom.

But there is a real difference between that and the fact that we can rebuild our armed forces. Today we have rebuilt our armed forces and we shall not allow our enemies or those who are behind them or America to dominate us.

Then there is the question of Soviet aid. I can tell you that you are going to hear a great deal of propaganda—you heard a great deal of propaganda in 1955—when we received arms they talked of Soviet control. Then we started to build the High Dam, and we brought 5,000 of them to Aswan to help us, and again they talked about Soviet control. Now that the High Dam is built it provides a reservoir that stores 130,000 million cubic meters of water and gives 10 billion KwH of electricity and the 5,000 Russians have gone—there are only 60 of them left. They helped us to build, and we now have plenty of water and plenty of electricity. All the talk and stories and uproar created by the colonialist countries and Israel, and written up in the colonialist press—it was all nonsense intended to frighten us so that we should not build the High Dam. After 1967 too, they said the same things. But without the U.S.S.R. and other friendly countries we should not have been able to rebuild our armed forces; we should not have been able to stand up and talk as proudly as we are talking today.

We can all remember how we were talking in '67 and '68.

Brothers:

A few days ago I wrote a letter to Chairman Brezhnev expressing the gratitude of all of us, the gratitude of the Egyptian people, and I received from Brezhnev a letter full of brotherly feeling and friendship and resolution.

Brothers:

From here, from the area in which is the Abu Za'bal factory which was attacked by American planes which killed and wounded its workers, burned its workers and destroyed its buildings and machinery—from here I address an appeal to President Richard Nixon.... We have met, I met him in 1963 and had a frank talk, and I am sure he still remembers our conversation. He was not in power at that time.

What I say is that in spite of all that has happened we have not finally closed the door on the United States, in spite of the great harm it has done us, in spite of the napalm, the bombs and the Phantoms.

A few weeks ago I met Sisco, the American Assistant Secretary of State; I met him with the idea of making our point of view clear to the United States of America.

I now turn to President Nixon and say to him that the United States is about to take a very grave step against the Arab nation.

If the United States takes another step along the road of confirming Israel's military superiority, it will drive the Arab nation into a position from which there can be no return, a position that will oblige us to decide what is essential, and that will affect relations between the United States and the Arab nations for dozens of years, very possibly for hundreds of years.

I say to President Nixon—and he knows that I mean what I say—that the Arab nation will never surrender and never abandon its rights, and that it wants a genuine peace. But that it believes that peace can only be based on justice. What I want to say is that if the United States wants peace it must order Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories.

The United States can do this, for Israel has to obey its orders as it lives at the expense of the United States.

Nothing else is acceptable to us, or ever will be.

This is one solution.

The second solution—if it is not in America's power to give orders to Israel—and

we are ready to believe it if it says so, whatever we really think—but in that case we have one thing to ask, which it is certainly in America's power to grant. This request is that it should give no new support to Israel as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories—no new military, political or economic support. If neither the first nor the second solution come about, the Arab nation will be forced to the conclusion which it will no longer be possible to deny—that the United States of America wants Israel to go on occupying our territories until it can impose its own terms on us by forcing us to surrender.

This—and I am still addressing President Nixon, in a last attempt—this will never happen; all the conspiracies that are being directed against the Arab nation and against the front of liberation and progress, can never succeed.

The peoples of the Arab nation have awakened, and it is quite impossible that they should ever again be enchained.

The forces of progress are bound to be victorious and nothing can intimidate them.

I call on you to learn the lessons taught by the Libyan revolution, the Sudanese revolution.

I say to President Nixon that a decisive moment is coming in Arab-American relations—either we shall continue the quarrel forever, or there will be a serious new start on specific lines.

Future developments will not touch Arab-American relations only; they will have grave consequences on a much greater scale than that. We have asked, and we shall continue to ask, for all possible help from our friends, from the friends of progress, peace and freedom, because our battle is the battle of progress, peace and freedom.

Our determination to liberate our territory is the first legitimate right of any nation that values its dignity.

I say this to President Nixon because the moment is critical and because the consequences will be extremely grave.

Although there are no diplomatic relations between our two countries, there is nothing to prevent us making one more final call for

peace in the Middle East.

We want President Nixon to ask Israel two questions, and the answers to them, if he gets any answers, will put the whole truth at his disposal.

We want him to ask them:

Firstly: Are they prepared to withdraw from all Arab territories in conformity with the Security Council resolution and the principles of the United Nations?

Secondly: Do they know that there is a people that was created free and sovereign—the people of Palestine—and that this people has rights, which are referred to in the Security Council resolution, United Nations resolutions, its Charter and its principles, and all the principles which humanity believes in and has fought for?

Their answer has been clear to us from the start: they are not prepared to withdraw—indeed, they are not prepared even to mention the word withdrawal, even if only for consumption by world public opinion. This is what the Israeli Premier said a few days ago—because what they want is to expand—they are against the rights of the people of Palestine—in fact they absolutely deny that there is such a thing as a Palestinian people.

President Nixon should take a look at what is going on in Israel itself to see the picture as it really is.

Many people, even in Israel itself, have started warning against the difficult and dangerous course down which the ruling military clique in Israel is sliding in the hope of dragging the whole Middle East along with it—and very likely not only the Middle East. Brothers, this is the appeal that I make to the American President Nixon.

Brothers:

We have decided to take a very wide-scale Arab initiative to discuss the matter and confront the situation in which Israel is trying to exploit American support and get further American arms and aid.

We have decided to take a very wide-scale Arab initiative, and send envoys to all the Arab countries to inform them of our point of view, so that we may hear their points

of view and gather together in order that all of us, the whole Arab nation from the Gulf to the Ocean, may confront whatever situation arises, and any new American aid to Israel. For this aid has not been against Egypt only—it will be against the whole Arab nation, against the Arabs everywhere. The effect of this aid will be that Israel will achieve what one of its ministers has called for—that Israel will achieve Herzl's plan of an Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates, including parts of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the whole of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and parts of Egypt.

We shall send envoys to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia—Dr. Labib Shuqair will go to these countries, and Mr. Muhammad Hasanain Haykal will go to Libya, and Dr. Hasan Sabri al-Khauili will go to South Yemen and North Yemen. Mr. Abbas Zaki will go to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Mr. Muhammad Faye'q to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and Mr. Amin Huwaidi to Sudan.

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Press Conference Statements by Kuwaiti Minister of the Interior and Defense Shaikh Sa'd al-Abd Allah al-Salem al-Sabah on Kuwait's Military Commitment on the Suez Canal and the Eastern Front¹

Kuwait, May 4, 1970

We know Israel's expansionist intentions and objectives, but for the Arab nation, which has waited patiently for so long in the belief that a solution could be found for the Middle East crisis—now that its "patience" has only led to a deadlock—there is only one course open, the course of arms.

The Arab nation has chosen this course because it is the only course by which we can defeat Israel and liberate our usurped territories, so that our brethren the Palestinians may return to their homeland and to their towns and villages.

We know that Washington gives Tel-Aviv moral, military, political and economic support. But however long America continues to support Israel, this support will have no effect on the morale of the Arab people. The Arab nation will continue on its course until it reaches its desired objective, which is the liberation of Palestine.

Q. Your Excellency... there are reports that Kuwait is intending to increase the forces of the Yarmuk Brigade because of the deteriorating situation on the Canal Front. What truth is there in these reports?

A. Our forces are in existence and always at the ready. Every Kuwaiti soldier is ready to fight the battle.

Q. An Egyptian envoy will shortly be coming to Kuwait on an urgent mission. What does Kuwait think of this envoy's mission?

A. Kuwait welcomes the envoy's visit, and we are ready to consult and come to an understanding with him, because it is essential that brothers should exchange points of view.

Q. Is it intended to station Kuwaiti forces on the Eastern Front?

A. I have already said in reply to a previous question that every Kuwaiti soldier is ready to do his duty... when it is required of him. Should it be necessary, we shall station our forces on the Eastern Front without a moment's delay.

Q. What about arms?

A. We are at present providing the Kuwaiti army with the most modern military equipment.

Q. What kind of arms?

A. All kinds of equipment. Especially the strengthening of the Air Force.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), May 5, 1970.

Q. Do they include rockets?

A. Without going into details, everything connected with all kinds of arms.

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Statement by the Unified Command of the Palestinian Resistance Movement Declaring a Formula for National Unity and a Program for Political and Military Action¹

Amman, May 6, 1970

All sections of the resistance represented in the Unified Command held a series of meetings after the crisis of February 10, 1970 [in Jordan] to discuss means of achieving integrated national unity linked with a program for political and military action, to constitute the minimum program that was agreed on in the debates of the Unified Command.

The Unified Command arrived at the following formula for national unity:

a. All sections of the resistance movement regard the Palestine Liberation movement as the broad framework for national unity.

b. After long discussion the Palestinian resistance movement, as represented by the Unified Command, decided that the following points should be regarded as the broad outlines for joint political and military action, together with the Palestinian National Charter and the resolutions of the National Assemblies:

1. The forces of the Palestinian revolution are the toiling Palestinian masses and all forces which have an interest in the stage of national liberation and the complete liberation of the soil of Palestine.

2. Palestinian struggle is based on belief that the people in the Palestinian-Jordanian

theater are one people, that the people of Palestine are part of the Arab nation, and that the territory of Palestine is part of Arab territory.

3. The Palestinian revolution is an indivisible part of the contemporary Arab revolutionary movement and an indivisible part of the world-wide national liberation movement against colonialism, imperialism and world Zionism.

4. The enemies of Palestinian national liberation are Zionism, the State of Israel, imperialism, and all subservient forces linked, dialectically and through their common interests, with imperialism and colonialism.

5. The object of Palestinian struggle is the liberation of the whole of Palestine in which all citizens will coexist with equal rights and obligations within the framework of the aspirations of the Arab nation to unity and progress.

6. Popular revolutionary war is the principal course to liberation of Palestine.

7. The people of Palestine and their national liberation movement are struggling for complete liberation and reject all peaceful solutions involving liquidation and surrender, including the reactionary and colonialist conspiracies to establish a state of Palestine in part of Palestinian territory, and the resolution involving liquidation adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967.

8. Commando action regards the territory of the Arab countries which are Israel's neighbors as a legitimate field for Palestinian struggle, and considers that any effort to close any Arab country to the Palestinian resistance is treason to the goal of the people of Palestine and the Arab nation, which is the liberation of Palestine.

9. Commando action declares its complete independence of all Arab regimes and rejects all attempts to encircle it, impose tutelage on it, contain it or reduce it to subjection.

10. All sections of the resistance agree to the formation of a unified military committee

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Sawt Filastin* (Damascus), No. 29 (June 1970).

to develop the armed struggle and ensure that it advances to a new stage of commando action and people's war of liberation.

11. Action will be taken to arm the masses of the Palestinian and Arab peoples in the Arab countries which are the neighbors of occupied Palestine, to protect the resistance from efforts to strike at and liquidate it, and to ensure effective combatant participation in the confrontation of any Zionist-imperialist invasion of Arab territories surrounding Palestine.

12. Israel, by virtue of its structure, is a closed racist society linked with imperialism and, also by virtue of its structure, the limited progressive forces that exist in it are incapable of bringing about any radical change in the character of Israel as a Zionist racist state linked with imperialism. Therefore the aim of the Palestinian revolution is to liquidate this entity in all its aspects, political, military, social, trades union and cultural, and to liberate Palestine completely.

c. All sections shall adhere unanimously to matters on which agreement has been reached; matters on which agreement has not yet been reached may be dealt with by each section in conformity with its own individual views; all matters touching the security of the revolution shall be adhered to unanimously.

d. All sections shall be represented in the forthcoming Palestinian National Assembly and in the organizations affiliated to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the extent of the representation of the organizations in the National Assembly shall not be discussed by the commando organizations.

e. A Central Committee, in which all sections of the resistance will be represented, shall be formed by a resolution of the National Assembly, to act as the command of the resistance movement. The Central Committee appointed by the National Assembly shall take the place of the present Unified Command. This Central Committee will consist of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, representatives of all the commando organizations, the

President of the Palestinian National Assembly and the Commander of the Palestine Liberation Army.

Signed:

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fateh)

The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command)

The Palestine Liberation Army

The Palestine Popular Struggle Front

The Vanguards of the Popular War of Liberation (al-Sa'iqa)

The Popular Liberation Forces

The Arab Liberation Front

The Arab Palestine Organization

The Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization

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Statement by the Islamic Committee in Jerusalem on the Seizure of Arab Lands in Hebron and Bait Sahur¹

Jerusalem, May 6, 1970

At this critical time when the attention of the Arab people of this holy land is focused on the Israeli prisons where their brethren are detained and are suffering such maltreatment, persecution and torture that they have gone on hunger strike, thereby endangering their lives;

At this time when the Arab nation is suffering so much, the Israeli authorities acquaint us with their decision to seize thousands of

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Quds* (Jerusalem), May 7, 1970.

dunums of Arab lands in Hebron and Bait Sahur, lands which constitute the main economic support of the population of those Arab areas. This is in addition to the tens of thousands of dunums which have been seized, appropriated or undergone a change of character in Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley.

The Israeli authorities are taking this action, which has led or will lead to the displacement of the people from their lands, towns and villages, regardless of the cries and protests of the oppressed.

The Islamic Committee stands by the detainees and supports their demands that the maltreatment and persecution to which they are being subjected should cease. It likewise protests against the fateful measures which the Israeli authorities are taking as regards the lands they have seized, expropriated or confiscated.

The Committee calls on the International Red Cross to establish its presence and perform its task. The Islamic Committee also declares its opposition to all these measures and calls on world public opinion and all men of conscience to make every effort to secure the repeal of these oppressive decisions and measures and to put an end to this policy which is in conflict with international custom and agreements and the many resolutions adopted by all the international organizations.

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Speech by P.L.O. Official Spokesman Nasir at the Opening of the International World Conference of Christians for Palestine (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, May 7, 1970

Talking of Zionist world domination, Gentlemen, we believe that Zionism has

succeeded not only in infiltrating into all the institutions of society in the West, but also in penetrating the Christian Church and subjecting it, in many fields, to its wishes and whims. Amongst other things, Zionist propaganda has given Western Christians the impression that Israel is sympathetic to the Eastern Christians, and wants to protect them from persecution by the Muslims. Certain quarters in the Christian Church have been influenced by this propaganda, forgetting that the Christian Arab, who is attached by links of history, nationality and civilization to the land, its people and its destiny, is fully aware of the nature of the struggle, and knows from experience that napalm bombs and torture have never made any distinction, nor will they ever do so, between him and his Muslim Arab brother. Moreover, the Christian Arab fully realizes that Christianity is itself a human revolution constantly blazing in society, which was sparked off by Christ, the greatest revolutionary ever produced by mankind. Christianity is a revolution against tyranny, aggression, usurpation and racialism; there is no need for me to recall to you the incident of the cleansing of the Temple, when Christ entered the Temple of God and found people buying and selling, and seized a whip and set upon them saying "My house shall be called a house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of thieves." Genuine, aware Christianity, if it is to mean anything to people at all times and in all places, must mean standing up to tyranny and usurpation, and if Christians have failed to embody this ideal, the only explanation, in our view, lies in the fact that they have so far deviated from true Christian principles as to degrade pure Christianity to the level of Pharisaism. In this connection I consider it my duty to affirm that we Christian Arabs are organically integrated into the society we have shared in building and forming, our Arab human society. This is due to our profound understanding of the factors and elements of which that society is really composed, and we also affirm that at both lay and ecclesiastical levels we are no less ferocious and savage in combating Zionism than any member of our nation and our people in the Arab homeland, and

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nadwa al-'Alamiya Lil Masihiyin min Ajl Filastin* "A'mal al-Nadwa" (Beirut), 7-10 May, 1970.

that we have refused in the past, throughout the ages, to become the prey of the hostile force represented by occupation and foreign colonialism, and have stood side by side with the members of our nation, in a single command and a single base, against every incursion intended to injure our territory, our dignity and our pride.

Gentlemen,

The great question posed by the Palestinian revolution today is the question that is posed by every free and honorable man in the world, the question of the Zionist presence in Palestine and certain parts of the Arab homeland. If we admit, for the sake of argument, that there is a problem for the Jews of the world which is not of their own making; if we admit, for the sake of argument, that this group of people has been subjected to persecution and oppression all over the world for reasons unconnected with their fanaticism and their morbid self-isolation, the great question still remains unanswered, hanging helplessly in the air, the question: Was it necessary that this people's problem should be solved at the expense of other peoples losing their homeland? Was it necessary that millions of Palestinians and Arabs should be slaughtered, evicted and displaced to solve the problem of these people? And is this the best solution that the intellect of the world could produce to settle the problem? This is the great question, as regards which world opinion will not long remain divided, because the world must of necessity move forward, and because the Palestinian revolution has settled all this, and has started to tell the world that the first thing it should realize is that the Arabs alone have never persecuted the Jews who lived among them for centuries as honored and respected citizens, under the aegis of a continuously thriving civilization with vast horizons that it is proud of and glories in despite the misrepresentation of which it has been the victim and the conspiracies and the injuries to which it has been subjected. In the light of all this, the Palestinian revolution declares that it makes a radical distinction between Zionism as a philosophy, a sick,

distorted, racist and expansionist movement, and Judaism and the Jews. The revolution also affirms that this concept lies at the very heart of its commitments; it is not just a tactic or words intended for consumption, because the revolution knows perfectly well, in spite of the immense burden it is carrying, that it is its duty to participate in the battle to defeat and liquidate Zionism in performance of its human mission on behalf of all mankind and on behalf of world peace, with which, as there is ample proof, and new proofs appear every day, Zionism is tampering in one way or another and exposing to the gravest danger; as those who follow the increasingly serious escalation of the situation in the Middle East with close attention are now pointing out.

Once again, Gentlemen, from its profound understanding of its role and its humane mission in the world, and from its awareness of the nature of the battle and of Zionism, the Palestinian revolution has proposed the solution of the problem that has arisen, has proposed it with courage and candor, to world public opinion, has proposed it grasping the rifle butt in its right hand, as it daily offers the lives of a host of martyrs and fighters, and bearing the banner of peace and love in its left hand. There is no contradiction or inconsistency in this, for, in the battle of liberation we are fighting today, we are determined to liberate the Jewish victims of Zionism from Zionism in order to establish the liberated democratic state, fundamentally linked to a democratic Arab society, in which all citizens will coexist with equal rights and obligations. The revolution is of necessity progressive, it cannot be otherwise, and under no circumstances can it permit the expansionist Zionist political entity to survive in Palestinian Arab territory, because that would threaten its safety and security.

Gentlemen, the establishment of the State of Israel has not solved the Jewish problem. The reactionary racist concept which is opposed to the absorption of the Jews into the various societies in which they live, is now impeding their absorption even into Israel. The so-called nationalism of the Jews is artificial; it is the nationalism of the business-

man and the upper sectors linked with a capitalist economy that control Israel, and its expansionist colonialist interests are the material basis of its aggressive racialist policy. Therefore talk of social change in Israel, which lacks a stable and historically constituted social life, is incompatible with the science of revolution, and the spurious slogans which allege the possibility of a radical change in the national home of the Children of Israel are the slogans of the interests of reaction and Zionism. It is therefore required of all progressive forces in the world that they should revise their views on the establishment of the State of Israel and all the hypotheses about its existence that they have advanced in the past.

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Newspaper Interview Statements by an Official Representative of the Partisan Forces on Relationships with the Commando Organizations, Communist Parties and the Soviet Union¹

early May, 1970

Q. Who are the members of the "Partisan Forces"?

A. The Partisan Forces are composed of members of the communist parties of the countries on the line of confrontation—Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Naturally membership is not restricted to communist comrades; in addition to these, anyone who wants to resist and fight can join the organization....

Q. Why does the organization not include members of all the communist parties in the Arab homeland?

A. As I said, it is composed of the com-

munist parties of the confrontation countries, both because these parties exist on the line of confrontation and because it is easy to establish permanent contacts between them. But this does not mean that the other communist parties in the Arab homeland will not participate in the Partisan Forces in one way or another, or will not aid and support them in one way or another. Indeed, I can say that this also applies to a great extent to the world communist parties, which regard the Partisans as a revolutionary group which the principles of proletarian internationalism require that they should support....

Q. Does the formation of the Partisan Forces mean that the Jordanian Communist Party and its sister communist parties have withdrawn their support from the Security Council resolution?

A. It is by no means because they reject military action that the communist parties believe in a peaceful solution. If this were the case the Partisan Forces would never have been formed. The Partisan Forces, as combatant forces, were established for the express purpose of bearing arms against the enemy, of fighting him with the well-known ferocity of communists when they bear arms....

Q. Do the Partisan Forces receive aid from the socialist camp, and in particular from the U.S.S.R.?

A. The socialist camp, and the U.S.S.R. first and foremost, provide both direct and indirect support to all the forces of revolution and resistance in the Arab world. Naturally the Partisan Forces expect such support.

Q. Are the communists in the occupied territories taking part in the armed struggle along with the Partisan Forces?

A. It would not be in the best interests to answer that question.

Q. Do the Partisan Forces intend to take action inside the 1948 frontiers?

A. The Partisan Forces will resist aggres-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahrar* (Beirut), May 8, 1970.

sion wherever it is. The consequences of aggression make themselves felt in the occupied areas and in the neighboring countries, but the source of aggression is inside the frontiers of the year of the disaster. It must therefore be resisted not only on the scene of its operations, but also where these operations are prepared, at their source.

Q. Do you intend to join the Unified Command of the resistance organizations?

A. We have applied to join the Unified Command as an expression of our good intentions and our desire for the unity of all sections of the resistance, and, at the same time, from our belief that as long as there is one common goal, one common enemy, as long as even the means of resistance are the same, it is obvious that these forces should be grouped together in some form of unity, the expression of which, at present, is the Unified Command.

Q. If your application is refused, how will you construct your relations with these organizations?

A. We are very anxious that our relations with all the resistance organizations without exception should continue to be based on friendship, mutual understanding and cooperation. We believe that, as far as the main lines of their policy is concerned, there is nothing to keep these organizations apart. We also believe that what unites all these organizations, as they face the lofty task they are determined to perform, is stronger than inconsiderable differences of detail. This will speed up the advance of all sections of the revolution, including the Partisan Forces, towards unity or, to be more precise, towards a front resembling the Liberation Front in Vietnam.

It is much to be regretted that our application has not been unanimously approved, one organization having reservations about it. We do not conceal the fact that we were surprised by these reservations, for we had thought that the sensitivities that existed before June had been destroyed along with everything else that was destroyed in the June War.

However, we are confident that this is merely a temporary error, because we believe that the process of resistance in itself will correct this error, which no one can say is in the interest of the resistance and the struggle. In placing on record our profound regret, we affirm that our relations with all the organizations, without exception, will continue to be friendly and brotherly. We base this affirmation on the firmly established fact that, however long they remain apart, revolutionaries must inevitably meet.

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Statement by Prime Minister Karami of Lebanon on Israeli Aggression Against Lebanese Territory (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, May 12, 1970

Following the aggression launched by the enemy against Lebanese territory at 4:45 this morning, our gallant army is performing its duty by defending the frontiers of the homeland, giving generously of the blood and the lives of its men in defense of Lebanon. The brutal aggressor against our land is trying to justify his aggression, as he has long tried to do, by such pretexts as commando action and the incidents that have taken place on the frontier. All this, if it proves anything, is proof of evil intentions that always try, by the use of misleading propaganda, to conceal the truth and disguise the facts.

Why does Israel try to delude public opinion everywhere by condemning what are merely natural reactions and forgetting that it was Israel itself that is the cause of all this? We, therefore, as Lebanese aware of our responsibility to defend our sovereignty, our territory and our rights, cannot stand idly by in the face of these outrages and brutal aggressions, which are not really directed against

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 13, 1970.

commando action and the commandos. They are really an attempt to impair our national unity and to cause disturbances in Lebanon by creating an atmosphere and using force, which they believe is the only way of achieving all this. . . .

The Lebanese, with their awareness and patriotism, will stand up to this as one man, because Lebanon, which is part of this Arab area, and cooperates with it in full solidarity in the battle for existence, the battle of destiny, right and liberation, cannot but meet its responsibilities and make its choice between a life of dignity and an honorable death.

The Council of Ministers met at 7 a.m. today, and after discussing the situation and the current aggression against our territory, took a number of decisions. The first of these was to call for a meeting of the Security Council to consider Lebanon's complaint against Israel. The Council of Ministers also formed a delegation which will leave today to raise this question and to employ all means and arguments in the defense of our cause.

The Council of Ministers also called the ambassadors of the four great powers to the Presidential Palace to explain to them Lebanon's attitude to the aggression against Lebanese territory and to call on them, as permanent members of the Security Council, to do their duty and face their responsibilities because, in our view, it is not merely a question of an aggression against the frontiers of Lebanon; its significance and consequences extend far beyond our frontiers.

We are therefore taking the various measures that duty requires of us in the fields of internal affairs and defense. The Council of Ministers will remain in session to follow up the development of events as they occur, and to take such measures as circumstances may demand.

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Newspaper Interview Statements by Secretary-General Habbash of the P.F.L.P. on Theoretical, Political and Military Questions Related to the Palestinian Movement¹

mid-May, 1970

Q. Some people think that the employment by the resistance organizations of the slogan of the democratic Palestinian State is incompatible with the mobilization of the Arab masses for the battle of liberation. What are your views on this?

A. It is essential to be clear about what the slogan of the democratic Palestinian state really means. For example, is the idea to establish a Palestinian state with an undefined national identity, which would be on its own, isolated from the Arab homeland and the Arab nation, and not constituting an integral part of the whole Arab entity in the area? I do not think that any of the organizations has this idea.

Another point is that the destiny of Palestine, inasmuch as its future is linked with the future of the Arab homeland and the Arab nation, will be determined by the objective developments of the struggle in the area; it does not depend on a slogan adopted by an organization or a group of organizations. The basic conflict in which the area is involved is the conflict between Israel, Zionism, imperialism and the forces of local reaction on the one hand, and the masses of the whole Arab area on the other. This is the material and objective reality of the struggle; consequently no slogan can restrict the image of the struggle to a Palestinian regional framework. The fact that the Palestinian revolution is an inseparable part of the Arab revolution is not just an idea or a vague national aspiration; it has its roots and its material basis in the nature of the conflict and the nature of the struggle. That is to say, in the nature of the battle, and even at this preliminary stage of the revolution we find that the process of forging organic links between the

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Beirut), May 22, 1970.

regional and national characters of the revolution has started—a process that will eventually lead to the integration of the Palestinian revolution with the Arab revolution.

From this start what course will events follow? In what direction will they be directed by the objective process of struggle that is at present taking place in the area? The answer is that, from this start the course will lead towards the full integration of the Palestinian revolution with the Arab revolution, towards the unity of the Arab national liberation movement, towards the unity of the instruments of the revolution and, consequently, to the unity of the area.

The operation of liberating Palestine will be very hard and very long. On the road towards liberation great and radical developments will take place in the area surrounding Israel in particular and in the Arab homeland in general. It is impossible that the present image of the area should remain unchanged after so many years of the development of the revolution and of the movement of the masses in their resistance to imperialist-Israeli aggression. The process of unifying and revolutionizing will forge ahead side by side with the growth of the revolution; thus the operation of liberating Palestine cannot take place within the framework of the Arab image as it exists today. The operation of liberating Palestine will be the culmination of unification and radical change comprehending the Arab area, and the area surrounding Israel in particular. Consequently Palestine, liberated from Zionism and imperialism, will, by a natural process, become part of a unified revolutionary Arab entity, with the Palestinian liberation movement integrated with the Arab liberation movement, the Palestinian revolution integrated with the Arab revolution, and the army that liberates Palestine an inseparable part of the Arab liberation army led by the Arab revolution.

In the light of this objective conception of the future of the struggle movement and of the course of events in the area, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes

that the significance and practical application of this slogan lie in finding a democratic solution to the Jewish problem in Palestine. That is to say, all Jewish citizens in liberated Palestine, which will be organically united with the Arab homeland and the Arab nation, must enjoy all their rights as citizens without distinction. The Palestinian Arab liberation movement is not a racist and aggressive movement, hostile to the Jews as Jews; it does not aim at annihilating them or throwing them into the sea. It is a progressive liberation movement whose aim is to liberate Palestine from the Israeli-Zionist presence that is linked with imperialism and reaction. As soon as this presence is eliminated it will be replaced by a progressive, democratic Arab society which will allow every citizen his full rights.

This society, which will objectively ensure the full economic and social liberation of every citizen, will have destroyed any objective ground on which Zionist tendencies might arise again; in this way it will have provided the scientific solution, the human, democratic and progressive solution of the Jewish problem.

Q. What do you think of the entry of the Partisan Forces into the field of commando action?

A. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine regarded the entry of the Partisan Forces into the field of commando action as an important step taken by the Arab communist parties. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine therefore welcomed and supported this step, and was in favor of the Partisan Forces being accepted in the Unified Command, for two principal reasons:

1. The Arab communist parties constitute one of the basic progressive sections of the Arab revolution, so that for this basic section to remain outside the framework of the revolutionary situation, which started to prevail in the Arab area when the resistance movement embarked on its armed struggle after June 1967, is something unnatural and anomalous. Therefore the entry of these parties

into the framework of the armed struggle is a gain to the resistance movement which can only make it stronger and give it greater impetus.

2. The Front believes that if the communist parties become involved in the armed struggle they will become readier to comprehend objective facts, which will enable them to take a broader analytical view of the Palestine problem and all the problems of the Arab revolution, and thus of their strategic conception of the problem of Palestinian and Arab national liberation. For, according to our analysis, the close contacts that will result from their involvement in the fighting will enable these progressive revolutionary parties to relinquish their traditional attitudes. Very possibly this hypothetical transformation will not take place overnight; what is important is that it should take place.

Q. Some of the Arab regimes are saying that they accepted the peaceful solution as a tactic to win over world public opinion, whereas the resistance organizations generally rejected the peaceful solution. What do you think of the peaceful solution as a tactic?

A. The problem of the nationalist Arab regimes is that they have not made a radical analysis of the June defeat from which they could have deduced a radical revolutionary strategy which would have enabled them to confront and be victorious over Zionism and imperialism. A precise and scientific analysis of the battle, of the nature of the enemy and of imperialism and its technological superiority, of the nature of Israel's economic and military structure, which is organically linked to imperialism in the economic and military fields—all this gives us a clear picture of the kind of strategy that is capable of achieving victory. At the same time it clearly shows us that what is essential for the achievement of victory is not world public opinion nor the mere stock-piling of arms, nor the reconstruction of armies and the rectification of specific errors disclosed by the June defeat, nor in

maintaining some of our important alliances at international level. What is now really essential is the masses and indoctrinating them with a clear revolutionary political view of the battle, organizing, training and arming them, and leading them into battle in a way that will enable them to exhaust the enemy in spite of his military superiority. This will also ensure that they are unshakably determined to continue fighting for a thousand years, should it be necessary, to liberate themselves and defeat their enemies, and to subject all political attitudes and economic programs to the interests of this formula. This is what is essential, as is the case in Vietnam.

After this the natural result will be that we shall win over public opinion to our side, strengthen our alliances at international level, and obtain more arms. This is the basis that will ensure us arms, alliances, and world support, and without this basis all the alliances and all the international sympathy in the world will not enable us to achieve victory.

On this basis the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine believes that to accept the peaceful solution is a mistaken tactic. It creates an acute contradiction between the resistance organizations and the nationalist Arab regimes, prevents the masses from acquiring a radically revolutionary political view, and creates confusion in their ranks. Thus any gain the peaceful solution achieves is at the expense of something very important. What is more important is ourselves, the masses of our people, their awareness, organization, mobilization and determination to fight for a thousand years, whatever the sacrifices involved. After that we can win over world public opinion, form alliances and obtain all the arms necessary for the achievement of victory.

Q. It is to be observed that there are far less operations on the Syrian frontier than on the Lebanese and Jordanian frontiers. What is the reason for this? And how can military confrontation be escalated in the Golan area?

A. In the first place it must be made

clear that commando action in Lebanon and Jordan forced its way to existence and activity in spite of the reactionary authorities in those countries, and not by their consent or at their wishes or indulgence, as they claim. The attempts to crush commando action made in Jordan on November 14, 1969 and February 10, 1970, and in Lebanon in April and October 1969 and March 1970, were not the only ones. Meetings, discussions and conspiracies with the object of crushing commando action started in September 1967, and they have been going on ever since, as those authorities know very well.

The forces of reaction are aware that all revolutionary activity threatens their survival and their interests, and they act on this assumption.

In forcing its way to existence in these two countries, commando action has relied on itself and on the masses. It has taken advantage, as it is entitled to do, of all the objective circumstances which arose from the June defeat, the most important of which was the inability of these forces to destroy commando action and the movement of the masses.

But the nationalist Arab regimes, which are not controlled by the alliance between colonialism, feudalism and capitalism—and Syria is one of them—have a different attitude to commando action. How is their attitude different and to what extent?

Syria supports commando action at information level, and is ready to provide certain assistance. But it does not want—for this is not in its interests—commando action to be in its territory, and if it does take place in its territory Syria is anxious that such action should take place with its knowledge and under its supervision, and should not escape its control. The reason for this is clear. It is that commando action and the mass situation that stimulates it, will become a force that demands that the regime carries out radical changes in its structure, its programs, its relations with the masses and its entire approach to the confrontation of the battle. With the passage of time a situation will arise in which the masses can exert pressure in support of their demands for a

program for a people's war of liberation, and a program for a people's war of liberation means many things, both great and small. It includes, for example, the destruction of all the privileges enjoyed by the ruling class, both military and civilian, and the demand that the authorities should adopt a fighting mentality and be in the midst of the fighting.

The nationalist regime in Syria acts on this basis. This is only natural. For a long period after June 5 the resistance organizations, in view of their balance of strength, and also in view of their belief that Jordan was a principal theater—from the geographical point of view—for the growth and escalation of resistance in the interior—for all these reasons the resistance organizations were unable to impose their existence in all the territories surrounding the occupied area at once, and unable to confront all their contradictions at once.

In my opinion this explains the ineffectiveness of the resistance from Syrian territory. The escalation of resistance in the Golan area depends on the resistance organizations themselves and the development of their military and political forces. Consequently, it depends on their ability to defend their right to freedom to fight Israel from all the surrounding Arab territories.

Q. What do you think of the operations carried out by sections of the resistance abroad?

A. The views of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on this subject are well known. The Popular Front has more than once made them clear in its dialogue with the other organizations, and has also written about them several times.

Without going into details, the basis of the Front's point of view can be summarized as follows:

1. Our enemy is not Israel alone. Our enemy is Israel, the Zionist movement, imperialism and the forces of reaction. It is thus natural that our military strategy should conform to our political definition of the enemy.

2. These operations inflict material and moral injuries on the enemy, and at the same time greatly raise the morale of our people:

we must exploit this in order to attain a higher degree of mobilization and greater strength.

By their very nature, and because the enemy is unable to conceal them, these operations strike at the morale of the enemy—this explains his nervous reactions. They also raise the morale of our people immensely, and give them confidence in themselves and their capacities. The blow-by-blow weakening of the enemy's strength and morale, and the corresponding step-by-step increasing of our strength, is the law which governs the tactics of fighting at the stage of guerrilla war which aspires to the state of a people's war of liberation.

3. It is a fundamental mistake to say that this line of action threatens the resistance movement with deviation from its line of revolutionary mass combat towards terrorism and individual and anarchic acts of heroism. The Popular Front adopts this line as a complement to, not an alternative to, its fighting and political effectiveness in the occupied area and the Arab theater. The Front's effectiveness in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and its political effectiveness in the Arab theater, is the answer.

4. The one and only problem involved in this line is public opinion, and the fact that extensive sectors of it do not understand these operations and all the considerations that lie behind them. This is something that we recognize and that we must bear in mind and deal with. But the way to deal with this problem is to reduce the dangers involved in these operations to a minimum and to plan them so carefully that they do not lead to third parties being harmed, and ensure that the damage they do is restricted to the enemy and his interests. On the other hand there must also be adequate and extensive information coverage to make it absolutely clear that right is entirely on our side in every operation we carry out. When this is achieved these operations will be of service to our cause, at world level in particular. We know how successful Zionism has been in obscuring the real nature of the Palestine problem, and how successful it has been in

burying Palestine, the Palestinian people and the cause of the Palestinian people, as far as extensive sectors of world public opinion are concerned.

5. Any appraisal of this line and its consequences must take into account not only its present level but also the level of influence it may come to exert should it be escalated and adopted by all the resistance organizations. Should this happen, this line will play an important role in the continuous exhaustion of the enemy's morale, and in the process of the increasing mobilization of all revolutionary forces at Palestinian and Arab levels.

6. Finally, the fundamental criterion by which these operations must be judged lies in our masses and their attitude to these operations, the extent to which they respond to them, and the influence they exert on the process of the continuous mobilization of the masses which will enable us to escalate the resistance to the level of a people's war of liberation. By this criterion, and from tangible experience, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine supports these operations and carries them out, and calls on all forces of the resistance to adopt this line, and in particular that aspect of it which relates to the destruction of colonialist interests in the Arab homeland. This will lead to the integration of the movement of the Palestinian masses with the movement of the Arab masses against their common enemy, imperialism.

We are one hundred per cent in favor of this line, though we realize that there are some gaps in it that must be closed. This can be done through a process of sincere and scientific criticism, which we must be ready to carry out from time to time.

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Press Interview Statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on the Israeli Attack on the Arqub Area in South Lebanon¹

end of May, 1970

...The Israeli attack on South Lebanon did not begin at dawn on Tuesday, May 12. It started before that with a preparatory operation which lasted 5 days, during which the enemy carried out air raids and heavy artillery shelling on the resistance bases and civilian villages in south-east Lebanon.

The object of this preparation was to achieve two things:

1. To discover and strike at the positions of the resistance.
2. To lower and smash the morale of the commandos before the operations started.

Seventy-two hours before the start of operations I called the Unified Command of the resistance to an emergency meeting in Amman, when I acquainted them with all the information at my disposal and told them that the aggression would take place in a matter of hours.

Confrontation plans were made, and then instructions were given for the artillery positions to be changed. And in fact a little before the thirty-four hour battle all our artillery positions on the Mount Hermon-Kafir Shuba axis were changed, and a state of emergency was declared for all combatants.

Q. Fully granting the important military, political and moral results achieved by the resistance in the battle, the view is being expressed that the resistance could have inflicted much heavier losses on the enemy, especially as the aggression was anticipated. Also that the nature of the terrain on which the military operations took place was eminently suitable for guerrilla warfare.

A. ... I disagree entirely with this view, for a number of reasons.

It was not to be expected of us as guerrilla

fighters that we should fight for thirty-four hours on end against Israeli forces pouring over the Lebanese frontier. There were not more than 750 commandos engaged in the fighting, 550 belonging to al-Asifa and from 150 to 200 from the other organizations. The only arms we had were Klashenkovs, hand grenades, anti-aircraft guns and some rocket bases.

We faced an Israeli armored brigade consisting of 100 Patton tanks, 200 armored cars and mechanized vehicles, and from 60 to 70 planes which flew over the area for 14 hours on the first day and ten hours on the second, according to Syrian Army reports.

But in spite of the notable difference in capacity and even in numbers between us and them, the fighting lasted for 34 hours, and Israel did not achieve its objectives.

Suffice to say that I have never seen Israeli aircraft in such density as I saw in the Arqub battles. I was present at the 1956 fighting on the banks of the Suez Canal, I was present during the June 5, 1967 operations and I took part in the Battle of Karamah and the subsequent operations, but I have never seen aircraft in such density, such continued shooting and such profuse firing as I saw in the Arqub fighting.

In one position where I was stationed with a number of comrades, the aerial bombardment above us lasted for four full hours. I remember that one enemy plane aimed its bombs directly at my position. I threw myself flat on the ground, as did the men who were with me, in spite of which the bomb hit two comrades, who were killed. I escaped, as did the rest of the Fateh command.

Suffice to say that in a distance of not more than three kilometers from al-Khuraiba to the Salah base we succeeded in stopping the advance of the convoy of Israeli tanks and armored cars for nine full hours throughout which there were savage battles, including even hand-to-hand fighting.

Suffice to say that our bases continued to fight until all their ammunition was exhausted. In spite of all this we destroyed 30 motorized armored cars, tanks and tractors, and inflicted about 150 casualties, killed and wounded.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 23, 1970.

And in spite of all this they ask why the enemy losses were not higher!

Finally, I want to say that generally we were fighting alone. This expression may annoy some people, but it is the truth.

Q. What is your view of the results of the fighting at all levels?

A. At the Lebanese level the fighting established an important basic fact—that Lebanon, whether it likes it or not, is indissolubly linked with the Arab destiny. The fighting also put an end to the myth of Western protection for Lebanon, and confirmed that the only protection for Lebanon is Arab protection. This was secured through commando action, which defended Lebanese soil, through effective participation by the Syrian air force, and through Iraqi artillery battles. So those parties in Lebanon who are only too well known and all those who have been prattling about Western protection for Lebanon had better shut up.

Also, contrary to what Moshe Dayan expected, the battle established the fact that commando action exists in Lebanon, and proved that it can defend, fight and die for Lebanese soil just as it fights, defends and dies for liberation and return.

Q. What decisive moments did you face during the operations? And what were the most important military results achieved by the resistance?

A. Probably the most important thing and the most difficult action that took place during the course of the fighting was the operation of replacing forces. We managed to replace the forces that took part in the first day's operations with others.

Suffice to say also that the command of al-Asifa, along with combatant elements, took part, at 4 a.m. on Wednesday, May 12, in a counter-attack operation against the Israeli forces. From a military point of view this meant that we were in control of the battle-field.

Suffice to say that the whole area of operations was not more than seven kilometers long by six kilometers wide, and this area stood out against all the aerial and ground bombardment for 34 hours.

After Mr. Rashid Karami's visit to Damascus, my Syrian brethren told me that the Commander of the Lebanese Army, General Jean Nujaim, had told them that he would never have imagined that Fateh would fight with such exceptional bravery and hold out against an Israeli incursion as heavily equipped as this one was.

Q. Does this mean that there were no negative aspects to the fighting? What is your purely personal appraisal and criticism of everything that happened?

A. To tell the truth, the coordination between the resistance organizations was not sufficient or of a sufficiently high level. This is a question that must be studied, and a solution must be found for the problem. I think that the new formula for national unity which will be announced after the meetings of the Palestinian National Assembly will be able to deal with such problems.

As to why there was no coordination, I can say, firstly, that Fateh fought alone, or bore the brunt of the fighting. Secondly, because the area which was the scene of the operations was the advance area in the confrontation of Israel and was the area in which Fateh's bases were concentrated. Al-Sa'iqa, for example, was in Shab'a, and the Arab Liberation Front in another area; this probably explains why Fateh fought alone and why there was not full coordination. Not that this means that the other organizations there did not fight; they all fought, and fought with honor, to the limit of their capacity.

Q. What is your attitude to the Lebanese whose houses were demolished by the Israelis and who suffered damage from the aggression?

A. A committee has been formed to study the situation of our Lebanese brethren who suffered damage from the aggression. We shall pay full compensation to our Lebanese brethren who continue to live permanently

in the same places in the Arqub area, and half compensation to those who choose to live outside Arqub.

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Statement by the National Assembly of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party on its Position Towards the Palestine Question¹

Rabat, May 24, 1970

The National Assembly of the Istiqlal Party, meeting from May 24-27, 1970;

Having studied the situation in the Arab East and the development of the Palestine problem in the field of resistance;

And having reviewed the problems that impede the course of commando action and the liberation of the territories colonized by the Zionist state supported by colonialism and imperialism;

And having studied the plans of the Zionist state to obliterate Islamic and Arab treasures and antiquities in the occupied territories and in the cities of Palestine, especially in the city of Jerusalem and in Hebron;

And having studied the attitude of America to the question of the destiny of the Arabs, its constant support for the Zionist state in international circles and its provision of that state with lethal offensive equipment;

And having observed what commando action has achieved and how it has held out in the battle; and the great sacrifices it has made to realize its legitimate existence in all fields, in conformity with the developments of the Palestine problem;

And having observed the developments in the attitudes of Islamic and other friendly countries to the Arab cause in general and to the Palestinian people in particular, which developments have started to show some positive results;

And having observed how slow the states in confrontation with Israel have been to unite to fight the battle of destiny, and how

they have hesitated to give free rein to the commandos and the popular resistance;

And having observed the desire of Arab popular circles for development, sacrifice and absorption in the battle of honor and liberation side by side with their brethren on the lines of confrontation and

In view of the above, the National Assembly of the Istiqlal Party declares that:

It is the duty of the commando organizations to unite and to coordinate their military and information efforts and their plans to deliver Palestine from the clutches of colonialism and imperialism.

It is the duty of the countries in confrontation with Israeli aggression to unite their fronts and plan for the decisive battle that will decide the destiny of colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East, and to give free rein to commando action and popular resistance.

It is the duty of the Islamic and Arab countries to declare their effective and immediate support of the military and commando effort for the battle of destiny, by allowing the masses to volunteer, by training volunteers and providing them with the necessary equipment, and by providing material and moral support to the resistance movement and the commandos, headed by the Fateh organization and the confrontation countries. They must clearly declare their attitude to the colonialist countries that support the Zionist state, headed by the United States, which supports the Zionist entity in international fields and provides it with lethal weapons, and announce their intention of imposing a political, economic and cultural boycott on all countries that support Israel.

It is the duty of the Moroccan government to respond to the desire of the Moroccan people to fight the battle of destiny and to work freely for the Arab cause, and to place Moroccan information media at the disposal of the Palestine cause.

The National Assembly of the Istiqlal Party honors and esteems the martyrs who have fallen on the territory of the homeland for the battle of liberation, and salutes the heroes of resistance and struggle, and the gallant soldiers, headed by the Fateh organization.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Alam* (Rabat), May 26, 1970.

The National Assembly calls on friendly and peace-loving countries to support the Arab cause and the Palestinian people, and to condemn the attitudes of the colonialist countries, especially the United States, in supporting the aggressive Zionist state and supplying it with lethal weapons.

The National Assembly salutes our Egyptian brethren who are continuing the war of attrition on the Canal and in Sinai.

It extols the heroic attitude of solidarity adopted by the army and the Arab people of Lebanon, and their support for the comandos in the Arab war of liberation.

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Address Made by U.A.R. President Nasser During a Visit to the Sudan on the State of Arab Confrontation with Israel and the United States (Excerpts)¹

Khartoum, May 28, 1970

When the United States says that it wants to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East, it means that it wants to maintain Israel's supremacy over all the Arab countries.

This, brothers, is the reasoning followed by the United States, and by Britain too, which advocates this, as do all the countries that follow in America's train.

But has the U.S.S.R. accepted this demand?

The U.S.S.R. has frankly rejected this demand of the United States and said that the aggressor forces must withdraw from occupied Arab territory, that Israel must withdraw from occupied Arab territory, and that without Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory the U.S.S.R. will continue to supply its friends, the Arab countries, with arms, the most modern arms.

After the 1967 defeat we asked the U.S.S.R. for advisers and experts to teach us how to use these modern arms, how to use the modern electronic arms.

We got what we asked for from the U.S.S.R. We now have Soviet advisers in Egyptian units; they have never interfered in politics and are not doing so now; they just carry on with their work of rebuilding the Arab armed forces.

I repeat that they are with our forces everywhere. In this connection I also want once more to express my thanks and gratitude to the U.S.S.R., because it helped us in our time of trial; it helped us in those critical days of grief we lived through in June 1967, it helped us in spite of all the pressures exerted on us at the beginning of this year when Israel stepped up its strategy and started striking in depth: striking at the suburbs of Cairo, striking at schools and killing children, striking at factories and killing workers.

We have been able to obtain from the U.S.S.R. modern arms which prevent the enemy, who is supported by the United States, from penetrating with Phantom and Skyhawk planes. They prevent him from penetrating into the interior of the country, into the Delta area and the Nile Valley area. Therefore we thank the U.S.S.R., because without the U.S.S.R.'s help Israel would have been able to strike at us in Cairo and the surrounding suburbs.

But we have been able to distinguish between two aspects. After the 1967 war, after the battle in 1967 was over, after we had started to rebuild our forces, after the adoption of the Security Council resolution which calls for the withdrawal of Israel's forces of aggression, what did the United States do? And what did the U.S.S.R. do? The United States gave Israel 150 Phantom and Skyhawk bomber planes. These planes are not used to defend Israel; their only use is to strike at and destroy our towns. We have been threatened and warned that if we do not accept Israel's conditions, all our vital installations, all our economic installations will be destroyed by these planes.

So we went and asked for help from the U.S.S.R., we asked it to help us to face these

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 29, 1970.

weapons, these weapons of destruction that the United States handed over to Israel to kill our children with. And the U.S.S.R. helped us by giving us the modern weapons that enable us to confront the American weapons of destruction that were attacking us and killing our children, our sons and our workers.

All this, brothers, without any terms or conditions.

In the last few years we have built up our armed forces and armed them and trained them, and they are now fighting a constant battle on the firing line on the Canal.

Israel demands that the fighting should stop, and we demand withdrawal.

All this gives us great hopes that, God willing, we shall be able to carry on our battle for liberation.

As I have told you, this revolution and the Libyan revolution and the way the Arab people have held out—all this gives us great hopes for the future.

The Palestinian people, too, have set out on the road of combat, the road of struggle to recover their rights by commando action. Commando activities, carried out by nuclei of the Palestinian people, have started to play a real part in the battle, they have started on the road of the Palestinian revolution, the road of Arab nationalism. The Palestinian people are being transformed from a people of refugees to a people of commandos, and the Palestinian people, whose name was formerly never even mentioned in international circles, is starting to exert greater political weight, because the Palestinian people have decided to live, though colonialism and Israel wanted them to die. So the Palestinian people rose up and formed the Palestinian resistance. They have given their blood and their lives for their Palestinian revolution, for their land and for their homeland.

And we, brothers, have started to develop the Arab alliance. The Western Front has been established on the Suez Canal, and the Eastern Front, consisting of Iraq, Jordan and Syria, has been established on the other side. A new phase has started; we were in the phase of holding out, in the phase of struggle; the

phase we are now in on the Suez Canal means that we can say that we are able to wrest the initiative from Israel, and that we are engaging in military operations on the East Bank of the Canal, that we are fighting incessantly.

Brothers,

So far it has not been possible to say that the battle against Israel and those who are behind Israel is one that involves the whole Arab nation; so far it has been a regional one; I am thus commenting on what my brother Qadhafi said.

In Egypt in 1967 our budget for the army was LE 160 million; today our budget for the armed forces is LE 550 million—that is to say, we have increased it by nearly LE 400 million by our own efforts.

At the Khartoum conference we agreed on Arab support, but this Arab support was to compensate for the losses Egypt, Jordan and Syria had sustained as a result of the aggression. We sustained losses estimated at LE 180 million, including the Suez Canal revenues, revenues from the oil wells in Sinai, revenues from the mines in the Sinai Peninsula and revenues from tourism. At that time it was decided that we should receive LE 95 million.

We thank the countries that gave this money and who promised in 1967 to continue payments until victory is won.

But when our factories in Suez were wrecked, when our oil refineries and fertilizer factories were wrecked, when we moved half a million Egyptian citizens from the Canal Zone to the interior, we were all enduring together—your brethren in Egypt endured all this. And we managed to rely on ourselves alone, we managed to construct a strong economy. But this battle does not involve the whole Arab nation, and we support President Qadhafi in the efforts he intends to make in contacting the Arab countries with the object of turning the battle into one that involves the whole Arab nation. Because under no circumstances can the battle with Israel be a battle in which only one Arab country is involved; Israel will not make an exception of any country; it has not made an

exception of Lebanon. So far the Arab nation has not mobilized its armies as it could have done. It is easy enough to talk of popular combat, popular struggle and popular fighting, if it were only a question of talking, with everyone cheering—that sort of talk is easy enough.

The mission President Qadhafi is performing is really a sacred one, because he wants to turn this battle in which Israel caught us divided, into a battle involving the whole Arab nation. Israel's whole strategy is always based on the assumption that it can deal with us piecemeal, country by country.

But some countries may feel, may fancy that they have been promised by a great power that Israel shall never come near them. But we know what Israel's frontiers are; only last month an Israeli Minister stated that Israel's frontiers are the frontiers demarcated by Herzl, one of the leaders of the Zionist movement, which start from the Nile and include the *Sharqiya* and *Ismailia* governorates, then the whole of Sinai, then part of Saudi Arabia as far as Medina, then the whole of Syria, the whole of Lebanon, the whole of Jordan and half of Iraq.

And a responsible minister in the Israel government [Weizmann, the Minister of Communications] said that America supports this.

It is necessary to say this so that the Arab nation and the leaders of the Arab nation may be aware of the danger that threatens it, so that the Arab nation may be aware that our enemy is not only Israel but those who are behind Israel, because it is inconceivable that the United States should abandon Israel—so that the Arab nation may bear in mind the nature of our enemy... his aggressive nature, and so that we may all bear in mind that what was taken by force can only be recovered by force.

This is really the right step that must be taken to turn the battle from a regional one into a battle between Zionism and all the Arabs.

The other aspect is that we have followed the course of political action, the course of building up our armed forces and the course of a war of attrition. We have also followed

the course of political contacts, for we know that the battle is a battle of destiny, a great battle, and we must not hesitate to follow any course that will lead us to the redemption of our rights, for we want peace.

But we do not accept the peace that the United States wants us to accept, for we regard it as surrender, and we do not accept the peace that Israel wants to impose on us.

So we must contact many organizations throughout the world—free people in the Western countries, as well as the economic and political support we receive from the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries. We have received support from the peoples of Africa and from the nonaligned countries—we have received support from free groups.

Brothers, we are demanding our right. We do not want the right to commit aggression, we want peace through peace, and peace, not surrender.

Brothers, what is our attitude today? We shall try by all available means to recover our right. We shall take political action, but when we take political action we do so on two basic conditions. The first is the necessity for the forces of aggression to withdraw from all territories occupied since June 1967, and not only from Sinai.

It was on this basis that we accepted the Security Council resolution adopted in November 1967. The government of Israel rejected this resolution, and when the envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General went to Israel, it refused to answer any of his questions.

Why did Israel refuse? Israel does not want peace. Israel wants expansion. Israel has declared that it has annexed Jerusalem and that there can be no talk about Jerusalem. Last week they announced that Hebron had been the town of their ancestors, so that it must be Judaized to become a town for Jews, and they have built houses there. Today they say that the town of Nablus also belonged to their ancestors, who used to live in it, and that it must be annexed to Israel.

Israel will not want peace as long as the United States continues to support it by force.

The last time I met you here, last January, on Sudan's independence day, I said that we demand that Israel withdraws from Jerusalem before Sinai, from the Syrian Heights and the Golan Heights before Sinai, from Gaza before Sinai, from the West Bank of Jordan before Sinai, from every inch of Arab territory which has been trodden by the forces of the great conspiracy whose raging tempests were loosed on our nation on June 5, 1967.

The second condition—and this is also included in the Security Council resolution—is the necessity to solve the problem of the people of Palestine and to restore to the people of Palestine all their legitimate rights.

This people is no longer demanding its rights as a people of refugees, as it did before. Israel says that to solve the problem of this people, it will call an international conference and solve the problem at that international conference.

We are trying by all available means, we are trying to convince our friends, so that all of them may be clear of the facts when they support our attitude. We are trying to convince the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America so that they may be indulgent to our attitude. We are trying to convince the peoples of Western Europe, so that they may realize that we harbor no hostility towards them, but that we have a right and are defending our right, just as they were in the right and defended it against the aggression of Fascist and Nazi racialism in the Second World War.

We are also trying to convince the United States itself, so that history may not hold it against us that we left a single stone unturned.

This was what I had in mind when I made my appeal to the American President Nixon on May 1. I said to him, and he knows that I mean what I say, that the Arab nation will never surrender; it wants real peace, but it believes that peace can only be based on justice.

I want to say to him, to the American President, that if the United States wants peace it must order Israel to withdraw. This is in the power of the United States, whose orders Israel obeys because it lives at its expense.

Nothing else is possible for us; nothing else will ever be possible for us.

If it is not in the power of the United States to give orders to Israel—we are prepared to believe it if it says so, whatever we think, but in that case we have one thing to ask, which is certainly in America's power—we ask that America should refrain from giving any further political, military or economic support to Israel, as long as Israel continues to occupy our territories.

If the first solution is not achieved, and if the second solution is not achieved, the peoples of the world will be obliged to believe a fact—that henceforward it will be impossible to deny the fact that the United States wants Israel to continue its occupation until it is able to impose its conditions on us.

Brothers, when I sent this message to President Richard Nixon I knew the facts about the links between the President of the United States and Israel. I knew about the political support America has given Israel at the United Nations and in the Security Council. I knew about the economic aid Israel receives from America in the form of aid or contributions. Israel receives \$500 million every year from America in aid and contributions. I knew about the military aid Israel receives from America—it has recently received tanks and guns—every month four Phantom planes are arriving in Israel.

We must be able to move from the field of the United Nations to the field of war, from dialogue to bombs, from constructive dialogue with the whole world to armed dialogue with the usurping enemy.

Brothers, the struggle must be carried on on all fronts without reservations. This is the duty of all true revolutionaries who know the meaning of struggle through endurance and combat on behalf of principles and beliefs.

You must not forget the great fact that everything is set in action by our own free will, which expresses the will of God. Everything is decided by our own power, which is derived from God. Everything is decided by preparedness and planning, by our actions matching our words on the field of battle, in the battle for victory.

Our forces are capable of this. Therefore

the greater part of our effort must be directed to the field of battle. We must, in our deeds, our thoughts, and with all the might we can muster, stand behind our men who are stationed on the line of fire and, with outstanding wisdom, are providing the world with a model for the defense of a homeland.

The destiny of our whole nation, all our vast dreams for the morrow, today depend on what happens on the battle front, what happens on all the fronts with the enemy.

The final solution, brothers, the final word, God willing, is victory.

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Statement by Minister of Information Dana of Lebanon on Commando Action in South Lebanon¹

Beirut, May 30, 1970

The Council of Ministers, from its concern for the interests both of commando action and Lebanon, has decided to prohibit the firing of rockets from Lebanese territory. As to whether or no this prohibition is mentioned in the provisions of the Cairo Agreement—that is a secret that cannot be commented on or discussed.

The Lebanese government is taking the measures required by the public interest in the light of the new situation. The date June 15 was fixed as regards the carrying of arms, not in connection with the firing of rockets from Lebanese territory. This date was fixed to enable the commando organizations to control their members and to form a disciplinary police force to help to enforce the prohibition on the carrying of arms by our Palestinian brethren under any circumstances.

What I can affirm is that the Lebanese authorities are determined to implement the Cairo Agreement in both letter and spirit,

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), May 31, 1970. The statement was made by Dana in reply to questions put to him by journalists and foreign correspondents.

and that our Palestinian brethren are also determined to implement it. Nothing in this Agreement will be infringed, either positively or negatively. The two sides are determined that it should be implemented. If there have been certain ephemeral infringements, they have certainly not been at the wish of those who drafted the Agreement on either side, and things can be settled amicably, because I am sure that it is in the interests of both parties that there should be just and correct implementation of the Agreement.

In implementing the Cairo Agreement, Lebanon is performing its national and Arab duty, and the recent decisions made by the Council of Ministers do not include any restrictions on the Cairo Agreement.

The decision of the Council of Ministers is perfectly clear—it did not prohibit the carrying of arms—a decision prohibiting the carrying of arms was issued by the Ministry of the Interior; it says that, in conformity with the agreement with the commandos, the carrying of arms is prohibited as from June 15.

As for the ban on firing rockets from Lebanese territory, the decision was issued in conformity with a proposal of Minister Junblat.

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Exclusive Interview with Commander-in-Chief al-Yahya of the Palestine Liberation Army on the Military and Political Strategy of the Liberation Army (Excerpts)¹

May 1970

Q. Brigadier Yahya, could you give us a clear idea of the Palestinian Liberation Army and how it has developed since its establishment?

A. The Palestine Liberation Army was established in 1965 by a resolution adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organization, after numerous consultations and contacts with the

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Sawt Filastin* (Damascus), No. 28 (May 1970).

Unified Arab Command at the time. The Liberation Army was built up, with the knowledge of that Command, to be a Palestinian force to share in the battle of liberation in accordance with the plan the Command had drawn up; thus it was constituted in harmony with this idea. The Army is constituted of both regular and special forces. The regular forces have cadres which correspond exactly to their counterparts in the other Arab armies, especially the armies of the countries in which the Liberation Army operates. The role played by the Palestinian Liberation Army in conformity with the plan of the Unified Arab Command can be summed up as follows: the special forces perform special combat tasks inside the occupied territory during the period prior to the time decided for the Arab attack. It is also their task to shake the enemy's defenses, to throw his commands into confusion and prepare the way for the attack of the regular forces. The role of the Army's regular forces is to take part in combat tasks along with other Arab forces.

The building up of the Army was planned to take place in three stages, of which the Command only succeeded in completing the first, because of inadequate financial resources, in particular because a number of the Arab countries did not provide the Army and the Organization with the funds they had undertaken to provide. Thus the Palestine Liberation Army entered the June War with limited forces—the forces of the first stage only, as I have said. In spite of this it succeeded in playing an effective and positive role on all the fighting fronts, especially in the Gaza Strip and on the Syrian Front. After the War numerous suggestions were made with the idea of eliminating the Palestine Liberation Army; one suggestion was that it should be attached to the Arab forces in the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq, and another that it should be completely abolished on the grounds of lack of funds. However, the Organization's Executive Committee, in collaboration with the Supreme Command of the Army, decided at the Committee's first meeting immediately after the War, that the Army should continue to exist

and be developed. On this basis a plan was drawn up for the revision of the Army's cadres and forces in conformity with the new situation which had arisen since the War. As regards the commando organizations, before the War the Liberation Army played a fundamental part in building them up, by supplying them with arms, funds, trainers and trained elements, and the success of the Liberation Army in the June War was one of the main reasons for the rise of Palestinian resistance after the War. During the War all the forces of the resistance rallied round the Army. Before, during and after the June War the Liberation Army opened up all its stores to the resistance organizations, and it has continued to do so ever since, thereby helping them greatly and contributing to their growth and the escalation of their operations. The Command's idea was that arms should be given to all who wanted to fight regardless of their political, ideological and organizational affiliations, in view of the gravity of the stage and of the principle that the Palestine Liberation Army was the army of the whole Palestinian people.

Q. Would you tell us about the development of the Army since the June 1967 War?

A. At the end of 1967 the army formed the Popular Liberation Forces, as a commando force affiliated to the Army, to participate directly in the resistance and to help the unification of the forces of the resistance and the escalation of its operations. Moreover, the Army succeeded in creating genuine resistance in the occupied territory, especially in the Gaza Strip. It is no secret that the resistance in the Gaza Strip was established and led by officers of the Palestine Liberation Army in accordance with the instructions of its Command. The Army also succeeded in establishing revolutionary cells in the occupied territory, which are still the basis of resistance in many places there. At popular level the Army built up the special people's liberation forces to act as reserves for the active people's liberation forces and to embody the idea of the people's war of liberation. And now that the Army has recovered its strength, and in view of the way in which

it is deployed, it performs operational duties along with the armies of the Arab countries in which it is stationed. It also plays an effective part in the activities of the resistance, and assists in recruiting and mobilizing all popular resources for the battle. As regards the military strategy of the Army and its popular and special forces, I can say that it rests on the basis of the complete liberation of Palestinian territory.

Q. Naturally there were fundamental objectives in view when the Palestinian Army was established. What were they?

A. According to Article 22 of the Constitutional Statutes, the national duty of the Palestine Liberation Army is to constitute the vanguard in the battle for the liberation of Palestine. This means that the Palestine Liberation Army makes preparations and takes vigorous action for the decisive battle of liberation in which Arab regular armies play their part. In practical terms this means that the Palestine Liberation Army is gradually escalating resistance in the occupied territory and seeking to unify the resistance forces in the neighboring Arab countries, to prepare its regular and popular forces and to create an appropriate atmosphere for the achievement of this objective. Another of its basic tasks, of course, is to protect and defend the revolution and to ensure that it continues to exist.

Q. Have attempts been made to set obstacles in the way of the Palestine Liberation Army in order to prevent it from performing its duties?

A. Important lessons can be learned from Palestinian history, the most important being that colonialism has always sought to frustrate the revolutions of our people by encouraging and exploiting divisions among them. It is to be observed in all previous Palestinian revolutions that the different sections of the revolution were unable to achieve real revolutionary unity, which made it easier for colonialism to liquidate it piecemeal, one section at a time. In 1948 Zionist colonialism forced a large part of our people to leave their country for the territories of the neighboring Arab countries; the idea was to fragment the

Palestinian popular base so that it might be possible to liquidate the Palestinian people completely at a later date. Such colonialist conspiracies have always had as their object the complete liquidation of the Palestinian Arab people; this is why conspiracies have been directed against the Palestine Liberation Army as being the symbol of the Palestinian entity embodied in the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Ever since the Army was established there have been constant conspiracies against it with the object of securing its dissolution, of liquidating it or immobilizing it, so that colonialism might destroy the whole structure of the Palestinian entity through the destruction of the mainstay and protective shield of that entity. Colonialism's schemes for the achievement of its objectives have always consisted of attempts to create conflicts between the Command of the Army and the Arab countries concerned, and between it and the existing commando organizations, and also to create confusion in the Army and its commands. These attacks with the object of causing confusion in the Army are only one link in the long chain of conspiracies to which the Palestinian Arab people are subjected every day.

Q. Could you tell us about the attitude of the Palestine Liberation Army to the solutions that have been proposed, and to the Palestinian State?

A. The Palestine Liberation Army, as the army of the Palestinian people represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, is of the opinion that the correct solution of the Palestine problem is the complete liberation of Palestinian territory as being the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people who are part of the Arab people. Obviously this means that the Palestine Liberation Army cannot accept so-called political or peaceful solutions or anything of that kind. And inasmuch as the Palestinian Army is the embodiment of the Palestinian personality, it cannot in any circumstances accept the fact of the forced expulsion of the Palestinian

people. This Army has been built up to restore their dignity to the Palestinian people, and the dignity of the Palestinian people depends on their returning to their homeland as a free and sovereign people.

Q. What is your attitude to the Palestinian Commando Action Unified Command?

A. I think that the Unified Command and, before it, the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, together constitute a kind of move towards the attainment of a genuinely unionist formula for Palestinian action. Therefore every effort must be made to bring this idea to fruition, so that it may assume its proper dimensions. But if the Unified Command follows the same course of action as the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, it will not achieve the kind of command that is desirable for national unity quickly enough. It is to be observed that, so far, the attitude of the Unified Command to the existing Palestinian institutions has not yet been defined. In my opinion this Command will be able to become a contributing factor in the achievement of the national unity of the Palestinian forces only on condition that this is done against the background of, and in accordance with the Charter of, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution.

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Statement by Secretary-General Hawatmeh of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the Proposed Democratic State in Palestine (Excerpt)¹

end of May, 1970

We reject chauvinistic solutions, and propose to establish a democratic, popular state

in Palestine, including Arabs and Jews within the framework of a socialist regime, each group having the right to retain and develop its own culture. There is no problem as regards the constitutional set-up of this state; we can envisage something like the Yugoslav pattern, with two independent governments linked to a single authority in the fields of economics, security and foreign affairs. Socialism, which puts an end to racial, religious and class hostility, will help to liberate this new state from imperialism, Zionism and Arab chauvinism at one and the same time.

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Memorandum of the P.D.F.L.P. to the Seventh Session of the Palestine National Assembly on the "Present Tasks of the Palestinian Resistance Movement" (Excerpts)²

early June, 1970

Current international and Arab developments at the present stage are threatening the Palestine problem and the resistance movement with total liquidation. This requires that all patriotic classes and combatant groups engaged in the struggle should arrive at a common national program which will constitute the minimum program on which all can agree. They should also construct a unified national liberation front which will channel joint everyday action towards promoting and developing resistance to the Zionist-imperialist enemy, will defeat attempts to achieve liquidation by encirclement, and prevent reactionary and imperialist solutions from gaining currency in our country.

The formula for a national front that is required must represent a clear reflection of

¹ Excerpted and translated from the French text in *Le Monde* (Paris), May 31-June 1, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), June 1, 1970.

the common history and destiny of the Palestinian-Jordanian theater and comprehend the special characteristics of life in the East Bank as regards the growth and promotion of the resistance movement. The Jordanian-Palestinian theater is the principal field for the revolution and constitutes the front-line defense of all the Palestinian masses wherever they are and in whatever Arab country, and of their just and legitimate right to bear arms against the Zionist imperialist enemy.

The Jordanian-Palestinian theater also constitutes the human and material base for improving the subjective situation of the resistance and developing it into a revolution and a people's war of liberation. In addition it must be observed that the resistance is being daily exposed to attempts to encircle it and exhaust its resources in the Jordanian theater, especially since February 10, 1970.

Any attempt to sidetrack these objective and historical facts is an action which, in the final analysis, is of service only to the forces of counter-revolution. This makes it essential that all sections of the resistance movement should review their attitudes and their ideas as regards the unity of the people in the Palestinian-Jordanian front and the unity of the armed national movement of the masses.

This revolutionary view of the Palestinian-Jordanian theater will put an end to the separate existence of Jordanian and Palestinian political, trades union and professional organizations, which is at present dividing the unity of the people. Also, this view alone is capable of mobilizing all the country's resources, both human and material, for the people's revolutionary war and for the protection of the rear lines of the revolution. It alone is capable of ensuring that there is a compact front to oppose attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and to impose by force reactionary and colonialist solutions, headed by the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

A unified national front in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater is alone historically quali-

fied to implement the common national program which must comprise the following:

— Developing and revolutionizing the Palestine Liberation Organization so that it may constitute the broad framework for a national front in which all organizations participate on a basis of equality; and liberating the Liberation Organization from official Arab pressures represented by material aid. The liquidation of the bureaucratic and bourgeois institutions of the Organization, and dependence, instead, on patriotic and progressive volunteers, and the liquidation of material and moral privileges in the ranks of all combatant forces operating under the aegis of the Liberation Organization, will open the door to self-reliance and reliance on the masses and on the Arab and world forces that are hostile to imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

— Regarding belief in the unity of the people in the Palestinian and Jordanian theater, both in theory and practice, as the basis for the mobilization and militarization of all patriotic classes in a popular militia which will assist the resistance and develop it materially, militarily and at the manpower level, and constitute the firm, armed popular base to protect the authority of the resistance and strengthen it in the ranks of the masses of our people.

This unity, as embodied in a unified national liberation front, will also be responsible for "militarizing the national economy" and placing the production front at the service of the long-term fighting front, and for the struggle to make the East Bank a firm national and revolutionary base which will serve to develop commando action into a long-term people's war of liberation.

Belief in the unity of the people in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater requires struggle against, and the eventual abolition of, all regional tendencies and all regional mass and trades union organizations, and their replacement in this theater by unified organizations.

— Commitment to armed struggle as the basic and principal form of national struggle for the complete liberation of the whole of Palestine and the defeat of Zionism represented by Israel, imperialism and the reac-

tionary forces linked by dialectic and interests with imperialism and colonialism.

— The rejection of any formula for the political settlement of the Palestine problem—whether the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 or any other resolution which infringes the right of the people of Palestine to liberate their national territory entirely and to decide their own destiny in their own land. Also the rejection of any fragmentation of the cause of our people, such as the establishment of a Palestinian state in part of the territory of Palestine, this being one of the reactionary and colonialist solutions involving the liquidation of the Palestine problem.

— Commitment to the joint defense of all sections of the national front as they fight and struggle against attempts to encircle or liquidate any of them through the use of such bogus slogans as “real and unreal commando action,” or “honorable and dishonorable commando action,” and of other such colonialist and reactionary tunes played by the forces of counter-revolution.

— To determine relations with any Arab quarter in the light of its attitude to the question of the complete liberation of Palestine and to the problems of the struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

— To regard Arab territory as the vast and legitimate field for resistance, and to see any attempt to encircle or restrict the resistance, as represented by its numerous sections, in any Arab country, as treason to the cause of liberation. The front will therefore also determine its attitude to any Arab regime in the light of its attitude to the resistance movement.

— The field of the struggle of the people of Palestine is the territory of Palestine and all Arab areas in which there are concentrations of Palestinians, and all the frontiers adjoining the occupied territories.

— The Front regards the reactionary forces and regimes in the Arab area as the loyal and natural allies of imperialism and the Zionist movement, and as the instruments of

imperialism, in the part they played in bringing about the results of the 1948 war, when they forced their armies to fight within the framework of the frontiers demarcated by the 1947 partition. Since 1948 these forces and regimes have played the part of policemen in protecting colonialist interests in Arab territory and in suppressing and liquidating the national movement, the movement which is primarily directed against Zionism and imperialism.

The Front, therefore, by virtue of its dialectical, day-by-day and living links with the Palestinian national liberation movement and the Arab national liberation movement, insists on common struggle with the progressive Arab patriotic movement against the common enemy, Zionism, plus imperialism, plus the reactionary regimes and classes linked with imperialism and colonialism.

The Zionist entity in the territory of Palestine has a dual character. It is a racist and expansionist entity, and at the same time is linked with imperialism. Imperialism implanted it in Palestine (the heart of the Arab homeland) to play the role of a firm colonialist outpost and base to serve the interests of imperialism in the Arab countries. Thus the aim of the struggle of the Palestinian people is to smash the state of Israel and all its military, administrative, trades union, cultural and Zionist institutions, to liberate the whole of Palestine, and to establish a democratic popular state in which Arabs and Jews will coexist with equal rights and obligations. This state will be linked to a socialist Arab federal state, inasmuch as Palestine is part of the Arab homeland.

— Our people's struggle for liberation against Zionism is directed, first and foremost, against world imperialism led by the United States of America, and its interests in the area, for imperialism is responsible for the protection of Israel as the security guard for these interests and the instrument for the repression of the Palestinian and Arab national liberation movements.

Our people's struggle for liberation is an

inseparable part of the contemporary Arab revolutionary movement, of the world national liberation movement, and of the socialist, workers' and democratic forces in the world which are hostile to world imperialism, Zionism and world reaction.

— To call on all progressive Jewish forces which are hostile to Zionism and support the national rights of the Palestinian people to adhere to this program and to join the ranks of the unified national front.

— To work towards ensuring that all sections of the resistance have the same training and the same arms and to secure the unity of the fighting forces and the popular militia organizations, to raise their technical and fighting standards and to develop the common and unified armed struggle against the Zionist-imperialist enemy; and to form detachments with unified administration and command for a popular militia, which will constitute the armed base for the protection of the resistance from the attacks and conspiracies of hostile forces to the rear of the revolution. They will also constitute the armed popular forces to resist any Zionist invasion of further Arab territories in which the resistance movement exists.

— To unify the collection of financial contributions to and the common financing of the National Front and of all sections of the resistance movement.

— To unify the informational orientation and the national political indoctrination of the masses of our people as regards all matters on which the National Front agrees in the common program.

— To unify the National Front's political and information representation abroad.

The formulae for national unity made before February 10, 1970 (the National Assembly, the Executive Committee, the Armed Struggle Command) obviously lacked throughout 1969 a specific common political and military program. This is what gave the political activities of all the groups that took part in these experiments their charac-

teristic features, which were derived from their subjective individual structure and their ideological and political view of the problems of national alliances, and of the problems of developing the Liberation Organization and Palestinian armed struggle. This involved these alliances in many contradictions as to their political positions toward fundamental attitudes to the Palestine problem and the resistance movement (the Summit Conferences; political and information relations with the masses; relations with the Arab regimes in the light of their attitudes to matters connected with the destiny of Palestine and the resistance movement, etc.). Similarly, all attempts to build up a joint striking force as a step on the road to the unity of the fighting forces ended in failure.

In the same way the existing formulae have failed to put into practice the organic unity of the national, mass and trades union movement in the Jordanian-Palestinian field. This encouraged the counter-revolutionary forces to implant regionalist tendencies, as between Jordanian and Palestinian, in the ranks of our people at all levels, and this theater started to become the scene of regionalist and secessionist trades union and professional organizations, which constitute a real and serious threat to the unity of the people and the unity of the nationalist movement, and thus a direct threat to the national revolution itself.

The crisis of February 10, 1970 resulted in a more progressive formula for national alliances than its predecessors, a formula which responded more closely to the need to liquidate the phenomenon of fragmentation within the resistance movement and to form a unified front to confront the crisis and the specter of civil war which the reactionary regime ruling in the East Bank had forced on the country. At this time too the Jordanian nationalist, trades union and professional organizations started to support the resistance movement and to stand side by side with the resistance to protect it and destroy the conspiracy of February 10. This was a tangible, resolute and outspoken affirmation of the unity of the people and the patriotic movement in this theater and of how fully

they rose to their responsibilities in these historical moments in the life of the resistance movement. It provided tangible evidence of the unity of the patriotic movement and of our people, and proved the sterility of regionalist and secessionist claims in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater.

The revolutionary gains achieved by our struggling people on February 10, 1970 may be defined as, firstly, the liquidation of the tendency to fragmentation in the ranks of the resistance movement and, secondly, the affirmation of the unity of the people and the Palestinian-Jordanian patriotic movement through common attitudes and common shedding of blood in defense of the resistance movement against the attack of February 10, 1970, which was planned and led by Jordanian-Palestinian reaction in the East Bank, in alliance with imperialist circles hostile to the revolution of our people and the armed struggle of their masses.

The way in which the masses rallied round the Unified Command, and the way the patriotic, trades union and professional forces unhesitatingly stood by the resistance movement in those bloody days, shows how closely our people are attached to national unity and to the unity of the national front in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater. It shows how strongly our people insist on rejecting the campaigns of encirclement and annihilation launched by Jordanian-Palestinian reaction against the resistance and the patriotic forces engaged in the struggle.

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Resolutions of the Seventh Session of the Palestinian National Assembly¹

Cairo, June 4, 1970

At its first session the Palestinian National Assembly discussed the first item on the agenda, which was the question of membership of the Assembly, and adopted the following resolutions:

Membership

1. That the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine should have a token representation of one member—Mr. Ahmad al-Yamani.
2. That the Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine should be represented by one member—Mr. Yusuf Uthman.
3. That the Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine should be represented by one member—Mr. Walid Abduni.
4. The Assembly resolved that the following members should be replaced:
 - a. That Abd al-Karim Hamad and Khalil Hindi, of the Democratic Popular Front, should be replaced by Nabil Hamada and Hamza Barqawi.
 - b. That Mr. Abd al-Qader Yaser should be replaced by Mr. Muhammad al-Dajani of the General Federation of Palestine Students.
 - c. That Mr. Ali al-Bannawi of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatch) should be replaced by Mr. Sa'id Hamami.
 - d. That Mr. Yusuf Abu Isba' of the Arab Palestine Organization should be replaced by Mr. Muhammad Isa Abu Samra.
 - e. That the seat in the Assembly made vacant by the death of Khalid al-Yashrati should be filled by Mr. Nadim al-Zarw.
 - f. That the resignation of Dr. Usama al-Naqib should not be accepted.

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The above text is translated from the Arabic original. The Congress was held in Cairo from May 30-June 4, 1970.

g. The Assembly referred the question of increased trades union representation to the Popular Organization Department for study, with a recommendation that the representation should be increased.

As a result of these resolutions the Assembly now has a permanent membership of one hundred and fifteen.

Committees

Having discussed the subsequent items on the agenda and heard the report of the Executive Committee and the report submitted by the Palestinian National Fund, the Assembly resolved that the following committees should be formed:

- a. The military committee.
- b. The special committee.

After studying the work of the aforementioned committees, the Assembly adopted the following resolutions:

Military Resolutions

I. Military Unification of Combatants

1. That the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization should be allotted the task of forming a single military command for the Palestinian Revolution, consisting of:

- a. A Military Council consisting of the military commands of the organizations and establishments in the Palestinian theater.
- b. A General Staff drawn from the Military Council.

2. That the Executive Committee shall decide on the name of this command and determine its relations with the existing military establishments.

3. That this command shall abide by the instructions and orders of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization as being a supreme command with full control over all the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

4. That the military forces active in the Palestinian Revolution shall be placed at the disposal of this command, which shall be entitled to command, develop and deploy these forces and to direct their operations.

5. That this command shall draw up unified training programs, and establish unified principles for organization, supplies, rationing and services to which all the forces shall subscribe, and that as soon as these principles are established the command shall reorganize these forces.

6. That the Military Command shall establish joint forces from the forces of the organizations, which will be paid for by the Palestinian National Fund. The individual organizations shall provide the National Fund with sufficient funds to cover the expenses of their forces in accordance with the decision of the Executive Committee of the Organization, until such time as the collection of funds is unified.

7. That no organization shall have the right to withdraw any of its forces that it has placed at the disposal of this Military Command.

8. That the Military Command shall divide up the field of combatant activities into sectors of action, each of which shall have its Command Council consisting of the commanders of forces whose permanent strength is more than a company.

9. The commander of the sector shall be appointed by the Military Command of the Palestinian Revolution, with due regard for the size and efficiency of the forces in his sector.

10. The Military Command of the Revolution shall decide in whose name military communiqués on the operations of the joint forces shall be issued.

11. The decisions of the Military Command shall be binding on all the military forces that form part of it, and this Command shall enforce its decisions in such manner as it sees fit.

II. *Medical Services for the Armed Forces*

12. The Palestinian National Assembly reaffirms the resolutions it adopted at its Sixth Session on medical services and the Red Crescent, and recommends that these resolutions be published by the responsible quarters so that all may abide by them.

III. *The Palestine Liberation Army*

13. The Palestinian National Assembly reaffirms the resolutions on the Palestine Liberation Army it adopted at its Sixth Session, in particular those charging the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization to make all necessary efforts to ensure the Palestine Liberation Army's freedom of will and command.

14. Expenditure on the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Liberation Forces shall be on the basis of a special detailed budget drawn up by the High Command of the Army within the limits of the 68/69 budget, on condition that it is approved by the Executive Committee.

15. All Palestinian military reservists shall be liable to the general mobilization of the Palestinian Revolution, and shall constitute a general reserve for the Revolution. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization shall have the right to call any of them to reserve service, in accordance with the appropriate regulations, and the Executive Committee shall make the necessary contacts to ensure the enforcement of this resolution.

16. The Palestinian National Assembly recommends that the military qualifications and experience of Palestinians who have served in other Arab armies be turned to advantage.

The Central Committee

I. The Palestinian National Assembly resolves that, in accordance with the communiqué of June 6, 1970, the Central Committee shall consist of the following members:

- a. The President of the National Assembly.
- b. The members of the Executive Committee.
- c. The Commander in Chief of the Palestine Liberation Army.
- d. Three independent members of the Palestinian National Assembly chosen by the Executive Committee.
- e. A command delegate, enjoying full powers, to represent each of the Palestinian organizations that signed the communiqué of June 6, 1970: there is no obligation for these to be members of the Palestinian National Assembly. The Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be Chairman of the Central Committee.

II. The Central Committee shall continue to function as long as the National Assembly does not resolve to change, replace or dissolve it.

III. The Central Committee shall represent the High Command for Palestinian Struggle in affairs that are referred to it, within the limits of its powers.

It shall:

- a. Take decisions on urgent and unforeseen matters and problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter.
- b. Make constant efforts to find more advanced, profound and expanded formulae for national unity.
- c. Follow up the implementation of its resolutions and those of the National Assembly.
- d. Discuss matters referred to it by the Executive Committee or by any of its members, and adopt the necessary resolutions in accordance with such internal regulations as may be decided on by the Central Committee.

IV. The Central Committee shall submit to the National Assembly, in ordinary or extraordinary session, a report on its activities

and the extent to which they have proved effective.

V. The resolutions of the Central Committee must be in harmony with the National Charter, the Basic Regulations and the resolutions of the National Assembly, and the Executive Committee shall be responsible for enforcing the resolutions of the Central Committee.

VI. The Central Committee shall have the right to freeze or suspend the membership of any member or organization and to impose any penalty on them, on condition that the case is referred to the National Assembly when it next meets, when its decision shall be final. Every effort must be made to prevent the emergence of new organizations in the Palestinian theater.

Financial Resolutions

1. The Assembly resolves that the 1968/1969 budget shall remain in force during the financial year 1970/1971, actual expenditures being taken into account.

2. Expenditure on the forces of the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Liberation Forces shall be within the limits of the credits allocated in the 1968/1969 budget and in accordance with a detailed budget drawn up by the Command of the Palestine Liberation Army and approved by the Executive Committee.

3. Should it prove necessary to undertake projects required by the interests of action, and should the revenues of the Palestine National Fund permit this, expenditure on such projects shall be in accordance with annexes to the 1969/1970 budget approved at a joint session especially convened for that purpose and attended by the President of the Palestinian National Assembly, the Executive Committee, the Chairman of the Administrative Board and the Director General of the Palestine National Fund.

4. The Executive Committee shall be called on to draw up a definite and integrated plan to support the endurance of our people

in the occupied homeland. This plan shall be based on an objective study to which shall be devoted a special annex of the budget based on provisional estimates of the revenues that can be provided for this purpose, and the Palestine National Fund shall be responsible for expenditure in accordance with it within the limits of such of these revenues as are realized and in conformity with resolutions adopted by the Executive Committee.

5. The Palestinian National Assembly confirms the resolutions it adopted on the unification of the collection of funds and calls on the Executive Committee to continue its efforts to achieve this as soon as possible, especially in Jordan and Lebanon.

6. The Executive Committee is called on to make the necessary contacts with the Arab governments concerned to ensure that they pass the necessary legislation for the levying of the liberation tax from Palestinians living in their countries, and for the provision of the necessary facilities to enable the Organization's subsidiary bodies to collect popular contributions.

7. Every effort must be made to ensure that all Arab governments settle their accumulated liabilities, and the Executive Committee is called on to employ all possible means to achieve this end, including the sending of delegations for the purpose.

8. The Executive Committee is called on to persuade the Arab governments to allocate a percentage of their general and development budgets to the Palestine National Fund, to constitute a regular income for Palestinian action.

9. The Executive Committee is called on to persuade the Arab oil-exporting countries to increase the financial support they provide to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to ensure that it is paid into the National Fund.

10. The Executive Committee is called on to make the necessary contacts with the governments concerned to ensure that they transfer deductions made from the salaries of

Palestinian employees working in their countries to the Palestine National Fund.

11. The Executive Committee is called on to make the necessary contacts with the Arab governments concerned to ensure that the Palestine Liberation Organization and its subsidiary bodies are granted exemption from customs, telegraph, postal and telephone charges.

12. The Executive Committee is called on to make the necessary contacts with Arab governments and other quarters to ensure the formation of Support Palestine Committees so that the Palestine National Fund may cooperate with them in holding Support Palestine Weeks and depend on them for the execution of plans for the development of financial revenues.

Resolutions Involving Liquidation

1. The Palestinian National Assembly resolves that the military solution is the only solution for the present conflict between us and the Zionist entity, and that this solution is to be achieved through continuing the people's war of liberation and escalating it to its full dimensions. However much the balance of power turns in our favor, a political solution involving liquidation can never be anything but surrender and a miscarriage of our struggle and sacrifice, which will prevent our Revolution from fully realizing its aim of liberation. The Assembly affirms its rejection of all solutions involving surrender.

2. The National Assembly calls on the Palestinian people in particular, and the Arab people in general, to escalate the struggle against the forces of imperialism, headed by the United States of America, to the greatest possible degree, and to promote the struggle in new fields.

3. The Palestinian National Assembly calls on the Arab people in Jordan and Lebanon to stand in a single rank with the Palestinian Revolution in order to frustrate all conspiracies against it and to protect its rear from agents, and to support it with all available means to enable it to realize its aims, in

view of the fact that the Arab territories which surround the Zionist entity are a legitimate base for Palestinian struggle.

The Endurance of the Palestinian Arab People in the Occupied Territories

a. The Executive Committee is called on to continue its efforts to persuade the Arab governments to support the endurance of the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied territory, and to invite them to meet their financial obligations to the extent required for this endurance to be maintained.

b. The Palestine National Fund shall be the organization which receives all kinds of financial aid and assistance for the support of endurance.

c. The Organization's subsidiary bodies shall be urged to make greater efforts to ensure the existence of all factors necessary for steadfastness in the occupied territories.

d. That Arab information machinery in general shall be urged, and the Revolution's information machinery in particular shall be charged, to participate in an operation to increase the awareness of the masses and to give greater significance to the idea of supporting endurance in the face of the enemy's conspiracies.

The Jordanian-Palestinian Theater

The Palestinian National Assembly held a special session at which brothers from the East Bank, invited by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, were present and spoke. All present discussed the best practical methods of increasing cohesion and endurance in the face of the conspiracies of colonialism and Zionism and their agents, and the Assembly adopted the following resolutions:

a. To confirm the resolution it adopted at its session held on June 1, 1970 to the effect that Palestinian struggle is based on faith in the unity of the people of the Jordanian-Palestinian theater and on the belief that the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation and that Palestine is part of Arab territory.

b. That the Central Committee and the Executive Committee shall take all necessary measures to establish and embody this principle at all levels, political, organizational, mass and trades union, in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater, and in cooperation with the national forces in the East Bank, as soon as possible.

c. That a higher committee be formed of members of the nationalist movement in the East Bank and of the Palestinian revolution, to ensure cohesion between the masses of our people in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater and to construct the firmest possible relations between the Palestinian revolution and the nationalist forces in the East Bank.

The Lebanese Theater

The Palestinian National Assembly, while observing the present situation in South Lebanon, and after reading the memorandum submitted by the Executive Committee of the National Conference of the Movement for the Fortification of the South, and with due regard for its contents, resolves the following:

a. To condemn the attitude of the subversive and counter-revolutionary forces that are trying to isolate the Palestinian resistance from the Lebanese masses.

b. To call on the combatant forces to strengthen their relations at all levels with the masses of South Lebanon and to participate in arming and organizing them and strengthening their endurance.

c. To extol the heroic role played by the resistance forces in repelling Israeli aggressions and the role played by the Lebanese masses in supporting and protecting the resistance movement.

d. The Assembly resolves to form a higher committee of members of both the national movement in Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution to ensure cohesion between the two peoples and to protect the Palestinian revolution.

e. The Palestinian National Assembly

salutes the people of Lebanon for the way they have held out in the face of all the conspiracies that have been devised, and are still being devised, against the Palestinian revolution. The Palestinian revolution offers all its resources to our Lebanese Arab people in South Lebanon to strengthen their endurance and consolidate their cohesion with the Palestinian revolution in their confrontation of the Zionist peril and imperialist ambitions.

f. To call on the Arab countries to support Lebanon militarily and financially by allocating a budget for the strengthening of its endurance.

Arab Soldiers on the Line of Confrontation

The Assembly salutes the endurance of our heroic Arab soldiers stationed on the lines of confrontation with the Zionist-imperialist challenge.

The Peoples of Indo-China

The Palestinian National Assembly salutes the peoples of Indo-China in their splendid and heroic struggle against American imperialism, and affirms that the Palestinian people stand by them in their just and legitimate struggle.

The Struggling Peoples

The Palestinian National Assembly salutes and supports all peoples struggling against colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Friendly Countries

The Executive Committee is called on to strengthen the contacts and links with liberation movements throughout the world, and with friendly countries, especially the socialist countries that support our cause.

The Arab League

The Palestinian National Assembly requests the Executive Committee to follow up the resolutions of the Arab League on Pales-

tinian affairs and to make every effort to enforce them, in particular:

a. The resolutions of the Conference of Arab Ministers of Health held at the League's Headquarters from October 14-16, 1969;

b. The resolutions of the Third Regional Conference of Ministers of Education and Economic Planning held from January 12 to 20, 1970;

c. The resolutions of the Arab Ministers of Labour.

Palestine Liberation Organization Offices

The Assembly requests the Executive Committee to reorganize its offices so as to make them more effective and better able to perform their duties.

The Democratic State

The Assembly refers the subject of the "Democratic State" to the Executive Committee for exhaustive study, the conclusions of which it shall submit to the National Assembly at its next session, so that it may take the appropriate decisions.

Other Subjects

The National Assembly refers the following subjects to the Executive Committee for study when necessary, and for implementation when required.

a. The revolutionary education of the masses.

b. A special budget to assist students from the occupied territory.

c. Contributing towards the cost of building a hostel for girl students which the General Federation of Palestine Students is establishing.

d. Support for the Palestine World Conference.

e. Increasing allocations to popular federations and organizations.

The Executive Committee

1. The Assembly resolved to accept the resignation of Mr. Yusuf al-Burji from membership of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, while remaining a member of the Assembly. The Assembly elected Mr. Ibrahim al-Barghuthi to fill the vacant seat.

2. Mr. Zuhair al-Alami was elected Chairman of the Palestine National Fund to succeed the late Mr. Khalid al-Yashruti.

The National Assembly

The Assembly resolved that it should remain in session and that its members should remain in office in coming sessions until such time as a resolution to the contrary is adopted.

The Assembly issued a concluding statement.

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Resolution Constituting the Central Committee Adopted by the Palestinian National Assembly at its Seventh Session¹

Cairo, May 30 - June 4, 1970

1. The Palestinian National Assembly resolves that the Central Committee shall consist, in accordance with the statement of May 6, 1970, of the following:

a. The President of the National Assembly.

b. The members of the Executive Committee.

c. The Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine Liberation Army.

d. Three independent members of the Palestinian National Assembly chosen by the Executive Committee.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in Husam al-Khatib, *Fi al-Tajriba al-Thawriya al-Filastiniya* (Damascus: Wizarat al-Thaqafa, 1972), pp. 176-177.

e. A command delegate representing each of the Palestinian organizations that signed the statement of May 6, 1970, enjoying full powers; it is not necessary that these should be members of the National Assembly. The Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be Chairman of the Central Committee.

II. The Central Committee shall continue to exist as long as the National Assembly does not resolve to reshuffle, replace or dissolve it.

III. The Central Committee shall represent the Palestinian struggle. High Command as regards such matters as may be submitted to it, to the extent of its powers. It shall:

1. Decide on urgent and emergency matters in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter.

2. Seek constantly to devise more progressive, profounder and more extensive formulae for national unity.

3. Follow up the implementation of its resolutions and those of the National Assembly.

4. Discuss matters submitted to it by the Executive Committee or any of its members and take such necessary decisions as may be required of it in accordance with the Regulations which shall be drawn up by the Central Committee.

IV. The Committee shall submit to the National Assembly sitting in ordinary or extraordinary session a report on its actions and the extent they have proved effective.

V. The resolutions of the Central Committee must be in harmony with the National Charter, the Statutes and Resolutions of the National Assembly, and the Executive Committee shall be responsible for implementing the resolutions of the Central Committee.

VI. The Central Committee shall have the right to freeze or suspend the membership of any member or organization or to impose penalties on them, on condition that the matter is submitted to the National Assembly at

its first session, when its decision shall be final. All means must be employed to prevent the emergence of any new organization in the Palestinian theater.

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Concluding Statement Issued by the Seventh Session of the Palestinian National Assembly¹

Cairo, June 4, 1970

At its Seventh Session, held in Cairo from May 30 to June 4, 1970, the Palestinian National Assembly concentrated mainly on national unity, which is the goal the Palestinian masses are so anxious to achieve. This was embodied in the emphasis laid on the importance of and necessity for unity as an indispensable foundation for escalating the Palestinian Revolution, expanding its field of activity, strengthening its striking forces and ensuring that it moves forward to new and more advanced stages.

This emphasis took definite shape in the important decisions taken by the Assembly when it adopted the communiqué issued on June 5 by the Unified Command, which, comprising as it does all sections of the Palestinian resistance, is a propitious start on the road to unity, and when it formed the Central Committee, which includes members of all these sections, in addition to members of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the President of the National Assembly, the Commander of the Palestine Liberation Army and three independents. The Assembly has vested in this Committee the powers it requires to act as a supreme command for the struggle in such matters as are referred to it.

One of the most prominent of the resolutions embodying the cause of unity is that which provides for the formation of a single military command for the Revolution, which will be responsible for commanding the forces

¹ Archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The above text is translated from the Arabic original.

placed at its disposal, developing and deploying them, directing their operations and unifying their training.

In the course of this Session the Assembly once again stressed how important it is that the Arab masses should be linked to the Palestinian Revolution, as constituting a vanguard movement of the Arab Revolution. Inasmuch as Palestinian struggle is based on the belief that the people of the Jordanian-Palestinian theater are one people, that the people of Palestine are part of the Arab nation, and that Palestine is a part of Arab territory, the Assembly resolved that all necessary measures shall be taken to affirm this principle at political, organizational, mass and trade union levels in this theater, in cooperation with the national forces in the East Bank, and that a Higher National Committee shall be formed, whose members shall include representatives of the Palestinian Revolution and the Jordanian national forces.

In affirmation of this basic principle the Assembly also adopted another resolution, providing for the formation of another similar committee consisting of members representing the national forces in Lebanon, and for every effort to be made to achieve the highest possible level of coordination with these forces in order to ensure that the Arab-Lebanese masses play a greater part in protecting the Palestinian Revolution and Arab territory in Lebanon. The Assembly saluted the Lebanese people for the heroic role they have played, and called on the Arab countries to provide the necessary financial support to strengthen the endurance of the Lebanese masses.

In view of recent moves in the international field on the part of the forces of world imperialism, led by the United States of America, and on the part of the Zionist enemy, aimed at imposing peaceful solutions involving liquidation, the result of which has been continued conspiracies with subservient forces directed against the Palestinian revolution, the National Assembly, after affirming its absolute rejection of all solutions involving liquidation, resolved to call on all the Arab masses in general and the Palestinian masses in particular to escalate the struggle against

the hostile forces to the greatest possible degree, and to stand in a single rank with the Palestinian Revolution in order to frustrate the conspiracies which confront it and to protect its rear.

The Assembly affirmed that the role that world imperialism, led by the United States of America, is playing in Arab territory, is an integral part of its aggression against the freedoms of peoples in all the continents. By the same token it is obvious that the Palestinian Revolution is organically linked with national liberation movements throughout the world, which the National Assembly saluted, praising their heroism, and especially the heroic struggle of the people of Vietnam.

Inasmuch as the endurance of the masses in the occupied homeland is one of the mainstays of the Palestinian Revolution, the Assembly resolved to salute them and to extol the heroism they have shown, especially in the Gaza Strip, and to employ all ways and means at the disposal of the Revolution to support them in their endurance.

The Assembly also resolved to call on the Arab governments and the masses of the Arab people everywhere to fulfil their responsibility to support this endurance and to support the Palestinian Revolution and consolidate its resources and capacities.

Finally, the Assembly saluted the world struggle for freedom. It also saluted friendly countries, in particular the socialist countries which support the Palestinian Revolution in its struggle to achieve its goal of complete liberation of the territory of Palestine.

In the course of this Session the Assembly also affirmed that the Revolution is advancing along its long hard road towards the achievement of this goal, and that it must inevitably prove victorious in the end, for victory belongs to the will of the people.

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Press Interview Statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on Relations with Socialist States and the Proposed Democratic State in Palestine¹

Cairo, early June, 1970

Q. What is your appraisal of the Palestinian revolution five years after its outbreak?

A. The most important achievement of the Palestinian revolution lies in the fact that it has resuscitated a people which, from being deliberately relegated to the margin of a cause, to the margin of Arab struggle, is now in the vanguard of Arab struggle and the vanguard of the Arab advance. After that, and in particular after the defeat of June 1967, the Palestinian revolution was able to restore hope to the Arab individual and frustrate the attempts to surrender which certain countries in the area were preparing and, in the atmosphere of defeat, to create a new atmosphere of revolution and struggle.

We believe that the whole world now knows the value of the Palestinian revolution. I do not want to talk of the military achievements of the Palestinian revolution because I believe that, in spite of all we have done, we still need more action and greater cohesion with our people in the occupied territory and with the Arab people, so that we may frustrate the conspiracies that are being hatched against the Palestinian revolution by certain Arab regimes.

Q. What have been the practical consequences of your recent visits to the U.S.S.R., People's China and North Vietnam?

A. The mere fact that a delegation representing the Palestinian revolution has visited the U.S.S.R., People's China and North Vietnam is an expression of the unity of Arab

and world struggle against the imperialist-Zionist camp. We believe that, by receiving a Palestinian delegation, the U.S.S.R. has indirectly recognized the Palestinian revolution and its method of struggle which goes further than all political methods of struggle.

We hope that this relationship will continue and that the U.S.S.R. will come to acquire a clearer understanding of the dimensions of our cause and our struggle.

As for the results of our visits to China and North Vietnam, we cannot but appreciate the attitudes of those countries to the cause of our people and to their armed struggle, which they unreservedly support, their support consisting both of the constant aid that China has provided to the Palestinian revolution, both before and since the June War, and which it is still providing, and of the firm relationship between the Palestinian revolution and the Vietnam revolution through the experience provided to us by the heroic people of Vietnam and their mighty revolution.

Q. What is your appraisal of the relations between Algeria and the Palestinian revolution?

A. We know that Algeria is in the vanguard of the Arab countries which are linked to the Palestinian revolution by deep roots, which began to grow before June 5 and which, since then, have continued to grow stronger and wider. We know that in addition to moral support and to the military and non-military material aid they have provided us with in the form of experience and training, they have also given us what we are most proud of—a spirit of detachment and non-interference in the affairs of the Palestinian revolution, an absence of efforts to split it from within and to create organizations intended to impede the advance of Palestinian struggle and its revolution.

The relations between Algeria and the Palestinian revolution must be a model for the relations between the Palestinian revolution and the other Arab countries, because they are really established on an objective and revolutionary basis and their foundations are mutual respect and unconditional and unlimited aid without any reservations.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Sha'b* (Algiers), June 6, 1970. The interview was granted by Arafat to the correspondent of the Algerian News Agency in Cairo.

Q. What effect has the declaration of the Palestinian revolution of its readiness to establish a democratic Palestine in which all can live had on world public opinion?

A. Before describing the effect that this slogan raised by the Palestinian revolution has had, I should like to point out that the Palestine in which it intends to establish this democratic state is a Palestine liberated by armed struggle from all traces of Zionist fanatics and of that society closed in on itself which is called Israel. The world has come to realize that the aim of our struggle is not to kill the Jews or throw them in the sea; what we want, in addition to liberating the territory of Palestine, is also to liberate the Jew, as a human being, from Zionism and its fanatical fascist tendencies. The value of this slogan and the effect it has had on a variety of progressive circles throughout the world can be judged from the fact that Israel has found itself obliged to launch a vast information campaign to combat the effect of this slogan on European and world public opinion. We believe that we must continue to employ this slogan until the whole world realizes what we hope to achieve by the war of liberation we are engaged in, and that we are fighting for a great human objective.

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Statement by an Official Spokesman of the Syrian Arab Republic on His Country's Position Towards the Fighting in Jordan (Excerpts)¹

Damascus, June 10, 1970

Brothers and fellow-citizens,

In view of how far these [quarters] have gone in their attacks on commando action and the Palestinian resistance, the Syrian Region declares its official and popular attitude. It declares that it will support com-

mando action to the end and support the Palestinian resistance whatever the cost in effort and sacrifice, and it once again warns those who play fast and loose with the dignity of the Arab nation and infringe its honor and its sacred right to resist and hold out, that it will never show quarter to those who try to weaken or liquidate the Palestinian resistance.

In calling for an end of the attacks on commando action and the Palestinian camps, the Syrian Arab Region also calls on honorable elements in the Jordanian Arab army to stop attacking their comrades in arms. It also calls on all loyal members of the Arab people in Jordan to make every effort to stop these clashes, and urges all Arabs, rulers and others, to take decisive action at once to put an end to this fratricidal fighting and to restore the situation to normal, so that the Palestinian resistance may have the proper opportunities and the necessary resources to strike at the enemy and play a serious part in the battle for liberation.

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Text of Report on Meeting Held Between King Hussein of Jordan and Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. To Agree on a Settlement of the June Crisis in Jordan²

Amman, June 10, 1970

Early this morning, an important meeting was held at the Royal Palace in Hummar. King Husayn presided on the Jordanian side and the Premier, the Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister and a number of political and military officials attended. Brother Abu Ammar [Yasir Arafat], the Chairman of the Executive and Central Committees of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), presided on the resistance movement side and a number of members of the two committees

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), June 11, 1970.

² Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3401/A/5; reprinted by permission.

attended. The meeting was also attended by the Iraqi Defence Minister Lt-Gen. Hamad Shihab, the Iraqi Minister of Culture and Guidance Salah Umar al-Ali, the Salah ad-Din Forces' Commander Maj-Gen. Abdullah as-Sayyid Ahmad and the Iraqi Assistant Chief of Staff Brig. Hasan Mustafa an-Naqib. The regrettable incidents in Jordan in the past few days were discussed extensively. An atmosphere of frankness and understanding prevailed during this important meeting. As a result of the discussion, complete agreement has been reached on the following:

- (1) A complete cease-fire.
- (2) Joint diligent and sincere work to restore life to normality and to secure calm.
- (3) The return of all regular and fida'i forces to their bases and centres.
- (4) Joint patrols to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire and to secure law and order.
- (5) Joint detachments to exercise once again their former duties.
- (6) The release of those detained by both sides as a result of recent incidents.
- (7) The formation of a joint investigation committee to ascertain who caused the incidents. This committee will deliver the results of its investigations to the King who will then take strict measures against them.
- (8) Sincere work to consolidate the national unity of the people and to consolidate ties of brotherhood and affection between the armed forces and the resistance movement to enable them to carry out their sacred duty in the liberation battle.
- (9) The setting up of a joint committee to prevent any disturbance of calm or the creation of difficulties.
- (10) Co-operation to expose the elements which are trying to stir up trouble and to sow intrigue among the brothers-in-arms.
- (11) Broadcast publicity for this statement.

The King has ordered compensation to be paid to all those who suffered losses in life or property during the recent incidents.

The people—sons of the one homeland, the soldiers, the fida'iyyin and the strugglers: During this grave crucial stage in which our Arab nation is facing the fiercest attacks and challenges, we appeal to you to stand in one rank in a solid front against the usurping enemy and for the liberation of the usurped homeland.

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Statement of the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on Continued Attempts by "Suspect Organizations" in Jordan to "Liquidate the Forces of the Revolution" (Excerpts)¹

Amman, June 10, 1970

Masses of our people,

The resistance movement has done everything in its power to restore normal conditions, to ensure that its forces are concentrated against Zionism, and that it is once more in a position to escalate its military operations and inflict defeats on the enemy. With this end in view the resistance movement has made sincere attempts to cooperate with the authorities; it issued its first and second communiqués, and has adhered to all their provisions. But certain suspect organizations in high places, which have close links with the American Central Intelligence Agency, have not adhered to these provisions, and have brought things to such a dangerous pass that the advance of the masses, their revolution and their future are being affected, and the toiling masses of our people are being threatened with the gravest dangers.

In the light of the present situation the forces of the Palestinian revolution hold the authorities entirely responsible for the con-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), June 12, 1970.

tinuing massacres in Jordan and insist on the following:

1. That the authorities should adhere to the cease-fire.
2. That the elements who cause these incidents through their special organizations should be banished. They are:

- a. Sharif Naser ibn Jamil.
- b. Muhammad Rasul al-Kaylani.
- c. Sharif Zaid ibn Shaker.

Our attitude will be determined by the extent to which the authorities accede to these demands.

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Statement by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Formation of the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee¹

Amman, June 10, 1970

In these critical days through which the Arab nation is passing as it confronts the forces of Zionism and colonialism and struggles for liberation, now that things have begun to return to normal in Jordan and the sincere efforts that have been made have succeeded in frustrating those who intrigued and sought to foment civil strife, in order to safeguard the success that we have achieved in this field we call on all sons of the beloved homeland to be more alert, vigilant and cautious as regards all actions or rumors intended to disturb the atmosphere of brotherhood, serenity and quiet in this country.

No sooner had some of the intriguers realized that life had returned to normal in the country, than they started trying to foment strife again. This requires of us all that we rise to our responsibilities and redouble our efforts to frustrate these evil attempts. The

movements of the enemy on all fronts, where he is lying in wait for our heroic people, the conspiracies of colonialism directed against your resistance, and the usurpation of your rights and your homeland, requires of all of us that we amass arms and direct them against our common enemy. With this in view representatives of the Jordanian authorities met with representatives of the Central Committee of the Palestinian resistance movement. The meeting was also attended by the Iraqi delegation, headed by Lieutenant-General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, Vice President of the Iraqi Republic, and the Algerian delegation, headed by Mr. Abd al-Aziz Boutaflika, the Algerian Foreign Minister. At this meeting, which was characterized by an atmosphere of profound understanding of the extent of the responsibilities involved and of the gravity of the situation, the following was decided:

1. That a committee shall be formed which will operate from Staff Headquarters. Its task will be to control the situation and to prevent all provocative actions or conduct by all such means as circumstances may require.
2. That this committee shall consist of the following representatives of the Jordanian authorities: Abd al-Mun'em al-Rifa'i, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Major General Mashhur Haditha, Chief of Staff, Major General Zuhair Matar, Director of Public Security, Brigadier Ghazi Arabiyat, Director of Military Intelligence in the Army, and Brigadier Mudar Badran, Director of Intelligence.

And the following representatives of the Central Committee of the resistance movement: Abu Sabri, Isam al-Sirtawi, Ahmad al-Yamani, Abu Maher and Saleh Ra'fat.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nida* (Beirut), June 14, 1970.

Letter from the Executive Committee of the P.L.O. to Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atasi, Head of the Syrian Arab Republic, on Current Events in Jordan¹

Amman, June 11, 1970

The Palestine Liberation Organization offers Your Excellency its most respectful greetings and hereby informs you of the truth about the critical situation in Jordan, which started with provocations on the part of groups under the control of the authorities on June 6 and 7, 1970.

These provocations developed into bloody clashes in Jordan which led to dozens of deaths.

From the first moments of the crisis the Central Committee of the resistance movement was in control of all its cadres and imposed the strictest discipline on all its members. Contacts were made between the Central Committee and the office of the Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff through Major General Mashhur, and both sides expressed the same good intentions to prevent the situation deteriorating further and to find a way out of the crisis. But agent forces in the army command, who are directly under the control of Sharif Naser ibn Jamil and his supporters, insisted on involving the country in a massacre.

At noon on Tuesday, June 9, 1970 a delegation representing the Central Committee of the resistance movement met the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Chief of Staff, and it was agreed that every effort should be made to put a stop to the bloodshed, and to restore quiet and normal life in the country, and we issued a decision providing for:

1. A cease-fire.
2. The formation of a joint operations room and joint patrols to bring the situation under control.

The Palestinian Armed Struggle Command made preparations for the implementa-

tion of this agreement, but the other side did not implement what had been agreed on. Their object was to confuse the situation and gain time, and every time quiet was restored their hidden forces went into action again to ensure the implementation of the plan that had been made for them.

They are now trying to impose a curfew on the country, as part of their scheme to liquidate the resistance. The political preparations and internal mobilization they had undertaken on behalf of this scheme can be seen in the cables they sent to certain Arab countries, to explain their view of the situation.

The General Staff in Jordan does not control the organizations of Sharif Naser and his supporters. This makes it much more difficult to find a way out of this grave crisis.

In confronting you with your historical responsibility as regards all the consequences of this situation, we declare to the whole world that the resistance movement will never lay down its arms whatever attempts are made to liquidate and annihilate it, but will continue along the course of its struggle with ever stronger and firmer steps, and will never surrender to threats.

The Palestinian revolution will resist conspiracies of all kinds intended to liquidate the Palestine problem and to crush the struggle of the Palestinians, and declares to the whole world that it will not lay down its arms until full liberation is achieved, and will never surrender to threats.

Speech by King Hussein of Jordan to the Jordanian Armed Forces on the June Crisis in Jordan²

Amman, June 11, 1970

From Husayn, C-in-C of the Armed Forces, to all ranks of the armed forces: You know, brothers, the true facts about the recent devel-

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), June 12, 1970.

² Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3403/A/6 and A/7; reprinted by permission.

opments which followed our misunderstood patience and all challenges against our armed forces, commanders, officers and men.

In Amman, we have preferred until now to keep the Army out, to let it defend itself in the positions where it is stationed. Aggression has struck these positions and the Army a number of times. Meetings and discussions took place at which decisions were taken. But unfortunately, the implementation of these decisions was not possible.

One side in our capital Amman, and not the Army, made difficult conditions on us today directed against my uncle, the Commander of the Armed Forces, and my Brother Commander of the Royal Armoured Corps. Their relinquishing of their posts will immediately secure the implementation of the [cease-fire] agreement and the return to normal of Amman and other towns.

The situation in Amman is as follows:

A number of armed gangs are in the city stealing, looting and committing murder. Amman is facing hard times. As for myself, my family and those close to me, we have always offered ourselves for this country and this people. I realise that the plan now being implemented in our country and our sacred land is aimed at the Army, the people and the steadfastness. It intends to destroy everything we have built during three bitter years since the setback which befell our nation and all of us with a view to entrenching it for good and destroying us here. It is aimed at occupying the land, striking the eastern front and perhaps liquidating the cause by establishing a State in our occupied territory in which the evacuees will settle or by making it part of a bigger State, embodying them and the Israelis in a new form.

The most cherished thing to me is the armed forces and all the Arab forces. The commander has always carried out my orders precisely and honestly. He stood by me throughout the recent discussion. He also stood by me when I was shot at during the first hours of the discussion, when one of my personal guards was killed and five others wounded. The only order he issued was for calm and self-restraint while the Army General Staff controlled the course of events.

The sister of the Brother Commander of the Armoured Corps and formerly Commander of Amir Brigade in the June Battle and Corps Commander in the Karamah battle, was killed in Amman by bullets fired at her mother's house and at the houses of many of my people who were among those killed. She was the daughter of Shakir, the hero of the great Arab revolution. He contacted me and requested me not to take any measures as a result of my emotion. He expressed sympathy to me over the death of his sister and over all victims and martyrs.

I respected him and the corps commanders and officers. The houses they were guarding were fired on and the fire was returned by the forces. He and his companions went to the positions from which the fire was returned. He threatened those who returned the fire with the severest penalties. That was in obedience to my orders. He and his officers supervised our positions to personally control the cease-fire in the face of provocations, in the face of the shelling from rockets and other weapons and the fall of martyrs and victims.

I have refused to accept the difficult condition which holds these responsible when they should not be. Everybody knows what efforts we have made for the unity of all parties and the control of the situation until something about which we were patient and tolerant happened—the squandering of the full capabilities of our people, particularly the armed forces which are the shield of the homeland and the nation.

I refused this at the beginning because it was harmful to them, to me and all of us, but I later changed my mind at the request of Maj-Gen. Sharif Nasir Bin Jam'ail, C-in-C of the Armed Forces, and Brother Brig. Zayd Bin Shakir, the Commander of the Royal Armoured Corps, who insisted that they should make a new sacrifice for the sake of the general interest—such sacrifice is known of us, the Royal family. They put themselves at my disposal and requested all of you to accept this. I have therefore accepted their request and relieved them of their posts. I have personally now taken over the direct command of the armed forces. I have

appointed Col. Katib as-Sut, the Commander of our forces during Karamah battle, as Acting Commander of the Royal Armoured Corps. I have attached the corps to me personally.

This is the last chance. After this there will be no other chance. This is further proof of our love for you all—Army, people and honest Resistance. It is our utmost wish that our agreement with the unified command of the armed struggle be promptly implemented and a final absolute end is put to all chaos and uncertainty. If the situation remains as it is in Amman and other places, I hold them alone responsible for the consequences before God, the people and history. I shall be forced to put things in their right place and to save the people from evil. God is our guide and he who will grant us success.

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Speech by President Nasser of the U.A.R. to the Egyptian National Assembly on the Incidents in Jordan (Excerpts)¹

Cairo, June 11, 1970

In Jordan today a tragedy is being enacted, for, to my profound regret, I can find no other word to describe the massacre that is taking place in intrepid Amman and other centers of heroism in patient and steadfast Jordan.

It is not only blood that is being drained away by what is happening in Jordan, but also the feelings, the thinking, the mind and the nerves of an Arab nation which is faced with a fateful responsibility.

We have known, brothers, the nature of the relations between the Jordanian authorities and the members of the Palestinian resistance, and we have appreciated both the real and the artificial causes of tension

in these relations. But at the same time we thought that the desire for coordination was making it possible to rise above all these causes of tension.

We have also been aware, brothers, of the circumstances in which the Palestinian resistance arose from the ruins of 1948 and 1967. We appreciated these circumstances, but at the same time we were following with close attention the attempts that were being made to achieve the unity of the resistance organizations, and especially the successful efforts of the latest Palestinian conference, which concluded its meetings only a week ago, and we were certain that the creation of unity was more important than anything else.

We have also observed the attempts of colonialism and its supporters to cause quarrels between comrades engaged in the same struggle, who share the same situation and the same destiny. We have seen how ferocious were those attempts, how dangerously provocative. But at the same time we realized that our brethren regarded them in the same way as we did, and that their awareness of what the situation required was sufficiently extensive and profound to encircle and contain all such attempts.

In the last few days and hours, brothers, the situation in Jordan has attained a climax of gravity that we hoped would never be reached; we had hoped that it might be possible to withdraw before it led to a disaster which will fundamentally affect the very existence of the Eastern Front; which we had hoped would be strengthened, made more effective and made to live in the full sense of the word, instead of merely existing, as had been the case before.

Honesty requires of us, brothers, that we define our attitude as follows—and this has always been our attitude:

1. The Palestinian resistance and the Fateh organization itself, above all, is one of the most important and healthy manifestations of our Arab struggle. It is the practical embodiment of the great change that has taken place in the Palestinian people under the pressure of conquest—a change

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 12, 1970.

from a people of refugees to a people of fighters.

2 We do not ignore the fact that mistakes may have been made by some of the resistance organizations, but we believe that it is the duty of the Arab nation to adopt a friendly rather than a hostile attitude, and to correct and remedy these errors.

3. It is the duty of all forces, all quarters, all individuals even, in the Arab nation, to realize absolutely that there is no alternative for any of us but to fight for the rights we claim as ours and for the peace we are striving for; there can be no waiving of these rights, and the peace must not be surrendered. Therefore it is our duty to fight. But fighting is not the same as fighting among ourselves.

Fighting means bullets aimed at the right target—the target being the enemy who is occupying our territory.

Fighting among ourselves means bullets aimed at the wrong target, with brother firing at brother.

Fighting is honorable; fighting among ourselves is a crime.

4. We cannot look on in silence at what is happening in Jordan, because the danger threatens us all, and because the outcome will affect us all. We therefore call upon all concerned to ring down the curtain on this grievous scene of suicidal strife.

We know that attempts have been made to secure a cease-fire both by King Hussein and our brother Yasser Arafat.

These attempts must succeed, and their success must be complete and absolute, thereby securing and supporting the legitimate rights of all parties and enabling them to do their duty.

It is reassuring that the reports received during the last few hours indicate a cease-fire. But the Arab nation is entitled to that full assurance that will give us confidence that every one of us will be looking forward, and not back.

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Speech by Secretary-General Habbash of the P.F.L.P. to Foreign Hostages Held in the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman¹

Amman, June 12, 1970

I feel that it is my duty to explain our case to you. I ask you to understand, or to try to understand, from a revolutionary point of view, what has obliged us to treat you like this. Perhaps this will be difficult for you, because we live in a different environment that makes us think and act differently from you. I regret what has happened.

We Palestinians have lived for many years under grim conditions which have influenced our thinking—it has been impossible to avoid this. For 23 years we lived in misery and suffering in camps outside our country, driven like sheep, neglected, and waiting for our rights to be restored. And nothing happened. Then three years ago the course of events gave us the opportunity to take up arms for the cause of the liberation of our territory. We are right in all we are now doing for our cause; it is right and proper that we should use all available means to defend our just revolution. It is for a fine and noble cause. You must take this into account, whether you support or oppose us.

You get up in the morning and have your coffee and milk. Your wives sit at the mirror for half an hour, or board planes to Geneva, while our wives are queueing for water in the camps.

You live in dollar luxury, you travel and enjoy yourselves, so naturally you cannot feel as we do, just as we cannot think and feel as you do. We live in camps where nothing is right. We have no water to wash our faces, sometimes none to drink. If you visited our camps only once a week you would not be able to bear it, but we have to live in them all our lives.

Since the start of the revolution there have been a number of conspiracies against us in Lebanon and Jordan, planned by Britain and

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 13, 1970.

America—your governments. They have taken place in several stages, in particular on November 4, 1968 and February 10, 1970. For the last week we have been the victims of this conspiracy which we believe was intended to liquidate us completely. This is what the Jordanian people feel; they know it was they who started it. We felt that we had the right to defend ourselves, bearing in mind our sufferings and our people. You in your world feel coolly towards us. We shall do all in our power to defend our revolution. Our law is our revolution. It is our duty to defend it because it is a righteous cause and because we shall be victorious. And it is our duty to liquidate the group that is conspiring against us, although there are other organizations whose views on the subject are different from ours.

At least a thousand people have been killed or wounded in the fighting, as far as we can estimate. But we are very pleased that we have not been obliged to blow up the hotel over your heads. But if our camps had been attacked again, we should not have hesitated to do so, we were deadly serious. But now we have won. I thank you for helping us in this for, had it not been for you, the attacks on us would have continued.

I offer my personal apologies. Our men are excellent fighters, but I am not sure that they were very good at running a hotel.

Q. Is there any cooperation and coordination between you and the rest of the organizations?

A. There are differences, especially when it comes to dealing with a difficult situation like this.

Q. Is the crisis over?

A. Not yet, but the King has acceded to our demands.

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Statements by Former Commander of the Lebanese Army Bustani on the Cairo Agreement Made Between Lebanon and Palestinian Commando Organizations (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, June 14, 1970

In fact the spirit of the Cairo Agreement is more important than the letter.

Many factors contributed to this agreement being reached, first and foremost being the determination of both sides, the Lebanese and the Palestinian, to find a sound and effective formula for mutual understanding. This determination was fostered, and its success was assisted, by the great concern evinced by the Arab countries, led by Egypt and President Gamal Abdel Nasser in person.

But this great Arab concern, and these immense efforts would not have led to the Agreement but for the spirit of confidence and candor that characterized the contacts and negotiations. It was this spirit that dictated the Agreement, and no agreement can live without it.

The importance of the Agreement does not lie in the solutions it led to of the problems of arms, training, Palestinian activity and the situation in the camps, but in the fact that it regulated Lebanon's relations with the cause of Palestine and the struggle of its sons, and with the struggle of the Arabs in the new stage and at the new level which the cause of Palestine and Palestinian and Arab action on its behalf have attained.

In my opinion, as long as this spirit of confidence and candor continues to characterize the Agreement and its implementation, it is impossible that any problem should arise which the parties concerned will find too difficult to solve.

Q. In view of the fact that the Agreement has been strongly criticized by certain deputies and politicians, it is only natural that the person who signed the Agreement should make some reply to its critics, or at least have views on the subject. What is the General's view?

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 15, 1970.

A. May I explain certain facts connected with this subject?

Firstly, despite the great understanding I have encountered on the part both of my Lebanese fellow-countrymen and of the Palestinians, and also on the part of the Arab countries, I regard everything that has been achieved, including the Agreement, as a gain for my country, Lebanon, not as a personal gain for myself. I went to Cairo and signed the Agreement on behalf of the Lebanese State and its President, not on my own behalf, within the framework of the requirements of Lebanon's sovereignty and security. And I still believe that this Agreement is binding on the Lebanese State, the parties that signed it and the parties that gave it their blessing and promoted it.

Certain facts are essential for an understanding of the essential nature of the Agreement, its significance and its justifications. The Cairo Agreement was concluded to put an end to a political crisis that had raged in the country and impeded its smooth running for more than seven months; it had almost swept away the national unity that is the life of this country and the mainstay of its continued existence. After the Agreement was signed a government was formed, and authority was once more able to make itself felt, play its role and solve the country's problems.

What is more important is that the Cairo Agreement filled a political vacuum that had resulted from the lack of a clear and united attitude to commando action in Lebanon. I shall not be disclosing a secret if I say that I was in the forefront of those who called on the authorities in the Council of Ministers, when it met after the attack on the Airport in 1968, to adopt a firm and unambiguous policy as regards commando action. Along with others, I continued to urge the highest political authorities, before the incidents of April and October, and during the intervening period, to inform us of what attitude should be adopted to the commando question, for, first and last, we are subject to a democratic regime in which the highest political authorities exercise the powers of judgement and decision.

Here I should like to point out that the Cairo Agreement restored to Lebanon the formula of a single homeland, a single state and a single authority, whereas before it was signed there had been a multiplicity of homelands and authorities.

As you said, some politicians have criticized the Agreement, others have accepted it and others again have welcomed it. But a large number of those who once criticized it are now calling for its implementation in both spirit and letter, now that they have found that it contains nothing that impairs Lebanon's interests—quite the contrary, indeed.

Q. This view, while obscuring some points as well as shedding some light, leaves the door wide open for continued talk on the Agreement. It is said that certain unwritten details were agreed upon, as an appendix to the Agreement. Is this so?

A. In my opinion the Agreement was a step that must be followed by a series of further political and military steps, and by measures in the field of fortifications, which must be taken in the same spirit of confidence that dictated the Agreement. To stand by the letter of the Agreement regardless of its spirit, to be content with the Agreement itself and to neglect the other steps that should follow it, and to disagree about this or that clause of the Agreement, is not in the interest of either the Agreement or those who concluded it, and in particular it is not in the interest of Lebanon.

In my opinion the problems arising from the existence of the Agreement or from its implementation are less serious than the tragedies and disasters that could arise if it did not exist.

Q. Does the former Commander of the Army think that the Agreement alone can solve the Lebanese crisis? And if it solves it for one party, can it solve it for the other?

A. I repeat that the Lebanese crisis, and perhaps the problem of Lebanon, cannot be solved by any clause or clauses in this Agreement or by any clauses in a constitution or a charter. Lebanon's problem, or problems, can be solved, first and foremost, through

agreement among the Lebanese themselves. Anything that brings the Lebanese closer together is a source of strength to Lebanon and to the Arabs, and anything that sets them apart is a source of weakness to Lebanon and to the Arabs.

The Cairo Agreement is the consequence of a new stage that confronts Lebanon and the Arabs. We must rise to the level of this stage with political, economic and military planning that is in harmony with it, if we are intent on Lebanon's safety and salvation, and the unity of the Lebanese remains the basis of any planning or agreement. Lebanon as a single homeland, even if there is only fifty per cent agreement within it, is better for itself and for the Arabs than Lebanon as a multiplicity of different homelands on which there is one hundred per cent internecine disagreement.

Q. Has the General a solution to offer?

A. Lebanon, in my opinion, is confronted with problems that must be faced and solved:

Here I must frankly and candidly state that Lebanon cannot isolate itself from the conflict between its Arab brethren and Israel. Similarly it is neither reasonable, advantageous nor fair that the Arabs should leave Lebanon to suffer from the consequences of this conflict alone. Lebanon's participation in the Arab effort in general and in the Arab military effort in particular, must be based on a comprehensive plan drawn up in collaboration with its Arab brethren, and in return Arab efforts and Arab capacities must participate in supporting Lebanon's political, military and economic endurance.

Lebanon's security and prosperity depend on this participation. Lebanon, as far as the Arabs are concerned, is not merely a winter or summer resort, a buyer and seller; it is a free and independent Arab country which is a partner with the Arabs in their defeats and victories, in their wealth and their losses; it is not only a partner in profit. This was my conviction when I was Com-

mander of the Army, and this is my conviction today.

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Press Conference Statements by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on the Situation in Jordan¹

Amman, June 14, 1970

Q. What have been the results of your contacts, either direct or indirect, with King Hussein or the Jordanian authorities?

A. The first point is that the aim of the subservient elements was to destroy our revolution, and they foolishly thought that they were capable of doing so. We had two principal objects in making the contacts—first and foremost to stop the fighting. This we were most anxious to do, not out of weakness, but because we value the precious Arab blood which the subservient forces had planned to shed.

Our second object was to pinpoint the leaders of the intrigue and conspiracy and ensure that they were expelled from the country. A statement issued by the Central Committee said who they were—Sharif Naser, Sharif Zaid and Muhammad Rasul al-Kailani.

Q. It is said that some of the organizations insist on certain conditions, or should we say adopt basic attitudes, to the incidents and to the regime in Jordan. This is said to be the attitude of the Popular Front, for example.

A. The Popular Front abides by the decision of the Central Committee. I do not know of any front making conditions, there is one set of conditions, one will and one command, the command of the Palestinian

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), June 15, 1970.

revolution, the conditions of the Palestinian revolution and the will of the Palestinian revolution, and the revolution will never allow any one to leave the ranks of the group or to try to divide them.

Q. What about the regime?

A. There are no personal or individual views; there are only the views of the Central Committee.

Q. We have discussed the role played by the Central Intelligence Agency in provoking the disturbances. What have you to say about the threat of the American government in alerting the 82nd Parachute Division for attack?

A. People in Washington who think that we are afraid of the 82nd Division ... they are welcome to come and see what it is like to deal with our revolutionary fighters. The American Central Intelligence Agency is not only working against the Arab nation, but also against all freedom- and peace-loving peoples in the world. We can see this in many parts of the world today.

The American Central Intelligence Agency tried to frighten our heroic people with a display of military strength and with threats to send the 82nd Division. But they failed. If they are really thinking of sending the 82nd Division, I say that they are welcome in the second Vietnam.

Q. As regards Lebanon, of course you have heard what is being said about the decisions which the Lebanese government has taken, which are to be implemented as from June 15, and the immediate reactions to them. Do you expect further incidents? And what is the truth about the attitude of the commando organizations?

A. I hope that Lebanon and the Lebanese authorities will meet their responsibilities and not give evidence of being linked with this terrible plan; I urge them not to commit this act of treason to their people and to the Arab nation. I call on them, in the name of Arabism and of the Palestinian revolution, to realize their responsibilities and to appreciate the consequences of their not doing so.

Q. The reports so far published of losses

sustained as a result of the incidents in Jordan have been contradictory. Some figures given for the dead and wounded have been really terrifying, amounting to thousands.

A. The figures that came out of Jordan for losses during the clashes were certainly exaggerated. But according to available figures, there were 900 casualties, one quarter of which were killed. We have no idea of the losses sustained by those who attacked the revolution; they have made a point of keeping their losses secret.

Most regrettably the majority of those killed were civilians—women, children and old people.

But all who were killed, whether civilians or commandos, died as martyrs for the revolution, and will be treated as such. The same applies to the wounded and those whose homes or places of work were damaged. The revolution has decided to pay the necessary compensation and all damages.

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U.S. Television Interview with U.A.R. President Nasser on a Peace Settlement with Israel, Soviet Advisers in Egypt and U.S.-U.A.R. Relations (Excerpt)¹

June 14, 1970

Fisher: Well, Mr. President, I want to thank you for giving us this chance to discuss your position. Despite everything you've said there are still many Americans who do not understand clearly your views. On May 1st you made an appeal to President Nixon. Will you like to tell the American people just what you want President Nixon to do?

President Nasser: Well, mainly the appeal to President Nixon was directed for the

¹ Broadcast on "The Advocates," a Public Broadcasting Service presentation of KCET, Los Angeles and WGBH, Boston; transcript provided by WGBH educational foundation. The interview was conducted in Cairo by Dr. Robert Fisher, Professor of International Law at Harvard University.

implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November, 1967. From our point of view, a big part of the Arab territories either in Egypt or Jordan or Syria—these parts were occupied by the Israeli forces. So our objective is the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territory. The second question, the second main point for the Arabs is the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, the rights of the refugees who were deprived of their country, of their land, of everything, in their homeland and then their land.

Q. But what do you want President Nixon to do? What should he do? Should he...

A. ... we agreed about arrangements for peace—all arrangements for peace which were included in the Security Council we agreed about. There was no agreement from Israel in principle about the word "withdrawal" from the Arab occupied territories. So we are sure that Israel doesn't want peace but wants expansions. So we want President Nixon to use his influence with Israel and get from them a promise or a word that they are ready to withdraw from all the occupied territories and they are ready to solve the problem of the refugees according to the United Nations resolution.

Q. Many Americans are still uncertain on your position toward Israel. Do you unequivocally accept the existence of the state of Israel?

A. Well, according to the United Nations resolution—we agreed about this resolution—we accepted the right of each country to live, including Israel, but when they speak about recognized and secure boundaries this is the big question. What are the recognized and secure boundaries?

Q. We'll come to boundaries in a minute. But do you, in accepting the resolution, you're now prepared to accept the existence of the state of Israel as a state entitled to live under some boundary?

A. Yes, but...

Q. ...now we'll come to the...

A. ...under two conditions. I want, because if I say that I accept the state of Israel while they occupy our territory really I will be encouraging Israel for expansion.

Q. No, but will you accept the demarcation lines as of June 1st or June 4th 1967...

A. ...yes...

Q. ...as final boundaries?

A. Yes.

Q. These temporary armistice lines as of June 4th, I guess, 1967 you are now prepared to accept those boundaries as final boundary lines of Israel?

A. Yes.

Q. Israel as a state inside those boundary lines.

A. Yes, but is Israel ready to accept these boundaries as demarcation lines?

Q. I do not know and I will ask those questions when I get a chance. From your statements I take it that your position has changed from 1966 to today. Is that correct?

A. Well, of course, there was confusion. We're always stressing about the rights of the people of Palestine. So now if the withdrawal will insure the rights of the people of Palestine are fulfilled it would be a different situation.

Q. Let's turn to the question of talks. You objected to bilateral talks between the U.A.R. and Israel. Why?

A. Because they occupy 20 per cent of our territory, of our country.

Q. But might not talks be the way to deal with that problem?

A. Well, if I go and sit on the table it would be a table of capitulation.

Q. Well, you do not want to sit in two party talks with Israel.

A. Yes.

Q. Now you do meet in the Security Council with Israel. You do not object to the Security Council discussing this question.

A. No, we don't object.

Q. *What one step could Israel take that would be the best step forward toward peace in the Middle East?*

A. To agree about the implementation of the Security Council Resolution and to declare that they are not willing to expansion and they are willing to, they are ready, to withdraw from all occupied territory as long as there is peace arrangements.

Q. *You do not ask them to withdraw first?*

A. No, no. There must be a package deal about everything.

Q. *A package deal and you want them to promise now to work out that package deal.*

A. Yes, because if they agree, this means a promise but it was said last week by Mrs. Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, that they are not ready to mention the word "withdrawal" at all.

Q. *If Israel promised to accept the Security Resolution and to withdraw within one year to work out the package deal, would you accept a cease-fire for one year?*

A. I think one year is a very long time, because if we have to make arrangements for...

Q. ...six months?...

A. I'll be ready to accept.

Q. *A six month cease-fire if, to work out the package deal if they would accept an agreement to the resolution.*

A. Well, I'll be ready to accept but I think it needs less than six months.

Q. *Once Israeli forces have withdrawn to those boundary lines, would you be willing to see to it that no Egyptian territory was used as a basis for armed attacks by anybody against Israel?*

A. Yes. Yes, this really is clear in the Security Council Resolution.

Q. *Once Israel withdraws, Egypt will promise that its territory will not be used by anybody for attacks on Israel.*

A. Yes.

Q. *Do you feel the United States is taking sides? Your speech criticized the United States?*

A. Yes, we are sure the United States is taking the side of Israel. Well, before the war we got words from the United States government that they guaranteed the integrity of all countries in this area. We were getting these guarantees from the United States government but when the Israeli forces attacked us suddenly and destroyed our air force and as a result of that we were defeated. Now we realized that Israel was able to get all the modern equipment for electronic warfare from the United States. Then after that we tried, of course, to rebuild our armed forces. But Israel received from the United States "Phantoms" and "Sky-Hawks"—airplanes. For what purpose? To attack us; to attack our cities; to kill our children and to kill our workers. Why? To impose a settlement on us.

Q. *Let me turn to the Russians. How many Russians were here that helped build the Aswan Dam?*

A. About 5,000 were here.

Q. *And where are they now?*

A. We have now about 70.

Q. ...70?

A. ...in Aswan and the rest left to...

Q. ...the rest have gone back.

A. Yes.

Q. *Now how many Russians are here to help with the defense?*

A. Well, this is a secret. (laughter)

Q. *It's a secret? Why?*

A. Because it is a military question.

Q. *Well, about how many? Is it a big number or a small number? Is it like Aswan Dam? Is it comparable?*

A. Less.

Q. Less than there at the present time. Now, how much equipment are you receiving from the Soviet Union?

A. We received equipment to rebuild our armed forces. You know we lost all.

Q. ...in 1967...

A. ...our equipment in '67 because of the surprise which destroyed our air force.

Q. But you're getting airplanes?

A. I'm getting airplanes.

Q. Tanks?

A. Tanks.

Q. And electronic equipment?

A. Some electronic equipment, yes, but not as "Phantom" airplanes. We get MIG 21s. MIG 21 is an intercept, defense airplane, but the "Phantom" is for strike. The Phantom could carry seven tons of explosives.

Q. And the MIG 21 is just an interceptor?

A. Interceptor.

Q. Now, does the Russian commitment to help defend Egypt, does it extend to the Sinai?

A. Well, they are not having a commitment to defend Egypt. We have the Egyptian armed forces and we have Russian advisors.

Q. Are you using Russian pilots?

A. No, we have advisors.

Q. Do they fly around?

A. Yes, of course. They train our people. They train our pilots and these squadrons and all over the units so they have to fly.

Q. I take it you really don't want to settle this problem with military means though.

A. Well, of course, one doesn't go for war just for war. But there must be a just solution.

Q. Is there any other point you would like to make to Americans...

A. There are some things. The Americans look to me as a military man who thinks that military people like wars. And so on. Well, military men always know what happens in war so really we are for peace. We don't like to go just for war just to fight. We want to have good relations between the United States and people in the Egyptian country. Why do we quarrel? Why do we conflict. There are no dire problems between us. People think that as it was really published in some newspapers that we wanted to kill the Jews, want to kill the Israelis, want to destroy them. All that we want is justice to the Arabs, to the Moslems, the Christians and the Jews—the rights of the Arabs of Palestine. Rights for everybody.

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Statement by the Revolutionary Council and the Government of Algeria on Their Attitude to the Palestine Question¹

Algiers, June 14, 1970

The Revolutionary Council and the Government held a joint meeting with President Boumedienne in the chair.

Mr. Qaid Ahmad, the Official Responsible for the Party Organization and Mr. Ahmad Talib, Minister of National Education, submitted a report on the task they performed in the Middle East.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government studied developments in the situation in the Arab world since June 1967, and observed that the most prominent events of this period confirm the soundness of the political line laid down by Algeria on the eve of and in the wake of the aggression. They therefore decided to continue to defend these basic attitudes in order to reach a solution that will safeguard the honor and dignity of the Arab nation.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government recorded their opinion that the

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Sha'b* (Algiers), June 15, 1970.

Arab countries' lack of a clear political line has done untold harm to the sacred cause of the Arab nation. They believe that the adoption of a clear political line will mobilize all resources and that the adoption of a military strategy devoid of all obscurity is still the first condition that must be fulfilled as soon as possible.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government observed that Algeria has met all its obligations and duties during the last three years, and reaffirm their full commitment to the Arab nation and their determination to do all in their power to ensure that Algeria spares no sacrifice in the battle of destiny.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government believe that the one positive factor that has made its appearance since the aggression of June 1967 has been the emergence of the Palestinian revolution and the gradually increasing support it has enjoyed as the political and military force of the Arab nation.

The Palestinian personality has become a political fact which is imposing itself spontaneously throughout the whole world.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government regard the resistance as the sole representative of, and sole spokesman for the Palestinian people.

On this basis, it alone is qualified to enter into commitments on behalf of Palestine.

It is now necessary for the Palestinian revolution to maintain its gains and to strengthen its positions in particular by defending its unity and maintaining its full independence vis-à-vis all political moves.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government believe that the moral, political and material support of the Palestinian revolution is an urgent duty for all the Arab countries and for all peace- and freedom-loving forces in the world.

Support by Arab governments for the Palestinian revolution is inseparable from their commitments to the Palestinian cause.

Any kind of refusal to offer aid of any kind to the Palestinian resistance, and any obstacles placed in the way of its military activity against the enemy, constitute a

disavowal of commitments to Palestine and a cruel blow to the whole of the Arab nation.

The struggle for unity, although it is, first and foremost, the concern of those engaged in the struggle and those responsible for the resistance, must also be a top-priority objective of Arab governments and parties. The most important thing for the future of Palestine is that a stop should be put to interference in the internal affairs of the revolution, and in particular to the encouragement of partisan movements to cause divisions in the Palestinian ranks. It is therefore the duty of the whole Arab nation to condemn such action as strongly as possible.

The bloody incidents that have recently taken place in Jordan, following similar incidents of the same kind, have clearly demonstrated that the Palestinian revolution must always be at the ready to unveil all conspiracies intended to injure it.

The Revolutionary Council and the Government affirm that they will spare no effort to support the Palestinian resistance in all fields until final victory is won against the Zionist enemy.

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News Conference Statements by King Hussein of Jordan on the June Crisis in Jordan (Excerpts)¹

Amman, June 17, 1970

I welcome you hoping that my meeting with you will help clarify a number of facts connected with the events which took place in our country. The first fact is that last week's bloody events in Jordan were not impulsive or natural but a pre-planned plot and dissension concocted in the darkness.

¹ Excerpted from Hussein's press conference for Arab and foreign news correspondents and information officers. He began the conference with an opening statement and then answered journalists' questions. Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3409A/1, A/2, A/3, A/4, A/5, A/6, A/7 and A/8.

The second fact is that this plot was directed against the entire country, Army, people and the fida'iyyin. This dissension was aimed at striking the steadfastness of this country and crushing the strength which we built after the June 1967 setback which we wanted, with both its military and honest fida'i flanks, to become an asset to our sacred cause and a hope for our nation's aspiration for victory and liberation.

The third fact is that my primary concern since the eruption of the crisis was to avoid fighting between the Army and the fida'iyyin. I was convinced that the honest Resistance and the Army were the real target of the plot. The fourth fact is that I immediately issued orders forbidding the Army to enter Amman. I wish to declare and emphasise that the Army definitely did not enter Amman. My main aim was to preserve the lives of the citizens as well as the Resistance and the lives of the honest fida'iyyin.

I do not have to say how sad I am about what has happened. I always looked forward to strengthening our country's valiant procession on the road of liberation—the procession in which the hearts of our sons from the armed forces and the fida'iyyin are linked together and in which the hearts of all the citizens surround them with love and pride. I was sad to see that the procession was about to be crushed between the jaws of the plot and the fingers of dissension. I was never party to a group in my country against another group because my responsibility, which is based on historical and actual facts, prompts me always to offer myself to all. My main concern is that the liberation procession in my country should include the Army, the people and the fida'iyyin. My primary task and sacred wish are to see this procession marching firmly, confidently and faithfully.

As a result of the co-operation between the authority and the Central Committee [of the Palestine Resistance Movement], we were able to save the country from the dissension and wrest it from the claws of the evil plot and stop the clashes. Now that things are returning to normal as a result of the co-operation and correct understanding of the reality and dimensions of the events, sincere

and constant efforts will be exerted to reach a serious formula for joint action. This formula will be a clear framework governing the close co-operation between the authority and the honest fida'i action. This formula must guarantee that all roads will be blocked in the face of the enemies, continuous efforts to strike this country and weaken its strength and steadfastness, prevent the recurrence of the provocations leading to future events, guarantee more ability and effectiveness for the fida'i action to devote itself to its noble aims, and reassure the armed forces about the safety of the procession so that they can devote themselves absolutely to their sacred duty.

A final point, which I wish to emphasise firmly and clearly, is that we in this country are one indivisible whole, one body and one heart—people, Army and fida'iyyin. We do not have a good Jordanian and a bad Palestinian or vice versa. We are all working, building and moving to serve our beloved people in the occupied land, retrieve our violated rights, and restore dignity and honour to our Arab nation. If the Army is the light of the eye, the defender of the homeland and the hope for victory, and if the honest fida'iyyin are an asset to the liberation, then all the citizens are our people, support and tribe. Their comfort, happiness, honour and dignity are the reasons for my existence and life.

I now give the opportunity to the brothers who wish to raise any questions or subjects.

Q. You said there was a plot. Would Your Majesty explain its nature?

A. I firmly believe the next phase will reveal its dimensions. There can be no other explanation for what took place. Three years after the calamity that befell the Arab nation in June 1967 and after all the efforts and sacrifices to build up the armed forces and to devote all resources to the battle, the armed forces have been carrying out their duty in the battle as honestly and faithfully as they had done previously. These forces should have had an atmosphere of assurance and trust—assurances about their rear areas. They should have been given affection and

appreciation by all. The Resistance should also have been given the affection and appreciation of everyone in this country. It cannot play its part unless the Army and people give it their affection. In all these fields, whether in relations to the people, the Army or the honest fida'iyyin, there were incidents and matters over a long period of time which were clearly aimed at dividing unity, creating confusion and splitting our efforts.

We expected this year to reach a military position that would enable us to confront any new enemy attempt to defeat us or to destroy the shield of our nation. We also expected during this decisive phase to be subjected to plots and attempts to destroy us and to foil our achieving the desired degree of strength.

Answering your question, I ask: Could the Resistance play its part without the affection of the people and Army? Could the Army play its part without being assured of its rear areas? Could the people be assured without all this? I am confident that the coming phase will uncover many things in all dimensions.

We actually wanted to spare anything that would waste our efforts, destroy the structure and blow up the fortress from within, so that the enemy would not achieve his ends. Subsequently there was self-restraint and earnest attempts to save the country and the situation from destruction.

I believe we have to a large extent succeeded, but our success will only be partial unless we continue to stop up every gap through which our enemy tries to penetrate in order to achieve his ambitions and objectives within our one rank, one Army, one people and one group. We are all a sacrifice to this nation, the cause and justice.

Q. When will Your Majesty visit Cairo and will your tour include a number of other Arab capitals?

A. I believe I may visit Cairo very soon. Naturally I wish to reiterate my pride and that of every person in this country in the fraternity between me and brother President Jamal Abd an-Nasir under all the circum-

stances and the fraternity between our two peoples and armies. This fraternity has been strengthened under the most difficult circumstances—the circumstances of the battle of destiny. I do not know the date, but I believe there will be a meeting very soon between me and my brother, HE President Jamal Abd an-Nasir. This meeting may take place in Cairo.

Q. [Words indistinct] and future crises must be avoided. What are these gaps exactly? Your Majesty said in your statement that you would visit some capitals and make some contacts to avoid these crises in the future. Does this mean that the crises had foreign roots?

A. Undoubtedly the crisis had foreign roots. Let me review the past. When I assumed this country's great responsibilities in 1953 I found love, admiration, support and encouragement from the overwhelming majority of the sons of this country. Otherwise I would not have been able to carry out my duty or [words indistinct]. This happened after the 1948 calamity. Frankly, many sons of this country doubted that it would be able to play a part in the battle. There was no proper attention either. The attention of many people was turned in several directions in the Arab world while we were confronting and fighting Israel, with its aims against us and against the entire Arab homeland.

All this happened here. All my attempts sought to establish one family in the full sense of the word, because the destiny is one and the danger is one. Our duty to ourselves and our nation was great. We Arabised the Army, which was originally an extension of the Army of the great Arab revolution whose commander fell without sacrificing the rights of the people but sacrificing everything else to uphold his principles and his people's rights.

We gradually convinced many people in our ranks to see our point of view. Despite all the difficulties and obstacles, we began our work and we are now going forward. We were often exposed to hypocrisy. [Word indistinct] we were aware of the reality of the danger threatening us and threatening everybody. When we reached the stage before the 1967 battle and realized that the whole na-

tion was threatened, and when the battle was imposed upon us, we did everything we could with the means available to us. We suffered because of our faith in Arab unity, destiny and aims.

After this we began to rebuild our armed forces and began to resist. We opened the doors to every person to play his part in this battle. We worked and exerted efforts with our brothers and partners, and foremost of these our brothers in the UAR, to defend the rights of our nation. In the pre-June stage we managed to freeze certain elements in one way or the other, or at least made them believe that the people, half of whom were exposed to the 1948 calamity and half of whom shed blood to defend every inch of our land, could and must perform their duty. After the 1967 battle these elements reappeared. They attached themselves to this or that circle in the Arab world. All the contradictions in the Arab world were brought to this land. This contributed greatly to what took place.

For our part, we wanted our work to be united and organised. We wanted to forget the past and our past affiliations and devote ourselves and our lives to our land and cause. We believed this was the only way to play our part in the best way.

This is our problem in this country. The contradictions in the wide Arab world accumulated in our land under the most difficult and grave circumstances. This is why I say my concern and my aim is to avoid a continuation of such gaps in the procession and to tackle the situation with all our brothers in a spirit which safeguards our common interest, cause and steadfastness and to confront the common danger.

Naturally in an atmosphere of this kind our enemies played a major part, exploited the conditions and tried to blow up the fortress from within.

Q. [*Indistinct.*]

A. What undoubtedly happened in Amman was extremely painful. Everyone in this country and every free and honest person in the great Arab homeland was pained. It is really a shame for all of us that a foreign-

er under our protection should be (? harmed) and exposed to danger. Many foreigners have left, and they must return if we are to build the inevitable strong and sound structure.

Q. *Did you note during the recent incidents that the Palestine Resistance forces tried, I mean wanted, to take over power? What was the extent of co-operation between the Jordanian authority and the Palestine Resistance forces?*

A. Obviously the atmosphere was electrified. To us the situation looked like a mine-field. We felt that we were literally being pushed towards a head-on clash. We were not in a weak position. We were confident we could deal with any challenge from any quarter. The Army which we built and prepared to fight Israel and to guarantee the safety of this country and the Arab nation can easily deal with any situation. However, it was very clear that both the Army and the men of the honest Resistance were provoked. One purpose was to create a bloodbath, the other was to discredit us and our tactics in every sense of the word. I want to say that honest elements in the Resistance movement were among those who contributed greatly to stopping the bloodshed. Many are forgetting the past and unconditionally devoting all their resources and lives to their country, cause and people. This concern about the common interest, destiny and all we have achieved so far greatly reassured us and helped us to control the situation. We therefore decided that we must not only overcome the present difficult stage but also review everything and build a sound structure—measures which would affect not only the Resistance and the people, but also all the departments.

The circumstances of June 1967 imposed certain conditions on us—half-solutions to a large extent. Now, however, after what has happened, we shall review everything so that the structure will be strong and completely capable of resistance. We want to see the soldier devoting himself to his duty reassured and at ease; to see the Resistance man also playing his part; and to see the citizen living in comfort and reassurance, loving and helping everyone in every sense of the words.

Q. What do you think Israel meant by saying it would not remain indifferent to the incidents in Jordan?

A. We believe Israel was getting ready to exploit the situation in its own interest. As I have already said, we consider this stage as a critical, difficult and decisive one. Once we pass this stage, God willing, we shall be strong enough to hold the initiative, at least to the extent of stopping Israel from striking at this nation by striking Jordan. In the past, Israel tried to deprive us of the opportunities. In fact, I was expecting problems from the beginning of this year, and unfortunately these problems occurred in this way.

Q. Are you tackling the question on an Arab level by way of a summit conference or through the Arab League?

A. As I have already said, we are tackling the question locally and on an Arab level with all our brothers who care about the march and the achievement of the common objective. I cannot give you more details now because we want the present efforts to produce the desired results at the earliest opportunity, to everyone's benefit.

Q. A joint committee was formed by the Jordanian authority and the Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance Movement. What powers and guarantees have you given to this committee? Will this be followed by the trial of those responsible for the crisis?

A. It depends whom you mean by those responsible for this crisis. As I have already said, we are exerting maximum efforts to straighten matters out and to pinpoint responsibility. I have explained that many elements were involved in the case. Many elements contributed to creating this unnatural atmosphere between the Army and the Resistance and between the people and the Resistance. These elements were prompted by various motives resulting from different relationships among the various quarters. They tried to destroy everything. But the march must continue. The elements must be exposed and they must be eliminated finally and categorically.

Q. Your Majesty, a certain fida'i organization has called for the disbandment of the special forces. What is your position on this?

A. I believe we shall settle this among ourselves. I am sure such suggestions are in fact provocations and attempts to create more difficulties and new disturbances. I think the elements calling for such actions should bear the responsibility for what might happen. I believe these elements are not supported by the majority of the people.

I shall explain what the special forces are for those who want to understand the situation. The special forces started as a company of paratroopers in June 1967. It played a part inside Israel in co-operation with Egyptian commando units. After June 1967 in the course of the reorganisation of the Jordanian armed forces and with a lack of appropriate co-operation of efforts, it was considered necessary to increase the size of these forces and to give them special training. Several hundred were chosen from the armed forces, paratroopers and commandos, physically and morally fit, with an expert knowledge of all weapons. These forces are vital and effective in the battle we are fighting. They are the cream of the Army. This is always the case.

There have always been destructive suggestions. If what the questioner says is true, then this is one of these suggestions. There have been a number of attempts to destroy this force from within. I believe the consciousness of our people, our armed forces and the vast majority of the Resistance men who have dedicated their lives for the country and their cause, will end all this.

Q. Would Your Majesty answer briefly two points on Jordanian-US relations? First how do you feel about the evacuation of the Americans and other foreigners and, two, what is the Jordanian Government's view on President Nixon's decision to sell more Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft to Israel?

A. Very simple. Relations with the United States are directly related to the US attitude to Israel. They have always been so. We have always tried to keep the bridges open to achieve a better understanding which

would lead to an improvement in the general situation in this part of the world. However, we shall most certainly not be happy if more Phantom aircraft reach Israel because this would not contribute in the least to a just and peaceful solution to this problem.

The 22nd November 1967 Security Council resolution cannot possibly be implemented so long as Israeli aggressions continue against all Arabs, civilian or military, and against targets in this entire region, and so long as Israel continues to occupy the Arab land it occupied in June 1967.

Q. For the sake of the Arab cause we support the establishment of peace in the Middle East. During the past two years talks were held in various quarters to find a substitute for fighting. One suggestion called for a mass peaceful march by the Palestinians to their country accompanied by volunteers made up of individuals and groups from all over the world, including Red Cross people to go with them and protect them from aggression. Would you like to comment?

A. I have heard of this suggestion. I think it is a fine suggestion but quite frankly I have not had a chance to discuss it in detail. I believe there is a determination to return, one way or another. This determination is now stronger than ever, and we shall return.

Q. Your Majesty, do you believe the charges made by the fida'iyyin to the effect that US Intelligence was behind last week's disturbances in Jordan?

A. Quite frankly, this is one point I cannot talk about now nor can I speak about who was behind the disturbances, but I can tell you this: The aim was to destroy everything we have built. As I told some of you this year, the present year is going to be very difficult and critical for the following reason: Israel always strikes when it feels it is up against an Arab defensive stand which will prevent it from implementing more of its plans. It is in this stage now.

It appears that Israel does not care about a just and honourable peace. Our Army must therefore be prepared to fight, and must above all be able to take on its responsibilities with a spirit of happy satisfaction and reas-

urance about those standing behind it. This is why all the people should give the Army the support, love and respect it deserves. The feeling should prevail that our country and family are safe.

As for the Resistance, it cannot survive without the people's support and without the Army's support. There have been attempts to drive a wedge here. I am quite sure that what happened was no coincidence. As I said before, during the past few days I felt like someone walking through a minefield. I have done my best to prevent the total devastation of everything we have built and loved—namely, the people, the Resistance and the Army.

I am sure that everything is over. We shall be able to bring the situation under control in a short time.

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Memorandum from the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce to the Israeli Authorities on the Collection of Taxes from the Inhabitants of Jerusalem¹

Jerusalem, June 22, 1970

A short time ago the Jerusalem Tax Department started imposing new taxes and loans on the people of Jerusalem, in conformity with laws and legislation passed for the purpose, in addition to the income tax they were already paying.

These demands are based on the following legislation:

1. The Security Tax.

This is collected in conformity with a law first passed in 1967; in accordance with an amendment passed this year the tax is levied at the rate of fifteen per cent of the income tax paid.

2. The Compulsory Loan Tax (Savings).

This is a new law promulgated on April 1,

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Quds* (Jerusalem), June 23, 1970.

1970, which stipulates that every ordinary or juristic person shall pay a percentage of his income as a compulsory savings loan, the percentage being calculated on the basis of his total income liable to income and security tax, and every employer has to deduct the amount of the loan from the sums due to his workers and pay four per cent of the total salaries of his employees and workers.

3. The Compulsory Defense Law.

This also is a new law, promulgated on April 1, 1970: It stipulates that every person shall pay a defense loan at the rate of seven per cent of his taxable income.

Inasmuch as the imposition of these new taxes, whether in the form of loans or otherwise, has caused confusion among the Arab population of Jerusalem and given rise to the expression of great discontent; and inasmuch as the imposition of these taxes is in conflict with custom and the principles of international law, it is our duty to raise this subject in order to explain the views of the Arab population on the enforcement of Israeli laws in general and the imposition of new taxes and compulsory loans in particular.

This Chamber has already objected to the enforcement of Israeli regulations and administration in the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem in a special memorandum submitted to the authorities on May 26, 1970, in which it requested the Minister of Finance to recommend that the collection of these taxes and loans should be suspended to give the Chamber time to study their legality and to submit a detailed memorandum on them.

After discussion and study with a number of legal advisers, and further to the above-mentioned memorandum, the Chamber of Commerce hereby submits to you the following:

1. After occupying the Arab part of Jerusalem, the Israel Defense Army imposed military government there. Then, on June 27, 1967, the government of Israel unilaterally joined this part of the city to the State of Israel and enforced Israeli laws in it. It is well known that occupation does not transfer sovereignty to the occupying state until the

situation has been finally decided in one of the ways recognized by international law, such as the conclusion of a peace treaty or the relinquishment of the area.

2. It is a recognized international principle that the occupying state may only change the laws in force in order to maintain security and order. Article 43 of the Hague Convention and Article 154 of the Geneva Convention affirm this principle, which has become an accepted legal principle.

3. Since Israel and its legal system are obliged to observe and enforce the principles of international law as if they were part of Israel's own legal system, there is all the more reason for it to observe them in its administration of the Arab part of Jerusalem.

In the light of these principles, the Chamber of Commerce is of the opinion that the occupation authorities are entitled to collect taxes levied in accordance with laws and regulations that were in force before the occupation, but that they are not entitled to levy new taxes, either direct or indirect, for military purposes. Article 48 of the Hague Convention affirms these principles, and adds that taxes must only be collected to cover the expenses of administering the occupied area and for the normal conduct of affairs to the extent that, and no further than, this was done before the occupation.

Therefore the imposition of the taxes referred to above is an infringement of the principles of international law, international legal precedents and all the opinions of jurists and legal experts.

4. This Chamber feels itself obliged to point out that the economic situation and the standard of living in the city have greatly deteriorated, and that statements to the contrary cannot be based on correct figures and profound study.

5. The international community, as represented by the United Nations, does not acknowledge legislation imposed on it unilaterally, and the Chamber of Commerce therefore requests that these laws may be repealed as regards the Arab population, that

they may not be enforced and that the Arab population may not be obliged to pay the taxes.

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Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya at a Ceremony Marking the Evacuation by American Forces of the Aqaba ibn Nafe' (Wheelus) Military Base (Excerpts)¹

Tripoli, June 22, 1970

Brothers,

The problem of Palestine is a problem of struggle, of serious armed struggle. It is a problem of grave confrontation, one of the gravest operations in the historical confrontation between the Arab nation and its enemies. The problem of Palestine today, especially since the defeat of 1967, has become one of the gravest of problems in which the existence of the Arabs is in the balance, the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of the Zionist entity are in the balance.

But today when we talk of the liberation of Palestine we must not vaguely employ slogans advocating destruction, liberation or peace. We must fully realize that the battle of Palestine—of which the territories occupied in 1967 are a part—that this battle requires a vast mobilization of the resources of the Arab nation, that it requires that the strength of the Arab masses should exert urgent pressure and play an effective part in the battle. In the battle of Palestine today, before calling for the elimination of aggression or its consequences, we must make a start from solid ground, from solid ground on which we can ensure the political, military and economic mobilization of the resources of the Arab nation, and if the rulers are unable to achieve this, we hereby call on the masses of the Arab nation to achieve it by causing an explosion, by revolution, by exerting insistent pressure

to ensure the mobilization of these resources for the battle of destiny.

Brothers,

Since 1948 the Arabs have been employing slogans calling for the destruction of Israel, for liberation, for the return of the Palestinian people. But today, after many years we have not destroyed Israel, we have not liberated Palestine, we have not returned the refugees to their homes. What is the cause of this?

Brothers,

The cause of this still exists today, though I hope that it will no longer exist tomorrow. It is that the whole of the Arab nation was not ready for the battle. In spite of the fact that our enemies made a careful calculation of Arab capacities, Arab potentials and Arab resources that could be mobilized for the battle, the majority of them were not deployed in the battle.

Brothers,

The cause of Palestine was, in practice, linked with the sacrifices made by our great sister, the United Arab Republic.

Brothers,

Fifteen thousand members of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic fell in the battle of 1967. For what? For Palestine, for the 1967 war was one link in the long chain of struggle to recover Palestine. But today we cannot possibly allow the United Arab Republic to wrestle with aggression against the Arab nation alone. Today the whole Arab nation must go into action to play its part in liberation, to play its part in wresting back its territory.

Brothers,

As things are at present, when defeats befall us we hold one country responsible for them, and when we win victories we all claim responsibility for them. But in tomorrow's battle, which the Arab masses are entering with greater awareness and greater determination to know the facts, with greater determination to be victorious—in tomorrow's battle we shall not allow one group to bear the responsibility alone; we must all

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 23, 1970.

bear defeat together, we must all win victory together.

Brothers,

Today we feel that we are better off than we were yesterday; today the Arab will has grown stronger than it was yesterday.

In most Arab countries today the key positions in the Arab nation are in the hands of its sons, in the hands of loyal citizens. Today the Syrian Arab Republic is resisting side by side with its great sister, the United Arab Republic. On your behalf, therefore, I salute our distinguished brother, Nur al-Din al-Atasi, who, along with his people and his territory, is stationed on the front, the front of real confrontation with the enemy, who is placing the resources of the Syrian people, the resources of the sons of the Syrian Arab Republic—the armed forces and the people—who is placing all these resources at the disposal of the battle.

I have myself stood in Syrian territory, on the line of confrontation with the enemy, on the Syrian Front, and felt the deep determination and firm and strong will which is devoted to Arab territory and is resolved to liberate it.

Having returned from Syria, I can assure you that Syria is much better prepared for the battle than it was in 1967, that Syria is providing a model that all should imitate of reorganization and preparation for the battle and of the mobilization of capacities and resources for the battle. We hope that all Arab countries which appreciate the gravity of the situation, will also appreciate that the battle is not a regional one, will mobilize their resources and redouble their efforts, as the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic have done.

I can assure you that the coming battle will be different from that of yesterday, because the coming battle will be fought on strong Arab fronts in Syria and Egypt.

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Statement by Heir Apparent and Prime Minister Shaikh Jaber al-Sabah of Kuwait on Current Arab Issues (Excerpts)¹

Kuwait, June 24, 1970

Our relations with other countries are determined by our interests and the interests of the Arab nation, and by our absolute belief in the unity of that nation as a basis and an aim, in Islamic brotherhood, in peace based on justice and in friendship based on mutual respect.... Therefore there is neither right nor left, there is no alignment with any international camp, but pure Arab nationalism, friendship with all who offer us the hand of friendship, support for a peace that does not infringe rights or deny justice and, at the same time, a determination that no one shall violate our sovereignty or encroach on our rights and dignity. Similarly, we fashion our foreign policy vis-à-vis other countries in the light of their attitudes to the problems of Arab destiny.... It has become essential that we should adopt a unanimous Arab attitude to the interests of the countries that still support Israel and encourage it to continue its aggression and its occupation of Arab territory. We also reject all solutions of the Palestine problem that are not approved by the Palestinian Arab people.

As a part of the Arab nation, we believe in the unity of that nation, though it includes many countries, and the Kuwaiti people are linked to all the other Arab peoples by the links of a common destiny, the dissolution of which is unthinkable.... And we welcome any union or federation between two or more Arab countries as a step along the road towards complete Arab unity. And if Arab unity is the aim of the Arab peoples, we also believe that the union of the strong is better than the union of the weak. This is why we have striven to make our country strong, to develop our society and to ensure the welfare of our people. Our view of Arab problems

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), June 25, 1970.

has always been based on this belief in Arab unity as being the precious goal for which we are striving. We have therefore shared with our brethren in the Arab nation the wealth and resources that God has bestowed upon us. We do not give favors nor are we niggardly, but we are not unnecessarily extravagant, lest we should become a burden on others.

In the same way our hearts have been gladdened by the Palestinian armed struggle and the appreciation of the whole world for the determination of the people of that usurped part of our homeland to offer their lives and wealth in sacrifice for the liberation of their land. . . . We have seen this struggle as a natural point of departure for the recovery of a beloved part of our homeland. We have supported it with all our resources and we shall continue to support it in the persons of those who direct their resources to the field of battle with the usurping enemy. . . . For the battle with the enemy must come before everything else; it demands that all Arab forces should be subjected to its requirements, and that we should not be diverted from it by dialectical theories, ideological slogans or irrelevant disputes among ourselves. . . . It is unimaginable that Arab blood should be shed by Arab hands at this critical juncture, which will decide the destiny of our nation for so many years to come.

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Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya on Arab Self Reliance and Soviet Assistance (Excerpts)¹

Benghazi, June 25, 1970

Brothers,

I maintain that it is only by building up itself, its national personality and its internal strength, that a nation can attract the respect

of others, the assistance of others, while weakness, lack of cohesion, regionalism, internal disunity and an unstable national personality can only attract colonialism and colonialist bases. Never again shall we allow ourselves to fall into spheres of influence, into the trap of colonialist conspiracies. We must build that strong national personality which attracts the respect of others, the assistance of others, their respect and esteem, and not their bases and influence.

Brothers,

When America realized that the Arab area was living in a state of regionalist disunity, it produced the Eisenhower Doctrine. There were bases in Libya. There was occupation, there was humiliation, there were spheres of influence, and we were in them.

Brothers,

When the forces of colonialism saw that the Arab nation was living without a national personality . . . it established its colonialist bases at the expense of the dignity and freedom of the Arabs—the Arab people of Libya paid the price with their dignity and freedom—and at the expense of their future, and for many years we succumbed, until today we have liberated ourselves through our own will and national strength.

Brothers,

When the U.S.S.R. saw that the Arab nation was a national personality, that the Arab nation has a right to Palestine, that the Arabs could not be contained in spheres of influence, by colonialist bases, then the U.S.S.R., which had recognized Israel, utterly changed its policy, and is now the friend of the Arab nation, when it realized that this nation must be respected and must exist.

Brothers,

We can now, therefore, compare the different sources of strength for this cause, and at a time when the Soviet Union is giving us aid, we must salute the U.S.S.R. which supports Arab rights and respects the Arab personality.

Brothers,

This encourages us to strengthen our

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 26, 1970.

capacities and our national personality, and to unite so that we may obtain the respect of the world for Arab nationalism, for the Arab personality, for Arab rights and for Arab dignity.

This is the pattern followed by the U.S.S.R. in its relations with our great sister, the United Arab Republic.

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Memorandum from National Organizations and Leaders in Jordan to the Government Authorities on the Current Situation in Jordan (Excerpts)¹

Amman, end of June, 1970

We believe that there were both direct and indirect factors and causes for the recent events . . . but, so as not to obscure essentials by going into too much detail, we shall restrict ourselves here to the direct factors, which can be summed up under two principal categories, the first being that of *Internal Factors*, which are the following:

a) The failure of successive governments so far to adopt a democratic constitutional regime that believes that the people are the source of authority and that any government must rule with the confidence of the people and in its interests, and, as a consequence of this, the absence of democratic rule which derives its powers from a constitution, exercises its responsibilities in conformity with the provisions of that constitution and believes that its first and most sacred duty is to maintain the rights of the citizen, to protect the sovereignty of law, to the fullest extent and in all senses, and to respect the principles of right, justice and fair treatment in both word and deed.

b) The fact that so far successive govern-

ments have not been confident that the vast masses of the people are sufficiently aware of their interests and their political, economic and social rights, and are able and sufficiently determined to protect these rights and interests as to effectively prevent any violation or suppression of them, exploitation of them, or deviation from them by any government, authority or other party.

c) As a result of all this, there has been no basis for or manifestation of confidence between successive governments, their institutions and representatives, on the one hand, and the people, whatever their trends, affiliations and political, social and professional organizations, on the other. A further result is that the field of conflicts between the rulers and the ruled has expanded daily, to the extent that relations between them have come to be characterized by suspicion and hostility.

The second category is that of *External Factors*, which are the following:

a) The fact that in deciding their foreign, economic and defense relations, policies and attitudes in general, and consequently their policy as regards procuring arms for the army in particular, our successive governments have so far always, both before and since 1967, taken as their guiding principle their continued hopes of and confidence in the imperialist countries, headed by the United States of America, although it has been perfectly clear that in their attitudes and policies they have been hostile to our causes, our rights and our interests. This applies in particular to the cause of Palestine and to Zionist aggression against the homeland, especially since the disaster of 1967.

b) Our successive governments, both before and since 1967, have had no confidence in the power and capacity of our Arab masses and the Arab armies to recover our rights in Palestine and the areas occupied by Israel. Consequently they have had no confidence in armed struggle as a way to liberation. Moreover, these governments have always hoped that it might be possible, by depending on the efforts of the United Nations and the Great Powers, to reach a solution which could

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh* (Amman), June 26, 1970.

never realize the legitimate rights of our nation or a just and honorable outcome for our cause.

c) As a result of this the strategy of successive governments, both before and since 1967, has been based on neglecting to train, arm, organize or mobilize the masses, on continuing to obtain arms for our armies from traditional sources, and on making attempt after attempt to encircle, weaken or isolate commando action by all means liable to ensure that it was restricted, as regards both extent and capacity, to the limits which would make it possible to paralyze, destroy and liquidate it in accordance with the requirements of solutions involving surrender.

The Remedy

These are the most important factors and the principal causes which led to the recent incidents and outbreaks. All other factors and causes are, in fact, only the direct or indirect manifestations, symptoms and consequences of these basic factors and causes. And there will always be a possibility of such incidents continuing or being repeated, in a form equally, or even more dangerous to the future of our cause, as long as these factors and causes continue to exist, and as long as the supreme authority and all loyal forces and powers do not take radical, decisive and rapid action to remedy this situation.

In our estimate the first step towards a decisive and radical remedy is to establish a constitutional government of national unity which enjoys the confidence and respect of the masses, and is willing and able to abide by the interests of the country and the citizen in conformity with the provisions of the constitution and the law, and to protect the rights of the country and the citizen in both word and deed, in keeping with the requirements of the current situation, the battle at hand and the highest interest of the nation, all this being embodied in clear programs and an unambiguous strategy adopted by such a government on the following main lines:

1. Respect for the letter and spirit of the constitution, with all that this implies in

the way of the true performance of the duties and responsibilities of government in conformity with the provisions of the constitution, and the prevention of any quarter or authority from exceeding its rights, prerogatives and constitutional duties.

2. Respect for civil liberties in both word and deed, with all that this implies in the way of the duty to regard freedom of opinion, assembly, expression and organization as sacred, inviolable and not to be infringed upon, and the repeal of all legislation and measures which restrict these freedoms.

3. Affirmation of and respect for the sovereignty of law and the principles of right, justice and fair dealing in all fields and transactions, the judiciary being given the widest powers to invalidate any violation or infringement of that sovereignty.

4. The adoption of an economic policy that is in conformity with the requirements of this stage and of the decisive battle of destiny, and that will make Jordan a theater of fighting and genuine and serious confrontation with the enemy.

5. The combating of regionalist, confessional, racist and tribal trends and of all factors and manifestations of division between the members of the single people.

6. The construction of state institutions on a basis of competence, integrity and loyalty, purging them of all manifestations of bribery, corruption and patronage.

7. Paying the greatest possible care and attention to the armed forces, which must be provided with all material and other resources to raise their technical and moral competence and enable them to perform their duty in the battle of liberation as completely as possible; in particular supplying them with the most modern arms, obtained from any source whatever, including the socialist countries, in the quantities required by the present stage and the battle.

8. Armed struggle, at both official and popular levels, is the only way to liberate Palestine and all the Arab territories occupied

by the Zionist enemy. Commando action must be strengthened and supported, and given every opportunity to train the people and mobilize them in commando and civil defense units. For, at the present stage, commando action is the true embodiment of the will of the people to rely on armed struggle as the way to liberation, which struggle must be developed and escalated towards all-out revolution and a people's war of liberation to be fought until victory is won over Zionist-imperialist colonialism. It is therefore necessary:

a) To support commando action and provide it with everything that can help and strengthen it, in order to ensure that it develops and expands and is in a position to perform its duties and meet its responsibilities, escalate its activities on behalf of liberation in security and freedom, and to protect itself from all interference and conspiracies.

b) To support and ensure the success of members of both the armed forces and the resistance movements, who are brothers in arms with a common goal and a common destiny, with a view to establishing mutual confidence between them on a firm basis, and to ensuring greater cooperation and cohesion between them as they advance together along the same road of battle for liberation.

c) To support all efforts being made to secure greater national unity and cohesion between the different sections of the resistance, and between them and the popular masses in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater.

d) To support all efforts being made to achieve greater discipline and a spirit of discipline in the ranks of both the army and the resistance and to correct all errors in this field in a spirit inspired by brotherhood, affection and a common goal and destiny.

e) To combat all intrigues and attempts aimed at arousing antipathies or causing divisions, or weakening mutual confidence and cohesion between the civilian population of the East and West Banks and the soldiers and commandos.

9. To make every effort and to use all resources at both domestic and Arab levels, to ensure greater cohesion between the political leadership and the armed forces, within the frameworks of both the Eastern Front and the Eastern and Western Fronts. The object of this is to create a unified Arab cordon around Israel, with a unified command, unified political and military forces and unified attitudes and planning, which will form a nucleus capable of absorbing all other Arab resources into the battle.

10. To provide every possible support to enable the people of the occupied areas and on the lines of confrontation with the enemy to hold out, and to do everything possible to defend and protect them and give them confidence against all raids, aggressions and psychological warfare.

11. To pursue a foreign policy aimed at combating and liquidating all manifestations or indications of cooperation or dealings with the colonialist and imperialist powers, headed by the United States, at political, military and economic levels, and, on the other hand, to establish the closest relations with friendly countries and peoples, particularly the socialist countries and the countries which support Arab rights in Palestine and other Arab causes.

Signed:

Sa'id al-Mufti, President of the Senate

Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, Senator

Akef al-Fayez, Deputy

Abd al-Majid Shuman, Director of the Arab Bank

Antun Ata Allah, Director of the Land Bank

Sulaiman al-Sukkar, Director of the Ahli Bank

Mitri al-Sharaiha, Chairman of the Dentists' Association

Ja'far al-Shami, Chairman of the Engineers' Association

Nizar Jardana, Chairman of the Pharmacists' Association

Khalil al-Lubani, Chairman of the Agricultural Engineers' Association

Muhammad Ali Budayr, President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce
Sulaiman al-Hadidi, Chairman of the Lawyers' Association

Marwan al-Hammud, Mayor of al-Salt

Hasan Kharis, Mayor of Irbid

Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem

Shaikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sayeh

Ibrahim Bakr

Yusuf Abu Hakima, President of the Chamber of Commerce

Kamal al-Dajani

Salah al-Anabtawi, Chairman of the Medical Association

Walid al-Khayyat

Ahmad al-Hadidi

Camille Barakat

Isam Abd al-Hadi, Chairman of the Women's Federation

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Press Interview Statements by Secretary-General Hawatmeh of the P.D.F.L.P. on the June Events in Jordan¹

end of June, 1970

We think—and the Central Committee of the Palestinian resistance adopts the same attitude as we do—that the ending of this crisis and of future crises depends on the following:

1. The dissolution and liquidation of all the private organizations recently formed by Naser ibn Jamil—the “special forces, the special intelligence networks and the special political organizations.”

2. The purging of the state organizations, in particular the army, the public security and the intelligence services, and all

extremist, reactionary and subservient elements and officers.

3. The trial of all those responsible for the crimes committed against the people, which have resulted in the killing and wounding of one thousand citizens and strugglers in the present crisis.

Only by taking these steps will it be possible to prevent the crisis becoming even graver and to control the state organizations so that they may be capable of long-term co-existence with the Palestinian resistance. If this is not done the crisis will continue, whether or not Naser ibn Jamil and Zaid ibn Shaker continue to hold their official responsibilities. They now enjoy the same powers as they did when they were at the head of the armed forces.

The hostile Israeli information media, the rightist and reactionary Arab press, and certain individual Arabs, have tried to represent the present crisis as being a crisis between the extremist wing of the reactionary regime and the leftist organizations in the Palestinian resistance. This is pure misrepresentation of the facts.

The struggle is essentially a struggle between the forces of the Palestinian revolution, however much their ideological and political positions may differ, and a reactionary regime, linked with imperialism, which acts in accordance with imperialism's plans to oppose our people's right to fight until they have completely liberated our country.

This is why Lebanese reaction, in alliance with Jordanian reaction, is fighting a constant war of attrition against the Palestinian resistance, in the hope of weakening and exhausting it, in order to make it easier to finish it off completely. And there is one maestro who guides the steps of both Lebanese and Jordanian reaction—the American maestro.

Q. You said that you expected a fourth crisis, possibly soon. When do you think it will come?

A. In view of the King's encouraging of, and provocative messages to the armed forces, of the mobilization in progress in the ranks of the Jordanian armed forces to pick

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), June 22, 1970.

the forces which are loyal to the extreme reactionary wing, and the executions and arrests that are being carried out by the special organizations attached to that wing, and the artificially fomented armed clashes for which they are responsible, we expect the crisis to recur in the course of this week or next. But we are doing all we possibly can to contain this crisis once again.

Q. It is very surprising to hear that Naser and Zaid ibn Shaker are still active and are still holding their responsibilities. If they have been relieved of their posts, how can they still be active?

A. In practice, they still constitute the military command of the Jordanian armed forces. In practice they are the ones who go to visit the sectors of the Jordanian army, who incite them, and put down mutinies. Moreover, Sharif Naser ibn Jamil was seen at the airport the day before yesterday wearing uniform. The other wing of the authorities, which officially has the military responsibility, is trying to impose its authority on the army, but the moves of Naser ibn Jamil and Zaid ibn Shaker, and the King's encouragement of them, have so far made their efforts ineffective.

Q. What role is King Hussein playing in all these incidents?

A. It can be gathered from King Hussein's message broadcast to the armed forces, in which he relieved Naser ibn Jamil and Zaid ibn Shaker of their posts; this message made it obvious that he supported Naser ibn Jamil and Zaid ibn Shaker. His internal messages, that are being distributed to the armed forces, and have not been broadcast, adopt the same attitude. Both in theory and in practice, King Hussein's attitude is sympathetic to Naser ibn Jamil and Zaid ibn Shaker, and all his messages so far have been intended to mobilize and instigate the armed forces against commando action which he describes in his message as being "an armed gang that is playing fast and loose with the country."

Q. In the next crisis will it be your aim to bring down the royalist regime?

A. Throughout this stage it has never been our aim to bring down the regime in Jordan. Our aim is absolutely clear—peaceful co-existence with good neighborly relations between us so that all guns may be aimed at the Zionist-imperialist enemy. All the organizations of the Palestinian resistance share this attitude with us.

Q. During the conference you spoke of the reactionary character of the established regimes in Lebanon and Jordan, and of their relations with American imperialism. Do you then believe that your aim is to cooperate with these reactionary regimes, and not to overthrow them?

A. I have said that our aim, and that of all the resistance organizations, is to coexist with these regimes in order to confront the Zionist enemy who is occupying our land.

Q. A joint committee, representing both the government and the resistance movement, has been formed to investigate the facts and to discover who was responsible for arousing the people. What powers has this committee been given? Can it impose penalties? And so on?

A. So far three committees have been formed to calm things down, contain the crisis and investigate all the factors that led to its breaking out.

It is perfectly clear who was responsible for this crisis—it was the extreme reactionary forces in the regime, which are in alliance with imperialism and are acting in accordance with a joint plan to destroy commando action so that it may be possible to impose the political liquidation of the problem of our country. We know that these joint provisional committees will be faced by assiduous efforts on the part of the reactionary forces in the regime to ensure that they fail in their tasks. So far they have only imposed their authority on the Palestinian resistance; so far they have not been able to do so in the case of the other party.

Q. Why has this conflict, which reached the state of bloody clashes, taken place now, rather than at any other time?

A. I think that I answered this question

earlier in the interview. The forces of imperialism are trying, in cooperation with the reactionary forces, to impose solutions involving surrender on our country and to liquidate the cause of our people. Quite recently Golda Meir announced that Israel accepts the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and when it was put to the vote in the Knesset, there was a majority of 23 votes in favor of its acceptance, 6 against and 19 abstentions. The dish of peaceful solutions intended to liquidate the cause of our people is now cooked to a turn. The Palestinian resistance is the main obstacle to these solutions. That is why attempts have been made, and will continue to be made, to liquidate the Palestinian resistance, such liquidation being regarded as the first step towards preparing for the imposition of solutions involving surrender.

Q. Does the formation of a five-member secretariat for the Central Committee of the Palestinian Resistance constitute a development towards the achievement of the national unity of all sections of the Palestinian resistance movement?

A. Certainly the formation of the Central Committee of the resistance movement, on which all the resistance organizations are represented, and the formation of a five-member secretariat to be responsible for the day-by-day military, political and mass command of all the organizations, is an effective step along the road towards the unification of all the armed and popular forces of the Palestinian resistance for the confrontation of the grave situation.

Q. a) You said at the last press conference that the principal conflict is between the forces of the Palestinian revolution and Israel, and that the secondary conflict is between the forces of the revolution themselves. To which of these conflicts did the recent events belong?

b) What is your attitude to the attitude of the following Arab capitals to the crisis: Baghdad, Tripoli, Cairo and Algiers?

A. a) We still think that the principal conflict is between the forces of the Palestinian revolution and Zionism, as represented

by the State of Israel, which is occupying our country and is in alliance with imperialism. The conflict that occurred for the third time, in the recent crisis, between the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the reactionary regime in Jordan—we are still struggling for coexistence in order to confront a common enemy—Zionism and imperialism, and for this conflict to be turned from a secondary into a primary one depends on the attitude of the regime to the Palestinian revolution. When this regime adopts an attitude based on the liquidation and massacre of the Palestinian revolution, the latter is obliged to recruit all its forces to deter it.

b) As regards the second question—what do we think of the attitudes of the Arab capitals you mentioned—we think that the Palestinian revolution and all the nationalist Arab regimes and the forces of the Arab national liberation movement are in a single rank against Zionism and imperialism.

We feel a profound revolutionary satisfaction at the favorable attitudes they adopted to us during the crisis. But at the same time we strongly criticize any attempt by any Arab capital to represent the crisis as being a crisis between the left wing of the Palestinian resistance and the regime, with the noble and patriotic forces of the Palestinian resistance having nothing to do with it—one of the capitals you mentioned has been heard describing the crisis in this way. This is an unobjective and untrue approach.

The proof that the crisis is a crisis between the Jordanian regime and imperialism and all the forces of the Palestinian revolution lies in the fact that all the organizations, from Fateh to the smallest organization in this country, have all adopted the same attitude.

Q. a) How many commandos have been arrested and summarily executed since last Thursday?

b) Some members of the army and the public security were arrested by the resistance. How did the resistance treat them?

A. a) At the moment I do not have full statistics of the numbers who have been executed since the cease-fire agreement, but

I know very well that three of our comrades were executed after their arrest.

b) As for the second part of the question, those who were arrested by the reactionary authorities were subjected to cruel and brutal tortures—you can meet a number of them. On the other hand, those who were arrested by the resistance organizations were treated as brothers, since they were blameless—especially the patriotic soldiers and officers—they were not to blame for the crisis, but were pushed into it. Far from subjecting them to any kind of torture, we had patriotic and political discussions with them, on the assumption that we are all members of a single people and a single homeland, and that we have the same enemies—Zionism and imperialism.

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Text of the Arab Four-State Committee Statement on the Agreement Reached Between the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the P.L.O.¹

Amman, July 10, 1970

The four-State committee, which was formed at the conference of the Arab Kings and Presidents in Tripoli, held meetings in Amman between 29th June and 10th July 1970. The committee was composed of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria's representative Qa'id Ahmad, the Libyan Arab Republic's representative Muhammad Najm, the UAR's representative Dr. Hasan Sabri al-Khuli, and the Sudanese Democratic Republic's representative Maj. Ma'mun Awad Abu Zayd.

The four-State committee studied the current situation with representatives of the Jordanian Government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). It became clear to the commit-

tee after the contacts that everyone agreed that the co-operation of the Arab forces was the only way to victory for the Arab nation in its fateful battle and that this was the basic condition in Jordan where the people, the valiant Jordanian Armed Forces, and the Palestine revolution forces were unified in one solid rank and formed an effective force in the battle of the Arab nation against Zionism, imperialism and colonialism. Consolidating the Palestine revolution, supporting it and providing it with all material and moral means will enable it to escalate its struggle and achieve its sacred and basic goal of full liberation. Thanks to this revolution, the personality of the Palestinian people has emerged. Their struggle has proved that armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine.

As a result of the talks conducted by the committee with the Jordanian Government authorities and representatives of the Central Committee of the PLO, the following points were agreed upon:

(1) The PLO Central Committee will be the body controlling and responsible for all fida'i organisations and their activities. The Government will contact this committee on all matters concerning fida'i action, activities, rights and responsibilities.

(2) The Central Committee commitments will be binding on all fida'i organisations, and the Government commitments to the Central Committee will apply to all organisations.

(3) Freedom and protection for fida'i action and the safety of the fida'iyyin and their right to popular and national mobilisation is guaranteed by the Government without infringement on State sovereignty.

(4) The valiant Jordanian Armed Forces, which are determinedly and firmly facing the enemy and are on the road of sacrifices, honour, and redemption of the usurped homeland, are the basic pillar of all the Arab military forces and are joined with the Resistance forces in the common struggle of the battle of steadfastness and liberation.

(5) The Palestine Resistance is a national

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3428/A/9 and A/10; reprinted by permission.

struggle force and is one of the basic requirements in our battle against aggression and for liberation; thus, it must be supported and stepped up.

Accordingly, the Government will take the following measures:

(1) Cancel all arrangements and extraordinary measures taken during the crisis.

(2) Support the armed struggle in the battle for liberation, the battle to wrest the right from the usurping enemy and do everything necessary to strengthen co-operation between the Jordanian Armed Forces and the armed struggle of the Palestine revolution forces, in word and deed, on the road to liberation.

(3) Mobilise the information media and moral support to serve the revolution's liberation and to serve the people and the armed forces.

(4) Ensure that no organisation, machinery or element will act against the Palestine revolution and national unity. The Central Committee will undertake to abide by the following principles and organisational measures which have already been issued:

(a) To prevent military demonstrations and the presence of armed fida'iyyin in public places such as cafés, hotels, cinemas, restaurants, parks, Government offices and court-rooms, with the exception of special guards for offices and leaders.

(b) All resistance vehicles must have special registration numbers and must stop at barricades whenever asked to do so. In the event of any disagreement at the barricade, the armed struggle military police officer in co-operation with the employee in charge of the barricade will deal with the matter.

(c) Since army personnel, security forces, and the fida'iyyin are the sons of this one people and brothers in arms, all should preserve each other's dignity and establish a spirit of amity among themselves.

(d) Firing in the air and training with live ammunition within cities and inhabited areas is strictly prohibited.

(e) It is not permissible to set up military bases for fida'i organisations in towns. Their popular resistance forces are excepted. The stockpiling of explosives, ammunition and heavy arms in inhabited areas is prohibited. The sites of the bases will be defined by a joint committee of the Army Chief of Staff and the Military Command of the Armed Struggle.

(f) All fida'iyyin must respect the regulations in force. Every member of the fida'iyyin who commits a crime or a civil offence against laws and regulations in force in the Kingdom will be handed over to the appropriate Jordanian authorities.

(g) No member of the army will be accepted as a member of the fida'iyyin.

It was also agreed to form a joint committee to deal with contraventions and handle whatever matters might arise within the framework of internal unity and the supreme national interest. The joint investigation committee would continue its work to define responsibilities in the recent regrettable incidents.

This statement was signed on behalf of the Jordanian Government by the premier Abd al-Mun'im ar-Rifa'i, and on behalf of the Central Committee by Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee of the PLO. It was also signed by the members of the Arab four-State committee.

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Letter from U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad Accepting the American Peace Initiative As Proposed in a Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Rogers¹

Cairo, July 22, 1970

Dear Mr Secretary of State,

I have received your message of June 19, 1970, in which you referred to the critical

¹ Egyptian News Agency text as reprinted in *New Middle East*, No. 24 (September 1970), pp. 25-26.

situation in the Middle East and said that it was in our joint interest that the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and states of the area, and expressed your readiness to do your part towards this goal. You also urged others concerned to move to seize this opportunity.

In your message you also expressed the view that the most effective means to achieve a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on November 22, 1967.

It is to be noted that we, as well as our friends foremost of whom the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have called for the necessity of endeavouring to ensure the success of the mission of Ambassador Jarring to implement the Security Council Resolution. We, together with our friends, have and are still exerting every effort to achieve this end.

The very critical situation in the Middle East is the result of the Israeli aggression and its occupation of Arab territories, and that Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands and its persistence in its aggression against Arab peoples further aggravate the situation.

The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied as a result of its aggression of June 5, 1967 is fundamental to the achievement of peace in the area. The liberation of Arab territories is not only a natural right but a national duty. This right was reaffirmed by the Charter of the United Nations to which we all adhere. This has also been reiterated in the Security Council Resolution when the Council emphasised the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and affirmed the necessity of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the area.

The people of the United Arab Republic which strive for development and a higher standard of living consider that the achievement of peace is of primary concern. War can only obstruct construction and development. Furthermore the United Arab Republic had no expansionist aims. Israel, however, is seeking expansion and annexation of Arab territories. Israeli leaders openly declared that

they waged the war for the purpose of expansion. To this day, their stated intention to annex Arab lands is reiterated in their successive declarations.

It is undoubtedly of great importance that the wish of the United States to strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and states of the area be realised. We believe that this would contribute to the consolidation of peace in the area. This could have been realised had the United States adopted a truly even-handed policy.

Furthermore, I am confident that you realise that to continue to ignore the rights of the Palestinian people who were expelled by Israel from their homeland, can in no way contribute to the achievement of peace in the area, and that to establish peace in the Middle East it is necessary to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

By the unanimous adoption of the Security Council Resolution, an opportunity for the achievement of peace in the area was provided. Israel's rejection of that resolution impeded the realisation of peace and consequently war continued. Since we have consistently urged the implementation of the Security Council Resolution, we attach great importance to your calling for the necessity of seizing this opportunity and implement the Security Council Resolution, which could have established peace had it then been implemented.

I wish to reaffirm that we still believe that peace can be established by implementing the solution adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. Since Ambassador Jarring began his mission in December 1967, we consistently stressed the importance that the parties to the conflict, as a first step, declare their acceptance of the Security Council Resolution and their readiness to implement it in all its parts.

The Government of the United Arab Republic informed Ambassador Jarring of its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution and its readiness to implement it. That position was stated more than once in several official documents. It was also declared at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Furthermore no occasion was left by the United Arab Republic without restating this binding position.

It should be noted that the United Arab Republic completely cooperated with Ambassador Jarring and has spared no effort to make his mission successful. It is also to be noted, in this respect, that on May 9, 1968, Dr Jarring delivered to me certain suggestions similar to yours contained in your message. To his suggestions I replied on the same day by reiterating the acceptance of the United Arab Republic of the Security Council Resolution and its readiness to implement it. I furthermore, responded favourably to his request and agreed to instruct the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations to meet with the Special representative of the Secretary General in order to resume his contacts in accordance with the Security Council Resolution and for the sake of its implementation. Moreover, and in the same reply, I suggested to Ambassador Jarring that he should draw up a time table for the implementation of the resolution.

For Ambassador Jarring to carry out his mission Israel should have likewise declared that it accepted the Security Council Resolution and was ready to implement it. Israel, however, refused and consequently Ambassador Jarring's efforts came to a standstill. It is therefore obvious that the responsibility for Ambassador Jarring's inability to fulfill his task, in conformity with the Security Council Resolution, falls on Israel.

France, in view of the deteriorating situation, and realising that Ambassador Jarring was not enabled to fulfill his task proposed the four power meetings to implement the Security Council Resolution and to assist the Secretary General's special representative to carry out his task. Israel, however, by its persistent opposition obstructed the four power efforts.

As for the resolution adopted by the Security Council in June 1967 calling for the cease-fire it is to be noted that, we respected it from the outset. Yet Israel never respected this resolution at any time and continued its aggression on the Suez Canal area, bombarded its cities and destroyed the economic in-

stallations.

On adopting the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 which contained peaceful settlement, the cease-fire resolution became linked with the implementation of the November 22, 1967 Resolution, a fact which we indicated in our communications to the United Nations. The refusal by Israel, however, to implement Security Council Resolution No. 242, led to the continuation of war and obstructed a peaceful settlement.

It is therefore clear that in order that Ambassador Jarring could carry out successfully his mission, Israel should declare unequivocally its acceptance and readiness to implement the Security Council Resolution.

We also believe that for Ambassador Jarring to be able to achieve quick progress in the first stage of his work, the four powers should provide him with specific directives with regard to the implementation of the articles of the Security Council Resolution and in particular the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the guarantees for peace.

We are ready to reaffirm to Ambassador Jarring our readiness to implement the Security Council Resolution in all its parts as well as designating a representative to discuss with him the implementation of the Council's resolution, and for enabling this to be achieved we are ready to accept a cease-fire for a limited period of three months, as proposed by you. We believe that the correct procedure with which this could be started, is to draw a time-table for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories. This was the point at which the previous efforts of the representative of the Secretary General were blocked, as a result of the obstacles which Israel put before him by refusing to implement Security Council Resolution No. 242.

Please accept, Mr Secretary the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed: Mahmud Riad
Minister of Foreign Affairs

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Speech by U.A.R. President Nasser to the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Arab Socialist Union National Congress on Accepting the Proposals Submitted by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers (Excerpts)¹

Cairo, July 23, 1970

Brother compatriots, on this precious day of our struggle—the day of our 23rd July revolution, the 18th anniversary of this revolution—we only need to glance between two lines on our land to know the substance of this homeland's struggle, the objective of this struggle and the forces motivating this struggle. One line is in the south across the great Nile. This is the High Dam which was completed today. Another line is in the north along the Suez Canal. This is the battle front on which the Egyptian people and Egypt's national Army are fighting their noblest, greatest and fiercest battles.

On that southern line across the Nile stands the High Dam, and next to it stands the giant power station in which the 12th turbine was switched on a few hours ago. Thus, one of the biggest hydroelectric power stations in the world was completed.

Brothers, because of the High Dam, 836,000 feddans have so far been converted from basin to perennially irrigated land. Another 850,000 feddans have been added to the cultivable area, thus triumphing over the desert. Furthermore, reclamation by means of surplus water continues non-stop, regardless of the circumstances.

With the High Dam, 10,000 million kilowatt-hours of electricity has been added to our capacity. Thus the annual Egyptian per capita share of available electricity rises to 500 kilowatt-hours compared to less than 40 kilowatt-hours the year before the revolution.

On the other line in the north, along the

Suez Canal, the Egyptian Army stands fighting, its young men setting a supreme example in patriotism and military qualities. The Egyptian Army, soldiers, officers and commands, made extraordinary efforts to rebuild itself after one of the worst circumstances ever encountered in our struggle. This Army, which the enemy thought was finished for decades to come, was able to return to the fighting with a speed that will go down in the impartial history of this period as a miracle.

Just as the sincere co-operation of the Soviet Union was a major factor in the construction of the High Dam, so the sincere co-operation of the Soviet Union enabled this Army to acquire the equipment and skill necessary for its rebuilding. The dedicated efforts of hundreds of thousands of Egyptian men and youths who had the honour of military service in this difficult period have achieved a fighting standard which never occurred to friend or enemy three years ago.

Today the Egyptian Army is fighting a battle of special significance, a battle against Israeli air superiority which was made possible and helped by the United States after the 1967 aggression. The enemy wanted the Egyptian front to remain open so that he could, with his air superiority, limit our movement.

The enemy is carrying out from 20 to 150 raids a day for long hours. The enemy air force flies over our forces. Some days, the enemy drops 1,000 tons of bombs, worth £1,000,000 sterling, on the front. The enemy has undoubtedly concentrated on air defences. His aim has been to prevent these from playing their role on the front. However, the enemy has failed to do that. The enemy recently admitted that the number of Egyptian missile batteries at the front was increasing, not decreasing, despite the fierce raids. US Phantoms have begun to fall in our territory. The Phantom pilots, the elite of the aggressive Israeli military force, are prisoners in the hands of our men.

¹ Excerpted from Nasser's speech as broadcast on Cairo Home Service and "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3439/A/2, A/6-A/7, A/8-A/19; reprinted by permission.

Brothers, the Palestine Resistance then emerged. This Resistance was able to trans-

form the Palestinians from refugees into a fighting people. Palestinian action was also able to assert itself throughout the world. Fatah, which began this action and the sacrifice for the sake of liberating the Palestinian people, and the Fatah leaders succeeded in finding great support in the Arab world. Then all the Resistance organisations succeeded in uniting in a central committee to unify action and objectives.

I say the enemy will always try to divide the Palestine Resistance and the Palestinians. So far we have noted that the Palestinian people and the Palestine Resistance have been able, by their great awareness, to foil imperialist plots.

Next I want to speak about the eastern front. The eastern front was the subject of great interest to us and the people of the Arab nation, both in the East and the West. It was also of great interest to the whole world. Everyone was saying that the eastern front needed more support and more work. Israel used to say that its aim was to weaken the eastern front because this front overshadowed Israel itself, the sensitive and difficult areas in Israel. When Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi said he would like to raise the slogan of making the battle a national rather than a regional one and said he would tour the whole Arab nation for this purpose, we encouraged these efforts.

Colonel Qadhafi's view was that the Arab nation must take common action. National action against imperialism and Zionism must be unified. There are 100 million Arabs against two and a half million Israelis. He asked, are all the 100 million Arabs actually facing the two and a half million Israelis? Colonel Qadhafi's reply was—so far no one can say that the Arab nation has mobilised itself and its efforts against the Zionist enemy and those backing him. Only the frontline States are taking action. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi said he felt that it was his great duty to unify the Arab nation. We encouraged this. We spoke about this in Tripoli at a conference. We pray to Almighty God that Colonel Qadhafi will succeed in achieving his objective of uniting the Arab nation so all the Arab States participate with all their re-

sources in the battle. Thus, we shall be able to confront Israel and the USA.

After the setback in 1967 at the Khartoum conference, a big discussion took place. There were some who said that the Arab nation could not resist but would collapse politically and economically just as it had done militarily. Its military forces would not recover. After a long discussion at this conference, we reached a decision on the need to support the States which had suffered great losses as a result of the 1967 aggression, namely Egypt and Jordan. Hence, Arab aid. With this Arab aid, we were really able to face all economic pressure.

In Egypt, for instance, we lost the revenue from the Suez Canal, which amounted to £120 million and the revenue from the Sinai oilfields, which amounted to £25 million. We also lost the coal and manganese mines, the industrial areas in the Canal Zone and the oil refinery and the fertiliser plant at the Canal. The aid has enabled us to resist the enemy economically.

We then met late last year in Rabat. The Rabat conference did not succeed as we wished, but that conference was not the beginning or end of unified Arab efforts.

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Brothers, our Arab nation's struggle cannot be separated from the rest of the world. The world contains our friends as well as the friends of our enemy. If we recall what has happened since 1967, it will be easy for us to know who our friends are and who are the friends of Israel. When we recall the friends who stood by us in our tribulation in those sordid days in 1967, we say that the first and most important friend who deserves our continuous thanks and boundless gratitude is the USSR. A letter I received on 11th June 1967 from the Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin said that we must not despair and that the USSR would help us with every means and provide us, free, the arms we had lost in the Sinai battles. That was the cornerstone in rebuilding our armed forces.

Soviet arms kept coming from the first days. Everyone in the West, in the USA and

Israel, used to say that we were finished and that there was no hope in our armed forces or in us after the June defeat. Some Israeli leaders used to say that they were waiting by the telephone for a call from Cairo or Damascus saying that the people had decided to surrender and that the Cairo or Damascus leaders would like to know the terms of surrender.

But the people resisted during those days. The Egyptians and all peoples of the Arab nation rejected defeat. But we also needed the arms to buttress our armed forces. Therefore, when we say we are grateful to the USSR, it is because, despite the enemy's statements and wishes, the USSR sent us aircraft, tanks, guns and other weapons. It also gave us great hope in steadfastness and victory, God willing.

Subsequently Israel obtained new arms after 1967. It acquired new arms from Britain and the USA. It became stronger than it had been in 1967. It became clear to us that only offsetting our 1967 losses would keep us constantly at the mercy of Israel and the USA which strengthens Israel. We discussed this matter with the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders told us they were prepared to support us militarily so that we could build a defensive army and subsequently an offensive army which will help us liberate our occupied territories.

When I speak of the Soviet Union I also say that the Soviet Union helped us with its political support, both at the UN or in the international arena, while the USA was aiding Israel and helping it stay in the occupied territories.

As I speak about the Soviet Union I also say that the Soviet Union helped us economically. When we ran short of some raw materials and when we did not have hard currency to purchase these materials on the free markets which deal in free currencies, we requested these valuable materials from the Soviet Union in accordance with the payments agreements. The Soviet Union responded to our request.

When we talk about the Soviet Union, we say that after the 1967 defeat we needed to learn. As we received modern weapons we

greatly needed the Soviet Union's help in learning how to use these weapons. Therefore, we requested experts from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union agreed to give us these. These experts are now with our armed forces units. They are working in a fraternal manner and in full co-operation with our armed forces. They do not fight but act as instructors and advisers.

Brothers, last January we were exposed to deep Israeli raids in Ma'adi, Hulwan, Abu Za'bal, Khanka, Huckstep and other areas. Every day we heard Israeli threats that they wanted to convince the Egyptian armed forces that Israel was capable of anything. They raided the armed forces using thousands of tons of explosives and bombs. But the armed forces were not convinced that Israel was able to do anything. The armed forces did not ask to surrender. Then they said in public statements published throughout the world that if the armed forces remained unconvinced they were prepared to convince the people that steadfastness and fighting were of no avail.

Israel's strategic plan to strike deep at factories began on this basis. They struck at the Abu Za'bal plant and then apologised that this was done by mistake. Then they attacked children's schools, just as they bombed the Bahr al-Baqar school. Then they said this action was not deliberate. In those days our air defences needed strengthening and reinforcing so that we could face Israel.

Israel received the Phantoms in 1969. It received 50 Phantoms and 100 Skyhawks. Why? To defend themselves or to attack us? It was clear that they obtained these aircraft in agreement with the USA so they could attack us, our economic units, cities and vital objectives.

In fact, we found out in those days that our air defences were unable to check this serious Israeli threat which also enjoyed US support. To us as a command, the matter was very hard and serious because the people had been exposed to the escalation of Israeli operations.

On 22nd January 1970—I sent a letter to the Soviet leaders in which I told them: I want to make a secret visit to Moscow to

review with you the situation we are facing and to discuss the matter—on 22nd January I went to the Soviet Union. I had requested that the visit be kept secret. We talked continuously for four days. During those days I sensed much interest on the part of the Soviet leaders—interest in the safety of the Egyptian people, in their cities and villages, in saving the Egyptian people from exposure to the enemy's raids and in ensuring Egypt's ability to defend its territory with all means. The Soviet leaders subsequently issued a decision saying that the Soviet Union would help us with all its power to defend our homeland against deep raids and threats to civilians and economic targets. They told me during my January visit that all this support we required would reach us in no more than 30 days. The Soviet Union kept its promise.

Therefore we mention them with thanks and gratitude because the USA gave Israel all the weapons of destruction it wanted and weapons required for electronic warfare: We now see the raids since last April. These are the raids the Israelis used to brag about. They used to say every day that their air forces were striking and would go on striking deep inside Egypt.

On 2nd February, after my return from the USSR, I received through the Foreign Ministry a threat from the USA that we must accept the cease-fire issued in 1967, that we should not link this resolution to the Israeli withdrawal and that if we did not accept this the deep Israeli raids against us, the towns and the economic targets would increase. This showed the complete collusion between Israel and what it demanded, and the USA.

Later, when the modern equipment arrived in Egypt we found a condition of hysteria in Israel, the USA and among the friends of Israel. They said: How could the USSR give defensive rocket units to Egypt to prevent the US-made Phantoms from launching strikes against the people and the workers? US, British and Western papers in general thought that this might disturb the balance of power in the Middle East. It was supposed under this balance that Israel should remain superior and capable of striking any locality

in Egyptian territory. No one, no magazine or paper in the USA, mentioned that Israel had 72 rocket bases for air defence and that 24 of these were Hawk missiles which had arrived in the past year.

What is the meaning of this? Has Israel the right to obtain rockets for air defence from the USA while we—who are exposed to aggression and to air raids by the Phantoms Israel received in 1969 and by Skyhawks—have no right to defend ourselves? Of course every one of us saw this and felt that plans were being designed against us so that our internal front would collapse and we would submit. These plans collapsed and steadfastness strengthened.

Brothers, when we speak about the USSR I must mention that we were there a few days ago. At that time there were many press statements by the USA and Israel. There were threats and predictions. These statements and threats did not in any way affect the atmosphere of the talks, but I found in the USSR and from the leaders of the USSR every determination that we should work with all means to regain the occupied territories.

It was said that the talks took a long time and that these talks must have foundered. The fact is that we held four sessions and understanding was complete between us and the leaders of the USSR. But the only reason the talks took a long time is what 'Al-Ahram' said—that I went to a sanatorium for a medical check because the last time I was there was 1968. The talks and the relations between us and the USSR are as they were—indeed, they are stronger than they used to be. I say to you that I returned from the Soviet Union fully satisfied with the outcome of the talks with the Soviet leaders.

When we speak about friends we must mention the socialist countries which stood at our side after 1967. These countries stood at our side politically and economically. They stood at our side in international forums. They stood at our side in every one of their international policies. They all announced their severance of relations with Israel on the principle that Israel was an aggressor and did not want to withdraw from

the occupied territories. We have always felt grateful to the socialist States for this noble attitude towards the Arab nation's just struggle to regain its territories and destroy the 1967 aggression.

When we speak about friends we must mention the non-aligned States. We must mention President Tito's and Yugoslavia's attitude when Yugoslavia announced the severance of political relations with Israel after the aggression. We must also mention that Yugoslavia stood with us politically and helped us politically in all international forums. It always called for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. President Tito's visit at the beginning of this year was an expression of the full understanding and solidarity between the two countries.

When we speak about the non-aligned States we must also mention India and the stand of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from the first day. India has no relations with Israel. India stood with us politically in all international forums. When we speak about the non-aligned States we must mention Mrs. Bandaranaike's stand after coming to power. She declared that Ceylon stands at the side of the Arab nation and that it will not continue political relations with Israel because Israel is an aggressor and refuses withdrawal.

We must also mention the African States. We mention the Tanzanian President Nyerere's stand when Tanzania declared it supported the Arab people in regaining their rights and that it requested Israel to withdraw from all the occupied territories. We also mention President Bokassa's attitude when he visited Cairo and declared that his country would work to erase the traces of aggression. We mention President Sekou Toure and Guinea, when they severed relations with Israel and declared their solidarity with the Arab nation to erase the traces of aggression.

Brothers, when we talk about Africa we must remember the Somali revolution which came to liberate Somalia and which has declared support for the Arab nation. Somalia has refused to establish any relations with Israel.

When we talk about friends and about the world, we must remember that certain coun-

tries in the western world have begun to see the picture as it really is. They have been able to disengage from Israel's propaganda, claims and attempts to appear to the world as the martyr State subjected to Arab aggression. We remember France's stand announced by President Pompidou who said that France was for peace based on justice and that, therefore, the aggressor forces must withdraw from the occupied territory. We remember Pompidou's words that France will not lift the ban on the export of arms to Israel because Israel is an aggressor and his statement that time is against Israel.

Brothers, we also remember the progressive forces in the western world which are beginning to be aware of the Palestine question and its importance and of the Palestinian people's right to their land and country and their right to fight and struggle for their freedom and for the restoration of their country which they were driven out of in 1948.

When we talk about friends we also remember that Israel cannot bear any neutral voice speaking the truth, nor can Israel's friends. They cannot accept any word of justice from any neutral person in the world. We all remember Israel's recent attack on U Thant simply because he said that the installation of Egyptian missiles on the West Bank of the Canal was a legitimate defensive act. He was attacked by the US and Israeli press.

There has been much change. We have friends and the enemy has friends. In Israel itself, there are some who believe that time is against Israel's interests. Also in Israel, where everyone danced in the streets on 9th June until morning on the assumption that we had collapsed, there are now those who wrote "See you on the list of victims at the Suez Canal". The students who left the universities or who completed their studies and were enlisted used to tell one another "See you on the list of victims at the Suez Canal."

Indeed, the situation and time are in favour of the Arabs. We have a feeling of steadfastness and are optimistic. We feel we are getting stronger every day. We feel that world public opinion, that many free men every-

where, have been able to understand the issue and expose Israel's propaganda and misinformation. They have been able to realise that the USA unconditionally supports Israel, that what is written in the USA does not advocate peace based on justice and that what the US press writes is but an expression of the US desire to see Israel occupying the greatest amount of Arab land and forcing the Arab nation to surrender.

Brothers, when we look at the situation now we must remember the demonstrations in Tel Aviv and occupied Jerusalem. I remember several of the published reports which said that Israel believed that peace was within its reach in 1967 but now found itself at a dead end. There are demonstrations in Tel Aviv and in occupied Jerusalem. There are young people who these days see the racial fanaticism in their leaders who continuously seek to impose war. There are people in Israel who never believed that the Arabs would slaughter the Jews and throw them in the sea because they remembered that the Jews lived here with us for thousands of years and had never been slaughtered or persecuted. The situation we are now in came about because Israel occupied Palestine and drove the Palestinian Arab people out of their land, denied the Palestinian people their rights and resolved to follow a policy of force to terrorise the Arab people by killing children and women.

Brother compatriots, all this should not make us forget the character and structure of the enemy and the character and ambitions of the enemy's friends. We must ask ourselves: What does the enemy want? Of course it is clear from the Israeli leaders' statements since 1967 that the enemy seeks expansion and accordingly he does not in any circumstances want to implement the Security Council resolution. The enemy has refused to implement it. When Jarring contacted us and asked us questions we answered them, but when he went to Israel and asked questions Israel refused to answer them. The Israeli leaders used to tell Jarring that Israel was willing to answer these questions at the negotiating table.

The enemy wants to expand. After 1967

the Israeli leaders made big statements. Dayan said: The 1948 borders were made by our generation—that is Dayan's generation—and the borders we reached in 1967 were made by the generation now bearing the responsibility and that the new generation must work for the restoration of all Israel. He said that as long as there was the Torah there was the land of the Torah. By the land of the Torah he means all Palestine and parts of the Arab homeland from the Nile and the Euphrates.

The Transport Minister said that Israel's borders extended from the Nile to the Euphrates and that Israel's map was the map drawn up by Herzl 70 years ago. This map starts with Damietta and goes to Iraq, taking in large parts of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This is what the enemy wants.

Since 1967 the enemy has refused to mention the word withdrawal. They used to answer questions ambiguously and say redistribution of the Israeli forces instead of withdrawal.

Eshkol, when he was Premier, told 'News-week' that he would give some towns back to the Arabs, but he was subjected to strong criticism and was forced to deny this statement.

All this indicates that Israel wants to expand at the expense of the Palestinian and Arab peoples. What does the enemy want? The enemy wants expansion at the expense of the Palestinian and Arab peoples. This is the enemy's character and we must not forget it at this stage of our struggle. What does the enemy want? The enemy does not want us to obtain any arms and wants to obtain all the arms himself. The enemy insolently wants an open sky in Egypt where his aircraft can operate in complete freedom. The enemy wants an open sky over the front at the Suez Canal. The enemy is inciting the USA against us and is joined by the US leaders who give him all the electronic and military equipment he asks for so that we cannot defend our land and our children against the Israeli raids.

The enemy is co-operating with the USA and the USA is co-operating fully with Israel.

A fortnight ago, after the bringing down

of the Israeli Phantoms, it was announced in the USA that President Nixon had decided to compensate Israel's losses with eight Phantom aircraft. It was also announced that 130 new electronic devices had been delivered to Israel to enable it to obstruct our air defence. There is a new type of war now going on for the first time in history—electronic war. They say Israel has technological superiority and that with such superiority Israel was able to win in 1967. By that they sought to cover the US collusion at the time.

Before 1967 Israel was able to get from the USA all the electronic equipment to obstruct radar and rockets, pinpoint radar positions and rocket positions, jam radio communications and so forth. It got these in 1967. They said in the press that these things were the result of Israeli skill and technology, but it later transpired that all this equipment was obtained by Israel in complete boxes from the USA.

In fact the enemy is fighting us now, relying on all the arms and equipment available in the US arsenal. The war we are now confronting is the first of the kind in the history of war because it is neither based on the conventional weapons used in the previous war, in the Korean war, nor on the way of the war in Vietnam. Naturally our land is topographically different from Vietnam. The war is mainly based on air superiority. The air war involves the use of electronic equipment which only the USA in the West and the Soviet Union in the East possess.

We stood fast despite all this equipment. We did not have any of this equipment. Little was published about electronic military equipment before 1967. In the whole world there was no warfare called electronic warfare before the present war along the Suez Canal.

Therefore the present war is complex and fierce. But despite all the US assistance, our armed forces have been able to stand fast and to find ways to confront the electronic war. Naturally, while Israel obtains this modern electronic equipment, we cannot produce it. We should obtain this equipment actually to be able to confront the electronic war equally. In 1967 we were never capable of facing the war on an equal basis. By giving

secret electronic equipment to Israel the USA helped Israel score a quick victory in the six-day war.

Brothers, while we discuss the present situation, what does the enemy want? The enemy wants to increase his arms. In 1969 they succeeded in obtaining 150 Phantoms and Skyhawks and actually succeeded in achieving air superiority. They not only brought in aircraft but they also brought in pilots. We all know there are US Jews working in Israel and holding both US and Israeli nationality. One of the captured pilots actually held US and Israeli citizenship. He arrived in Israel about eight years ago. Others arrived there before 1967 and others after 1967.

Israel now wants to strengthen and increase its air superiority. They have asked for another 125 aircraft from the USA. When Golda Meir was in the USA and met Nixon she asked for 25 Phantoms, 100 Skyhawks and other equipment. We are aware that the other equipment is being shipped daily to Israel from the USA, including self-propelled guns, tanks and all types of arms.

After the bringing down of the Phantoms it was announced in the USA, 48 hours later, that the most modern electronic equipment had been shipped to Israel to help it overcome the problems facing it in attempting to raid the Egyptian front along the Suez Canal.

Despite all this aid and despite Israel's announcement that it is deploying all means to disperse the Egyptian armed forces, prevent them from concentrating and preparing to cross the Canal, and to prevent the Egyptian armed forces training—despite this, the training programmes are going ahead. Despite this, the Egyptian armed forces are in their positions, and morale along the front is very high. During my recent visit to the front I saw a number of aircraft attacking positions while soldiers were out of the trenches talking to me and to the officers. Everyone asked me when we would cross the Canal and liberate our territory occupied by Israel.

Despite this, we were able to stand fast. We must build up our armed forces and must mobilise everything for the battle, for the battle is our big hope of overcoming this

enemy who does not understand any language but the language of force.

Brothers, we must be prepared for everything. We must be prepared. When Israel obtains 125 Phantoms and Skyhawks from the USA we must be ready to confront the electronic war. We must be prepared to confront all types of arms the USA gives Israel. At the same time, we must try with all our strength and all the pressure of the Arab nation to check the flow of modern war equipment into Israel from the USA.

We have a dual objective in this phase. We are attempting to supply ourselves with our needs for the defence of our country and for the liberation of our occupied territory. At the same time, we must expose Israeli propaganda and attempts at expansion. We must check the alarming flow of equipment into Israel.

We do not view this matter as an encroachment. Our territory was occupied. Our country has been exposed to air raids. We must obtain everything to enable us to defend our country and liberate our territory. We are not an aggressor. We seek our rights. We are facing Israeli occupation and we feel our fate is hanging in the balance. We are not invaders. Israel and the US papers say every day that Egypt is preparing to invade Israel. Crossing the Suez Canal is invading Israel. Whom are they misleading with such words? They are misleading the people who do not know that Sinai is part of Egypt. They say, nevertheless—we must give Israel arms because it is threatened by invasion. We are not invaders, but we are a liberation potential, and I mean liberation of our territory.

Everyone and all parties and people must understand this. We must announce that this nation will forsake no territory because this is beyond the power of human beings. We want to liberate all the occupied territories. We cannot forsake any of this territory. We must also vociferously announce that this nation will not concede its legitimate rights. This should be understood by all.

Brothers, I say this because we were taken by surprise when the US President Nixon stated recently that the Arabs wanted to throw Israel into the sea and that Israel nei-

ther threatened the Arabs nor wanted to throw them into the sea. In fact, that was a surprising statement. In fact, only Israeli and Zionist propaganda have said such things in the past. This is, in fact, an opportunity. I say that President Nixon must know the true facts. He must know that it is Israel which is endangering the Arabs and which has made the Arabs homeless. Israel threw 100 million Arabs [sic] into a sea of sand. It expelled them to the East Bank of Jordan and turned them into refugees.

A new note is now being struck: that is, Israelis being subjected to aggression; Israel is a martyr. Perhaps this reassures us. After 1967 there were notes of conceit and threats to strike. They said: We shall strike, the Israeli Army is invincible, this war has put an end to all wars, and the Arabs will not be able to rebuild their armed forces. They have been harping on this tune for three months: Israel is a martyr, Israel is in danger, the balance of power must not be upset and must remain in Israel's favour so Israel will not be exposed to extermination.

What, in fact, is behind all this? Behind all this is the intention to encourage Israel to continue to occupy Arab territories and launch daily raids against the Arab States. Sometimes aid raids are launched simultaneously against Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. How can these aggressive operations be reconciled with the talk that Israel is exposed to extermination and death?

As I have said, this nation will yield none of its territory. As I have said, this nation will not forsake one of its rights despite the influx of US arms and electronic gear into Israel. This nation is not out to attack or invade. It demands its occupied territories, the Palestinian people's rights and the rights of its peoples which Israel has usurped. All this must be clear to all those concerned because its consequences may be serious.

Brothers, my appeal to President Richard Nixon of the USA in my May Day speech came within the context of this logic. I then said in my appeal to President Nixon: If the USA really wants peace in the Middle East it must ask Israel to withdraw in accordance

with the Security Council resolution. We believe this is within the power of the USA whose orders Israel accepts because Israel lives at the USA's expense. That was the first request in my appeal to President Nixon of the USA. Then I told him: If this is not within the ability of the USA we are prepared to believe the USA regardless of our views. But if this is the case, we shall make one request which is certainly within the power of the USA: that the USA abstains from extending any new support to Israel while the latter occupies our territories.

I addressed this appeal to President Nixon. We addressed it fully aware of the possible consequences of the US policy's persistence in unconditional support for Israel, particularly by providing Israel with modern weapons and especially with aircraft and electronic equipment.

On 19th June we received a reply from the USA. The reply was received by the Egyptian Foreign Minister. It was sent by the US Secretary of State. I must say to you in all sincerity that we found nothing new in this reply. The reply was called a peace initiative. In fact, it is no more than a procedural process which, we think, will arrive at nothing new because of Israel's frivolous stand. Naturally, this course—in accordance with which Israel makes demands, announces that it rejects the Security Council resolution and seeks expansion—is based on the political, economic and military aid which Israel is being given by the USA.

The USA has announced that this is a peace initiative. It is clear it is nothing new. They say it is a plan to settle the issue. We believe the US initiative falls well short of settling the crisis unless, of course, there is a firm US stand on supplying Israel with modern weapons. As long as Israel obtains modern weapons and electronic gear from the USA there will be no room, even very limited room, to settle this crisis.

In fact, if the USA continues to pursue its pre and post-1967 policy, it will further expose the area in which we live to a number of dangers. The US initiative has come to us in the form of a letter sent by the US Secretary of State to the Egyptian Foreign

Minister. The US Secretary of State says in the letter: The USA submits the following proposals:

That Egypt and Israel agree to return to the cease-fire for a limited period of three months. They say Egypt and Israel, only Egypt and Israel, on the basis that Egypt was the only State which declared that the June 1967 Security Council cease-fire resolution was no longer valid. I had announced that we cannot accept the cease-fire resolution forever and that, as long as Israel does not accept the UN resolution calling for its withdrawal from the occupied territories, we cannot continue to adhere to the cease-fire resolution. Subsequently, we declared the war of attrition. The USA, therefore, suggests that Egypt and Israel should agree to return to the cease-fire resolution for a limited period. This period was set at three months.

The USA then suggested that Ambassador Jarring should resume his mission in accordance with the Security Council resolution on the basis that Egypt, Jordan and Israel should approve of:

(1) Implementation of all the provisions of the 1967 Security Council resolution by agreeing on the establishment of a just and durable peace based on the recognition by all parties of the sovereignty and safety of the territories and independence of all states; and (2) Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 conflict in accordance with Security Council resolution No. 242. A number of countries made various interpretations of Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 1967. But the preamble to the resolution stipulates that it affirms the impossibility of acquiring territory through war.

The US proposals then end with a demand that the cease-fire be observed from 1st July until 1st October.

In connection with the return of Ambassador Jarring to the area, we did not cause the Jarring mission to fail. This was brought about by our enemy, Israel, which does not want peace but seeks expansion.

In connection with the suggestion on the implementation of all the provisions of the

Security Council resolution, we have constantly requested that implementation of the Security Council resolution. We requested Ambassador Jarring to draw up a timetable for withdrawal, but the enemy, Israel, hampered the implementation of the Security Council resolution because Israel seeks neither peace nor withdrawal but expansion.

Regarding the cease-fire resolution, we were not the ones who started the shooting. This subject is being denied everywhere and no one wants to mention it. After 1967, when Israel was bombarding us in Suez and Ismailia and firing at civilians, no one said at that time that Israel had violated the cease-fire. The USA was not disturbed. No US official was disturbed.

We were not the ones who began the shooting. The fact is, it was the enemy who never observed the cease-fire, even in those difficult circumstances when we were not able to return the fire. We all know that none of the Canal towns was hit in the six-day war, not even by a single bullet, but all the Canal towns were hit when the cease-fire resolution was in force. The enemy did not observe this resolution.

The US proposals call on all parties to acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each State and for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. All this was contained in the Security Council's 1967 resolution. This is the resolution Israel has rejected and refused to implement. Jarring tried every means to implement it; then he gave up hope and returned to his post.

The Security Council resolution says: "The Security Council, expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, emphasising further that all member States in their acceptance of the UN Charter have undertaken the commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, (1) affirms that the fulfilment of the principles of the Charter requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle

East which should include the application of both the following principles: (a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict. (b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised borders free from threats or acts of force."

These are precisely the two points contained in the US proposals. The Security Council resolution says:

"(3) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution.

"(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible."

Actually, we do not know the objective of the new US initiative and the power with which the United States can influence the situation. The Phantom and Skyhawk deal recently requested by Israel has not yet been fulfilled, as President Nixon of the USA said. But will the USA cancel this deal? Will it also stop the delivery of electronic equipment to Israel? Israel rejects the Security Council resolution. Can the USA impose the Security Council resolution on Israel in every sense? Israel refuses the mere mention of the word withdrawal. Can it really guarantee the acceptance of withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the 1967 aggression?

In my comment on this, I must mention a few points. On 22nd November 1967 the resolution, which was a British initiative was submitted to the Security Council. Many efforts were exerted to make us agree to the resolution. We asked the USA, or rather the US representative at that time, Goldberg: If we agree to this resolution, will the USA

implement it or remain pro-Israel and pour cold water on the resolution? The reply we got in November 1967 was that the USA wanted us to agree to the resolution and that it would do all in its power to implement it. We accepted the Security Council resolution. I announced our acceptance of the resolution on 23rd November in the National Assembly.

What did the USA do after that? The USA gave to Israel political support. At the UN America was completely pro-Israeli. The USA encouraged Israel to reject the Security Council resolution and any talk about withdrawal. The USA encouraged and supported Israel. Even after the Security Council resolution the USA supplied Israel in 1969 with Phantoms and Skyhawks. It was clear that the supply of these aircraft to Israel was to enable it to remain strong in the air in order to continue to occupy the Arab territories it seized in 1967. The USA also supplied Israel with tanks, guns and arms.

There was also the economic support. The USA gave Israel hundreds of millions of dollars annually in the form of loans from the US Import-Export Bank, loans from US banks, aid from the US Government and donations from the US people. It became clear to us then that the USA was completely pro-Israeli and that we had no choice but to build up our forces, to continue along the path of building up our forces and the offensive army with the assistance of our friends.

Last November the plan of the Secretary of State, William Rogers, was submitted to us. We found this plan contained diverse points. We did not answer this plan. We now feel our position is stronger. We are not acting from a weak position but from a strong one. There are many factors in favour of our strong position. There are two main factors in this position. The first is the increasing ability of our armed forces to strike back. The second factor is increased Soviet political and military backing for us as a result of the sound Soviet appreciation of the fairness of our struggle and the importance of this struggle to the liberation movement in the world.

Brothers, our aim is defined and well known. The enemy's aim is not defined, although everyone knows it. It is expansion

and seizure of Arab land. Our aim is based on two points: Withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories—the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza and Sinai. The other point is the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the UN resolutions. These rights and Israel's repudiation of these rights has affected the situation in the area throughout the past 22 years.

There was a conciliation commission. This commission was required to implement the UN resolutions. The commission was and still is composed of the USA, France, and Turkey. Israel met this commission and the Arabs met this commission in 1949. Its task was to return the Palestinian people to their homeland and restoration of their rights, but the commission held only one meeting.

The enemy refuses to implement the Security Council resolution. He considers it merely an agenda for talks with us in direct negotiations. This is what we have refused and continue to refuse. But the enemy's ambitions are known. His daily conduct shows that his ambition is expansion. The fact is, it is self-evident that there will be either peace or expansion. There cannot be peace with expansion.

I have told you about the points in the message of the US Secretary of State. First point: A cease-fire between Egypt and Israel for three months. Second point: Jarring resumes his mission. He will subsequently ask the States to implement the Security Council resolution fully and in all its parts by reaching agreement to establish a just and permanent peace based on recognition by all sides of the sovereignty and integrity of the territory and independence of every State. Then Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 conflict in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

I said interpretation of this resolution appears in the preamble, which confirms the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by means of war. This means that what we have received from the USA is not new.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister yesterday sent his reply to the message he received from the US Secretary of State. He informed him

that we agreed to implementation of the Security Council resolution. The Security Council resolution means withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and restoration of the Palestinian people's rights in accordance with the UN resolutions. He informed him that it was being said that Israel wanted peace and we want war, and that we wanted to annihilate Israel or the Jews, but the real or correct situation was that, in 1967 Egypt had approved the Security Council resolution and Israel had not approved it.

The Egyptian Foreign Minister informed the US Secretary of State that there was nothing new in the proposals and that they were all included in the Security Council resolution which the USA helped not to implement because US policy was not evenhanded but aligned with Israel. The Egyptian Foreign Minister informed the US Secretary of State that we agreed to the US proposals.

The fact is, in 1967 we believed the USA and accepted the Security Council resolution. Since 1967 and as a result of US conduct we lost confidence in the USA. When we received Rogers's message last November we lost confidence in the USA.

Then Sisco, the US Assistant Secretary of State, arrived in Cairo and met me and we had a long discussion. I told him frankly we did not trust the USA and that the USA was not following a just policy but a policy aligned with Israel. Sisco said the situation was becoming very dangerous. It might require or might culminate in a confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union. We said we were not working for a confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union but that we were working: (1) To defend our land; and (2) to liberate our land.

Sisco said the crisis of confidence should not affect us and that a final opportunity should be provided for understanding.

These US proposals arrived. The fact is there is nothing new in them as far as we are concerned, and the fact is we should not have trusted the USA and should not have replied last December, which in fact we did not do. This is now an opportunity. The US President, his Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State, and US Congressmen

everywhere are saying that Israel is endangered, Israel fights the Soviet Union, Israel seeks peace and the Arabs only want war for the sake of war. It was inevitable for us to make a constructive reply and say that we had accepted all these points in 1967. This is a final opportunity. We inform the USA that we approved of its decision provided Jarring obtained his instructions and guide-lines from the Big Four States.

We have not ceased and will not cease efforts to liberate the occupied territories and to ensure the Palestinian people's right. We are acting in a very large field. We are acting through politics and war. When we decided to act through politics and war, our objective and idea was that we did not seek war for the sake of war but wanted to liberate the occupied territories. When we embark on political action, we expect it to succeed. But when political action is exposed to failure, we shall only have military action before us.

Since the first day, since 1967, we accepted the Security Council resolution. We had no armed forces. While we constantly announced our acceptance of the Security Council resolution and that we wanted to work for peace, we built up our armed forces because we sensed there could be no peace unless the enemy and those behind him felt that we had reached a degree of strength that would enable us to liberate the territories. Our move towards our objective was not restricted. Our objective lay clearly ahead of us. We had no right to forsake any of our territory.

In fact, and while announcing our approval of this US initiative which, as we have said, includes nothing new since all its provisions were included in the 1967 Security Council resolution, we shall at the same time build up our armed forces. We now have 650,000 men under arms, in December [as heard]. What I am saying is no secret. The enemy and those behind him must know we shall recruit—even if we must recruit men, women and children—to defend our country and liberate our occupied territories. We resolved in 1967 and we are still determined to liberate our occupied territories. In 1967 our armed forces budget totalled E£ 160 mil-

lion. Today our budget amounts to E£ 530 million. We are proceeding towards our objective, that is liberation of the occupied territories. Our move towards this goal is not restricted but free. It is committed to the basic principles of our struggle.

Brothers, I want to tell you in all sincerity and frankness and with a feeling of historic responsibility that, despite our efforts in the political field, we must never forget the principal fact. I spoke these words on 23rd November 1967. I am speaking them now on 23rd July 1970. We are acting politically and we must not lose sight of the major fact which we must try to apply. This fact is: What has been taken by force can only be recovered by force.

We can move in the political field as we like and as we deem fit in accordance with the continuously changing circumstances. But the final word in any conflict, and in this conflict and specifically with the enemy we are facing—Israel—will always belong to force. The enemy only understands the language of force. All his words are based on the use of force. We must be prepared to reply with force to the enemy who only understands the language of force. Our force must be above his force. We must try by every means to be superior to Israel, particularly in the air. We must pool all our resources for the battle. We must mobilise our military and economic resources. We must pool the Arab nation's resources.

President Nixon says Israel wants peace, that the Arabs want war for the sake of war, that Israel will not throw the Arabs into the sea, and that the Arabs want to throw Israel into the sea. He decided, therefore, to discuss Israel's application for arms. His Secretary of State says there is a US initiative, the points I have mentioned, submitted to Egypt, Israel and Jordan, who had accepted the Security Council resolution [sentence as heard]. Either the reply will be positive or the USA will give Israel the arms it has requested.

We say: We do not make war for the sake of war but we want to reach our objective, the liberation of all the occupied territories and the restoration of the Palestinian people's right. Israel seeks expansion. So that our

position will be clear to all the world, the US President and the US people, we say: We have accepted the US proposals submitted to us by the US Secretary of State, Rogers, because we believe these proposals include nothing new and we accepted them before. But Israel rejected all these proposals, which were included in the Security Council resolution.

We must look to the future to determine the US position. We say that if the USA continues its policy after this—that is its policy based on supplying Israel with large quantities of arms—then the situation will be grave. It will show that the USA did not want peace but wanted the Arab nation to fall under Israeli occupation and helped Israel to occupy the Arab nation's territories.

Brothers, our force must be above that of the enemy. We announce that we must be prepared to reply with force to the enemy. We are saying this. In conveying our reply to the USA, we must constantly remember and say that what has been taken by force can only be recovered by force. To reach this objective, we must be able to act and to think, armed with the greatest amount of vigilance, fully confident of and believing that we are entitled to our rights, and realising that the voice of justice is God's. This also helps us to pool all our resources for the battle. This is the primary duty of this Congress at this session. We are proceeding on our course of political action and on our course of military action. If political action succeeds, well and good. If it fails, we the Egyptian people will have only the alternative of fighting for our freedom and to liberate our territory and the occupied Arab territories. In this, we depend on ourselves, on the Arab nation, on our friends and mainly on God, Who has enabled us to stand fast all these years.

Brothers, we have passed through critical days and I say they were very critical. I cannot say now that these days have ended or that their end is imminent. But I can say that we shall stand fast, that this people will stand fast. This people will remain steadfast because they have stood fast in the worst circumstances. They remained steadfast even

when their armed forces lost all their arms. Our people have rejected defeat and are resolved to work. This is so because this people and the Arab people in the Arab homeland, this people, the Arab people and the entire Arab nation have transformed defeat into steadfastness.

God willing, the people of this nation and the Arab people will be able to transform steadfastness into liberation and victory. May God grant you success.

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Radio Interview Statements by Central Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on the Efforts Being Made To Reach a Peaceful Settlement¹

July 25, 1970

Q. The Palestinian and Arab masses are following with the greatest concern the various efforts and proposals aimed at imposing a political settlement on our people. What is your opinion of these efforts and proposals?

A. The truth lies in an extremely important point, to which we draw the attention of all our brothers. The point is that, as regards peaceful settlements, we do not recognize them. We rejected them on January 1, 1965, and we rejected them on August 26, 1967, when we resumed the activities of our forces in the occupied territories.

For us peaceful settlements can have only one meaning—surrender—because what they mean in the present situation is that there is a victor who wants his victory to ensure him permanent gains, and to force our people to sign the instrument of defeat.

How can they hope to achieve in the present situation what we rejected immediately after the defeat? For there can be no doubt that our situation now is a thousand times better than it was after the defeat. But in spite of this they now want us to agree to things

that we did not agree to immediately after the defeat. How is this possible?

The Palestinian revolution has now become strong enough to stand on its own feet, and is advancing with firm steps. Many of the features of the June defeat have been obliterated, and the Arab people have started to take a new stand as regards anything they want and that is connected with surrender and a political settlement, which we do not believe in.

When we shouldered our rifles and went up into the mountains, and declared a revolution in the occupied territories—from that moment we believed in one thing—that the one way to the liberation of those territories was armed struggle, the material of which is the will and resolution of our people, our rifles and our unshakeable belief that this land is ours and must return to us. This will not be the first time that our people has vanquished its enemies. The Mongols came and swept away the Abbasid caliphate, then they came to Ain Jalut in our land—in the same region where we are today fighting the Zionists—and they were defeated at Ain Jalut. Then came the crusaders and swept over the area, to be defeated at Hattin. And the Zionists will be defeated in the same valley, in the same land. This is our conviction.

There is an important point that every one must realize—as a liberation movement, as a revolution for liberation, we are not fighting for peaceful settlements or to win a political position. We are fighting for the liberation of the whole of this land.

Q. Does this mean, Abu Ammar, that the struggle is not restricted to the territories occupied after the disaster of June 5?

A. Our revolution existed before June 5. June 5 was an incidental factor that increased our responsibilities and the burden we have to carry. We are a movement and a revolution for the liberation of the whole of the land, every inch of it.

Q. Is this the basis of Fateh's rejection of Jarring's proposal and any kind of mediation?

A. Certainly we do not recognize Jarring or any one else. We recognize one thing

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh* (Beirut), July 26, 1970. Arafat was interviewed by the correspondent of "Sawt al-Asifa" radio.

only—we want to recover our country, and the only way to recover it is by this rifle. Victory or death lie ahead of us; we welcome either.

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Press Conference Statements by Secretary-General Habbash of the P.F.L.P. on the Front's Attitude Towards the Rogers Plan and its Acceptance by Certain Arab Governments¹

Tripoli (Lebanon), July 25, 1970

How do we regard these peace proposals involving liquidation? We see them very clearly as being an attempt to liquidate the problem, to ensure that Israel continues to exist within secure frontiers and is recognized—and for this to be achieved the resistance movement must be liquidated and massacred. This is why I want to draw attention to the gravity of the stage through which the Arab nation is now passing. For the resistance, which embodies the will of a people who for twenty years or more have lived a life of humiliation, dishonor, vagrancy, hunger, deprivation and misery in tents—all these are tangible objective facts which any man who can look at things scientifically can see for himself in our camps—the resistance movement, which represents these people, and which is now for the first time arming itself to defend these wretched people—a movement of this kind will never permit itself to be butchered. The resistance movement will be fully prepared—and this is something I want to make quite clear—to turn this part of the world into an inferno, attacking all colonialist and reactionary interests and any force that wants to destroy the hope of our people that the resistance movement will continue to exist.

Our object in holding this conference was

to make this fact clear, so that the quarters that are pushing affairs in this direction may bear the responsibility for whatever happens in this area.

As far as we are concerned, everything is perfectly clear. People who have been turned out of their land and their country, and for twenty years have known nothing but humiliation and deprivation, are entitled to take up arms and to go on fighting to their last breath, until they realize their right to liberation. What I also want to make clear, and what everyone must understand, is that from now on it will no longer be easy to attack and destroy the resistance movement, and every party and every force, whether Arab or international, must appreciate this fact.

In all previous attempts we have been victorious through the use of this weapon. I am going to speak frankly, and say that in the last six attempts we have not been victorious at military level. From the military point of view, the resistance movement still has its weak points—lack of sufficient arms, the wrong kind of arms, the level of training or civil defense, and the kind of line it follows in defending itself. But the resistance movement's basic weapon is that it is the expression of people who are bearing arms for the first time and feel that their arms are their dignity, their life, their country, and their land—their all. They can imagine how it would be if they laid down their arms, and things returned to what they were twenty years ago, when they were beaten, crushed, humiliated, imprisoned and deprived of their dignity. They remember all this, and live in a state of firm determination that they will never lay down their arms under any circumstances whatever.

This is our fundamental support, and with this force at our command we know that we can hold out, although we are aware of the nature of both the international and Arab forces that lie behind these attempts.

We know that it is a scientific fact that we are confronted with a difficult situation. We know that the balance of forces will be dif-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), August 1, 1970.

ferent from what it was in our previous battles. We know that certain forces which supported us in our battles against reaction will this time be in favor of peaceful solutions.

Q. Does the Palestinian resistance movement feel that it will come face to face with the Arab governments and the reactionary governments and overcome them in the battle of the peaceful solution? (L'Orient)

A. From the military point of view the answer is No, of course. Because however great the conflicts between the resistance movement and the progressive regimes, they will never reach the level of military confrontation, even if these nationalist regimes want a peaceful solution. (To be scientific and realistic, it is in the nature of things that they should want some kind of settlement for the problem of occupation.) We cannot conceive that, to impose a peaceful settlement, these regimes should go so far as to send their forces to the main centers of the commando organizations and support the reactionary forces in destroying the resistance movement.

It is only natural that the reactionary forces should strike at the resistance movement, and that is what they have done six times in the past. It was only natural that they should so do, and as far as we are concerned, from our view of reaction as being an inseparable part of colonialism, we can see no difference between Israel and colonialism and the reactionary forces in this part of the world. This is proved to us by events, if we are really scientific—they are hostile forces, Arab only in name—Arab in name, but they are an inseparable part of the enemy.

These Arab regimes do strike at the resistance movement with military force. In the recent events in Jordan more than one thousand children, women, young and old people were wounded. They were the victims of these forces, which, by virtue of their links, their structure and their interests are an inseparable part of the enemy—they are Israel in our midst and the supporters of colonialism.

The case of the nationalist regimes is different. As I have said, they are hostile to Israel and colonialism. The problem is that their strategy is not clear and that they have not the strategic power that would make them instruments of liberation.

For example, we believe that it will never be possible to win the battle of liberation merely by [superior] numbers of Migs, tanks or quantities of arms. We believe that the basis is the masses, and that no tactic must be adopted at the expense of the masses, their vitality, their mobilization and the ability to depend on them.

This is the problem between us and the nationalist regimes. But of course it is to be expected that there will be conflicts and clashes of some kind between the resistance movement and these regimes. This is certainly to be expected, and it will happen. These regimes will make many attempts—most of them, of course, political—to contain the resistance movement and make it act in conformity with their plans and wishes. But it is difficult to imagine that the conflict would go as far as a military clash.

Q. (Question asked in English by the correspondent of American Broadcasting) Do you think that Abdel Nasser's approval of the American proposal has harmed the Palestinian cause?

A. We must look at things with regard to their consequences in the future. What will the consequences of acceptance of the peaceful solution be? There will only be a peaceful solution if the resistance movement is crushed and the Palestinian resistance is determined not to be crushed. Should the peaceful solution reach the stage of implementation, the United Arab Republic will probably say that its acceptance of the peaceful solution was a tactical operation; if it does so, we say that it is mistaken. Because our one hope, our one weapon is the masses, and they must know the way they can achieve liberation. We must inform the masses that it is they who are to be liberated, and that they cannot be liberated until they depend on themselves and on the strategy of a people's war of liberation. If the peaceful solution reaches the stage of implementation, all the forces

that are working to achieve that peaceful solution will work to crush the resistance movement.

Q. (American Television) Does that mean that the resistance movement now feels that Abdel Nasser is its enemy?

A. Our enemy, our principal enemy, is imperialism, which is seeking a so-called peaceful solution. The United States is anxious to achieve an early peaceful solution in the Arab world. The latest proposals, as you know, were American proposals. America is anxious to achieve a so-called peaceful settlement because it knows very well that the resistance movement will make the whole of this part of the world—not only Jordan or Lebanon, but the whole of the Arab world—a second Vietnam. This is true and realistic—it is what is actually happening, and no power on earth can stop it.

We regard the nationalist regimes, including the regime of the United Arab Republic, as being, scientifically speaking, on this side of the conflict that we are engaged in—the side that is hostile to Israel, Zionism and imperialism. But as regards this particular battle, the battle of the peaceful solution, the resistance movement insists on being completely independent to decide and explain its attitude and to make its plans. And, as I have said, its attitude is against these peaceful settlements.

The resistance movement believes that its problem is Israel and imperialism. But this problem did not begin in June 1967; it began in 1948—in fact long before that, in the First World War. We now have the opportunity of continuing, and we cannot stop half way along the road. We must continue to fight, depending on our masses, for the next fifty years, if necessary, to win complete freedom.

Q. (al-Bairaq) Is it not possible that Egypt's acceptance of the American proposals was a maneuver to win over world public opinion?

A. If any one imagined that the battle of liberation would be won through world public opinion, you would be right. But our idea of the battle of liberation is that it will not be won through the sympathy of world public opinion; it will be won through our own masses, their awareness of their cause, their organization, their mobilization, their bearing arms, their reliance on themselves, their fighting day after day, inflicting slight damage on the enemy here and there, and their preparedness to offer millions of victims until victory is won. It is essential that this view of the battle should be crystallized—there will be no liberation for twenty years, there will be no liberation without sacrifice and bloodshed. All nations have achieved their basic aims in this way and in this way only. In the Second World War the U.S.S.R. sacrificed twenty million men for freedom. There is no cheap way to liberation. This is the basic principle.

If our masses, who are the base, are left in a state of perplexity, what good will that do? Take Arab public opinion at present. It may be on the threshold of living in a state of perplexity. And just as you ask me, so I ask myself—is it possible that Abdel Nasser should really accept the peaceful solution? Or is it just a matter of tactics?

If the Arab masses live in such a state of questioning and perplexity, will that mobilize them to fight the battle of liberation?

Everything is important, but it is of secondary importance compared with the importance of the masses being politically aware, organized and mobilized, and of their bearing arms in defense of their cause.

World public opinion is important, but we cannot liberate our homeland through world public opinion. And with all due respect to world public opinion, it will not be the primary factor in determining the lines of our strategy. The primary factor will be the masses.

In fact we judge things from this aspect—that the first criterion is the masses and their mobilization.

When we realize that when the masses see a girl like Laila Khalid hijacking a plane and flying it over Lydda, and defying the

enemy, they are proud and more determined than ever to fight, we believe that this is a genuine criterion for action, we believe that this kind of action is good for our cause, and we say: Certainly, world public opinion is quite important, and we shall try to make our position clear to it, we shall make every effort to increase our information activity. But even if world public opinion continues for a time to be unable to comprehend the considerations that lie behind these activities, we shall continue to engage in them, because our first criterion is the masses.

To be perfectly frank I am not only talking about world public opinion; I am going to go so far as to talk about the military aid which may be behind the acceptance of the American proposals. The June War showed that it is not just a question of numbers of planes and tanks. Of course I do not belittle the value of the technological factor and the factor of arms, but I stress that it is not fundamental. What is fundamental is the masses, people, their awareness of their cause, their discipline, their readiness to fight for this cause. After that comes a long list of things that have to be taken into consideration to enable the masses to be victorious, through all the arms it is possible to get, and all the political alliances that will bring victory closer.

This is the fundamental situation, and any attitude, any tactic that goes against this situation is mistaken.

Q. (Jeune Afrique) Will this conflict between the resistance and the United Arab Republic lead to a clash?

A. In the present stage we define the enemy camp as consisting of Israel, Zionism, imperialism and the reactionary forces in the Arab homeland. This is the fundamental conflict. Then there is a lesser conflict between the Palestinian revolution and the nationalist regimes. This is a conflict of strategies. The strategy of the resistance is based on the "people's war of liberation." For us this expression does not only mean the military aspect. The people's war of liberation is an integral picture of the masses' way of life: their political, economic and

social life, and their relations—and, of course, their way of fighting. The nationalist Arab regimes work in conformity with a different strategy; they think that by rebuilding their classical armies they can win the next round in the clash with the Israeli enemy.

We do not believe in this strategy; we cannot win our battle through such a strategy. We hope that these regimes will be made revolutionary, and change their strategy in the direction of the people's war of liberation. Then everything will be different: Damascus will not be the Damascus of today, but a Damascus on a war footing. Cairo, too, will be a Cairo on a war footing. Everything will be for the battle, men, women and children, the six or seven millions in Syria will work non-stop on the production of food and arms, by organizing themselves. We must be rid of this danger we have been living in for fifty-two years. Since the First World War the Palestinian and Arab masses have not known life as you know it in the West. We must be rid of this danger. All our previous attempts have miscarried; it is incumbent on us to follow a revolutionary course that will finally lead us to victory and freedom. This course is the strategy of the people's war of liberation which depends on the masses, mobilizes the Arab millions and provides them with political indoctrination and political organization and arms, and requires them to fight until Zionism and imperialism are crushed in Palestine and the whole of the Arab world.

Q. (L'Orient) Do you regard the governments which accept the American proposals as being hostile to their masses and to the resistance?

A. If the step taken by the Egyptian regime is a tactical one, and the peaceful solution never reaches the stage of implementation, the masses will say that the regime was forced, in one way or another, to accept the Rogers proposals. But if the peaceful solution forges ahead to implementation, by the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance, every Arab leader or government will, in the eyes of the masses, be in the ranks of the enemy.

Q. (The correspondent of Canadian Television) *Do you regard official Arab intervention in the affairs of the resistance as constituting a danger in the present stage?*

A. To a certain extent yes. We must be very cautious. For the last fifty-two years—since the Balfour Declaration—the Palestinian people have had bitter experiences. You know that the revolution of the Palestinian people in 1936 was made abortive by official Arab intervention. In 1948 official Arab intervention led to the loss of Palestine. In 1967, as you know, the battle was not with the Palestinian people, but with the more nationalist Arab regimes, and in that battle we lost what was left of Palestinian territory.

At the present moment we have every right to be extremely cautious, and to insist on our absolute independence to follow our revolutionary strategy as we believe in it. What has already happened is more than enough. There is a saying “once bitten twice shy.” But we have been bitten three times—in 1936, in 1948 and in 1967. It’s enough. Let’s depend on ourselves, on our people, on the masses of the Arab nation, and fight a battle that is absolutely clear-cut.

Q. (A.P.) *Are all the organizations of the Palestinian resistance in agreement on a unified attitude to the latest developments?*

A. As regards the peaceful solution, as far as their basic attitude is concerned, all sections of the resistance naturally agree in rejecting the peaceful solution completely. If there are any differences between sections of the resistance, they are differences on plans for confrontation. How are we to confront the affair? We, as a Popular Front, say: that from now on the masses must be confronted with all the facts, regardless of the consequences, so that they may realize the dangers that threaten them and surround their cause, so that they may rely on themselves and foil these dangers, whatever their source, and believe that, in the long run, it is through them that liberation will be achieved, not through any of the presently established Arab regimes.

Q. (A.F.P.?) *What peaceful settlement would you accept if it was offered to you?*

A. Of course that is an impossible and unrealistic hypothesis. Our reply to this hypothetical question is immediate revolutionary rejection without any hesitation. Our only way to liberation is not the way of accepting American offers, it is to destroy imperialism in this part of the world, to attack its interests and to go on fighting it until it is forced to evacuate every inch of Arab territory.

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Statement by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Attitude of the Arab Governments to the Palestine Question and the Rogers Plan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, July 25, 1970

Negotiations with Israel for the implementation of the Security Council resolution and for the recognition of Israel would mean not only the relinquishment of the Arab undertaking not to negotiate with Israel, but also the final waiving of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland, Palestine. And “withdrawal from the territories occupied during the June War” would mean incomplete Israeli withdrawal; in particular it would mean no withdrawal from Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and other territories. And restoration of the cease-fire would mean prohibiting commando activity and, consequently, a clash with the Palestinian resistance movement. This conclusion is supported by the American and Israeli attitudes, and by the proposals previously submitted by America which define the American concept of a just and lasting peace in the area.

It is clear that this American proposal is

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh* (Beirut), July 26, 1970.

really an iniquitous conspiracy whose aim is to smash the unity of Arab ranks and to undermine the Arab home front. A further aim is to strike at and liquidate the Palestinian resistance movement in particular and the Arab liberation movement in general. It is not only that the American proposal ensures that Israel would gain enormously without the Arabs gaining anything; the Israeli gains would be accompanied by grievous losses to the Arab nation.

The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, speaking in the name of the Palestinian Arab people and expressing the goals of their struggle, hereby declares the Palestinian people's rejection of the Security Council resolution, and of all formulas for its implementation, including the Rogers proposal, and affirms that no party, whether Arab or foreign, is entitled to abolish the existence of the Palestinian people, hand over their homeland to Zionism and colonialism, or be a factor in their complete and final liquidation as a people and a homeland.

The Palestinian people, who have borne arms to liberate their homeland, to return to it and exercise their right of self-determination in it, will never lay down their arms, but will continue their armed struggle until complete liberation is achieved; they will not observe the cease-fire. The Arab masses who have rallied round the Palestinian resistance are hereby called on to increase their aid and support for the Palestinian resistance, and to join it in frustrating all imperialist and Zionist conspiracies and all forces of the counter-revolution against the Arab homeland and the Arab nation, and, first and foremost, all proposals aimed at liquidating commando action and the Palestinian cause.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of Yemen Republic Council Member al-Amri to Saudi Arabia (Excerpt)¹

Jedda, July 27, 1970

In the Arab field, both sides deeply believe that the Palestine problem is the problem of every Arab and every Muslim, and that the Arab and Muslim countries should co-ordinate their efforts and gather resources in order to liberate the usurped Arab territories and the holy religious places from the yoke of treacherous Zionism. Both sides stand on the side of the Palestinian people in their just struggle to regain their stolen homeland and their stolen rights. Both sides affirm their adherence to the teachings of Islam, and firmly believe that Islam is the religion of peace and real social justice and that its teachings ensure prosperity and welfare for all mankind.

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Statement of the National Command of the Ba'th Party on the Rogers Plan (Excerpt)²

Baghdad, July 27, 1970

Struggling Arab People,

The Security Council resolution No. 242 adopted on November 22, 1967 not only stipulates Israel's withdrawal from the territories it occupied in the war of June 5, but also makes this undefined withdrawal con-

¹ Excerpted from the communiqué as broadcast on Jedda Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3442/A/8; reprinted by permission.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Iraqi News Agency*, No. 157 (Beirut), July 28, 1970.

ditional on the neighboring Arab countries recognizing the Zionist entity with secure frontiers, on their recognizing its sovereignty and its right to live with its neighbors, and on their renouncing all kinds of disputes with it.

The latest proposal prepared by American imperialism and submitted by its Secretary of State Rogers, is nothing but an American imperialist attempt to implement the aforementioned Security Council resolution in a manner best calculated to safeguard the existence of Israel and to ensure as many advantages as possible for usurping Zionism.

These two proposals in fact mean *de facto* recognition of the Zionist presence in Palestine and peaceful coexistence with it—that is to say the final relinquishment of the right of the Arab people to liberate Palestine. It also inevitably means—and probably quite explicitly—the total and decisive liquidation of the Palestinian resistance.

In herewith rejecting solutions involving surrender and liquidation, and all attempts to impose tutelage and to maneuver, the Ba'th Party, which faithfully expresses the aspirations and demands of the Arab masses for the achievement of unity, freedom and socialism, intends not only to stress its resolute basic attitude, which is epitomized in the method of revolutionary armed struggle pursued by it at all levels, official and popular, against imperialism and Zionism—the attitude which it has embodied in its struggle and in the attitudes and policy of its revolutionary authorities in the Iraqi Region. It also calls for the formation of a comprehensive Arab endurance front, consisting of the Ba'th Party itself and of all forces which reject defeatist solutions involving surrender, to constitute an impregnable barrier against the maneuvers and conspiracies that are at present being planned, and a real support for the forces of liberation.

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Text of Statement by the Joint Session of the National and Regional Commands of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party on the Plan Submitted by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers¹

Damascus, July 31, 1970

The joint session of the National and Regional Commands of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, while following very closely and with great interest the recent developments in the Palestine issue and the plans and attitudes related to it, reaffirms that the Party and the revolution in the Syrian Arab Republic reject UN Security Council Resolution No. 242 issued on 22nd November 1967 and consequently everything based on it. It particularly rejects absolutely the plan of the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, which attempts to impose surrender on the Arab nation, and it declares that armed struggle is the means, proved by the peoples' experience and contemporary revolutions, for victory against the imperialists.

The Party and the revolution clearly and firmly state that the vanguard role of the Palestine Resistance is an inseparable part of the Arab liberation and revolutionary movement. The Party and the revolution will not be lenient and will not hesitate to make decisive stands against any side or quarter attempting to prevent the Palestine revolution from discharging its struggle tasks in the battle to liberate Palestine soil from Zionist-imperialist aggression and colonialism.

The joint session of the Party's National and Regional Commands appeals to the masses of the Arab nation and its revolutionary vanguards and progressive forces in these difficult and complicated circumstances for more cohesion and unity to reinforce the steadfastness and struggle against the attempts to cordon off the Arab revolutionary movement and liquidate the Palestine revolution.

¹ Broadcast on Damascus Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3446/A/5 and A/6; reprinted by permission.

Statement Issued by the Revolution Command Council of Libya on President Qadhafi's Return from a Visit to Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus¹

Tripoli, August 4, 1970

After all sincere and arduous efforts made by the Libyan Arab Republic and after ascertaining all the facts, points of view and attitudes on the highest level in most Arab capitals concerned, the Libyan Arab Republic declares:

(1) Its absolute adherence to the view that there can be no negotiations and peace with or recognition of Israel, and no arbitrary disposal of the Palestine question.

(2) The Palestine question, in view of the serious international defiances and the resolve of the Israeli enemy to expand into the whole Arab homeland starting from the occupied territory, has become the responsibility of the whole Arab nation and all Muslims in the world. The Palestine people are only the vanguard.

(3) Those who say the Palestine question is the concern of the Palestinians alone are disclaiming their national duty.

(4) The Arab-Israeli dispute has reached such a degree as to make it impossible to achieve a peaceful solution satisfactory to all sides.

(5) The Arab strategic military position in its present form is unsound.

(6) The Libyan Arab Republic stands fully on the side of the UAR and would fight on its side if it fought.

(7) Funds and arms will continue to be provided for the Palestine resistance led by Fatah so long as it pursues the true road of liberation, fida'i action and Palestinian unity of action.

(8) A condemnation of every campaign

of slander which tries to denigrate the reputation of President Jamal Abd an-Nasir as leader of this nation and of its struggle. Denigration of him will be regarded as denigration of the reputation of the Arab nation in its contemporary history and its aspiration towards freedom, socialism and unity, because the Libyan Arab Republic does not look upon President Abd an-Nasir as an individual but as the intellectual and practical embodiment of a total Arab ideology and a humanitarian experiment which is the greatest in contemporary history.

(9) The Libyan Arab Republic salutes the struggle of the fraternal Egyptian people and appreciates their sacrifices. It also salutes their martyrs on every inch of Arab territory.

Text of Reply by Foreign Minister Atallah of Jordan to U.S. Secretary of State Rogers Concerning the U.S. Initiative in the Middle East Crisis²

Amman, August 5, 1970

To HE Mr. William Rogers, US Secretary of State. My dear Mr. Secretary of State, on 20th June the US Chargé d'Affaires in Amman handed the then Jordanian Foreign Minister, Abdal-Mun'im ar-Rifa'i, who is now the Premier, your letter including your new initiative for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. The present predicament concerning a peaceful settlement to which you referred and which we are pleased to know you are working to overcome, would not have occurred but for Israel's present obstinate attitude based on its military superiority, its continual refusal to implement the 22nd November 1967 Security Council resolution, and its refusal to withdraw from all the Arab territories it has been occupying since 5th June 1967.

¹ Broadcast on Libyan Radio in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3449/A/9 and A/10; reprinted by permission.

² Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3450/A/2 and A/3; reprinted by permission.

I have to say that the continual US support which ensures Israel's present military superiority and is inducing it to persist obstinately in its negative attitude, and Israel's policy of territorial expansion at the expense of the Arab countries round it, make Israel refuse to implement the Security Council resolution and create difficulties for Ambassador Jarring, who thus cannot proceed with his mission of implementing this resolution.

My Government has considered and given special attention to your new proposal. It transpires that this proposal is no different in its provisions from the contents of Security Council resolution No. 242. In addition, your proposal calls for certain measures to be taken with a view to implementing that resolution.

The Jordanian Government has always called for acceptance and implementation of the Security Council resolution. It has also been sincere in its dealings with the UN Secretary-General's representative, Dr. Gunnar Jarring. The Jordanian Government, in its discussions with Dr. Gunnar Jarring, has followed a positive and constructive course.

From this point of view, therefore, my Government does not find anything new to prevent it from accepting your proposal, which seeks to abide by implementation of Security Council resolution No. 242 and the resumption of Ambassador Jarring's mission of contacting the sides to implement the resolution in question. However, my Government, in its view of the Security Council resolution and in its discussions with Ambassador Jarring on implementation of that resolution, has always proceeded from two fundamental points of departure:

(1) The necessity for Israel's agreement to withdraw from all Arab territories without exception which it has been occupying since 5th June 1967 in conformity with Security Council resolution No. 242, which stipulates the inadmissibility of the gaining of territory by force of arms.

(2) Recognition of the Palestinian people's full legal rights, which have been approved and confirmed by UN resolutions, and the necessity for that people's exercise of such

rights to ensure peace based on justice and stability in the area.

That is why it is natural for my Government to continue to adhere to these two principles. We believe firmly that no progress towards a peaceful settlement will be achieved if these two principles are not completely respected.

As for respect of the cease-fire, my Government has respected and continues to respect the cease-fire resolution very carefully. Throughout the period which has elapsed since the Israeli aggression of June 1967 my country has been a target of Israeli armed aggression, attacks and raids. The many resolutions which the Security Council has issued repeatedly condemning Israel for these aggressions are true evidence that Israel is the one which has violated the cease-fire. Moreover, the tension in the military situation along the Jordanian-Israeli front is really due to Israel's continued military occupation of Arab territory, Israel's changing of landmarks in certain parts of these areas, and Israel's arbitrary measures, persecution, ill-treatment and expulsion of the Arab population from their homes. This is in addition to the bombs Israel has been dropping in its air raids on the East Bank of the Jordan river, thus causing fires, destroying villages, towns and farms, harming our economy and killing civilian and military citizens alike. This situation has made it necessary for the Palestine Resistance to fulfil its legitimate right of self-defence and resistance to occupation.

In view of the foregoing, and out of its desire to establish peace based on justice, my Government approves your proposal contained in your letter dated 20th June 1970. Please accept my esteem and respects.

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Statement of Palestinian Commando Organizations on Current Moves Aimed at "Liquidating" the Palestinian Cause¹

Amman, August 9, 1970

Sons of the Palestinian Revolution! Noble officers and men! Palestinian and Arab masses!

Now that the American proposals have been accepted, the Palestinian cause has entered the stage in which every effort will be made to ensure its effective liquidation. Measures are being taken every day to secure the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 which was aimed at liquidation. A cease-fire has been proclaimed on the Egyptian front, the Jordanian authorities have reaffirmed their adherence to the cease-fire, and steps are now being taken to start negotiations under the supervision of Dr. Jarring, between the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel for a permanent peace in the Middle East area.

At the same time the Jordanian authorities have taken a series of steps in the ranks of the armed forces in order to tighten their grip on the army and public security. The officers responsible for encircling Amman and shelling it with tank artillery in the crisis of June 7, 1970 have been brought back, while a number of officers have been expelled from the country. The authorities have also withdrawn large numbers of troops from the Ghor area and stationed them around Amman, to bring the Palestinian resistance between the fire of the forces of the Zionist-imperialist

invasion, and the pressure of the Jordanian authorities.... The Central Committee sees in these steps a clear trend towards a fourth campaign of encirclement and annihilation and the organization of a terrible and bloody massacre, in order to liquidate the Palestinian resistance and to fulfil the condition of secure frontiers for Israel. The Foreign Minister of the Jordanian government stated on August 8, 1970 that his government will recognize Israel in conformity with the Security Council resolution and with the American proposals for the recognition of the territorial existence and political independence of the State of Israel.

The Central Committee has also observed that, since the American imperialist proposals were accepted, reactionary and suspect Palestinian elements have begun to take action in the Palestinian-Jordanian theater, with the object of misleading our people and inducing them to accept political liquidation; some of these elements, who are linked with Zionism and American imperialism, are hinting at the establishment of a dwarf Palestinian state in part of the territory of Palestine, which state would certainly be under the military domination of Israel and imperialism. Sons of the Revolution! Patriotic officers and men of the Jordanian army! Masses of Palestine and the Arab nation!

All the steps that are now being taken will certainly lead to the forces of the Palestinian and Arab revolution attacking each other; the hope is that this will tear them apart and exhaust them, and fragment the forces which are opposed to imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. All this is an integral part of the scheme implicit in the American proposals to promote the conspiracy to achieve the political liquidation of our country's cause, through the recognition of Israel, and to liquidate and suppress the Palestinian revolution in order to ensure "secure frontiers for the state which was established by the colonialist-Zionist invasion of our country."

All sections represented on the Central Committee agree in seeing these measures as tangible steps towards the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

The Central Committee unambiguously

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, August 10, 1970. The statement was signed by the following organizations: The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization; the Palestinian National Assembly; the Palestine Liberation Army — the Executive Committee; the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fateh); the Vanguard of the People's War of Liberation (al-Sa'iqa); the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Arab Liberation Front; the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command); the Front for Palestinian Popular Struggle; the Arab Palestine Organization; the Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine; the Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine.

declares to the masses of our people and of the Arab nation that all sections of the Palestinian resistance reject the American proposals, the Security Council resolution, and all the measures that are at present being taken in the Arab area with a view to implementing them, from the cease-fire and the steps that are being taken towards negotiations to the political liquidation of the cause of our homeland. As the highest authority in the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in confirmation of the Palestinian National Charter, which stipulates that the Palestinian Liberation Organization shall represent the Palestinian revolution and be responsible for the popular movement, the Central Committee affirms that the Palestinian Arab people have the absolute right to decide their own future through armed struggle, and that the Palestinian Liberation Organization rejects all forms of tutelage, subservience and interference, and determines its attitude to all countries and forces on the basis of their attitudes to the Palestinian cause and the extent to which they support the Palestinian revolution.

All sections of the revolution are resolved to continue the armed struggle against the Zionist and imperialist enemy, and to prevent the Palestinian cause being liquidated through the Security Council resolution and the American proposals. They are also resolved to continue the people's revolutionary war for the total liberation of the soil of the Palestinian and Arab homeland. We demand that all sections of the Arab national liberation movement and the forces and regimes that stand by the Palestinian revolution should support our revolution, and translate their support into tangible material and political steps to make the rejection of the American proposals really effective by employing all ways and means to confront Zionism and imperialism.

To frustrate the attempts to liquidate the Palestinian cause and to inflict total and comprehensive defeat on Zionism and imperialism there must be a protracted people's war, in which the people of Palestine and the whole Arab people will be called on to make the greatest sacrifices for many years to come.

Masses of our people! Sons of the Arab nation!

The Palestinian cause is threatened with liquidation. Your revolution is in danger. Give it all possible human, material and moral support to frustrate the efforts that are being made to liquidate the Palestinian cause in favor of Zionism and colonialism.

We must make the Middle East a second Vietnam to defeat Zionism and imperialism and to liberate completely the soil of the Palestinian and Arab homeland.

All sections of the resistance reaffirm:

1. Their rejection of the Security Council resolution and the American proposals.
2. Their rejection of the cease-fire and the measures that are at present being taken to implement plans for the peaceful liquidation of the cause of Palestine.

Masses of our people! Sons of the resistance!

This statement is an affirmation of the unanimous attitude of all sections of the revolution to the political moves that are being made in the present stage with the object of liquidating the Palestinian cause and the resistance movement.

On the basis of this statement combatants of all sections of the resistance are called on to strengthen their bonds of brotherhood and increase their readiness to work as one man to frustrate the current conspiracies.

Rally round the Palestinian revolution; form a broad front against Zionism and imperialism in the Arab area!

Long live free Arab Palestine!

Long live the people's revolutionary war!

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News Conference Statements by U.A.R. National Guidance Minister Haykal on the Ninety Day Cease-Fire and the Continuation of Jarring's Mission¹

Cairo, August 12, 1970

Q. What is your comment on the reports that the talks held in Cairo between the delegations of the Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance and the UAR authorities did not lead to any positive result?

A. You know I am the Egyptian official who was talking to the representative of the central committee of the Palestine fida'iyyin. I am still trying to maintain my press identity and I do not wish to lose it. You also know I met those representatives as a friend. But why did they come to me? I was not in fact officially asked to conduct talks with them in my capacity as Minister of National Guidance.

Throughout the past period I was the liaison between Fatah and the Egyptian Government. It was I who introduced Yasir Arafat to President Jamal Abd an-Nasir three years ago. For some time I remained the liaison between the Egyptian Government and the Fatah organisation. When there was a misunderstanding between us, it was natural for me to meet them again. I believe I met them in my capacity as 'Al-Ahram' chief editor because these talks were not in fact official but were conducted in an informal atmosphere.

I do not believe that those meetings failed. Nor do I believe these meetings were held in secrecy and under a heavy guard as the BBC once said in one of its Arabic programmes. The meetings were held in my office, the 'Al-Ahram' office, and were informal. We held five or six meetings and discussed all the aspects of the problem. I do not know how failure or success can be determined in this case, but I believe our sitting together and talking in an atmosphere of friendship and cordiality about the misunderstanding be-

tween us—and you know this was a very important matter—was in itself a success because at least they learnt our point of view and we learnt theirs.

Apparently, they were surprised by the way we accepted the US proposal. We accepted the proposal and tried to keep this matter secret because we believed we should not miss this opportunity. If we look at the Rogers plan—and that is what I said to them—I do not believe that this plan is for peace. I do not believe it will lead to signing a peace treaty between us and the Israelis as some people say it will.

You know that the Rogers plan only includes two things: firstly a cease-fire for 90 days. I believe, from our point of view, that this is a privilege. The cease-fire is limited to 90 days. This means that, during the cease-fire period, Jarring will have an opportunity to revive his mission and to resume his activities he was involved in before he abandoned his mission or before he suspended his efforts to implement Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22nd November 1967. These are the only two things contained in Rogers's plan and nothing more.

We have continuously supported the Security Council resolution. We accepted it and during all this time we thought it could lead to a solution to the Middle East crisis if all its provisions were applied. Then, if we were given an opportunity, and the US Government—which completely disregarded the Security Council resolution for a long time—has come forward and said it is prepared to support another attempt by Dr. Jarring to implement the resolution, I see no reason for our rejection.

If the proposals say the cease-fire will last only 90 days—instead of the unconditional cease-fire which we accepted in June 1967, which the Syrians and Jordanians accepted, and by which the Iraqis have abided—I see no reason for us not to give Dr. Jarring an opportunity to renew his efforts since this is supported by the US Government; that is, if the said Government is actually ready to use its influence.

Therefore, we believed, as I said, that this is an opportunity since this is happening for

¹ Broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3456/A/5-A/10; reprinted by permission.

the first time. For a long time the US policy has been based on completely disregarding the Security Council resolution on the Middle East problem. The US Government, as you know, used to listen to Israel's advice which said: Leave the Arabs alone and they will come on their knees to accept much less than the Security Council resolution. In fact, during all that time and for three years the US Government said nothing about the Security Council resolution. It is clear there are important factors that prompted the US Government to make the initiative.

If I were to speak from the Egyptian point of view, I would say there were three factors. The first of these factors is that the Israelis have always been under the influence of the idea of forcing, by various means, the Egyptians to submit. They attempted it after the war but did not succeed. As you know, they attempted it by raids and helicopter operations against Naj Hammadi. They attempted it by attacking the Red Sea coast. With the beginning of this year, they tried new tactics: deep raids. In fact, none of these efforts have shaken the Egyptian people or the Egyptian Government's confidence in steadfastness and resistance.

The second factor is the rebuilding of the Egyptian Army, which has been fruitful. I believe the Egyptian Army the Israelis are now facing is certainly not, in various aspects, the Egyptian Army they faced in 1967. I shall not go into details on the subject. For example, if we consider the recent crossing operation we carried out, or the effectiveness of the Egyptian artillery, or the effectiveness of our air defences, or at least the enormous improvement which has been made in this field, the rebuilding of the Egyptian Army has convinced the Israelis of the futility of their ideas.

Add to this the Egyptian people's and Government's determination to stand fast. The Israelis have found the Arab nation's people actually standing fast against the challenge. They will not kneel. We refused to kneel in 1967. We shall not do so after three years, when our military situation has completely changed and our international situation has changed.

The third factor, which played a most important role, is the increased Soviet aid. I believe the increased Soviet aid to Egypt drew the US Government's attention for the first time to the fact that the conflict was not merely local and could be set aside.

We are living in an important area in the heart of the world. It cannot be ignored until it yields to what the United States or the Israelis desire. Therefore, I believe there are positive elements and pressures that actually prompted the US Government to make this initiative. Therefore, I do not believe the initiative was a grant or a donation by Mr. Rogers. I believe it was the outcome of many pressures by Egypt and world forces friendly to Egypt. Therefore, when the initiative came we believed it was an opportunity which should not be missed.

As you know, we informed a number of the Arab States that we had received an initiative from Mr. Rogers. We did not ask these States to vote on this because the initiative was based on the Security Council resolution. We had to consult those who accepted the Security Council resolution which we too accepted.

Nevertheless, we accept the Palestine Resistance's stand based on rejection of the Security Council resolution since the resolution is inadequate in relation to what it aspires to. We accept Syria's rejection of the Security Council resolution, for one reason or another, and we accept Iraq's decision, for one reason or another, not to accept the resolution. We have, therefore, held comprehensive contacts with the Governments which have accepted the Security Council resolution and asked for their views.

Since the Tripoli meeting, many of our friends knew we were about to accept the initiative because it caused us to lose nothing. On the contrary, I believe it added a number of things to our position and for the first time linked the cease-fire and the Security Council resolutions. We have been fruitlessly asking for some sort of a connection between the two Security Council resolutions issued in 1967, the cease-fire resolution and the 22nd November resolution. The Israelis have been on the cease-fire line and have been

happy about it, so why should they move from there? They have had no interest in linking the two resolutions. But there have been strong reasons compelling us to connect the two resolutions. I believe this has been achieved and, as I have already stated, we have found that we shall lose nothing.

When Sisco came to Cairo and met President Jamal Abd an-Nasir, he said to the President: Try us. After that the President addressed his appeal to President Nixon. The US initiative then followed and we believe there is a relation between what Sisco said to President Nasir—please try us for the first and last time—and the appeal President Abd an-Nasir addressed to President Nixon and the recent initiative.

In our opinion, there is nothing to lose and as the President has often said: We shall not fight for the sake of war itself. If we find a means enabling us to liberate all the territories occupied after 1967, we must not let it go by. Why should we let the West Bank inhabitants suffer what they are suffering. Why should we let the Gaza inhabitants continue to suffer what they are now suffering? Why should we give the Israelis time to implement their plans to change the character of the occupied territories? Therefore we found this was an opportunity which we had to exploit, and we did.

It is clear that we expected certain people to be unhappy about it but I am confident there are many who have been really happy about it. I mean specifically the Palestinian people. Do you know that all the reports and messages we receive from the occupied territories, from Gaza, from the West Bank and everywhere in the occupied territory, support Egypt's position? They all express absolute confidence in the measures we have adopted and the policy we have decided on, which we have begun implementing and which is being tested. It may be surprising, but the support from the occupied territories is full and sweeping.

Please allow me to go back to the beginning of this discussion. We were talking about the delegations of the fida'i organisations. I met them as a friend, as I told you. We talked and I simply explained to them that our at-

titude did not oppose Palestine Resistance action.

You know that, despite our acceptance of the Rogers plan, we are still very far from peace. The proposals are not a solution to the problem. We are a long way from peace and I do not know where it can be found. If there is a way to peace I wish someone would tell me so that we can find it.

The Palestine Resistance operated in cease-fire circumstances. If you remember, their greatest confrontation with the Israelis, the Karamah battle, was fought when we and Jordan were observing the cease-fire resolution. At that time President Abd an-Nasir had not declared the war of attrition on Israel. While the cease-fire resolution was implemented on the Egyptian front, the Palestine Resistance did whatever it considered necessary.

Therefore, we believe our acceptance of the Rogers initiative does not constitute anything new concerning Palestine Resistance action. They have the absolute right to continue doing whatever they want to do. As you know, there is no trusteeship on any of their activities. They can go ahead and act. We only opposed one thing—they have no right for example to attack those who have accepted the Rogers plan. We informed them that we had accepted the cease-fire but we did not ask them to accept a cease-fire for 90 days.

The Iraqi Army has accepted a cease-fire since 8th June. We accepted a cease-fire on the Egyptian front but we have not placed any restrictions on any group or any Arab Government willing to open fire. This, as you know, is a question of desire, luxury and rights which we leave entirely to the party concerned.

The cease-fire is centred on the Egyptian front because the only fighting that has taken place has been on this front since President Abd an-Nasir proclaimed the war of attrition. The other Arab fronts have been calm and all the Arab armies have respected the cease-fire line. These armies continue to respect the cease-fire line. Therefore, we are surprised that those respecting the permanent cease-fire are objecting to Egypt's acceptance of a 90-day cease-fire.

We have accepted the US initiative because it links the Security Council resolution of June 1967 on the cease-fire and Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November 1967. It is clear that we have told our friends and brothers in the ranks of the Resistance all this and more. It is clear that they are free to handle the matter in the way they desire. We have informed them of all we have, and we have listened to everything they have said.

Regarding the question of broadcasts, this has actually been painful to me because, as I told you, I was the liaison between Fatah and the Egyptian Government. I believe I contributed to giving them radio facilities. Following our acceptance of the Rogers plan, they began to attack us over these radios. They are absolutely free to reject the Rogers plan because it is based on the Security Council resolution which they had previously rejected. They are completely free to do so. But we do not believe they have the right at any time, yesterday, or tomorrow, to attack the Egyptian Government because it has accepted the plan.

We always say to those in the Arab world attacking our attitude: If you are displeased with our action, please show us another way. If you are displeased with the way we are fighting, let us see how the battle should be fought. If you are displeased with the way we are directing our political activity, please show us what the political action should be. As you know, it is very simple for someone to sit and give advice to others and tell them how to fight their own battle and how to manage their foreign policy, particularly if he is not ready to fight or incapable of making any positive move on the political stage.

[Asked what had been decided about the Palestinians should the Rogers plan be implemented and what their fate would be, he answered:]

The Rogers plan, as I have told you, has two parts: the special procedures for a cease-fire on the Egyptian front for 90 days, and the mandate given by the big-four Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council to Dr. Jarring to attempt to draft details of the implementation of the Security Council resolution. The Rogers plan means

a return to the implementation of the Security Council resolution. This resolution includes two things: withdrawal, and the Palestinian people's rights as we see them and believe in them.

However, there is another question from you whether we shall sign a peace treaty. We are still at the beginning of the road. The dreams of peace, as you know, are still very distant. I cannot see now at what point these will be within our grasp. However, let us assume that the Security Council resolution is justly implemented and let us assume the withdrawal from the territory occupied in 1967 takes place. We shall concentrate on this point.

Once again I say it is clear from the preamble of the resolution that no one has the right to seize territory by military force. The resolution means complete withdrawal from all territory occupied in 1967. This was stated by President Pompidou himself a few days ago. We shall strongly insist on this. That is our position. It means withdrawal from Sinai, Golan, Gaza, the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem. That is our position which we shall not change. We believe that, in this, we are relying on the letter and spirit of the UN resolution. If it is implemented, the second part of the Security Council resolution concerns the Palestinian people's rights.

I wonder why all this uproar was raised over this question. Have the Palestinian people's rights been ignored? When we reach this part of the resolution, I believe the Palestinians will have their say in this respect because no one will decide anything about them in their absence.

Therefore, I do not believe anything will happen if the Rogers plan is implemented. The plan is actually being implemented now. The cease-fire is in force. Dr. Jarring has received his directives from the four Powers. Thus, the US plan is being fully implemented. Nothing has happened to the Palestinians and nothing will happen to them.

The Security Council resolution ensures withdrawal and guarantees the Palestinian people's rights. Lack of acknowledgement of the Palestinian people's rights has been the stumbling block of the problem throughout

these years because the Palestinian people's rights have continually been ignored.

[Answering another question about enforcement of the cease-fire, he said:] I can say that the cease-fire has been observed to a great degree so far. An incident took place three days ago when they fired three rounds at an Egyptian soldier who was near one of our positions in the Suez Canal area. Luckily, he was not hit. As far as I know, that is the only violation so far of the cease-fire.

[Asked who was observing the cease-fire, he replied:] I am not in a position allowing me to go into details on this. I believe there are certain arrangements made by the US Government since that Government proposed cease-fire arrangements. Following our approval of them, they followed them up and expedited implementation of the cease-fire measures. I do not find it my right to speak about these arrangements, but I believe that since the US Administration took upon itself a special responsibility in arranging the cease-fire—I believe we informed the US Administration of the cease-fire violation.

Regarding Dr. Muhammad Hasan az-Zayyat's mission in New York, I wish to clarify this point. I have noticed in the last few days that there has been talk about Dr. Zayyat's participation in negotiations in New York. I state that there are no negotiations in New York. Dr. Zayyat will adhere to the specific role assigned him, and he has clear instructions. He will confine his activity to contacting Dr. Jarring alone. This means that what is taking place now is a resumption of Dr. Jarring's activities before he suspended his mission because of lack of co-operation from the Israelis and lack of adequate support from the big-four Powers. However, he is now resuming his mission, using the same methods as before. He meets Egyptians separately and then meets others.

[Haykal stressed that there were no negotiations being held in New York and that the instructions given to Dr. Zayyat were restricted to contacts, discussions and meetings with Dr. Jarring. This was the whole matter.]

Q. What is the likelihood of direct negotiations with the Israelis? Do you believe you can sit face

to face with them?

A. I do not believe we shall meet the Israelis. They are occupying our territory. How can we sit down together with them and talk to them, even if the talk is about withdrawal? We believe the Security Council resolution contains all the necessary elements.

Q. What is your opinion of the insistence by the Israeli Premier on direct negotiations?

A. The Israelis can say whatever they like. The problem with the Israelis is that they have imprisoned themselves within a certain frame of mind resulting from their military victory, but at the same time they do not realise that the military victory has not produced any fruit. You know they won a military victory and I am not prepared to argue about that. The military victory, however, has not achieved its political goal and is therefore a futile victory.

They cannot impose their will on us. They do not have the power to do so. Therefore, Golda Meir can keep waiting for ever and saying: We shall not withdraw unless they sit down with us round a negotiation table.

Q. When will the UAR stop jamming the BBC Arabic service?

A. Fundamentally, I do not believe in a closed society, and you may have read what I have written in this respect. By its nature, this country cannot be a closed society. From the geographical point of view and from the point of view of its culture and position and the character of its people, this country cannot be a closed society. Therefore, I wholeheartedly support the removal of all the barriers. But I believe and I say this with utter frankness, that the BBC Arabic service was established for a specific purpose. It is not a mere luxury and not an instrument financed by the British Government to serve the Arab people. It was established for a political purpose. Is that not true? I have listened to it and I have noticed that it behaves strangely. I do not blame this service because it is only an instrument to achieve a specific policy.

[Haykal gave an example of the falsifica-

tions broadcast by the service. It described the US initiative as the Rogers proposals and then the peace proposals and finally as the plan for peace and settlement between the Arabs and Israel.] This service suddenly discovered recently that we were the only ones who had stopped firing while others were continuing the shooting. This service indicates a line of policy hostile to Egypt. Therefore, if the BBC Arabic service is an instrument for a specific policy and if I believe that policy is hostile to my country, I must prepare myself with all the resources and means to counter all the lies and propaganda it broadcasts against us. When we achieve this, we shall stop jamming. I believe that what we are doing at present is a perfectly normal thing.

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Communiqué Issued by the Foreign Ministry of Algeria on the Arrest and Detention of Two Algerian Officials by Israel¹

Algiers, August 15, 1970

It appears from news agency reports that the provocation resulting from the arrest and detention of brother Jallul Khatib, official of the Permanent Committee for the Study, Development, Organisation and Planning of the Suburbs of Algiers, and Ali Bin Aziz, by the Israeli authorities, is being accompanied by a type of deal which Algeria will not accept at all. The UN and all its organisations should intervene urgently and firmly to obtain from the Israeli authorities complete respect for the principles governing the safety of passengers and international air navigation. It is the duty of all world organisations and those responsible for civil airlines, especially the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Air Transport Association and the International Fede-

ration of Air Line Pilots' Associations to take the necessary measures without any delay to end the serious danger with which the Tel Aviv authorities are threatening civil air transport in the light of this incident.

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Address by President Boumedienne of Algeria to the Algerian Forces Returned from the Suez Front Explaining the Reasons for Their Withdrawal (Excerpts)²

Oran, August 24, 1970

If, just recently, since the cease-fire and the acceptance of the Rogers Plan have been announced, we have decided to bring you back, this is because for you to be on the Canal on the first line of the battle is now inconsistent with the policy of your country, your homeland and your people. For we could not refuse the cease-fire, and at the same time leave you in the trenches being burnt up by the sun four thousand kilometers from the capital of your country—this was impossible. So we had to take this decision to bring you back to your homeland, because for you to be on the Canal at a time when negotiations are in progress on the American proposal is inconsistent with our policy. This is the meaning of the decision, and this is the only explanation of it, nor must the decisions or the attitudes of the Algerian people be misinterpreted, because the times we are living in do not permit us, nor do we permit ourselves, to enter into arguments. What we want to emphasize is that our country has performed its duty and that Algeria, in addition to the sacrifices it made in the War of Liberation, now has new victims, new widows, orphans and disabled persons, and not for a narrow restricted Algerian cause, but for a cause in which the whole Arab nation is involved.

These matters had to be raised, because

¹ Broadcast on Algiers Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3459/A/2; reprinted by permission.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Sha'b* (Algiers), August 25, 1970.

for more than a year—for nearly two years, in fact, I am sorry to say that there have been rumors in the East to the effect that Algeria is fanatical and extremist in its attitude, and that it talks and does not do its duty. What is even more dangerous than this, it has been said that Algeria has made no sacrifices for the Arab cause. . . . Let me be frank on this point, brother soldiers, and say that if, as authorities and officials, we do allow criticism to be directed against our actions, if we allow our brothers to pass judgement, whether positive or negative, on our political attitudes, we shall never allow any one, however great his status in his own country, to insult the sacrifices we have made, either directly or indirectly.

We do not mind being criticized, we do not mind our country's policies being criticized, we do not mind what is said about Algeria, as long as it is not said that Algeria, which has suffered so much, has not done its duty. We can accept everything except that those who have fallen for this country should be insulted.

This we can never accept, from any quarter or any individual.

These, brothers, are some of the facts. Algeria's attitude has always been in conformity with its policy, and we shall never work in any direction but this, because we have not handed over our affairs to those who are greater than we are, and we have refused to hand over the control of our destiny to any great power or powers. From the start we have refused to hand over the control of our affairs to others, so that they might negotiate on our behalf and reach solutions for us. And today we ask: When has American imperialism ever had good intentions towards the Arabs?

In the same way we acknowledge that every sister Arab country is entitled to do what it likes in its own territory, to do as it likes within the limits of its national sovereignty, because this is its right. It is not for us to interfere in the affairs of brothers and members of the family, but we are entitled to say on behalf of Algeria and the Algerian

revolution that no one, no Arab head of state and no Arab official, has the right to deal with the Palestinian cause in such a way that the Palestinian people have to pay the price of the 1967 defeat—that price being the rights of the Palestinian people.

I say this and emphasize it as strongly as I can, because no Arab individual and no Arab official has the right to deal with the Palestinian cause. We say this because we have no inferiority complex as regards the Palestinian cause. We did not come to power because of the Palestinian problem, and we have never used the Palestinian problem for the purpose of building a party or achieving national goals. What links us, thank God, to the Palestinian problem is the struggle and our faith in the future of this cause and the rights of the Palestinian people. The revolutionary command of this country has announced that we unconditionally support the Palestinian cause, that we unreservedly support the Palestinian resistance, and that we support the aims of the Palestinian resistance even though we are not in agreement with many Arab countries, close though they are to us in goals, in struggle and in destiny.

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Text of the Resolutions of the Emergency Session of the Palestinian National Assembly¹

Amman, August 28, 1970

I. Referring to its previous resolutions, adopted at its fourth, fifth and sixth sessions, on rejection of Security Council resolution no. 242 of November 1967—resolutions in which the Assembly declared and affirmed its rejection of the said resolution and set out in detail the reason for this rejection; and in which the Assembly declared and affirmed that the liberation of Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories could only be

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, August 29, 1970.

achieved through armed struggle and a long-term people's war;

The Palestinian National Assembly today declares its unequivocal rejection of and resolute opposition to the American conspiracy known as the Rogers Plan. It thereby confirms all the resolutions on this subject recently adopted by the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, whether these are related to rejection of Security Council resolution no. 242 or to the Rogers Plan and all it involves in the way of a cease-fire and the start of negotiations with the occupying imperialist-Zionist enemy.

In the view of the National Assembly the American imperialist proposals involve:

a. The cession, for the first time in Islamic and Arab history, of a part of Arab Palestinian territory to a usurping occupier.

b. Recognition of the legitimacy of the enemy's occupation, surrender to the Zionist-imperialist oppression that has been inflicted on the people of Palestine, and perpetuation of the presence of this enemy in the body of the Arab homeland.

c. The liquidation of the Palestinian entity, the problem of the people of Palestine being once more regarded as being a problem of refugees, and all Palestinian aspirations to revolution and liberation being constrained, so that any talk of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine would be devoid of all national significance at both Palestinian and Arab levels.

d. The strengthening and expansion of imperialist influence and its exploitation throughout the whole of the Arab homeland. The door would be opened for world Zionism and Israel to implement their expansionist programs for the creation of a Greater Israel as a major industrial state constituting a base for Zionist and American capitalism in the Middle East. This would make the area a monopoly market, thereby killing all Arab initiative in the field of industrialization and perpetuating the state of backwardness and fragmentation in the area.

II. In this historic, critical and decisive

stage, during which all those quarters and organizations which conspire against and are hostile to our people and their cause are trying to give prominence to certain elements with suspect affiliations, on the pretext that they represent the people of Palestine, so that they may later be associated with surrender and settlements behind the back of the Palestinian armed resistance movement, the National Assembly declares:

a. That the Palestinian armed resistance movement, as represented by the Palestinian National Assembly and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Movement, and organically linked as it is with the national movement of the masses in Jordan, inasmuch as the Palestinian-Jordanian theater is a single theater of struggle, is the sole representative of the people of Palestine, on the strength of its natural right to be the revolution which expresses the authentic hopes and aspirations of our people to the total liberation of the soil of the homeland.

b. On the basis of the above, anyone who tries to speak on behalf of the people of Palestine or fraudulently claims to represent their command and their will, far from acting in accordance with their will, is a traitor to their cause and their revolution for liberation and deserves the severest penalties. This is to ensure the unity and continuation of our revolution for liberation and to protect our cause from the dangers constituted by those who want to tamper with it or liquidate it.

c. The bogus calls that have recently been launched in connection with the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination are no more than a desperate attempt to induce a group of weak-minded persons, whose affiliations are only too well known, to engage in one form or another of activity which will be held against the Palestinian people, in a spurious attempt to suggest that they have taken part, or are prepared to take part, in the surrender settlement.

Scientifically speaking, self-determination at this stage can only mean one thing: the choice between surrender and the liquidation of the problem on the one hand, and con-

tinued struggle for national liberation on the other. Our people have chosen the course of a people's national war as the only way in which their national aspirations can be realized.

d. Historical, economic, social and political factors all assert the unity of the people of the Jordanian-Palestinian theater. This is why our people reject imperialist and reactionary conspiracies aimed at smashing the unity of the people, their land and their destiny. They also emphatically refuse to accept that the country should be partitioned into petty states, one Palestinian, the other Jordanian, in an attempt to seduce the people of Palestine, to push through settlements involving liquidation and to establish petty states to be used by colonialism to strike at the Palestinian revolutionary movement and to act as a safety valve for Israel.

III. The Palestinian National Assembly affirms that, at this decisive stage of the struggle, what is required of the people of Palestine and the Arab people is more than a mere declaration of their rejection of solutions involving surrender and of American imperialist conspiracies aimed at liquidation. They must draw up and implement practical plans for struggle to frustrate all colonialist schemes and projects aimed at liquidation, and to protect the armed revolution and ensure that it continues. The Assembly also affirms that it is in the Jordanian theater, by virtue of its political, national and social characteristics, that conditions are most favorable for launching the operation of frustrating solutions involving liquidation. The Palestinian National Assembly therefore resolves the following:

a. That unity of command and unity of action in struggle for all sections of the Palestinian armed resistance is a vital and fundamental precondition for success in frustrating plans and projects for liquidation. It is therefore necessary to increase the powers of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and all the commands and organizations which are factors in the unification of all sections of the Palestinian

armed resistance. This applies in particular to the military command, which must become capable of controlling and commanding the armed forces of all the organizations and deploying them effectively in accordance with a central plan.

b. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, inasmuch as it constitutes a revolutionary command for our people, must take all necessary steps and measures to prevent the continuation of the negotiations now in progress with the enemy within the framework of the plans and projects involving liquidation. It must take these steps in the light of the fact that the Jordanian-Palestinian theater is a single theater of struggle in which it is totally unacceptable that any authority should be permitted to deal with our cause and our future contrary to the wishes and real aspirations of our peoples. The Central Committee must also make every effort to turn the whole of the Jordanian-Palestinian theater into a fortress for the over-all popular revolution, in which the armed forces of the popular revolution can join with the soldiers in ensuring the continuation of popular combat for the total liberation of Palestinian and Arab occupied territories, and the mobilization of all Arab resources for the achievement of this objective.

c. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization must take all effective steps and measures, both locally in Jordan and within the framework of the Arab world as a whole, to protect continued armed struggle against the enemy, so as to protect the forces of the popular revolution from the conspiracies and the moves that are at present being made, at both military and non-military levels, with the object of striking at and liquidating the Palestinian armed resistance movement. In this field it is not only the right, but also the duty of the Central Committee not to hesitate, waver or delay in initiating action to frustrate all the conspiracies and unconcealed preparations that are now in progress.

d. As far as our people in the East Bank

are concerned, the surrender solution means the destruction of all the gains people have seized through their struggle and sacrifices in the last three years. Its inevitable result will be that the masses will be deprived of their arms, and their right to freedom of assembly, publication, expression, demonstration and political affiliation, that there will be a return to the era of black terror to which they were so long subjected before June 1967, and to which hundreds of them fell victims.

e. In the field of Arab action aimed at frustrating solutions involving liquidation and at protecting the Palestinian armed resistance movement and ensuring that it continues, the Palestinian National Assembly resolves:

1. That the Palestinian armed resistance, inasmuch as it provides the Arab people with a new impulse towards revolution, liberation, union and progress, should today, and through this Assembly, take action to establish organic organizational links with all Arab popular movements and bodies that have adopted the principle of rejection of solutions involving liquidation. A start should be made with those that are attending this Assembly with us, in such a way as to ensure that the meetings of this Assembly may be an important turning point that will ensure that this Palestinian revolution acquires its true national and popular dimensions.

In this field it is not enough that the Arab popular progressive movements should merely be movements which support the Palestinian revolution; on the contrary, we must all fuse in a single Arab popular revolutionary front which regards armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine as the first item on its program for struggle.

The Assembly therefore charges the Central Committee to take action to form an Arab popular command body which will embody the activity of the Arab people and lead it in its struggle against imperialism, Zionism and agents.

2. In order to mobilize all our revolutionary resources to ensure that surrender solutions are frustrated and that our armed struggle against the occupying enemy is escalated,

the National Assembly calls on the Arab countries concerned to release the Palestine Liberation Army and place it at the disposal of the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, so that the latter may perform its role of directing and deploying this army and moving it to the localities where it ought to be, especially in Jordan, to enable it to play the combatant role that is required of it.

3. To call on Arab regimes which have announced their rejection of the American initiative to give expression to their attitude in direct support for the resistance and for its freedom of action in all fields.

4. To call on all anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist Arab countries to provide effective support for the forces of the armed Palestinian revolution and to pay such sums as they have undertaken to contribute to the Palestinian National Fund.

5. To call on the Arab people in all regions to engage in effective struggle against colonialist interests and positions and against the agents of colonialism and imperialism, because in our view the struggle against imperialism in the Arab countries provides support to the Palestinian revolution which is part of the Arab revolutionary movement.

IV. a. Inasmuch as the Palestinian resistance movement is part of the world national liberation movement and the world revolution against imperialism, we call on all forces of national liberation everywhere to support the legitimate struggle of our people for the liberation of their country.

b. The Palestinian National Assembly calls on the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, along with all its institutions and organizations, to engage in extensive activity in the information field at world level, and to make direct contact with all national liberation movements and progressive movements. In this their object must be to make clear both the attitude of the resistance movement in rejecting surrender solutions and the necessity for the revolution to continue, and to refute all hostile propaganda aimed at misrepresenting this attitude.

The Assembly must stress the importance of information at this stage, whether it is directed to the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and elsewhere, to the Arab people everywhere, or aimed at world level.

The immense information machines of a number of foreign and Arab countries are at present engaged in propaganda which is injurious to the Palestinian cause and supports surrender solutions. It is directed first and foremost at the Palestinian people, with the object of making surrender solutions attractive to them and of misrepresenting commando action, thereby confusing their views and softening their attitude. This underlines the importance of revolutionary propaganda in the present stage in no uncertain manner.

The Assembly therefore believes that it is essential that broadcasts by The Voice of Palestine—the Voice of the Palestine Liberation Organization—should be resumed and that all information machinery should be unified and engage in as much information activity as possible.

V. The National Assembly entrusts a joint committee drawn from the Central Committee and the Planning Council with the task of devising a detailed formula for the confrontation of all eventualities that may arise from the present situation.

VI. The National Assembly entrusts the Central Committee with the task of taking all measures necessary for the implementation of its recommendations and resolutions.

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Speech by King Hussein of Jordan on the Command of the Eastern Front and an "Imaginary Clash" with the Palestinian Resistance (Excerpts)¹

Amman, August 29, 1970

Following the events of June 1967, the

effect of the Zionist aggression, the danger of the Israeli war machine to the Arab destiny and cause, and the Arab duty to confront and crush that danger dictated unification of the Arab military effort under a single general command. The command was entrusted to the most efficient and capable Arab officer, General Muhammad Fawzi, the War Minister and C-in-C of the UAR armed forces. He was given command of the western and eastern fronts. . . .

However, when it was noticed that the accomplishments of the eastern front and the state of affairs there—the supreme and common interest—necessitated reconsideration of the eastern front question to ensure the best possible form of command and control of all Arab military forces, arrangements were approved as recommended by the General Commander at the recent Tripoli meeting of the Defence Council of front line States. These provided for dissolution of the eastern front and for the exercise by the General Commander of duties and control, through a command comprising picked staff officers representing the Arab forces, over three fronts; the western UAR front, the northern front in the Syrian Arab Republic and the eastern Jordanian front. They also provided for the deployment of all the Arab forces on the territory of any of the three States and under the orders of that command. In addition to the advantages of this arrangement, it is the natural right of each direct command since it is the owner of the land for the safety of which it is directly responsible and since it is also responsible for it to the General Commander.

New negative attitudes reflected deeply and adversely on these arrangements, necessitating immediate action to establish a new arrangement to regulate the military ties between us and fraternal Arab armed forces deployed on our territory, especially the dear Iraqi armed forces. This was necessary to serve the general Arab military effort. We are now discussing this and hope for success. . . .

We feel sad to read in the fida'i papers and to see signs that the Resistance imagines there might be a clash with the State authorities

¹ Excerpted from Hussein's speech as broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3470/A/9 and A/10; reprinted by permission.

and so is preparing itself for this imaginary clash. Whenever our armed forces move about the capital or any town or village for any reason, the Resistance portrays the movement as having been directed against it. It is as though the army had no right to move near towns. This is the army of the people, the country's shield and the nation's strong hope. It has an absolute right to move anywhere throughout our land.

The Resistance papers and bulletins often contain accusations against us, raise doubts about us and attack and insult us. We choose not to answer them, believing that if we strike back we shall hit a force which we want to see as a growing force for the struggle, a force which comes from us and is for us. Were it not for this, we would not have tolerated any such undermining of the State, insults to the Government, slandering of the Army and intimidation of the people.

In all our past and present sacrifices and in our past and present actions, our consciences and our heads have been held high. We do not seek recognition from anyone because we are defending our country, our rights and our people. But we tolerate neither insults nor slanders from anyone. Neither do we tolerate efforts to show superpatriotism—efforts which soon dwindle in the race to do patriotic (Arabic: *wataniyah*) service and national (Arabic: *qawmi*) action.

Honourable people, Arabs everywhere, the phase through which we are passing now is so critical, important and serious that it requires the highest and most perfect Arab awareness. Whenever there is a difference of opinion between one group of us and another on how to face the occupying enemy and wrest our rights from the grip of the aggressors, we must always remember that every action is permissible except one: our efforts should not be scattered or diverted from confronting the enemy into confrontations within our own ranks.

The Arabs are shamed if they turn against one another when their future and all their aspirations are in danger. Perhaps it is our right to expect their absolute support for our common effort, which is in their own interests first and last.

On the other hand, especially in this critical situation, we declare that in the event of any attempt to undermine the tower of our steadfastness or national unity or to harm our citizens or undermine our existence, we shall do our duty of placing matters in their proper perspective. We have been doing that since we assumed responsibility in our country....

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Statement Issued by the Jordanian Prime Minister's Office Concerning an Attempted Armed Attack on King Hussein of Jordan¹

Amman, September 1, 1970

At 17.40, while King Husayn was proceeding in a motorcade to Amman civilian airport to welcome his daughter Princess Aliyah, armed men opened fire at His Majesty's motorcade near the railway crossing along the Ayn Ghazal road. Thanks to God's care for this steadfast country and for His Majesty, the Arab commander who is devoted to his people and homeland, the wicked hand was disappointed. Husayn will remain the symbol of the steadfastness and struggle of this homeland and will remain surrounded by the loyalty and love of his people. The Premiership, in the name of the Government, congratulates His Majesty on his safety.

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Statement Issued by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. Concerning an Alleged Armed Attack on King Hussein of Jordan²

Amman, September 2, 1970

The Jordanian Premiership this evening issued a statement which was broadcast by

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3472/A/10; reprinted by permission.

² Broadcast on Baghdad Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3472/A/13; reprinted by permission.

Amman radio saying that the King was fired on. The Central Committee stresses to our Arab people everywhere that this report is not true and that it is wholly fabricated. It is meant to cover the crime committed by the authorities this evening in indiscriminately shelling Amman with artillery for the purpose of confusing and preoccupying our masses and those of the Arab nation. The case is wholly fabricated. The truth is that the Central Committee headquarters was the target of direct shelling when it was in session. A large number of people were wounded as a result and some were killed. If their justification for the shelling of Amman with artillery was their story of an attack on the King, what is their excuse when they pounded Amman with their artillery and machine-guns the day before yesterday? These people who want to impose surrender on our people by force of arms should have imposed surrender on the enemy who is occupying our soil. We wish the intense fire Amman witnessed the day before yesterday and tonight had been directed at Beisan [Beit Shean] and Tiberias and all our occupied soil.

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Text of Speech by King Hussein of Jordan on the "Unusual Circumstances" in Jordan¹

Amman, September 3, 1970

My dear people, sons of my homeland: I am speaking to you while our dear country is living in unusual circumstances. This is the result of the sad incidents that occurred in our Jordanian capital during the past few days. The citizens are frightened and worried at the possibility of renewed fighting and what it may lead to, endangering the lives of innocent people and damaging buildings and public life. The work of businessmen and merchants has stopped, the general effort and

the State's revenues have suffered great losses, and work in government departments, establishments and schools has been disrupted.

I, upon whom destiny has thrown the responsibility for taking care of this dear people and homeland, am watching the situation closely. It perplexes me, in view of my grave responsibility, to stand idly by and not perform my duty. I carry my duty before you all, dear citizens, men of the valiant Army, and fighting members of the Resistance. I am in touch with you all, in thought, emotion and conscience. This united homeland and brotherhood in God and struggle join us together. Any bullet fired in the capital, this city in which we live together as one family, is a stray and wicked bullet.

Any life lost in the capital is the victim of guilt and sin. Let the rifles pointed at our relatives and sons be silenced. Let anyone not carrying arms in the field of honour and struggle against the occupying Israeli enemy disappear and let every fighter return to his allotted position on the national defence front. We are on a march towards liberation, making step after step, and are trying to secure the means of success. Therefore we do not accept, under any circumstances, any internal clash that obstructs this march. Our valiant Army, of which we are proud and which we can place in the highest ranks of honour, strength and discipline, is eager to direct all its concern and attention beyond our immortal river where the usurped Arab rights are waiting for us to wrest them from the claws of aggression and where our captive people are waiting for the day of liberation. To enable our Army to fulfil its noble wishes, our beloved capital must live without the clash of arms with which it now lives and without armed men roaming its streets and alleys without reason.

I have therefore, asked my Government to take on all its responsibilities in handling matters and to take the necessary measures to ensure order, security and stability in the capital and the Kingdom. This is so that the citizens may enjoy their daily life in peace and reassurance and so that their anxiety may disappear.

Having entrusted the Government with its

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3474/A/1 and A/2; reprinted by permission.

responsibilities, the Cabinet—the Premier and members—has my full confidence and appreciation. I depend completely on the Chief of Staff of our Armed Forces and his ability, with his assistants, to carry out all the duties entrusted to him.

I have also asked the Cabinet to contact the Central Committee of the Resistance command so that the Central Committee, for its part, may control matters among its groups and so that the Government, jointly with the Resistance command, can prevent any provocation, contain the dissension and ensure security and public safety.

I am sure that the Cabinet will do its duty and achieve what is wanted with expected speed. Once this is done, the Government will immediately turn to implementing the agreement reached last June under the supervision of the four-member Arab committee. The non-implementation of this agreement was the cause of the regrettable developments we are suffering.

When drawing up this course of action, I hope the desired results will be achieved with the required speed so that the citizens will be reassured and so that the general interest and our front against the enemy will be preserved. Peace and God's mercy and blessings be with you.

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Statement by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on Security Measures in Amman¹

Amman, September 5, 1970

During the last few days many military blows have been directed against the people and the resistance movement, attempts have been made to stir up regional chauvinism, and many political statements have been issued, the assessment of which leads to the conclusion that they are all directed against the Palestinian revolution.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 6, 1970.

Although it is the duty of the resistance to defend itself, the conduct of the resistance movement has been conspicuous for its self-control; it has attempted to calm things down and to restore normal life for citizens, especially in the city of Amman.

The Central Committee, which has always been concerned for the freedom, safety and security of citizens, and which has imposed the most rigorous self-control on all its cadres, has issued explicit instructions on the following matters:

1. All show of military strength inside the city is to stop.
2. All barricades are to be removed from the streets.
3. There is to be no movement of commando armed vehicles with the exception of patrols of the Armed Struggle Command.
4. The Armed Struggle Command is to assume responsibility for maintaining order, ensuring security and protecting the possessions of citizens, and is to take all necessary measures for that purpose.

In announcing this we expect the authorities to put into practice their statement to the effect that they would withdraw military forces from Amman and its environs and open the roads, so that these forces may take their proper place side by side with their brothers, the commandos, on the lines of contact with the enemy, in defense of the sanctity of the homeland.

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Statement by an Official Spokesman for the Revolutionary Command Council of Libya on His Government's Stoppage of Financial Aid to Jordan²

Tripoli, September 5, 1970

The official spokesman for the Revolutionary Command Council stated that the

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Haqq* (Benghazi), September 6, 1970.

Libyan Arab Republic is watching with extreme concern the critical situation between the commandos and the Jordanian authorities, and profoundly regrets that fighting between the two sides has continued for six consecutive days, in spite of the Arab countries' appeal to them to stop the fighting, and while the emergency meeting of the Arab League is actually in session for this express purpose.

The official spokesman announced that the Revolutionary Command Council has officially decided to stop the Arab support provided to Jordan, because it believes that this aid is being used for other purposes than those for which it was given, until such time as the situation is clarified.

At the same time the Council calls on the two parties to stop fighting and solve the problems in dispute through mutual understanding, and to direct their arms against the common enemy who is the first to gain from any fighting or clash between Arabs.

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Speech by King Hussein of Jordan on Relations with the Palestinian Resistance (Excerpts)¹

Amman, September 6, 1970

... We have declared on every occasion, in every Arab political or international meeting, that we seek what is right. We will not yield on our rights. We accept only one thing—restoration of all our occupied territory and the right of our people in Palestine, regardless of the method that leads to it. A successful policy is the result of effective power, and effective power leads to successful policy. As long as the goal is clear, a positive move toward that goal should be one of our methods.

The Resistance is in the arena with our full approval and is the object of our appreciation, support, and patronage. We helped it from the beginning and protected it so it could grow and get stronger. And because it is part of us, we cared for it like we care for our sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters. We continue to care for the unity of its efforts and we are anxious that it remain free from hindrances, because this hinders us too. We cared for it and for all our forces like we cared for our people and for their security, peace, comfort, stability, strength, steadfastness, livelihood, and property—because they are a family and they support us and we belong to them and we work for them and after God we believe in them.

Because the Resistance is of the people and belongs to them, there is no room for thinking of liquidating the Resistance, and we shall never think of that. Tomorrow when we get back all our occupied territory and save the rights of our Palestinian Arab people, we will all decide what we want. We are engaged in a fierce political and military battle.... On the other hand, we are still concerned about the unity of the Arab ranks and efforts, particularly every Arab military effort on our territory, on the battlefield....

I can no longer remain silent in the face of a painful flow of doubts and accusations, disorder and incitement, and ruin and destruction directed at the people, at the Army, and at the Resistance.... I see before me a dreadful plan directed against the entire Arab existence and the Arab stand. It is designed outside and implemented inside our country and inside the great Arab homeland in order to give our enemies the opportunity to achieve their ambitions and aims against us. Therefore I appeal to you all—to my family and brothers on both banks—to care for your dear country and your holy unity and not to permit the voice of disunity to sound among you and divide you into Palestinians and Jordanians....

I appeal to you to unite even more; to protect your country against civil strife which only your enemies can benefit from; to prove to the world that all plots will be foiled by your firmness, steadfastness, and continued

¹ Excerpted from Hussein's speech broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3476/A/20 and A/21; reprinted by permission.

readiness to sacrifice for the sake of the homeland, the nation, and the cause. I appeal to my brothers, the leaders and officials in all sectors here and in the Arab world, to assume their responsibilities in the present serious stage. I hold them responsible for what they say or do and for the stands and steps they adopt. The plot exists and we are all its victims. For the last time I appeal to the Arab conscience to awaken, to the Arab mind to move, and to the Arab will to close all gaps through which danger could come. I, my Army, and my people have sacrificed for this cause of destiny, and we are still sacrificing. We live in this country with pride and a clear conscience. We have borne what no human can bear. We have stood fast because we know ourselves and know what we have sacrificed. We will not be rewarded with false accusations and attacks and with denials of the truth and with disavowance of brotherhood in God, the homeland, future, and destiny.

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Interview Statements by Two Officials of the P.F.L.P. on the Plane Hijackings Carried Out by Them¹

Amman, September 7, 1970

Why did we carry out these operations at this particular time? Because we are at present witnessing the most serious of all attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and the Palestinian resistance.

Doubtless you hear the sound of bombs and bullets every day in Amman, and witness the repeated attempts to isolate the resistance from the masses, as a preliminary step towards attacking and liquidating it.

Thus these operations coincide with the grave stage through which the Palestinian

cause is passing and lie within the framework of the plan to frustrate the surrender solution which the Arab regimes and America are striving for, while behind them is Israel which hopes to perpetuate its existence and its entity through such a settlement.

The TWA and Swissair planes landed in Jordan because Jordan is the principal theater of the Palestinian resistance. The Pan American plane was landed in Cairo, and then blown up as a symbol of the Popular Front's protest against the Egyptian government's policy of accepting the Rogers plan.

The Popular Front will continue to escalate its struggle both inside and outside the occupied area to ensure the victory of the will of the toiling Palestinian and Arab masses groaning under the yoke of reactionary imperialism.

As regards the Swiss plane—the plane will be detained at Revolution Airfield, which is under the control of the Front, until the Swiss government releases the two commandos detained in Switzerland. We shall come to an agreement on guarantees for the implementation of this with the parties concerned.

As regards the American plane, we shall detain its passengers until the body of our martyr is transported from London airport and until our heroine who is being detained in Britain is handed over to us.

This will not take place until our two heroes arrive from Zurich and the body of our hero arrives from London.

As regards the Israeli passengers, we have not yet disclosed their numbers, and we shall continue to hold them until Israel releases all our fighters who are being held in Israeli prisons—there are about three thousand of them—and until it releases the Algerian detainees as well.

We shall release the non-Israeli women and children today, and we shall also release all passengers today except those of American, British, West German and Israeli nationality.

These demands of ours must be met within 72 hours, of which twelve have already elaps-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 9, 1970.

ed, so that there remains until 4 p.m. on Wednesday.

We shall negotiate with Switzerland, Israel or Britain through the International Red Cross, which has taken food to the passengers today.

Q. Did the Jordanian government agree to the planes being landed in its territory?

A. There is no reason why we should ask for any approval from the government of Jordan. Moreover, we regard the airfield as a liberated area.

Q. ...on what world public opinion thinks about the hijacking operations and the possibility of its sympathizing with Israel.

A. World public opinion has not helped us in our case during the last twenty-five years; we don't care about world public opinion. The important thing about the operations is that they ask the world a question: Why?

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Joint Communiqué Issued by the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on Their Agreement on a Cease-Fire¹

Amman, September 8, 1970

To protect the safety, security and well-being of citizens and to maintain national unity in the Kingdom, the government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization agreed, on September 8, 1970, on the following:

1. An immediate and final cease-fire.
2. That the declaration made by the authorities in their statement of September 5, 1970 shall be implemented, in return for the immediate evacuation of the streets and entries of Amman and of main roads by

armed men and all members of the commando organizations.

3. That all show of military force by armed men in the city shall be prohibited.

4. That it shall be prohibited for any party to interfere with members of the Jordanian armed forces and the commando organizations.

5. That it shall be prohibited for any party to interfere with any citizen, his security, his possessions or his money, and any offender shall be regarded as breaking the law and the regulations and be subject to penalties enforced by the two parties in cooperation.

6. That efforts shall be made to stop information campaigns and psychological indoctrination on the part of all quarters, liable to harm the interests of Jordan and the Arab nation.

7. That the joint committee composed of the government and the Central Committee shall perform the tasks it is entrusted with, including those set out in the above articles.

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Statement by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Rejection of the Joint Communiqué by the P.L.O. and the Government of Jordan²

Amman, September 8, 1970

At the meeting held at noon on Tuesday, September 8, 1970, the government urgently requested that a joint communiqué be issued with a view to restoring calm. The Central Committee, from its concern for the security of the population and the peace of mind of women, children and old people, acceded to the government's request, and the joint communiqué was issued.

In all the measures it has taken to safeguard discipline the Central Committee has been

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 9, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 9, 1970.

guided by its intense concern for our people, our army and our national unity, and it has therefore endured, in the sight of the masses and the revolutionary bases, much suffering and pressure in the face of repeated provocations. But before the ink in which the joint communiqué was written had dried, it became clear to the Central Committee that the subservient authorities were engaging in the lowest, vilest and most perfidious operations against a number of commando organizations' bases in the Irbid area, including the Jordan Valley. The 40th Armored Brigade treacherously encircled a number of commando bases, and shelled them with heavy artillery fire, as a result of which about 30 were killed and 40 wounded. This treacherous operation was one more link in the chain of conspiracies perpetrated by the subservient regime after the incidents in the South and al-Salt, and in the series of acts of aggression and sniping in Amman, Zarqa and other towns and villages, which are still continuing.

The way the subservient authorities moved certain units of the army to strike at the commandos in their combatant bases in the Jordan Valley provides definite and decisive proof of their firm intention of liquidating commando action. It also reveals the falsity of all the claims of the authorities and their mouthpieces that they are only opposed to commandos appearing in Amman and other towns, for they are now killing the commandos in their bases on the line of confrontation with the enemy, although they are the only Arab force which is still fighting the Zionist enemy daily.

In the light of the above, and in view of all its previous bitter experiences with the subservient authorities, the Central Committee has decided the following:

1. That the joint communiqué issued by the government and the Central Committee be regarded as repudiated, since the government has been unable to implement it and since the subservient authorities have annulled the agreement that was concluded by the treacherous measures they have taken.

2. To call on the masses in general and all commandos in particular to practise the

greatest revolutionary vigilance against all moves by the organs of the subservient authorities.

3. To call on all honorable officers and men in the Jordanian Arab army not to allow themselves to be used as instruments in the hands of agents and colonialism, and to frustrate their conspiracies against the people and the resistance.

4. To request the four-member Arab committee to conduct in person an immediate inquiry into the crimes committed by the authorities against the population, both civilians and commandos. In the course of this inquiry the committee should visit hospitals and examine the bodies of those who have been mutilated and tortured.

5. To call on the Arab masses and all nationalist Arab forces to take rapid action to end the war of annihilation that the authorities are waging against the Palestinian-Jordanian people in Jordan, in the interests of Zionism and American imperialism and at the behest of the leaders of the American intelligence services who are in Amman to supervise the conspiracy and its implementation.

It is revolution until victory!

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Telegram from Central Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. to the Arab Kings and Presidents on the Critical Situation in Jordan¹

Amman, September 9, 1970

To the Arab Kings and Presidents,
Greetings from the Revolution.

At this critical moment in the history of our Arab nation, when the revolution is resisting the Zionist enemy and world colonialism on more than one field of honor and self-sacrifice, the revolution is being subjected to

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 10, 1970.

an operation of the most odious perfidy on the part of colonialism and Zionism, which are doing all in their power to liquidate the revolution, destroy the entity and the existence of the Palestinian people, and strike at the masses of our gallant people in the Palestinian-Jordanian field.

These were the momentous events that confronted us, planned by the intelligence services of world colonialism to finish off the Palestinian revolution. The first steps to implement them were taken in heroic enduring Jordan. These crimes were committed in several towns and villages, such as Maan, al-Shubak, al-Tufaila and Kerak, and their target was the masses of our people, as is shown by the fact that their houses were plundered, their honor violated, and innocent people were killed. Associated with the authorities in the perpetration of these crimes were certain of their agents—persons sick in mind drawn from the tribes. At the same time the authorities were trying to smash our national unity, and not content with the massacres they carried out in the southern towns, they followed them with an operation of the most odious perfidy by giving orders, in the morning of September 8, to the 40th Armored Brigade, and certain infantry divisions, to attack a number of our commando bases in the North of Jordan, near the line of contact with the Zionist enemy, having first submitted them to intense and concentrated artillery bombardment. This formed part of an operation of war directed not at the Zionist enemy, but at our commando bases which are engaged in the most noble and sublime activity an Arab can undertake—the fight against the Zionist enemy who is occupying our sacred soil. The result was that thirty of our men were killed, and their bodies mutilated, and a number of others were wounded.

Before this the authorities had, on more than one occasion, shelled the defenceless population of Amman, causing large numbers of casualties, both killed and wounded.

The dangerous situation in which Jordan and its gallant people are situated requires that all our brothers, the Arab Kings and Presidents, should face up to their historical and national responsibilities and appreciate

the gravity of this situation, which is only too clear to us and which is nothing new to the people of Jordan, in order to protect the Palestinian revolution.

The Central Committee hereby declares to you that it is resolved to continue to go forward and protect its revolutionary advance, and calls on you to face your historic and national responsibilities, so that the whole of Jordan may not be reduced to ruins by this odious conspiracy.

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Memorandum on Measures To Be Taken in Jordan from the Arab Five-Man Mediation Committee to the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the P.L.O.¹

Amman, September 10, 1970

The Five-Member Committee met this morning, September 10, 1970, and discussed the situation and the grave incidents now taking place in Jordan.

Aware as it is of its sacred duty, as laid down in Resolution No. 1665 of the League of Arab States, the Committee is of the opinion that:

I. In the light of what took place on Tuesday, September 8, Wednesday, September 9, and Thursday, September 10, the Committee is of the opinion that both parties have failed to adhere to the cease-fire decisions announced both at 1400 hours on Tuesday and at 1800 hours on Wednesday.

II. The Committee therefore demands that both parties:

a. Adhere to the cease-fire decision announced by both parties and broadcast at 1800 hours on Wednesday, September 9, 1970.

b. Commit themselves to implement the agreement of July 10, 1970, especially as regards the following:

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh* (September 16, 1970).

1. The Joint Committee provided for in the above agreement shall meet at 1000 hours tomorrow, Friday, September 11, 1970 to decide on the measures necessary for the implementation of the agreement.

2. Joint committees of inquiry.

3. Joint patrols to supervise the cease-fire, these patrols being given all powers necessary for them to perform their duty in the most efficient possible manner.

III. The Committee decides that these demands shall be met by tomorrow, Friday morning; if they have not been met by then the Committee will feel itself obliged to submit a report thereon to the League, showing that it is impossible to do anything as long as the commands concerned do not control those who are under their command. This will mean that the two parties will be held entirely responsible for all the consequences.

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Statement by the Press Spokesman for the P.F.L.P. on Some of the Circumstances Attendant on the Blowing Up of the Planes Hijacked by the Front¹

September 12, 1970

In connection with the blowing up of the three planes on Revolution Airfield, the press spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine wishes to clarify the following points:

Firstly: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine provided the quarters concerned, through the Red Cross, with ample and far opportunities to reach an agreement on the hostages and planes that are being held by the Front until such time as the resistance prisoners are returned from Europe and Israel. But these quarters submitted to pressures exerted by the Washington government on Bonn, Berne and London, and start-

ed to maneuver to gain time, assuring themselves that the Front would not carry out its threats.

Secondly: The Front accepted an offer submitted by the Red Cross on behalf of the countries concerned last Wednesday, but the countries concerned retracted their acceptance, and submitted what they called a new offer. This offer, which was full of cheap threats and showed an utter lack of respect either for the lives and liberty of their nationals, or for the Front's ability to carry out its threat, demanded that the three planes and all their passengers should be unconditionally returned to Switzerland, Britain and America!

Thirdly, in the opinion of the Front, this retraction, and the terms offered by Switzerland, Germany, America and Britain, the tone of which was prompted by an arrogant colonialist mentality, not only suggested that the Front's threats were not to be taken seriously, but also made light of the struggle of our masses to impose their will on the enemy, and of the lives and liberty of the hostages.

The whole attitude of these imperialist powers which submitted to pressures exerted by Washington and Zionism, is summed up in the attempts they are making to gain time and to maneuver, to ruin the credit of the Front and to give rise to rumors and confusion, and at the same time to raise doubts in the minds of the Arab masses as to the ability of their revolutionary organizations to carry out their threats.

Faced with these maneuvers and attempts to exert pressure, intimidate and misrepresent, and with the overbearing attitude of these countries, which show that all they are interested in is imposing their colonialist will in utter contempt of the struggle of the masses, members of the Popular Front have blown up the three planes, while detaining a sufficient number of hostages to ensure that the three colonialist powers submit to the Front's just demands.

Fourthly: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine holds the United States,

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), September 19, 1970.

West Germany, Switzerland and Britain fully responsible for whatever may happen to their nationals who are being held as hostages until such time as the Front's demands are met and the resistance prisoners in Europe are released.

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Statement and Resolutions by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. Suspending the P.F.L.P. from Membership in the Central Committee¹

Amman, September 12, 1970

In the heat of the struggle between the revolution and the subservient forces in Jordan, while the Central Committee was in permanent session in order to protect the revolution from the military campaign launched by the subservient and imperialist forces against the resistance movement, and in order to continue the struggle so as to ensure the real security of the revolution by liquidating the agents, and to work for the establishment of a national authority that would assist the Palestinian revolution in its struggle until victory is won—at this time an unforeseen circumstance made its appearance in the conflict, as a result of the hijacking of the planes, which involved the resistance in a contingent problem which has distracted its attention from the fundamental problem. As a result the Central Committee was obliged to devote its attention to this contingent problem, from its anxiety to protect the humane image of the revolution and from the necessity to protect the lives and security of the civilian passengers who had nothing to do with the policy of their colonialist governments. The Central Committee was also anxious that all sections of the resistance should be united at this critical time so as to stand in a single front in confrontation of the barbarous reactionary attack.

For these reasons, the Central Committee took a number of decisions to cope with the contingent problem so that it may be free to deal with its fundamental task, with representatives of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attending all its meetings.

In dealing with the problem the Central Committee took into consideration all local and human circumstances, and its resolutions were unanimously adopted, though with some reservations on the part of the Popular Front which did, however, announce its intention of abiding by the resolutions.

At 9 p.m. yesterday evening a delegation of the Central Committee went to the site where the planes were being held, the first attempt made by the Central Committee in this connection having failed. But the Central Committee was surprised to discover that the Popular Front had again violated the above resolutions. The Central Committee therefore held a meeting at 4 p.m. yesterday, September 12, at which it decided the following:

1. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization announces that it completely washes its hands of this affair.
2. Suspends the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's membership of the Central Committee because of its violation of the communiqué of June 6, 1970 in conformity with which the Central Committee was formed, and of the resolutions of the Central Committee issued on June 6, 1970.
3. Condemns the conduct of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and to have no further dealings with it because of its failure to adhere to agreements and to the resolutions issued by the Central Committee.
4. Takes a firm stand against any conduct on the part of the command of the Popular Front that is prejudicial to the safety and security of the revolution and which distracts it from its real battle against the Zionist enemy and world imperialism.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 13, 1970.

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Memorandum by Mayor of Jerusalem al-Khatib to the Government of Jordan on the Continued Judaization of the City of Jerusalem by the Israel Authorities¹

Amman, September 12, 1970

Israeli Activities with the Object of Judaizing the Arab City of Jerusalem

1. *Jewish Prayers in the Haram al-Sharif Again:* According to the daily *al-Quds* on August 13, 1970, in an article under the headline "Religious Jews Pray in the Jerusalem Haram al-Sharif," "Members of the security forces evicted a group of fifteen devout Jews from the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem after they had tried to say prayers there the day before yesterday, on the anniversary of the destruction of the Temple of Solomon some 1900 years ago, an occasion which Jews all over the world used to celebrate with fasting and prayer.

"The members of the group first tried to enter the Haram al-Sharif, in which the Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock are situated, by the Maghareba Gate, and when the Israeli guards prevented them from doing so, went to another gate, through which they entered and started praying. The security men arrived and expelled them when they had nearly finished their prayers."

This report has been confirmed by Husain Tahbub, the Director of Jerusalem Waqfs, in a letter he sent to *al-Quds*, which published it on August 14, 1970 under the headline "A Letter from the Director of Jerusalem Waqfs." According to this letter: "At about 8.45 a.m. on Wednesday, August 12, 1970 a number of young Jews and Jewesses, estimated at fifteen, entered the courtyard of the Aqsa Mosque by the Maghareba Gate, one at a time, like ordinary visitors. They assembled in the courtyard of the Haram al-Sharif and started singing religious chants. Members of the guard hurried to stop them, and asked the police to help them to evict

the group, and in fact a police officer, with a number of his men, did help them to evict the group through the Maghareba Gate.

"I want to make it clear that the Waqf guards are always ready to deal with such matters."

2. *The Suspension of the Jerusalem Shari'a Court and the Transfer of its Functions to the Jaffa Shari'a Court:* It is clear that the Israeli occupation authorities are still pursuing their policy of suspending the functions of the Jerusalem Shari'a Court and are still refusing to recognize its proceedings and decisions on matters connected with marriage, divorce, inheritance, Waqfs, and other affairs which it is its function to deal with. It is clear that the authorities are insisting that Muslims in Jerusalem and the Jerusalem district who have business with the court should submit such matters to the Jaffa Shari'a Court. The most recent measures I have observed confirming this violation and this Israeli resolution is a notice by the Jaffa Shari'a Court which I read in the daily *al-Quds* on August 14, 1970. It reads as follows:

"Notice

The Jaffa Shari'a Court

A procès-verbal signed by the Mukhtar and the Mukhtar's Committee of Wadi al-Jauz in Jerusalem has been received announcing the decease of the late Fakhri Abdullah Naser al-Din on August 8, 1969, and stating that his estate, under both Shari'a and civil law, is bequeathed exclusively to his mother, Khairiyya Muhammad Nairuch, his wife Salwa Muhammad Naser al-Din, and his children by her, Fayez, Emad al-Din, Jihad, Ghaleb and Abir. All wishing to raise objections should refer to this court within thirty days from the publication of this notice.

Issued on August 13, 1969.

The Shari'a Qadi of Jaffa

Tawfiq Muhammad Usaila."

3. *The Excavations around the Haram al-Sharif:* The excavations around the Haram al-Sharif, both to the west and the south, especially those adjacent to the Aqsa Mosque, are continuing. According to the Hebrew

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), September 13, 1970.

daily *Haaretz* on July 23, 1970, excavations were continuing in the neighborhood of the Jerusalem Haram, to the South of the Gate of the Chain and earlier, on November 25, 1969, the same daily had admitted that the excavations being carried out beneath the Haram al-Sharif at the Gate of the Chain were dangerous, and reported that the President of the Jerusalem Islamic Committee had protested strongly against the Ministry for Religions carrying out excavations in the Wilson arch which leads to the Haram al-Sharif. The same paper also reported that the Ministry for Religions had converted the interior of this arch into a synagogue, and went on to say that the employees of the Ministry for Religions had excavated towards the north of the arch under buildings in which Arab families were living, and that the archaeologists working in the area had expressed the fear that these excavations might result in the collapse of the buildings standing above them.

In connection with this report I should like to draw your attention to my confidential letter to His Excellency the Prime Minister of July 23, 1969, a copy of which was sent to Your Eminence, on the designs of the Israeli authorities to prolong the Wailing Wall by two hundred meters. In this letter I disclosed that the long term object of this prolongation was to obtain possession by expropriation, confiscation or other means, of all the Islamic Waqf properties between the Gate of the Chain and the Gate of Ala al-Din al-Busair—the Arab Higher Committee Gate. In view of the importance of this letter I am sending Your Eminence another copy of it herewith, adding that the excavations to which the Hebrew newspaper refers are being carried out beneath these Waqf and Islamic properties and involve all the buildings extending from the Gate of the Chain—the Kaitbay building, the Gate of the Chain Minaret, and Khalili Mosque, the Gate of the Cotton Merchants, the Bab al-Hadid, the mosque which contains the resting place of Hussein ibn Ali, and the other which contains the tombs of the late Pakistani leader Muhammad Ali, the late father of Queen Dina, and the Palestinian leaders Musa

Kazem al-Husaini, Ahmad Hilmi Abduh and Abd al-Qader al-Husaini. Also involved are dozens of Islamic historical buildings and some hundreds of dwelling houses, all of which are liable to collapse completely, as happened in the case of the Fakhriyya Zawiya and the houses of Abu al-Sa'ud, which were adjacent to the Aqsa Mosque on the west side. The Israelis deliberately carried out excavations below them, resulting in them collapsing, which provided the Israeli authorities with a pretext to start demolishing and removing them on June 14, 1969.

This large group of buildings adjacent to the Haram al-Sharif is now threatened with demolition and removal, and the people living in them, who are estimated to total some three thousand, are also threatened with being made homeless. Both these threats require that no time should be lost in adopting a resolute attitude to stop them.

4. *The Removal of the Islamic Cemeteries at the Bab al-Asbat in Jerusalem:* While Israeli excavations have been in progress around the Haram and the blessed Aqsa Mosque to the west and south, as planned, other steps have been taken which reveal the existence of further Israeli plans for new expropriations with the object of encircling the Haram al-Sharif from the east and south. On February 26, 1970 the Hebrew paper *Haaretz* had the following to say on the subject of the Israeli authorities' intention of annexing the Muslim cemeteries in Jerusalem and converting them into gardens:

"The two-member committee of the Jerusalem Town Planning Committee has discussed the question of annexing areas of land owned by Muslims and Christians around the walls of the City of Jerusalem and turning them into public gardens, the members of the committee being aware that the Israeli Ministry of Justice has no legal objection to areas like Muslim cemeteries and residential areas being made part of such gardens." These lands include Muslim cemeteries along the western part of the walls of Jerusalem; thousands of Muslim martyrs are buried in the cemeteries known as the "Bab al-Rahma Cemetery" and the "Yusufiyya Cemetery,"

both of which are adjacent to the walls of the Haram al-Sharif and the Aqsa Mosque on the eastern side. There is also another piece of Waqf land involved, for which the same fate is in store; this is adjacent to the Aqsa Mosque on the south-eastern side. When this new operation is completed not less than sixty per cent of the Haram al-Sharif will be surrounded by confiscated or usurped properties, and under direct Israeli control.

On August 20, 1970 the daily *al-Quds* published the following notice under the headline: "New Plan for Old Jerusalem".

"750 dunums in the Suburbs for Those who Leave their Homes.

Four Months for Objections to be Submitted.

Jerusalem. The Central Committee for Building and Planning for the Jerusalem District has approved a planning scheme for the Old City and its environs. Implementation of the plan will begin in four months' time; before then any person or public body may register objections to it.

The scheme consists of two stages. The first, which has been worked out in detail, covers planning for the municipal area—inside the walls, while the second is for the area outside the walls.

There was unanimous approval of this scheme, which covers an area of ten thousand dunums, with fifty thousand inhabitants.

The plan for the national garden outside the walls has also been approved, and the committee has allotted an area of 750 dunums on the Jericho road for those whose houses will be evacuated under this scheme."

One of the most important points in this report is the short sentence which says: "The plan for the national garden outside the walls has also been approved," for the authorities' real object in forming this national garden is to remove the Muslim cemeteries around the walls and to encircle the Haram al-Sharif.

Really these people behave in a strange way. They turned the whole world upside down when a few stones were missing from their graves, and when a few dozens of these graves were removed to build a road required by planning. And now they are planning to remove whole Muslim cemeteries on the pre-

text of making gardens. During the many centuries the country was under Arab and Islamic rule Jewish and other cemeteries were protected, and it was also found possible to meet the requirements of planning without demolishing anyone's house or evicting him from it.

I place these facts at your disposal so that you may discuss them with the government and take early action to halt these measures.

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Agreement Between the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the P.L.O. Concerning Security Arrangements in Amman¹

Amman, September 15, 1970

1. The present guards in all positions in the city of Amman shall be replaced by civilian police. This includes embassies and public utilities, but not the Royal Diwan, the Zahran Palace, the Citadel and al-Hawuz in Jabal al-Taj.

2. The present guards on al-Hawuz in Jabal al-Taj and the Citadel shall be reduced.

3. All security forces that have recently occupied localities shall be withdrawn.

4. All military forces shall be withdrawn from around Amman.

5. The commandos shall withdraw from all positions they have recently occupied in the streets of the city.

6. All barricades shall be removed from all public highways.

7. Commando elements shall not interfere with civilians and soldiers.

8. Commandos shall refrain from searching houses and arresting people.

9. Members of the armed forces and secu-

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), September 16, 1970.

rity forces shall not interfere with any commando elements in any place.

10. The Armed Struggle shall have a token presence in the following areas: the Post Office, the electricity generators in Ras al-Ain, the water pumps in Ras al-Ain.

11. The commandos' military bases shall be withdrawn from the city.

12. These measures shall be implemented between the morning of today, Wednesday, September 16, 1970, and 6 p.m. on the same day.

13. A joint committee shall be formed, with the following as members:

For the government Major-General Muhammad Khalil Abd al-Dayim, Colonel Abd al-Rahman Mahadin, Colonel al-It Matar, Major Khalil Qa'war, and for the Central Committee: Colonel Ahmad Affana, Major Abd al-Rahman al-Armuti and Major Abu al-Ala.

Finally, when these measures have been implemented in Amman, they shall be implemented in all the towns in the Kingdom.

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Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to Brigadier Muhammad Daud Charging Him with the Formation of a Provisional Military Government¹

Amman, September 15, 1970

Dear brother Brigadier Muhammad Daud,
Greetings.

It is now clear beyond all shadow of doubt that forces which are hostile to our nation and its goals and to our people and their aspirations, their hopes and their future, have gone a long way towards achieving the following aims and objectives:

Firstly: To destroy the basic constituents of the State, to impair our image and our

reputation at Arab and international levels, and to paralyze our effectiveness, our capacities and our resources.

Secondly: To destroy our national unity.

Thirdly: To upset the armed forces, which are the bulwark and hope of the people in the whole of our land, both free and occupied, to dislodge them from their positions on the line of confrontation, to destroy their martial spirit and their struggle, to affect the morale of our men, officers and commanders, up to the Supreme Command, and all elements which are a source of confidence to all of us, and to create a state of despair, alarm and psychological disturbance at all military levels.

Fourthly: To ensure that this situation has repercussions in the occupied territory in order to spread a spirit of despair and collapse in the ranks of our people there, so that they may once more despair of all of us, both here and in the whole of the Arab world.

Fifthly: To blow up the bridges of military unity between our armed forces and the forces of other Arab countries stationed in our territory, in particular the armed forces of Iraq, and to destroy the spirit of brotherhood and confidence which has been strengthened by the blood shed on our territory by the one Arab army since June 1967.

Sixthly: To divert the resources of the resistance from their lofty national goals with the object of blowing up all bridges between it and the people to whom it belongs, and the armed forces, which are the bulwark both of the people and of all honorable resistance, which shares their struggle against occupation and aggression, and provides them with powerful support on the road to liberation.

Seventhly: Attempts are being made to isolate the United Arab Republic from Jordan in particular and from the confrontation countries of the Arab East in general, so that it may follow its own individual course and solve its problems on its own. It could, in fact, have chosen such a course a long time ago, but the United Arab Republic has

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 17, 1970.

always based its action on true Arabism and on a belief in the single destiny of the Arabs. It has always been determined to play its full role in liberating all occupied territories and in recovering Arab rights in them full and undiminished, as stipulated by United Nations resolutions and the precepts of right and justice throughout the world. If our enemies succeed in achieving this aim, it will result in Jordan and the confrontation countries of the Arab East losing the resources of the United Arab Republic and its immense military, political and international capacity and weight. This would make it impossible for us to recover our rights and rescue our territory, thereby giving the enemy the initiative and decisive influence in the whole of the battle and the conflict in its entirety.

Eighthly: Among the factors that have contributed to making things in this field deteriorate to such an extreme degree of gravity are the conflicts which have spread throughout the whole of our public life, the aloofness of certain government organizations and their failure to confront events and challenges with honesty, awareness and courage; policies of liquidation and selfishness, and the overbidding and clouds of error which have obscured the atmosphere and made it impossible for many people to achieve a clear view of things.

Ninthly: The result of all this has been that the worst has happened and that there is now a serious possibility of hostile military action to destroy the State being undertaken in the near future; events of the last few days have provided evidence that such action is being prepared in such a manner as to constitute a constant danger.

In confronting this deteriorating situation we have left no stone unturned—and this in a country where we used to boast to the world that, before June 5, 1967 not a single drop of blood had been shed in our territory for any domestic reason, despite domestic and Arab convulsions. At that time, and, indeed, throughout our life, our way has been to meet evil with good, and to seize every opportunity to unite the people and to build up our strength on the sound foundations without which there can be no salvation. For policy

springs from strength, and strength is the way of achieving aims in politics. In the course of a long and profound study, I asked myself whether the disappearance of this entity, with all its personalities, leaders, forces, and other constituents could be of the slightest service to the cause of the destiny of Jordan and the Arab nation.

I reached the conclusion with the utmost conviction that the opposite was the case, and the only possible course is to hold out and to restore the State to its proper place as the cornerstone of the endurance, manliness, and legendary struggle of a people that is entitled to live and is entrusted with the aspirations and goals of successive generations to unity, freedom and a better life, and their determination to do the impossible to rescue their rights and their territory.

On behalf of all this, on behalf of the citizen and his security and the protection of his life and possessions, on behalf of the peace and safety of his children, on behalf of the piece of bread that every man needs, on behalf of the dignity of the soldier and the protection of his honor in order to protect the constitution, law and order, to protect the resources and capacity of the noble commando and to enable him to perform his duty, I appoint you to the office of Prime Minister and charge you to form a provisional military government. Your task will be to take immediate action to frustrate the hostile plot, put the situation right, restore order, impose the authority and protection of the State over its subjects, protect the resistance from the hostile plot and ensure positive and effective cooperation with it.

We ask you to cope with the situation with the energy, resolution and firmness required to restore security, order and stability: We ask you to implement the Four-Member Committee resolutions concluded between the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Government on July 10, 1970, and the later agreements between the Government, the Five-Member Committee and the Central Committee, including the agreement of September 15, 1970. You should also abide by all measures taken to regulate the State's relations

with the resistance, first and foremost the Palestine Liberation Organization and the organized regular Palestine Liberation Army, and take the necessary steps to enable the resistance to perform its sacred role to the full, supported by us and by all the organizations of the State and all existing resources. We pray that God may guard over the welfare and honor of all of us.

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Statement by the P.F.L.P. on its Conditions for the Release of the Hostages Held on the Planes Hijacked by the Front¹

September 15, 1970

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine wishes to acquaint the masses, journalists and Arab and world public opinion with the developments in the situation as regards the operation of seizing the planes and its consequences:

1. As a result of the imperialist maneuvers in which Switzerland, West Germany, Britain and the United States took part, and of the pressures and the provocative and ill-considered challenges of those countries, the Popular Front has blown up the three planes on Revolution Airfield. It has taken this action from its belief that these countries should be taught a lesson and realize that their unjustifiable provocations have resulted in their sustaining heavy material losses, and that if they continue on this provocative course they will sustain further losses.

2. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has its hostages in safe keeping. It holds itself responsible to the Palestinian and Arab masses for these hostages and, in consequence of this responsibility, it is treating these hostages in the same way as their countries treat Palestinian prisoners, and it gives warning that any foolish attempt from what-

ever quarter to recover these hostages will endanger their lives.

The Popular Front's medical service will undertake the medical care of these detainees, and will prevent any unnecessary contacts being made with them, as happens in the case of the Popular Front prisoners held in the European countries and Israel. As regards shelter, food and welfare, they will be treated in accordance with the standards applied by the Front in its treatment of the Palestinian masses and combatants.

3. The Popular Front reaffirms that its conditions for the release of the internees are clear and definite, that there can be no question of waiving any of them by so much as a hair's breadth, and that the maneuvers which the imperialist countries are accustomed to employ against conquered peoples will be wrecked on the rock of this determination, and can only result in unjustifiable delay in submitting to the Front's conditions.

The Popular Front's conditions for the release of the detained persons are as follows:

a) That the three resistance prisoners in Switzerland be released and sent to a place of safety, in return for the release of the Swiss detainees.

b) That the three resistance prisoners in West Germany be released and sent to a place of safety in return for the release of the West German detainees.

c) That comrade Laila Khalid be released by the British government and sent to a place of safety, and that the body of the comrade who met his death during the operation should also be sent, in return for the release of the British detainees.

d) That the Israeli government should announce that it agrees in principle to the return of the Algerian officials it interned at Lydda airport, the young Swiss it arrested on a charge of belonging to the Popular Front, and the ten Lebanese soldiers, and to an exchange of prisoners with the Palestinian resistance. When it does so the Front will provide a list of the names of those prisoners whom Israel must release in return for the

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), September 19, 1970.

release of the Israeli detainees and those with dual American-Israeli nationality.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine repeats, for the last time, that only by submitting to these conditions can Switzerland, Britain and West Germany solve their problem and ensure the safety and liberty of their detained citizens.

4. The way events have developed has convinced the Popular Front that the International Red Cross is playing a biased role, and has tried to gain time in favor of the political attitude of the imperialist powers, neglecting its duty as a neutral party. The Popular Front therefore considers that the direct responsibility now falls on the shoulders of the countries concerned, and that it is up to them to announce their acceptance of the Front's conditions.

5. The Popular Front regards the decision of the Central Committee to suspend its membership as being both unjustified and illegal and, aware as it is that Palestinian national unity is a fact too firmly established in the ranks of the masses to be eliminated by any decision from above, pledges itself to the masses to do all in its power to defend their cause and their unity.

6. The Popular Front's insistence on the release of resistance prisoners in different parts of the world stems from the will of the Palestinian and Arab masses, which has proved its invincible strength through a long period of struggle. To realize this legitimate aim the Front will continue to consider that international law, which imperialism drafted and wishes to impose on the peoples of the world by force, does not oblige it to do anything that is not in the interest of the revolution and the masses, and that this law, about which the imperialist information media are talking so much these days, is the same law that expelled the people of Palestine from their country for twenty years, starved them, exploited them and tried to crush them. It is for this reason that the Front definitely and totally refuses to allow this law to rule it or to exploit the subjected masses.

The Front will persist in attacking the

enemy wherever he may be, and in believing that it is absolutely legitimate for our masses to achieve their freedom in the teeth of unjust imperialist laws, and that the security and victory of the revolution is the only law that the revolutionaries respect.

This incident should provide courageous men in this world, whether they are journalists or writers, with an opportunity of bringing the truth to those deaf ears that have persisted in ignoring a whole people and their self-evident rights for more than twenty years. It should also prevent the imperialist countries from committing another error by falling victim to their own malicious campaign of misrepresentation.

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Telegram from President al-Bakr of Iraq to the Arab Kings and Presidents on the Situation in Jordan¹

Baghdad, September 16, 1970

After the disaster of June 5 commando action offered the Arab nation its only hope of liberation, return and effacing the ignominy of the disaster. It was also a proof of this nation's readiness to struggle to achieve its objectives and secure its rights. It is not surprising that the feelings and attention of millions of the members of this nation should be focused on the Palestinian resistance movement because it offers a glimmer of hope after the gloomy darkness and despair left behind by the disaster of June 5.

Therefore every sincere Arab and every honorable man who believes in the right of peoples to survive and live, is convinced that only if the resistance movement survives and continues to be active will it be possible to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people in their territory and their homeland. Therefore every attempt to liquidate the resistance movement can be nothing more nor less than a means of achieving the aims of the

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), September 17, 1970.

imperialist Zionist alliance, and the sincerest efforts must be coordinated to resist and frustrate such attempts.

The fatal dangers to which the Arab nation is exposed at this critical stage, as a result of activities aimed at liquidating the resistance movement and involving the Arab people of Jordan in a civil war, require that the most serious efforts be made to put a stop to the bloodshed and protect the lives of citizens.

We have high hopes that every effort will be made to ward off the dangers that confront the Palestinian revolution.

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Statement by Chairman Shibli of the Arab Five-Man Mediation Committee on the Agreement Reached Between the Government of Jordan and the P.L.O. Central Committee¹

Amman, September 16, 1970

It pleases me to announce to the Jordanian citizens and the Arab nation that an agreement was reached today between the Jordanian Government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation under the supervision of the five-member committee to remove all appearances of tension in Amman and other Jordanian towns as from Wednesday morning, 16th September 1970.

Following is the text of the agreement: (1) Guards at all positions in Amman will be replaced by civilian police—this includes Embassies and public utilities, but does not include the Royal Court, Zahran Palace, the Citadel, and Jabal at-Taj reservoir. (2) Guards at the Citadel and Jabal at-Taj reservoir will be reduced. (3) All security forces which recently occupied positions will be withdrawn. (4) All military forces will be withdrawn from the outskirts of Amman.

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3484/A/8; reprinted by permission.

(5) The fida'iyyin will withdraw from all positions occupied recently in the city streets. (6) All barricades on public roads will be removed. (7) Fida'iyyin will not intercept civil or military personnel. (8) Fida'iyyin will refrain from searching houses and arresting people. (9) Military and public security personnel will not intercept any fida'iyyin at any place. (10) A token presence of the armed struggle will be maintained at these places: the post office, Ra's al-Ayn power generators, and Ra's al-Ayn water pumps. (11) Fida'iyyin military bases in the city will be removed.

(12) These measures will be implemented between Wednesday morning and 18.00 hours 16th September 1970. (13) A joint committee will be formed as follows: (a) For the Government—Maj-Gen. Muhammad Khalil Abd ad-Dayim, Col. Abd ar-Rahman Mahadin, Col. (? Al-Io) Matar and Lt-Col. Khalil Qawar; (b) For the Central Committee—Col. Samir al-Khatib, Col. Ahmad Afanah, Lt-Col. Abd ar-Rahman al-Ajmuni, and Lt-Col. Abu al-Ala.

After implementation of these measures in Amman, they will be implemented in other towns.

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Message from King Hussein of Jordan to the Citizens of Jordan on the Formation of the Provisional Military Government (Excerpts)²

Amman, September 16, 1970

Too long has our beloved country been beset with indecision. Too long has there been a state of alarm, anarchy and lack of security in this dear land. Disunity, weakness, distraction and perplexity have increased, as has the danger that threatens Jordan and the very existence of all Arabs.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), September 17, 1970.

In view of this situation, and of the sincere and ceaseless efforts we have made to bring it to an end, it is now our duty to shoulder the greatest and heaviest of responsibilities, and to take a series of measures to restore security and order and to protect the life, livelihood, possessions, security, confidence and dignity of all citizens, to maintain the national unity of our people, to defend the dignity of noble commando action and to protect it from all danger, to maintain the dignity of our soldiers and armed forces, to defend our country and our nation from the schemes of the enemy and to preserve the love of our homeland, its name and its dignity.

[King Hussein then called on all sons of Jordan] to close our ranks and to accord to the government and its officials their sincere cooperation and absolute obedience, so as to relieve our country of its afflictions, strengthen the unity between noble commando action and the Jordanian armed forces, restore confidence and stability, impose law and order and mobilize all forces for good on behalf of dignity, prosperity and victory.

Without this we can never rebuild our country and provide it with the force and strength it needs to continue its prosperous advance towards victory and liberation.

Without this, indeed, we can do nothing against the certain and terrible danger that threatens the whole of our national existence.

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Proclamation by the Provisional Military Government of Jordan to the Citizens of Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, September 16, 1970

The Government will strike down all who commit abuses or try to mislead, whoever they may be; we have the greatest confidence that you will cooperate with and support the Government. What is happening in our

land is by no means accidental; on the contrary it is part of a terrible conspiracy directed against us specifically, and it is to be feared that it is being carried out in preparation for a new cataclysm, after all our strength and resources have been exhausted by anarchy, and after our traveling companion and comrade-in-arms, our elder sister the United Arab Republic, deprives us of all its immense resources and huge capacities, without which we cannot hope to take the initiative or exert a decisive influence on the battle. This would enable the enemy to perpetuate his occupation of our territory and threaten our brethren and our people.

Therefore, your armed forces which have come to prevent a new disaster the consequences of which only God can foresee, certain government organizations having failed to confront the challenges with awareness and courage, call on you to arm yourselves with awareness and vigilance, to refute misleading rumors and tendentious talk, and to cooperate with them in closing the ranks, ensuring national unity and showing up agents, intruders and those who indulge in overbidding.

The task of the Provisional Military Government is to put a stop to fratricidal strife, to suppress civil strife and restore confidence and stability. Its task is to help the noble members of the resistance to perform their sacred duty on the firing line, side by side with their brothers and supporters in the armed forces, by saving them from the abyss of deviation and uncertainty through the enforcement of all agreements concluded between the Government and the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Government calls on citizens to frustrate the conspiracies and intrigues of the enemy by establishing law and order, so that our noble citizens may return to the field of honor and martyrdom, and share with their brothers in arms the honor of defending the land of their ancestors and withstand the Zionist enemy who is lying in wait for the Arab nation, as a prelude to the recovery of our city of Jerusalem and the release of our people from captivity.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), September 17, 1970.

458

Message from Central Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. to the Arab Kings and Presidents on the Critical Situation in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, September 16, 1970

My brothers, the Arab Kings and Presidents,

We were surprised to learn at dawn today, September 16, 1970, that a military government has been formed, that army officers have been appointed as military governors in all parts of the country, and that a prearranged and malevolent mobilization of forces, directed against the people and the revolution, has been set in motion. And all this only a few hours after agreement had been reached by the Central Committee with Mr. Abd al-Mun'im al-Rifa'i's government under the supervision of the five-member Arab committee—the agreement which lays the preliminary foundations for the restoration of normal life in the country, and for the establishment of firm brotherly relations between the Jordanian government and army and the Palestinian revolution and the Jordanian-Palestinian people.

This agreement was made possible by powers being granted to the government of Mr. al-Rifa'i and to the Chief of Staff, both of whom have since resigned, and by the mutual confidence that existed between the Central Committee on the one hand, and the head of the government that has since resigned and important elements in the Ministry, in particular the former Chief of Staff, Lt. General Mashhur Haditha, on the other.

This dangerous step has divulged all the plans of the authorities backed by the forces of colonialism and Zionism to strike at the Palestinian revolution as a prelude to peace with the Zionist enemy, supported and protected by an American imperialist invasion of our country, which constitutes a grave peril to the advance of the whole of our Arab na-

tion. But be it known to all that our people in heroic Jordan, who, unarmed though they were, succeeded in frustrating the Baghdad Pact and Templer proposals and the Eisenhower Doctrine on the vacuum in the Middle East, are capable of crushing all the conspiracies devised against them and the whole Arab nation when armed with their destiny and their faith.

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which represents all the sections of the Palestinian revolution, I call on you, in these grave and critical circumstances, to meet your national, historic Arab responsibility to assist the Palestinian revolution which today faces the most violent colonialist attack. We call on you to rise to your responsibilities, and to intervene to prevent this blood bath which is being planned and carried out by all the agents and all the suspect forces in our beloved Jordan against the heroic and gallant Jordanian people and their national unity.

God be my witness, I have said my say.
Revolution until victory!

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Resolutions of the Central Committee of the P.L.O. Unifying the Forces of the Resistance Movement and Withdrawing the Resolution Suspending the Membership of the P.F.L.P.²

Amman, September 16, 1970

1. The Palestinian Resistance Movement orders the immediate unification of all our regular, commando and militia forces... Brother Yasser Arafat shall be the Commander in Chief of all these unified forces.

2. The Supreme Military Committee shall be transformed into a General Staff commanded by Staff Colonel Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya, Commander of the Palestine Liberation Army.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 18, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh* Supplement "September, Heroism and Massacre," 1971.

3. The resolution suspending the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's membership of the Central Committee (which was adopted because of the affair of the planes) is hereby withdrawn.

460

Order Issued by Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Resistance Forces Arafat on Self-Defense Measures Against the Jordanian Army¹

Amman, September 16, 1970

1. It is strictly forbidden to fire at any military position held by the Jordanian armed forces in towns, villages and camps, except when such a position opens fire first, in which case return fire shall be directed only at the position which opened fire first.

2. If any military force belonging to the Jordanian armed forces tries to storm any position held by the revolution, it shall be resisted by force, but firing shall be restricted to the group whose position the military force tries to penetrate.

3. Every combatant member of the resistance shall obey all orders given to him by the commander of his position.

461

Appeal Issued by the Provisional Military Government of Jordan to the Palestinian Commandos To Surrender the Arms of the Militia (Excerpt)²

Amman, September 16, 1970

Brothers, commandos. To rob our enemies of their opportunity, and so that we may be of

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), September 17, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Anwar* (Beirut), September 17, 1970.

real service to our cause of destiny, it is our duty to put an end to the danger that threatens us and to practise discipline in all our actions.

Let us all go out together, brothers, to meet the usurping enemy on the field of battle. Let the noble members of the resistance go to the localities agreed on, while the army, which is of you and for you, assures all necessary facilities. And let the members of the Militia surrender their arms to the organizations they belong to, so that they may be redistributed to all citizens regardless of regional considerations and in accordance with a new system.

Brothers, cooperation between you and your brothers in the Army will frustrate our enemies and prevent them from stirring up trouble between us and troubling the clear atmosphere that should prevail as we advance together towards the achievement of our great objectives—the liberation of our land and the recovery of our holy places that are now under the yoke of occupation.

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Resolution of the Extraordinary Session of the Arab League Council on the Events in Jordan³

Cairo, September 17, 1970

The Council of the League of Arab States held an extraordinary session at the League Headquarters on Thursday evening, September 17, 1970, to discuss the situation in Jordan, and adopted the following resolution:

[The League] in expressing its profound grief and anxiety at what is at present happening in Jordan, calls for:

1. An immediate and unconditional stop to the massacre to prevent the further shedding of Arab blood.

2. The restoration of the situation in Jordan to normal to enable the Five Member

³ Translated from the Arabic text in *Nashrat Jami'at al-Duwal al-Arabiya* (Arab League Bulletin), No. 76 (Cairo), September 17, 1970.

Committee to resume its task as set out in Resolution No. 2665 of September 6, 1970.

3. The return of the Assistant Secretary General to Amman to inform the Five Member Committee of the proceedings of the Council's meeting held on September 17, 1970 so as to provide it with guidance in such contacts as it may make and in performing its task.

4. The Council will continue in permanent session to follow the situation in Jordan in the light of such reports as it receives.

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Summary of the Message from President Nasser of the U.A.R., Major-General al-Numairi of Sudan and Colonel Qadhafi of Libya to King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, on the Events in Jordan, as Published in *al-Ahram*¹

Cairo, September 17, 1970

1. The fighting now in progress in Jordan between the army and the Palestinian resistance organizations has created an extremely grave situation—one of the gravest situations since June 1967.

2. The three countries—the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic and the Democratic Republic of Sudan—are making efforts in the present grave situation, despite their great reluctance to enter into the lists of the overbidding which is now taking place to exploit the Palestinian resistance, which is something honorable, on behalf of party activities whose sole object is to make cheap gains at the expense of the blood of the innocent.

3. There are several factors in the balance at present.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 18, 1970. The three Arab leaders delegated Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadiq, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, to go to Amman and give this message to King Hussein and Yasser Arafat.

— The blood which may be shed so abundantly if things are left as they are.

— The security of the Jordanian people in their homeland.

— The responsibilities and rights of the Jordanian authorities.

— The legality of the Palestinian resistance and its indisputable right to continue the struggle, and the fact that it is an expression of the will of the Palestinian people.

— The possibility of maintaining a minimum of effectiveness in confronting the enemy on the Eastern Front.

4. As regards the resistance, it is realized that there were unjustified provocations, and that there was conduct which injured not only the image of the resistance but also the whole Arab nation, its reputation and the sanctity of its rightful struggle.

But the whole of the Palestinian resistance movement cannot be held responsible for these provocations and this conduct, and the honorable elements in the Palestinian resistance must be helped to take over the reins of command and the direction of affairs.

To protect the resistance is a sacred duty, even if this duty lies in protecting elements of the resistance from themselves.

5. The three countries appreciate the self-control that King Hussein has exercised for so long, but they fear that certain recent measures may be interpreted as going too far for the good of both Jordan and of the whole Arab nation. The three Presidents call on the King to check the onrush of events before they develop into a grave conflict between the forces of the Jordanian Army and the forces of the resistance, both of whom, when all is said, constitute a single force with a single goal opposing a single enemy.

6. If the conflict continues in this way it will turn the Eastern Front from a war front with the enemy into a front of civil war between Arabs at which the enemy will assist as a spectator, not caring who wins or loses, for in either case he will be the winner.

7. If the clash continues, along with the attendant futile overbidding aimed at cheap

exploitation, while it is incapable of performing any positive or constructive role—if this continues regardless of the consequences, it may well result in the door being opened to international hazards which will bring the Arab struggle into a situation in which the interests and demands of continuous and unceasing struggle cannot be realized.

8. What we ask first and foremost is that the clash be stopped to provide an opportunity for profounder and more extensive consultations in order that solid foundations may be laid for the action and hopes of the future. The decision taken by the resistance organizations to unify all their forces under a single command means that for the first time in a long period there is a possibility of laying solid foundations for normal and straightforward relations between the leaders of the resistance and the Jordanian authorities.

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Call by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. to the Iraqi Forces in Jordan¹

Amman, September 17, 1970

From the Central Committee of the Palestinian resistance movement to the Iraqi forces in Jordan.

The decisive battle which the Palestinian revolution is now fighting against the subservient authorities in Jordan is the battle of the whole Arab nation and requires that all efforts be united to win it.

We call on you to take part in the battle, to enter it immediately and to assist the forces of the revolution to bring down the regime of treachery and conspiracies.

The Central Committee stresses that it is essential that you should intervene immediately in favor of the revolution.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 18, 1970.

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Telegram from President Boumedienne of Algeria to King Hussein of Jordan on Algeria's Support for the Palestinian Resistance²

Algiers, September 17, 1970

Our hearts are wrung with grief as we follow the bloody events that are taking place in Jordan, where Arab blood is being shed by Arab bullets and men have fallen who should rather have joined the company of martyrs who are creating the future of the Arab nation, ensuring its protection and maintaining its honor and dignity.

Living as we are on our nerves at this painful juncture, we feel that it is our national duty to call on you to make every effort to avert disaster, stop the shedding of Arab blood and resist all who are trying to liquidate the Palestinian revolution which has become the symbol of Arab pride and is effacing the blemish that has disfigured Arab honor since the defeat of June 1967.

From our profound concern, Your Majesty, for Jordan's sovereignty and independence, and from our determination that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of sister Arab countries, we support our brothers against the Zionist-imperialist danger that threatens to destroy the Arab nation and to impair its dignity. By the same token we can never keep silence in the face of any action aimed at destroying the Palestinian resistance. Nor can we disregard the conspiracies set on foot by imperialism and Zionism with the object of reaching a solution at the expense of the Palestinian entity and the just rights of the Palestinian people.

We hope, Your Majesty, that you will deal with this crisis with the wisdom and perspicacity we have observed in you in many previous crises, by not permitting the forces that harbor feelings of hatred for the Palestinian revolution to engage in activities that can be of no service to the Palestinian cause in particular and the Arab cause in general, and are not even in the interest of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Sha'b* (Algiers), September 18, 1970.

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Telegram from President Boumedienne of Algeria to Central Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on Algeria's Support for the Palestinian Resistance¹

Algiers, September 17, 1970

The bloody events that are taking place in Jordan and that have caused the shedding of Arab blood and the stirring up of strife and discord between brothers, lead us to condemn the base conspiracy aimed at destroying the Palestinian resistance and dissipating Arab resources which our sacred national duty demands should be employed to strike at the Zionist enemy in wait in the occupied territory. We stand with all our resources behind the Palestinian revolution which is holding out against colonialism and imperialism and the hostile force; Algeria will remain loyal to its principles and will maintain its attitude to the struggling Palestinian people and its victorious revolution.

In view of the critical circumstances through which the Palestinian revolution is passing and the tribulations that the Palestinian people are suffering, we feel obliged to assure you that Algeria stands by you and supports your revolution, and will be true to its pledge, whatever the cost.

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Statement by the Communist Parties of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in Support for the Palestinian Resistance (Excerpt)²

Beirut, September 18, 1970

In these critical and dangerous circumstances, the Communist Parties of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are of the opinion that a responsibility greater than any known in re-

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Sha'b* (Algiers), September 18, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Akhbar* (Beirut), September 27, 1970.

cent years falls on the shoulders of all sections of the Arab liberation movement, whether or not they are in power. This is the responsibility for taking rapid action on the basis of full coordination between them, and regardless of minor and secondary differences, in support of the struggle of the gallant Palestinian resistance and the heroic Jordanian people by all necessary means, so as to paralyze Jordanian reaction and overthrow the Fascist military regime before it grows any stronger, and so as to obstruct its efforts and those of similar regimes throughout the Arab world. There must also be effective struggle to prevent direct colonialist intervention in the area, and to maintain constant vigilance as regards the possible consequences of such intervention.

Aware of their responsibilities at this stage, and in conformity with their policy and their principles, the three Parties that have signed this statement offer all their political and material resources in support of the Palestinian resistance and the Jordanian people in the common battle they are fighting against the Fascist regime in Jordan, shoulder to shoulder with all sections of the Arab liberation movement. Past experience has repeatedly proved that it is only possible to frustrate the many colonialist-Zionist-reactionary conspiracies within the framework of the unity of and cooperation between all sections of the Arab liberation movement and the progressive regimes. For this conspiracy is directed against all of them, even though at the start it seemed to be directed against only one country or one particular force.

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Cable from President Nasser of the U.A.R. to King Hussein of Jordan Calling for a Cease-Fire³

Cairo, September 19, 1970

To my brother, His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal,

³ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 20, 1970.

Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, because of circumstances beyond his control, has so far not been able to meet brother Yasser Arafat, the President of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, although in our view such a meeting is of vital importance to ensure the success of the efforts we are trying to make to stop the bloody conflict between brothers in Jordan.

If we are to be faithful to our responsibilities, we cannot allow the present situation to continue. We therefore address to you directly a sincere Arab appeal for a cease-fire as soon as possible, if only for 24 hours, to give our nation the respite we so urgently need at Jordanian, Arab and even human levels.

The information we have received about losses is terrible, and according to our appraisal the consequences are fraught with danger. Thousands of innocent people are at the mercy of the firing or are bleeding to death untended in the streets. This is a situation which our nation cannot accept; all of us are disgraced by it in the sight of our own consciences, of future generations and of all countries in the world, whether they are our friends or our enemies.

I repeat my appeal to you. We have told Lieutenant-General Sadeq to be ready to make urgent efforts on behalf of a cease-fire, even if only for a limited period, and I hope that he will be able to contact brother Yasser Arafat with a view to achieving coordination.

I am confident that you will respond immediately to this appeal, thereby enabling us to put an end to the grievous tragedy that is now being enacted, and to frustrate the international conspiracy, evidence for which is to be found in the suspect moves of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. This conspiracy is trying to exploit the deplorable events in Jordan to provide it with the opportunity to intervene. Should this happen it would have disastrous consequences which our nation cannot accept.

Your historic responsibility at this moment is decisive, and may God help every one of us to do his duty.

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Cable from President Nasser of the U.A.R. to Palestinian Resistance Forces Commander-in-Chief Arafat Calling for a Cease-Fire in Jordan¹

Cairo, September 19, 1970

Brother Yasser Arafat,

I have just cabled His Majesty King Hussein to tell him that because of circumstances beyond his control, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, has not so far been able to meet you, in spite of the fact that in our view such a meeting is of vital importance to ensure the success of the efforts we are trying to make to stop the bloody conflict between brothers in Jordan.

If we are to be faithful to our responsibilities we cannot allow the present situation to continue. We therefore address to you directly, as one Arab to another, a sincere appeal for a cease-fire as soon as possible, if only for 24 hours, to give our nation the respite we so urgently need at both Jordanian and Arab levels. The United Arab Republic believes that the Palestinian people is the most sensitive nerve in the whole of the contemporary Arab struggle, and that the Palestinian resistance is the living embodiment of the existence of this people and of its role and aspirations. The United Arab Republic is as completely concerned for the Palestinian resistance as it is for the officers and men of the Jordanian army; all are sons of the Arab nation, all of them are its men. Moreover, we have received distressing details of what the civilian population is suffering in Amman and elsewhere as a result of what is going on there. For all these reasons I have asked King Hussein to cooperate in securing an immediate cease-fire which will give us all a breathing space.

I hope, brother, that you on your part will help me to achieve this so that we may be able to put an end to a situation that is as explosive as it is distressing. I also hope that Lieute-

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 20, 1970.

nant-General Sadeq may later be able to contact you and coordinate with you.

The United Arab Republic will finally determine its attitude in the light of the response we receive to the disinterested efforts we are at present making, with right as our sole object, on behalf of the security of our nation and its ability to continue the struggle.

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Message from King Hussein of Jordan to U.A.R. President Nasser Agreeing To Order a Cease-Fire in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, September 19, 1970

The regrettable manner in which the situation has recently exploded in Jordan was not the result of pure coincidence, nor did I have any say or choice in the matter. On the contrary, it was the climax of a great conspiracy directed against the whole country, army and people alike.

Just as the whole world knows how great have been the sacrifices offered by the Jordanian people on the long road of Arab struggle, so my brother and friend knows as well as the enemy does with what self-sacrificing devotion the army of that people has offered the lives of its men. This is the army that, without delay or hesitation, hastened to join the battle in 1967 alongside the heroic army of the United Arab Republic under your command, and fought on the longest line of confrontation with our common enemy.

For a long time now the loyal and enduring people of Jordan have been the target of a deliberate and evil campaign designed to divide its ranks, dissipate its energies and destroy its security and confidence and the honor of its citizens.

For a long period the citizen of this country has enjoyed no security for his life or the lives

of his children, nor for his livelihood and his possessions; nor could he feel assured of even the minimum of dignity in his life.

The army, which constitutes a part of the Arabs' resources and their joint strength in the battle of destiny, was being stabbed in the back at a time when it should have been devoting itself exclusively to stemming the spate of attacks that were being made on it from in front. Its lines of communication were cut and thrown into confusion, the houses of its officers were blown up, the families of its commanders and men were attacked, and the evildoers did not hesitate even to impugn the honor and reputation of these officers and men.

I had long been aware of and on my guard against all this. I had long been opening my heart to His Excellency, my brother, and revealing to him my fears as I watched the conspiracy advancing stage by stage.

God knows that the role played by the army in the last few days was forced on it and on us against our will. It was imposed on us by the conspiracy and the conspirators when things had reached such a pass that the very existence of this army, which is so dear to you, and this country, which is so close to your heart, was threatened with destruction.

It will suffice for the moment if I say that the Jordanian Army, with its unblemished and brilliant record in the Palestine war, has become the target of attacks even by certain quarters who neither took part in nor had any direct experience of the Palestine war; instead they drew you and us into the battle and then surrendered their territory to the enemy without a fight.

The enemy, Your Excellency, planned to destroy our country and our nation and you, as the great leader of the struggle in the midst of your nation, are as profoundly concerned for Amman as you are for Cairo, for every Jordanian, civilian or military, as for every Arab Egyptian in the ranks of the people and in the ranks of the armed forces.

The disaster is not so much that the enemy should be plotting and planning to achieve his ambitions; the real disaster is that there should be within our walls, within our country, within the great Arab world men ap-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 21, 1970.

pointed by the enemy to carry out his plans and realize his ambitions.

You yourself, Your Excellency, from your long experience, from the bitter trials you have passed through, know that it is this alone that truly wrings the heart.

My brother's voice has plucked at my very heart-strings, his brave and noble appeal has touched my hearing and the whole of my being. Firm as I am in my belief that I shall continue to advance with you until the goals and aspirations of our nation are achieved, I hereby declare that in everything he does my brother is inspired by his conscience, his honor and his true Arabism.

I therefore hasten to respond to your appeal, and now that the Army has obtained control of the situation I shall give orders for a cease-fire to be observed in Amman except when any firing is aimed at the armed forces and citizens, and we shall do all we can to meet the humane requirements of the situation, in the hope that the other side will also respond to your sincere efforts and magnanimous endeavors.

I shall accord your respected envoy every possible support in his task, and expect a similar honorable attitude on the part of the other party, although experience has taught us that its commands are not in control of the elements attached to them, and that their concern for the keeping of promises and compacts is not always as great as you could wish.

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Message from Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Resistance Forces Arafat to his Forces Calling for a Cease-Fire¹

Amman, September 19, 1970

In response to President Gamal Abdel Nasser's call for a cease-fire, the Palestinian revolution announces that it is ready to take

the necessary measures to enforce a cease-fire, so that the delegate of the three Presidents, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq, may be able to perform the task entrusted to him. In return, we call on the authorities to enforce a cease-fire to stop the shedding of innocent blood, to prevent our country becoming the scene of a long civil war and foreign intervention, and also to save it from the danger of epidemics that may well spread as the result of the thousands of corpses that are lying unburied beneath the ruins. We shall leave it to Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq to take the necessary steps and measures to ensure a cease-fire by both sides.

We shall adhere to the cease-fire as soon as we are informed of it and it is announced.

Your brother the Commander in Chief of the Revolution wishes you, heroic combatants, to know that he salutes your heroism as you defend not only the Revolution and the right of our people to life, return and liberation, but also the honor of the Arab nation.

Revolution until victory!

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Call by the Notables, Trade Unions, Doctors, Pharmacists' and Engineers' Unions in the West Bank to King Hussein of Jordan To Stop the Fighting in Jordan²

mid-June, 1970

To King Hussein, Amman.

The people of the occupied territory condemn the inhuman actions and barbarous crimes that are being perpetrated by the military regime in Amman with your approval and permission. Your conduct and your chameleon changes have finally convinced us that your rule, from which we have suffered for twenty years, has not changed and will never change.

Stop the massacre and stop killing peaceable women, children and old people. It is

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 21, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Quds* (Jerusalem), September 20, 1970.

shameful that you should kill members of your own family. You are re-enacting the tragedy of Nero, and these barbarous crimes will be held against you throughout history.

Be it known to you that the dominion of the unrighteous lasts but a moment and that the tyrant is soon overthrown.

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Speech by President al-Atasi of Syria to the Congress of the General Federation of Workers in Syria on the Events in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Damascus, September 20, 1970

They are now talking of Syrian forces entering Jordan, and we say that we are being submitted to pressure from large numbers of our citizens scattered all over Arab territories—thousands of cables are reaching us every day asking us: What are you doing? Arabs are being slaughtered in Arab territory; why are you doing nothing?—thousands of cables from the north to the south of the Arab homeland, from the east to the west, from all parts of the world. Every Arab whose conscience is shocked by this tragedy is writing to us, calling on us, saying: You who are witnessing the tragedy, by just looking on at it, you are contributing to it.

What is more, Arab countries that are not in confrontation with or neighbors of Jordan have asked us to allow our forces to intervene to protect the Arab individual. But for all this we know that the battle is long, we know that our battle with Jordanian reaction, or rather with agents, is at the same time the battle of their imperialist and Zionist masters. Therefore, brothers, you may be confident, and the masses of the whole Arab nation from the Ocean to the Gulf may be confident that the battle is our battle and that we are placing the full resources of this Region at the disposal

of the Palestinian revolution without any reservations. But we are also aware of the great plan and of our historic national responsibility. Therefore, within the framework of this view, it is absolutely impossible that we should not give our Palestinian brothers, revolutionaries and members of the resistance and the army of liberation, all they require to defend their sons who are being slaughtered like sheep in Arab territory. We call on every individual in the Arab world to bear his full responsibility in the face of the enemies of the Arab nation, both the agents and their masters. And let American imperialism know that if it wants this battle to be a decisive one, it will be a decisive one indeed, in which all its interests in the Arab homeland will be destroyed, because both it and our people too wanted the battle to be a decisive one. And so it shall be.

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Letter from Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Resistance Forces Arafat to President Nasser of the U.A.R. on the Situation of the Cease-Fire in Amman (Excerpt)²

Amman, September 20, 1970

Your appeal itself and the confidence felt in you by your brethren greatly influenced our response to it, and I gave immediate orders for a cease-fire on our part if the other side agreed to it. But to our amazement they did not stop firing at the time announced by the Jordanian government for the cease-fire. This leaves no room for doubt that it is the intention of the Jordanian authorities to continue with the execution of their plan to the end with the object of liquidating the Palestinian revolution. And not only this; there can be no doubt that the intention is to proceed with their operation against our people,

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), September 21, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 21, 1970.

who are now being subjected to violent measures and to bombardment by the Jordanian artillery which is shelling the city without mercy and regardless of our women and children—that artillery which, along with the tanks, should now be performing their duty providing cover for the operations of their brethren the commandos against the Zionist enemy.

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Cable from President Nasser of the U.A.R. to King Hussein of Jordan on the Necessity of Abiding by the Cease-Fire¹

Cairo, September 20, 1970

To His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal.

The latest reports I have received from Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq show that the gravest dangers are latent in what is happening in Jordan.

These dangers will have the gravest effect on our nation, its advance, its struggle and its aspirations.

Elements of the Jordanian army are still firing despite the assurances I have received from Your Majesty, and at a time when I learn that the leadership of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization has accepted the cease-fire.

I will not conceal from Your Majesty the fact that I feel that Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq is not finding it possible to perform his task in Amman in the manner we would wish, and this is causing us all the greatest concern.

I call for Your Majesty's immediate personal intervention to ensure that the Jordanian army units adhere to the cease-fire, and I regard it as my duty to raise my voice to warn of the grave consequences that may ensue if this is not done.

I feel that I am entitled to call on you in the name of our nation, our struggle and our

history, to take a decisive stand to secure the unity and security of our nation and of the holy war which it must continue to fight against the enemy.

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Second Cable from President Nasser of the U.A.R. to King Hussein of Jordan on the Dire Necessity for a Cease-Fire²

Cairo, September 20, 1970

To His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal.

I have heard from Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq that after long efforts, which were beset with many dangers, he has succeeded in arranging a meeting with brother Yasser Arafat, the President of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, within the framework of the task allotted to him by my brothers Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and Ja'far al-Numairi and myself, with the object of putting an end to the civil war in Jordan.

I now learn that the place in which it was arranged that the meeting should be held is at this moment being shelled by elements of the Jordanian Army, a situation which I am sure Your Majesty cannot approve or accept.

Similarly all Arabs agree with you and me that this is a situation that no one can approve or accept.

Once again I call on you to help us to bring to an end this ordeal and the suffering and calamity it has already brought on all of us.

Any miscalculation or wrong appraisal at the present juncture is liable to have the most undesirable consequences for us and for our nation. It is therefore the duty of all of us to make sure where we are going before the course of events involves us in complications of the utmost gravity.

I hope from the bottom of my heart that you will immediately take such decisions as are necessary to ensure that what is now hap-

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 21, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 21, 1970.

pening ceases, for this nation has suffered enough in the last few days. I pray that God may grant you success and guide your steps.

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Cable from King Hussein of Jordan to President Nasser of the U.A.R. in Response to the President's Two Cables to Him¹

Amman, September 20, 1970

I have listened to your truly brotherly appeal with all my heart and soul, and once again I wish to assure Your Excellency that the trials that have afflicted the people, the armed forces and the noble freedom fighters of Jordan are part of a terrible conspiracy planned and prepared by the enemy and carried out by those who became involved in it regardless of the interests of Jordan, the Arabs and the sacred cause.

Like my brother, I am the last to consent to the shedding of a single drop of blood except on the field of the struggle against the common enemy, and I am confident that my brother is the first to refuse that Jordan should be a morsel to be swallowed by that enemy and a cheap offering to his ambitions for expansion and occupation.

I was being perfectly sincere and serious when I called on the Jordanian armed forces to give orders for a cease-fire yesterday (Saturday), and I regret that the other side should have shunned every appeal, even yours, and turned a deaf ear to every voice, even the voice of the nation, the cause and destiny. Far from accepting the cease-fire, it has been loud in its rejection of it in its broadcasts and has not even hesitated to shell my headquarters throughout the evening, as it has done throughout the last four nights. My one consolation in this has been that this was exposing me to the same perils as my beloved subjects, my gallant soldiers and every honorable man in this country.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 21, 1970.

I have the pleasure to inform Your Excellency that there are encouraging indications that it may be possible to arrange a meeting between brothers at which I hope we shall arrive at the results that all of us so earnestly desire.

I have told the government to associate Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq with its efforts and to inform him of all results. With repeated thanks to my brother. May God help us all.

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Cable Message from King Hussein of Jordan Informing the Arab Kings and Presidents of the Entry into Jordanian Territory of an Armed Force from Syria²

Amman, September 20, 1970

To my brothers, the Arab Kings and Presidents:

We have been surprised, as has every loyal and honorable Arab, by a criminal attack launched this time not by the ruling authorities in Israel but by the rulers of Damascus and the butchers of Syria—a force, estimated to consist of an armored brigade of the Syrian Army, has attacked Jordanian territory.

This aggression by the rulers of Damascus is another part of the planned conspiracy against this country and the Arab nation. It is an undisguised invitation to Israel to achieve more of its ambitions and designs, the rulers of Syria having already, in the war of June 1967, enabled it to achieve what it has so far achieved.

The Jordanian armed forces, which have succeeded in repelling this base aggression, remind Arabs everywhere of the treachery of the rulers of Damascus in 1967 when, not content with drawing the Arab nation into disaster, they left the right wing of the Jordanian front uncovered and surrendered the

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 21, 1970.

whole of the Golan Heights as a morsel to be swallowed by the Israeli army.

The Jordanian people, who are standing as one man with their armed forces against the conspiracy aimed at their army and the destiny of the one Arab nation, today remember and recall to all Arabs wherever they may be the repeated Israeli attacks on them from the Golan Heights, in the hearing and with the blessing of the rulers of Damascus. It sees in today's base Syrian aggression the latest illustration of the subservience of those rulers and of their close links with the terrible Zionist-colonialist plan against this struggling country and the struggle of the whole Arab nation.

The rulers of Syria have disclosed the dimensions of the new conspiracy and shown that it goes beyond martyred Palestine and steadfast Jordan to include the Arab entity as a whole. While reminding my brothers, the Arab leaders, of the historic responsibility imposed on them by this treacherous conspiracy, I affirm that the army and people of Jordan will oppose the conspiracy and the conspirators to the last drop of their blood—men, women and children—and declare that all must bear the consequences of this grave Syrian aggression. And the tyrants shall know what is in store for them.

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Second Cable Message From King Hussein of Jordan Informing the Arab Kings and Presidents of the Entry into Jordanian Territory of an Armed Force from Syria¹

Amman, September 20, 1970

From Hussein to the Arab Kings and Presidents:

I have already informed you earlier this morning that the Syrian Arab Republic has attacked Jordanian territory. I now regret to inform you that the Syrian forces entered

Jordan with large concentrated armored units all along the northern sector, moving towards Irbid.

This barefaced Syrian invasion of Jordan reveals that it is part of a hostile conspiracy aimed at creating a favorable opportunity for a new Israeli sweep and for the implementation of hostile plans in the Arab area at the expense of this country and its very existence.

In conveying to you the true picture of how the situation has developed in Jordan, I am confronting each of my brothers with his national and historic responsibility, now that the Syrian aggression has transformed the danger into one that threatens the very existence of all Arabs.

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Statement by a Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic on an American Communiqué Accusing the Syrian Government of Military Intervention in Jordan²

Damascus, September 21, 1970

The United States State Department has issued a communiqué in the name of the Secretary of State William Rogers accusing the Syrian Arab Republic of sending its forces into Jordan.

The government of the Syrian Arab Republic denies these allegations, which it regards as paving the way to an American military intervention in the area, especially as since yesterday the United States has been moving its Sixth Fleet and sending naval units to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and issuing statements on the possibility of its intervening in Jordan.

The subservient authorities in Jordan would not have dared to strike at the commandos, shell their camps and carry out an appalling massacre had they not been sure of United States encouragement, which induced them to act in a provocative manner by also shelling certain Syrian positions.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 21, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), September 22, 1970.

In drawing the attention of the world to this imperialist conspiracy, the government of the Syrian Arab Republic calls on all countries in the world to condemn these American threats, to take a resolute stand against this conspiracy and to demand the withdrawal of the naval units of the American Sixth Fleet which constitute a threat to the security of the Middle East and to world peace.

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Call by King Hussein of Jordan to the Jordanian Forces To Observe a Cease-Fire¹

Amman, September 21, 1970

From Hussein, Supreme Commander of the Jordanian Armed Forces to all commanders [officers], non-commissioned officers and men of the armed forces in Amman.

In response to the call of conscience and national duty, and in order to put a stop to the tragedies which the conspiracy has inflicted on the army and the dear citizens of our country, and from our appreciation of the great responsibilities that fall on us in these historic moments of the life of Jordan and of all Arabs, I hereby order strict and absolute observance of a cease-fire as from this moment and call on all to maintain law and order and to make the most strenuous efforts to cope with the regrettable complications that have come to pass and to heal the bleeding wounds sustained by our beloved country.

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Message from President Nasser of the U.A.R. to King Hussein of Jordan on the

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 22, 1970.

Perils Attendant on the Liquidation of the Palestinian Resistance²

Cairo, September 21, 1970

To my brother, His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal; King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

I have asked Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq to inform Your Majesty of my decision that he should leave Amman after the tragic and regrettable developments which are still taking place and which we are unable to find any satisfactory way of stopping.

If I may be permitted to say something to Your Majesty at this grave moment in the life of our nation, I should like to submit to you the following:

1. The military operations which have been carried out, and are still being carried out in Amman must stop. They should have stopped long ago, and the Jordanian authorities should have been more capable of self-control, especially after we arrived at a cease-fire agreement.

It is not a question of authority; there are Jordanian, Arab and human factors in Jordan which are entitled to veneration and respect, and I cannot conceive how any authority can be firmly established on ruins, corpses and unlimited bloodshed.

2. Your Majesty will remember that when we met in Alexandria on August 21 I fully explained to you my view that it is not in the higher interests of the Arabs nor in the interests of our future struggle that the Palestinian resistance should be the object of any operations leading to its liquidation or any-

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 25, 1970. Mr. Muhammad Hasanain Haykal, Editor-in-Chief of *al-Ahram*, published the text of this message in his weekly article "Frankly Speaking," stating that, at the time it was sent, King Hussein requested that it should not be published, and adding that "changed circumstances now require that it should be published... for the first time." On September 22, 1970, *al-Ahram* reported that Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq had requested an early interview with King Hussein, and that he met him and handed him "a last important message" from President Nasser, then left Amman for Cairo in accordance with the orders he received.

thing of the kind. I felt that I had made my view clear to you and that you were apparently convinced.

Unfortunately the course that events took in Jordan with the formation of the military government has created an impression totally at odds with this spirit and this has been followed by conduct that it is impossible to justify.

I realize that the other side made mistakes, but the United Arab Republic cannot accept that the response to these mistakes should take the form of what all must regard as an attack on the resistance as a whole.

3. I must inform Your Majesty with all frankness that recent circumstances have brought to positions of responsibility in Jordan elements in whose good intentions I can have no confidence, and I do not believe that the advice offered by such men can be either sound or sincere. Although I have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Jordan, the responsibility I feel under present circumstances compels me to tell you this frankly, and to say that, in my estimate, these elements not only constitute a danger to the Palestinian resistance, but may lead to Jordan itself and its national institutions being imperilled.

4. The United Arab Republic believes in the importance of the role of the Palestinian resistance, in its legality and in its effectiveness in the constant struggle against the enemy, and for this reason the United Arab Republic has always been of the opinion that the Palestinian resistance must be protected from all its enemies and from some of those who, for their own purposes, pretend to be its friends—and even from certain elements that actually belong to it, and we have always said that the Palestinian resistance is one of the noblest consequences of the setback of June 1967.

It has always been our wish that all Arab forces should act on this basis, to sustain the hopes, maintain the rights and embody the existence of the Palestinian people in the field of struggle.

5. Lieutenant-General Muhammad Sadeq

will present Your Majesty with a last call for a cease-fire, so that we may all reconsider our attitudes. If events continue on this disastrous course hundreds of thousands of Arabs will be subjected to frightful horrors, and the door will be opened to national and international complications which must be avoided at all costs.

My last request is that you will respond to this call as soon as possible, to protect the future, the security and the honor of the Arab nation.

It is impossible for us to stand idly by in the sight of what is happening in Jordan and we cannot allow things to get worse as every hour passes.

I must honestly tell you that we shall not allow the Palestinian resistance to be liquidated, and that no-one will be able to liquidate it, and that we shall find ourselves fighting a civil war instead of a war against the enemy; I should not like you to be responsible for this, and I sincerely believe that it is still in your power to avoid it.

I know what an honorable attitude you are capable of adopting; I have often heard you talking of your people and your nation. This is the last chance given to all of us to ensure that our actions rise to the level of our historic responsibilities. May God grant you success in what you decide.

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Statement by the P.F.L.P. on the Negotiations over the Hostages Held by It¹

September 21, 1970

1. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is not prepared to listen to anything but acceptance in principle of its conditions for the exchange of prisoners.

2. West Germany, Switzerland, Britain and the United States have overtly linked themselves with the Israeli attitude which is

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), September 22, 1970.

the result of the fact that Israel is in a state of war with the Arabs, and they must bear the consequences of having done so. When Israel detained the Algerian officials, it argued that it was in a state of war with Algeria; this gives the situation a special character. In the view of the Popular Front the four Western Powers have chosen to regard their relations with us, as far as their subjects are concerned, as being on the same basis as their relations with the Israelis, whom the Popular Front regards as prisoners of war. Therefore, while it is unable to understand the meaning of this Western decision, the Front holds the four countries responsible for its consequences.

3. The Popular Front holds the government of the United States and the Red Cross representative, M. Rochat, directly responsible for the consequences of the foolish and unnecessary tactic which has resulted in the failure to resolve the problem and, consequently, in placing the hostages in their present dangerous situation.

4. The Popular Front holds the five countries (America, Britain, Switzerland, West Germany and Israel) responsible for any harm or injury to the hostages, especially as, since the start of the affair, these countries have preferred to treat the matter lightly and to act in conformity with a campaign of misrepresentation of which they themselves soon became the victims.

5. In consequence of the above, the Popular Front believes that the recent Israeli measures involving the arrest of 3,500 Palestinian citizens in the West Bank and Gaza were taken with the knowledge and at the instigation of the four Western countries (America, Britain, West Germany and Switzerland) which have effectively linked themselves with the state of war that exists between Israel and the Palestinian revolution.

6. The information campaign engineered and launched by the United States of America has resulted in world public opinion being provided with a distorted picture of the hostages and an obscure picture of the at-

titude of the Popular Front to this matter. This has led to Washington instigating members of the "Berne Group" to act in accordance with this misleading information, and this in turn has brought the group to the present deadlock, which is the consequence of American misrepresentation.

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Cable from Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Resistance Forces Arafat to the Conference of the Arab Kings and Presidents in Cairo on the Situation in Jordan¹

Amman, September 22, 1970

To the Arab Kings and Presidents—the Summit Conference—Cairo:

Amman is burning for the sixth day. The bodies of thousands of our people are rotting beneath the rubble. Tens of thousands of houses have been destroyed. Hundreds of thousands are homeless in the streets and mosques. The bodies of our dead are scattered in the public squares. Hunger and thirst are destroying such of our women, children and old people as still survive. Their artillery and tanks are still shelling and destroying, in spite of all their promises to you. It is a massacre unparalleled in history. We have constantly tried to spare our country this massacre, and we have tried more than once to conclude an agreement with them. But every time they have betrayed us. The committees you have sent know all the details. We no longer have any confidence in any of them or in their honor. They continue to be intent on annihilating our people; their conspiracy is now clear and undisguised, and supported by documentary evidence, and now that they have failed to destroy our whole people an American landing at their request is a matter of hours.

A sea of blood and twenty thousand of our people killed or wounded divide us from

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 23, 1970

them. From Amman, among our dead, among the piles of ruins, the debris of our long-suffering people, I address you. We had hoped to be with you to arraign the criminals as they deserve, but our present situation requires that we remain among our people so that we may face our destiny together. I am incapable of describing the tragedy that is being enacted here; I therefore call on you, in the name of the people, to transfer the Conference to Amman at once, so that you may see for yourselves how great is the crime and how appalling the massacre, and so that the masses of our people may feel that, after six days, some members at least of their nation have come here to shoulder their responsibilities in the sight of God and history. Despite all their losses and sacrifices our people are steadfast and resolved to continue along the road they have driven through their suffering, their blood and the lives of their martyrs, until God grants them victory. God be my witness, there has been a massacre. God be my witness, I have said my say. May God judge between us, for to him who is with God, He grants victory.

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Communiqué of the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Threat To Land American Troops in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, September 22, 1970

Masses of our people, the Arab nation and the world,

The Central Committee of the Palestinian Revolution unambiguously announces the entry of the Hattin Brigade, which is part of the Palestine Liberation Army—and this is a legitimate right of the revolution—to play its national role of defending the Revolution and frustrating the imperialist, Zionist, reactionary conspiracy. When defeat seemed prob-

able, the authorities had recourse to their imperialist masters and provided them with justifications to intervene and slaughter the revolution.

The Central Committee warns American imperialism against intervening; it should realize that all its interests in the Arab area will be destroyed by the peoples of the Arab nation and their national forces. The Central Committee also warns the subservient authorities against continuing to play fast and loose with the destiny of the homeland and the people and affirms that this band of lackeys no longer has any links with the people since the blood-bath that has divided the people from that handful of lackeys who are only concerned for their own sordid interests and in executing the wishes of their imperialist masters. Arab people! Sons of the Revolution! Noble men and officers! Arab revolution!

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Speech by President Franjeh of Lebanon at the Swearing-in Ceremony in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies (Excerpts)²

Beirut, September 23, 1970

... Lebanon will always remain sovereign, free and independent, show concern for the integrity of its land and Constitution, work for progress in all spheres and remain proud of its democratic republican regime.... Lebanon will continue its strong cooperation with friendly States and its solidarity with the fraternal Arab States on the basis of reciprocal respect for the sovereignty and order of each State. Lebanon will honestly work to strengthen the ties of fraternity and blood with the Arab States. Lebanon will respect international and Arab charters,

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 23, 1970.

² Broadcast on Beirut Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3491/A/1; reprinted by permission.

particularly those of the UN and the Arab League, and will always continue to be a member which loves and strives for peace.

Lebanon believes that the Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Sepulchre make Palestine a holy land for all Lebanese and Arabs. Lebanon believes in the sacredness of the fida'i action, which adheres to its sublime goal and which abides by the duty of respecting the bases of national integrity and sovereignty. Lebanon will always strive for the return of their rights to their owners, wishing for dear Palestine what its sons wish. Lebanon will direct its attention to the south and its problems and strive to find solutions for these problems....

I stress that I will undertake the responsibility of the Presidency—like every responsibility I have undertaken—alone, conscientiously, independently and firmly.... The Lebanese are all equal, in our view and in accordance with the law. No one Lebanese is preferred over another except in the degree of his loyalty to Lebanon....

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Letter from Detained Fateh Leader Abu Iyad to King Hussein of Jordan Calling for "an End to Dissension"¹

Amman, September 23, 1970

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate—HM King Husayn, may God preserve him, God's peace and blessings be with you.

I address this letter to you in the name of the Palestinian people, which seemed destined to remain destitute and lost for over 20 years and then found itself in the fida'i action to retrieve Palestine and return its people to it. Today this people and its fraternal Jordanian people are living a real tragedy in which dissension is about to devour almost everything. For this reason and for the sake of the

people, whom you have loved throughout your life, I ask you to make an unbiased appeal out of concern for all—the Army, the people and the fida'iyyin—an appeal which would put an end to dissension and prevent its exploitation, thus preserving all.

I wish to submit to Your Majesty the following practical proposals:

(1) The Army should withdraw to suitable points around the capital.

(2) After that the fida'iyyin should withdraw from the city and all bases should be removed from it.

(3) After these steps have been taken a formula could be reached embodying the following:

(a) Dealing with the PLO as a representative of the Palestine people and the ending of duplication in the fida'i action.

(b) The fida'iyyin will remain at their bases at the frontiers of the occupied homeland and shall not appear in the towns.

(c) The fida'iyyin and those connected with them shall abide by the country's laws and regulations.

Agreement on other points could then be reached in an atmosphere of national conciliation in which there is no victor or vanquished but a spirit of national harmony. I hope, Your Majesty, that you will continue to be as we have known you, eager to see that all these points are carried out under your guidance and through your efforts, so that the people's unity may remain immortal and so that we may be able to work for the complete liberation of our soil and our greater homeland.

Your Majesty, I shall not forget your detained brothers and sons whom I consider to be your guests and under your care. May God preserve you. Peace be with you.

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3490/A/6 and A/7; reprinted by permission.

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Message Broadcast by President Numairi of Sudan on the Agreement of "an Immediate and Permanent Cease-Fire" in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, September 23, 1970

I came here last night at the head of an Arab delegation in the name of the Arab leaders' conference which convened in Cairo in the wake of the disaster that befell your dear country. The regrettable bloody incidents which occurred in Jordan have pained the hearts of all Arabs from the Ocean to the Gulf and also the hearts of the freedom-loving friends in the world who support our just cause. The delegation consists of brothers the Tunisian Premier, Bahi al-Adgham, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence and the Interior, Shaykh Sa'd al-Abdullah as-Sabah, and the UAR Chief of Staff, Lt-Gen. Muhammad Sadiq.

In past years the Arab peoples have been closely following your struggle against the common enemy, praying for your victory, and giving you every possible aid. However, they were suddenly horrified by the catastrophe in struggling Jordan. They expected anything but this catastrophe, for the man on the battlefield should know better than anyone else the need for unity, co-operation and cohesion under all circumstances. The Arab peoples did not expect events to deteriorate to this extent between brothers of one blood who share livelihood, objective and destiny. On the contrary, the Arab peoples believed that the steadfast forces in Jordan were stronger than the enemy's plots and contemptible, destructive methods.

I and my fellow members of the Arab delegation met HM brother King Husayn. Like my brothers, I sensed how deeply pained the King is. However, in addition to this we sensed his faith in and concern for

the fida'i action and also his faith in and care for the unity of his people and the sanctity of this unity. We sensed His Majesty's sincere and immediate response to the call of his nation and its conscience. After all, he has devoted his whole life to struggling for this nation.

Although it was not possible for me to meet with brother Yasir Arafat, I and my fellow members of the Arab delegation met brother Palestinian revolutionaries Salah Khalaf—Abu Iyad; Faruq Qaddumi—Abu al-Lutf; Ibrahim Bakr; Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah; and Col. Samir al-Khatib. I and my brothers sensed how deeply pained they were. We also sensed their sincere and immediate response to the call of their nation and its conscience. After all, they also are struggling for the nation's sacred cause.

Our delegation saw the message HM brother King Husayn gave this morning. The proposals contained in this address are based on the proposals put forward by brother Salah Khalaf—Abu Iyad—in a letter to His Majesty at midnight last night. We bless and support these decisions in the name of the Arab leaders and Arab peoples. We sincerely and in a brotherly spirit request that these decisions be adopted, adhered to, and considered a basis for any future detailed arrangements.

We have all agreed that there must be an immediate and permanent cease-fire. Thus, we will expose the agent elements which do not want the country to calm down, which want to enable the enemy to occupy more territory, and which want to leave the door wide open for the fleets and other [word indistinct] forces which are moving close to the Arab world and to you.

Finally, brothers in fraternal Jordan, the freedom, support and organisation of fida'i action is in the trust of all Arabs. The Jordanian armed forces are an asset to the Arabs and a partner to honest fida'i action on the course of liberation and victory. Co-operation, cohesion and co-ordination between the armed forces and fida'i action is a sacred duty unto victory or martyrdom. The Jordanian people have welcomed and will continue to welcome their Palestinian brothers. The Jor-

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted from the English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3491/A/8; reprinted by permission.

danian territory has been, since the first setback and the occupation of Palestine, a refuge for all. We do not doubt that all will forget the disaster and its tragedies in the common march and joint constructive action, which will console all for their tragedies.

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Message from King Hussein of Jordan on the Achievement of a Cease-Fire to the Jordanian Army and Citizenry and the Palestinian Commandos¹

Amman, September 23, 1970

My brothers, our beloved citizens:

Dear brothers in arms and struggle, members of the gallant Jordanian armed forces:

My brothers, the honorable commandos:

I salute you, whether you are in your homes or at your posts; I send you the love with which my heart is overflowing, and the devotion which fills my spirit.

At midnight yesterday, Tuesday, I received from a number of the leaders of the Fatch organization and Palestinian commando action a message in which they called on me as brothers and sons and addressed to me a sincere and loyal appeal.

I have given this message my most careful attention, in view of my concern for the unity of my people, my determination to maintain the unity of the struggle whose base is beloved Jordan, and my absolute belief in the unity of the struggle of the gallant Jordanian armed forces, honorable commando action and the beloved Jordanian people, which is the father of both the army and commando action. I have considered it in the light of my constant conviction that the goal of liberation is the one sacred goal of all noble fighters in our beloved land, whether they be soldiers or commandos.

Now that, with God's help, we have suc-

ceeded in putting an end to the disunity and division which, the aim was, should prevail among us, to provide our enemies with an opportunity to implement their conspiracy against our existence, our nation and our cause, I hereby declare and reaffirm to you my firm belief in an approval of the following:

1. That the natural place for the commandos and their bases is the line of confrontation with the enemy, and that the Jordanian armed forces, being the bulwark of the homeland, the protector of its people's homes, the guardian of the land and the homeland and the citadel of its freedom and independence, should be stationed in those localities where their presence is required by national security and the circumstances of the battle of destiny with the enemy.

On this basis orders will be given for the army to assume its customary positions and for the commandos to withdraw and remove their bases from the towns and villages to the frontiers of the occupied territory.

2. That the Palestine Liberation Organization should be treated as the representative of the Palestinian people inasmuch as it represents the unity of Palestinian political and military action, and as it moves and acts with one will, one discipline, one command and one faith, untouched by party trends, influences and vagaries, towards one goal—the goal of liberation.

3. There shall be no commando bases in Amman or other towns or villages in Jordan; such bases shall be on the frontiers of the occupied territory.

4. State laws and regulations shall apply to the commandos, and the state shall exercise its full sovereignty over all persons in its territory, and all such persons shall be obliged to respect this sovereignty.

In announcing this decision to you, now that our armed forces have succeeded in rescuing our beloved country from the clutches of the conspiracy, I wish to inform you all, citizens, soldiers and commandos, that the unity of Palestinian action has always been an aspiration dear to my heart, and that

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 24, 1970.

my concern for commando action arises from my absolute belief that the people and the army of Jordan regard it as an inseparable part of its endurance and its strength, just as it is part of the endurance and strength of the Arab nation.

Just as I believe that the struggle with Zionism is really an all-Arab struggle, so I believe with you that the struggle of the Palestinian people, the first victim of the Zionist invasion, must take its place in the vanguard of the general Arab struggle.

Jordan, my brothers—its King, its army and its people—has never thought and will never think of liquidating Palestinian commando action. But Jordan has always been, and will always be anxious that there should be no question of the purity of the intentions that surround it and reside in commando action, however much some may boast of their honesty and lay claim to loyalty and integrity. Jordan has always been, and will always be anxious to ensure that such quarters are really acting in good faith. Similarly, Jordan has always been, and will always be anxious to close all gaps through which the party influences, differences and trends which are known to all of us can infiltrate commando action and thereby divide it, weaken it and turn it aside from its true course, the course of victory and liberation.

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Communiqué of the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Alleged Statements Attributed to its Imprisoned Leaders¹

September 23, 1970

The Central Committee of the Palestinian Revolution wishes to make clear its attitude to the words attributed to our brother Abu Iyyad who is now held prisoner by the authorities. Because of their isolation our brothers have only been able to see the picture as it has been presented by the other side,

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 24, 1970.

and it was this that led them to make the proposal. When Ben Bella and his comrades were prisoners, they were not the representatives of the Algerian people at negotiations, in spite of their positions in the command. The situation of our brothers at present detained by the authorities (Abu Iyyad, Abu al-Lutf, Ibrahim Bakr, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, Samir al-Khatib and Abd al-Rahman al-Armuti) is similar to that of our Algerian brothers. The only party entitled to express the views of the Revolution and to speak on its behalf is the last fighter in the Revolution who bears arms as a revolutionary on the course of liberation and revolution.

The Revolution therefore regards the proposals of Abu Iyyad and his comrades as having been made in ignorance of what is going on outside the framework of their prison and in isolation from the facts of the situation in Amman.

The revolution therefore regards the proposals made by him and his brethren as imposing absolutely no restrictions on the course followed by the Revolution.

After a massacre unparalleled in the whole course of history the situation has developed to a pitch of gravity where there can be no question of normal agreement and settlement, and radical measures must be taken to maintain the unity of the people and the country. The Central Committee will later publish its reply to the reports published by the subservient authorities this morning.

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Message from Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Resistance Forces Arafat to the Palestinian Commandos Agreeing to a Cease-Fire in Jordan²

Amman, September 25, 1970

Masses of our mighty people, intrepid revolutionaries:

To stop the shedding of innocent blood,

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 26, 1970.

and to enable people to bury their dead and tend their wounded, and to obtain such necessities of life as food, water and medicines, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution, in response to the call of the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries at present meeting in Cairo, and of the delegation which has come to Amman headed by Major-General Ja'far al-Numairi, and to prevent the enemies of our nation from achieving their objectives, hereby agree to a cessation of hostilities and order all forces of the Palestinian revolution to observe an immediate cease-fire.

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Order by King Hussein of Jordan to the Jordanian Forces To Observe the Cease-Fire¹

Amman, September 25, 1970

My brethren, members of the gallant Jordanian armed forces.

In confirmation of my previous order for a cease-fire, now that the commanders of Palestinian commando action have affirmed their readiness to adhere absolutely to the cease-fire, following their meeting with the delegation of the Arab leaders, I hereby repeat my order to the Jordanian armed forces to observe a cease-fire immediately and absolutely.

At the same time all who have listened to inflammatory propaganda, gone astray and been misled must return to their senses and show a proper regard for their homeland, their nation and their cause.

We have accepted the agreement proposed by certain leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a final formula for the elimination of the crisis; this agreement was also approved by the delegation of our brothers, the Arab Kings and Presidents, during its first visit to Amman.

I call on all to cooperate honestly, truly

and sincerely to ensure the success of the efforts we have made to restore security, order and normal life to our dear people and our beloved country.

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Statement by the Premier of Tunisia and Member of the Delegation of Arab Kings and Presidents, al-Adgham, Concerning an Operation to "Annihilate the Palestinian People" in Jordan (Excerpt)²

Cairo, September 25, 1970

We found that the work we were engaged in was useless because we and the opposite side—I mean we and the Jordanian authorities—did not speak the same language. We wanted to stop the bloodshed, we wanted the Jordanian government to face up to its responsibilities—what I mean is that the shepherd must do everything in the interest of his flock. But we found there was no readiness to come to an understanding or to listen to facts. This may have been from good intentions, and it may have been the result of a mistake or mutual misunderstanding, but we made every effort to advise them to take definite decisions and to implement them honestly and with good intentions.

But it was clear to us that the Jordanian authorities were not acting from good intentions, because good intentions can hardly be said to lie in a cease-fire agreement which was only accepted nominally so that we might not leave empty-handed, while from the opposing side, that is to say the Palestinians, we got a real cease-fire; even if some of them did not abide by it, that could not justify continued military operations involving the use of artillery and incendiary bombs. For this is what we saw—with our own eyes, for we were eye-witnesses of this

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 26, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Tunis), September 27, 1970.

after the declaration of the cease-fire. Some of them said that a cease-fire was impossible as long as some of the revolutionaries were still shooting from time to time—but this does not really invalidate the cease-fire, for efforts were being made both to bring the conflicting parties together so that they might once more cooperate, and to eliminate elements desirous of fishing in troubled waters.

But it was not really this that prevented the implementation of the cease-fire, for we did not observe anything of this kind, and even if there had been such incidents it would have been possible to put a stop to them. No, what hampered our efforts was that after the promises had been made and after we had broadcast to the general public over the air that we had come to an agreement on a cease-fire, Jordanian armed forces, armored cars and artillery attacked an area or quarter, and showered it with a hail of shells, and we heard people lamenting.

We went back to the King to inform him of the breach of the agreement we had reached; from the Egyptian Embassy where we were staying we could see fires blazing in a quarter that had previously been quiet, and we could see the artillery and its activities. That is to say we could see that, on the Jordanian side, there was no real intention of putting an end to the fighting and bloodshed, because there was a military plan that was not yet completely implemented. That is to say, there was an operation to annihilate the Palestinian people—the operation was being carried out but had not yet been completed.

This was intolerable and had to be stopped; that is why we are continuing our work here, and God willing we shall not despair of achieving results.

There are elements whose interest it is to mislead—perhaps the King himself—or to create this atmosphere in Jordan. This is what led me to tell them there directly that in what they are doing they are serving Israel and acting on its behalf. This is exactly what Israel wants: that there should be general anarchy and disturbance, and that we Arabs should fight among ourselves, that we should annihilate ourselves—may God not permit

such a terrible thing to happen.

God willing we shall make further efforts at our meetings here. By convening this conference our intention was to leave no stone unturned, so that history may be our witness that we have done all we can to stop the shedding of Arab blood, that we ourselves went to Jordan and saw for ourselves what was going on. But we absolutely never expected that we were going to find an operation of annihilation; we thought that blood was being shed and we came to stop it and to put an end to the discord, and persuade the two sides to cooperate again, for the highest interests of both of them lie in such cooperation. But when we arrived we were confronted with military operations that no one could have imagined. For example yesterday we saw an operation directed against a Palestinian hospital in which there were one hundred medical staff, including doctors and male and female nurses—they were arrested for twenty-four hours and have not yet been released; then the whole area was wiped out—it is called the Ashrafiyya hospital—and all the patients were dispersed, so that the operation was really one of annihilation.

Some people say that they committed even worse crimes. We ourselves saw the hospital burning, although hospitals should never have been harmed. From all this you can see that the problems are complicated; we do not know if our meeting tonight will be the last or not; at any rate it will be important, for at tonight's meeting we shall consider ways and means of confronting the problem.

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Statement by the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq on the Attitude of the Iraqi Government and the Ba'ith Party to the Events in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Baghdad, September 26, 1970

When the main lines of the conspiracy

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text issued by Iraqi News Agency, Beirut Office, September 27, 1970.

began to become clear, and especially after Cairo and Amman declared their acceptance of the imperialist Rogers plan, and it was obvious that a confrontation between the resistance and the reactionary Jordanian authorities was inevitable, the Ba'th Party called for rapid and complete coordination with the resistance to meet the demands of the situation.

Numerous direct contacts were made, including contacts in Baghdad between representatives of the Party and representatives of the resistance, headed by Mr. Yasser Arafat. During these contacts the two parties agreed as regards their analysis of the situation. They were also in agreement as regards what the resistance would need and the way in which we could support it, at every stage of the anticipated confrontation between it and the Jordanian authorities, in conformity with the resistance command's own views of circumstances and possible developments.

It was also clearly agreed during these contacts that, in the view of the resistance, the role of Iraqi government and army in any confrontation between the resistance and the Jordanian authorities should be restricted to the provision of aid in the form of arms, ammunition and funds, together with coordination in the political and information fields.

The revolutionary authorities in Iraq met all their obligations before the confrontation and during the massacre engineered by the Fascist Jordanian authorities—indeed, they did more than their obligations required. In reporting this we wish to make it clear that Iraq is not bestowing favors on its brothers in the resistance because, when it provides the resistance with the help it needs, it is only performing its national duty. The reason why we are obliged to report it is to protect ourselves against intrigue, lies and misrepresentation.

Throughout the last ten days the masses of the Arab nation have observed that American and British quarters, and all the quarters that are linked to them, and information media of evil repute in Cairo, and the like, have been urging, inciting and manufacturing news reports and commentaries, with unparalleled enthusiasm and with equally rare intensity,

with the object of driving the Iraqi armed forces stationed in Jordan into a direct confrontation with the Jordanian army.

In this connection we announce to the whole Arab nation that the revolutionary obligation to support commando action does not necessarily mean joining in a direct military conflict with the Jordanian armed forces. Support, in its truly national and revolutionary sense, does not mean throwing the Iraqi state into a war with the Jordanian state alongside the resistance. The resistance was not fighting a war against the Jordanian state, as the imperialists, Zionists and Jordanian reaction tried to make out. It was fighting a battle with the Fascist Jordanian authorities who are trying to liquidate commando action, and the resistance was fighting along with the nationalist forces and the popular masses of Jordan.

The role of Iraq, as a state and an army, in supporting commando action, was defined in accordance with the appraisal of the situation which was agreed on by the responsible officials of the Party and the state and the command of the resistance. Those who, during the last ten days, have been so despicably exploiting, for their own suspect purposes, the question of why Iraqi forces did not take part in the fighting, are well aware that providing the resistance with arms, ammunition and other things necessary for the combat was more useful in the battle, in view of the methods followed by the Palestinian resistance, than a few tanks and planes that could have given the butchers all the justification they required, and also justified a foreign landing and the slaughter of the resistance.

The Liberation Front in Vietnam, and the freedom fighters in Laos and Cambodia, do not depend on the direct support of the Soviet or Chinese armies; they depend on their own resources and initiative, and on the unlimited indirect support provided them by their allies.

The Iraqi army cannot fight the commandos' battle for them; if it did the commandos would no longer be commandos; the whole picture would be changed, the whole problem—the problem of the right of the Arab people of Palestine to struggle for the liberation of their land and the recovery of

their rights—would be distorted. The Iraqi forces, which Jordan's acceptance of the Rogers plan and the cease-fire had obliged to abandon their day-to-day confrontation with the enemy, were doing nothing more nor less than their duty, which was to protect commando action, both before and during the conspiracy, from effective advance positions.

The above facts about the nature of the battle and the special and international circumstances surrounding it, made this method of support obligatory at official level. But this absolutely does not mean that Iraq—its people, its Party and its fighting forces—and with all its resources—did not take part in the fighting directly, side by side with the resistance. This indeed is what happened. The revolution in this country, while honestly and courageously performing its national duty, was also aware of the suspect schemes devised with such malice and hypocrisy by imperialist and reactionary circles, and by circles implicated in the Rogers plan. The object of these schemes was, by exerting pressure in the form of misrepresentation and adverse publicity, to drive Iraq into providing imperialism with a justification for carrying out its infamous projects. This was not because the Revolution was afraid of imperialism—ever since its outbreak it has fought imperialism with resolution and courage, and at all levels. It was because of the Revolution's view that what form the confrontation shall assume must be decided by responsible revolutionaries, without providing imperialism with the justification to strike at the time and in the place of its own choosing.

The conduct of the people, the Party, the authorities and the armed forces of this country was that of a revolutionary who is confident of himself, his past and the masses' confidence in him; not like the conduct of those who are trying to wash away a three years' old blemish—and another new blemish—that of submitting to solutions involving liquidation and surrender.

Sons of our people!

At both political and information levels the Revolution in this country, both before and

during the fighting, showed the greatest concern for full coordination with the resistance. When the summit conference was called, it was agreed, within the framework of coordination with the resistance, that Iraq should boycott the conference, in support of the slogan of the resistance that fighting was to continue until the Fascist military regime was overthrown and a nationalist regime established in Jordan, and in case the Cairo Conference should adopt resolutions enjoining a cease-fire, the rejection of which by the resistance would provide the Fascist regime in Jordan with a new cover for massacring the resistance.

Arab masses!

These are some of the facts that the Revolutionary Command Council finds itself obliged to disclose in the present critical circumstances, so that every revolutionary struggler in the Arab homeland may know his true position and his real duty, and so that he may know how to confront the machinery of misrepresentation, intrigue and involvement that is being set in motion by imperialism, reaction and elements responsible for defeat.

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Cable from President Nasser of the U.A.R. to King Hussein of Jordan on the Report Submitted by President Numairi to the Arab Kings and Presidents on the Situation in Jordan and the "Plan To Liquidate the Palestinian Resistance"¹

Cairo, September 26, 1970

To His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal.

On behalf of the heads of Arab states meeting in Cairo I regret to inform you of the great anxiety we feel after hearing the report of President Ja'far al-Numairi and the other

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 27, 1970.

members of the delegation representing us which returned from Amman tonight.

The reports we have heard from all of them leave absolutely no room for doubt as regards a number of facts:

1. That the Jordanian authorities insisted on continuing to fire in spite of all the efforts that had been made.

2. That all the promises made to us were completely ignored and made valueless.

3. That there is a plan to liquidate the Palestinian resistance despite all claims to the contrary.

4. That a terrible massacre is in progress in Jordan, in which all Arab and human values are being ignored.

5. The delegation of the heads of state which has returned from Amman feels that it was treated with a deplorable lack of frankness.

In view of the above we have now agreed that President Ja'far al-Numairi shall hold a press conference at which, on his own behalf and on behalf of all the members of the committee which was associated with him in his task, he will publicize the details of his report to us.

It grieves us greatly that things should reach such a pass between us, but what is happening at present leaves no other course open to us; truth will out, and our nation will ever be greater than all mischief and stronger than any intrigue.

respect the cease-fire in spite of continuous intolerable provocations. Yesterday and the day before we were subjected to intense and continuous shelling in our headquarters, and the Arab conciliation committee was itself able to witness some of these attacks.

For three days our forces stationed round Irbid and Ramtha have been awaiting the implementation of the agreement concluded with the leaders of the resistance who fell into the hands of the royal forces, an agreement which was made possible by the efforts of the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries, and by our positive response to their call. We are as yet ignorant of the consequences of the occupation of these two towns by Syrian forces, and we should have been glad if our brothers the Arab Kings and Presidents had condemned this aggression.

... Things are once more quiet in Amman and life is gradually returning to normal, although scattered armed elements in various places are still trying to prevent the restoration of order and security.

We are making the greatest possible efforts to eliminate the consequences of the insurrection and to heal the wounds, and in a few hours' time a new government will take charge of the affairs of the country which will enter on a new stage of its existence.

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Press Conference Statements by President Numairi of Sudan on His Second Visit to Amman²

Cairo, September 26, 1970

Dear friends and brothers, following our return from Amman last night, I submitted on behalf of the delegation to my brother Kings and Presidents a full report reflecting

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Cable from King Hussein of Jordan to President Nasser of the U.A.R. in Reply to the Latter's Cable to Him (Excerpts)¹

Amman, September 25, 1970

I assure you that the Jordanian armed forces have respected and will continue to

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hayat* (Beirut), September 27, 1970.

² Broadcast on Cairo Home Service and "Voice of the Arabs" in English. Excerpted in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3494/A/1-A/7; reprinted by permission.

the true picture of the situation in Jordan and our delegation's efforts there. Having heard this report, the Kings and Presidents decided that I and fellow members of the delegation should hold this press conference to convey to you on their behalf the details of this report and the additions made by the Kings and Presidents.

I have had the honour of heading the delegation which was composed of: Husayn ash-Shafi'i, member of the Supreme Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union; the Tunisian Premier Bahi al-Adgham; the Kuwaiti Defence and Interior Minister, Sa'd al-Abdullah as-Sabah; HM King Faysal's personal representative, Dr. Rashad Firawn, who is indisposed and could not attend this press conference; the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Faruq Abu Isa; and the UAR Chief of Staff, Lt-Gen. Muhammad Sadiq. The commission arrived in Amman at 19.00 the same day. Immediately upon arrival, the commission met with King Husayn. At the outset of the meeting, I told the King about the commission's powers and explained that Jordan had not observed the agreement we reached on a cease-fire. This had made it necessary for us to return immediately to Amman to learn his opinion. I also hinted to him that I and my fellow members wanted to contact Abu Ammar [Yasir Arafat]—something which we could not do in our first visit following the first session of the Arab Kings' and Presidents' conference in Cairo.

Afterwards my fellow members were given the opportunity to state their opinions and to comment. All of them spoke. We agreed on the following:

(1) The Arab Kings and Presidents are still in session in Cairo, and the commission cannot return except with definite and final results from both sides to reassure those at the conference and the masses of the Arab nation.

(2) Fighting must stop, even if only for a limited period of time, to give a chance for all to know the truth, particularly since reports estimate the dead at 10-15,000.

(3) The Jordanian State's authority over its territory is unquestionable and indisputable.

(4) The question is not a constitutional one concerning Jordan alone, but is a historical and humanitarian responsibility affecting the destiny of the whole Arab nation.

(5) With the escalation of the bloody incidents in Jordan, people in the Arab nation and in the world at large have begun to believe that our agreement was reached through enticement or by exerting pressure on captives.

(6) A meeting with Yasir Arafat is an urgent necessity dictated by the circumstances of the tragedy. Agreement with him is agreement with a real fida'i, not with dubious elements which have infiltrated the Resistance.

(7) King Husayn should broadcast a statement affirming the Jordanian armed forces complete observance of an immediate cease-fire.

Now I want to sum up King Husayn's viewpoint in the following: (1) There are elements—not fida'iyyin, but men who have infiltrated the resistance—which want to destroy this country. Reports continue to reach us about the influx of lorries full of fida'iyyin. Both Syria and Iraq are waging continuous campaigns of incitement against us over their radios. (2) The northern parts of Jordan are occupied—particularly Irbid, the second main city and the backbone of the country's agricultural resources. As for Amman, it is completely safe apart from small pockets which we are combing out to restore normal life. (3) Regarding the contact with Yasir Arafat, King Husayn said that this did not concern him but that the commission was free to exert its efforts. He also said he did not mind broadcasting a statement over the radio. The King said he held Yasir Arafat completely responsible for all that had happened. He also cited repeated reports that Yasir Arafat's life was in danger. The King concluded his statement to the commission by saying: "Try and exert all the efforts you can. But I am going ahead with the measures which I have taken." The King repeated this sentence three times.

I and the members of the commission

used the UAR Embassy premises for our meetings. We used radio communications in our contact with Yasir Arafat. Arafat replied at 23.30 and fixed the meeting for 01.00. He also fixed the meeting place at Jabal al-Luwaybdah. The message addressed to Yasir Arafat was as follows: In my name and on behalf of the commission which arrived in Amman tonight, we want you to suggest to us how we can contact you and by what means. We also want to know the time and place of the meeting. Since the matter is important and urgent, I would like this to take place immediately. Thanks.

Brother Yasir Arafat's reply was as follows: Brother Ja'far Muhammad an-Numayri, I have heard your appeal over Amman radio for an immediate and urgent meeting between us. In response to your appeal, I suggest that the meeting take place tonight at 01.00. We suggest that you come in your car through the street leading past the Caravan Hotel, the Alihah school, to the UAR Embassy at Jabal al-Luwaybdah. A representative will meet you there to take you to the meeting place. We have ordered the soldiers of the Palestine revolution to stop firing and stressed this order. We ask you to stress to the other side to observe the cease-fire at Jabal al-Luwaybdah. Until we meet. Your brother Yasir Arafat.

After this, I contacted King Husayn and asked him to provide us with vehicles to carry us to the meeting place. I also asked him to guarantee a cease-fire at the meeting place, particularly since Yasir Arafat had requested this in his message to me and affirmed that he had ordered his men not to open fire under any circumstances that night in the Luwaybdah area. The King failed. He did not stick to his promise by sending the vehicles or the "high official" from his armed forces whom I had requested as our escort. The delay continued until 02.15 when I had to request a meeting with Abu Ammar at 02.30 instead of 01.00. We thought of cancelling the meeting for the sake of Abu Ammar's life, particularly after learning that the meeting place would be bombarded at 05.00. But finally the vehicles arrived and we decided to go.

We reached the meeting place at about 06.00 [*sic*]. A short while before our arrival we had discussed how to tackle the situation with Abu Ammar and agreed on the following: (1) We would ask his opinion on the cease-fire and the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. (2) We would ask him if he preferred to remain in Jordan or come to Cairo with us. (3) If agreement were reached on the cease-fire, we would seek the withdrawal of the Army and the fida'iyyin from the city. (4) We would discuss matters concerning provisions and food supply and the formation of a food control board.

We began our talks with Abu Ammar in the light of the above. Other members of the commission spoke before Arafat was given the chance to speak. When Abu Ammar spoke he was deeply moved by the disaster and tragedy. In short, this is what he said:

(1) The situation is terrible and savage. It is similar to the battle of Karbala. There is an attempt to liquidate completely and annihilate the Palestinians. There are 25,000 killed and wounded, while the fida'iyyin number barely 25,000. Before striking, the authorities cleared Amman of all Jordanians, then surrounded it with three divisions. These divisions are estimated at 24,000 soldiers, most of them withdrawn from the front line. He said: We were bombarded when you were meeting him [King Husayn] at the Hummar Palace. At that moment also they bombarded my house where I was hiding.

(2) One hour after we have signed the agreement with the five-man committee of the emergency session of the Arab League Council, Rifai's Government was dismissed and the Military Government was formed.

(3) The first thing his Military Government—meaning the King's Military Government—asked of us was to surrender our arms. Abu Ammar commented on this, saying: In 1948 we surrendered our arms. They deceived us. This time we will not surrender our arms. We shall fight from house to house. There is a plan and a plot. We have documents showing that the King had prepared a new division to attack Jabal al-Hashimi.

(4) Some 14,000 youths have been arrested in their homes, simply because they are youths able to bear arms—but they had no arms. Women were molested and stores destroyed and pillaged by the Army.

(5) All I want is a 48-hour cease-fire to bury the dead. But I am sure that you will not achieve this, because the matter is planned and premeditated. At any rate, we agree to the cease-fire; I will order this and guarantee its immediate and complete implementation, providing he [the King] does likewise. He added: The International Red Cross has asked for a 24-hour cease-fire and I have agreed to this request. I now agree that the Army and fida'iyyin should leave Amman. However, I do not accept that the militia should leave Amman because he [King Husayn] has his own militia.

(6) There must be guarantees to implement the cease-fire agreement. To implement the cease-fire, we suggest the creation of an instrument consisting of the armies of the Arab States. In the shadow of this Arab force, the Jordanian Army and the fida'iyyin can withdraw from Amman and then we can restore the people's unity by establishing a patriotic Government.

(7) The Army's casualties are at least 5,000 and its losses in equipment 93 tanks, in addition to motorised vehicles and other material. The Army is mobilised with hatred against the fida'iyyin.

(8) The fida'iyyin are in full control of the entire northern province. They are capable of waging guerrilla warfare. This means that the Jordanian Armed Forces cannot wipe out the fida'iyyin. On the contrary, we can resist for a long time.

This is a summary of what Abu Ammar said. We left Abu Ammar at 04.30 after obtaining a letter from him approving the cease-fire. This is the same as the previous agreement on the cease-fire. In view of the fact that Abu Ammar could not go to his fida'i comrades and in view of the fact that he wanted to accompany us, he came with us to our HQ. When we arrived in our HQ, we began consultations on what should we do.

Sounds of shooting had not stopped in Amman for a minute since 05.30. After we had agreed on a plan of work, some of us thought that we should not meet King Husayn because he had not stopped shooting. But after a short discussion, we did decide to meet him. I telephoned the King at 08.45 and informed him that we had completed our meeting with Abu Ammar and that we were on our way to confer with him. We then went to the Hummar Palace, arriving there at 09.15.

King Husayn showed up at 09.40. I spoke to him about the terrible destruction—which I and my colleagues saw with our own eyes—caused by the tanks and artillery. I asked him to broadcast a statement in person and I would read the statement of brother Abu Ammar. I told him that the efforts made this morning by the delegation members, particularly by its older members, for the sake of sparing blood should be greatly appreciated—it was an invitation to act wisely and quickly. In order to guarantee the implementation of the agreement, I suggested that we placed at the disposal of the two sides a number of members of the armed forces of some Arab countries. The King agreed. These were to be led by a brigadier from the UAR armed forces and would consist of five officers of the UAR armed forces including the brigadier, two colonels from Sudan, two officers from Kuwait, two officers from Tunisia and two officers from Saudi Arabia.

Please allow me to read to you the agreement reached between King Husayn and the delegation. This was broadcast over Amman radio following the delegation's return to Amman for the second time and its meeting with brother fighter Yasir Arafat alias Abu Ammar, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance and C-in-C of the Palestine revolution forces, and other brothers in the Resistance Command.... [Numayri here read Arafat's message approving the cease-fire, King Husayn's address repeating orders to the Jordanian armed forces on strict and immediate observance of cease-fire, and Numayri's own address that followed.]

At the suggestion of King Husayn, we agreed to the formation of a joint committee between the Jordanian Government and the fida'iyyin to implement the agreement and review its details. The delegation agreed to this and King Husayn asked the delegation to help in distributing foodstuffs and aid received in Jordan among his countrymen. We informed him that the Arab summit conference had appointed a relief committee to carry out this task. I asked King Husayn to release 14,000 Palestinians who had been arrested in their houses because they were capable of carrying arms and not because they carried arms. He said the Army was currently screening them because they included foreigners. However, he promised to release the Palestinians and Jordanians—if there were any.

On our way back from the Hummar Palace to the UAR Embassy in Amman after this meeting and after the announcements had been made over the radio, shelling was continuing and guns were firing in various sectors of Amman, being particularly alarming in the Palestinian areas and in the quarters of Ashrafiyah, Jabal al-Luwaybdah and Masarwah. The Ashrafiyah hospital was shelled and hundreds of children, women and disabled people were taken and put on the street, where motorised vehicles were brought to crush them. They kidnapped doctors and nurses and threatened to kill them unless the fida'iyyin and Palestinians evacuated the entire area. We kept watching the situation and following it until 01.30 when the Military Governor-General, F-M Habis al-Majali, issued a statement claiming that the shooting and explosions heard were the result of operations by the Army Engineering Corps to explode dud shells and mines laid in those areas.

The delegation members had no choice but to contact the General Command. Speaking on my behalf, Lt-Gen. Sadiq drew to the Command's attention for the second time that we had brought about a cease-fire by the fida'i side while the fida'iyyin were still being heavily shelled by the Jordanian forces and exposed to mass annihilation. Shaykh Sa'd al-Abdullah spoke to them to

the same effect. Also Bahi al-Adgham spoke to them and told them that they were implementing a criminal plan on behalf of Israel—it amounted to the mass annihilation of the Palestinian people. He told them that the committee could not face such responsibility. Dr. Rashad Farawn also told them the same thing. Afterwards Faruq Abu Isa spoke to them to the same effect on my behalf. He asked that what he said should be conveyed to King Husayn. He also asked them to rescind immediately the order—which was taken without consulting us—to take the two Sudanese colonels to the Irbid area. He also told them to inform King Husayn that I, as the committee chairman, had decided to submit an urgent report to the Arab Kings and Presidents in Cairo to explain to them the situation and the continued violation of the cease-fire by the Jordanian authorities at a time when the ink on the cease-fire agreement had hardly dried, pointing out that they were continuing to shell and kill without mercy unarmed and innocent people, and that King Husayn alone was fully responsible for all that was happening.

A few minutes after these conversations between delegation members and the Command, our HQ at the UAR Embassy came under heavy, concentrated fire. The firing went on uninterruptedly, thus causing us deep concern and disappointment. Thereupon, I immediately contacted King Husayn personally and informed him of the gravity of the situation and of the danger threatening the lives of the committee members. I also made him listen to the sound of shooting over the telephone. He was silent. Later he said: "I will do the necessary now". He sent to me: the Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj-Gen. Muhammad Khalil; the Director of Royal Protocol, Ahmad Tuqan; the Deputy Chief of Operations, Zayd Bin Shakir; and the Director of Public Security, Zuhayr Mattar. They spoke to the military operations room by telephone from our HQ and asked them to stop firing immediately, because they had seen for themselves what was happening. They told the operations room that they had been unable to enter the Embassy except after leaving their cars and

riding in an armoured vehicle.

It is strange that the shooting stopped instantly after the contact with the Chief of Operations. This proves to us that there was a plan aimed at forcing us to leave immediately. It also proves false the Jordanian authorities' allegations that to effect a cease-fire was difficult because of the time it took to transmit orders and instructions in the various areas. Moreover, this proves to us that instructions reach the soldiers quickly and that the chain of command in the Jordanian Army is very good. However after this cease-fire arrangement, firing on us was resumed but to a lesser extent. We heard shooting throughout Amman and smoke was billowing from most parts of the city. On our way from the Embassy to the airport yesterday we drove in an armoured car. Another strange fact here is that the Army opened fire on us—on our car. Therefore we decided that we should report this incident together with other incidents to the conference of Arab Kings and Presidents, which we have done. We left Amman at 19.00 amidst disturbance, continued firing, and heavy shelling from artillery, tanks and various light and heavy machine-guns. At the airport we observed various reconnaissance operations to determine artillery targets on Jabal al-Ashrafiyah and Wahdat camp, in order to shell them once again, set them on fire, and destroy them.

In any case, we came out of Amman with the collective conviction that there was a full plan to exterminate all men of the valiant Palestine Resistance and all the Palestinians in Amman. The plan is being carried out despite all promises and agreements. There is nothing to stop this plan being implemented. In the light of all these details, the delegation drew such conclusions as made it certain that what was happening in Jordan was an organised plot and a premeditated plan to crush the Palestinian people as a whole, as I have said. The Jordanian authority has been and still is resorting to falsification and deception for the purpose of gaining time so that it can carry out its plan. We have learned that the Jordanian authorities' assessment of the

situation was that the extermination would be completed in three days at most. But this conclusion was wrong because eight days have passed and the Jordanian forces are still unable to control Amman. They will not be able to do so for another three months, in my personal view.

Finally, I would like to express before you, dear friends, my profound thanks and great appreciation for the members of the delegation who accompanied me on this difficult mission. [List of members]... The delegation members have worked hard under very difficult conditions and have often risked their lives. I wish to thank them. I also wish to thank members of the UAR Embassy staff who shared with us their food, accommodated us in their Embassy, and offered us every possible assistance, which enabled us to carry out our mission. They placed all their resources at our disposal. This helped us to complete our mission in a satisfactory manner. Last of all I would like also to thank all those who work in the press and information services for attending this conference and wish to thank all of you on behalf of the delegation for following up the news of this major catastrophe, the like of which, I have never seen in my life. I hope that you will continue to show concern and sincerity in reporting this tragedy, because there is now a people who are being annihilated, a people being annihilated by regular forces. Thank you.

[Excerpts from Maj-Gen. Numayri's answers to questions]:

[Q. concerning Maj-Gen. Numayri's view of a solution after all he had seen in Jordan.] The committee was dispatched to carry out a special task—to commit the two sides to the implementation of the proposal arising from the Kings' and Presidents' meeting in Cairo—an immediate cease-fire. We attempted to carry out this task, but failed because certain parties do not want to abide by the proposed agreement. Your question is what will be the duty of the Kings and Presidents? I naturally cannot say what the next step will be. The Kings and Presidents will discuss this step.

[Q. on whether the Arab States will send military forces to Jordan to stop the massacre and effect a cease-fire.] This falls under the responsibility of the Kings and Presidents, who can answer this question. They will discuss the question at tonight's session. It is my personal opinion that military intervention in Jordan by Arab States is unlikely.

[Q. by a Libyan newspaper on whether what is now taking place in Jordan is a prelude to the involvement of the UAR in one way or another in a war.] I believe that if we were to examine our position well, we would find out that the answer to your question is yes.

[Q. by the Syrian News Agency correspondent on whether the other Arab States will sever diplomatic relations with Jordan.] The events in Jordan require the Arab States to adopt a special measure to frustrate the plan—the present genocide. I cannot answer this question in terms of a collective measure by the Arab States. As for individual States, many of the States attending the [Cairo summit] meeting do not want any normal dealings with the Jordanian authorities if the latter persist in their methods and plan in Jordan.

[Q. on what is happening in Jordan.] I personally believe that King Husayn, who is a part of the Jordanian authority, is a partner in this plan because he and the Jordanian authorities persist in exterminating the Palestinian people. The plan to exterminate the Palestinian people is a broad plan and Jordan is only one small place among those where this extermination is being implemented....

[Q. concerning King Husayn's reply to President Nasir's telegram.] The National Government which Husayn announced he would form is one of the demands of the Palestine Resistance and one of the demands or questions discussed at the Kings' and Presidents' conference. One cannot say that it will be a success or failure except when one sees its deeds. If King Husayn could form a national Government which could restore

to the Jordan people their unity and eliminate the tragedy now taking place in Jordan, this would meet our wishes. But if a national Government came into being and also embarked on the implementation of the plan, it would be like its predecessor, the Military Government. In fact, I would like to add that I cannot, on the basis of my observations in Jordan, tell what the powers of King Husayn are: Is he King, Premier, C-in-C, Chief of Staff, or all these things? The Jordanian Government has no responsibility; King Husayn is everything—he is King, Commander, Government, everything.

[Q. on the Palestine Resistance.] I found no difficulty in reaching an understanding with the Resistance men because they had identical views. The only difficulty was the objections made by some Arab States—States which are not attending the Kings' and Presidents' meeting—claiming that a number of the Resistance men did not represent the Central Committee. This was the only difficulty. Now that the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation has come here, the difficulty will no longer exist.

[Q. on Zionism and the USA.] ...The State of Israel is the adopted child of the USA. Both States work together in plotting against the peoples. I say that these two States master-minded the plan now being implemented in Jordan. Their target is not Jordan alone but all the Arab States, particularly the progressive States in the area.

[Q. on whether the objective of the events in Jordan is to impose a peaceful solution on the Middle East crisis and what would Numayri's attitude be if King Husayn concluded an independent settlement with Israel.] This question will be discussed at the next meeting of the Kings' and Presidents' conference. I do not wish to go into any details so as not to influence the course of discussion.

[Q. On whether Syria had a role in the Jordanian events.] I believed I was undertaking a particular task. I did not obtain

sufficient information to prove the alleged Syrian intervention in Jordan, the results of the intervention, or the attitude of the Jordanian Government. I was only carrying out the task of effecting a cease-fire between the Jordanian Government and the fida'i-yin....

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Text of Cable from King Hussein of Jordan to President Nasser of the U.A.R. Expressing "Surprise" at the Proceedings of President Numairi's Press Conference in Cairo¹

Amman, September 26, 1970

Your Excellency brother Jamal Abd an Nasir, President of the UAR, I was surprised by the proceedings of Chairman Maj-Gen. Numayri's press conference in Cairo this morning. In view of the serious distortions and accusations attacking us and defaming our policy, our country, and our struggling and united people; and in view of the possible grave consequences of his statements at this press conference; unless you take the initiative to correct them and to inform the brother Kings and Presidents of the truth of the situation, I draw your attention to all the responsibilities which will result from the distortion of the truth and the fumbling in clouds and illusions.

What makes matters worse is the fact that these allegations and accusations serve to worsen the calamity which has befallen our country and people, and are the opposite of what we expected and hoped for from HE brother Numayri, who saw at first hand all our pains and sufferings here and witnessed and appreciated the dangers that threatened us, and consequently our entire nation and the cause of all the Arabs. We expected that the efforts of the Kings' and Presidents' delegation led by brother Numayri and the

efforts of your venerable conference would help to stop the currents of incitement and instigation and even the actual interference and propaganda, which has continued to fan the fire of sedition in our country. We expected you to help steer the ship to the shore of safety amid the storms and waves. We expected and continue to expect—for humanitarian reasons and because of our close relationship and national ties—that you would aid your people here who are suffering from shortage of food, clothing and medicine.

However, and very much to our regret, we heard at the said press conference the opposite of what we expected. Moreover, we have been accused of having sought, and of still seeking, to destroy the Palestinian people, who are actually our people and relatives and with whom we have shared the pains, aspirations, and bitter and good life to the extent that there are no more Palestinians and Jordanians among us but one people, some of whom have been subjected to occupation in the grip of the Israeli aggression, while others are struggling and working for the liberation with all the strength, patience and endurance that God bestowed on them. Those who have been afflicted by the incidents in Amman and elsewhere are not Palestinians or Jordanians, but all of us—citizens, military men and fida'i-yin. All of us are Palestinians and Jordanians. All the accusations directed at us during the press conference contradict the facts of the situation and the intentions and thinking of the most senior officials and most junior citizens in our country.

Your Excellency brother President, what prompted me to address this urgent message to you and to the brother Kings and Presidents meeting in your dear capital is the fact that all of you, who hold the highest responsibilities for the future of your nation and the great Arab homeland, are now aware more than ever that the situation in Jordan requires wisdom, constructive action, and immediate initiative to implement in text, spirit and detail and with sufficient guarantees the recently-accepted agreement. We implore Almighty God to enable all of us

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3494/A/7 and A/8; reprinted by permission.

to repair what has been destroyed; dress our bleeding wounds; be strong to confront the danger surrounding and lying in wait for us, and continue the procession in a way which will satisfy God and our conscience.

We can produce ample information, documents and arguments for anyone who wants to be further convinced and better informed, and to prove our innocence, submit our accounts, and reveal the bright and pure fact that it was not we who worked to shatter or who sought to harm our national unity, or who persisted in widening the gulf of estrangement and fighting among the people, Resistance and Army—the three elements on which our national unity is based. What grieves us and you most is that the huge potential of our forces, preparations, youth and weapons has been transferred from its natural position opposing the Israeli aggression and behind the ranks of the Israeli forces—has been transferred to explode in our houses, the heart of our capital, our cities and our villages. Here also, we are not responsible. We have always called, sought, and worked to frustrate the elements of this plot and to avert what has taken place. As for the Resistance, I have always been and will remain, with our brother leaders, among the foremost in supporting, defending and preserving it.

In these final moments and before you conclude your great meeting, I appeal to you not to allow the current situation to slip for good into the final stages of the plot directed against all of us, at a time when we are achieving the impossible to avoid this. If this happens, the position we have maintained in our land throughout the years since the June 1967 calamity will change in the interest of our enemies, and the image of our Jerusalem and every inch of our sacred occupied land will disappear forever from the mind of the Arabs. God bear witness that we have told you. God help us and lead us on the right path.

499

Statement by Representatives of the West Bank Chambers of Commerce on the "Infamous and Barbarous Massacres" in Jordan¹

Jerusalem, September 26, 1970

The Chambers of Commerce in the West Bank have been following with the utmost grief, bitterness, amazement and aversion the reports of the infamous and barbarous massacres which throughout all history will be a brand of infamy on the brow of the malevolent authorities in Amman, and which are utterly repugnant to human nature and to all men of conscience. The victims of these massacres, the like of which have never been witnessed throughout the course of history, have been women, children, old people and innocent unarmed civilians in the East Bank.

At their meeting held near the blessed Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Nativity, the Chambers of Commerce have discussed the deplorable and terrible development of events and the shocking deterioration of the situation in the East Bank; they have also discussed the continued perpetration by the military authorities there of acts of repression, violence, maltreatment, brutal torture and mass annihilation. After hearing the report of the committee representing the Arab Kings and Presidents which came to Amman for this purpose and uncompromisingly condemned the conduct of these authorities and disclosed their determination to implement their evil and criminal plans, the Chambers of Commerce have decided the following:

1. To call on Jordanian deputies, senators and diplomatic representatives accredited abroad to resign their posts immediately in protest against these terrible and barbaric massacres and against the infamous conduct of the Amman authorities.

2. To call on the Arab countries to suspend their relations with Jordan until such

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Quds* (Jerusalem), September 27, 1970.

time as the present regime is replaced.

3. The Chambers of Commerce in the West Bank call on all citizens in general and merchants in particular to lose no time in contributing generously to the local aid committees which will be formed in their towns. In this way we can assist without delay in saving those of our people who still survive from their terrible ordeal.

4. To call on the International Red Cross and other international humanitarian organizations to facilitate the transfer of the wounded to hospitals in the West Bank for treatment, and to ensure the arrival in the East Bank as soon as possible of all kinds of aid supplies.

We call on all municipalities, public institutions and personalities in the West Bank to meet in their towns with a view to forming local aid committees in an atmosphere of calm and tranquillity, so that these committees may go to work at once. The Chambers of Commerce place their offices and resources at the disposal of these committees. May God guide our steps in the right road. There is no power and no strength save in God; we are from God and to Him do we return.

500

Telephone Conversation Between President Nasser of the U.A.R. and King Hussein of Jordan on the Cease-Fire in Jordan¹

Amman-Cairo, September 27, 1970

Censor's Office. (Cairo)
Report No. 206
Date: 26/9/1970
(Secret)

Speaker in Amman: His Majesty King Hussein

Speaker in Cairo: His Excellency President Gamal Abdel Nasser

Number of telephone to which the call was transferred: 861915

The King: How are you, sir?

Abdel Nasser: Well, thank you.

The King: Your Excellency, my brother—

Abdel Nasser: Yes?

The King: I wanted to tell you that things are quieter now—

Abdel Nasser: Yes—

The King: But these statements and provocations from Cairo are causing us the greatest possible anxiety—

Abdel Nasser: Yes—

The King: Please, Your Excellency, do as much as you can, please—

Abdel Nasser: Right, but there must be a cease-fire at once.

The King: Your Excellency, we are not firing—it's all from one side, sir—

Abdel Nasser: Our information here says the opposite—

The King: Your Excellency, send a military committee to observe—

Abdel Nasser: The Jordanian government refused—if a committee comes now will you really let it observe?

The King: Yes, sir, yes—but, Your Excellency, the policy of provocations and instigation—

Abdel Nasser: If there was a cease-fire everything would be quiet—

The King: But, sir, al-Numairi's report is all provocation, it's a principal factor in the situation becoming so critical.

Abdel Nasser: The fact is that all of us here are angry—

The King: Yes, sir—

Abdel Nasser: What we want and demand is an immediate cease-fire—we want you to enforce it.

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 23, 1971.

The King: I am doing the impossible, sir—

Abdel Nasser: The Jordanian Army must cease firing completely—

The King: Be assured, sir, that we are doing the impossible—

Abdel Nasser: We want to be sure—

The King: Yes — all the heavy armor is being withdrawn from the area, even though it may result in our sustaining losses—

Abdel Nasser: Right, as regards the cease-fire—we have a final meeting of the conference now. Shall I tell them on your behalf that you are doing the impossible to achieve a cease-fire?

The King: The impossible and more, sir—

Abdel Nasser: Right, that's all we ask. But at the same time what about the people who have nothing to eat or drink and no medical treatment?

The King: Yes—

Abdel Nasser: What I mean is, I ask you to see to that yourself, personally.

The King: And then, Your Excellency—

Abdel Nasser: Yes—

The King: But then I am obliged, it is my duty, to stay here in order to do the impossible; we are trying—

Abdel Nasser: Yes—

The King: But if you want I'll come to you, I'll come—

Abdel Nasser: Yes—

The King: If you want me to I'll come to you, even if it's dangerous. I am ready. I'll start in the morning—

Abdel Nasser: You'll come in the morning?—

The King: If you want me to I'll come, sir—

Abdel Nasser: It really might be a good thing—to reassure all our brethren—

The King: I'm ready—

Abdel Nasser: Really, it might be better—

The King: Right, I'll make arrangements to be with you in the morning—

Abdel Nasser: But before you leave please make sure that the army commanders enforce a cease-fire—these must be a total cease-fire throughout the whole country. Please—

The King: You can be sure of that, sir—

Abdel Nasser: That's what we all want, for the good of all of us—

The King: Your Excellency, brother—

Abdel Nasser: Yes.

The King: You can be sure that I am doing more than the impossible, and I hope everything will be all right in this respect.

Abdel Nasser: I shall expect you in the morning. Send me a cable to say how you are coming.

The King: Right, sir.

501

Letter of Appointment from King Hussein to Mr. Ahmad Tuqan, Charging Him To Form a New Government in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

Amman, September 26, 1970

Dear Mr. Ahmad Tuqan,

Brigadier General Muhammad Daud having resigned, and the period during which his government was necessary having come to an end, and in view both of the necessity for an immediate advance to a new stage of construction, organization and mobilization and of your well known profound patriotism and loyalty to this peaceable Arab country, I entrust you with the task of forming a new government that will mobilize all efforts and

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 27, 1970.

resources to cope with the consequences of the terrible strife with which our beloved country has been afflicted, and to work with all possible dispatch to restore life to normal and to heal the wounds that recent events have inflicted on us.

One of the first things to which the new government must devote the greatest attention is putting an end once and for all to the slackness, lack of initiative and indifference which have characterized the attitudes of many individuals and institutions. It must deepen the citizen's belief in his homeland and the unity of its citizens and also his readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of his conscience, and to do all in his power to create a better future for himself, his people and future generations.

502

Statement by the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Formation of a "National Government" in Jordan (Excerpt)¹

September 26, 1970

Intrepid members of our people:

Revolutionaries: the Central Committee reaffirms its positive rejection of the Fascist military regime and the new government and reaffirms that the shedding of the blood of tens of thousands of killed and wounded and the rendering of hundreds of thousands homeless, as sacrifices on the altars of the agents and the imperialists, shall not have been in vain. We affirm to our people and to the Arab nation that to put an end to the conspiracy of the authorities:

1. The agents must abide by the truce and the cease-fire so that we may bury our dead and treat our wounded, and provide food, water and shelter for our homeless people.

2. The subservient military government must be dismissed, the killers and shedders of the blood of the people and the revolution must be brought to trial, and all those in authority who were responsible for waging the war of annihilation against the revolution and the people must be expelled.

3. A national government must be established which will implement the will of the people, produce radical solutions to the problem of achieving the unity of the people and the homeland in the Jordanian-Palestinian theater, and provide every safeguard for the protection of the revolution and the strengthening and arming of the masses so that they may confront the possibility of Israeli treachery in the East Bank and ensure that what happened to the West Bank in 1967 does not happen to the East Bank. In this way both the revolution and the country will be given the necessary strength to continue fighting against the Zionist invasion and the State of Israel until the total liberation of our martyred country.

4. There must be an armed Arab force to supervise the enforcement of the cease-fire and to implement radical solutions that conform to the will of our people, that will bring the protection of the revolution, the getting rid of agents, and the bringing to trial of the shedders of the blood of the people and the revolutionaries.

503

Conversation Between U.A.R. President Nasser and P.L.O. Central Committee Chairman Arafat on the Situation in Jordan²

Cairo, September 27, 1970

Nasser Arafat: Mr. President, how can we

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 27, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 16, 1970. Mr. Muhammad Hasanain Haykal, Minister of National Guidance in the U.A.R., published the text of this talk, which took place in his presence, in his weekly article "Frankly Speaking."

trust these people, when they are determined to liquidate the resistance...while we are talking here.... It is useless, the only thing we can do is to bring down the world on their heads and ours, come what may....

President Nasser: Yasser, we must not let anything make us lose our heads.... We must keep on asking ourselves: What is the goal? The goal, as we have agreed, is a cease-fire as soon as possible. I have taken action on behalf of this goal, in the light of my estimate of the circumstances, and in the light of your request to me from the start.

Your position in Amman has become hopeless, and your men in Irbid are under siege.

I have told you from the very first moment that we cannot help you by direct military intervention on our part, because that would be a mistake, because it would mean that I was abandoning the fight with Israel to make war in Jordan.

Also it would open the door to foreign intervention which can be expected at any moment.

I am trying to gain time so that I can increase your capacity to resist and reach a reasonable solution.

In the last few days I have made all the arms and ammunition you wanted available to you.

I have also sent you planes and the men of the three Palestinian battalions in the Palestine Liberation Army that were on the Egyptian front, to strengthen your position.

And as you know, I have sent a message to Brezhnev asking the U.S.S.R. to exert all possible pressure on the United States to prevent it intervening. You sent me a message asking me to do so, and I did so.

All this was to gain time in which we could prevent the resistance being dealt a mortal blow, and also prevent the unity of the forces of Arab struggle being impaired.

In the last few days I have sweated blood to protect you. It would have been the easiest thing in the world for me to issue an elegantly worded and powerful statement announcing my support for you and then to give you a broadcasting station from which you could

say what you liked against the King...and then relaxed and sat back to watch.

But my conscience and my sense of responsibility would not let me do that.

I can stop the conference at this moment. From a political point of view the conference has achieved a lot.

Brother al-Numairi went to Jordan for the first time and came back with four of the resistance leaders—in fact he had got them out of prison. Then he went a second time and came back with you.

Then we published the report of al-Numairi and the delegation that accompanied him, a report which disclosed all the facts and constituted an immense force of political pressure.

I can perfectly well leave things as they are and relax. But I ask myself and you: What is the goal? This is the question we must not forget.

Our goal is still a cease-fire, to give you a chance to reappraise your situation and prepare all your forces.

We now have a chance of reaching agreement. Shall we try to reach it? Or shall we sit back and forget our goal?

It is for you to decide, for since the very first moments I have been on your side, I have tried to protect you and to protect people who were blameless, who are now dead with no one to bury them, or wounded with no one to treat them, and wandering about amongst the rubble—women and children, desperately searching for the most basic of human rights—the right to live in security.

504

Inter-Arab Agreement (the Cairo Agreement) Effecting a Cease-Fire Between Jordan Government Forces and the Palestinian Resistance¹

Cairo, September 27, 1970

To stop the shedding of Arab blood which has resulted from the events of the ten days

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), September 29, 1970.

prior to this agreement in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, to protect the security and safety of the Arab nation from the colonialist conspiracies against it, and to ensure the stability of Jordan which has been so painfully rent apart, full agreement has been reached this twenty-sixth day of *Rajab* 1390 A.H., (the twenty-seventh of September 1970 A.D.) among those attending the Conference of Arab Kings and Presidents on the following:

1. All military operations on the part of both the Jordanian armed forces and the forces of the Palestinian resistance shall cease forthwith, as shall all military movements not necessitated by the requirements of normal routine. All information campaigns incompatible with the aims of this agreement shall also cease.

2. All Jordanian armed forces shall be rapidly withdrawn from Amman and returned to their normal bases, and all commando forces shall be withdrawn from Amman and stationed in localities suitable for commando action.

3. In Irbid and other towns the military and civil situation that existed before the recent incidents shall be restored, under Jordanian administration.

4. The internal security forces shall be responsible for maintaining security under civilian administration.

5. All prisoners held by both sides shall be released forthwith.

6. A Higher Committee shall be formed to follow up the enforcement both of this basic agreement and of such subsidiary agreements as it may give rise to, and to coordinate action and relations between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian resistance to ensure security and to restore the situation to normal. This Committee shall also have the right and the responsibility to recommend all the practical and procedural measures it considers necessary for the restoration of concord between the parties concerned and of normal life.

7. The Higher Follow-up Committee shall have the following three branch offices attached to it and carrying out its orders:

a. A military office dealing with all military matters connected with the enforcement of the provisions of this agreement.

b. A civil office dealing with civil affairs connected with non-military relations between the two parties.

c. An aid and first aid office to supervise the distribution of the provisions and aid it receives from Arab and other countries to victims, casualties and those in need.

8. The Higher Follow-up Committee shall draw up and conclude an agreement, that shall be binding on both parties, to ensure the continuation of commando action and respect for the sovereignty of the country within the limits imposed by the law, apart from such exceptions as are necessary for commando action.

9. All decisions taken by the Higher Follow-up Committee in the enforcement of the Agreement shall be finally and absolutely binding on both parties.

10. The Higher Follow-up Committee shall exercise the responsibilities set out above forthwith, and shall from time to time submit to the Arab Kings and Presidents reports on the tasks it is performing, the decisions it has taken, and the extent to which this Agreement is being enforced and the parties concerned are abiding by it.

11. The Higher Follow-up Committee shall consist of a President, Mr. al-Bahi al-Adgham, the Prime Minister of Tunisia, and two members, one representing the Jordanian authorities and appointed by King Hussein, the other representing the Palestinian resistance and appointed by Mr. Yasser Arafat.

12. To ensure an atmosphere favorable to the enforcement of this Agreement, and to ensure that the achievement of the lofty aims for which it was concluded shall be both possible and legal, the two parties shall un-

dertake to put an end to all exceptional situations and to military government.

13. Should either the Jordanian authorities or the Palestinian resistance violate any provision of this Agreement or impede its enforcement, all the Arab countries which have signed it shall take unified and collective measures against the guilty party.

14. The Palestinian revolution shall be strengthened and supported until it achieves its aims of total liberation and the defeat of the usurping Zionist enemy.

Signed by: King Faisal, Amir Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Lebanese President Sulaiman Frangieh, King Hussein ibn Talal, Mr. Yasser Arafat, Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, Major General Ja'far al-Numairi, Mr. al-Bahi al-Adgham, Prime Minister of Tunisia and Mr. Ahmad al-Shami, Member of the Yemeni Republican Council.

505

Message from Central Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. to the People and the Palestinian Revolutionaries on the Reasons for Accepting a Cease-Fire (Excerpt)¹

September 28, 1970

Members of our gallant people:

Heroic revolutionaries:

The Palestinian Revolution, both before and since the June War, has always rested on certain fundamental bases. They are:

1. The Palestinian revolutionary vanguard along with the masses of our people.
2. The masses interacting with the revolution.
3. Certain Arab forces that have constantly declared their support for the Revolution.

When the subservient authorities in Jordan launched their barbarous attack on Amman, Zarqa and other towns in Jordan, they avoided confronting our military forces and started shelling the refugee camps and all residential quarters with inconceivable violence. The object of this was to make it impossible for the masses to move or even to think. Moreover, the continuous shelling, and the interruption of civilians' water and electricity supplies, prevented movement in the residential quarters and subjected women, children and old people to violence and extermination, in addition to the acute hunger and thirst.

Add to this the lack of medical treatment, and it will be understood that any one who was injured was more than likely to join the numbers of the killed.

This barbarous action taken by the butchers against our steadfast people in Jordan confronted us with the choice between two alternatives. One was to continue fighting at the cost of the death and destruction of more than 700 thousand citizens by the brutal bombardment, hunger, thirst and the disease which must inevitably spread because the bodies of the dead were piling up in streets and houses, and the wounded were growing worse and dying from lack of medical treatment.

The other alternative was to choose a cease-fire to save the population from a barbarous massacre which, for a variety of reasons, Arab forces outside the country were unable to stop. Add to this the fact that there was extremely heavy and continuous shelling, and that Amman was encircled by three divisions—the Third Armored Division, the Fourth Mechanized Division, and the First Infantry Division, in addition to some units of the Second Division and artillery battalions. The object of this was to prevent units of the Jordanian Army going over to the Revolution and the masses, as they had done in previous crises. A further object was to make it impossible for the masses, especially in Amman and Zarqa, to express their views and take effective action, because the violence of the shelling forced them to stay where they were, and the barbarous massacre, along

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, September 29, 1970.

with the hunger and thirst from which they were suffering, deprived them of the power of thought.

The responsibility was immense, but a revolution which allows its people to be massacred cannot expect to be victorious in its long, hard and weary advance.

The command of the Revolution therefore held a meeting to appraise the situation, and also to take into account the following factors:

— The situation of the Arab countries and their fear of a foreign landing.

— The urgent need to save our people from massacre, hunger, thirst and disease, and to save the thousands of wounded before they died of their wounds.

— The urgent need to make known to the masses of the Arab nation the magnitude of the massacre and of the conspiracies to exterminate them to which our steadfast and heroic people in Jordan were being exposed.

In the light of the above the command of the Revolution unanimously decided to agree to a cease-fire. It was a result of this and of the Arab and international situation that an agreement was reached in Cairo.

Brothers, masses of our heroic people:

The plan of the subservient military regime in Jordan was to destroy the Revolution and annihilate our people in Jordan in a matter of hours. But the way our heroic people held out amazed not only the subservient military regime in Jordan but the whole world too. For this fabulous endurance frustrated the colonialist conspiracy which, both in planning and execution, was closely interlocked with the base American conspiracy against the people of Indonesia and Vietnam. This endurance also convinced our people and our nation that this people is capable of engaging in a long struggle until victory is won.

The Palestinian Revolution announces to all and sundry that it will be as hard on itself as it is on its enemies. It will take the decisions required by its long struggle unimpeded by suspect overbidding and emotional impulsiveness, and will always abide by its general strategy, which is embodied in the slogan of struggle against all the enemies of our nation until final victory is won.

Brothers, masses of the proud Arab people, heroic revolutionaries:

The enforcement of the cease-fire depends on the other side abiding by it. This is the acid test because we, as we have made known to the world, always abide by everything to which our signature is appended and every declaration we make. What is more, the cease-fire provides a formula for the frustration of the plan to destroy the Palestinian Revolution and annihilate the Palestinian people, and has confronted the Arab nation with its historical responsibility.

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U.A.R. Newspaper Interview with P.L.O. Executive Committee Chairman Arafat Commenting on the Agreement Putting an End to Civil War in Jordan¹

Inflight between Cairo and Damascus, September 28, 1970

Q. Will you go to Amman?

A. I shall land in Damascus for urgent contacts, and then go on to Deraa, Ramtha and Jordan. Where I am to be found in Jordan will depend on how the situation develops.

Q. What is your most urgent task at the moment?

A. To meet my brother members of the Central Committee and then meet all the military commands of the commandos and the Palestine Liberation Army and the popular liberation forces for consultations, and then to go to Jordan.

Q. Will you be in Amman tonight?

A. I hope to be in Jordan in a few hours.

Q. And how will the activities of the Higher Committee for the supervision of the agreement be followed up?

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 29, 1970.

A. We have appointed Ibrahim Bakr to be with Premier al-Bahi al-Adgham as representative of the resistance movement.

Q. Does the agreement signed the day before yesterday mean that the commandos will leave Amman?

A. The commandos will move from Amman to places suitable for commando action. By the commandos I mean armed combatants. But the Popular Militia will stay in Amman and in its previous positions. At the moment there are in Amman more than thirty thousand members of the Militia; the number of commandos who will leave Amman is not known; it will be left to the Committee supervising the agreement.

Irbid, as the town nearest to the line of confrontation with the enemy, is a special case. The military and civilian situation in the capital of the north, and other towns, will be restored to what it was before the recent incidents.

Q. Does that mean that the commandos will stay in Irbid?

A. Certainly, because of its special importance which has been appreciated by the Kings and Presidents.

Q. Has a time-table been drawn up for the withdrawal from Amman?

A. Not so far; that is the task of the Committee. The Army will withdraw first, to be followed by the commandos.

Q. What is the most urgent task at the moment?

A. The most urgent task is to ensure the withdrawal of the Army and the restoration of the situation to normal. We have the task of rescuing the wounded, providing our people with food and water, removing the rubble and rebuilding our shelled camps.

Q. What are your comments on the agreement?

A. From our point of view the agreement is a step in our long, hard advance. We agreed to its provisions because we wanted to put an end to the operation of annihilating our people.

The agreement is a formula which confronts the Arab nation with its responsibilities as regards the revolution and the Palestinian people.

Q. Are you committed to implement the agreement, and what is the view of the other parties in the resistance movement?

A. There is one single view, and we shall allow no other. This experience, in which so much of our blood has been shed, is enough.

The provisions of the agreement are now being implemented, and if the other side abides by it in letter and in spirit, that will be the solution. As we have made known to the whole world, we abide by anything we sign.

Q. Are you optimistic as regards the situation? And do you think that it may be possible to reach a formula for coexistence between the two parties?

A. I am afraid that my answer may impede the efforts that are being made. We shall sincerely and honorably stand by our undertaking to implement the agreement, but we shall allow no breach of the agreement, nor shall we allow the rights of the revolution to be infringed in any way whatever.

As for being optimistic, the experiences of the last three years give no grounds for optimism. . . but for all that we shall continue to honor our word and our promises, and let us hope for the best.

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Message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Syria to Party Committees on the Events in Jordan and the Party's Tasks in the Coming Stage (Excerpts)¹

Damascus, end of September 1970

[*The Attitudes of the Arab Communist Parties (the Jordanian Communist Party, the Syrian Communist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, etc.)*]

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Akhbar* (Beirut), November 8, 1970.

There was not a single progressive Arab force that did not take noteworthy action in connection with the events in Jordan, which aroused strong reactions at both popular and official levels in both the Arab and international fields. But this does not mean that special emphasis should not be accorded to the attitudes adopted by the Arab communist parties.

1. The Attitude of the Jordanian Communist Party

The Jordanian Communist Party was in the heat of the battle and breasted the storm side by side with the forces of the Palestinian resistance and the other progressive forces, supported by its political credit and its popular influence, and the small amount of arms it had at its disposal.

On the eve of the events, immediately after the formation of the military government, the Jordanian Communist Party engaged in important political activity which will have important historical consequences. It placed the "Partisans" and its militia forces at the disposal of the Central Committee to repel the reactionary attack.

Armed communists took part with honor in the fighting in Amman. They performed unforgettable acts of heroism in the defense of Jabal Amman and Jabal al-Hashemi, frustrating all efforts by the royalist forces to occupy them, and inflicting heavy losses on them.

The Party organization in Amman also engaged in political and mass action in many quarters of the city, action of which all speak with the greatest admiration.

2. The Attitude of the Syrian Communist Party

The attitude adopted by the Syrian Communist Party in those critical days could not have been stronger or more unambiguous, nor could the Party have been more speedy in its moves. It supported the attitudes of those who defended the Palestinian resistance movement and the Jordanian people, and took part in their defense with strength and resolution, resisting the colonialist-reactionary attack along with all the other progres-

sives. With this end in view it engaged in political and organizational activities in many fields, at domestic, Arab and international levels, details of which follow.

The most important activity undertaken by the Party was illustrated in the widespread enthusiasm to volunteer and fight side by side with the resistance. During the incidents the Party was able to send thirty comrades to Jordan, where they fought alongside their brothers the commandos. Comrades have also been fighting as volunteers with commando action for a long time, in such commando organizations as the Popular and Democratic Fronts, and the comrades who fought displayed great heroism in Amman and held out intrepidly at Irbid.

The Central Committee's Commando Bureau also played an important part in the Party's activities in this field by conducting liaison with the various commando organizations and organizing volunteering.

The Syrian Communist Party's political activities included the rapid initiative it took in calling for a conference of representatives of the three Communist Parties, the Jordanian, the Syrian and the Lebanese, for an exchange of views on the situation that had arisen and on the tasks and duties that had to be performed. This conference was held on September 18, and on the same day issued a series of important documents which were published in the press with considerable éclat.

All of this activity was appraised and unanimously supported by the Central Committee at its meeting held at the end of September. The Committee regarded this activity as being in conformity with the resolutions of the Third Conference of our Party and in full harmony with the party line as previously laid down at the meetings of the Central Committee.

3. The Activities of the Lebanese Communist Party

The activities of the Lebanese Communist Party in support of the Palestinian resistance

movement were extensive and many-sided, and were expressed in all fields: the Party's press, the activities of its Political Bureau and Central Committee, the participation by its representatives in the activities of the tripartite meeting, in its joint action with the other nationalist and progressive forces in Lebanon in reply to the propaganda and the attitudes of Lebanese reaction and to the collection of contributions and various kinds of financial aid for the resistance and the victims of the aggression.

It is to be noted in particular that, in spite of the fact that a large number of its armed combatants were stationed on Lebanon's southern frontiers, the sister Party prepared a detachment of volunteers to leave immediately for Jordan, to play an active part on the field of battle in activities aimed at frustrating the schemes of Jordanian reaction paralyzing it, and stopping the massacre.

There can be no doubt that the activities of the sister Party will have a positive influence on the situation of the Party in Lebanon, as well as at Arab level.

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[The Attitude of the Soviet Union and the Progressive and Socialist Forces in the World]

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If we turn to the attitude adopted by the U.S.S.R. vis-à-vis the massacre by Jordanian reaction of the Palestinian resistance movement and the Jordanian people, we can say that the U.S.S.R. undertook extensive and important action which played a basic role in:

1. Securing a cease-fire in Jordan, as being in the interests of the resistance first and foremost, and also in the interests of the struggle against colonialism and Zionism.

2. Preventing the colonialist countries, especially the United States of America and Britain, and also Israel, from exploiting the events that were taking place by open intervention in Jordan and against Syria.

The U.S.S.R.'s warnings to the governments of the United States and Britain were also effective in restraining such intervention.

3. Warning the Jordanian authorities of the consequences if they persisted in massacring sections of the resistance and in trying to ask for aid from the imperialist countries.

Throughout the crisis the U.S.S.R. acted in coordination with the United Arab Republic, to protect Syria and refute the charges of intervention brought against it. The U.S.S.R. also resisted all international attempts to induce it to adopt an attitude of open condemnation of Syria's policy.

In fact all the action taken by the U.S.S.R. was in the interests of the Palestinian resistance movement and the Jordanian people.. In spite of this, however, as was to be expected, there were those who, inspired either by indifference or hostility, tried to blame and accuse the U.S.S.R. and to discredit Arab-Soviet friendship, claiming that what the U.S.S.R. had done was not enough, disparaging the action it had taken and maintaining that it was useless. This obviously calls for a scientific view, vigilance and struggle against all suspect attempts; action must be taken to strengthen Arab-Soviet friendship and to promote scientific confidence in this friendship and in the fundamental role the U.S.S.R. is playing in all our battles and in assisting our just struggle along its course towards certain victory.

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On Some Fundamental Conclusions as Regards Principles and Policy

Even if we ignore the consequences of the recent events in Jordan, but even more if we take them into account, in both their positive and negative aspects, it is possible to arrive at a series of conclusions as regards principle, policy and practice, the most important of which are:

1. Through the struggle, sacrifice and endurance of their resistance, the Palestinian Arab people have proved to the outside world that they are an actual fact, that their rights in their homeland must be safeguarded, and that it is impossible to solve problems with which they are connected without reference to them. By such problems we mean the Mid-

dle East problem, the question of eliminating the consequences of the aggression and the problem of evicting the occupiers, and all attempts in this direction will be injurious and dangerous.

2. Although there is no intention here of conducting an appraisal of the resistance movement organization by organization, section by section, we can confidently say that this movement has demonstrated its ability and vitality, and shown how deeply it is rooted in the Palestinian Arab people. It has, in fact, proved that it is an efficient vanguard for the movement of this people, of which movement it is, at the same time, a part with its own special status, an increasingly important and influential part of the Arab national liberation movement and the world revolutionary movement.

The documents of the world communist movement have already affirmed and emphasized this, and now life is proving it irrefutably, once and for all.

It is therefore necessary to oppose the mistaken views of the resistance movement held in certain quarters, to stress what is fundamental and essential to it, and to go on from there to support and strengthen it more and more. This does not exclude appropriate action based on principle and taken at the appropriate time, to remedy the deficiencies and close the gaps that this movement displays in the course of its advance, with a view to increasing its influence and ensuring that it plays a profounder and more extensive role.

3. The Palestinian resistance movement has displayed rare endurance and heroism. This is due to class factors which are embodied, first and foremost, in its dependence on the impoverished Palestinian toiling masses. These masses have felt and realized that, in their struggle, they have nothing to lose but their chains and that only through struggle can they clear themselves of dishonor. What is more, these masses make no distinction between their social objectives and their national objectives, their social struggle and their national struggle against colonialism, Zionism and Israel.

4. The battles fought by the resistance in Amman and Zarqa were not battles with the Israeli invaders, but all the same they showed that a great development has taken place, involving a complete change of character, in the field of general Arab endurance in the last few years. And this must be taken into account in all future confrontation with the enemy, whatever its nature and wherever it takes place.

5. It is impossible to talk of the events in Jordan and their implications without, this time, talking of the positive role played by the Arab communist movement, not only in the traditional political field, but also in other fields. There can be no doubt of the importance of the participation by Jordanian comrades, with the small amount of armaments at their disposal, and the self-sacrificing way they helped the masses, in order to save them from hunger and thirst and to protect their security, and of the activity of the "Partisans" and their militia. All these activities, some of which are known to us, while we have still to learn the details of others, resulted in the combatant revolutionary detachments, the detachments of the Palestinian resistance, being accorded greater weight and better appreciation. And in addition to the efforts of comrades in Amman and Zarqa, the part played by our own Syrian comrades, and the attempts of our Lebanese comrades to involve themselves in the fighting, will also give the communist movement greater weight.

The sacrifices, the deaths, the heroism, are bound to be potent factors in:

— Strengthening the influence of our Parties collectively and individually, and in presenting them as they really are.

— Strengthening our alliance with all those who are our natural allies, both at this stage with its communist face, its popular, proletarian face, its nationalist and internationalist face, and at the coming stages, and also in increasing our influence on them, exclusively through our activities and the way we ourselves undertake them.

6. The events in Jordan have shown how

urgent and essential a matter it is that all sections of the resistance and all nationalist and progressive Arab forces should unite, how essential it is that all these forces should cooperate and be coordinated, especially in the fields of political coordination within a minimum framework, and military coordination. They have also shown how essential it is that there should be cooperation and coordination between them and the forces of freedom, progress and socialism throughout the world, especially with the U.S.S.R.

7. The crimes committed by Jordanian reaction and its Fascist military regime have created a gulf between it and the Jordanian people that can never be bridged, and the agreement that has been concluded is only a temporary truce. And the achievement of the aims of the two Arab peoples, the Palestinian and the Jordanian, is now dependent, more than ever before, on the liquidation of the positions of Jordanian reaction and the establishment of a nationalist regime in the place of the present rotten one.

The Marxist-Leninist class attitude to subservient reaction is the only right and sound attitude, the attitude to which the future belongs.

8. The events in Jordan, supported by the circumstances that preceded and accompanied them, have shown how urgent and essential it is that problems that concern the whole Arab world should be solved by consultation and mutual understanding between all the nationalist and progressive bodies, forces and organizations that are active in the Arab world, one of the most prominent of which is the Palestinian resistance movement. We also stress, above all, the necessity for consultation and coordination between the progressive Arab countries, especially between the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.

It is also necessary to stress here the role played by the encounter and cooperation of the Arab communist parties.

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Statement by the Arab Leaders Who Met in Cairo on the Occasion of the Death of President Nasser (Excerpt)¹

Cairo, October 1, 1970

We, the Kings and Presidents who are the leaders of the Arab nation and their representatives, meeting in Cairo on the day of the funeral of that great, heroic and beloved fighter the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser... hereby pledge our word to our whole nation, which continues to call for our aid in its cruel and terrible ordeal, and to the dear departed, whose solemn words continue to encourage us and whose magnificent example continues to inspire us, that we will continue, in both word and deed, with greater resolution and strength than before, to confront colonialism in all its forms, and all its schemes and conspiracies, and to war against Zionism in all its manifestations—as a movement, an organization, a state, an occupation and an alliance—until we liberate every inch of territory that has been wrested from the homeland—Sinai, Golan, Jerusalem and the whole of Palestine. We pledge our word that we shall rise above the mere forms imposed by our territorial frontiers, surmount our petty cares in our concern for the much greater wounds from which our homeland is suffering, and unite against our common enemy, forgetting our differences, and firmly determined either to be victorious or to die.

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Cable from the Central Committee of the P.L.O. to Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Council of State of the People's Republic of China, on the Twenty-first

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 2, 1970.

Anniversary of the Establishment of the Republic¹

early October, 1970

Comrade Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of China.

The anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China is a notable occasion for all struggling peoples and all liberation movements, because it is the anniversary of the erection of the mightiest citadel of freedom in the world—a citadel which has firmly and unyieldingly resisted all the forces of imperialism, headed by the United States of America, the first enemy of struggling peoples.

Engaged as it is in the most ferocious battle against the agents in Jordan and against the Zionists in Palestine, supported by the forces of American imperialism, the Central Committee of the Palestinian Revolution takes this splendid opportunity of saluting, in the name of the struggling people of Palestine and its defiant revolution, the People's Republic of China, its leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, its revolutionary government and its friendly people. The Central Committee expresses its thanks and gratitude for, and pride in the firmly revolutionary attitude that the friendly Republic of China has always adopted to the cause of our just struggle against agents and Zionists. It also expresses its gratitude for the great Chinese aid which has done so much to strengthen our revolution and its endurance. The Palestinian people have not forgotten their friends who have always stood by them, and first and foremost among these are the great people of China. We shall continue with our revolution however great the subservient forces of colonialism, and victory must inevitably be on the side of struggling peoples, while imperialism and Zionism are destined to defeat.

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Television Interview Statements by Foreign Minister Riad of the U.A.R. on the Arrangements Concerning the Cease-Fire¹

Cairo, October 6, 1970

Q. How much truth is there in the US statement in this matter reiterating Israel's allegations that we have violated the cease-fire?

A. There is something which everybody must know. We have not violated the cease-fire. Therefore, all Israel's complaints published by the press are groundless. In fact, it is the United States and Israel which have violated the US initiative. I have challenged the United States and its representative here and I repeated my challenge to Richardson when I met him. I told him, when you—the United States—submitted your initiative, you volunteered to inform us how many Phantom aircraft you handed over to Israel every month. You further volunteered the information—which we did not ask for—that you would not supply Israel with more than the 50 Phantom aircraft as long as the initiative was in effect. Then suddenly the United States issued a declaration saying it would supply Israel with more Phantom aircraft.

Thus, the first to violate the US initiative was the United States itself. As for Israel's violations, these are being committed daily. Israel is daily and continuously committing violations. When we drew the United States' attention to these violations it ignored them completely and has continued to do so to this moment. We have asked the United States for an explanation, but so far we have not heard a single explanation, either of its own violations of the initiative or Israel's. In fact, we have a long list of Israel's violations.

Q. Why do we not submit this list?

A. We have a long list, but to whom shall

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 3, 1970.

¹ Excerpted from Riad's interview broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3502/A/4-A/7; reprinted by permission.

we submit it? This is the problem, to whom shall we submit it? Shall we submit it to Israel's lawyer—the United States? It was the United States which proposed the cease-fire arrangements and it said that it wanted to supervise them. However, it became apparent to us that the United States was completely biased, because it is the United States which has violated. Israel is also violating it. Therefore, to whom shall we submit our complaint, if we want to submit one?

The United States has made itself a party to the dispute and not an arbitrator. This was proved to us recently. I mentioned this to Richardson, that according to information available to us—in fact, according to a statement by a certain US Ambassador—American cameras photographing developments in the area are aimed only at Egyptian territory and never at Israeli territory.

Therefore, the operation is one of espionage on Egyptian territory and not of supervision for the preservation of the so-called cease-fire arrangements.

Q. Have we violated the cease-fire arrangements?

A. The fact, as I have said, is that we have not violated the cease-fire arrangements—for a very simple reason. Under the US proposals two things were required of us, not to introduce missiles into an area extending 50 km. from the Suez Canal and not to establish new missile sites in this area.

Why did the United States make such requests? Why did it not wait for the arrival in the area of Jarring—a neutral party, whose duty it is to make the arrangements for a cease-fire? Jarring, as a neutral party, would make the arrangements for the supervision of the cease-fire violations. This was the logical and natural thing to do. However, it would have taken at least 10 days or two weeks for Jarring to arrive from New York, after which he would have begun his contacts and discussions and we would have reached an agreement on cease-fire arrangements. But the United States and Israel were in a hurry. Why were they in a hurry to set the earliest date possible and why did they want it to be the 8th [August] as they asked? Why? Because they saw that Egypt had

actually succeeded in introducing a number of missiles into the Canal area and in shooting down some Phantom aircraft.

We announced the number of aircraft. We only reported five aircraft. Why. Because we had captured the pilots of these aircraft. On the other hand, the United States announced that Israel had lost nine aircraft and later confirmed information that Israel had in fact lost 13 Phantom aircraft, because many had fallen on the eastern bank and some had exploded in the air. A Phantom aircraft carries seven tons of bombs and when it explodes nothing is left of it.

This fact was admitted by the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban when he said—or rather made a slip of the tongue—that the Israeli Air Force was diminishing, as he put it. Golda Meir and the Defence Minister were furious with him for saying this.

Israel and the United States wanted to hurry to fix a date for the cease-fire before Egypt could introduce all its missiles into the area. They had information that we were bringing in still more missiles.

An Israeli paper said that Egypt would need six months to train its personnel in the use of these missiles. However, the fact was that the missiles had already been on our territory and our men had completed their training and were ready to use them. This was the surprise. Instead of accepting the 8th we could have rejected this date and made it the 9th, 10th, 12th, or any other day. Why did we accept the 8th?

We were aware of the American trick. We knew that their intention was to prevent us from introducing our missiles, but we were prepared to face up to this situation. Our armed forces were successful. Our air defence personnel were also successful by virtue of the skill and experience they had gained and the great sacrifices these brave men had made. History will record the heroic feats of the air defence officers and men—feats which there is no time to discuss now. However, before the 8th—in fact on the evening of 3rd August to my recollection—we announced bringing down two Phantom aircraft on that day. We captured one of the pilots while the other aircraft exploded in the air and disintegrated.

So, on the days of 3rd, 4th and 5th including each night we moved in missiles. When the day we had accepted came, we had moved in all the missiles we wanted to move.

Q. Who violated the cease-fire?

A. I want to add something, because there are two things required of us, not to introduce missiles and not to construct posts. We set up scores of posts during these nights. It is true we used these ordinary military posts to lay sandbags, as everybody knows. We set up scores of alternate, field and structural posts. Some of these terms may be technical, but the whole world and any soldier knows that these are measures which any army or any commander is entitled to. Each position must have field, alternate and structural posts because they are essential to protect the lives of the armed forces.

All this took place before the cease-fire. Israel began reconnaissance operations—a real violation—and was surprised to see posts which it did not believe we could have set up in such a short time. In fact, it did not learn the truth. The United States submitted to me on 3rd September a document listing violations. The document is full of errors, although the US Secretary of State says that he is confident of the information in it. However, I say that it is all mistakes and a series of mistakes, that it is not possible for them to learn the truth without our divulging military secrets. Some of these posts do not exist at all, some are structural posts and others are alternate posts.

Actually, I can say something which I do not believe to be a military secret and which is a confirmation of what I have already said. Israel on one occasion attacked missile sites and I shall only say that in two-thirds of these sites there were no missiles at all. In other words, we can, through our posts; military actions; and alternate, field and deceptive posts; prevent the enemy from knowing the real location of the missiles. This is our duty and undoubtedly our right.

We emerge with the conclusion that we have absolutely not violated the cease-fire, because we introduced the missiles before the cease-fire. This action did not constitute a

violation. It is true that we set up posts later. We strengthened these posts, built of sandbags, to protect the lives of the soldiers. The Americans objected to this. We said this was maintenance work and that we had not set up new posts but strengthened the old, weak posts. We added that Israel was setting up concrete posts and that we had ample photographs and documents to prove what it was doing. We asked, what was Israel's attitude to the construction of these posts? They came back with the very simple answer that Israel was carrying out maintenance work. If Israel sets up fortifications and this is called mere maintenance work, then we are also entitled to do maintenance work on our posts and strengthen them with reinforced concrete to protect the lives of our sons and soldiers.

The fact is that there has been no violation. The real violation has been committed by the United States. Israel's mistake was in trying to deceive us, but the trick failed and we were able to set up what we wanted under the canopy of the agreement we had approved.

Q. If the United States has appointed itself a judge in the area as far as the cease-fire decision is concerned, then why did it not announce Israel's violations at the time?

A. The US attitude entirely favours Israel. The United States was never prepared to accuse Israel. The United States wanted to give Israel arms and was looking for a pretext to do so.

Let us suppose that the United States began with good intentions. It then found itself under Zionist pressure and was compelled to back down. How could it back down? It is a big country wanting to back down. Should it admit that it is subject to Zionist pressure for the sake of elections? It does not want to admit this. Therefore, it must find a justification or an excuse. What could the justification or the excuse be? It could accuse Egypt of failing to honour its word. The United States tried to say this all over Europe and it tried to convince European and major capitals throughout the world that Egypt did not actually honour its word and that this was the reason for suspending the initiative.

However, I believe that we have also been able to convince all those we have met that we have respected our word and that it was the United States and Israel which did not honour their word.

Q. Now that Your Excellency has explained the US attitude to the initiative, and Israel's and the United States' violation of the cease-fire, which has almost ended the initiative, what do you think the solution can be?

A. I have actually expressed my view on a solution through peaceful action. We said that in respect to the US initiative, it was supposed that the United States would unilaterally exert pressure on Israel. Now that it has been proved that the United States cannot put pressure on Israel, we demand that the big four Powers, including the United States, in their capacity as those responsible for world peace and as permanent members of the Security Council, put pressure on Israel in their joint meetings to compel it to contact Jarring with the purpose of implementing the resolution. This is the line that we are demanding now. I believe that several countries welcome this line, particularly since this is in fact a French proposal and initiative which we welcomed from the beginning.

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Speech by Provisional President Sadat of the U.A.R. to the National Assembly on Guidelines for the Future¹

Cairo, October 7, 1970

Brother citizens, members of the National Assembly: I have come to you following Jamal Abd an-Nasir's path. I consider your nomination of me to assume the Presidency of the Republic an instruction to march along Jamal Abd an-Nasir's path. If in the public

referendum our masses reply in the affirmative, I shall consider that as an order to march along Jamal Abd an-Nasir's path. I declare before you with honesty that I shall continue to march along this path in any circumstances and whatever position I hold.

The past few days in our life have been days of deep sorrow, but this great nation, through its unique steadfastness, has been able to turn the feelings of its great sorrow into a great potential power. It has overcome all its sufferings more quickly than anyone expected. This nation decided, resolved and firmly said with one voice and in a single, decisive phrase: The path of Jamal Abd an-Nasir.

During the past few days I have thought deeply about what we can do in view of what the almighty God has willed. I have based all my thoughts on one principle—that I should begin every action with the specific question: What would he have asked of us if he were still among us? It is in the light of my knowledge of him during 30 years of comradeship, of being colleagues in struggle in one battle after another, and of the understanding between one friend and another, that I have considered steps and positions—seeking his path and inspired by him. If Jamal Abd an-Nasir was among us at this moment he would have said: Do not be sad but move; do not be sad but go forward; do not hesitate but continue on the road. This is what our great people have done. This is what all the political and constitutional institutions representing the people's power and sovereignty over this land have done.

Brothers, I need not speak to you at length in describing the outlines of Abd an-Nasir's path. You know it, our people know it, our Arab nation knows it, and the whole world knows it. It is a long path commensurate with our aspirations. It is a difficult path because of the dangers facing us. Our aspirations cover a broad horizon. The danger from our enemies has reached the extent of occupation of part of our sacred soil. I should like to review for you a number of points which I think are of special importance, before we come to the fundamentals of Jamal Abd an-Nasir's path.

¹ Broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3503/A/1-A/3; reprinted by permission.

(1) We must, first and foremost, continue by every means the struggle for the liberation of all the Arab territories occupied in the 1967 aggression. These are Arab Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank of the Jordan, the Syrian Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Desert. At the same time we must fully preserve the rights of the Palestinian people and ensure the continuation of their struggle for their land and for their destiny. The real safeguard for this legitimate aim of our struggle is summed up in one basic demand: Strengthening of the fighting capability of the Egyptian armed forces to be a protector of peace based on justice or an instrument for imposing such a peace.

(2) We must continue struggling for the unity of the Arab nation. This nation's contradictions and their aggravation—a natural result of the past—should not divert our attention from the essence of the truth which Jamal Abd an-Nasir called and worked for, namely that we are one nation with one history, struggle and destiny.

(3) We must clearly define the enemies of our nation. Our enemies are Israel, international Zionism and world imperialism. We are engaged in a struggle of destiny with all of them. This struggle does not aim at invasion, but seeks security; does not aim at domination, but seeks freedom; does not aim at war for the sake of war; but seeks peace as peace should be.

(4) We must uphold the policy of non-alignment. The policy of non-alignment, as Jamal Abd an-Nasir taught us, is not a negative attitude. The policy of non-alignment, according to Jamal Abd an-Nasir, is an alignment in favour of our independence, freedom, peace and progress and is therefore a policy of confronting the dangers which threaten all these values. Our special friendship with the USSR and its great peoples, and behind it the great socialist people's bloc, completely agrees with the policy of non-alignment. It is a practical and realistic application of one of the most prominent slogans of our great leader, who said: We shall befriend those who befriend us and be hostile to those who are hostile to us.

(5) We must always remember, and never forget, that we are part of the great national liberation movement with its socialist-progressive orientation; that we are part of the mammoth world progressive movement; and that we—people and nation—are a current influencing civilisation, giving and taking and acting and reacting.

(6) We are required first and last to preserve the socialist gains which have been achieved for the masses of our working people's forces and to go forward along this course. This course was charted and defined for us by our leader Jamal Abd an-Nasir, as a faithful translation of the hopes of the working people's masses and as our inevitable destiny and existence.

Brothers, having made these observations, I come to the gist of Jamal Abd an-Nasir's course. You will not hear anything new from me about it. All I am going to do about it is to confirm a pledge. I brought with me to this assembly one document to place in its care, and then take my leave saying to you: This is his programme and it is also my programme because it is the will of the people. I place in the hands of this assembly the 30th March Manifesto, which is the last integrated programme that Jamal Abd an-Nasir submitted to his nation. His people's masses approved it in a free general referendum and adopted it as a course of struggle and a physical extension of the charter in the light of the emergency circumstances which have confronted our struggle since June 1967.

The 30th March Manifesto represents at this stage the unity of a nation. We need this unity. The 30th March Manifesto represents during this stage our clear objectives and we need clarity of objective. The 30th March Manifesto represents at this stage a popular will which rises above any other will. The 30th March Manifesto is the embodiment of a popular clear-cut will. And moreover, the 30th March Manifesto is a physical extension of the charter which is the line Jamal Abd an-Nasir personally defined at the beginning of his road.

Brothers, I want, however, to add something. I say to you, out of a faithful feeling of

responsibility, that to work for the implementation of the 30th March Manifesto programme during the lifetime of Jamal Abd an-Nasir was one thing but to work and implement it in his absence is something else. Jamal Abd an-Nasir was an historic hero. A hero is not made but is born in the conscience of his nation. His ability, therefore, cannot be measured by accepted criteria. The absence of the hero means something which we must not lose sight of: That the entire responsibility become the duty of the masses—in their working forces, establishments, organizations and their free generations directly connected with the daily struggle. That is why our confirmation of the pledge must be accompanied by a readiness of all of us to accept responsibilities of which Abd an-Nasir's presence would have relieved us.

I tell you frankly that nobody can take on what Abd an-Nasir shouldered. Therefore, the responsibilities must be distributed to guarantee the fulfilment of the trust as it should be fulfilled, to attain the people's rights, and to honour the memory of a leader.

Brothers, you have bestowed on me an honour. God knows that receiving this honour never crossed my mind during my life and I never sought it. I appreciate the extent of the responsibility you envisage. What helps me in accepting it is that you and the entire nation should be with me in word and deed and that we should follow in word and deed the way of Jamal Abd an-Nasir—the way which he is living now in the heart of his Arab nation just as his Arab nation lived it in his heart until the moment he handed us the banner of struggle.

Lord, punish us not if we forget or make a mistake. Lord, do not lay on us a burden such as thou didst lay on those before us. Lord, impose not on us (?afflictions) which we have not the strength to bear. Pardon us, and grant us protection, and have mercy on us. Thou art our patron, and so grant us victory over the disbelieving people. God's peace be with you.

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Radio Interview Statement by Prime Minister Tuqan of Jordan on the Estimate of Casualties During the Civil War in Jordan¹

Aminan, early October, 1970

Q. Reports on the number of deaths during the civil war in Jordan vary considerably. What are the Government's official figures on the number of dead and wounded among the Government forces, guerrillas and civilians?

A. I am most grateful to you for asking this question, because there has been a lot of exaggeration in the world. Long before the crisis developed between us and the guerrillas some people had argued that in the event of such a crisis, 15,000 to 20,000 persons would perish. The reports put out after the clashes were in the same vein. This indicates that someone had been planning before the event to exaggerate the loss of life and the damage to property. With the assistance of the Government, the Red Cross has established the actual number of dead and wounded.

The Red Cross canvassed the hospitals and obtained information on the number of dead. They obtained information from press reporters as well. For, according to the law, dead are brought to a hospital and a burial permit is obtained. The number of dead is only 581, no more. The number of wounded is about 1,200. Most of the wounded have now recovered.

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Newspaper Interview Statements by U.A.R. Guidance Minister Haykal to *The Times* on Arab Relations with Great

¹ Broadcast on Ankara Home Service in Turkish. English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3507/A/2 and A/3: reprinted by permission.

Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.¹**Cairo, October 13, 1970**

Q. Let us move to the next question. How do you describe present relations between Britain and the UAR?

A. There is more than one point. There are the present relations and the relations as I wish them to be. Concerning the present relations, quite frankly it is difficult to describe them as relations at all. You know that they stand at a minimum—not because we wish them to be so. Perhaps you also do not wish them to be so. But this level shows the amount of positive activity you carry out in the Middle East. I do not say that there are no relations at all between us, but I do not know whether it is possible to develop what exists between us to the level of real relations.

You know that we have retained our Ambassadors—one here and one there. The past contains some good and bad things. But all this does not approach relations in the real sense of the word. We no longer see Britain. We only see and hear Britain from behind the United States or as an echo of the US voice. This is regrettable, because Britain used to maintain with the Arab world relations which could be said to have been at least long and influential.

We have rejected and fought some aspects of these relations and accepted other aspects. We were willing for instance to develop cultural relations. From the cultural viewpoint, you will find that quite a number of those who lead the development of our country are English educated. This is a positive asset. But it seems to me that after the Suez stupidity, Britain preferred to jump from complete involvement to complete withdrawal. We can attribute this to a guilty conscience—or whatever term you may use.

But what I want to stress is British participation, or British co-operation in the Middle

East. This is what I have not seen. You may have had undercover relations, but on the surface I do not see any adequate existence of British relations. It is clear that I wish things were different.

Q. What can Britain do to improve its relations, not only with Egypt, but also with the Arab States?

A. In my opinion Britain can do a great deal, but it should be through the new forces in the Arab nation. Britain cannot achieve anything through the shaykhs or the skill of the diplomatic language experts who drafted the Security Council resolution—an example of the art of drafting but leading to no results.

Britain cannot hide behind the shaykhs or the skill of drafting vague language. The Security Council resolution has proved this fact. Britain has a mine of information on the Middle East owing to its long experience and old relations in the area. If it considers the changes in our life, then I believe that it has a role to play, provided it truly wants to participate in the Middle East and to play a role which reflects its concern for the Middle East. Britain has a great deal to do: for instance, Britain can do a great service by offering its interpretation of the Security Council resolution. I want Britain to clarify its position or to commit itself to a stand. When I look at the United States I know exactly where it stands—it stands with Israel. When I want to know where the USSR stands I can say exactly where it stands. When I want to know where France stands, I can ascertain it precisely. But if I use a microscope, periscope, telescope, or whatever instrument you may choose to try to find the British attitude, I shall not be able to do so because it is tricky and shrewd....

Q. It was said that President Jamal Abd an-Nasir was not personally inclined to the English and did not like them. Is there any truth in this. You should know better than anyone else.

A. This is absolutely baseless. As far as I know, I do not believe President Abd an-Nasir hated the British people or Britain herself. But like every nationalist, he hated British domination....

¹ Interview with Haykal (excerpts from which appeared in *The Times* (London), October 12, 1970, pp. 1, 5) as broadcast on Cairo Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3509/A/1-A/4; reprinted by permission.

Q. Let us turn to US-Egyptian relations. Do you think they are still deteriorating or have they reached the nadir and hit rock bottom?

A. They are continuing to deteriorate. I believe our relations are extremely bad, and this is something we did not wish. Let me give you one example, a statement made by the US Under-Secretary of Defence, Packard, and published in all papers, commenting on the lessons of the Jordan crisis. It was a strange statement confirming what we had always suspected, that US policy now relies completely on Israel to terrorise the Arab world. I think that neither I nor anyone else—not even US public opinion—could expect an improvement in relations as long as such policy and mentality prevailed. However, we are always seeking better relations. We know very well that we cannot, with our resources, liquidate the United States and that we are not prepared for a comprehensive war of strength against the United States. There is perhaps a two-fold reason for our conflict and difficulties with the United States: (1) that we have to frustrate their plans against us; (2) that we try to convince them that they have much to gain from our friendship, and much to lose from our enmity. This is not a comprehensive war since we have neither the intention nor the ability to eliminate the United States or put it out of existence. It is far beyond our ability to do so.

Q. If they continue to give aircraft to Israel could the situation between the two countries reach a state of war, from a legal viewpoint?

A. We are close to a state worse than war. If you are talking about a state of war in the sense of our declaring war on the United States it would be madness on our part; and we have not reached that point. However, the hatred which will be implanted in the hearts of the Arabs will be more harmful to the United States than a mere official declaration of war by one Arab State, or group of Arab States.

Q. Do you see a danger of the Middle East becoming another Vietnam?

A. No one can predict what will happen in the future. However, I am confident of one thing: The Arab people will not accept Israel's conditions. I know that the Arab people will not accept US domination, and I also know that we shall continue to fight to the end. I do not know the form all this will take in future—Vietnamisation, Balkanisation, or any other name you want. All I can tell you is that no one can impose capitulation on us....

Q. What would you expect to happen if the present cease-fire period was extended for a further three months and no settlement achieved?

A. I believe I have already answered this. We have no alternative but to stand, fight and triumph.

Q. Would there be another cease-fire period?

A. There might be a possibility of another cease-fire period. But more important than this, we shall not accept an unlimited period of cease-fire. We shall not accept one period after another and one extension after another because this will be tantamount to a complete, extended cease-fire. In other words, if we accepted this we would give the Israelis what they wanted. The Israelis are sitting happily where they want to be and are thinking of strengthening their front and turning it into a political line with all the political significance this word has. This is what we shall not accept in any way.

As I have said before, we can accept another limited cease-fire period. But before we agree we must make sure that this will bring results and achieve a certain amount of progress; otherwise what is the logic of accepting such a thing? If we were to accept an extension of the cease-fire for another period without results, we would have only one alternative—the alternative to which any side will resort when his independence, security and future are threatened—namely, to stand and fight.

Q. How do you see the near future in Jordan and how do you want things to develop there?

A. I see it dangerously serious and not the way I should like to see it. I

believe that all the Arab colleagues in the struggle must realise that we are waging a battle to defend our life, our future, all we possess, all we believe in and all that is valuable in life. From this point I believe that if the Resistance thinks it can seize power in Amman it would be making a gross mistake and on the other hand if the King thinks he is capable of checking the national (Arabic: *wataniyah*) liberation movement of the Palestinian people he would be making a regrettable mistake.

What I should like to see is for everyone in Jordan, the King and the liberation movement alike, to realise that there is no easy solution and that they are both partners in the struggle to retrieve what has been lost. You know that the only beneficiary from this conflict is Israel. Both parties must realise that they are partners in one battle and on one battlefield....

Q. What about a separate Palestine State?

A. Much has been said about a separate Palestine State. You know that such a State cannot be created by Israel. It cannot even be created in the shadow of Israeli occupation. I wholeheartedly support the establishment of a Palestine State. The question is, when this will take place? A State created in (the) shadow of the Israeli occupation would not be a State. It would be a satellite, or even worse, a colony. This would be treason. The first step is that the yoke of Zionist occupation must be removed and then the whole case must be put into the hands of the Palestinians to decide what they actually want.

Q. People wonder how long King Husayn can stay on in his throne.

A. I believe he can stay on his throne so long as he is able to retain his understanding of the true nature of the whole Arab struggle.

Q. In view of the absence of the late President Abd an-Nasir as a unifying factor, do you believe Arab unity is threatened?

A. No. You sometimes believe or seem to believe that Abd an-Nasir was the one who

created Arab unity. This is wrong. Abd an-Nasir did not create the idea of Arab unity. On the contrary, I believe that it is the idea of Arab unity that created Abd an-Nasir.... We have undoubtedly lost an honest man whose word was heard in the whole Arab world and who enjoyed the support of all Arabs. But the idea of Arab unity continues to exist. It has been enriched by Abd an-Nasir's contribution. I believe that the shock the Arab world has suffered with the loss of Abd an-Nasir will, more than anything else, further awaken the Arab world.

Q. Commentators on Middle East affairs predict that the heavy burden of leadership Abd an-Nasir shouldered will now be divided among three men—the President, the Premier and the Chairman of the ASU. May I ask if this is true?

A. This is an oversimplification by those commentators. If we imagine that Abd an-Nasir's authority could be divided among one man here, another there, and still a third yonder, then we are making a mistake. We must ask ourselves, what is Abd an-Nasir's real legacy? What was it then and what is it now? Abd an-Nasir's legacy is that he expressed the Arab nation's ambition and the Egyptian people's will. This is what Abd an-Nasir has left. He did not leave the posts of President of the Republic, Chairman of the ASU, or Premier....

Q. Some observers wonder about the special friendship between your country and the USSR, as the acting President of the Republic has said, and whether it is possible to reconcile this friendship with your declared policy of non-alignment.

A. I believe that the two policies completely agree.... How can we equate the United States, which gives arms to the enemy occupying our territory, with a State which gives us arms to defend ourselves? Non-alignment here is alignment with the forces of peace, the forces that work for independence and are ready to help our struggle for this independence.

Q. In a previous press conference in your capacity as Guidance Minister you pointed out that you

intended to give more facilities to foreign journalists. Do you want Cairo to be a centre for Middle East correspondents as in the past instead of Beirut becoming a rival?

A. I know one thing: Cairo before, during and after President Abd an-Nasir was and is the capital of the Middle East; I mean the Arab world. This means any person wanting to cover Middle East events must, by virtue of this fact, cover these events from Cairo. I admit that in certain circumstances we have made this difficult. We ourselves made it impossible for Cairo to play this role for the foreign correspondents through a number of naive, undemocratic actions and through a number of measures such as censorship, restrictions, and so forth.... I have tried my best to make the foreign correspondents' work easier. I believe it has indeed become easier since I assumed this responsibility...

Q. In the case of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, how long would it take you to reopen the Suez Canal? Have you assessed the costs of reopening the Canal?

A. I have one reservation; the question is not the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai alone. Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories. If the withdrawal takes place according to our demands, then from what I have heard from the experts the reopening will take four to six months.

Q. Are there any estimates in figures on the costs?

A. Yes, there are estimates in figures. According to the estimates by the experts, the cost might range from £ 25,000,000 to £ 30,000,000.

Q. In view of the Suez Canal's revenue, which I believe is £90,000,000 going into the treasury, it is obvious that the reopening of the canal is an extremely worthwhile proposition.

A. We are interested in reopening the Canal, but this is practically impossible with the continuation of aggression.

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Agreement Between the Government of Jordan and the Central Committee of the P.L.O. Regulating Relations Between Them¹

Amman, October 13, 1970

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

And from our belief that the Jordanian people holds tenaciously to its unity and is loyal to its cause, that it shuns dissension and discord and condemns any kind of armed clash between the Jordanian armed forces and the forces of the Palestinian Revolution;

And from our unanimous agreement on the goal of the liberation of Palestine, to which all efforts must be directed and on which all parties concerned must concentrate, standing in a single rank with their gaze firmly fixed on the usurped homeland beyond the Eternal River;

And from our conviction that conflict between brothers can be of advantage only to the Zionist and imperialist enemy who is preparing terrible plans for the destruction of Jordan as a base for endurance and liberation, and that certain supporters and agents of that enemy are manufacturing incidents and endeavoring to ensure that the insensate strife continues;

And from our belief that only if the armed forces and the forces of the Palestinian Revolution stand together in the face of the Zionist enemy will victory be ensured, as happened at Karameh, when some of our honor was restored through brotherhood in arms and the commingling of the blood of martyrs in the battle;

And in order to consolidate the foundations of national unity, to restore confidence, to mend the breach and heal the wounds in a spirit of understanding and national conciliation;

And in implementation of Articles 8 and 12 of the Cairo Agreement signed by the Arab Kings and Presidents on September 27, 1970, which is still in force, in addition to the

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, October 15, 1970.

subsequent agreement on withdrawal, dated Amman, October 1, 1970, which is attached to this agreement, as an annex;

Agreement was reached on the following:

General Principles

1. Both banks of Jordan, as regards both their territory and their people, constitute a single indivisible unity which is the principal base for the Palestinian Revolution and for the struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

2. On the strength of paragraph 1 above, and in order to implement its content, both popular and military resources in Jordan shall be placed at the service of the goal of the liberation of Palestine, and the Jordanian government undertakes to support the Palestinian Revolution in the battle for liberation and the recovery of our rights from the usurping enemy, and to take all measures calculated to consolidate mutual support between the Jordanian Arab Army and the Palestinian Revolution, so that, in both word and deed, they may fight in the same trench against the Zionist enemy for the achievement of liberation.

3. Presence, mobilization, popular and combat organization, and freedom of action and movement in the political, military, information and social fields are essential for the Palestinian Revolution, and it may engage in these matters freely.

4. The Palestinian people alone, as represented by the Palestinian Revolution, are entitled to decide their own future.

5. The Palestinian Revolution is a national force engaged in struggle and is one of the fundamental requirements for the battle for liberation against the enemy. It must therefore be supported and escalated.

6. The government undertakes that no body or organization or any quarter in Jordan shall be allowed to take action against the interests of the Palestinian Revolution and of national unity.

7. The consolidation of popular and national unity by ensuring that all members

of the people in all fields of life, and in state institutions, whether civil, military, political or economic enjoy complete equality of rights and obligations, without discrimination of any kind.

Commando Action Affairs

1. Amman shall be the principal seat of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and of all its political, military, information, social and other branches.

2. The Central Committee shall establish branch offices in the towns and villages of the Kingdom as it sees fit.

3. The Central Committee shall provide the necessary guards for its offices in the capital and elsewhere, and shall also provide guards for members of the commands.

4. The forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall consist of the forces of the Palestine Liberation Army and the commando bases, and the High Command of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution, appointed by the Central Committee, shall assume responsibility for all these forces.

5. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization is in control of, and accountable and responsible for, the Palestinian Revolution at both political and military levels and as regards everything connected with the affairs of commando action, its activities, rights and obligations.

6. The Central Committee's undertakings to the Jordanian government shall be binding on all the forces and organizations of the Palestinian Revolution, and the government's undertakings to the Central Committee shall be binding on all state bodies.

7. The freedom and protection of commando action and the safeguarding of its security and its right to carry out popular and national mobilization shall be guaranteed by the Jordanian government, insofar as this does not infringe the country's security within the limits of the law, with

due observance of such exceptions as are necessary for commando action.

8. The organs of moral mobilization and information shall be directed to the service of the common goal of liberation.

9. The following shall be regarded as the principal organizations of the Central Committee, and they shall have full freedom to engage in their activities:

a) The Palestinian Red Cross organization.

b) The Militia organization. The High Command of the Palestinian Revolution, as appointed by the Central Committee, shall assume the responsibility for this organization and for everything connected with its discipline and control, and members of the Militia shall abide by the provisions of paragraphs A and B of Article 2 of Section 4.

c) The Futuwa and Cubs organization. The High Command of the Palestinian Revolution, as appointed by the Central Committee, shall assume responsibility for this organization and for everything related to its discipline and control and members of the Futuwa and the Cubs shall abide by the provisions of paragraphs A and B of Article 2 of Section 4.

d) The organization for the welfare of the families of combatants and martyrs.

e) Fateh's newspaper and broadcasting service.

f) The medical services of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

g) The production institutions of the Palestinian Revolution.

h) The institution for studies and scientific research.

Travel and Movement

— The forces of the Revolution shall be ensured freedom of travel and movement on all main and side roads, to all commands, positions and bases of the forces of the

Revolution, including the road which leads in and out of the country, and it shall not be permitted for either party to erect blocks or impediments on these roads.

— Vehicles of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall be permitted to circulate in towns and villages, whether or not they are armed, on condition that they have a task order duly signed by the competent authority in the Command of the Revolution and that they abide by established traffic regulations.

— Authorized persons shall be permitted to wear uniform when travelling, though they must not be armed when they travel. An exception shall be made in the case of political and military leaders, who shall be permitted to carry personal arms if they obtain written permission from the High Command of the Palestinian Revolution.

1. The Jordanian government shall undertake to observe the following:

a) There shall be no intervention or interference in the affairs of members of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution by any authority or in any circumstances, except through their commands.

b) Documents issued by the Central Committee and the military commands and their organs shall be regarded as valid.

c) Military and disciplinary misdemeanors shall be tried by the Command of the Palestinian Revolution; apart from this, commandos shall be subject to the Jordanian civil courts.

d) The Directorate of Public Security shall notify the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command when any commando is arrested for committing any crime that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular civil and criminal courts.

e) In the case of crimes prejudicial to the Jordanian Armed Forces, there shall be a joint inquiry by both parties, and the accused shall be referred to the competent court.

f) Members of the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall be accorded the same treatment as is accorded to members of the

Jordanian Armed Forces, and the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall have the same rights and facilities as the Jordanian Armed Forces.

2. The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization undertakes to observe the following:

a) There shall be no molestation of any kind whatsoever of citizens or their property by any individual belonging to the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

b) There shall be no molestation of any member of the Jordanian Armed Forces by any individual belonging to the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

c) To abide by the laws and regulations in force with due observance of such exceptions as are necessary for commando action.

d) Collection of funds by individuals shall be prohibited; instead the system of unified collection of funds decided on by the Central Committee shall be employed.

e) Any commando who commits an offense of assault against any citizen or his property shall be handed over to the competent Jordanian courts.

f) Every commando shall carry a document establishing his identity, including his photograph, similar to the identity card approved by the Liberation Army, and should he travel, this identity card will be accepted as a valid travel document, on condition that he carries with him a permit or task order from his competent authority.

g) All vehicles belonging to the forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall be numbered by the competent authority in the Central Committee or the High Command of the Revolution, and every driver shall be obliged to carry a driving licence, either a civilian one issued by the Traffic Department, or a military one issued by the Command of the Revolution, and a uniform system as regards markings on vehicles and the positioning of such markings shall be observed.

h) No members of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution shall carry arms except in the cases set out in the foregoing paragraphs.

i) There shall be no demonstrations of military force.

j) There shall be no firing, holding of maneuvers or training with live ammunition in towns, villages or populated areas.

Inasmuch as Paragraph 5 of the Cairo Agreement stipulates the immediate release of detainees, it shall not be permissible in the future to detain or arrest any individual on account of the recent incidents.

In view of the common desire for the implementation, in letter and in spirit, of both the Cairo Agreement and of this Agreement, and in order to deal with any such problem as may arise, a permanent joint committee shall be formed, consisting of a representative of the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and a representative of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and, as its chairman, the President of the Higher Arab Follow-up Committee established by the meeting of the Arab Kings and Presidents held in Cairo in September, or whoever he may authorize to act on his behalf.

Deriving from, and with the same composition as the Permanent Joint Committee, there shall be:

1. A political office in permanent session, concerned with all non-military affairs.

2. A military office in permanent session, concerned with all military affairs, with an executive organization consisting of a number of Arab officers.

3. An aid office, concerned with all matters related to aid for citizens and assistance to the victims of the recent incidents.

Success is from God.

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Speech by King Hussein of Jordan to the Jordanian People on National Unity and Relations with the Palestinian Resistance (Excerpts)¹

Amman, October 14, 1970

... Brother compatriots, up to 1967 Jordan was the land of ambition and hope. Its ambitions and hopes began with the achievement of a better life and a happier future for man in Jordan and went on to cover the whole Arab nation to achieve its objectives and aspirations in this life. . . .

The heroism of the army and the sacrifices of the compatriots transformed steadfastness into an epic. Out of the call for steadfastness and for struggle the fida'i action was born to Jordan, Palestine and the entire Arab nation. This was an honourable and valiant birth to which all our hearts turned with confidence, love and hope.

Furthermore, Jordan viewed the fida'i action as a part of itself, a mainstay of its steadfastness and its strong arm in the struggle. Fida'i action is no newcomer to Jordan, nor is it a guest here. Fida'i action stems from the very core of Jordan. Jordan is fida'i action itself. Jordan does not view fida'i action from afar or adopt its attitudes to it from afar because no one in the world can look at himself from afar and (?adopt) the attitude he pleases. If the Jordanian people are the fathers of the army, they are equally the fathers of the fida'i action. . . .

But the infiltration of political forces and ideological currents into the fida'i action and the covert and overt strife caused by these forces and currents thwarted all honourable attempts and blocked the way to all sincere efforts. This was followed by leniency on the part of the Government and weakness on the part of government organs. All this resulted in instability and an end to the rule of law. It was natural that this deteriorating situation should not be allowed (?to continue). Several

hostile, opportunist, ignorant and reckless quarters were standing by to act, and they began to interfere in an attempt to exploit it and benefit from the deterioration. . . .

With God's grace, the first fruit of co-operation, understanding and faith came in the form of the agreement concluded yesterday with the Palestine Liberation Organisation Chairman, brother Yasir Arafat. This agreement reinforces the firm foundations of our noble people's unity. It consecrates the sacred cohesion of the Jordanian armed forces and the fida'i action. It embodies our cherished Jordan as a firm base for steadfastness and liberation. It will be a torch illuminating the path for our common march. Everybody will cherish this torch so that it will continue to burn forever. For us the agreement will mark the beginning of a fundamental and continuous action through which all the values, principles and rules laid down by the agreement will be established. We shall not tolerate anyone forsaking or disregarding this action at any time.

The agreement is not merely a piece of paper; it is an historic turning-point from which we shall go forward in fraternity, friendship and sincerity, shoulder to shoulder and soul to soul, towards a better and nobler future for Palestine, Jordan and all the Arabs. . . .

The fact is that for Jordan the Palestine question is one of life and death. So far as Jordan is concerned the tragedy of the Palestinian people is not merely the tragedy of a brotherly people; it is largely the tragedy of Jordan and its people. Jordan most determinedly rejects any claims, interpretations or theories that do not conform with and admit this fact. Jordan wants everybody to understand and admit this fact and to go forward from it, whether they are citizens or brotherly Arabs, soldiers or fida'iyyin, young or old, throughout our greater Arab homeland.

Continuing from this concrete fact, we must at this point stress another firm fact that Jordan has already proclaimed on several occasions, and we again confirm it: The struggle with the enemy is an Arab struggle. The role of the Palestinian people in this struggle is the role of a vanguard and a

¹ Excerpted from Hussein's speech broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3509/A/10-A/11; reprinted by permission.

spearhead. Discussing the right of the Palestinian people to the usurped territory is one thing; specifying their militant role in recovering this right is another.

Whereas Jordan insists that the Palestinian people are entitled to their full right to their territory, homeland and self-determination, Jordan also insists that it is disgraceful to leave the Palestinian people alone on the battlefield at this time. Overzealousness has ended. It was overzealousness that introduced into the dictionary of the Arab-Zionist conflict notions and words which only signify the Arabs' forsaking of the issue and their departure from their real responsibility of rendering service to the cause. Attempts to evade responsibility gave rise to the practice of deeming as adequate action the extension of emotional support or even of aid which had no influence at all on a decisive settlement of the conflict.

The Palestinian action, political or military, is part of Jordanian and Arab military and political action. If the tactical requirements of the present struggle called for independence of Palestinian action at different stages, then national concepts and convictions must preserve this independence in the context of co-ordination and co-operation with Jordanian and Arab action so that each action complements, strengthens and doubles the efficacy of the other.

We must reaffirm here that the relationship between Jordanian and Palestinian action must assume its true and original form. We are not a fraternal State, our country is not a fraternal country, our people are not a brotherly people; we are the origin, the father and the mother. Jordan's relationship with Palestinian action is fundamental, historic and sacred. Not a single stone in the glorious edifice of this relationship must be displaced....

We must at this point announce our intention to invite the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny when, through them, with them and with our brothers, we witness the dawn of liberation. Our kinsmen in the West Bank and their brothers will choose the method, system and rule they want. They will also define what governs the

relationship with Jordan and with the other fraternal States. We shall bless and support the Palestinian people's decision and opinion whatever it is.

I refuse to criticise or slander the fida'i action in any way. I leave criticism to my brothers, the fida'iyyin themselves, hoping that they will muster enough vigilance and loyalty to make a fundamental review of their attitudes and actions. Although I have avoided slander all my life because this is my character and these are my ethical values, I consider the fida'i action dearer than myself and Jordan. I shall not let the fida'i action be slandered by anyone....

Brother compatriots, the past, with all its mistakes, defects, sorrows and tragedies, is past. We must not look back or pause at what happened except to take stock of our position and to benefit our future course. The mistakes were not committed by one side only; the Government also had its share of mistakes.

The Government turned a blind eye. Government departments failed in their duties and responsibilities, particularly when officials showed weakness—disguised as support—in their dealings with the fida'i action. A strong, loyal and sound rule best constitutes the real source of effective support for the fida'i action. It can best help the fida'i action to avoid pitfalls and mistakes. Therefore, we are convinced of the need to establish and continue with this kind of rule. Our main request is the consolidation of all efforts and co-operation between all groups—soldiers, officials, fida'iyyin and citizens—to make the rule reach the desired level of capability, resolve and efficacy.

The rule is not merely the Government, nor the army, nor the citizens; it is a machine in which each person in these groups has his right place. He assumes his place in the light of his abilities, qualifications, character, manners, devotion and readiness to give Jordan his efforts, sweat and soul. Without this the machine cannot work....

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Policy Statement by the Government of Saeb Salam, the New Prime Minister of Lebanon (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, October 17, 1970

The government is determined to work out a defense policy aimed at strengthening the morale of the Army, providing it with all its real needs, modernizing its equipment and associating the young with the service of the flag....

The object of this defense policy is to safeguard Lebanon's independence and entity and the security of its territory, to fortify the frontiers with the enemy and to ensure that the population of the South are supplied with all that is necessary to enable them to hold out; so that they may feel confident that the government will never neglect them, their rights and their land, which is an integral part of Lebanon. In this way Lebanon will ensure that it is respected at international level, in addition to affirming its sovereignty.

There is no need for the new government to affirm that it will fulfil Lebanon's natural responsibilities within the Arab framework, and it is determined to participate in a positive and effective manner in dealing with the Palestine problem which is also, in many respects, a problem linked with Lebanon's destiny.

The government believes it to be its duty, in conformity with the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference and the pacts and agreements to which it has adhered, to adopt a flexible diplomacy at both Arab and international levels, and to turn to advantage the fact that Lebanese are dispersed throughout the whole world. It also believes it to be its duty to support commando action, which has undertaken not only to pursue its lofty

aim, but also to respect, jointly with the government, the bases of Lebanon's security and sovereignty.

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Speech by Provisional President Sadat of the U.A.R. to Commanders of the Armed Forces on the Struggle with Israel and Relations with the U.S.S.R. (Excerpts)²

Cairo, October 19, 1970

I will prolong the cease-fire on one condition only—that the contacts are serious and effective. In any case, we must not forget that the enemy's aim is to turn the cease-fire into a routine matter, prolonged every ninety days.

If we do accept to prolong the cease-fire, it will be for one period only; I shall not agree to a second period. You must therefore not accord this date any importance; you must continue your efforts and your unceasing preparations for the battle of destiny.

The Israelis cannot conceal the difficulties that confront them or their desire for the cease-fire to continue. And you, men of the armed forces, must continue preparing for the battle and making plans of action both before the fifth, after the fifth, and at all times.

Our people have held out for the last three years in the political, economic and military fields, and the U.S.S.R. has stood by us honorably and honestly in all these fields.

The U.S.S.R. has continued to give us all we want for practically nothing, because we are paying by instalments over a long period.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *National News Agency Bulletin* (Beirut), October 17, 1970.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 20, 1970.

I know this because I have attended the meetings between the two sides, the Arab and the Soviet.

We have started paying the instalments in Egyptian crops and Egyptian manufactures. The U.S.S.R. gave us everything necessary to build the High Dam, which cost four hundred million Egyptian pounds.

The U.S.S.R. has given us equipment for the second High Dam—I mean the iron and steel rolling mill, the initial cost of which was eighty million Egyptian pounds. It manufactures steel plates for civilian products—car and ship bodies. The factory started to produce. We had no iron ore, because the furnaces were not yet ready, so the U.S.S.R. gave us iron ore at the price prevailing on the world market, and paid us the difference in the price between it and manufactured steel plates. Steel plates are like gold from the economic point of view, because the market for them is open in both the East and the West.

In some years' time we shall have ship-building experts up to the highest world standards. And all this thanks to the aid of the U.S.S.R. at a time when the West refuses to give us a single rifle, not to mention other arms, heavy or light, even if we pay for them in hard currency.

As regards the military field, there is no need for me to tell you of Soviet military support for us. Where do these arms come from? The West will not agree to sell us a single rifle.

I want to emphasize that there are no secret agreements between us and the U.S.S.R. It is only that we and the U.S.S.R. are confronting a common enemy—world colonialism.

We must take advantage of the U.S.S.R.'s experience, and understand its attitude to us and its support for us. We must not allow the situation to be frozen when we are in a position of power; we must continue the struggle. The battle is coming, and a peaceful solution or a political solution will only be achieved by you. We must raise combat efficiency, we must keep our goal in view, we must continue the struggle.

Gamal has left us, and he has left us a

responsibility. It is not my responsibility alone; it is the responsibility of every one of you, and you must maintain your loyalty so that we may maintain the position that Gamal brought us to.

I pray that Almighty God may make us successful in realizing the hopes of our people, and I hope that we may be victorious in our battle in the field so that we may confront the battle of internal construction. For history will not forgive us, nor will our people pardon us, if we shirk our responsibility.

We must not be remiss and we must not forsake the trust reposed in us. We thank Almighty God that He has fore-ordained that one of the two great world powers should support us and stand by us. But we must not forget that the battle is our battle, and that the responsibility for liberating our territory is ours.

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Amiri Speech [Speech from the Throne] at the Opening Session of the Fifth Supplementary Session of the Second Legislative Season of the Kuwait National Assembly (Excerpts)¹

Kuwait, October 20, 1970

For our part, we declared at the time that we did not contest the right of Arab countries, parts of whose territory were occupied in the June 1967 War, to adopt such methods as they consider appropriate to liberate these territories and efface from them the traces of aggression. As regards the Palestine problem itself, we shall never agree to any solution of it to which the people of Palestine themselves do not agree, and no one can compel this people to accept a specific solution of their problem that is not in accordance with their wishes. Palestinian commando action will receive our full support, as being the vanguard of the Arab

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), October 21, 1970.

struggle against the Israeli enemy. It is surprising that the United States should recently have destroyed what it had itself achieved by announcing, at the beginning of this month, its withdrawal from the talks of the deputy representatives of the Four Great Powers on the Middle East, on the pretext—that is also employed by Israel—that the United Arab Republic had violated the cease-fire provisions on the Suez Canal Front. In this the United States chose to ignore Israel's flagrant violations of the same provisions and was, in fact, exploiting recent events in the area which it imagined were likely to weaken the Arabs' capacity to hold out and the Palestinian struggle.

We have been pained by the clashes that have taken place between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian Resistance movement, especially as they have been repeated on more than one occasion in the course of the year. We have always called, as we did earlier, during the armed clash between the Lebanese forces and the Palestinian resistance, for the exercise of self-control and for all parties concerned to adhere to clear and well-defined agreements safeguarding freedom of commando action without infringing the sovereignty of the countries concerned or their domestic security situation. But most regrettably the clashes that have taken place in the last few months ended only to break out again, causing no little loss of life and creating breaches in the ranks that should have been united to confront the Zionist enemy. I made many efforts to prevent a clash between the two sides and to regularize the relations between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian resistance movement. But the situation in Jordan deteriorated every day, and events followed each other with terrible rapidity, until the appalling clash took place in the middle of September. Then the Arab nation lived some of its darkest and most miserable days, as it witnessed the shocking tragedy which led to the death and wounding of large numbers of the sons of the one homeland.

Kuwait lost no time in calling for a cease-fire and an end to the bloodshed, and offered to mediate. In view of the continued conflict,

it was obliged to suspend the financial aid it was providing to one of the parties to the conflict in conformity with the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference on consolidating Arab endurance and strengthening the confrontation of the Zionist enemy.

If there is one thing that we must emphasize and resolve to achieve in the face of the perils that threaten the whole of our nation in the present critical stage, it is what we have always advocated—an end to all differences and steadfast advance along the road of endurance and struggle until we are victorious. We also reaffirm what we have stated on many previous occasions—that the countries which support Israel must learn that their interests in all the Arab countries will not be safe from the dangers that threaten them if they continue to assist our enemy.

International relations have become so closely interlocked that any threat to the peace of any area in the world entails a threat to international security as a whole, and every solution of an international problem is of service to world peace as a whole.

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Letter from King Hussein of Jordan to Wasfi al-Tall, Appointing Him Prime Minister of Jordan (Excerpts)¹

Amman, October 28, 1970

Our dear Excellency, Wasfi at-Tall: We send you our sincere love and great esteem. Following our acceptance of the resignation of HE Brother Ahmad Tuqan and in view of our awareness of your sincere love for the country and of your loyalty

¹ Broadcast on Amman Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3521/A/6-A/8; reprinted by permission.

in serving it, considering the firmness, resolve and adherence to the law you have shown for many years, and in view of your ability to set institutions in motion and to push forward development and construction, we appoint you to the post of Premier and charge you with forming a new government which will include the following primary tasks in its programmes and plans:

(1) Our country has been through a blind dissension which was the result of slackness, lack of firmness and the scheming of enemies. This dissension seemed like an inevitable fate. Many nations have experienced such dissension but did not weaken, retreat or surrender to fate.

Fortunately for this country, the fraternal Arab Kings and Presidents met in a conference in Cairo. At that conference they assumed the task of stopping bloodshed, reuniting the ranks and concerting efforts. The recent agreements were the result of sincere efforts, goodwill and common aims. I have pledged to God, to my brother Arab Kings and Presidents and to the Jordanian family—as King, citizen and man—to do my utmost and to exert all my efforts to implement these agreements in both letter and spirit, to guide the parties concerned to avoid errors, and to establish relations between the regime and the Resistance on new bases of trust, positive action and ethics as well as on responsible co-operation along the path of liberation. For this reason one of the principal Holy tasks which the new Cabinet and government departments should undertake is not only fully to implement these agreements but also to strengthen further the mutual trust and to build solid bridges of brotherly dialogue and sincere co-operation in planning, work and execution.

(2) The aggressive occupation forces are still corrupting our land. Their oppressive presence is still felt here and in the neighbouring Arab countries. They are desecrating our Holy places, jeopardising our security and the security of our nation, and enjoying our property and our wealth. Consequently, it is our duty and the Government's to put aside at this stage all that may cause disunity

and rupture and to devote all our strength and efforts to eliminating aggression and expelling the aggressor from our territory. . . . Henceforth we cannot afford—just as we could not afford in the past—to aim our weapons anywhere except at the forces of occupation and aggression. We shall not allow a drop of blood to be shed elsewhere than on the battlefield.

Now that the brothers-in-arms and the comrades on the path of struggle in this country have come together again and friendship has been restored, we hope the Government will seek to unify views and unite the ranks and efforts on the eastern front, and provide daily proof that Jordan is sincerely willing to build this front and provide it with the means of strength, invincibility and mobility. Jordan has dedicated itself to the battle of liberation and will continue to offer its blood and every sacrifice. The Government must extend an honest hand of co-operation to the Arab brothers on this front and go to the farthest point in meeting the desires of our brothers so as to thwart the enemy's horrible schemes and to make the eastern front a bastion of steadfastness and a springboard of liberation.

(3) Recently our people's unity showed a weakness because of the campaigns, rumours and imaginary stories fabricated by the enemy and his hirelings. The campaigns have misled our people. The only way to face the enemy's daily, systematic psychological warfare is to strengthen national unity and fraternal relations between members of the one family. . . .

I therefore believe that one of the main tasks of the Government is to counter these false campaigns with courage and frankness and to co-operate with leading thinkers in this country to uphold right, expose falsifications and suppress whims. . . . The information media must counter this systematic psychological warfare by stating the truth and promoting among the citizens the spirit of brotherhood, friendship and amity; and must continue to strengthen the ties between members of the Jordanian family in all fields.

(4) During the blind dissension some official and public departments and organizations showed a laxity and seemed disinterested in events. They abandoned their duties and responsibilities and stood waiting and watching as if they did not care about what was happening. There was also evidence of multiple loyalties and a lack of interest in the land and in the country. Many were intent upon leaving, as if they were tied to the country by only a thin thread.... The Government must therefore strive to review all the official institutes and departments in order to clarify their objectives, revise their methods of operation, and remind those working in them of their responsibilities, so that they will undertake these responsibilities with honesty, efficiency and sincerity.... We have placed heavy responsibilities on the Government—responsibilities which it can bear only if every citizen helps it and joins it in achieving the sublime aim, liberation.

(5) I believe the Government should strive to turn over the black page in this country's history and to begin a new, white page. It should rebuild what has been destroyed, repair what has been damaged, and indemnify the losses incurred. The Government should therefore draw up urgent plans for the rapid implementation of the programmes of economic modernisation and development, and expand agricultural, industrial and commercial activities....

(6) While we believe the prerequisites of our national battle should have first priority in every plan and programme at the national level, we also believe that our armed forces should be given all our love, care and help to enable them to carry out their Holy task. This is of first importance in the process of construction and preparation.... To provide these forces with their requirements and needs and to develop these forces is a Holy task in which we should all co-operate.

I would like to stress the importance of creating a national atmosphere conducive to the mobilisation of all resources and concentration on national unity, because this affects the spirit of our sons and brothers in

the armed forces, to whom we should give all the care, attention and respect they deserve.... We have confidence in this country and in its future as well as in the wisdom of the majority of its sons and their loyalty to serving the nation.

We hope you will soon submit to us a list of your colleagues who with you will be able to undertake this mission and carry out these tasks. We wish you all success. God be with us.

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Speech by President Boumedienne of Algeria on the Sixteenth Anniversary of the Algerian Revolution (Excerpts)¹

Algiers, October 31, 1970

I cannot conclude this speech without referring to what is taking place in the Arab East. This is no news to you. For the events taking place there have always been in train, probably taking different forms, since 1967. For there is a reality, a fact, in front of us: on the hand there is the Palestinian people, and on the other, the so-called Israeli State. As long as no solution has been found to this state of affairs, no peace will ever exist, nor permanent stability. Some may say that to state a fact cannot solve any problems. True; but, as we said in the past, the Arab countries have vast potentials and effective weapons, capable of confronting this grave and open challenge to their dignity and the rights of the Palestinian people. But the Arabs, the Arab countries, have not used all these weapons and potentials. History must record this fact about them. The Arab homeland is a vast territory, with an important strategic position. The Arab homeland has 100,000,000 Arabs. Some may say that it is quality not quantity

¹ Excerpted from Boumedienne's speech broadcast on Algiers Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3524/A/16 and A/17; reprinted by permission.

that matters; but this is still a fact. They have vast economic potentials, which are not used in the interest of the Arabs. This is one of the bitter facts which have brought about defeat, and will bring about further defeats for the Arabs. The Arabs speak as one nation, as one people but, there is a difference between words and action. Remember what I said about Arab oil; it is filling European banks, and is invested in America, Britain and Europe—in America, I repeat, which supports and arms Israel, providing it with the most modern equipment. Our emotional thinking—that is, thinking based on excitement in ceremonies and so forth—cannot lead us anywhere if we do not take account of these facts, and lay down sound plans for the establishment of a real revival, and try to act as Arabs, not as people who have organic links with those who humiliated the Arabs....

The point is not to talk of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people and the Security Council resolution, but to make a reassessment [of the situation].... The Arab countries today stand at the crossroads: either to profit by the 1967 defeat and the previous defeats, and so embark on a new stage with an ensuing revival of the Arab nation; or to surrender in the face of the circumstances and say that the Arab nation and the Arab homeland have passed away for ever, just as all empires have disappeared, and such is history.... We most urgently pose this question today. Algeria is capable of providing a formula for work.... The revolutionary Algerian Government is capable of offering a formula for work at the level of the Arab world.

We must always try to take a comprehensive view of the situation if we are to create the new Arab man. Arab governments have responsibilities, and they must undertake to bear them fully. A new Arab society must be established.

Recently we have seen a war waged against the Palestinians; barely a week after that war, when the blood had scarcely dried—the blood of innocent Palestinians—we found weapons pouring to the murderers who had shed the blood of those innocent people,

those homeless, those Jews of the modern era, the Palestinians. These are glaring contradictions.... We have said before that we cannot defend the Palestinian cause and at the same time remain allied to the Americans, that is, allied to the allies of the Israelis. This is impossible. In spite of all the attempts [made in this connection], the bitter facts have prevailed once more, as the bloody events of the fraternal Jordanian people and the homeless Palestinian people amply testify.

On this occasion, when we are about to commemorate the martyrs of the November revolution, I cannot but reaffirm our full, absolute and effective solidarity with the Palestinian revolution and people, and all the liberation movements in the world—whether in Africa, Latin America or Asia. My last words are: Glory and immortality for our blessed martyrs; peace be upon you.

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Press Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Higher Arab Follow-Up Committee, Amin al-Shibli of Sudan, on the Committee's Completion of its Task in Jordan¹

Cairo, November 1, 1970

There are elements in Jordan known to all that are not interested in the implementation of the Cairo Agreement or the subsequent Amman Agreements and the Military Protocols. This is a fact known to everyone in Jordan but, on behalf of the Higher Arab Committee I hereby draw the attention of these elements to the fact that we have taken all precautions and measures necessary to expose all attempts aimed at creating dissension once again.

I am not disclosing a secret when I say that Article 13 of the Cairo Agreement reads as follows:

In the case of either party, the Jordanian authorities or the Palestinian resistance movement, infringing any provision of the Agreement

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 2, 1970.

or impeding its implementation, the Arab countries which signed the Agreement shall take unified and collective measures against that party.

The Higher Arab Committee will keep a careful watch on all that happens, and will not hesitate for a moment to expose all parties that try to infringe or trifle with the Agreement.

Q. Does that mean that the Arab Committee will fulfil its responsibilities to ensure that the Agreement is implemented seriously?

A. Certainly. We have left behind us in Amman three principal offices whose task is to follow up the situation on the spot—a political office, a military office and an aid office.

In the case of any violation of the Agreement the Arab Higher Committee will be called to an urgent meeting to discuss the situation and then refer the whole matter to a meeting of the Arab Kings and Presidents.

Q. Does that mean that the Arab Higher Committee will become a permanent committee stationed in Jordan?

A. Certainly not. After a whole month of work I am in a position to state that the political task of the Arab Committee came to an end with the signing of the Amman Agreement and the publication of the Military Protocol. It is now engaged in the military aspect of its work, and this is the most important aspect. We completed all the political contacts with the signing of the Agreement, and the Higher Military Committee is now performing the delicate task of ensuring the implementation of all the provisions of that Agreement.

In my estimate, if things follow a normal course in Amman, we are entitled to hope that the Arab Higher Committee will have completed all its work within two months.

Q. What are the most important trends in the report which is to be submitted to the Arab Kings and Presidents?

A. We shall not submit written reports to the Kings and Presidents; we shall inform them verbally of the results of the Committee's activities. The Chairman of the Com-

mittee, al-Bahi al-Adgham, has met President Bourghiba and told him what has been done, and he will soon have a meeting with President Qadhafi, while I shall make the same report to Presidents Numeiry and Sadat.

As regards the tenor of these reports, I am in a position to say that the Higher Committee has—so far—been completely successful in the performance of its difficult tasks.

All military operations between the two sides have ended completely, as have all the military movements prohibited by the Cairo Agreement. Information campaigns between the two sides have also come to an end, except for the radio programs the Central Committee is now broadcasting in Damascus and Baghdad, and I think that the Resistance's information line will be unified in a few days. Moreover, ninety per cent of the Palestinian, commando and civilian internees have been released—a total of some twenty-three thousand—and there are now only about nine hundred detainees, whose cases are at present under consideration.

Let me tell you of my own personal experience. I was completely *au fait* with events both before and after the crisis in Jordan. I was Chairman of the Five Member Committee sent by the Arab League to put an end to the conflict in Jordan before the recent bloody crisis. We went to Amman and, after continuous meetings between the Jordanian government and the Central Committee of the Resistance, we reached an agreement which was announced on the morning of September 15. Then, a few hours only after the Agreement had been signed, the military government headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Dawd was proclaimed, so that the Agreement became null and void before the ink in which it was written had dried.

I then went to Amman as Deputy Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, after some critical and bloody days of all-out fighting and destruction. In fact I could not imagine that our task could possibly be successful, for many agreements had been concluded between the two sides, and all of them had been violated. But now, after a full

month of work, I can say that we have succeeded.

As to how we succeeded—that, in my estimate, is due to a number of factors:

—The way in which the Committee itself worked. We did not follow the traditional method only—I mean meeting the conflicting parties. We left our offices and went out into the streets and met the people in the city and in the camps, and found out everything for ourselves.

— Continuous efforts by all parties to ring down the curtain on the tragedy of Amman.

— The outstanding efforts of the Arab military observers. The Higher Military Observation Committee proceeded rapidly to all centers of provocation—and there were many of them—and obtained complete control of the situation. We were completely successful in this pioneer experience.

— The personality of al-Bahi al-Adgham. As Chairman of the Committee he enjoyed the confidence of both the conflicting parties, in addition to the fact that he himself had been a freedom fighter against French occupation, so that he is familiar with the revolutionary mentality. In my estimate we have succeeded so far for the following important reasons:

— Each of the conflicting parties realized that it could not finish off the other. The Jordanian Army could not liquidate the Resistance, nor could the Resistance movement completely finish off the regime. Neither party could eliminate the other except after terrible bloody massacres, the effects of which would not only have involved loss of life, but would have spread to the political field in the future, both locally and at Arab level.

— There is a second reason that leads me to think that the Agreement will be conclusively implemented. It is that the Cairo Agreement was signed by ten Arab Kings and Presidents and by both the conflicting parties through their highest commands.

— Then there is the immense moral obligation to the late President who sacrificed his life to end the conflict, and respect for

Abdel Nasser's last act will induce all parties to implement the Agreement seriously.

The ambassadors of the Four Great Powers in Amman have severally met the Arab Higher Committee and informed it of a number of highly important matters:

1. The representatives of each of these countries have declared on behalf of their governments that they are profoundly concerned that all parties in Jordan should implement the Cairo Agreement in letter and in spirit in the interests of world peace.

2. The representatives of each of these countries have expressed the wish to the Arab Higher Committee that it should remain in Amman as long as possible to superintend the final implementation of the Agreement and until the situation there returns to normal.

3. The situation will become extremely grave if the crisis breaks out again and the situation once more becomes as desperate as it was at the time of the crisis. Thus all the parties have no alternative but to implement the Agreement.

4. There remains the question: To what extent is the obligation to implement the Cairo Agreement being met?

This depends on how serious and honest the new government is in implementing the Agreement which rang down the curtain on the tragedy of Jordan in which thousands were killed or wounded.

The question will be answered in the course of the next few days.

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Press Release Issued by the Expanded Meeting of the Central Committee of the P.F.L.P. on the Challenges after the Civil War in Jordan¹

November 5, 1970

1. In response to the grave circumstances through which the Arab revolution, and its

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), November 21, 1970.

vanguard, the armed revolution of the Palestinian people, are passing, the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine resolved to evaluate the present stage of commando action and, in particular, the situation following the latest conspiracy intended to liquidate the Palestinian Revolution. It also resolved to explore future horizons in a scientific and analytical manner, to face up to the new and important tasks that await the resistance movement in its confrontation of challenges and to map out the way ahead. With these ends in view the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine held an expanded meeting on November 5, 1970, during which it passed in review the experience of the Palestinian Revolution, with particular emphasis on its advance.

The Comrade Secretary General of the Front submitted detailed reports on all the important and urgent matters that are engaging the attention of Arab and, in particular, Palestinian public opinion. The Central Committee conducted a serious appraisal of the situation of the Front and its relations with other sections of the Palestinian Revolution; it also studied new methods of commando action which will promote the advance of the Revolution, ensure that it continues and endures and enable it to surmount the obstacles that impede its revolutionary advance. Undoubtedly the most important part of the deliberations of the Central Committee was its exhaustive survey of the question of national unity. This the Committee regarded as being the pivot of the whole problem, and hence a subject to which the resistance must give top priority, inasmuch as national unity is of fundamental importance, since it alone can enable the Revolution to stand on more solid ground, provide it with a clearer basis and enable it to provide a general national program which will lead to the effective fusion of all armed groupings.

At its meetings the Committee also stressed the necessity for effective action by the Popular Front to ensure that it advances towards the adoption of a clear-cut and genuine formula for a firmly based national

front. It emphasized that, in this connection, the Front has a heavy burden to shoulder: it must implant the idea of national unity in the consciousness of all combatants, and subsequently become the practical embodiment of that unity and guide it in the right direction. At its meeting the Central Committee also reviewed the role that the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization can play, as constituting the present formula for the embodiment of the unity of all combatants on the field of battle.

In its discussions the Central Committee of the Popular Front stressed that a unified national front, consisting of all sections of the Revolution, and supported by the effective cohesion of the Arab revolutionary forces and the masses of our Jordanian-Palestinian people, can ensure the defeat of all the reactionary conspiracies hatched by the Jordanian regime with the object of containing and liquidating the Revolution.

2. The Central Committee is of the opinion that if the struggle is to continue and escalate, more revolutionary methods must be adopted for the confrontation of all challenges and for the solution of all the problems that impede the advance of the Revolution.

The continuation and escalation of the struggle depends, basically, on this effective cohesion between the Palestinian Revolution and all progressive and national forces in the Arab homeland, and on the establishment of more extensive alliances with the socialist camp, with the working class in capitalist countries and with revolutionary movements in other countries.

After approving at its meeting all the studies submitted by the Comrade Secretary General, which studies will be issued as special annexes, the Central Committee re-elected Comrade George Habbash Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The unanimous re-election of Comrade George Habbash as Secretary General has silenced those who sought to impair the democratic atmosphere which characterized the discussions of the meeting of the Central

Committee, and which fundamentally strengthened the genuinely leftist trend within the Front.

The results achieved by the meeting of the Central Committee came as a fatal blow to all hostile elements and venal sections of the press which had taken money in advance to conceal the unmistakable fact embodied in the meeting of the Central Committee—the fact that this meeting further consolidated the leftist line which had already been firmly established by the Front's assumption that, for the conduct of the struggle, Marxism-Leninism is the best course to follow and constitutes the only true guide along the road which leads to victory.

Relying as it does on the awareness of the masses of our people, the Central Committee fully understands the truth about the imperialist-reactionary information campaign that is being directed against the Popular Front at a time when the armed revolution of our people is passing through the most critical and dangerous stage in its history. It is fully aware of the motives that lie behind the attempts of the imperialists and their henchmen to demoralize our combatants who, through their revolutionary experience, have learned the true nature of the struggle in which their leaders have been, and are still engaged on behalf of the future of our land and our masses.

It is because of the genuinely revolutionary trend embodied in the advance of the Popular Front and its leadership, which has attracted such large numbers of the Jordanian-Palestinian people, that the agents and reactionaries have launched this smear campaign against the Front and its revolutionary leftist leadership.

The way the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is promoting the struggle, and the genuinely leftist phenomenon it embodies, have alarmed the stooges and hirelings, and the latest commotion fabricated by imperialist circles and carried into effect by their hired instruments in our homeland is only an expression of the aversion felt by the imperialists and their stooges for the sound course that the Front is pursuing.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine will continue on its course, along with all other sections of the Palestinian Revolution, struggling to achieve and consolidate national unity, until our people's goals of liberation and return are fully achieved.

Long live revolutionary unity. Glory and immortality to our devoted martyrs.

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Statement by Prime Minister al-Tall of Jordan on His Government's Policy (Excerpts)¹

Amman, November 7, 1970

The second weapon which accords us the permanent strength we require consists of the convictions and basic principles on which the whole of Jordanian existence depends, especially at this stage, in which our country and our nation are confronted by the most fearful challenges and perils. These convictions and basic principles are:

Firstly, that Jordan is the starting point, the mainstay and the source. While this fact means that the Arab cause in general is Jordan's first concern and preoccupation, it also means that, for Jordan, the Palestinian cause in particular is a matter of life and death. Hence for Jordan, the tragedy of the Palestinian people is not the tragedy of a brother people but simply and solely the tragedy of Jordan itself and its people. When this conviction finds its way into the mind and establishes itself in the feelings of every one of us, it will provide us with a light that will not only disclose the facts about past errors, but also light us on the way of the future and protect us from falling into error once again. Jordan belongs to the Palestinian just as much as to the Jordanian, and Palestine to the Jordanian just as much as to the Palestinian.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), November 8, 1970.

Secondly, the Jordanian regime, with all its constituent elements, basic principles and institutions, is an inevitable necessity imposed by the role played by Jordan as a vanguard and a model, both in the field of construction and preparation and in that of national action and the attainment of national goals. It is not too much to say that the need for this regime, the need to adhere to it and rally round it, increases and grows with the increase of people's belief in liberation as a target and a goal.

These two convictions lead us directly to the third cardinal conviction—that the whole of Jordanian existence must bear the stamp of one thing only—the battle. This stamp not only distinguishes the Jordanian existence from other kinds of existence; it also determines the purport of that existence and gives it its true meaning and significance. It is my conviction that the battle is the only possible stamp for the whole of our existence in this country, and that when the battle becomes the stamp that distinguishes the life of every one of our citizens, whatever his position, victory in the battle will be a foregone conclusion which it is impossible for our enemies to alter or evade. I am also convinced that the way to our sacred goal, the goal of liberation, lies through and stems from this conviction. I therefore believe that one of the first and most cardinal principles of government is that all of us in this country should bring ourselves into a state where the battle becomes the stamp of our existence, our life, our work, the stamp of production in all fields and at all levels.

Because the battle will be long, and because it will be decisive, inasmuch as it will decide the whole question of the continued existence of the Arabs and the whole of the common Arab destiny,

And because our enemy in the battle has been preparing all the equipment he requires for it,

In our preparations for the battle the highest priority must be given to law and order on the one hand, and to production on the other. Only the citizen who lives in real security knows how to die courageously

for his country; the citizen who lives in fear, terror and anarchy has nothing to give either to his country or to any one. Without law and order no society can ensure its citizens real security.

Similarly, only the citizen who lives in real security is capable of participating in that great mainstay of strength, which is called production.

But the citizen who lives in anarchy, alarm and dismay cannot contribute a single atom to the construction that is in progress around him.

Without law and order no power on earth can enable any people to build up its production.

In my view, one of the first responsibilities of government is to give a profounder significance to the meaning of order and to embody the sovereignty of law in our everyday life.

Force is not the only instrument available to government for the achievement of this end; the real instrument is the awareness and understanding of the citizen, his faith in himself, his country and his cause, and his resolution to build and not to destroy, to give and not to take, and, at the end of the day, to be victorious and never again to be defeated.

When law and order become the established framework which regulates our actions and guides our steps, when we urge our production forward to the furthest limits permitted by our resources and our human potential,

When all of us do this—the soldier, the commando and the civilian—we shall have set our feet in the path which will lead us to our goals of victory and liberation. Fourthly: the battle which must become the stamp of our existence and our life in this country involves two absolutely unavoidable necessities which it is impossible to ignore or disregard if we are to emerge from the battle victorious.

The first is the necessity for national unity.

The second is the necessity for Arab cooperation.

This is why I want to declare the government's determination to proceed with cooperation with all our brother Arabs, with Arab solidarity and with joint Arab action, and in this respect, as our consciences so insistently urge us, the first field for the embodiment of this determination must be that of cooperation, solidarity and action with our elder sister, the United Arab Republic. We shall do this firstly in response to the demands and requirements of the battle, and secondly because the whole of Jordan appreciates the vanguard role which Egypt has consistently played in the Arabs' struggle against their enemies and the great sacrifices Egypt has offered throughout the course of that struggle from the start.

These sacrifices have constituted the solid foundations of the unity of the struggle of the two sister countries and of their united advance along the path of that struggle, and we must maintain and protect those foundations if we want our common struggle and our single advance to bring us to the dawn of victory and the realms of liberation.

I now come to the regrettable incidents that took place in our country about six weeks ago.

To speak briefly, I can say that those incidents were utterly alien to the very essence of the convictions and basic principles which are implicit in Jordanian existence and on which that existence rests. It is natural that Jordan should become, to an ever greater extent, the starting point, the source, the mainstay. It is natural that belief in the Jordanian regime and its ability to meet its responsibilities in the battle of liberation should increase, that the conviction of the unavoidable necessity for this regime should grow. It is natural that every man, every force, everything in Jordan should be enrolled under the stamp of the battle. In view of and as the result of this, it is natural that devotion to law and order should increase, out of concern for the battle, for there be can no hope of victory in any battle except through order and absolute adherence to it. In view of, and as the result of this, too, it is natural that there should be growing concern that security throughout the homeland should be ensured

and protected, and increasing respect for the law and its sovereignty over all. It is also natural that national unity should be growing profounder, stronger and more flourishing, and that its strength and validity should bear the stamp of that sacred brotherhood that exists so profoundly between the army and the people on the one hand, and commando action on the other. Finally, it was natural that there should be a growing belief among our Arab brothers in the absolute necessity for Arab cooperation and for it to be promoted to the utmost extent required by the terrible conflict which Zionism has imposed on the whole Arab nation.

But, most regrettably, these incidents took place; they were the only thing that was unnatural and that should not have taken place.

However, it was not long before reason and reality were restored, before the basic principles and convictions of Jordanian existence regained their natural course, along with all that they are related to, and relates to them, in the great Arab world.

This came about with the birth of the Cairo Agreement signed by the Arab leaders on September 27, 1970.

This Agreement not only calls for the shedding of blood to be stopped, the clash between brothers to be checked and the causes of discord to be eliminated; it also returns the whole of the Jordanian advance to its true course, restores to it its basic principles and its firmly established fundamental convictions, and shows it, and through it the common Arab advance, the way it must follow, and clearly and precisely determines its goals.

It is my opinion, indeed, I am convinced, that what I have said applies to the Amman Agreement and its associated agreements and protocols.

All these documents constitute turning points of the greatest importance, inasmuch as they correct the errors, make straight what was crooked, eliminate deviation and close all loopholes through which evil and disunity might penetrate. In other words, these documents are of vital importance, for they are the crossroads from which we must set

out afresh on our hallowed and united advance towards our hallowed common goals.

I profoundly believe in all this. I am therefore resolved not only that these agreements shall be respected, but that they shall be implemented both in letter and in spirit. For in addition to all their positive features, these Agreements, in my opinion, constitute the culmination of a process of propitious and beneficial return to the facts and constituent elements embodied in the convictions and basic principles of Jordanian existence.

Furthermore, I want to stress and affirm that my government, in its total and absolute determination to implement the Cairo and Amman Agreements and everything related to them, will always regard them as the beginning, the groundwork, for a greater measure of that national unity which is the crowning glory of unity of arms, struggle and solidarity, and a greater measure of that Arab cooperation and solidarity which are the crowning glory of our efforts and of our readiness to sacrifice everything to the battle and on behalf of victory.

If these affirmations of mine give pleasure and satisfaction to many, as I am confident they will, I know that there are some people they will vex and displease. In more than one quarter there are ignorant or hostile forces who would like and are trying to thwart our aspirations and to bring all our goals and hopes to nought. They are doing all they can to frustrate the Cairo and Amman Agreements and their consequences and making superhuman efforts to embroil Jordan in civil strife once more.

To these quarters I want to affirm with such force as leaves no room for doubt or argument that the door leading to clashes between the commandos and the Army has been closed once and for all, and that the door of true brotherhood between the Army and the commandos has been thrown wide open, and that through this door the Army and the commandos will enter side by side, to press on side by side towards the attainment of their aspirations and the realization of their hopes.

Q. What is the government's attitude to the Militia forces, and what is their status?

A. In accordance with the arrangements agreed on, the Militia forces will be given regular official identity cards which will entitle them to keep their personal arms in their homes. Apart from this they will be subject to all the laws and regulations in force in the state.

Q. Jordan announced in the past that it would accept what President Nasser accepted as regards the cease-fire decision. Does Jordan now accept what President Sadat accepts?

A. Yes, certainly

Q. The news agencies have published reports to the effect that the Iraqi forces have started to withdraw from Jordan. Has this happened? And has Jordan asked Iraq to do so?

A. There is no truth in this.

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Press Interview with Central Committee Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. on Current Developments in the Situation in Jordan and the Future of Commando Action (Excerpts)¹

Cairo, November 9, 1970

What happened in Jordan was something unnatural, something quite unimaginable. That the whole of the Jordanian army should be employed in a police operation whose object was not only to curb the resistance but to annihilate it and to annihilate the Palestinian people—such an operation could never

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 10, 1970.

have been anticipated. For example, I could never have imagined that King Hussein could give orders for tanks to enter Amman, for to bring tanks into the capital meant that it was to be wiped out. And these tanks have never been the property of the Jordanian authorities; they are munitions to be used by the Arab nation for the confrontation of the enemy. And in fact ninety-one of the tanks of the forces that took part in the attack on Amman were smashed, destroyed or wrecked; these forces were the Third Armored Division, the Fourth Mechanized Division—this was a newly formed division—and the First Infantry Division, in addition to the artillery battalions.

What I want to establish is that relations between us and the regime in Jordan are governed by the agreements concluded by the Palestinian revolution with the Jordanian authorities.

The Arab Kings and Presidents signed the Cairo Agreement on September 27, and King Hussein and I signed the Amman Agreement, and what concerns us now is that the provisions of these agreements should be adhered to in both letter and spirit, for a number of considerations:

Firstly, because the Palestinian resistance movement has always adhered to, and will always adhere to everything it signs.

Secondly, because it has never been the aim of the Palestinian revolution to overthrow the regime in Jordan.

Thirdly, to spare the Jordanian-Palestinian people the scourge of clashes and military operations that can certainly only benefit the Israeli enemy.

Fourthly—and then there is an important reason—respect for the memory of the great President and leader who fell as a martyr to the Palestinian cause. . . .

Measures were actually taken in the occupied West Bank when the crisis was at its height with a view to announcing the secession of the West Bank from the Kingdom of Jordan. After the fighting stopped a delegation of nationalist personalities and elements in the West Bank came and met with me in

Amman, and told me that they had decided to announce the separation of the West Bank from the Kingdom of Jordan.

I asked them who was going to superintend the execution of this decision; had they contacted an Arab country?

They said, No.

I told them that, much as I respected and appreciated their feelings, I could not accept this decision. I realized, I told them, that they wanted vengeance for what had happened, but circumstances did not permit of this. On the contrary, I said, the Palestinian revolution would punish any attempt to implement this decision. . . .

The imperialist attack that is at present being carried out against the commandos, the vanguard of the Palestinian people, is a malevolent and planned attack.

The American-Israeli scheme is at present trying to establish a Palestinian state linked with Israel.

This is the insidious theme they are harping on: "You have had enough fighting, enough battles. The only solution of the Palestine problem is to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."

This is the most dangerous proposal that could be made. In the name of the Palestinian revolution I hereby declare that we shall oppose the establishment of this state to the last member of the Palestinian people, for if ever such a state is established it will spell the end of the whole Palestinian cause.

There are two roads open to commando action. Either it must devote itself exclusively to Israel and to fighting Israel, or it must turn its attention to the rear in order to safeguard and protect the advance of the revolution, without, however, losing its effectiveness and mobility for the confrontation of Israel.

The resistance will continue to respect all the agreements we have signed and we shall continue to avoid clashes as far as this is possible. But we shall never abandon our basic strategic objective, which is to fight Israel. The day we abandon that objective our revolution will have lost all justification for its existence.

Commando operations will continue; indeed, they have been resumed, and we shall never agree that our rifles should be aimed at the breasts of Arabs.

Here I should like to mention that King Hussein asked me what I thought of his desire to appoint a strong government (this was a hint that he was thinking of appointing Wasfi al-Tall Prime Minister). I said that it did not matter whether he appointed a strong government or any other government; the important thing was that he should form a national government that was acceptable to the people, that would unite the people and not divide them, and that would work for the higher national interest; this was the important thing that had to be achieved.

[Speaking of Syria's attitude, Arafat said:]

It is a good attitude, there is nothing wrong with it, it is an attitude of support. The Jordanian communiqués alleged that the Syrian army was intervening in the fighting, but in fact it was sections of the Palestine Liberation Army stationed in Syria that came in, and I, as Commander in Chief of the Revolution, had the right to give orders for the forces of that army to be deployed in such a way as to be of service to the Revolution. What is more, to confront the operation of liquidation I also had the right to call for help from any quarter.

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Communiqué Issued by the Military Governor-General and Prime Minister al-Tall of Jordan to Jordanian Citizens on the Coming into Force of the Protocol to the Amman and Cairo Agreements¹

Amman, November 9, 1970

Inasmuch as the Protocol to the Amman and Cairo Agreements comes into effect as

from the morning of November 11, 1970, citizens are called on to maintain security and order and, in order to avoid anything liable to impair public confidence, they are to adhere to the following regulations:

1. It is strictly forbidden to carry arms in streets and public places in the capital or in towns, villages and populated areas, except in exceptional cases where this is permitted by virtue of the Protocol annexed to the Amman Agreement.
 2. It is strictly forbidden to keep explosives, mines, bombs and all kinds of arms in these towns, villages and populated areas.
 3. Personal arms may be kept in houses only in accordance with the terms of the Protocol, and under all circumstances it is strictly forbidden to carry them or to appear in public with them.
 4. All persons shall immediately contact security posts to hand in, or give information about, all forbidden articles in their possession.
- The security authorities will exercise all the powers granted them by virtue of the laws and regulations in force against persons who disobey these instructions.

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Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Central Committee of the P.L.O. Commenting on the Communiqué of the Military Governor-General of Jordan²

Amman, November 11, 1970

1. There is nothing new in the Protocol that alters the Cairo and Amman Agreements; all it contains is articles for the regulation of certain provisions of the Cairo Agreement. The Protocol therefore has nothing to do with the carrying of arms or anything of that kind. The Protocol deals only with such

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), November 10, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, November 12, 1970.

matters as offices, the Armed Struggle military police, identity cards, permits, and the numbering and licensing of motor vehicles, all of which are matters for which the Central Committee is responsible.

2. The Amman Agreement does not forbid the carrying of arms in villages. The carrying of arms is, however, forbidden in towns, except in such cases as it is permitted by the Agreement—members of the Armed Struggle military police, the guards of offices, the guards of commanders and the commanders themselves are permitted to carry arms as set out in the Amman Agreement and the Protocol. Similarly, there is nothing which prohibits commandos from carrying arms in villages and on public roads or when passing through towns and villages for purposes connected with their work or with their movement from one place to another in which commandos are stationed. However, firing, the holding of maneuvers, and training with live ammunition in towns, villages and populated areas are forbidden.

3. The Protocol has nothing to do with the question of the personal arms belonging to members of the Militia; the Protocol does not deal with this subject. The status of the Militia is defined by the Amman Agreement. It is a free organization completely subject to the Command of the Palestinian Revolution; every member of the Militia keeps his own arms in his home and no party is entitled to interfere with him.

4. The preamble of the communiqué of the Military Governor General states that the Protocol came into force as from the morning of November 10, 1970. Here it must be pointed out that the government, on its side, has not implemented many of the things required of it by the Protocol nor has it implemented other things which the Protocol assumes that the government should have implemented already. For example, it has not terminated the abnormal military situation in Zarqa, and restored the previous situation there—that is to say, the situation as it was before the September clashes; it has not provided an atmosphere favorable for the Cen-

tral Committee to open offices and for the Armed Struggle military police to engage in their activities; it has not released the remaining detainees, nor has it settled the remaining matters left in suspense which are mentioned in the Cairo and Amman Agreements, and which the government has still not carried out.

5. The Central Committee re-affirms that it is fully resolved to meet all the engagements required of it by the Cairo and Amman Agreements. It also affirms that it is firmly resolved to protect the security of the citizen and his possessions, to restore life to normal in the towns and villages as soon as possible, and to promote work and production. The Central Committee also affirms that it is resolved to cut the ground from under the feet of quarters which, from their hostility to the people, fabricate lies and spread false rumors with the object of creating an atmosphere of tension and impelling the forces of the army into another clash with the commandos.

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Statement by the Official Spokesman of the P.L.O. on the Government of Jordan's Failure to Act in Accordance with the Cairo and Amman Agreements (Excerpt)¹

Amman, November 11, 1970

Since the afore-mentioned Agreements² were signed, the Central Committee, for its part, has fulfilled all the obligations imposed by those Agreements, especially as regards the following points:

1. All detainees have been released.
2. The Central Committee has put an end to all irregular situations in Amman, al-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *Fateh*, November 14, 1970.

² i.e., the Cairo and Amman Agreements.

Rasifa, Jerash, Irbid, Ramtha, al-Salt, Mafraq and all other places, in particular as regards withdrawal of commandos.

3. All the commando organizations' offices have been closed, the only offices remaining open being those specifically mentioned in the Amman Agreement and the Protocol.

4. The commandos are no longer appearing in the towns under arms, except in such cases as have been agreed on in accordance with the Amman Agreement and the Protocol.

The State, on the other hand, is still failing to implement many of its basic undertakings, the most important being the following:

1. The unjustifiable delay in releasing the remaining detainees, in particular Arabs who volunteered for commando action, and the commando detainees who the State claims are charged with crimes unconnected with the recent events. It has still not published their names or the offenses they are charged with.

2. Sporadic arrests are continuing without anything to justify them, such as offenses against the security of the citizen or civil offenses.

3. The activities of members of the Popular Resistance who are hostile to commando action have been disregarded. This applies in particular to such dangerous activities as incitement against the commandos, impeding their return to their bases, and in many cases actually firing on them. The government cannot be relieved of its responsibility in this respect, because the Popular Resistance is a State institution and obeys the State's orders, so that the government is in a position to put an immediate stop to such hostile activities.

4. The government has failed to put an end to the irregular situation in Zarqa, although representations and requests have been made to it to do so by the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab Military Observers and the Central Committee. There is still a reign of terror in Zarqa and at the entries to it; Army units are occupying many houses in the town and the surrounding refugee camps,

mounting machine guns on the roofs, carrying out searches and making arrests. Many elements of these units beat and insult citizens, and the Central Committee is still in a situation which prevents it from opening its offices in Zarqa and stationing Armed Struggle disciplinary officers in the town and the inspection posts at the entries to it. The Central Committee has also been unable, so far, to exercise its right, with regard to the masses of Zarqa, of mobilization, popular organization and unimpeded contact.

5. The Forces of the Jordanian Arab Army have not yet returned to their bases on the line of confrontation with the Zionist enemy; some units are still stationed around Amman, Jerash and other towns.

6. Civil administration has not yet been restored; Zarqa is still under military government by the Army, and elements other than the civil police are performing internal security duties—some of them are Army units which have been turned into security units.

7. Undisclosed measures are being taken against many officers and men of the Army and the Public Security; they are being arrested, interrogated and retired for sympathizing with commando action, or merely for refusing to adopt a hostile attitude to commando action. Similar measures have also been taken against a number of civilian officials. It is impossible to believe that Martial Law Orders No. 4, issued on October 24, 1970, which gives the Prime Minister the power to dismiss employees without their enjoying the protection of civil law as represented by the Supreme Court of Justice, are not connected with these measures and with the intention to go further with them.

In the meantime, although the government has persistently failed to meet the obligations set forth in the above-mentioned agreements, a new factor has started to make its appearance in the last few days. The government has started to establish bases for elements from the Army, masquerading as Public Security forces, in a number of dwelling houses in various parts of Amman, at a time when the commandos have left the city

completely. So far the following houses have been identified as being used for this purpose: the house of Mr. Muhammad al-Shurbaji near the Mauz in Jabal Amman, in the First Circle, the house near the "Advanced" School in Jabal Amman, the former house of Mr. Samir al-Rifa'i in Jabal al-Luwaiabda, and the Income Tax office in Jabal Amman, while the guard on the Development Board building has been strengthened, as is the case in many other places.

This will remind citizens of the days before the clashes and the fighting of September, when the security forces started to occupy new positions in the city of Amman, while Army units were constantly being concentrated around the city.

The object of the Central Committee in disclosing the above is to ensure that public opinion in Jordan and the Arab homeland may be aware of the real situation. For the Central Committee is profoundly concerned to ensure security and calm in the country and to avoid any armed clash between forces of the Jordanian Arab Army and forces of the Palestinian Revolution. It is also profoundly concerned with national unity and the strengthening of it, with the restoration of normal life in the country and with ensuring the atmosphere of calm which is now the first requirement of every citizen.

In disclosing the above the Central Committee believes that higher national interests require that the government should revise its whole attitude to the Agreements by losing no time in implementing such of their provisions as it has not so far implemented.

The Central Committee also hopes that the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Military Office will deal with all the above problems with the necessary dispatch.

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Resolutions of the Extraordinary Session of the Tenth National Congress of the Ba'ath Party (Excerpt)¹

Damascus, November 12, 1970

The Battle

1. To take a determined stand against all indifference, slackness and bargaining and all attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem.

2. To regard the Palestinian Revolution as the vanguard of armed struggle to resist the colonialist-Zionist invasion, and to take a determined stand against all imperialist and reactionary conspiracies aimed at liquidating or conspiring against the Palestinian resistance.

3. To develop the Party's relations with the organizations of the Palestinian resistance and to transform them from relations based on providing them with services and facilities into comprehensive revolutionary relations of struggle, and to create an atmosphere in which it will be possible for the Palestinian Resistance to unite and raise the level of its activities.

At Arab Level

1. To struggle, along with the progressive Arab countries, headed by the United Arab Republic, to attain unity at any level, on the basis of the armed struggle and the liberation of the occupied Arab homeland.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Raya* (Beirut), November 14, 1970.

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Statement by the Provisional Regional Command of the Ba'th Party in Syria on its Program of Action (Excerpts)¹**Damascus, November 12, 1970***In the Domestic Field*

1. Mobilizing all progressive and popular resources and placing them at the disposal of the battle, through developing relations with the aim of establishing a progressive front led by the Ba'th Party.

6. Continued building and development of the armed forces to enable them to perform their duty to the full in the battle of liberation.

In the Arab Field

1. Extensive action along with progressive Arab countries and forces in all fields which reinforce the strategy of armed struggle and mobilize Arab resources for the battle of destiny.

2. Efforts to realize steps towards unity with the progressive Arab countries, in particular the United Arab Republic.

4. Supporting the Palestinian Revolution and making the most strenuous efforts to achieve the unity of all sections of the Resistance.

International Policy

1. Developing relations with the socialist camp, in particular with our friend the U.S.S.R.

3. Developing and strengthening relations with countries that adopt just attitudes to our national problems, in particular the Palestine problem.

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Statement by a Jordanian Spokesman on the Government of Jordan's Adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements²**Amman, November 14, 1970**

Certain broadcasting stations and news agencies have put out reports to the effect that the spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Organization has stated that the government has not fully adhered to the Cairo and Amman Agreements, inasmuch as it is still holding certain detainees and as some army forces have not yet fully withdrawn from certain localities.

The government greatly regrets such misrepresentation and falsification, especially now that life has returned to normal in all parts of the homeland, and finds itself obliged to clarify the situation to Jordanian and Arab public opinion.

The Jordanian government has fully adhered to the provisions of the Cairo and Amman agreements, including those covering the release of detainees and the withdrawal of military forces from Amman. It is, however, still detaining a number of persons accused of committing crimes before the regrettable incidents of September, when the authorities were unable to arrest them, and also a small number of non-Jordanians who are offenders against the residence laws in force in Jordan. The Arab Higher Committee is fully aware of the facts of these cases.

¹ Excerpted from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Damascus), November 17, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), November 15, 1970.

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Independence Day Message by President Franjeh of Lebanon on "the Need To Strengthen Arab Solidarity" (Excerpt)¹

Beirut, November 21, 1970

Our Arab world is facing an organized aggression. Let this prompt us to plan and to become increasingly aware of the need to strengthen Arab solidarity to achieve justice in this area, particularly in Palestine, where the Holy Land has become a scene of persecution and destitution. A peaceful people are the victim of a usurper State founded on expansion by force, and on racial and religious discrimination. Our call for the strengthening of Arab solidarity is only part of Lebanon's Arab mission to which we shall remain loyal.

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Statement by Prime Minister Fawzi of the U.A.R. on His New Government's Policy (Excerpt)²

Cairo, November 25, 1970

Let it be known to those who do not already know it that we are holding out and that we and our Arab brethren will never allow Israel to sleep or relax as long as it continues in its aggression. We shall continue to be the friends of those who are friendly to us, and the enemies of those who are hostile to us. In this there is no contradiction—on the contrary, it is completely in harmony with the policy of non-alignment, which is the firm

¹ Excerpted from Franjeh's statement as broadcast on Beirut Home Service in Arabic. Excerpted and translated in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/3542/A/14; reprinted by permission.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 26, 1970.

and strong foundation of our independence. Non-alignment does not mean, nor can it ever mean, stagnation and confusion; it can never mean that we are not friendly to our friends and hostile to our enemies, or that we put those who provide us with aid and arms to defend our sacred rights on the same footing as those who shower aid and arms on Israel and instigate it to commit further aggressions, as those who refuse to give any help or arms to the Arabs as long as they continue to defend their people and their homes against Israeli aggression but partially supply some of them with help and arms whenever the tragedy of Arab killing Arab befalls them.

Similarly, although affliction has befallen us, an affliction which, with God's help, has passed away never to return, let it also be known to those who did not know it before that what links the United Arab Republic with its sister Arab countries is a brotherhood of blood, feeling, intellect, struggle and honor, a brotherhood that will never diminish but grow ever closer and remain strong and solid for ever and ever.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Abu-Hamad of Lebanon on Alleged Talks Between Lebanon and Israel³

Beirut, November 27, 1970

The statement made by the Israeli Minister Israel Galili in which he hinted at peace talks between Lebanon and Israel is one more link in the chain of underhand maneuvers carried out by Israeli propaganda with the object of making the Arab countries suspicious of each other.

There is absolutely no basis of truth in any report of talks between Lebanon and Israel, either through Dr. Jarring or anyone else. Nor is it possible that there should be such talks, for Lebanon regards the Armistice

³ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 28, 1970.

agreement concluded in 1949 as still being in force, and abides by and adheres to its provisions.

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Statement by Defense Minister and Prime Minister of Syria al-Asad on His Government's Policy Towards the Rogers Plan (Excerpt)¹

Damascus, end of November, 1970

Q. It is being forecast there will be a change in Syria's attitude to peaceful settlements and the Rogers Plan. What are your views?

A. Our attitude is clear and straightforward—it is to reject all solutions and projects that are being proposed, because they do not express the justice of our cause.

Q. It is also being forecast that there will be a change in the new government's attitude to the Resistance, and especially to the Sa'iqa organization. What are your views?

A. We shall continue to support all sections of the Palestinian Resistance, and in particular the Sa'iqa organization; this is one of the principal organizations we have supported in the past, and we shall continue to support it in the future. The statement published by the Regional Command declared that the Syrian Arab Region would continue to support the Palestinian revolution and all sections of the resistance.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of al-Asad's interview on French television, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), November 27, 1970.

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Speech from the Throne by King Hussein of Jordan at the Opening of the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Jordanian National Assembly (Excerpts)²

Amman, December 2, 1970

The proposal for a Palestinian petty state which is being put forward from time to time by the enemies of the Arab nation is nothing more nor less than a conspiracy against our unity here in Jordan and a blow struck at the feeling for the sanctity of unity which every Arab holds in his heart, and we do not believe that there is a single Arab who will be deceived by such a suspect call.

We ourselves, aware as we are of our responsibility to the international community, from our faith in the precept and principles of the United Nations, and from our desire to obtain a just peace, have accepted the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council and agreed to implement it fully along with our companion in struggle the United Arab Republic. But our inclination to peace does not mean that we accept surrender. The battles that have raged on the soil of Jordan, on its hills, in its valleys, in our Karameh, prove how determined we are to adhere to our goal, and the close cohesion between the Army, the commandos and the people in the struggle bear witness to our insistence on our rights. And the magnificent stand of heroism taken by the United Arab Republic under the leadership of the Arab hero Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt is an affirmation of the links that unite us in a common destiny for the achievement of our goals, which are the liberation of Jerusalem, the West Bank, Sinai and Golan.

We, like the United Arab Republic, have

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 3, 1970.

accepted the Rogers peace plan, from our belief in the precepts of right, justice and peace, and from our belief that justice and peace can only be achieved if the rights of our Arab people to Palestine are safeguarded. Peace cannot be established on injustice nor on the denial of the legitimate right of any people in the world to their homeland. Hence the flagrant attempts made by Israel in rejecting peace, impeding the American initiative and rejecting the United Nations resolutions which recognize and affirm our Arab people's right to Palestine.

Senators and Deputies,

Our country has passed through a period of insensate strife which was planned by the enemies of our nation, whose evil designs brought us to a pass where our unity was nearly swept away. Our hearts were so troubled and our minds so disturbed that the enemy almost achieved his object of tearing asunder our ranks, disuniting our efforts and destroying our future. But Almighty God frustrated the cunning schemes of our enemies and saved Jordan from the evil they were plotting against us; He kept it strong, impregnable and fit to be what we have vowed it shall be—a field for the battle and a base for liberation. For our Arab brothers met in Cairo in response to the call of our brother, the freedom fighter, His Excellency President Habib Bourghiba, and unanimous agreement was reached in Egypt. Here, for the sake of history, we must place on record the role played by that great Arab hero who has left us, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who so magnanimously took upon himself such an immense burden of effort and toil. Mention must also be made of our brethren, the Arab Kings and Presidents, for their sincere efforts and profound concern to help us to contain the strife, put an end to the shedding of blood, unite the ranks, close the rift and ensure that the Army and the Resistance should once more be brothers in arms. The Cairo and Amman Agreements were an embodiment of the will of the Arab nation moulded by the Arab leaders in their abundant nobility of heart, their noble sincerity of spirit and their zealous and aware competence

in the management of affairs. For us here in Jordan—Army, commandos, officials and citizens—these agreements are now a precious trust, a pledge for which we are answerable under the care and supervision of that great freedom fighter al-Bahi al-Adgham and the free Arab soldiers associated with him. It was not long before affliction passed away, things became clear, faithful hearts recovered their serenity, our beloved country its accustomed luster, and life its security and stability and with God's blessing we started once more, in confidence, brotherhood and unity in arms, to advance together towards our common goal and against our common enemy.

Senators and Deputies,

Our country has defined its goals and will never relinquish them until we liberate our people and recover our Arab territory, and first and foremost Jerusalem, the site of Muhammad's Night Journey and the cradle of the Messiah, the whole of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Sinai and Golan. Our first duty is to be aware of our vanguard role, of the gravity of the present stage and of the inevitability of the battle and the effort and sacrifice it will involve—that battle which every citizen must be aware of and take part in as it falls to his lot to do. We also believe that all Arab efforts must be enlisted in every field of life to ensure that we are prepared and mobilized for the battle. Hence we believe in the inevitability of cooperation and the achievement of Arab unity, however far away it seems at present, and it does not dismay us that the road that leads to the achievement of our great aims should be beset with so many difficulties and great dangers.

We take pleasure in saluting and giving our blessing to the agreement reached by the United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, the Democratic Republic of Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic to advance towards the achievement of Arab unity in which, we firmly believe, lies the Arabs' strength, their safety and their victory.

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Joint Communiqué on the Occasion of the Visit of King Hussein of Jordan to the U.A.R. (Excerpts)¹

Cairo, December 3, 1970

His Majesty King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, visited the United Arab Republic on Wednesday and Thursday, Shawwal 4 and 5 1390 A.H. (December 2 and 3 1970). In the course of this brotherly visit there were exhaustive talks between His Majesty, and his brother, His Excellency President Anwar al-Sadat, President of the United Arab Republic.

During their talks the two leaders conducted a comprehensive review of the present situation in all its aspects, political and military, Arab and international, at this critical stage in the life of the Arab nation and its struggle. The talks were held in an atmosphere of friendliness, candor and mutual frankness, and were characterized by a profound appreciation of the immense responsibilities which confront the two countries in particular and the Arab nation in general.

In addition to the above, the talks also covered the visits His Majesty King Hussein is to make to a number of world capitals within the framework of the political efforts that must be exerted at this critical stage in support of the just causes of our nation.

President al-Sadat expressed his support for these efforts and his best wishes for their success within the framework of the two countries' objectives, which are to ensure the elimination of every trace of aggression from Arab territories, the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories in the West Bank, Sinai, the Gaza Strip, Golan and Arab Jerusalem and the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people which have been usurped.

The talks confirmed the strength of the links of brotherhood and common destiny

forged by the glorious leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.

It was agreed that full coordination between the countries must continue in all fields and at all levels, to support Arab rights and to repel aggression.

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Memorandum Submitted by the U.A.R. to the U.S.A. on American Reconnaissance Planes Flying Missions over Egyptian Territory²

Cairo, December 4, 1970

At the meeting on November 11, 1970 between Mr. Donald Burgess and Ambassador Salah Jawhar, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Burgess informed us that American reconnaissance planes had ceased reconnaissance operations on November 10, 1970.

Mr. Burgess also stated that the United States has at present no plan to undertake reconnaissance flights. From this reply it is to be understood that the United States allows itself the right to resume flights by these planes in the future.

We wish to place the following points on record:

Firstly: We have not given the United States our approval for its planes to undertake air reconnaissance operations over Sinai at any time whatsoever.

Secondly: The cease-fire measures we agreed to on August 7 did not provide for the United States to supervise the observance of these measures, and the United Arab Republic has never subsequently commissioned the United States to undertake this task.

Thirdly: The United States has allowed itself the right, according to its reply of November 25, 1970, for its planes to undertake

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 4, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 5, 1970 from the memorandum handed by Salah Jawhar, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the UAR to Donald Burgess, head of the American Interests Mission in Cairo.

reconnaissance operations in order to observe the cease-fire and the arrangements for the area of pacification. The United Arab Republic has not admitted this right, nor agreed that the United States is entitled to it.

Fourthly: It is clear to us, and from the words of the American authorities, that they were observing and focussing the cameras installed in their planes on the positions of the Egyptian armed forces, and photographing these and nothing else.

When we inquired of the American authorities about these facts, they did not deny them. In other words, the task of the American planes was not to ensure that the cease-fire measures were being observed, but to obtain military information about Egyptian positions on behalf of Israel.

Fifthly: The General Assembly resolution of November 4, which called on the parties to observe a cease-fire for three months, did not refer to any measures to ensure that the cease-fire was observed.

Therefore, since that date, observation of the cease-fire has been the duty of the United Nations agencies.

Consequently, the fact that America has sent planes since that date—as is shown by Mr. Burgess's statement to the effect that the last reconnaissance flight took place on November 10, 1970—in addition to the fact that it gives itself the right to continue reconnaissance flights over Sinai to observe the cease-fire—constitutes interference by the United States in the activities of the United Nations and in the task of the United Nations observers who were entrusted with this work by virtue of a Security Council resolution; America is also performing a role allotted to it by no one.

Sixthly: You stated in your memorandum that international law gives you the right to fly over our territories which are occupied by the aggressor Israeli forces whose object is to expand and annex Arab territories. There is nothing in international law which allows the United States to send its war planes to reconnoitre and spy on our military positions, and to communicate such information to the enemy who is occupying our territories.

From this we come to the conclusion that we can only regard the dispatch by the United States of its planes over our territory as a hostile act intended to serve the objectives of the enemy who is occupying our territory in defiance of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

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Text of the Reply by the Kuwait National Assembly to the Amiri Speech (Excerpts)¹

Kuwait, December 8, 1970

Your Highness,

We support your Honorable Government's statement to the effect that those Arab countries whose territories were partially occupied in the June 1967 War have the right to adopt such means as they consider appropriate to liberate these territories and efface the traces of aggression. We also share the government's view of the Palestine problem, when it says that we shall never agree to a solution of it that the people of Palestine themselves do not agree to, and that no one can compel this people to accept a specific solution of their problem that is not in accordance with their wishes. We agree, too, that Palestine commando action shall receive full support from Kuwait, as being the vanguard of the Arab struggle against the Israeli enemy. We were pained by the armed clash between Lebanese forces and the Palestinian resistance, and even more pained by the recurrence of such clashes between the Jordan Army and the Palestine resistance movement. We agree with the Government that the only way to put an end to this tragedy was for all the parties concerned to adhere to clear and well-defined agreements safeguarding freedom of commando action without impairing the sovereignty of the countries concerned or their in-

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), December 9, 1970.

ternal security situation, and ensuring that there should be no split in ranks that should be united in full solidarity to confront the Zionist enemy.

The Assembly commends the rapidity with which the Government of Kuwait called for a stop to this bitter fighting, and hopes that sons of this nation, although they did for a time fight among themselves and shed each other's blood, will remember their kinship and put a stop to the shedding of Arab blood by Arabs.

The Assembly learned with satisfaction that other Arab countries shared in this call and that, after direct contacts had been made, these strenuous efforts resulted, in Cairo on September 27, in an agreement between His Majesty the King of Jordan and the leaders of the Palestinian resistance on a cease-fire and the prevention of further bloodshed by Arabs, and later, on October 13, in the signing of a comprehensive agreement in Amman for the precise regulation of relations between the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian resistance movement. The Arab countries which signed the Agreement undertook to take unified collective measures against either side if it was proved to have infringed any provision of the Agreement or impeded its implementation. We sincerely share the Government's hope that the Cairo and Amman Agreements may be the prelude to a new era of true cooperation between the two sides on behalf of their common interests and of the cause of Arab destiny, and may constitute a real and decisive conclusion to the discord and the clashes that have been tearing Jordan asunder and imperilling our nation.

The Assembly also shares the Government's view that the financial aid provided by Kuwait to one of the parties to the conflict should be suspended, and calls on it to disburse such aid only in the service of the Arab cause in general and the Palestinian cause in particular.

Your Highness,

It is essential that the countries which support Israel should realize that their interests

in all the Arab countries will no longer be safe from the danger that threatens them if they continue in their mistaken support of aggression. The Assembly also draws attention to the fact that no decision taken in this regard can be fully effective and truly decisive unless it is taken unanimously by all the Arab countries from the Ocean to the Gulf.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Abu-Hamad of Lebanon to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on His Country's Policy Towards Israel and the Palestinian Resistance (Excerpts)¹

Beirut, December 8, 1970

The fundamental principles on which the government's foreign policy is based are those defined by President Franjeh in the speech he made when he took office.

I also wish to state that, at practical level, in the situation through which Lebanon and the Arab world are at present passing, these principles are being applied in the following manner:

1. The struggle between the Arabs and Israel requires, above all, that the Arab countries should coordinate their efforts and activities on behalf of their common goal. At the Summit Conferences held in Khar-toun, Rabat and Cairo, Lebanon undertook to meet certain obligations, and it will be faithful to the obligations it took upon itself.

2. The only international document that defines Lebanon's position vis-à-vis Israel is still in force; it is the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), December 9, 1970.

3. In Lebanon's view, the two principal goals that must be achieved in the field of joint Arab policy, are the evacuation by Israeli forces of all occupied Arab territories, and the recognition of the Palestinian people's sacred right to decide their own future and to recover their usurped rights. Lebanon has made in the past, and will make in the future, the greatest possible efforts on behalf of these lofty goals.

5. Lebanon honors and supports commando action, and is prepared to cooperate in all sincerity with the Palestinian organizations. It desires that they may be strengthened and consolidated and be made more capable of serving their sacred cause—which is the cause of all Arabs—in an atmosphere of mutual understanding between their members and of cooperation and coordination between them and the Arab countries in whose territories they operate....

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Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya on the Nationalist Character of the Conflict with Israel (Excerpt)¹

Tripoli, December 9, 1970

In this connection I should also like to remind you of the Libyan proposal submitted earlier—many citizens are asking what has happened to it. This proposal calls for the battle to be given a nationalist character. The reason for this is that it must not be allowed to remain on a regional basis; if it does King Hussein will come to an agreement with Israel tomorrow on a solution which will keep both the Hashemite throne and the Zionist presence in existence. If the battle remains on

a regional basis, the Zionist enemy, through America, which always supports him, will continue to insist that the United Arab Republic should relinquish the idea of the battle assuming a nationalist character, should relinquish Jerusalem and the West Bank, should relinquish the Golan Heights and should make withdrawal from Sinai an independent issue. If the battle is on a regional basis, Israel will continue to say, through the United States of America, that it is prepared to withdraw from Sinai, to withdraw from the Western Front, so that Jerusalem and the West Bank may continue under occupation, and so that a new situation would come about which would amount to a great victory for the Zionist enemy.

What I say is that if the Libyan proposal that the battle should be given a nationalist character is not accepted, there are many solutions that may be put forward; there may be concessions that will lose us the cause of Palestine in addition to the Arab territory that was occupied in 1967. To prevent this the Libyan proposal calls for the mobilization of all resources that it is possible to mobilize, in specific circumstances, in a specific place, and in specific quantities, in conformity with the capacity of every Arab country that has entered into undertakings. To support the Libyan proposal seven countries have met in Tripoli and signed an agreement to the effect that the battle should be given a nationalist character. This conference, which was attended by the heads of these states, also recommended that a military conference should be held at a later date to draft a report on the military aspect of the situation, specifying what forces and resources are required to confront the Israeli enemy and the other colonialist enemy who is behind him.

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Thawra* (Tripoli), December 10, 1970.

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Statement by the Arab Higher Follow-Up Committee on Some of the Decisions Taken To Secure the Implementation of the Amman Agreement¹

Amman, December 14, 1970

In the evening of Monday, December 14, 1970, the Arab Higher Follow-Up Committee held an expanded meeting with His Excellency Mr. al-Bahi al-Adgham in the chair. The meeting was attended by His Excellency, Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tall, Mr. Riyad al-Mufleh, the representative of the Jordanian government on the Committee, and a number of officials representing the government and the Jordanian Arab Army. Also present were Mr. Ibrahim Bakr, the representative of the Central Committee on the Committee, a number of members of the Central Committee and the Military Command of the Revolution, Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Hilmi and Ambassador al-Tayyib al-Sahbani.

The meeting was devoted to discussion of the implementation of the Amman Agreement, and a number of important decisions were taken, including the following:

1. The Central Committee shall be responsible for the reorganization of the Militia, for its geographical deployment in different quarters of the city, for improving its discipline and for collecting its arms on the basis of its geographical deployment.

2. The government shall be responsible for the reorganization of the Popular Resistance, for its geographical deployment in the different quarters of the city, for increasing its discipline and for collecting its arms on the basis of its geographical deployment.

3. The places where Militia's arms are collected shall enjoy full immunity, inasmuch as the arms are personal.

4. These decisions shall apply to the towns of Irbid and Zarqa, and to all towns and villages in the Kingdom.

5. All police stations in the capital shall be demilitarized.

6. The security brigade shall be withdrawn from Amman and return to the positions it occupied before the incidents.

7. All exceptional measures related to searches in the capital shall be cancelled.

8. It is absolutely prohibited to acquire, obtain or bear arms in the town of Zarqa; this prohibition applies both to the Militia and the Popular Resistance.

9. There shall be a radical review of all search points within a week from today and in the light of the implementation of these decisions. The Committee believes that these decisions are of the greatest importance, as they indicate all sensitive points which are liable to impede the full implementation of the Agreements. They will also eliminate all causes of the impetuous action that has resulted from the non-implementation of the Agreement. Citizens will become aware of the positive results which will be achieved in the next few days; this will restore confidence and open the door to sincere brotherly cooperation.

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Statement by Military Governor-General and Prime Minister al-Tall of Jordan on the Collection of Arms from the People's Army and the Militia²

Amman, December 15, 1970

In pursuance of the decisions of the Arab Higher Follow-up Committee on reorganizing the control of the arms of the Militia and the People's Army, issued on December 14, 1970, citizens are informed that:

The government has started to take the necessary measures to collect and control the arms of the People's Army in towns and villages. The Central Committee has also

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 15, 1970.

² Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 16, 1970.

started to take the necessary measures for the collection of the arms of the Militia.

As from December 20, 1970:

1. It is strictly forbidden to carry arms in towns, villages and populated areas.

2. It is strictly forbidden to possess personal arms of any kind or to keep them in houses in towns, villages or populated areas without a legal permit.

3. Anyone who disobeys this order will be regarded as an outlaw, a rebel or an enemy agent and will be liable to the severest legal penalties.

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Statement by the Official Spokesman for the Central Committee of the P.L.O. on the Collection of Arms from the People's Army and the Militia in Jordan¹

Amman, December 16, 1970

1. The Higher Arab Follow-up Committee has never specified December 20, as does the communiqué of the Military Governor General, as the date on which the operation of regulating the arms of the Militia was to be carried out. When this communiqué was published, the Military Governor General was contacted by the Chairman of the Higher Arab Committee and a representative of the Central Committee, and it was made clear that this date was not binding as regards the operation of regulating the arms of the Militia, and that the Central Committee was entitled to take as long a time as it found necessary to complete the operation.

2. The statement in the Military Governor's communiqué to the effect that it is forbidden to bear arms in towns, villages and populated areas, does not affect the established rights of the Palestinian revolution as regards the bearing of arms, in conformity

with the Amman Agreement and the Protocol, by commandos, either in the localities where they are stationed, or when they are moving from place to place or travelling, or by guards, or by Armed Struggle commands and military police.

3. The operation of regulating the arms of the Militia is linked with a number of other decisions, some of which have been published, others not, all of which the state is obliged to implement simultaneously with the regulating of the arms of the Militia.

The Central Committee's object in agreeing that the Militia should be reorganized was to frustrate the efforts of other quarters which have tried, or are still trying, to make trouble with the object of ensuring that the situation continues to be critical and of creating tension between the forces of the Revolution and the Jordanian armed forces. In this the Central Committee was making a positive contribution towards restoring normal life in the country and ensuring the security and confidence of its citizens.

The Revolution, which has achieved the situation of a people armed for the defense of the masses and the East Bank against all Zionist and imperialist schemes, will continue the further arming of the people, within the limits imposed by such rules for the control of arms as may be made in the light of the Revolution's security requirements.

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U.S. Newspaper Interview with U.A.R. President Sadat on the Current Situation in the Middle East (Excerpts)²

Cairo, December 23, 1970

Q. I have been to the SALT talks at Helsinki, to Moscow, and to Jerusalem to find out how

¹ Translated from the Arabic text in *al-Dustur* (Amman), December 17, 1970.

² Text of interview as excerpted in *The New York Times*, December 24, 1970. The interview was conducted by James Reston, columnist and vice president of *The New York Times*, and Raymond H. Anderson, the paper's Cairo correspondent. © 1970 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

thoughtful people look at this poor old distracted world at the end of the year. Are you optimistic or pessimistic?

A. Well, it is a difficult subject, it was the year of the sorrows. President Nasser left Cairo here on the 20th December, 1969, for Rabat, for a summit meeting there. I was appointed the same day Vice President. He was feeling all the time that something will happen to him.

Q. You mean he had a presentiment of death?

A. That's right. When he appointed me on the 20th of December and I was sworn in early morning before he left, he told me: "All my will for you is the people. If anything happens to me, you are responsible for the people." We were thinking that the start of the [big air battles] would be early in 1970, but on the 25th December—this day, Christmas Day is my birthday—precisely at eight o'clock in the morning the air raids started.

Truly, the Israelis had already used their air force since the 20th July, 1969, but on the 25th of December, from eight in the morning till the last light at half-past four, eight hours and a half, 264 planes raided the line on the Suez Canal and threw thousands of tons of bombs during these eight hours and a half.

[The President then traced out the details of the Israeli deep-penetration raids over central Egypt during the first two months of 1970. He asserted that their purpose was to break the morale of the Egyptian people. He then came to the February raid on an iron factory at Abu Zabal on the outskirts of Cairo.]

I was with the President [Nasser] in the country retreat and after Abu Zabal occurred, the President said: "Well, this is a new escalation. Well, this is the second one, there will be a third and a fourth." And he sent to the leaders of the Soviet Union telling them: "I want to pay an urgent visit." At that time he had the influenza and a very severe one, but he said: "I can't wait."

On the 22nd of January, he left Cairo on a secret trip to Moscow, and there they agreed

upon the SAM-3 and the defense for the depth of the country. And about 50 days after the President came back, all the sites were built by our contractors and engineers. It was a marvelous work in 50 days, and we spent more than 40 million pounds [\$ 92 million]. Almost a million a day. And SAM-3 arrived and was in position.

The raids in depth stopped, and then they continued on the front flying there on the Suez Canal, with ferocity this time. And for more than three months, they raided our positions on the front lines in the canal and our troops, raids that started from 30 planes and reached 180 planes—from 60-80 planes to 180 planes a day. We made a calculation at some time. We found that the bombs that are thrown there daily cost from half a million dollars to one million dollars, according to the number of raids and air-planes.

Well, we stood fast, and I have given our men of the artillery and the missiles and anti-aircraft our flag—our highest decoration—because they have stood fast. Then the President on the first of May made his speech.

And he said to President Nixon: "In spite of everything, we are quite ready to have a new start, and we are quite ready to believe that you can't exercise any pressure on Israel but if you can't exercise any pressure, whatever our belief is, we shall believe it. But don't give them arms while they are occupying our territory: At least this you can do."

After that came the American initiative. One month and a half after the American initiative, President Nasser visited the Soviet Union for the second time. In our fourth congress of the Socialist Union on the 23rd of July, 1970, the President declared his agreement to the American initiative. And after that, in August, started the cease-fire, the first period.

Before the first period ended, on the 28th of September, as you know, the President died. I received here at the time of the funeral Mr. [Elliot] Richardson, who was at the head of the U.S. delegation, and we had a long talk at that time. He asked me directly

if we are continuing the same policy of the President. I said, yes, we are continuing the same policy. We agreed to the American initiative, but we are not ready to withdraw any missile from the canal zone and defending my people. And I told him about the raids and the number of raids and the number of airplanes.

In the American initiative, they stated on their own—we didn't ask them, but Secretary of State Rogers told us—that during the 90 days of the cease-fire they will not provide Israel with any arms. Well, after that, as you know, they raised this question of the missiles and so and so, and they provided Israel with more airplanes, more guns and more tanks, more economic aid, everything.

Then came the United Nations meeting and we decided that we must raise the question in the United Nations because at that time the policy of the U.S. and Israel was to tell the whole world that we have violated the cease-fire and so and so, and the matter was not occupation of our land but the violation of the cease-fire; just twisting the facts like this.

Well, we raised the question and, you know, we had this resolution in the United Nations and because of this resolution, we said we agreed to the U.N. resolution, and we prolonged the cease-fire for a second time. Now the situation is: As I told you, the year of sorrows is about to end. And this year of sorrows, I think from my own point of view.

Q. Well, what name shall we give to the year 1971? Is it to be a year of negotiations—not a year of sorrows?

A. Well, Mr. Abba Eban said it is a year of negotiations. I don't agree to this. I must tell you my impressions about 1970. You know the Battle of Britain. I think in the first six months of 1970, in spite of all what happened to us, and in spite of the casualties we had, we have achieved great success. We have won the battle of air, of the depth; at the same time, as I told you, they have helped us to make our internal front concrete and to fill it with hatred and solidarity, during the first six months.

This is for the first six months. For the second six months, these are the months of sorrows, really. Because we had this battle that happened between King Hussein and the commandos and the casualties there, and then the eastern front, and then what happened to the eastern front. And then, after that, the death of the President. They are the six months of sorrow.

These are my calculations. Well, when I come to 1971, I think the first six months of this year, 1971, will be decisive. You ask me if I'm pessimistic or optimistic? I am a farmer. I came from a very humble family here—100 kilometers from here in the Delta. From time to time I go to my home there—my people there—my relatives are farmers. We are very true believers. The true believer is never pessimistic. Never. Because, since the early days when we open our eyes, we hear around ourselves in the village everything comes from God. The plant from God, water from God, everything from God. Whatever happens, it is from God. It is like that. We were taught like that since we were children. As a fact in my life, I'm always optimistic, whatever the events are. But regarding the political solution, I'm not optimistic at all.

The nomination of Dr. Jarring was for the implementation of this resolution, and since that time we said that the implementation means a timetable—how to implement this resolution—a timetable for all the items that are in the resolution while Israel says, "No, it is just an agenda, for talks."

The U.S., believe it or not, I don't know their stand up till now except one thing: They are backing Israel one hundred per cent. But, they don't say anything more than that. Tell us what is your idea about this or that—they say: "Very well, we shall tell you, we shall tell you." And they never told us anything at all. Lately, Great Britain has made a clarification from their situation, and they said that the Security Council resolution means the withdrawal of the whole—the item of the withdrawal in this resolution means the withdrawal from all the lands that were occupied after 5th June [1967]. But the U.S. up till now said nothing—nothing about the withdrawal, nothing about the timetable, nothing about

anything at all. Just giving Israel everything they want—every support—nothing except that.

Q. When you say that there can be no continuation of the cease-fire, unless there is a timetable of withdrawal, what, Mr. President, do you mean by that? Whose timetable? What does that mean?

A. The Security Council resolution of November '67, was accepted by us and by all the members of the Security Council at that time as a solution. And it was declared at that time in the United Nations, by us, that we accept this as a solution for the problem.

Q. Well, now there is a point of confusion on both sides—because when I talked to Prime Minister Meir, her argument was exactly the opposite—that the U.S. was not giving to Israel either the military support she asks for, or the political support. Whereas the U.A.R. was getting open-ended aid to the full extent that you wished from the Soviet Union.

A. Well, and you believed that? Could you believe it when you hear that \$500 million were given to Israel just last week, and then Mr. Rogers before a committee in the Congress said that Israel is to have what she wants from the budget of the Ministry of Defense. Could you believe that, could you believe the long-range guns that were declared when they were sent from the States? Could you believe about the airplanes—the new Phantoms—they sent to them? And then could you believe when you hear the big mouth of Dayan and all the others, "If the Egyptians come through the canal, we shall do so and so, because we have the superiority—we have so and so and so!"

Q. If we take then these two positions that have been defined by you here now, and what I've heard on the other side, then we are in a stalemate. Now, do you see any way to break out of this? For example, Arnold Toynbee, who is an old friend of the Arab people, as you know, said in 1967, "Peace is the only hope."

But maybe he said there would be some possibility of progress if at the beginning of talks there could be an exchange of reciprocal assurances which would state the principles and objectives of the talks which would then go forward. Is there anything to that

idea? This is assuming, of course, that the talks are going to take place.

A. Even if the talks are going to take place, and they may take place, according to the maneuvers of the Israelis, they may come early in January, and say "well before Jarring puts his report," they may do that! But, this is not in itself an objective but the difficulty is this: You have been there in Jerusalem and you have heard their point of view, and you came here and you have heard our point of view, but there are more facts like this: Part of our land is occupied. We have not started the aggression or the attack. But, on the contrary, during my early years, I have seen three wars—1948, 1956 and 1967. And this would not be the last.

If we want to seek peace, it must be built on justice, to last. Well, Israel wants security, and secured boundaries and all that she claims. Well, what about the four powers, and the peace commitments? Why not start by peace commitments—by the four powers, U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France, to guarantee these commitments and to give the guarantees for Israel? And I need these guarantees, too, because, as I told you, I have seen three wars in my life, and we never started any of them.

Q. I want to understand what you mean by the four-power agreement, because I have a nightmare about this, namely, that we will get into a situation where we will polarize the battle, not only for the Arab states and Israel but also for the Soviet Union supporting you, and we supporting and guaranteeing Israel.

And, then, this part of the world would be dragged into not only a battle between the Arab states and Israel, but into the great confrontation of the nuclear powers.

A. This theory I don't want you to have in your mind because this is the theory of those advisers of President Nixon. They are putting this theory for Mr. Nixon to make a question of this whole thing. It is very simple like this. I am here, in the U.A.R., part of my land is occupied—I want this occupation to be ended—and I have nothing to do in this conflict, with this other world conflict.

I am just asking for the liberation of my land, which is my right. Well, if the advisers of President Nixon say that this is a global problem and must come in the global strategy of the superpowers, this is wrong. All I want is this: Israel has started on the 5th of June [1967] aggression of three Arab states and has occupied lands from these three Arab states. All we asked is that Israel retreats, and then there is the Security Council resolution in which it is stated the stages of the solution of the whole problem; even the refugees problem is stated in this resolution.

Very well, if you want to seek peace, let us come to this resolution and fulfill it. And if we are going to build around it this dilemma of the superpowers, the collision between them, and so and so, and then, because—as they say, because of the Soviets helping us and the Americans helping Israel; well, the Americans have always been helping Israel and even President Johnson didn't deny it, and he said that the Sixth Fleet is the strategic reserve for them.

He said it to Mr. Eshkol [the late Israeli Premier] and it was published all over the world, and no one denied it. America has always defended Israel, but I, myself, I who must ask for security now, after two wars, I must ask for the securities. For that I'm telling you: if we start by the commitments of peace, this means that the four powers will guarantee the boundaries of the area here, because I don't agree to a guarantee from the U.S. because they told them this officially in May, 1967, and then they didn't fulfill it at all.

Q. I was in this capital on the Sunday before the outbreak of the six-day war. At that time it seems to me that the Arab states were taking a different position toward Israel from what you have said now. Do I understand you to say that "not recognizing the state of Israel as a sovereign state"—that is finished now? That you are prepared to recognize her as a sovereign state, with the right to security within agreed boundaries?

A. It is stated in the Security Council resolution, but don't ask me to make diplomatic relations with them. Never!

Q. Never?

A. Never!

Q. Even after if you could resolve this [boundary] problem?

A. Never! Never! Never! This is something no one can decide. No one has the power to decide also. Our people here will crush anyone who would decide this!

Q. But this does not touch the other points in the resolution—free access to the canal—free passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

A. Free access through Aqaba and Tiran at once! But free passage in the canal, there must be this refugee problem solved.

Q. You link these two questions?

A. Yes. Because for that I am saying the timetable. If they want access to Aqaba, very well, from tomorrow. If it is agreed upon, very well, from tomorrow.

Q. But, for free passage of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal there is a precondition?

A. Yes.

Q. And the precondition is: resolution of the refugees problem.

A. Quite right!

Q. That is what you mean by the timetable?

A. Quite.

Q. Could we go back, Mr. President, so that I get the sequence right? Beginning, you suggest a four-power guarantee of whatever is agreed upon.

A. And the Security Council resolution.

Q. And the Security Council resolution. Then, secondly, free passage of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran tomorrow. For Israel.

A. If it is agreed upon.

Q. If it is agreed upon. Third, resolution of a formula for the refugees. And after that, and only after that, the question of free passage of Suez. But even if there is agreement at the end on borders and peace, diplomatic relations between U.A.R. and the state of Israel—never?

A. Never! Leave it to the coming generations to decide that. Not me!

Q. As I understand, you are a man of spirit. Can you look forward to the day when a sovereign state of Israel can take a place here within the Arab world and live in peace and with goodwill, to use the Christmas phrase?

A. This I can't say now, and no politician can answer this because, you know, everything is changing every day, and the maneuvers and the way Israel has chosen for herself in the area here is something that must be taken into consideration before answering this question. Since the early days of Israel and by Ben-Gurion himself, he said we must force peace on the Arabs, we must force so and so on the Arabs. All the policy of Israel is forcing so and so. They are taking this policy. How could we imagine them?

Q. You know one of the things that is really poisoning the mind of the people at home is that we cannot get up to facts. We are deluged by reports, for example, that the Soviet Union is not only engaging its men in defensive aerial action over central Egypt, but that she has her technicians manning the missiles—SAM-2's—SAM-3's in the canal zone.

A. This is wrong. What you are saying is completely wrong. No missiles. No Russian missile man is on the canal. This you can deny.

Q. This, you see, is useful, because this we've been told.

A. Perhaps they don't know that we have trained our people for eight months for the SAM-3's, and we have our men manning these missiles on the canal.

Q. There is another point of confusion and that is, that new land-to-land missiles have now been put into the battlefield.

A. As you hear this, I have here reports about land-to-land American missiles, and the name and specifications of it, and everything. This is from both sides. It is said from both sides.

Q. It would be so useful, if you could—clarify all this. The situation is bad enough the way it is; to

complicate it with false information is most unfortunate. There is another report that if we cannot agree by the 5th of February, "bang"—off goes the war again, and this time it's not going to be a war of attrition, but it will be a savage war on both sides, and even on the other side they say they have to prepare for Soviet air cover over the Sinai.

Sadat: Soviet air cover?

Reston: Soviet air cover:

Sadat: Over...?

Reston: Over the Sinai!

Sadat: The Sinai?

Reston: Yes, sir.

A. I must tell you this: There is a very great misunderstanding and exploitation of the Soviet aid to us, and I call it a vicious circle. When I hear—not I hear only—but I feel on the frontline the Phantoms, the American bombs, thousands of tons every day, for months, that even England or France, or half of Europe can't afford to pay for every day.

Half of the states of Europe can't afford to pay in such a way every day half a million dollars or a million dollars—bombs only! Leave all the other costs! But only half a million dollars or a million dollars daily in bombs; this England or France or half the state of Europe can't afford to pay. Well, when this is done, do you think I'm going to stand folded-arms? Or am I going to ask for the help from whatever source I can have—especially after these depth raids.

Q. Let me ask you about your priorities. Those people in your village. When I talked to President Nasser, I said that I felt a sense of sadness, because he came to power to make a revolution on behalf of his people, and he had spent most of the vigorous years of his life on this ghastly dispute. And the revolution, therefore, has had to take second place. Now I want to know your dreams. What are your priorities?

A. Well, you see, President Nasser, in 18 years and in spite of the battles, and I can relate the history to you before the revolution because we prepared for the revolution. And after the revolution up to this moment, day by

day: I can assure you we didn't have one day rest and because as I told you we were confronted by the facts and by the responsibilities and at the same time by the battles in the external field, because you know our revolution started while there were 85,000 Britishers here, in the Suez Canal area, armed to their teeth with everything, and behind them a very big base.

So as I told you from the early days we didn't have one day rest, but in spite of that, we have built more than 1,000 factories; we have built the High Dam, this is one of the biggest dams in the whole world. We have entered the era of change to socialism, giving our people equal chances.

Education is free now—sanitation—the standard of living—feudalism is ended—new land reclamations—All our schemes I should like that you have some time to see all this by your own eyes—in spite of all that happened in the 18 years—this year I am spending 300 million pounds—new projects—but, on the other hand, 560 millions for the army—560 millions.

If it was not for this war, I would have spent all this in the country for building.

You asked me about my priorities. My first priority is removing this aggression. This is my first priority.

Q. We are now at a critical point. I think these talks are either going to put us back into another period of sorrows or put us forward into some more stable and dependable order of the world, and I wondered whether you have been in touch with President Nixon, since you have been in office, or intend to be in touch with him before these talks start to see what can be done to ease these tensions and give the talks a chance?

A. As a principle, I welcome the idea. As a principle I welcome it. I have written to him just 10 days ago a letter, replying to a letter coming from him. I was told that maybe someone will be visiting here—we welcomed the idea, but there is a very important thing: there is a very important point of difference between us, and between our thinking.

In the States, and mainly the advisers of Mr. Nixon, they think that we have already lost the battle, and so, the attitude must be

that who lost the battle only, but we have not lost the war. If we can reach an agreement about this, it is very easy.

Then, in spite of that, I sent with President Yahya Khan [of Pakistan] a message to President Nixon telling him that: If the U.S. is willing for peace, and is not behind the expansion dream of Israel, mainly land—when I say expansion dream, it means land—this problem can be solved through Jarring in 24 hours. Again I sent the same message with King Hussein when he left.

And I told him to tell President Nixon that we are quite open and quite willing, but on the basis that we shall not surrender an inch of our land at all.

If we agree to this, I think everything can be done. But the difficulty is that recently, when I hear that Assistant Secretary of State Sisco tells some of my assistants there, that you must be ready for the negotiations and for concessions. What sort of concessions am I going to give again now? Israel may give concessions, because she has the lands she occupies, but what sort of concessions I'm going to give except land? I can't give one inch of land!

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Speech by Crown Prince and Prime Minister al-Sabah of Kuwait at the Closing Session of the National Assembly on His Country's Position Towards the Palestinian Resistance and the Conflict in Jordan (Excerpts)¹

Kuwait, December 30, 1970

We have declared our policy in this regard on more than one occasion, and you have accorded it your full support. This policy is to reject all solutions of the Palestine problem which do not satisfy the Palestinian people. This policy also involves our supporting

¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text in *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), December 31, 1970.

Palestinian armed struggle with all the means at our disposal.

You have also joined with the government in condemning the bloody clashes between brothers in Jordan which reached their climax last September, and are still recurring from time to time, in spite of the efforts made at the Conference of Kings and Presidents of Arab states in Cairo, and in spite of the decisions taken and the agreement reached at that Conference.... Committees are still continuing their efforts at mediation to

eliminate all causes of disagreement, and Kuwait, which has met its obligations, entered into at the Khartoum Conference, to provide aid to Jordan to enable it to hold out in its confrontation of the Israeli enemy, will be obliged to reconsider this aid if these deplorable clashes between the sons of a single country do not come to an end...and if the obligations arising from the Cairo and Amman Agreements are not respected.

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